U.S. ARMY COUNTERINSURGENCY FORCES

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CHAPTER 1
GENERAL

Section I. INTRODUCTION

1. Purpose and Scope
   a. This manual together with its classified supplement (FM 31–22A) provides information and guidance to commanders and staffs for the training and operational employment of units, teams, and individuals designated as U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Forces. It describes the organization, missions, and methods of employment of U.S. Army Special Action Forces (SAF), specially trained brigade-size backup forces, support units, and individuals who are deployed to advise, train and/or provide operational assistance to a host country’s counterinsurgency forces. It explains the relationship of U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Forces to MAAG’s/Missions and other elements of the U.S. Country Team engaged in supporting a host country’s counterinsurgency effort.
   b. This manual contains U.S. Army doctrine on the organization, operations, control, administration, and logistical support of U.S. Army counterinsurgency forces in all phases of insurgency. It should be used jointly with other doctrinal publications providing guidance, techniques and procedures for field operations.

2. Changes
   Users of this manual are encouraged to submit recommended changes or comments to improve the manual. Comments should be keyed to the specific page, paragraph, and line of the text in which the change is recommended. Reasons should be provided for each comment to insure understanding and complete evaluation. Comments should be forwarded directly to Commanding Officer, U.S. Army Combat Developments Command Special Warfare Agency, Fort Bragg, N.C.

Section II. U.S. POLICY AND DEFINITIONS

3. U.S. Policy
   a. Approved integrated interdepartmental policy guidance has been developed for the employment abroad of all relevant U.S. resources to prevent or defeat subversive insurgency. Included is a concept for the development of counterinsurgency plans and programs, and the functions and responsibilities of the major departments of the government and their overseas representatives. The chief of the diplomatic mission, as the head of the U.S. country team, is charged with the development of the Country Internal Defense Plan. The Department of the Army has formulated broad guidance for U.S. Army counterinsurgency elements as an extension of the interdepartmental concept.
   b. A major objective of U.S. policy is to thwart further communist inroads into non-communist areas by safeguarding and assisting the less developed nations in fulfilling their aspirations to remain free, and to fashion ways of life independent from communism or other totalitarian domination or control.
   c. The overall U.S. objective in the field of overseas internal defense is to encourage and assist vulnerable nations to develop balanced capabilities for the internal defense of their
societies. Psychologically, few of the developing nations are aware of the insidious nature of the threat posed by communist subversion, nor do they know how to cope with the blandishments and false hopes raised by communist propaganda. An adequate internal defense requires mobilization of national resources and their effective use through political, social, economic, military and psychological measures. Psychological operations can help to bridge the gap between the people and the government and can assist in mobilizing the human resources of the nation. The key aspect of the U.S. role in countering subversion and insurgency in these countries is assisting these peoples to help themselves. The major effort should be from the indigenous government because the problems in each area are local and unique to that society. These existing problems must be solved primarily by the local people and their governments. U.S. policy is to provide additional resources and capabilities to augment their own efforts in a constructive and acceptable manner in accordance with the local situation, with the credit for accomplished missions accruing in the fullest degree possible to the local government.

4. Definitions

a. Counterinsurgency. Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken by a government to defeat subversive insurgency.

b. Military Civic Action. The use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation and other areas contributing to economic and social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the indigenous military forces with the population.

c. Psychological Operations. This term includes psychological warfare, and, in addition, encompasses those political, military, economic, and ideological actions planned and conducted to create in neutral or friendly foreign groups the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior favorable to the achievement of national objectives.

d. U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Forces. Those forces which are comprised of Special Action Forces and other U.S. Army units, elements or personnel trained and designated for a counterinsurgency mission assignment. These forces are capable of operating in vulnerable areas, when invited by a host government, to provide training and military advice and operational assistance to indigenous military and paramilitary forces engaged in maintaining or restoring internal security and defeating subversive insurgency.

e. Levels of insurgency. See paragraph 8.

f. Country Team. See paragraph 16.

Section III. INSURGENCY — HISTORY, CAUSES AND PREVENTION

5. Examples of Insurgency Movements

a. Since World War II, insurgent movements of major dimensions have occurred in Greece, the Philippines, Malaya, Indo-China, (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia), Algeria, Cuba, Indonesia, China and several other countries. In many cases, these movements have involved hundreds of thousands of men on both sides in struggles lasting up to fifteen years. Insurgent activities of more limited extent and duration have occurred in many other areas. Some insurrections have resulted in the violent overthrow of existing governments. In some cases these new governments have been or become either communist or communist-dominated. Some historical insurgency movements are cited by cause and results as follows:

(1) National independence.

(a) Algeria is an example of a country which was seeking national independence. The Algerian war, or insurrection, was in progress for many years. Prior to the end of hostilities, the French committed a military force of approximately 400,000 troops in an effort to crush the insurrection. Although successful militarily, the French failed to suppress the insurrection for political reasons. Algeria under French
rule did not represent a truly colonial status; the desire for national independence was greatly influenced by French hegemony in Algerian political, economic and social systems. Efforts by the French to negotiate a settlement were found to be too little and too late. The rebels forced the French to grant Algeria political independence in 1962. The popular aspiration for national independence was achieved. It remains to be seen what course the new Algerian regime will take and whether it can provide for the social and economic needs of its people.

(b) The Indonesian revolt against the Dutch, between 1947 and 1949, was based primarily on the desire for national independence. The revolt succeeded with assistance from the communists.

(2) Relief from actual or alleged oppression.

(a) The initial success in 1951 and 1952 of the Huk (Communist) campaign in the Philippine Islands can be attributed in large measure to the oppressive measures taken by land owners against the tenant farmer and his family. Inequitable division of land and the disproportionate division of profits were grievances easily fanned into flames of discontent by Huk propaganda. The latter created many dissident elements and resulted in widespread support of the Huk movement. Under the leadership of Ramon Magsaysay, first as Defense Minister and later as President of the Republic, the government instituted positive military and civic improvement measures which it exploited skillfully by means of psychological operations to eliminate the communist inspired and controlled Huk rebellion. These measures produced outstanding results in winning the loyalty and support of the people to the government and democratic ideals. The campaign which defeated the Huks is considered a model, particularly in the area of civic improvements and psychological operations implemented by the government to overcome those grievances which led to much of the peasant discontent.

(b) The overthrow of the Batista government in Cuba by the Castro forces in 1959 was facilitated by the desire of many Cubans to obtain relief from the government's oppressive measures. Although most people in and outside Cuba believed insurgency to be a purely internal affair, it is apparent today that the communists played a major role in the final organization of the new government. The agrarian and other reform measures instituted by the Castro government were a means to the end but these have been offset in many cases by other more oppressive measures which have replaced those of the Batista regime.

(c) The Chinese Communists used "relief from oppression" as a basic theme to drive the Chinese Nationalists from the Asiatic mainland in 1949. The promise of agrarian reforms contributed greatly to the Communist success.

(3) Elimination of foreign exploitation. The resistance movement in Indo-China from 1946 to 1954 (Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos) is an example of the unified desires of major segments of the population to violently resist colonial exploitation. This was anti-colonialism in its truest form. All of Indo-China was characterized by an agrarian economy with low standards of living, high illiteracy, and low health standards. They were easily exploited by the forces of communism. Ho Chi Minh, a devoted Communist, with external support, launched an insurgency which culminated in the withdrawal of France from Indo-China. The insurgency continues in
those portions of Indo-China (Republic of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos) outside the Communist-led Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam).

(4) Desire for economic and social improvements. The historical examples of insurgency movements cited above have all been influenced by the desire for economic and social improvements. Additionally, it is a major factor frequently observed in coups d’etat or insurrections in Latin America. This desire is continually exploited by the communists with their propaganda.

(5) Elimination of corruption. This is another primary cause of insurgency. The movements in the Philippines and China offer good examples of large segments of the population supporting a communist-inspired insurrection in an attempt to eliminate graft and corruption in the existing government. In the case of the Philippines, positive action by the government prevented the insurgency from succeeding; the outcome in China is well known.

b. Not every insurgent movement has been communist-inspired, although many have provided opportunities for subsequent communist exploitation. Some insurgent movements, as in China, have been communist in origin and purpose from their inception. In Indo-China, a Communist Party led and dominated a popular movement to throw off colonial rule, while in Cuba a revolution to overthrow a repressive regime was betrayed and captured by communists. In a number of cases (e.g., Greece and the Republic of Vietnam) insurgency has been organized and instigated from a neighboring communist state. In such cases the insurgents have enjoyed the advantage of a secure base for training and logistical support, plus sanctuary from pursuit, on the communist side of the border.

6. Basic Causes and Motivation Factors of Insurgency

The following conditions are characteristic of many transitional societies and lend themselves to the development of insurgent movements:

a. Social.

(1) Conflicts in traditional social organizations and customs as a result of contact with other cultures.

(2) The expectation of radically improved living standards within a short period of time.

(3) Pressure of a dense and rapidly expanding population in an agrarian society.

(4) Divisive rifts in the population stemming from class, ethnic, religious, or linguistic differences.

(5) Aspirations of the underprivileged for improvement in their social status and opportunities for individual expression and individual satisfaction.

(6) Widespread illiteracy and an inadequate educational system.

(7) Indolent national character.

(8) The gap between the powerful urban elite and the unorganized and inarticulate majority of the peasants.

b. Political.

(1) Present or recent domination by a colonial power; inexperience of new indigenous leaders and administrators; inadequate civil service system.

(2) A government unresponsive to the aspirations of the people.

(3) Tyrannical, repressive, corrupt or inefficient leadership.

(4) Lack of communication between the government and the people.

(5) Lack of control by the government over rural areas and consequent breakdown of law and order.

(6) Unstable government.

(7) Frustrated and articulate segments of the intelligentsia which advocate radical solutions to speed modernization.

(8) A small but growing middle class, and extremes of right and left which oppose the struggle of the middle class for political and economic influence.

(9) The immaturity of the political process.
which does not permit the diffusion of power in the form of multiple interest groups and political parties.

(10) The unwillingness of the leading elite to tolerate responsible opposition, and the propensity for opposition groups for conspiracy and subversion.

c. Economic.
(1) Widespread poverty.
(2) Grossly inequitable distribution of wealth and income; concentration of wealth and economic power in one class or in a few individuals or families.
(3) Agricultural backwardness characterized by low capitalization, low level of agrarian techniques, poor transportation, incapability of weathering minor crises, land hunger and one-crop economics.
(4) A highly inequitable and inefficient system of land tenure tending to produce either vast landholdings or fragmented small holdings, combined with the lack of capital leading to usurious interest rates, chronic indebtedness and a penurious rural populace.
(5) A backward, unbalanced industry characterized by a small and inefficient indigenous sector specializing in light industry and a modern sector more often than not owned by foreign interests.
(6) Inexp, naive, ultranationalistic leaders who are incapable of developing a viable economy.
(7) A system of taxation and tax collection which is inequitable and which provides insufficient revenue for necessary government functions.
(8) Dependence on foreign capital assistance, and at the same time opposition to foreign private investment.
(9) Overdependence on export of raw materials or a single commodity.
(10) Large-scale unemployment, including an impatient segment of educated unemployed.
(11) An unstable currency.
(12) Lack of, or underdeveloped, natural resources.
(13) Inadequate transportation and communications systems.

d. Military.
(1) Estrangement of the military forces from the people.
(2) Failure to provide effective military and police forces.
(3) Organizations, equipment, and doctrine that are obsolete or inappropriate to the circumstances.
(4) An inadequate intelligence system.
(5) Military elements that are unresponsive to higher authority.
(6) Factionalism within the military forces.
(7) Absence of truly national loyalties in the military establishment.
(8) Lack of motivation.
(9) Lack of awareness of popular aspirations and attitudes.

e. Psychological.
(1) A newly awakened nationalism.
(2) Lack of national feeling or sense of national identity; persistence of local or tribal loyalties.
(3) Anticolonialism.
(4) A psychological gap between the government and the people; lack of knowledge and identification on the part of the people with the goals and objectives of the government.
(5) A widespread sense of injustice; lack of means of redressing individual injustices.
(6) Lack of faith in the government and in the social and economic system; lack of a dynamic ideology to oppose communism.
(7) Inability or ineptness on the part of the government in counteracting communist propaganda.
(8) Low national morale.
(9) Poorly motivated civil and military establishments.
(10) A crisis in personal and national identity; a sense of loss experienced as the
result of relinquishing old values and acquiring new ones.

(11) Diffused uncertainty and anxiety concerning personal and national future, causing alternately aggressive and apathetic behavior.

(12) The existence of a nation-wide behavior pattern inimical to economic growth and political maturation, such as taboos in innovation, authoritarian personality structure, caste systems and prejudices anchored in tradition and religion.

7. Communism and Insurgency Movements

The methods used by communist-dominated insurgency forces are designed to gain control of the people and to weaken the government and its forces. Insurgent leaders seek to gain popular support by identifying their objectives with the needs and aspirations of the people by persuasion and resort to immoral and illegal means including the use of terror and blackmail to enforce cooperation. They seek to weaken the government by propaganda discrediting its aims, its leaders, and its supporters; by eliminating key opposition personnel and demonstrating the government's inability to preserve law and order and protect its people; and by sabotaging the government's programs and the national economy. Their methods include subversion, infiltration of the government, sabotage and violence, including acts of destruction against public and private property, transportation, and communications systems; raids and ambushes against military and police installations, personnel, and equipment; terrorism by assassination, bombing, arson, armed robbery, kidnapping, torture, and mutilation; provocation of incidents; espionage, counterfeiting; and dissemination of propaganda and rumors.

8. Levels of Intensity of Insurgency

The types of military counterinsurgency measures to be employed and the degree of participation by U.S. forces will be largely determined by the level of intensity of insurgent activity. Levels of intensity may be portrayed in terms of three general phases:

a. Phase I, Latent and Incipient Subversion. This phase ranges from circumstances in which subversive activity is only a potential threat, latent or already incipient, to situations in which subversive incidents and activities occur with frequency in an organized pattern. It involves no major outbreak of violence or periods of uncontrollable insurgent activity. This phase, marked by organization, subversive activity, agitation, and propaganda is a period of preparation for the violent struggle to overthrow the government.

b. Phase II, Organized Guerrilla Warfare. This phase is reached when the subversive movement, having gained sufficient local or external support, initiates organized guerrilla warfare or related forms of violence against the established authority. Propaganda and other subversive activities are intensified.

c. Phase III, War of Movement. The situation moves from phase II to phase III when insurgency becomes primarily a war of movement between organized forces of the insurgents and those of the established authority. A rival insurgent government may be announced to seek recognition and belligerent status. All previous activities are intensified.

Section IV. FACTORS IN THE PREVENTION OF INSURGENCY

9. General

In less developed countries, the desires of the people for rapid modernization are frequently capitalized upon by insurgent elements. Generally, developing countries have just recently obtained political independence; some are just emerging into a new era of economic and social development. In the past, the problem of counterinsurgency has been viewed primarily, if not entirely, as an internal security problem of the nation concerned and one to be handled by military and police actions. Viewed as part of the larger problem of modernization, the prevention of subversive insurgency runs the gamut of measures for political, economic, social, and military development. Support of a modernization program by the conduct of military civic action is a major preventive measure.
10. Military Civic Action

a. Purpose. The purpose of the military civic action program is to use indigenous military resources for the benefit of civilian communities, such as assisting in health, welfare, and public works projects, improving living conditions, alleviating suffering, and improving the economic base of the country. In addition, such programs seek to gain the support, loyalty, and respect of the people for the armed forces and to emphasize the concept of freedom and worth of the individual. It is a concept and technique which as proven effective in reducing the threat of communist exploitation of real or imaginary grievances against a government. Civic actions are themselves psychological operations. They are undertaken to provide visible evidence of the government's interest in the welfare and betterment of the people. A positive military civic action program can help the government and its security forces gain the confidence and active cooperation of the population. However, in its implementation care must be exercised not to impair the military effectiveness of the units participating in military civic action projects, and to insure that military civic action projects do not duplicate but rather supplement the activities of other agencies. Military civic actions should be exploited by appropriate publicity, locally, regionally and nationally to create the image of progress.

b. Conduct of Military Civic Action. Both U.S. and indigenous forces may engage in the conduct of military civic action; however, the primary effort of U.S. individuals and units will be to advise, train or assist the indigenous forces. The objective of such advice, training, and assistance should be to increase the capabilities of the indigenous forces and reduce dependence on U.S. aid. U.S. and/or indigenous forces and/or their equipment will not be used in the conduct of military civic action if such use will interfere with, or be detrimental to, accomplishment of the military mission assigned them, or training therefor. Military forces should not be diverted from their primary mission. Likewise, military equipment should not be used in civic actions to such an extent that its usefulness for military purposes is degraded. Command and individual responsibilities described below are applicable to both U.S. and indigenous forces.

(1) Command. The direction, specific guidance, and control of military civic action is the responsibility of military commanders at all levels. The initiative and imagination of subordinate leaders should be exploited and encouraged. The fact that military civic action is often the result of a natural impulse of free men to help others less fortunate should be recognized and fostered. The guidance and control of an overall civic action program should allow for this natural impulse and encourage the native initiative and imagination of subordinates. The guidance provided should discriminate between the types of projects which a subordinate commander may undertake on his own initiative, and the types of projects which require additional funds, supplies, or equipment and which must be approved by higher headquarters. They are most effective when they fill a recognized local need and involve some participation of local citizens.

(2) Individual. Military civic action includes individual actions which cause the soldier to be regarded as a friend of the people, as well as their protector. Individual military civic action ranges from basic courtesy and discipline to participation in formal projects. In every case the fundamentals of correct conduct must be followed. For example, troops must be courteous to civilians at check points and road blocks, and still be prepared for action if required. A disproportionate amount of formal military civic action projects are required to overcome the harm caused by poor troop behavior. The failure to pay a fair price for goods, a recklessly driven vehicle, or a thoughtless or deliberate discourtesy, may be the act which will make villagers angry enough to refuse to cooperate or to withhold vital information. If, however, the troops have
established a good relationship with the people, have created a mutual feeling of respect and confidence, and have demonstrated a sincere desire to help the people, then their active cooperation and support may increase. In essence then, proper troop behavior supports the overall objectives of military civic action programs and psychological operations.

c. **Examples of Military Civic Action.** See appendix II.

**11. Psychological Operations**

a. Psychological operations are planned and employed by all units as an essential element of counterinsurgency operations. Objectives may include the following:

1. Divide and induce defection of the insurgents.
2. Reduce civilian support of guerrilla forces.
3. Dissuade civilians from resistance activities.
4. Win the support of uncommitted civilians.
5. Preserve and strengthen friendly civilian support.
6. Win approval for the presence of the military forces.
7. Development of unity or disunity as desired.

b. For purposes of conducting psychological operations, the population may be divided into three major target groups—
   1. Civil population.
   2. The insurgents.
   3. Indigenous armed forces.

c. Psychological tasks and themes are based on both the recognizable aspects of the friendly civil programs and the potentially divisive characteristics of hostile target audiences. Possible divisive factors are—

1. Political, social, economic, and ideological differences among elements of the resistance movement.
2. Leadership rivalries within the resistance movement.
3. Danger of betrayal.
4. Harsh living conditions of guerrilla forces.
5. Scarcity of arms supplies.

d. For more detail on psychological operations, see chapter 10 and FM 33–5.
CHAPTER 2
ROLES OF NONMILITARY AGENCIES AND OTHER SERVICES

Section 1. NATIONAL AGENCIES

12. General

The Military Assistance Program (MAP) to the country of interest in most cases will provide the basic requirements for support by U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Forces. The military assistance program is a part of the Country Internal Defense Plan.

13. Department of State (Diplomatic Mission)

At the country level the U.S. Ambassador or the principal United States Diplomatic Officer is the Chief of the Diplomatic Mission and of the Country Team. He is responsible for insuring that all U.S. military, economic and political assistance programs in the country to which he is accredited are fully integrated and coordinated. Although not in the line of military command, he works closely with the military commander of the U.S. unified or specified command to insure a full exchange of information. Coordination of all in-country U.S. effort is accomplished through the Country Team which normally consists of a senior member of each of the major U.S. government diplomatic, economic and military agencies located in the subject country. One of the primary responsibilities of this team is to develop a Country Internal Defense Plan to achieve approved U.S. objectives and to delineate the U.S. resources required for its accomplishment. The plan is submitted to Washington for consideration and approval by all departments and agencies concerned and becomes the basis for program proposals.

14. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)

The USAID Missions are the operational elements of the Agency for International Development (AID) deployed in foreign countries to provide economic assistance. Offices of this agency usually operate at and from the various population centers of the host country. The activities of the USAID Missions are closely coordinated with those of the U.S. Information Service (USIS) and the Chief of the MAAG or Mission, particularly in programming equipment necessary to develop indigenous psychological operations and information capabilities. The director of the in-country economic aid program is directly responsible to the Agency for International Development in Washington, D.C., but he is a member of the Country Team and his activities in the host country are coordinated by the Chief of the Diplomatic Mission. The USAID Mission in the host country is responsible for U.S. economic aid, including certain construction projects, agricultural improvement projects, and currency stability programs being instituted with U.S. aid. The AID mission is also responsible for training the national police and for developing indigenous police capabilities for countering insurgency and subversion. In this capacity they may require, and be provided, assistance from U.S. military police or other military personnel, especially when the police forces have paramilitary characteristics. The U.S. military assistance and advisory effort and the USAID effort should be closely coordinated and complement one another. During the development of operational objectives (for the entire counterinsurgency program) the activation, organization and training of indigenous paramilitary forces must be so planned as to support these objectives. Security aspects for U.S. Aid activities constitute a major requirement for these paramilitary forces. Divergent requirements must
be closely correlated. For example, when planning the construction of military roads, bridges, boat landing ramps and so forth, consideration should be given by the U.S. military advisors and USAID personnel to their functional design and construction so as to permit use by the civilian populace as well as the military. Coordination with USAID should be effected for the adequate care of refugees, aid to damaged villages, and provision for food supplies when shortages result from military operations. In each instance maximum use should be made of indigenous military and civilian leadership, with the U.S. representatives providing advice, assistance and support.

15. The U.S. Information Agency (USIA)

In foreign countries the U.S. Information Agency is known as the U.S. Information Service (USIS). The USIS office is concerned with the field of cultural, information, and educational exchange between the United States and the interested activities of the local government. The USIS director, known as the Public Affairs Office (PAO), is a member of the Country Team and like the USAID Missions, the USIS representatives usually operate at the various population centers of the host country, where they provide libraries, educational classes, language instruction, motion pictures, music and other cultural and informational facilities. However, USIS activities are not restricted to the population centers. Frequently their mobile teams equipped with record playing and motion picture equipment, accompanied by representatives from the local government, will visit rural areas to provide these services to farmers and tribesmen. When the military counterinsurgency teams are present within a country in which USIS is also operating, close continuous coordination of the efforts of each of these agencies must be maintained at all times. Uncoordinated duplication of effort must be avoided and combined operations should be used to the maximum feasible extent. When this is done the prospects for successful accomplishment of U.S. objectives will be materially increased.

16. Relationships with Nonmilitary Agencies

The primary requirement for successful operations is unity of action at all echelons of U.S. civilian and military representation within the host country. Through the Chief of the Diplomatic Mission and the Country Team, a clear understanding of the relationships between the military forces involved and other U.S. in-country agencies can be attained.

Section II. OTHER MILITARY SERVICES

17. The U.S. Air Force

The mission of the U.S. Air Force is to train, advise, and assist the air forces of the host country in consonance with the U.S. Military Assistance Program and to provide logistical and administrative air support to other U.S. and host country counterinsurgency forces. The U.S. Air Force element is a part of the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) and functions under the Chief of the MAAG in the same manner as other MAAG elements. The air support normally provided counterinsurgency forces includes, but is not limited to, cargo, troop and passenger airlift; aeromedical evacuation; airborne loudspeaker broadcasts and leaflet drops for psychological operations; visual and photographic reconnaissance; close air support and support of airmobile operations. Coordination for all air support is effected through appropriate joint staff elements of the MAAG.

18. The U.S. Navy

The U.S. Navy organizes, equips and provides Navy Forces for joint counterinsurgency operations and for support of the country counterinsurgency program. Due to the geographical locations of many of the countries of U.S. interest, the unified or specified commander may require that support services in the operational area be furnished from predominantly Navy sources. These services may vary from finance support for U.S. military troop payment to supervision of MAP construction projects. As required, the MAAG is provided Navy elements to train, assist and advise the naval forces of
the host country. Additionally, in the absence of indigenous navy forces, the U.S. Navy may furnish operational and training assistance to river and lake forces operating on inland waterways.

19. The U.S. Marine Corps

Marine Corps responsibilities parallel those outlined herein for Navy and Air Force forces. In addition, the USMC participates with the Army in the joint development of the doctrine, tactics, procedures, techniques and equipment employed by Army and Marine Corps ground forces in counterinsurgency operations and participates with the other services in joint developmental actions related to naval and air conduct or support of counterinsurgency operations. The Marine Corps develops language trained and area oriented USMC forces as necessary for employment in training or providing operational advice or support to indigenous security forces. U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations personnel may also be attached to U.S. Marine Corps units to perform their normal missions as an integral part of such units.
PART TWO
RESPONSIBILITIES AND ORGANIZATION
CHAPTER 3
U.S. AND INDIGENOUS COUNTERINSURGENCY FORCES

Section I. GENERAL

20. Purpose

This chapter delineates Army responsibilities and describes the organization and functions of elements of the U.S. Army for counterinsurgency operations. It includes an explanation of the relationships of U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Forces to MAAG's/Missions and other joint or unified commands and the indigenous forces being supported.

21. Army Organization

a. The counterinsurgency role assigned the U.S. Army by the Joint Chiefs of Staff includes the following:

(1) Organize, equip, and provide army forces for joint counterinsurgency operations and for support of country counterinsurgency programs.

(2) Develop, in coordination with the other services, the doctrine, tactics, procedures, techniques, and equipment employed by the Army and the Marine Corps ground forces in counterinsurgency operations. The Army shall have primary interest in the development of counterinsurgency doctrine, procedures, tactics, techniques, and equipment which are employed by the Army and the Marine Corps, but excluding related doctrines, tactics, techniques, and equipment as are employed primarily by landing forces, in amphibious operations for counterinsurgency purposes, for which the Marine Corps shall have primary interest.

(3) Develop language trained and area oriented United States Army forces as necessary for possible employment in training, or providing operational advice or operational support to indigenous security forces.

b. Structurally, the U.S. Army has three tiers of forces upon which the commanders of unified commands, the chiefs of MAAG's/Missions, or in some cases the army attaches, as appropriate, may draw to support or conduct counterinsurgency operations. In the majority of cases, the U.S. elements described below will be employed in an advisory/training role to indigenous forces.

(1) The first tier consists of U.S. Army Special Action Forces (SAF) developed by the Army to support commanders of unified commands. These forces, strategically located, can be provided with trained replacements from a Base Special Action Force in the Continental United States (CONUS).

(2) The second tier is composed of overseas general purpose TOE units, to include brigade-size backup forces consisting of infantry, armor, armored cavalry, artillery, engineer, psychological warfare, signal, civil affairs, intelligence, military police, aviation, Army Security Agency, medical, and essential support units, which have been designated as back-
up forces for the SAF's. Area-oriented, partially language and fully counterinsurgency trained, these backup forces provide mobile training teams and operational units of sizes and capabilities consistent with mission requirements. Generally, their elements are committed when the capabilities of the MAAG/Mission and/or the SAF are exceeded by the requirements of the country concerned.

(3) The third tier consists of CONUS-based U.S. Army forces, including the base SAF which serves as a rotational base for deployed elements. In consonance with contingency planning, area-oriented and counterinsurgency trained brigade-size backup forces are designated for employment in specific areas as required to assist in preventing or defeating insurgency. The third tier satisfies requirements that exceed those of the first and second tiers.

Section II. THE SPECIAL ACTION FORCE (SAF)

22. General

The SAF is a specially trained, area-oriented, partially language-qualified, ready force, available to the commander of a unified command for the support of cold, limited and general war operations. SAF organizations may vary in size and capabilities according to theater requirements.

23. Organization

A SAF consists of a special forces group and selected detachments, which may include civil affairs, psychological warfare, engineer, medical, intelligence, military police, and Army Security Agency detachments. Within the SAF, most of the capabilities of the army as a whole are represented on a small scale in a form specifically designed for counterinsurgency operations. Elements of the SAF are deployed as an advisory/training task force to a host country in accordance with requirements stated in the country internal defense plan or to meet the exigencies of an escalating insurgency situation.

24. Command/Control

The organization of the special forces (SF) group is provided with a flexible command and control system which facilitates administration, logistical support and, as required, operations of all elements in the SAF. The SF group headquarters, and the SF operational detachments B and C, each possessing a unit staff, plan and conduct operations as directed within their capabilities. The SAF is commanded by the SF group commander who in turn may be regarded by the commander of the unified command or army component command as his senior counterinsurgency specialist. The SAF augmentation elements, when employed in support of SAF activities, will be either in the SAF chain of command or directly under the MAAG. The establishment of a Special Forces Operational Base (SFOB) with its attendant communications center facilitates operational control of the widely dispersed subordinate elements of the SAF.

25. Characteristics of SAF

a. The SAF is specially trained and specifically available for special warfare missions including unconventional warfare, psychological and counterinsurgency operations. It is area-oriented and partially language trained.

b. It is maintained in a state of operational readiness.

c. Its members are prepared, from the standpoint of training and psychology, to work in remote areas with foreign personnel, including primitive groups, under conditions of relative hardship and danger.

d. It provides a pool of resources from which training assistance and operating teams and forces can be combined on a task force basis to meet the widely varying requirements of counterinsurgency operations.

e. It represents a regional repository of experience in counterinsurgency operations.

f. See FM 31–22A.
26. Backup Forces, Second and Third Tiers

Brigade-size backup forces are organized from selected overseas and CONUS divisions to provide area-oriented and partially language-trained mobile training teams, detachments, and operational units as backup for the SAF’s and/or MAAG’s (par. 21b(2) and (3)). The mission, training and organization of these forces generally parallel that of the SAF; however, since they are normally deployed following an escalation in the level of insurgency, more emphasis is placed on developing combat capabilities.

27. Brigade Organization, Capabilities

Within these forces are specially trained small infantry, artillery and armored cavalry mobile training teams, and engineer, psychological warfare, signal, civil affairs, intelligence, aviation, Army Security Agency, medical, military police, and other support units of varying sizes and capabilities. These teams and units may be deployed and assigned to a deployed SAF or MAAG or, under exceptional circumstances, the entire brigade may be deployed, when required. The elements of this force are capable of training, advising, and providing operational assistance to indigenous regular and paramilitary forces. The tailoring of this force as MTT’s is discussed in paragraphs 57 through 59. Training requirements for this force or elements thereof are outlined in paragraph 123.

28. General Purpose Units

In addition to the SAF and brigade-size backup forces discussed above, general purpose CONUS and theater army forces may be deployed to support the activities of the MAAG/Mission or specified command, in accordance with the requirements of country internal defense plans. Such requirements may include combat support and combat service support units and, under exceptional circumstances, combat units. These units are deployed to countries to support indigenous military and paramilitary forces or U.S. Army units in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations. The primary mission of such units is to provide operational assistance to indigenous forces in cases where the latter do not have the capability of providing their own.

Section IV. ORGANIZATION FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY

29. Organization

a. U.S. Army counterinsurgency forces may be organized within a country in support of requirements to provide maximum training, advice and assistance to the host country’s counterinsurgency effort. An entire SAF may be committed to one country. Usually, subordinate elements will be committed as task forces as required. Mission requirements and task force composition for a particular country or area may be based on an on-site survey conducted by SAF representatives. Following are examples of a variety of requirements that may result from surveys.

(1) In the early stages of phase I insurgency, SAF mobile training teams may be committed to a host country. These teams may be followed by other teams to perform specific missions. When SAF activities and strength within a country do not warrant an additional command and control organization, they may be assigned to the senior military representative within the host country.

(2) In the more advanced stages of insurgency a major part of a SAF may be committed. In such cases, a SAF headquarters may be established within the host country by either SAF headquarters personnel or by a B or C detachment of a special forces group. The senior military representative within the country will normally exercise operational control over such organizations.

(3) In other cases, it may be necessary for
all or most of the SAF to be committed to a country, or a region involving several countries, and be assigned to a JCS-established command. Such a command may include many U.S. Army general purpose units as well as support units from other U.S. military services. The commander may establish subordinate headquarters to control the activities of the SAF and other units.

b. In all cases outlined above, SAF commanders, staffs and individuals must be thoroughly familiar with the in-country U.S. and indigenous organizations to insure that maximum assistance in training, advice, and operational assistance is provided the indigenous military and paramilitary forces of the host country.

30. Organization of Host Country Military Forces

Although indigenous forces are not specifically organized along U.S. lines, the doctrine developed and tested by U.S. agencies may prove useful in many of the countries of the world. Chiefs of MAAG's/Missions or other commanders should encourage the military leaders of the host countries to adopt organizations similar to others which have proven effective in dealing with insurgency. However, political and sociological conditions in the country may have a considerable bearing on how the country is organized militarily to deal with insurgency. Also it may often be necessary to effect a compromise between those forces organized conventionally to deal with an external threat and the forces necessary to counter insurgency. With appropriate changes and additional training most conventional forces can perform both roles.

31. Indigenous Counterinsurgency Forces

Indigenous counterinsurgency forces are usually of two types, military and paramilitary, each tailored for its own role, yet both capable of being combined in a single task force. As discussed herein, military forces include all regular, conventional and specially trained units within the standing Army. Paramilitary forces include civil guards, self-defense units, civil defense groups and police. Police, generally classified under paramilitary forces, may be under the control of civil authorities.

a. Regular Forces. Regular forces, comprised of conventional and specially trained units, make up the largest contingent of readily available troops which can be moved at will throughout a country.

(1) Conventional units. Divisions, brigades, or regiments can be organized into a number of small, variable-sized task forces. These task forces are capable of semi-independend action without the combat support normally provided by a division. These forces engage in reconnaissance and combat patrols, or operate in larger formations tailored to strike rapidly in the area of operations. Regular forces are located to permit rapid reaction to guerrilla attacks or to conduct planned operations in coordination with other forces. See FM 31-16 for a recommended organization of brigade and smaller units. Regular forces also are frequently available and should always be considered in planning for and execution of military civic action projects. The extent that their work in military civic action is known to the people and the success thereof may well determine the degree of cooperation and amount of information received from the population for active counterinsurgency operations. Combat service support units, while not listed as security forces, are responsible for the security of their own installations and must be prepared to fight as infantry.

(2) Special units. These forces include ranger and airborne ready units and are especially useful when properly trained for the conduct of counter-guerrilla operations. Rangertype units normally operate within the military chain of command either as companies or in ranger task forces. Their form of combat is offensive in nature and is characterized by aggressive recon-
naissance patrols and security operations aimed at the destruction of guerrilla forces by raids and ambushes, long-range patrolling in remote areas and the disruption of guerrilla communications. They can provide the forces for intelligence and operational screening missions. These units should be employed in accordance with an overall, coordinated plan in a given area. Rangers, if assigned to one general area, obtain detailed knowledge of the terrain, population and insurgent habits. Units of particular usefulness are ready alert forces comprised of both parachute and helicopter-borne troops. Paratroopers with their troop carrying aircraft are located to meet established reaction time criteria for reaching planned objective areas in the shortest possible time. Operational control of these units is usually maintained at a higher level than that of helicopter-borne units. Parachute units provide troops to assault objective areas which are too distant for helicopter-borne or other forces. Both parachute and helicopter-borne units should maintain a portion of the force on an alert status in the vicinity of the aircraft. Aircraft and a proportionate number of crews are also maintained in a similar status.

b. Paramilitary Forces. These forces are comprised of civil guards, self-defense units, civil defense groups, and local, municipal and national police. Civil guards may be organized to provide security within the area of a political subdivision, i.e., a district or province, and normally are recruited from these areas. Civil guards may be organized into elements of platoon, company or battalion size and placed under the operational control of the sector commander. These units participate in counter-insurgency operations as required. In some countries these units may be under the direct control of the political head of the area. If this is the case, efforts must be made to coordinate their activities with those of regular military units. Self-defense units (SDU's) are organized for town, village, or hamlet security. These units usually remain within or in close proximity of the town, village or hamlet. Civil defense groups, like self-defense units, are local security forces. Police, which may be under the control of civil authorities, normally provide assistance in population control and in the maintenance of law and order. See chapter 11 for detailed discussion of paramilitary forces.

32. Area and Command Structure

A country may be organized into zones, area commands, sectors, districts and other military or political subdivisions to suit the conditions that prevail or to best use the resources of the country. These areas may correspond to the military force structure in the country, i.e., corps, division, brigade, or regiment, or to political subdivisions. They also may be classified according to the type of operations required. It can be expected, though, that areas classified in the latter manner will change constantly from one type to another. See appendix V.
CHAPTER 4
SPECIAL ACTION FORCE AND SAF BACKUP FORCES, ORGANIZATION AND CAPABILITIES

33. General

This chapter describes the missions, organization, capabilities, and concepts for the employment of the separate elements of the SAF and brigade-size backup forces. These forces are organized with the primary mission of providing training, advisory support and operational assistance to a host country's forces engaged in counterinsurgency operations. Therefore, the organizational structure is based on the mobile training team and detachment concept with each possessing skills which are needed to execute all the functions pertinent to a counterinsurgency mission assignment. The SAF is a provisional organization composed of elements organized under approved tables of organization and equipment. Similarly, the various elements and mobile training teams of the backup force are provisionally organized from resources within the parent organization.

34. Mission

The counterinsurgency mission of special forces is to provide training, operational advice and assistance to indigenous forces.

35. Airborne Special Forces Group

a. Organization. The special forces group consists of a headquarters and headquarters company, signal company, aviation company and four special forces companies (fig. 1).

b. Capabilities. At full strength the special forces group is capable of—

(1) Providing, for counterinsurgency operations, the organizational framework, including appropriate command and control, for a special action force and its component elements.

(2) Deploying its operational detachments and mobile training teams by land, sea or air when provided appropriate transportation.

(3) Establishing the nuclei of four special forces operational bases when required.

(4) Providing up to four (4) operational detachments C, twelve (12) operational detachments B and forty-eight (48) operational detachments A, each area-oriented, partially language-qualified and trained for a counterinsurgency mission assignment. However, when fully committed, another special forces group must provide a rotational base.

(5) Providing training and assistance to appropriate indigenous elements in guerrilla and counterguerrilla operations.

(6) Planning and executing appropriate aspects of civic action programs.

(7) Controlling, by long-range communications, the operations being conducted by its subordinate elements.

c. Employment. The special forces group is assigned to the U.S. Army Component command for operations under the operational control of the overseas unified command and is an operationally ready element of the theater army counterinsurgency force. Whether operating as a separate organization or as the major element of the SAF, and when appropriately augmented, the group trains its detachments and mobile training teams to meet theater requirements. Detachments and teams are committed as required in the host country; however, a task force capable of establishing an SFOB is committed when most of the capabilities of the SAF are required.
Figure 1. Airborne special forces group.
Figure 2. Headquarters and headquarters company, airborne special forces group.
36. Headquarters and Headquarters Company

a. Mission. To provide command and control, and administration, training, intelligence, and logistical support for assigned forces.

b. Organization. See figure 2. For the detailed organization, see FM 31–21 and current tables of organization and equipment.

c. Capabilities of the company for counter-insurgency operations.

(1) Provides staff and planning support for assigned special forces elements prior to deployment.
(2) Determines requirements for logistical support.
(3) When required, provides personnel and equipment to augment SAF Task Forces for establishment of an in-country SFOB.
(4) Supports administrative and training activities for the special forces group and attached units.

d. Group Commander and Staff. The commander of the special forces group commands and supervises the activities of the Special Action Force. In addition to the customary unit staff, the group headquarters includes the following special staff elements: group surgeon, signal officer, civil affairs officer, engineer, military police, psychological warfare officer, and chaplain. When the headquarters of the SAF is the superior in-country headquarters, a judge advocate should be included. The responsibilities and duties of the commander and principal staff officers are as detailed in FM 101–5 and FM 31–21.

37. Signal Company, Airborne Special Forces Group

a. Mission. To provide signal communications for the special forces group and its deployed operational detachments. Tasks to be performed include—

(1) Establish internal communications for a Special Forces Operational Base.
(2) Establish long-range communications for command and control of special forces operational elements.

(3) Termine landline and radio circuits from adjacent and higher headquarters.
(4) Provide third echelon maintenance of cryptographic equipment for the special forces group, and organizational and limited third echelon maintenance of all signal equipment less avionics and navigation, organic to the special forces group.

b. Organization. The signal company is comprised of a company headquarters, one base operations platoon, two base radio platoons and one mobile radio platoon (fig. 3).

c. Capabilities. At full strength, the signal company is capable of performing the following functions:

(1) Providing communications for a Special Forces Operational Base on a 24-hour basis, to include message center and cryptographic services, and telephone, teletypewriter and radio communications.
(2) Providing long-range communications between a Special Forces Operational Base and assigned special forces operational elements, and/or attached units.
(3) Providing limited ground messenger service.
(4) Providing personnel and equipment to the special forces group headquarters to operate a main SFOB and personnel and equipment to augment operational detachments C to concurrently provide four subordinate small operational bases (less landline teletype).
(5) Providing personnel and equipment augmentation to the operational detachments C to provide communications to include landline teletype, cryptographic and message center facilities for up to four separate operational bases.
(6) Providing mobile radio communications support for committed operational detachments B when required to effect operational control of subordinate elements.
Figure 3. Signal company, airborne special forces group.
38. Employment of Signal Company

The organization of the operational elements of the signal company provides a flexible means for supporting the SAF, SAF Task Forces when operating separately, and other subordinate elements as required. The two methods of employment described below exploit the full capabilities of the signal company.

a. SAF With Three Subordinate Task Forces.
The signal company can support four separate operational bases, each with landline teletype terminal facilities. This is accomplished by using one base radio platoon with the SAF headquarters, one base radio platoon with one operational detachment C, and one-half of the communication center section of the base operations platoon and one mobile radio team with each of the other two operational detachments C. Additional radio support can be provided for up to seven operational detachments B when the latter are employed to exercise operational control of subordinate elements.

b. Four Separate SAF Task Forces.
The signal company can be employed to support four operational detachments C when the latter are deployed to separate areas and each is required to establish an operational base. The employment of the signal company is the same as described above except that a base radio platoon supports an additional operational detachment C instead of the SAF headquarters. Landline teletype terminal facilities are available for all four bases.

39. Aviation Company, Airborne Special Forces Group

To support counterinsurgency, unconventional warfare, and psychological operations.

b. Organization.
See figure 4.

c. Capabilities.
At full strength this special warfare organization has the following capabilities:

1. Provide limited aerial fire support, to include escort of air serials, in counterguerrilla operations.
2. Provide tactical air movement of personnel, supplies, and equipment in counterinsurgency operations.
3. Provide air movement of personnel, supplies, and equipment in unconventional warfare operations within the capabilities of the aircraft.
4. Provide parachute and airlanded delivery, or ground or aerial pickup of personnel engaged in unconventional warfare operations within the capabilities of the aircraft.
5. Provide limited spot aerial photography.
6. Support psychological operations by provision of airborne loudspeakers or air drop or air landing of materiel, personnel, and equipment within the capabilities of the aircraft.
7. Provide training assistance and advice to indigenous forces in the conduct of air mobile operations.
8. Provide support to civic action programs in counterinsurgency operations.
9. Provide other aviation support such as reconnaissance and evacuation of casualties within the capabilities of the aircraft assigned or attached.
10. Organic third echelon aircraft maintenance including the repair and maintenance of avionics and navigation equipment.

40. Employment of Aviation Company

a. General.
This organization will be employed to support special warfare operations within the context of counterinsurgency, psychological, and unconventional warfare operations. While it is organic to an airborne special forces group, it may be attached to elements of a special action force, or placed in direct support of various elements.

1. Elements of the organization may be employed to support civic action; to transport indigenous personnel, supplies, and equipment, to provide air delivery of personnel and supplies, for evacuation of indigenous sick and wounded; for dissemination of propaganda; for any other support of the host country; for internal support of
Figure 4. Aviation company, airborne special forces group.
elements of a special action force; and for support of other U.S. civilian and military agencies.

(2) The organization can provide advice and training in appropriate aspects in the conduct of airmobile operations and can be employed for aerial reconnaissance and surveillance.

(3) Elements of this organization are employed to assist in dissemination of propaganda by airborne loudspeaker broadcasts, leaflet drops, airlift and air drop of psychological operations personnel and equipment, and support of civic actions designed to promote the objectives of the host country government.

b. Method of Operation.

(1) General. The aviation company, or elements thereof, will be deployed into a foreign country at the invitation of that country, either alone or with elements of a special forces group. Specific direction and missions will be received from the MAAG or another element of the U.S. Country Team to best support the host country's counterinsurgency operations and other operations in the fields of psychological and unconventional warfare. The unit may be further deployed within the country at one or more locations to best conduct operations.

(2) Company headquarters. The company headquarters plans for and controls operations of subordinate elements of the company; effects liaison with other U.S. elements in the country and with indigenous forces as required; provides the control and planning headquarters for miscellaneous aviation augmentation teams; directs the special training required by elements of the company; and provides the command element when other operational aviation elements are attached. It contains the normal mess and other administrative personnel less medical and personnel administration, required to support an organization, operating under conditions of little or no external support.

(3) Flight operations section. This section directs flight operations for the commander; makes available command and control aircraft, with additional radios, for close supervision and coordination operations requiring an airmobile operations command post; and establishes lighting and a navigational aid for the primary air facility.

(4) Communications section. This section furnishes the equipment and operators essential for communications between the company headquarters and higher and lower units, at distances of up to 150 miles. Personnel to repair the communications and electronic navigation equipment on aircraft of the organization are in this section. A photographic laboratory and necessary personnel are in this section to support a limited capability for aerial photography.

(5) Command and control platoon headquarters (fixed wing). The section headquarters team provides the control headquarters for the fixed wing teams of the company. However, to obtain maximum flexibility in tailoring elements for specific missions, the commander is trained to control and employ any aircraft elements of the company, together with other essential support attachments, for extended periods of time in areas distant from the company headquarters.

(6) Fixed wing utility team. Equipped with the U-10 aircraft, this team can operate from areas not normally accessible to other fixed wing aircraft in the Army inventory. It provides the company with an aircraft which can serve in a wide variety of roles, to include utility transport, observation, courier, evacuation of casualties, radio relay and psychological operations. The capabilities of the aircraft permit its employment in widely separated areas, by individual aircraft, or with other aircraft from the company.
(7) **Fixed wing transport team.** This team, equipped with cargo aircraft, is used as the primary means of furnishing logistic support to deployed elements of the company, special forces group, and other elements of a special action force. Its good cargo-carrying capability, together with the short takeoff and landing characteristics of the aircraft, make it ideal in furnishing airlift support between refined air facilities which can be used by Air Force-type aircraft and the smaller strips which can normally be used only by Army-type aircraft.

(8) **Command and control platoon headquarters (rotary wing).** This section headquarters has the same capabilities as the fixed wing command and control section headquarters. Normally, when the rotary wing reconnaissance and strike and transport teams are employed in airmobile operations, the team commander, together with the indigenous ground force commander, will be located together in a command control helicopter from the flight operations section.

(9) **Rotary wing reconnaissance and strike team.** This team provides additional aerial reconnaissance and surveillance means in support of indigenous forces. Its fire support capability, rockets and machine guns, is employed to support ground troops, to attack targets of opportunity and as escort for the transport helicopters.

(10) **Rotary wing transport teams.** These teams provide the principle means of reaching remote areas in carrying out all aspects of counterinsurgency and psychological operations. They transport personnel, supplies, materiel, and equipment of elements of the special action force. These teams provide the type of airlift most frequently lacking in developing countries where the company is most likely to be employed. They provide the essential means for mobility in counterguerrilla operations in scale with the small number of aircraft involved.

(11) **Maintenance and service platoon.** This platoon provides third echelon field maintenance, motor maintenance support, and POL and ammunition handling and storage. Elements from this platoon are attached to other elements of the company which are operating for extended periods of time at great distances from the main base of the company.

**41. Special Forces Company**

*a. Mission.* To provide command/control of operational detachments and mobile training teams and to plan for, advise, train, and assist indigenous forces in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations.

*b. Organization.* The special forces company consists of an administrative detachment, one operational detachment C, three operational detachments B, and twelve operational detachments A (fig. 5). This company was organized, as such, for garrison purposes, i.e., administration, mess, and training. Its flexible organization, however, with appropriate augmentation from components of the SAF facilitates its organization for counterinsurgency mission assignments. The special forces company commander is also the commander of the operational detachment C.

*c. Operational Detachment C.* This detachment is the senior operational unit of the special forces company. It is capable of—

(1) Participating in counterinsurgency operations with indigenous forces.

(2) Exercising operational control over subordinate detachments.

(3) Providing the nucleus for the establishment of a special forces operational base within a host country to support the activities of a MAAG/Mission or other U.S. military authority in support of the indigenous counterinsurgency effort.

(4) Providing training, operational advice and assistance in counterinsurgency operations to appropriate military and paramilitary forces of a host country.
Figure 5. Special forces company, airborne special forces group.
d. **Operational Detachment B.** This detachment is capable of—

1. Exercising operational control over assigned or attached operational detachments A and mobile training teams.
2. Providing training and operational advice and assistance to indigenous battalions, regiments or brigades.
3. Performing limited military civic actions.
4. Participating in counterinsurgency operations with indigenous forces.
5. Form mobile training teams as required within its capabilities.

e. **Operational Detachment A.** This detachment is capable of—

1. Training, advising and providing operational assistance to paramilitary forces, indigenous special forces and other military forces.
2. Form mobile training teams as required within capabilities.
3. Performing limited military civic actions.
4. Organizing, training, advising, and directing as required tribal, village and other remote area groups in counterinsurgency operations.

f. **Employment of the Special Forces Company.** The special forces company forms the nucleus for a SAF task force. The operational detachment C, in its dual role as an operating/control team, establishes an operational base within the host country when required, and conducts operations in accordance with provisions of the country team plan and supplementary directives of superior military headquarters. The base is located to facilitate operations and is in the vicinity of an air facility and support installations. The task force commander may employ operational detachments B to control and administer the activities of subordinate elements in a designated area of operations. However, separate detachments and mobile training teams may also be placed under the operational control of MAAG advisors when assigned missions within the latter’s area of responsibility. The latter course may be standard procedure when detachments and MTT’s are training, advising and assisting the country’s national army. Detachments and MTT’s engaged in organizing and training paramilitary forces in remote areas or training counterpart units may be in a chain of command established by the senior commander within the country. Their operations may be planned and supervised directly from the SFOB.

42. **Civil Affairs**

The civil affairs detachment of the SAF advises and assists indigenous forces in carrying out civil affairs functions. Where indigenous civil affairs organization, staff sections and units are in being, the task is simplified. If no civil affairs organization is present, the indigenous commander of the area must rely on forces available to him. In such a case, U.S. civil affairs elements should encourage the formation of a provisional indigenous staff organization. The Special Forces Group Civil Affairs staff officer assists in planning for the employment of the civil detachment.

43. **Civil Affairs Detachment**

a. **Mission.** The civil affairs detachment and its component elements participate and assist in military civic action by providing professional and technical assistance and advice to U.S. and indigenous military forces in the use of military skills and talents in ways which will strengthen the social, economic and political posture of the country.

b. **Organization.** The civil affairs detachment contains appropriate functional teams, and detachment and platoon headquarters drawn from TOE 41-500. The teams are selected and are expanded or reduced to meet the requirements of the mission and the characteristics of the area of operations. A type civil affairs detachment (fig. 6) may be organized to include a detachment headquarters, three platoon headquarters, two economic sections, two government sections, two public facilities sections, two special functions sections, and two language teams. The following skills are represented in this type detachment: economics, agriculture, public health and sanitation, public welfare, public education, labor, public works
Figure 6. Type civil affairs detachment, special action force.
and utilities, public communications, public transportation, and civil information. The detachment also may include the skills represented by veterinary, public administration and specialized medical personnel.

c. **Capabilities.** The civil affairs detachment is capable of—

1. Providing basic instruction, advice, guidance and assistance in civic action program of a host country.
2. Analyzing conditions to determine the basic causes of insurgency and recommend action to reduce or eliminate these causes.
3. Providing augmentation to an operational detachment C when the latter is deployed to a host country as the command element of a task force.
4. Providing mobile training teams to support the activities of SAF MTT's and MAAG advisory detachments.
5. Providing personnel with professional skills to assist MAAG or other U.S. military headquarters and agencies represented on the country team by organizing civil affairs operating staffs and units, and establishing training programs.
6. Providing assistance in the preparation of area studies and area surveys.
7. Providing instruction for other elements of the SAF in the conduct of military civic actions.

### 44. Employment of Civil Affairs Detachment

a. The civil affairs detachment, with its flexible organization, supports the mission of the Special Action Force. Its component platoons, sections, functional teams and individuals may be attached to elements of the SAF or to MAAG's/Mission, other U.S. headquarters or indigenous military forces in support of counterinsurgency programs. During the early stages of phase I, elements of the detachments may be deployed to a host country ahead of other components of the SAF. In such cases these civil affairs elements would be assigned to the MAAG/Mission or other U.S. component within the host country and operate at the national, provincial, and local level.

b. When a contingent of the SAF, such as a task force, is deployed, a civil affairs platoon with sections, teams and individuals may be attached as required. The civil affairs platoon may support the task force as follows:

1. Place civil affairs MMT's in support of operational detachments B to plan, coordinate and assist in the development and implementation of civic action programs at military area and provincial level. In implementing civic action programs these teams provide instruction and advice to both indigenous military and civilian leaders.

2. Provide technical assistance, advice and instruction for indigenous forces being trained by operational detachments A or other SAF MTT's which require support in civic action programs.

c. The civil affairs detachment operates under the command of the SAF except as noted above. Signal communications support is provided by the SAF, operational detachment C or MAAG/Mission, as appropriate.

d. The civil affairs detachment is provided administrative and logistic support by the SAF, operational detachment C or MAAG/Mission as appropriate.

### 45. Medical Service

In several counterinsurgency situations medical service has proven to be one of the most effective instruments available within the U.S. Army's resources for helping to gain the support of the civilian population. Civic action programs should include medical service clinics and MTT's which can provide training, advice, and operational assistance to indigenous military and paramilitary forces. They also provide emergency medical treatment and evacuation of civilians, assistance to civilian medical facilities, and assistance to aid-men in district and village dispensaries. The inclusion of the medical service detachment in the SAF provides, in part, a capability to carry out these functions. Its cellular organization facilitates tailoring for specific missions.
MEDICAL CONTROL TEAMS

MEDICAL SUPPORT TEAM (MTT)
(TOTAL OF 21 MOBILE TRAINING TEAMS)

Figure 7. Type medical service detachment, special action force.
46. Medical Service Detachment

a. Mission. To provide planning, training and operational assistance to indigenous military forces of a host country with particular emphasis on the latter's development of civic action projects. The detachment will provide, within its capabilities, unit level medical service for U.S. personnel.

b. Organization. The detachment contains appropriate functional teams drawn from TOE 8–500. A type detachment (fig. 7) might consist of three medical control teams (Team SA), and 21 medical support teams (Team SB) consisting of a chief medical specialist, a medical specialist and a preventive medicine specialist. The senior control officer commands the detachment when the SAF is deployed as an entity or in garrison prior to deployment. The number of medical support teams that can be controlled and supervised by a medical control team will vary according to the situation; however, control teams are allocated on the basis of 6 to 10 medical support teams deployed.

c. Capabilities. The detachment is capable of—

(1) Providing training, advice and operational assistance to indigenous military and paramilitary forces engaged in counterinsurgency operations.

(2) Establishing clinics to provide limited medical treatment to indigenous civilians as a part of the coordinated civic action program.

(3) Providing medical support to special forces operations in remote areas.

(4) Providing supervision, advice, and assistance in instituting preventive medicine programs to include public hygiene and insect and rodent control programs.

(5) Providing medical service in district or village dispensaries on a scheduled part time basis.

(6) Providing medical support, within its capabilities, to U.S. personnel.

(7) In furtherance of the above capabilities the detachment provides medical control teams and medical support teams to support a deployed SAF Task Force.

d. Employment of Medical Service Detachment.

(1) Organizational flexibility permits the detachment to provide medical control teams and medical support teams for support of elements of the SAF as required. Normally one medical control team and 6 to 10 medical teams will be attached to a special forces operational detachment C when the latter is deployed as the major unit of the SAF. These teams may be placed in support of operational detachments A and B. Medical teams may remain under the operational control of the operational base when required to work independently with indigenous medical units and civic action projects not involving special forces participation.

(2) Medical control and support teams may be placed under the operational control of MAAG advisory detachments operating with indigenous military forces.

(3) As required, medical control and support teams may be deployed separately to a host country and assigned to a MAAG/Mission or other U.S. military authority.

47. Military Engineers

Military engineers provide support in counterinsurgency operations in both a combat role and supporting civic action projects. U.S. Army engineers have adequate technical and managerial capacity for their cold war mission. Conversely, indigenous forces in the newly developing countries lack a sufficient number of trained engineers.

48. Engineer Detachment

a. Mission. The engineer detachment provides training, advice and assistance to indigenous engineer units, and to other forces engaged in counterinsurgency operations or performing civic action.
Figure 8. Type engineer detachment, special action force.
b. Organization. The engineer detachment contains appropriate functional teams drawn from TOE 5–500. A type engineer detachment (fig. 8) might consist of control teams (Team KA) and advisory teams (Team KB). The control team has a staff engineer, a public works-utilities officer, a construction inspector (NCO), a clerk-typist and a construction draftsman. The advisory team consists of a civil engineer and four engineer NCO's (construction inspector, equipment maintenance supervisor and an assistant, and a construction foreman). Engineer equipment organic to these teams includes survey levels, drafting and duplicating equipment and pioneer tool kits. The control team usually is allocated on a basis of one control team per four to nine advisory teams.

c. Capabilities. The engineer detachment is capable of—

(1) Providing training, advice, and limited operational assistance to indigenous engineer units and other military and paramilitary forces engaged in civic action projects such as construction of farm-to-market roads, bridges, village wells and sanitation developments; construction of schools, hospitals or other type public buildings.

(2) Providing assistance to indigenous engineer units in supporting their own troops in counterinsurgency operations.

(3) Supervising operations with indigenous engineer counterparts when required.

(4) Providing assistance and advice to U.S. military forces when committed in support of indigenous forces.

(5) Providing support to special forces operations in remote areas.

(6) Providing teams as required to a SAF task force when the latter is deployed to a host country.

d. Employment. The engineer detachment is under the command of the SAF commander prior to deployment or when the SAF is deployed as an entity. A normal method of employment is—

(1) One control team and three or more advisory teams with each task force when the latter is deployed to a host country. The mission of the teams are planned and controlled from the operational base.

(2) Advisory teams providing training, advice and assistance to indigenous engineer units or other forces may be placed under the operational control of a MAAG advisory detachment when the latter has primary responsibility within a given area or command.

(3) Under some circumstances, the engineer detachment or its elements may be deployed to a host country prior to other components of the SAF. In this case the detachment or its elements would be placed under command of the MAAG or other U.S. military authority.

(4) The engineer detachment or its elements will be provided administrative and logistical support by the special action force structure except when deployed as indicated in (3) above.

49. Military Police

Many aspects of counterinsurgency operations involve purely police actions. Police methods and techniques are applicable throughout all phases of insurgency. Police actions include riot control, area control, public relations, police information, physical security, and general investigation. The indigenous counterinsurgency force must obtain these capabilities within its organizational structure if it is to deal effectively with an insurgent movement. Many of the functions required in police operations can be performed by regular troops.

50. Military Police Detachment

a. Mission. To provide planning, training and operational assistance to both indigenous military and paramilitary forces in accordance with the countersubversion and the general military police program. The military police detachment also has the task of effecting necessary liaison with national and U.S. police agencies.
Figure 9. Type military police detachment, special action force.
b. Organization. The military police detachment contains appropriate functional teams drawn from TOE 19-500. A type detachment (fig. 9) might consist of a detachment headquarters and three mobile training teams. Each training team is organized with a team headquarters, riot control subteam, area control subteam, police public relations subteam, physical security subteam and a general investigation and police subjects subteam.

c. Capabilities. At full strength the military police detachment is capable of—

1. Command, control, staff planning, and supervision of operations of assigned or attached elements.

2. Staff planning, advice, and assistance to the special action force commander and indigenous military police on military police and related matters.

3. Performing the above mission in the following specific areas: area control, riot control, physical security, police public relations (to include civic actions), police information, and general investigation and police subjects.

4. Performing such other military police or related missions as may be directed or as may be inherent in or essential to the accomplishment of the overall special action force mission.

5. Providing support for up to three separately deployed special action force task forces.

6. Providing support, as required, to MAAG advisory detachments.

d. Employment. The military police detachment will be under the command of the special action force commander prior to deployment to an operational area or when the SAF is deployed as an entity. Additionally, the detachment may be employed as follows:

1. A military police mobile training team may be attached to an operational detachment C when the latter is deployed to a host country as the senior element of task force. In this connection, military police subteams may be assigned missions to train, advise or provide operational assistance to indigenous military police and regular forces or paramilitary police organizations in coordination with the USAID mission.

2. When military police subteams are supporting indigenous military police and regular forces in military police functions, techniques and employment, they may be attached to a MAAG advisory detachment for operational control.

3. Under certain circumstances, elements of the military police detachment may be deployed to a host country ahead of other elements of the SAF to support the activities of MAAG/Mission or other U.S. military authority.

4. Normally, the assignment of missions for the military police mobile training team and its subteams is effected at the operational base within a host country and will vary widely in the different phases of insurgency. This planning is closely coordinated by MAAG or other U.S. Army component staff to insure effective utilization of its training and advisory capabilities.

51. Military Intelligence

Military intelligence operations perform a vital role in counterinsurgency and must insure a thorough coverage of all aspects of combat intelligence, intelligence collection, and counterintelligence. Intelligence staff sections and units must be manned and supported by a sufficient number of trained specialists to maintain a constant impetus behind collection, processing, dissemination and planning. Experience indicates that intelligence operations against insurgency require a larger number of operational intelligence and counterintelligence personnel than are needed for normal combat operations. Successful intelligence operations depend on the proficiency and imagination of responsible officials, agents, agent handlers, patrol leaders and small unit commanders. Through training and application of principles learned, valuable intelligence assets can be developed in national and local civilian police organizations, and in military and paramilitary forces. Development of such sources of infor-
Figure 10. Type military intelligence detachment, special action force.
information can be enhanced through close coordination and cooperation with the military police detachment. The military intelligence detachment within the SAF contains the necessary skills to provide instruction, advice and operational assistance to indigenous military and paramilitary forces in developing a sound military intelligence capability. The detachment is also employed to provide intelligence training and support to other elements of the SAF.

52. Military Intelligence Detachment

a. Mission. The detachment provides planning, training, and operational assistance to indigenous military and paramilitary intelligence and counterintelligence organizations responsible for countersubversion and related intelligence activities in either latent, incipient or active counterinsurgency operations. It also has the mission of providing intelligence support for special forces operations, psychological operations and civic action programs.

b. Organization. A type military intelligence detachment (fig. 10) includes a headquarters, and order of battle, collection, counterintelligence, imagery interpretation, and interrogation teams.

c. Capabilities. The military intelligence detachment is capable of—

   (1) Providing training, advice and operational assistance to indigenous military and paramilitary intelligence organizations engaged in counterinsurgency operations.

   (2) Providing intelligence planning for the SAF and its subordinate elements.

   (3) Supporting special forces operations in remote areas.

   (4) Establishing and conducting intelligence schools for indigenous intelligence and counterintelligence agents.

   (5) Assisting indigenous military and paramilitary forces in the organization, training and planning employment of intelligence units.

   (6) Providing training for indigenous intelligence personnel and units in—

       basic theory of military intelligence; collection; processing information into intelligence; order of battle; military intelligence aspects of terrain, weather, and enemy; imagery interpretation; interrogation procedures; reporting procedures; counterintelligence and security; intelligence aspects of scouting and patrolling; and cover and deception.

d. Employment.

   (1) The military intelligence detachment can be utilized as an entity or it can be fragmented into several MTT's with the detachment headquarters remaining in support of the SAF.

   (2) The headquarters detachment remains in support of the SAF and assists in the higher level intelligence activities of the host country's military forces. MTT's, however, can directly support the MAAG/Mission by assisting major subordinate indigenous military or paramilitary forces, intelligence schools, or agencies. A special MTT having only collection and counterintelligence cells may be employed to support a special intelligence school or agency.

53. Psychological Operations

Military psychological operations in support of counterinsurgency involve the psychological operations detachment in training, advising, assisting and maintaining liaison with their indigenous counterparts. The task frequently will involve developing and understanding of the nature and employment of psychological operations among U.S. and indigenous military personnel and developing an indigenous organizational structure capable of performing the mission.

54. Psychological Operations Detachment

a. Mission. The detachment provides planning, liaison, training and operational assistance to the SAF and the indigenous military establishment in order to develop an integrated, coordinated psychological operations effort within the host country counterinsurgency program. It also provides support for civil affairs and USIS activities, and for U.S. forces when committed.
Figure 11. Type psychological operations detachment, special action force.
b. Organization. A type detachment (fig. 11) includes functional teams drawn from TOE's 33–500 and 33–600; and consists of elements for command and control, operations and liaison, and a number of control and operational cells suitable for mobile training team employment.

c. Capabilities. The detachment is capable of being formed into a number of variable-sized MTT’s. The basic organization provides for headquarters, liaison, mobile operations, and consolidation elements. The MTT’s are organized to fit the mission requirements. Mobile operations and consolidation elements may be mixed. The entire detachment is transportable in organic vehicles, although none are provided specifically for the three liaison officers. Some of the capabilities are to—

(1) Provide advisory support to elements of the SAF.

(2) Establish three basic psychological operations MTT’s that can advise, train and assist indigenous personnel in leaflet production, motion picture machine operation, and loudspeaker broadcast procedures. Each MTT has an audio-visual mobile unit.

(3) Establish one consolidation type MTT to provide advisory and supervisory type support for a newspaper printing plant, a fixed radio station, and an audio-visual mobile unit.

(4) Establish one MTT capable of organizing and training an indigenous psychological operations capability, to include staffs, units, a school, and provide advice and assistance in developing a psychological operations program, propaganda research and analysis, content, and production support for printed propaganda materials and audio operations.

d. Employment. The detachment may be fragmented into MTT's, establish and conduct a school, provide direct support for producing and printing leaflets, supervise printing plants and fixed radio stations, communicate with mass audiences by means of mobile sound and film teams, and provide assistance to appropriate elements of the indigenous armed forces. Elements of the psychological operations detachment may be placed under operational control of civil affairs teams. The detachment must receive administrative, mess, and supply support from higher headquarters.

55. USASA Special Operations Detachment (ABN)

See FM 31–22A.

56. USA Special Operational Detachment

See FM 31–22A.

57. Brigade-Size Backup Forces

In counterinsurgency operations, the infantry, mechanized infantry, armor, and airborne brigades may be employed as a subordinate element of the division or, with appropriate reinforcing combat, combat support, and combat service support units, as an independent or semindependent force or in an advisory training role. These brigades are area oriented and partially language qualified. A type brigade organization for combat is shown in figure 12. Within each brigade organization are specially trained units and mobile training teams which provide a provisional SAF backup force. The organizational structure of this provisional backup force, when augmented, closely parallels that of the SAF. The purpose of this section is to describe the organization and capabilities of a type provisional backup force which will be employed in an advisory and training role.

58. Command/Control Elements

a. General. Brigade-size backup forces are area oriented and designed to back up a particular SAF. These forces are committed to an operational area when the capabilities of the SAF or MAAG/Mission have been exceeded. Under certain circumstances, the entire provisional brigade backup force may be committed and operate in the same manner as a SAF task force. In most cases, however, the brigade will provide and deploy units and mobile training teams for attachment to the MAAG or to SAF elements operating within a host country.

b. Command/Control Elements.

(1) A provisional brigade headquarters detachment should be organized for
Figure 12. Type brigade-size backup force.
command, control, and planning for all subordinate elements when the brigade backup force is comprised of only mobile training teams and is committed as an entity in an advisory and training role. The provisional brigade headquarters detachment may be organized from the brigade headquarters and headquarters company. The detachment may consist of a provisional brigade headquarters, detachment headquarters, and aviation, communication, military police, supply and transportation, maintenance, and medical elements. Military intelligence, civil affairs, ASA, and psychological operations augmentation teams are provided for the provisional brigade headquarters detachment from resources available to the unified command or CONUS, as appropriate. The detachment provides the capability for establishing an operations base to support its activities when deployed to a host country. Personnel assigned or earmarked for the provisional brigade headquarters detachment will receive training in their duty assignments, and will be area oriented and partially language qualified as required. The personnel grade structure will be in accordance with the size of the provisional brigade organization as required by theater contingency plans.

(2) Provisional battalion command/control teams may be organized to exercise command, control and planning for attached mobile training teams and to provide training, advice, and operational assistance to indigenous counterinsurgency forces. A typical battalion command/control team consists of a commander, executive officer, unit staff, sergeant major, operations sergeant, intelligence sergeant, administrative supervisor, medical specialist, and radio operators. The team is capable of exercising command, control, and planning for a minimum of fifteen (15) MTT's. The

59. Backup Force Training Elements

a. Infantry Mobile Training Teams. The rifle company, infantry or airborne battalion, can organize four five-man infantry training teams. Each team may consist of one officer, an NCO assistant team leader, one machine gunner, one 81mm mortar specialist and one radio operator. The infantry MTT can provide training, advice and assistance in infantry tactics and the use of infantry weapons for indigenous small units up through battalion level. Training, advice and assistance emphasizes counterinsurgency/counterguerrilla operations. The team may be placed under the operational control of a MAAG advisory detachment as appropriate. The team can provide limited advice and assistance on military civic actions.

b. Artillery and 4.2 Inch Mortar Mobile Training Teams. The Arty/4.2 inch mortar MTT's are constituted from the heavy mortar platoon of the infantry battalion and the 105mm, field artillery battalion. These MTT's can be organized with an officer team leader, NCO assistant team leader, gunner, a 4.2 inch mortar sergeant, and radio operator. These teams are capable of providing training, advice, and operational assistance in the tactics and techniques of employment of light artillery and heavy mortars to indigenous artillery and heavy mortar units. The team can provide limited advice on military civic actions. They may be placed under the operational control of a MAAG advisory detachment when providing training for indigenous forces.

c. Armored Cavalry Mobile Training Teams. Each armored cavalry troop can provide the personnel for one armored cavalry MTT. Each team may consist of an officer team leader, NCO tank commander, gunner and a radio operator. The armored cavalry MTT provides training, advice and operational assistance to indigenous
troop-size units in the tactics and techniques of the employment of tanks and personnel carriers against guerrillas. Training and advice emphasize employment in both offensive and security roles. The team provides limited advice on military civic action projects. It may be placed under the operational control of a MAAG advisory detachment when employed in a host country.

d. Aviation Component. The aviation component, organized from the division aviation battalion, provides the provisional brigade backup force with necessary airlift to support its activities when deployed to a host country as an entity. The organization should include, as a minimum, one airlift section of the airborne company, one observation helicopter from the tactical support section of the general support aviation company, and mechanics. Sufficient equipment is provided to sustain a second echelon aircraft maintenance capability. The primary mission of the aviation component is to provide administrative and logistical support to the widely dispersed mobile training teams. On a limited basis, personnel, aircraft and equipment may be employed to provide training for indigenous units and to support psychological operations and civic action projects.

e. Engineer Component. The engineer company, airborne or infantry division engineer battalion, provides the capabilities required for support of a SAF or provisional brigade backup force. The company may be employed to provide training and operational assistance to indigenous military and paramilitary forces, and combat support to indigenous forces engaged in counterinsurgency operations. It can support civic action programs involving a construction effort. Details of the roles and missions of engineer units are contained in chapter 5. The company may be placed under the operational control of the MAAG or other U.S. military authority when deployed to a host country. When supporting the country’s civic action program, its efforts will be closely coordinated with the U.S. AID mission.

f. Military Police Component. A military police element from the MP company will be tailored to meet the requirements of the provisional backup force. With some special training, personnel of this element can be organized into MTT’s to provide training and advice to indigenous military, paramilitary police, and police organizations in riot control, area control, police public relations (to include civic action), police intelligence, physical security, general investigation, and police subjects. The military police element or its constituted MTT’s may be placed under the operational control of the MAAG/Mission or other U.S. authority when deployed to a host country.

g. Signal Component. The forward area signal center platoon, with minor personnel and equipment changes, can provide the necessary communication support required by the provisional brigade backup force elements operating in a host country. The installation section can be eliminated by adding two wiremen to the telephone section. The following specialists should be added to the platoon headquarters: one still photographer, one still photo lab specialist, one cryptographer, one general cryptographic repairman and two radio repairmen. Additional equipment required are a still camera set, laboratory darkroom, and one shop truck with sufficient maintenance equipment to provide second echelon and limited third echelon signal maintenance. The mission of the signal component is to support the provisional brigade backup force operational base and its signal activities in a host country. The platoon can provide, on a limited basis, training advice and operational assistance to indigenous military and paramilitary forces.

h. Augmentation Units. As required, overseas unified commands and USCONARC may provide military intelligence, civil affairs and psychological operations elements and the Chief, USASA may provide additional resources to augment the capabilities of the provisional brigade-size backup force. Skills required in these units are not available within the infantry or airborne division. Such units should have capabilities corresponding to like units in the SAF.
CHAPTER 5
COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT UNITS

60. General
Many countries which are subjected to insurgency must depend on the United States for military assistance in those areas of effort involving sophisticated technology. When training requirements impose an unacceptable lead time to attainment of operational status, it may be necessary to introduce selected U.S. Army units into the country to assist indigenous military forces in combat and combat support missions. Other factors permitting, indigenous personnel should be integrated into these combat and combat support units. This will not only hasten host-country self-sufficiency but will also help counter insurgent propaganda. Under exceptional circumstances U.S. Army combat units may be introduced into a host country to perform tactical missions. These are discussed in paragraphs 69 through 80. For the employment of chemicals, see FM 3–10.

61. Army Aviation
U.S. Army aviation units are deployed in support of counterinsurgency operations, when invited by a host country or to meet previously established military assistance requirements contained in the country internal defense plan. Aviation units have the capability to provide operational assistance to indigenous forces in counterinsurgency operations; to support the MAAG/Mission or the Army component of an established unified command; and to support Special Action Forces, brigade-size backup forces, and other U.S. Army units. An aviation company containing a mix of rotary and fixed-wing aircraft is organic to each special forces group (Abn). It provides command and control, and administrative and logistical support of the widely dispersed operational detachments and MTT’s. Some types of missions for Army aviation in counterinsurgency operations are—

a. Assisting and supervising indigenous forces in the organization, training and employment of similar units.

b. Furnishing tactical and nontactical air movement of personnel, supplies and equipment in counterinsurgency operations.

c. Providing reconnaissance, surveillance and airborne radio relay capabilities in counterinsurgency operational areas.

d. Providing supplemental aerial fire support in counterinsurgency operations.

e. Providing leaflet drop and airborne loudspeaker capabilities for civic action and psychological operations.

f. Aeromedical evacuation if augmented by medical attendants.

g. Providing command and control, and liaison aircraft.

h. Providing armed escort for airmobile and surface resupply and aeromedical evacuation.

i. Providing tactical air drop, air landing, and aerial pickup of personnel during infiltration or exfiltration operations.

62. Control of Army Aviation
U.S. aircraft used in support of indigenous forces are retained under the operational control of the senior U.S. officer involved in the operation. Appropriate request channels and procedures must be established to insure that aircraft are used on sound missions and the safety of aircraft and crews are not unnecessarily jeopardized without a commensurate tactical gain. These request procedures should insure that approval decisions are made expeditiously in order that the indigenous force can react rapidly to sudden guerrilla attacks.
63. Employment of Army Aviation

a. Support of Military Civic Action. Army aviation units deployed into developing countries may be used to support civic actions such as the transport of indigenous medical specialists and supplies, the airlift of emergency supplies to distressed areas, evacuation of indigenous sick or injured, transport of indigenous leaders and dissemination of information/propaganda material. All such actions will be in accordance with country-to-country agreements and policy directives published by the chief of MAAG.

b. Support of Psychological Operations.

(1) Army aviation supports psychological activities in counterinsurgency operations through positive deeds, propaganda dissemination, and transport of psychological operations personnel and equipment.

(2) Civic actions which may promote sympathetic support from the indigenous population are discussed in paragraph 10. These deeds can be exploited by the dissemination of information and propaganda through the several means available to psychological operations units.

(3) Propaganda dissemination support is accomplished by Army aviation through leaflet drop and airborne sound broadcast.

(4) Propaganda leaflet drops can be accomplished by means of hand dissemination, fuzed leaflet bombs and packages, and automatic leaflet dispensers. Factors to be considered in planning leaflet drop missions include the size of the target area, wind direction, optimum drop altitude, number of leaflets to be dropped, method to be used, and guerrilla air defense capabilities.

(5) Airborne loudspeakers can be used to broadcast propaganda and information to both friendly and insurgent targets. Aerial loudspeakers are especially effective against isolated targets of an illiterate population having no other available electronic communica-

tions. Additional missions may include warnings of severe storms, guerrilla attacks, and disease epidemics; and issuing directives in riot control operations.

(6) Psychological operations personnel, equipment and supplies may be transported by aircraft for parachute or air delivery to isolated areas which cannot be reached by surface routes or where fast transportation is required. Small printing devices, public address systems, audio-visual units or components thereof, radio sets, psychological operations expendable supplies, educational material, and training aids are some of the more important items of equipment and supplies which can be transported by aircraft.

c. Counterguerrilla Operations.

(1) General. Counterguerrilla operations are marked by requirements for the employment of small highly mobile task forces. Movement will frequently be over difficult terrain which may restrict or preclude the employment of supporting ground weapons. Aviation support can effect a superior mobility differential.

(2) Flexibility of Employment. The combination of airmobile infantry squads with helicopter mounted armament results in a versatile and relatively powerful combat force. The radius of operation of such a force employed against a small and relatively isolated enemy force far exceeds that of an earthbound force of similar size. Aircraft teams may be used to provide airlift for parachute and air delivery of friendly forces and/or aerial supply, thereby eliminating or reducing dependence upon ground lines of communications. The prompt reinforcement by air of engaged ground elements will provide added flexibility and the ability to concentrate the necessary force at the decisive time and place.

(3) Attack and Pursuit Role of Aviation. Army aviation may support opera-
tions to entrap and destroy guerrilla forces and to deny support to those forces. The fleeting targets presented by guerrilla forces dictate that a high volume of saturating area fire from armed helicopters be directed in minimum time and before the guerrillas disperse. Continuous pressure through pursuit can be maintained by the use of helicopter-borne troops.

(4) Command, Liaison, Courier, and Communications. Commanders of indigenous counterguerrilla forces use fixed or rotary wing aircraft to observe operations in progress and be in a position to move rapidly to critical points to personally influence the action. Such aircraft are also used by commanders and staff officers to effect liaison visits between widely separate counterguerrilla forces and echelons of command. Army aviation may provide air courier service to effect a rapid and relatively safe means of circulating tactical and administrative information and thus relieve or complement electrical signal communications traffic. Communication is effected by radio for air-to-ground, air-to-air and air relay traffic and through message drop and pickup between ground units and headquarters in special situations.

(5) Reconnaissance and Surveillance. Army aviation provides the indigenous counterguerrilla force a means of reconnoitering large and distant areas which are difficult to reconnoiter by ground elements because of area size and/or location. Weather and terrain are major considerations in the selection of aerial reconnaissance tasks. Aerial reconnaissance is accomplished in conjunction with actions of and information from ground patrols or other units. The guerrilla obtains many advantages through knowledge of country, well concealed hideouts and his ability to blend into the population. When availability of light fixed-wing aircraft permits, continuous surveillance missions should be flown. These missions accomplish the following:

(a) They restrict guerrilla daylight movement to the more difficult areas with dense vegetation.
(b) They increase the pilots and observers knowledge of the operational area enabling them to notice changes which might have a tactical significance.
(c) They become so commonplace that reconnaissance flights for airmobile operations do not warn the enemy of impending action.
(d) They can locate and report all suitable landing and drop zones so that the information is readily available in fast moving situations such as reaction force employment and emergency medical evacuation.
(e) They can discourage or detect ambushes where road or rail nets exist.
(f) They can provide emergency radio relay stations.
(g) They have a favorable psychological effect on both guerrillas and uncommitted civilians who constantly see them as an example of superiority in equipment.
(h) They can provide border or coastal surveillance to detect the movement of large scale support.

(6) Aerial Photography. Aircraft may be equipped with aerial cameras to provide rapid and timely photographic coverage of suspected areas. This coverage should include daylight and night photography.

(7) Direction Finding. Under certain circumstances, aircraft may be equipped with a direction finding capability to supplement ground-based units in the detection and location of insurgent forces.

(8) Aerial Fire Support. Various army aircraft may be armed with such weapons as machine guns and rocket launchers. Armed helicopters, employed in reconnaissance and search
missions, attack targets of opportunity and provide suppressive fires in support of counterguerrilla forces. Such fires are directed through voice radio, smoke, panels, arm and hand signals or other prearranged signals. When counterguerrilla forces are deployed within guerrilla small arms range, suppressive fires are provided from lead or supporting helicopters prior to and during landing and withdrawal of troops.

(9) Airmobile Support.

(a) In newly developing areas air transportation may be the only suitable means for rapid movement. This transportation includes the movement of forces, such as reaction or reserve forces, to execute counterguerrilla operations, the movement of reinforcements and the shifting and relocation of these forces as required to improve the relative force ratio in favor of the counterguerrilla force.

(b) To obtain maximum advantage from the use of transport aircraft, designated counterguerrilla forces with their organic equipment must be in close proximity to departure sites. Selected troop units and supporting air crews must be on an alert status. When possible, rotary wing aircraft should be so located that the operational flight time to the most likely areas of employment is no greater than 20 minutes.

(c) Helicopter assault operations are conducted in mass with emphasis on mobility, surprise and speed. Tactical surprise is achieved through delivery of assault forces immediately adjacent to a known or suspected guerrilla force. Trained shock troops are committed in the initial assault wave. Control of helicopter assault operations are best effected by the force commander from an airborne command post. Helicopter formations and landing procedures are determined by the conditions encountered, such as terrain, weather, guerrilla dispositions and avenues of escape. Standing operating procedures should be prepared for helicopter assault operations. Once the operation is under way, particularly after the initial assault wave has been committed, schedules should be adhered to as closely as possible. Helicopters must be rapidly evacuated, and disembarked troops must immediately gain contact or pursue the guerrillas. A small element should cover planned subsequent landings of troops or supplies in conjunction with aerial fire support.

(d) Fixed wing aircraft can support counterguerrilla operations in those areas not suited for air landings or when the radius of action is not within the capability of helicopters. Such operations may be conducted where guerrillas have succeeded in establishing firm control over a large land area and penetration is desired. Parachutists may be dropped with appropriate tools to clear areas for subsequent personnel and supply deliveries by helicopter.

(10) Aeromedical Evacuation. Under those circumstances where airborne assault operations are required, the most practical means of evacuating sick and wounded will be by air. Additionally, the possession of this capability will improve the morale of committed troops. Medical and aviation personnel are trained to assist in loading and unloading casualties.

64. Logistical Support Requirements

Army aviation units deployed to an operational area are supported through both MAAG and indigenous support resources. Aviation maintenance and service units are deployed to operational areas in accordance with requirements and augmented with indigenous labor to the extent possible. POL and repair parts are supplied through unit distribution to the maximum extent practicable.
65. Engineer Support

The Corps of Engineers has wide experience in both civil and military engineering. The Corps of Engineers has performed construction work related to the development of emerging nations; it has gathered a storehouse of practicable experience in the area of foreign assistance through construction. The construction of public works has a beneficial effect on the population and its attitude toward the established government. Such facilities as roads, railroads, airports and waterways not only provide valuable mobility for the military forces, but also help the general economic growth. The purpose of this section is to describe how engineer units can exploit their capabilities.

66. U.S. Army Engineer Organization

A wide variety of engineer units are available within the U.S. Army structure. These units are organized and possess a wide range of capabilities to provide training and operational assistance to a host country's indigenous military forces and other agencies in support of a counterinsurgency effort (FM 5-1). Engineer units considered most suitable for deployment to support counterinsurgency operations are described below.

a. Engineer Combat Battalion. The battalion is organized with a headquarters and headquarters company and three engineer combat companies. Capabilities which are especially applicable in supporting a host country's counterinsurgency operations are—

(1) Engineer reconnaissance and intelligence.

(2) Construction, repair, and maintenance of roads, fords, culverts, fixed or floating bridges, landing strips, command posts, supply installations, shelters, and defensive installations.

(3) Preparation and removal of obstacles, including minefields.

(4) Installation and operation of field water supply facilities.

b. Engineer Construction Battalion. The battalion is organized with a headquarters and headquarters company, engineer equipment and maintenance company, and three engineer construction companies. Among its capabilities which make this unit especially suitable for support of a host country's civic improvement program are—

(1) Construction or rehabilitation of routes of communication, bridges, and forward tactical and forward cargo airfields and heliports.

(2) Construction of buildings, structures and related facilities.

(3) Construction of pipelines and storage tanks.

(4) Construction and rehabilitation of railroads, ports, depots, hospitals and utilities.

(5) Limited bituminous paving.

(6) Producing potable water.

c. Division Engineer Battalions or Companies. These units may, if deployed as part of a task force, be employed within their capabilities to support a host country's civic improvement program when not engaged in tactical operations. The capabilities correspond with those of the combat engineer battalion and companies.

d. Engineer Topographic Company, Corps. The company organization includes a company headquarters, survey platoon, photo mapping platoon and a reproduction platoon. It is capable of—

(1) Preparation of sketches, drawings, maps and map substitutes.

(2) Reproduction of existing maps, and other intelligence material.

(3) Distribution of maps and similar materials.

(4) Accomplishment of surveys as required for topographic mapping and to furnish geodetic control for the use of the field artillery.

e. Engineer Base Survey Company. The company organization includes a company headquarters, operations section, aircraft section and three survey platoons. It is capable of—

(1) Providing organic topographic surveying.

(2) Performing geodetic survey of second and third order precision, including
leveling and establishment of base lines.

(3) Performing topographic surveys using conventional field methods.

(4) Providing necessary control data for compilation of new or the revision of existing topographic maps by stereophotogrammetric methods.

f. Other Units. Other engineer units which may be used to support projects established in a country internal defense plan are dump truck companies, port construction companies, pipeline equipment companies, forestry companies, light equipment companies, construction support companies, and a number of TOE 5–500 teams such as firefighting, equipment operating, construction, utilities and electrical power, topographic and intelligence teams and dredge crews.

67. Employment of U.S. Army Engineers

a. General. Engineer advisors, teams or units may be required to support counterinsurgency operations in a host country during all levels of intensity of subversive insurgency. It is necessary that engineer support be closely coordinated with other U.S. agencies to insure efficient programming. Coordination and free exchange of ideas with the local civil authorities is of equal importance. Whenever possible, projects should be set up as joint enterprises between indigenous military and civil forces. Engineer units may be deployed separately to a host country for the accomplishment of specific projects or with a counterinsurgency task force. In many situations, engineer functions will involve pioneer tasks accomplished with local materials and limited equipment. Improvisation and the use of field expedients will be the rule rather than the exception. To fulfill his combat role the engineer must be thoroughly familiar with the tactics and methods of the insurgent force and with the methods used by a counterinsurgency force.

b. Engineer Combat Role. In those areas of a country where the level of insurgency has escalated and the defeat of the insurgents requires major military action, engineer units or advisory teams may be employed to—

(1) Provide technical service support and/or combat support to indigenous forces engaged in combat.

(2) Provide advice and training to counterpart forces, in order that these forces may take over combat support missions.

(3) Provide operational assistance to indigenous paramilitary forces with emphasis on the development of field fortifications for secure villages and communications centers.

(4) Construct and repair major roads, bridges, landing strips and helipads in forward or remote areas, railroads and waterways, and operate ferries when these projects contribute directly to the combat effort of indigenous forces.

(5) Advise, assist, and train indigenous military and paramilitary forces in neutralizing guerrilla mines and booby traps, clear vegetation and destroy facilities useful to guerrillas.

c. Engineer Contribution to Civic Improvement. The following list is considered representative of engineer tasks:

(1) Construction of simple irrigation and drainage systems.

(2) Reclamation of land by clearing and draining swamps.

(3) Grading operations.

(4) Forestry activities such as planting, thinning, and harvesting.

(5) Setting up and operating saw mills.

(6) Devising and constructing flood controls.

(7) Assessment and development of acceptable sand and gravel resources for road work and general construction.

(8) Construction of housing and other buildings.

(9) Construction, repair, or improvement of roads, bridges, railway equipment, and airfields.

(10) Improvement of sanitary conditions.

(11) Devising acceptable methods of disposing of human waste when this waste is not used for fertilizer.
Providing safe water supply systems.

Providing technical training to indigenous military personnel which will be useful to them upon their return to a civilian status.

Preparation of necessary maps and charts as required for planning: road, railroad, and airfield projects; irrigation and land development; political subdivisions and geographical features; and land use.

Construction, repair, and operation of utility systems.

68. Engineer Counterinsurgency Techniques

The discussion of the following techniques may be beneficial to engineering personnel.

a. Field Fortifications. Defenses around fixed installations such as supply points, and secure villages and communications centers will be required. Field construction as provided for in FM 5–15 is generally applicable to counterinsurgency operations, but the protection needed will be more from direct fire and infiltration rather than from the blast caused by large explosives. This will minimize the requirement for overhead construction and wide dispersion. Subject to local conditions, consideration should be given to interconnecting trench type fortifications around small field installations. Local materials can be used for revetments to reduce the requirement for sand bags or other items. Areas for observation and fields of fire should be cleared. The use of impenetrable brush and nuisance items such as sharpened stakes around a position may be effective. Improvised booby traps, man traps, camouflage pits and snare-type traps can be used as warning devices for local security or in areas frequented by guerrillas. Extreme caution must be used to prevent local inhabitants from being injured by these devices. Construction of watch towers and moats at fortified areas may prove valuable.

b. Roads, Railways and Airfields. The construction of good transportation facilities not only assists in combatting the guerrilla, but also helps the economy of the country. Heavy reliance must be placed on local labor and materials. Since unusual soil conditions may prevail, the use of expedient type road surfaces such as bamboo mats, planks, corduroy, and log tread roads should be explored, but other more permanent type surfacing should be used whenever possible. Surfacing will normally consist of natural or processed materials such as crushed rock, coral, caliche and tuff; or stabilized soil surface. Soil cement can be used as a wearing course for roads and other hardstands. If proper types of mixing machinery are available, such hardstands are simple and easy to construct and do not require excessive amounts of cement. It can also be used for lining ditches and canals for bank stabilization. In the construction of helicopter landing areas in rugged terrain it may be necessary to construct elevated or raised platforms.

c. Bridges, Ferries and Rafts.

(1) Bridges may be constructed of steel, concrete, lumber or logs, or even rope. Depending on the time and materials available, bridges may vary from a permanent multilane bridge to the very crude expedient type (TM 5–258). Construction equipment may be in very limited supply, and maximum use must be made of hand labor and such techniques as gin poles, tripods, shears, boom derricks, cable runs and expedient pile drivers.

(2) Expedient ferry systems include flying ferries using cable and bicycle traveler, hand operated ferries, and river ferries using dugouts and bamboo outriggers.

(3) Raft construction will often be of locally available materials, and improvised. These include a framework covered with canvas, a brush raft, wrapping vehicles with tarpaulins, bamboo rafts, and a combination of dugout canoes.

d. Building Construction. Construction of office buildings, barracks, mess halls, community buildings and homes for relocated families or displaced persons may be required. The construction should be simple, durable, economical and easy to maintain. Standard plans may have to be modified to meet local conditions. Often it will be necessary and advisable to fabricate or manufacture the needed construction materials. Some examples are——
(1) Making of brick from local clays (TM 5–742).

(2) Making of concrete block (TM 5–742).

(3) Operating saw mills, blacksmith shops and rock quarries (TM 5–342, TM 5–728, TM 5–332).

(4) Engineers must be prepared to build facilities similar to native construction (straw roofs, bamboo framework, adobe siding) and to construct without such essentials as steel nails. Drift pins, mortise and tenon, dove tail joints, proper rigging techniques, and the use of fasteners or other materials can substitute for these devices.

(5) The decision to utilize permanent or temporary construction must be approached with judgment and a conservative attitude. Permanent construction must not be indulged in to meet a short-term mobilization capacity when operational plans indicate that requirements for such capacity will pass within the life of temporary construction.

f. Area Damage Control Operations. To minimize danger and to expedite recovery operations, engineers help organize area damage control teams to engage in recovery operations after natural or other disaster. Further, engineers can train paramilitary forces to include SDU's in fire fighting, fire prevention, and other repair and rehabilitation work in the event of natural disaster.

g. Assistance to Agriculture. Engineers can provide valuable assistance to local farmers. A few examples are soil erosion control by means of check dams and terracing; maximum utilization of available forest resources by proper selection, grading, classifying and controlled cutting; mechanization of the grain grinding process; movement of water for irrigation purposes; and clearing of land and building of homes to open up new areas for farming.

h. Power Production. In most undeveloped areas, work is almost exclusively done by hand labor. Engineers can introduce such power production by harnessing devices as the windmill, the water wheel and the gasoline, steam or diesel engines. The production and limited distribution of electrical power might also be explored.

i. Construction, Planning and Management. In planning work, the engineer must take proper cognizance of the skills, prejudices and customs of the local work force. He must also know the amount, type and condition of equipment available for the project. In order to plan construction projects special experience factors must be compiled and then adjusted to meet varying conditions. The less developed countries are characterized by limited resources and
operate on severely restricted budgets; available money must be stretched to the utmost. This requires the best in engineering, planning and management.

69. U.S. Army Artillery

U.S. Army Artillery units may be required to provide tactical support to indigenous forces. Normally the commitment of these artillery units will not occur until the intensity level of insurgency has reached phase III. The role of artillery in counterinsurgency operations, its advantages and limitations, techniques of employment and various types of artillery fire, and some special capabilities which artillery units possess for performing civic action programs are explained in paragraphs 70 through 74. Additionally, the information accumulated in the succeeding paragraphs can be used in the advice and assistance to indigenous artillery units.

70. Role of Artillery

a. The role of artillery in support of counterinsurgency operations is not materially different from its role in conventional warfare; however, the tactics and employment of artillery must be modified to meet the specialized requirements of these operations.

b. In counterinsurgency operations, artillery fire support will be of great value. Plans must be coordinated and executed in such a manner that the resulting artillery fires will not cause ill effects or perhaps alienate the population and cause them to support the insurgents.

c. The psychological impact of artillery in support of counterguerrilla operations will probably be out of proportion to the damage that the fire has actually accomplished. Constant harassing fires directed against guerrilla safe havens may cause the guerrillas to keep moving and thus induce serious morale problems. Timely and accurate artillery fire delivered on a guerrilla force is a two-prong morale factor; it is both devastating to the guerrilla and reassuring to the counterguerrilla.

d. Artillery units contain personnel with specialized skills developed through artillery training. In addition, artillery units contain various types of specialized equipment which might profitably be applied in civic action programs. Imagination must be given free play, however, to cope with nontraditional situations. Some of the artillery skills and equipment available to aid in counterinsurgency are discussed in this section.

71. Advantages and Limitations

a. The advantages gained through the use of artillery fire in counterinsurgency are essentially the same as in conventional situations but with the added advantage of possibly a greater psychological impact on the enemy forces (guerrillas). Some of these advantages are as follows:

(1) All-weather and all terrain capability.
(2) Continuous operations.
(3) Flexibility.
(4) Surprise.
(5) Accuracy and mass.
(6) Psychological impact.
(7) Show of force.

b. The limitations in the use of artillery fire in counterinsurgency operations are essentially the same as in conventional situations. Some of the more pronounced limitations are—

(1) Difficulties in identification of the guerrilla.
(2) Difficulties in observation of artillery fire.
(3) Difficulties in the movement of artillery weapons.
(4) Lack of survey control.
(5) Restrictions placed on the use of artillery fire.

72. Employment

In addition to the basic principles used when employing artillery under conventional conditions, the following will generally apply when supporting counterinsurgency operations.

a. The necessity for movement of artillery weapons by air, boat, pack-mule, and often perhaps by hand-tow.

b. Observation of artillery fire in difficult terrain will often require the employment of aerial observers.
c. Survey data, in the form of trig lists and benchmarks, will in most cases be nonexistent or unusable. The observed firing chart, and when time is available, the high burst registration will become the norm.

d. Fire planning must be extensive in order to have preplanned concentrations on call to neutralize, block and canalize fleeting targets.

73. Fire Support

In addition to the normal fire support plans, certain fires peculiar to operations against guerrilla forces must be planned. These plans are innovations or variations of fire plans used in conventional artillery support. Among these are—

a. Flushing. These fires are prepared to support counterguerrilla operations by "flushing" the guerrilla into an ambush. They are employed in rough and difficult terrain and in vegetation near paths, roads, and streams that are used as routes of communication.

b. Harassing Fire. These fires are planned to deny use of communication routes, selected areas and terrain features, and to disrupt guerrilla operations. These fires may also be used in conjunction with ground operations in the area. The amount of such fire must be well controlled to prevent wasting ammunition.

c. Neutralization Fire. Artillery may be used for the destruction of guerrilla bases or camps.

d. Blocking or Barrier Fires. These fires are planned to support infantry operations by denying guerrillas ingress or egress in the area of operations, preventing escape, and denying reinforcements. These fires may be especially effective where the movement of guerrillas is canalized by waterways or jungle trails.

e. Illuminating Fires. The illumination fire plan is made to assist friendly troops by exposing guerrilla activity and deterring infiltration. It is particularly effective in support of night ambush operations, and it may be used to orient friendly patrols.

f. Reconnaissance by Fire. Reconnaissance by fire is conducted to obtain target locations. It is accomplished by firing on suspected target areas in order to produce reactions from the guerrilla force. Because artillery fire may expose guerrilla installations by destroying natural cover and camouflage, aerial photographs should be taken before and after the preparation is fired. Aerial observation should be increased greatly during the firing in order to detect and report guerrilla activity. The possibilities and the opportunities to employ reconnaissances by fire in a counterinsurgency situation are extremely limited. The indiscriminate mixture of friendly populace and hostile insurgents preclude any large scale use of this tactic. Indigenous artillery units should be capable of employing this technique, however, since there are occasional "free zones" in which reconnaissances by fire can be practiced indiscriminately.

g. Preparatory Fires. Artillery preparatory fires may be planned to—

(1) Suppress guerrilla activity in objective areas of air assaults or landings.

(2) Achieve surprise and create confusion in the raiding or assault of guerrilla bases.

h. Aid to Navigation. A preplanned air burst on specified coordinates will often enable patrol leaders to definitely locate themselves in difficult terrain.

74. Skills and Equipment Useful in Civic Action Programs

a. Communications. The very complete communications facility which is organic to most U.S. artillery units may be used to augment or provide communications systems for civil use in remote areas.

(1) Wire. Artillery units can furnish telephone line construction personnel, switchboard operators, and telephone operators, with necessary equipment, and installation and repair capabilities to augment the civilian facilities, particularly within the perimeters of secured areas.

(2) Radio and Radio Teletype. Technicians are available who are capable of installing, operating, repairing, and supervising these communications media.

b. Survey. The unit survey crew, with some additional training, can provide invaluable as-
sistance in aiding civic actions by laying out unsophisticated roadways, bridges, building sites, airstrips, and other installations.

c. Transportation. Transportation available in most artillery units can be of great assistance to the local government and the populace.

d. Motor Maintenance. Although the number of mechanics within an artillery unit is limited, some instruction and supervision can be offered to indigenous personnel.

e. Electronics Maintenance. After a short transition period, maintenance personnel can be used as radio mechanics and repairmen to aid the local populace.

f. Administration. Administrative assistance can be provided local governments from organic sources. Although this capability is limited, instructors and supervisors can be supplied in this field.

75. Army Armor and Armored Cavalry

The circumstances under which U.S. Army Armor and Armored Cavalry units may be committed to support indigenous forces are the same as for artillery units discussed in paragraph 69. The assumption is that the commitment of these types of units will not normally occur until the intensity level of insurgency has reached phase III. For additional guidance on the employment of armor/armored cavalry units, see FM 31-16.

76. Armor in Limited Field Offensive Operations

The types of offensive actions in which armored units may participate successfully are—raid, pursuit, ambush, and counterattack. With the exception of ambush, these operations involve the movement of forces which must have greater mobility, fire power, and staying power than the insurgents. Additionally, armored units may support infantry attacks against insurgents. This role may become the more common during the latter phases of insurgency.

a. Raid. The most important characteristics of a raid are secrecy and speed. Raiding elements must be able to move rapidly to an objective area, and attack simultaneously before the target disappears. Armored cavalry platoons and air cavalry elements are especially suitable to this type operation. Ground armored cavalry is limited to objective areas that can be approached by vehicles. Armored units are capable of moving at high speed and attacking promptly. They can carry sufficient riflemen to root out hidden insurgents and have sufficient fire power to overcome any of the usual targets. Armored personnel carriers should habitually overrun the objective area so as to gain maximum shock action. This technique should be applied vigorously until such time as insurgent forces gain a repressive anti-tank capability.

b. Pursuit. In every possible instance, fleeing insurgents should be relentlessly pursued, pinned down, and killed or captured. Since dispersing guerrillas usually use preplanned routes of withdrawal, or if pressed, simply scatter to rally later at a predesignated point, any pursuit must be undertaken immediately both on the ground and in the air. Infantrymen are necessary to conduct the ground pursuit. Armored personnel carriers possess a distinct capability for ground pursuit in high grass, small brush and any terrain the vehicle is capable of negotiating. The speed, armored protection, fire power and elevated position of an observer in the vehicle hatches make this a particularly effective technique when flushing insurgents from positions.

c. Ambush. Indigenous infantry are best suited for this mission since they are not limited by terrain conditions. Air cavalry and dismounted armored cavalry troops are also well organized and equipped for this type action. Since insurgent tactics consistently call for withdrawal into areas relatively inaccessible to vehicles, the successful employment of mounted armored cavalry units in an ambush role is doubtful. Air cavalry units may be employed to establish impromptu ambushes to cut off withdrawing insurgents.

d. Counterattack. To be effective, the counterattacking force must be able to move swiftly into the battle area and assault the insurgents in the face of a large volume of automatic weapons fire. They must close with the enemy to destroy or disperse them. If the insurgents withdraw, they are relentlessly pursued. Armor protection and great numbers of automatic and large bore weapons are useful in assaulting an
enemy and overcoming his heavy automatic fire. A mobile, indirect fire support capability should be available to the counterattacking force. All the required characteristics for a successful counterattack force are available in an augmented armored cavalry squadron.

e. Support of Infantry Operations. The employment of infantry in counterinsurgency operations may take place in terrain not suitable for vehicles. The infantry can move into forests, jungles, and mountains to search out and destroy the insurgents. The infantry will execute these types of operations by constant deep patrolling, raids and ambushes. There will be instances, however, when infantry will be fighting in open terrain, especially during phase III conditions when large insurgency forces take to the field in force to engage government troops. At such times, armor/armed cavalry elements can play a decisive role by providing armor support to the infantry. During phase III, the insurgents can be expected to have antitank weapons, such as rocket launchers and recoilless rifles. Generally their anti-tank capability will be limited and their troops vulnerable to armored attack. Armored cavalry can be employed as a maneuvering element, provide direct and indirect fire support, or provide other support that will assist the infantry to complete its mission.

77. Armor Operations in Developed Areas

The types of developed areas are villages, towns and cities. Villages usually consist of poorly fabricated huts clustered in a disorderly arrangement convenient to the local industry. In many countries, houses provide no cover for weapons crews, but are often used for concealment of insurgent supply caches, especially for food and ammunition. In some areas, there may be permanent structures in towns and cities, such as factories, major stores, warehouses, temples, schools, and government facilities. Combat against insurgents in these highly developed areas will be conducted in the same manner as against hostile troops. In the attack of rural villages consisting of the bamboo and thatched hut construction, armored vehicles can operate in the same manner as outlined in paragraph 76b. In the absence of an enemy antitank capability the inherent shock action can be exploited to the fullest by aggressively overrun and destroying the objective area.

a. Armored vehicles are employed to move through and control streets, destroy barricades and reduce strong points. To prevent insurgent snipers from killing crew members who man automatic weapons, and to keep insurgents from throwing grenades into open hatches, it is desirable to have armored vehicles which can button up and still employ machineguns. This applies to scout vehicles and armored personnel carriers, as well as tanks. Armored vehicles are especially effective in riot control.

b. Air cavalry can play an important role in developed areas. Armed helicopters can hover or patrol over the area, observing, reporting, and interdicting any movements of insurgents across rooftops or in streets hidden from view of the friendly troops. Helicopters can attack insurgents hidden on rooftops, and can easily maneuver behind barricades or weapons positions to place machineguns or rocket fire on them. If necessary to reduce a strongpoint, the air cavalry troop can land riflemen on rooftops to attack downward into a building or to secure a better vantage point for covering fire.

c. In addition to its suitability for combat in cities, the armored cavalry squadron can also subdue and disperse rioting mobs, provide mobile communications for police, and protect key government and industrial facilities.

78. Security Force

One of the first steps in counterinsurgency operations is to convince and show the people that the established government will protect them. The government must take positive action to insure that insurgents cannot enter populated areas at will to assassinate officials, terrorize the people, and appropriate whatever supplies they need. It is necessary, therefore, to outpost villages with small, powerful elements which can be promptly reinforced by highly mobile forces from adjacent troop bases. An armored cavalry platoon reinforced with indigenous infantry would be useful in this role. The vehicles are effective in moving quickly under fire to different parts of the village as required. The village defense is undertaken in the same way as the organization of a strong
point, explained in FM 17–36. To place an armored cavalry platoon in all villages, however, would require far more units than are normally available. Even a massive program of resettling the populace in secure village complexes may be insufficient, and leave a large number of villages undefended. Once a village is apparently progovernment, has organized a self-defense system, and has participated in some actions against the insurgents, it can be outposted by an indigenous infantry element or left with only its own self-defense forces and thus relieve armored vehicles for other missions. Armored cavalry units may remain in major towns, however, to free troops for a more active counterinsurgency mission.

79. Security of Routes of Communication

This mission involves keeping the roads, trails, and waterways open for traffic. Securing land routes requires constant reconnaissance and surveillance to discover and eliminate mines, roadblocks, and ambushes. It is mandatory that units performing route security have a high probability of surviving ambushes. They must be able to destroy or disperse ambushing elements and inflict casualties on the insurgents with minimum casualties to themselves. Since ambushes are frequently conducted by insurgents, continuous employment of properly equipped armored cavalry units can be an effective instrument in the defeat of the insurgents. Actions are similar to standard route reconnaissance and passage through defile techniques described in FM 17–36, and follow the tactics specified for meeting engagements. See appendix IV for details on transportation security.

80. Reconnaissance and Surveillance

a. Reconnaissance, other than route reconnaissance discussed in paragraph 79, will be conducted primarily by aerial and dismounted elements. Finding specific insurgent bases or camps will be extremely difficult because of the lack of adequate intelligence. In pinpointing suspected insurgency forces, reconnaissance should be made by aircraft since speed is essential. Air cavalry aircraft and crews are well suited for this type mission. To avoid operational intentions, reconnaissance aircraft should not hover over or appear to show unusual interest in any particular area. Periodic flights over suspected areas will accustom the insurgents to such reconnaissance and tend to make them less cautious when a specific objective is searched. This will also permit continuous photographic coverage for comparative checks.

b. Dismounted armored cavalry elements usually conduct zone reconnaissance and often patrol selected areas. This area reconnaissance mission has a three-fold purpose—it permits the troops to become thoroughly familiar with the trails, cul-de-sacs, and habitations in the local terrain; it threatens the insurgents with the loss of supply caches and hidden cultivated food plots; and it forces the insurgents to keep constantly on the move or to stay dispersed. Caution must govern the scheduling, size and routes of such patrols, however, since they are vulnerable to ambush.
CHAPTER 6
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT UNITS

81. General

This chapter covers those combat service support units which may be required in a host country to support U.S. and indigenous counter-insurgency forces. Concurrently with planning for the employment of a SAF in a disturbed country, planning for the provision of adequate and effective combat service support also must be accomplished. Normally the size of a U.S. force in a disturbed country is small, and logistical systems are tailored from all in-country participating services. The system may frequently parallel a U.S. Army post, camp, and station arrangement in the CONUS, even though the troops are widely dispersed. It may be more practical, for example, to establish a commissary rather than a class I supply point or depot. It may be necessary under some conditions for the U.S. Army to provide and operate part or all of the combat service support for indigenous forces which have had insufficient time to organize and train their own units. The types and numbers of combat service support units required for support of U.S. forces in a host country will depend on the number of troops supported and the type units to which these troops are assigned. If the U.S. troop strength reaches a high figure, or indigenous support requirements are extensive, consideration may be given to introducing a logistical command to command, control, plan and operate the combat service support organization. It is normal practice to provide military medical service support for U.S. personnel deployed overseas. In addition, appropriate supply support and some form of maintenance support will be needed. Certain ancillary support activities such as post exchange, postal, finance, and chaplain services should be considered. There also may be a requirement for judge advocate support.

82. Medical Service

a. General. Medical service units are described fully in FM 8-5. Units which are considered especially suitable for support of U.S. and indigenous military forces engaged in counterinsurgency operations are briefly described below. All of these units can make vital contributions to civic action programs. All medical service units should utilize indigenous personnel to the maximum extent possible, providing them on-the-job training, classes, and assignment to positions of responsibility commensurate with their training and capabilities.

b. Medical and General Dispensaries (TOE 8-500). The mission of medical and general dispensaries is to provide outpatient service for units or personnel stationed in areas not provided with their own unit dispensaries. Support capabilities: Team MA—2,000 to 5,000 population, Team MB—5,000 to 10,000 population, and Team MC—1,500 to 3,000 population. Because of the wide dispersion of U.S. units and personnel in a host country it may be necessary to employ a greater number of these teams than would be required normally. However, this will permit a much greater participation in medical civic action. Each of the teams is commanded by an officer of the medical corps and each can perform dental, surgical, internal medicine and pharmacy functions. Team MA also has an EENT section; Team MB has an EENT section and also a laboratory section. Team MC has 10 beds available for overnight care and observation.

c. Medical Detachment (Team OA). The primary mission of the detachment is to provide dispensary service for troops not otherwise provided unit medical service. It is capable of providing service for approximately 1,000 troops.
d. Dental Operating Detachment (Team KI). The detachment is capable of providing emergency dental treatment and a limited scope of routine dental care to 1,000 troops in isolated areas.

e. Helicopter Ambulance Medical Detachment (Team RA). The principal mission of this unit is to furnish organization or field medical evacuation service by air for patients requiring immediate and definitive medical treatment and services. The detachment may be attached to one of the major medical service installations for operational control. However, the low density of troops, great distances involved, unusual and difficult terrain, and inadequacy of road nets, may dictate that some of the five helicopters be dispersed to support local dispensaries or other established evacuation systems. Added to these factors which may require unusual methods of employment is the very austere medical service support provided in a host country.

f. Field Hospital (TOE 8–510). The field hospital is designed to provide a single hospital facility of 400-bed capacity, or 3 separate, independently operating, hospitalization units of 100 beds each. This flexibility in organization permits commitment of one or more of its 100-bed units to meet requirements as they occur. The hospital is capable of providing station hospital type support on an area basis and operating a specialized treatment facility when augmented by professional service teams. Included in its responsibilities are provisions for medical-surgical care and treatment for patients normally requiring a limited period of hospitalization and preparing patients for further evacuation. Each of the separate 100-bed hospitalization units can provide support for troop concentrations of up to 4,000. In computing requirements consideration should be given to the allocation of a number of beds for emergency treatment of indigenous civilians.

g. Station Hospital, Communications Zone (TOE 8–563–8–567). There are five types of station hospitals: 100-, 200-, 300-, 500-, and 750-bed. These units may be increased in multiples of 20 beds. The organization of each includes three major components—the hospital headquarters, an administrative complement and a professional complement. Each station hospital unit is staffed and equipped to provide medical and surgical treatment of all types of cases; however, it prepares patients for evacuation who cannot be returned to duty within prescribed limitations.

h. Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (TOE 8–571). Units of this type may be required to support U.S. or indigenous forces if the level of intensity of insurgency reaches phase III.

i. Evacuation Hospital, Semimobile (TOE 8–581). The primary mission of the evacuation hospital is to provide hospitalization for all classes of patients within the combat zone and to prepare patients for further evacuation as necessary. The normal basis for allocation is one per U.S. division in a limited or general war situation. It may be advantageous to employ a unit of this type for treatment and evacuation of U.S. troops when other permanent facilities are available within the theater to treat cases beyond its capability and it would not be feasible to establish adequate treatment facilities within the host country.

j. Medical supply, optical, and equipment maintenance detachments are also provided by TOE 8–500. A Veterinary Food Inspection Detachment Team JA (TOE 8–500) may be required.

83. Medical Service for the Indigenous Population

In coordination with the U.S. AID mission and appropriate agencies of the host country, U.S. Army medical service units and personnel should provide support and assistance to the maximum extent possible to the indigenous population. Probably in no other area of military civic action can so much good will be gained. In consonance with the availability of indigenous personnel, all U.S. Army medical service units, facilities, and personnel should be encouraged to utilize and train indigenous personnel to the limit of their abilities. In connection with medical training, English language training should be given to facilitate learning. Other medical services which may be provided are—

a. The establishment of outpatient clinics, operated by indigenous personnel, with scheduled visits by a U.S. Army medical officer.

b. Medical supplies.
c. The use of aircraft for evacuation of emergency cases, especially those resulting from insurgency action.

d. Advice and assistance on sanitation.

e. Emergency dental service.

84. Military Police Services

a. General. Military police units, having the capability of providing training, advice, and assistance to indigenous forces, and complementing MAAG/Mission or U.S. Army forces, are deployed as a part of the forces in counterinsurgency operations. The indigenous police forces will be in the first line of offense organized by the established government against subversion and insurgency. Subversion and insurgency activities are illegal, and participants are considered criminals. It has historically followed that police forces and police operating methods have been employed with success by different governments in counterinsurgency operations. This fact, coupled with the police-type function of most paramilitary forces, ideally indicates the use of military police during all phases of counterinsurgency operations.

b. Support of Military Civic Action. The indigenous police force is usually the only governmental agency that reaches down to the grassroots level since in the emergent nations very few public services other than police are supplied to the citizenry. The police, having in most cases unlimited authority over the individual, create the father image of the state. The image and support of the indigenous government is correlated to the efficiency and effectiveness of the police in the performance of these duties. Any civic activities connected with the operating police will have an immediate effect on the local populace. Some specific areas of police civic action are—

(1) Training of the local citizens as auxiliary police.

(2) Assisting the development of police—community relations.

(3) Developing police youth activity programs.

(4) Developing a correctional and rehabilitation system.

(5) Developing an effective physical and community security program.

c. Support of Indigenous Police and Paramilitary Police. During phases I and II, the principal function of the military police is to assist the development and the improvement of the indigenous police and paramilitary police. The following are some of the areas of military police activity:

(1) Organization of the national police to meet the police, security, and safety needs of the country. Emphasis is placed on the creation of a police organization that will support the social structure of the nation.

(2) Organization of the paramilitary forces to serve as a defense force, yet complement and support the national police.

(3) Provide plans, training, advice, and assistance for the military police and paramilitary police, which will insure their effectiveness in the fields of police and military activities to include tactics and techniques in counterinsurgency operations.

(4) Development of equipment needs, equipment utilization, and local resources to support the mission of such forces.

(5) Provide guidance for indigenous police civic action.

(6) Provide advice in the handling of insurgency prisoners.

d. Psychological Aspects. Police type activity by nature is restrictive and may, by the layman, be considered negative. Without a positive public relations program based on impartial and just police operations, the public will easily form an unfavorable image of the police. Such an image is a weapon in the insurgent psychological war. The military police, working in cooperation with the psychological operations team, are a vital link in the war for men's minds. As with other army units it is a continuing mission of the military police to develop among the indigenous population an appreciation of the American way of life.

e. Military Police Role in Counterguerrilla Operations.

(1) Military police units, having roles in all phases of counterinsurgency, may
be used as a basis for expansion into counterguerrilla operations.

(2) In close cooperation with intelligence and counterintelligence personnel, military police have the capability of developing a police intelligence net to provide information that will enhance the overall intelligence effort.

(3) Military police patrols can, when required, serve as small fighting forces capable of overcoming small independent roadblocks and other small guerrilla activities. The constant route and reconnaissance activities performed by the military police complement all other U.S. surveillance programs. These patrols help to maintain open lines of communication while hampering the guerrilla movement.

(4) With the augmentation of automatic weapons the military police have the capability for conducting fast raids or patrols into guerrilla operational areas. Mobility, communications, and training provide the base that allows the military police unit to effectively perform this task. The posture of the military police performing this role is improved with knowledge of the area gained from patrolling and cooperation with the local police.

(5) A major role in any counterguerrilla operation is the control of individuals, a normal police function. The control of individuals is, in part, within the area of police intelligence. This may be extended to include operation of checkpoints, inspection of identification cards and travel permits, enforcement of curfew regulations, and investigation of movements. Also included is the control of movements of weapons, food, medicine, and other items beneficial to the guerrilla. Prompt police action in the control of individuals reduces the possibility of civilian support reaching the guerrilla and of mob action and riots taking place. If a riot occurs, the military police are trained in mob and riot control.

(6) Another common military police task is providing physical security to individuals and installations, to include towns and villages. While performing this security the military police unit is offensively oriented to defeat possible guerrilla activity.

f. Police Intelligence. The development of a police intelligence operation by the indigenous police and the military police complements the overall intelligence program by supplying information. Police intelligence includes—

(1) An identification program with fingerprint, photograph, and description activities.

(2) Establishment of police files, a part of which will be central information file, modus operandi file, and police records section.

(3) It may be necessary to organize a special information section which would maintain contacts to furnish information which could assist in the control of individuals, prevention of crime, and the processing of valuable information.

85. Transportation Services

In accordance with the country plan, U.S. Army Transportation Corps units may be required to support U.S. and indigenous forces in the host country. Usually high priority requirements will exist for general purpose aviation units and transportation aircraft maintenance detachments. There may also be requirements for motor transport units, although, as a general rule, host countries possessing good routes of communication will usually have adequate ground transport. When the U.S. Army component of a MAAG/Mission or other command has the responsibility for terminal operations, some motor transportation may be required. Additionally, much of the U.S. force structure lacks organic vehicular transportation which could be provided by transportation light truck companies. Other U.S. Army transportation corps units which may be employed in a host country are transportation boat companies, floating craft maintenance teams, terminal service teams, and railway service units. When required, all transportation units can make valua-
ble contributions to the host country's civic improvement programs by providing transportation for goods and services. Back haul should be planned and exploited for this purpose.

86. Supply and Maintenance

a. Indigenous Forces. Normally a host country receiving support under the Military Assistance Program will have and operate its own logistics system. When such is not the case, it may be necessary to provide U.S. Army units to operate supply points and depots and direct and general support units to perform various echelons of maintenance. U.S. Army supply and maintenance units should integrate indigenous personnel into their own organizations, when qualified by training, as rapidly as possible.

b. Support for U.S. Forces. The size and degree of dispersion of the in-country U.S. force will largely determine the type supply and maintenance organizations required. Experience has shown that even though units and personnel are widely dispersed, garrison type support is the most practical. Unless the host country requests a large combat task force, or requires extensive U.S. combat service support, there is no requirement for a logistical command or comparable organization. Elements of the military services, each with its own capabilities, may share in providing common support items and services. It will be the usual practice to provide general support from established logistical installations in the overseas theater or from CONUS as required. However, there are certain areas in supply and maintenance which present unusual requirements.

(1) The nature and employment of U.S. Army aviation units may require an increase above the normal for aircraft maintenance support. This is brought about by the requirement for detaching subordinate aviation companies or elements to support indigenous units and thereby separating them from their normal supply and maintenance support. Additional transportation aircraft maintenance detachments and teams should be provided to support detached units. These detachments and teams can be further organized into small mobile maintenance teams to repair deadlined aircraft on the spot. Organic and supporting aircraft maintenance units should be prepared to carry a large quantity of slower moving repair parts. Accurate records and data on consumption factors must be maintained.

(2) Normally class III and IIIA (POL) requirements will involve the largest tonnages to be handled within a host country to support U.S. counterinsurgency forces. Due to the usual inadequacy of routes of communication, POL bulk reduction points must be established to facilitate movement to the user. These bulk reduction points should be located as close to the users as possible. It can be expected that large quantities of packaged POL will be moved by both fixed and rotary wing aircraft. Weather considerations may cause larger than usual stockpiles of POL at local or user storage sites when movement is dependent on air transport. Most shipments will be in 55-gallon drums and five-gallon cans which should be appropriately marked to insure that they are always used for the same type fuel. Planners should make provisions for testing of petroleum products.

(3) The probable wide dispersion of U.S. troops in a host country imposes a distribution problem for rations. Many of the teams and detachments do not have a capability to receive and store perishables and some staple items of food, nor do they have adequate messing facilities to prepare meals from issue rations. In a long range counterinsurgency effort, generators for small detachments power supply may be issued which will enable refrigerators and freezers to be utilized. Usually, a centrally located commissary, operated by the embassy or MAAG, can provide the necessary components to supplement local perishables. Order and accountability procedures should be sufficiently flexible to accommodate remotely located field detachments and
an austere transportation system. Deliveries frequently can be accomplished only once or twice a week, and often only by air. In some situations, it may be necessary to resort to parachute delivery. The commissary or other established ration point should be prepared to package class I items to fit the method of delivery and to prevent spoilage before consumption. U.S. personnel working with indigenous units should make every possible effort to exist on the indigenous diet. The attendant physical difficulties that will accompany the adjustment in dietary habits must often be accepted if the U.S. Advisor is to be effective.

(4) Requirements for clothing and individual equipment are minimal because the tour of duty in the host country is usually short. Special items of clothing and equipment required may be issued to individuals on arrival at a staging or processing center.

(5) The provision of ordnance maintenance support will depend on the amount of ordnance equipment to be supported. Deployed operational units which have considerable organic ordnance equipment should be authorized additional maintenance personnel and tools to allow a partial third echelon maintenance capability. Ordnance direct support maintenance units may be required to support U.S. Army units within a host country which lacks a sound maintenance capability. Such maintenance units should be authorized a maintenance float or excess stockage to permit exchange of equipment to the user and the evacuation of deadline equipment which requires higher echelons of maintenance. The employment and training of indigenous labor in ordnance maintenance units will contribute to the civic action program and reduce the number of U.S. military personnel required in a host country.

87. Morale Services

a. General. Counterinsurgency forces may be deployed to a host country in which provisions have not been made for certain ancillary support activities. These include postal, finance, army exchange, and chaplain services.

b. Postal. U.S. mail service to a particular country will always be available. Frequent delivery of mail to the many dispersed elements and personnel of a U.S. Army counterinsurgency force can assist in maintaining high morale. Procedures should be established to coordinate delivery of mail with air courier and transport service.

c. Finance. Procedures established for payment of MAAG/Mission personnel are usually adequate for U.S. Army counterinsurgency forces. Troops operating in remote areas should be afforded the opportunity to secure U.S. Treasury checks payable to a designated recipient. Provisions should also be made for cashing personal checks. Any of the U.S. military services may be charged with providing finance services for all U.S. military elements within a host country.

d. Exchange Service. Post exchange facilities are normally located only where there are troop concentrations. The responsibility for exchange operations may be charged to any one of the military services. Provisions should be made for delivery to troops who do not have access to an exchange with attendant flexible mail order and credit procedures. Small mobile exchange units containing fast moving items and mounted on vehicles or aircraft may make scheduled visits to outlying areas. Establishment of delivery service to remote areas can be coordinated with other agencies having movement requirements.

e. Chaplain. As with the other ancillary support activities, it is not feasible to provide complete chaplain coverage for all the widely dispersed troops. It should be a standard practice to station chaplains in the headquarters area and/or areas of troop density with these chaplains conducting services at outlying detachments on a circuit rider basis. A chaplain should be ready to go anywhere in the country when troops cannot come to him. Minimal but
essential chaplain support may be provided by special forces chaplains, or U.S. Armed Forces chaplains assigned to MAAG’s or other agencies. In exceptional circumstances American or foreign missionaries and selected indigenous clergy may be requested to provide for U.S. personnel the opportunity to worship, the administration of sacraments, certain other religious activities and, in some cases, limited counseling.

f. Legal Assistance. During planning for force requirements, the provisions of legal assistance service for U.S. military personnel should be considered. In countries where only a small contingent is deployed, the U.S. Embassy may be requested to provide minimal support. It may not be feasible, however, to provide full legal assistance to all dispersed personnel at all times. For emergency cases procedures should be established which authorize personnel to travel to the nearest contact point for legal assistance.
PART THREE
SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS
CHAPTER 7
INTELLIGENCE

88. General

a. An adequate and timely intelligence effort in support of U.S. policies and actions is vital to the achievement of U.S. overseas internal defense objectives.

b. See FM 31–22A.

c. See FM 31–22A.

d. In broadest terms, intelligence can be used in counterinsurgency to determine the causes of popular discontent, to obtain information about the enemy, weather, terrain, and indigenous people as a whole, to deny information to the enemy and to identify subversive elements in the country suffering the insurgency.

e. The purpose of this chapter is to isolate the problem, examine the requirements, and provide guidance for the solution to intelligence and counterintelligence requirements peculiar to counterinsurgency at all levels, but particularly those that confront the SAF.

89. The Role of Intelligence in Counterinsurgency

a. See FM 31–22A.

b. See FM 31–22A.

c. Phase II insurgency will be marked by additional requirements for intelligence. Combat intelligence efforts to find and identify the insurgent who now, overtly, is conducting harassing and interdiction operations, increase in importance. The nature of guerrilla warfare, characterized by sudden attacks against targets of the guerrillas’ own choosing and followed by rapid dispersion, make heavy demands on intelligence to find the enemy. All activities of intelligence agencies in phase I continue and are intensified in phase II; additional assets and resources may have to be developed. The liaison, training, and advisory roles of counterinsurgency forces are intensified. Intelligence training programs are initiated after requirements have been assessed. There is a constant revision of intelligence and counterintelligence estimates, collection efforts are coordinated, the dissemination and use of intelligence is assessed.

d. Phase III insurgency intelligence activities resemble those conducted under conditions of prolonged combat.

90. The Responsibilities of the Force Intelligence Officer

a. The desired qualifications of the key intelligence officer of a U.S. Army counterinsurgency force are manifold. Ideally, the force intelligence officer should possess as many of the below listed qualifications as possible. He should be a qualified combat arms officer. He must be thoroughly schooled and experienced in military intelligence procedures including all those activities and products associated with combat intelligence, strategic intelligence, counterintelligence, intelligence collection, and technical, communications and electronics intelligence. Ideally, he should be a specialist on the area in which he is to operate and be language qualified.

b. The responsibilities of the intelligence officer include but are not limited to those delineated in FM 101–5 and FM 30–5. He must be capable of employing expedients and exercising initiative and ingenuity, based on experience, in very sensitive areas of endeavor.
In the beginning, the intelligence officer contributes most to the commander and other staff officers by making detailed intelligence and counterintelligence estimates of the situation. The assembly of all available intelligence bearing on the area facilitates the start of an area study, if required. FM 31–21 contains an area study outline for special forces personnel. While this study outline is oriented toward guerrilla warfare, rather than to counterinsurgency, the basic elements to be studied are much the same. FM 30–5 and FM 33–5 give further guidance on area analysis. The necessity for adequate map and air photo coverage for planning and preparation of estimates by all staff sections places this requirement early on the intelligence officer. He must have appropriate map indices not only for his own use but for the convenience of other planners. See FM 101–10 and FM 30–5.

d. In the discharge of his responsibilities the intelligence officer must plan for, direct, and supervise the activities of the SAF intelligence augmentation detachment. This detachment as presently composed has the capability of preparing operational plans, determining the intelligence training requirements for the host country's armed forces, preparing a complete intelligence training program, and either supervising, training, or assisting the indigenous intelligence units in the conduct of their operations. Doctrinal guidance for utilization of intelligence specialists is contained in the pertinent DOD publications, Army Regulations, Field Manuals, Pamphlets, and 30-series TOE. Basic individual training in collecting and reporting military information is contained in DA Pam 21–81. The specialists constitute the school trained, skilled and experienced cells that will conduct most of the specialized activities in the intelligence effort. Decision making rests on their efforts. The intelligence officer must make full and correct use of these assets. All personnel involved in advising on intelligence matters within a host country must be conscious of the sensitive manner in which such subjects are dealt with by their indigenous counterparts.

e. See FM 31–22A.

91. Intelligence Requirements and Special Considerations

a. Basic Intelligence. See FM 31–22A.
b. Phase I. See FM 31–22A.
c. Phase II. See FM 31–22A.
d. Phase III. See FM 31–22A.
e. Special Considerations.

1. Intelligence agencies at all levels supporting counterinsurgency may expect many factors limiting their overall efficiency. Planning in advance may lessen the impact of these factors. The following are general categories:

(a) Insurgent penetration of the host country governmental structure.

(b) Lack of a national registry or census data.

(c) Apathy and/or lack of a spirit of cooperation.

(d) Lack of an adequate governmental structure to receive the preferred military or economic aid.

(e) Language difficulties; inability to communicate.

(f) Personality conflicts.

(g) Lack of trained personnel.

(h) Lack of adequate funds and materiel support.

(i) Lack of proper and timely guidance.

(j) Personality of chief executive of host country, his cabinet and advisors.

(k) Political factionalism in-country.

(l) Excessive centralization of authority.

2. Formal agreements between the U.S. and the host country, status-of-forces agreements, and other jurisdictional arrangements must be thoroughly understood and complied with for effective bilateral operations. For these reasons, close liaison and coordination must be maintained with the Judge Advocate providing legal support for the command.

3. The degree of control the government exercises over means of communications has a bearing on intelligence
operations. If censorship is in effect, for example, it may provide support for certain security operations.

(4) The degree of control the host country exercises over telecommunications media, including internal and external cable service, has considerable bearing on the overall efficiency that may be expected for certain operations.

(5) Basic intelligence principles and techniques can be utilized but must be changed to fit the peculiar needs of counterinsurgency. Additionally, the entire intelligence cycle must be speeded up in order to provide the quick response which is necessary. The preparation of elaborate reports, routine dissemination, and like procedures may not be practicable, and if emphasis is placed on such practices the inherent delay will seriously hamper intelligence operations.

(6) There must be a recognition of the difficulties that will be encountered in initiating a sound military intelligence operation. There is often an inherent reluctance on the part of people to accept training or advice in this field. Similarly, political bias or jealousies at the local level often precludes the exchange of vital intelligence information. Maximum efforts are needed to develop the confidence of persons or units being advised and a full appreciation of social and political factors must be developed.

92. The Scope of Intelligence Activities in Counterinsurgency
See FM 31–22A.

93. Relationships, Coordination, and/or Collaboration Within the Intelligence Community
See FM 31–22A.
CHAPTER 8
LOGISTICS PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES

94. General

This chapter covers those aspects of logistics peculiar to counterinsurgency operations. Logistics systems are designed to provide adequate support for all types of counterinsurgency operations; however, techniques for logistical support in areas separated from organic service support units must be geared to unique operational requirements and may vary considerably from conventional operations. These principles and techniques for logistical support of counterinsurgency forces are applicable to both U.S. and indigenous forces. Flexibility, responsiveness and improvisation are key factors in supporting counterinsurgency forces, and can be accomplished by:

a. Advance planning, so that units are equipped with minimum essential supplies and equipment consistent with contemplated operations. This is particularly important for operations in remote areas and where adverse weather conditions may be encountered.

b. Stocking supplies at echelons below those at which stockage is normally maintained in order to expedite supply; for example, at regimental bases of operations in populated areas and at battalion bases of operations in remote areas.

c. Making counterinsurgency forces as self-sufficient as is practicable, to include living off the land. Food, supplies, equipment, materials, and facilities requisitioned for military use must be paid for to avoid undesirable psychological effects. In areas where food or other supplies are scarce, local purchase or requisitioning should be prohibited.

d. Accomplishing logistic support by air or water when land transportation cannot provide timely support.

95. Supply and Maintenance

a. Planning for logistic support must be detailed and accomplished as far in advance of operations as is possible. Counterinsurgency forces should be provided with only those supplies and equipment essential to the accomplishment of assigned missions. Unessential items should be left at a base camp or home station so as not to encumber the individual soldier or available transportation. Accompanying supplies and equipment should be of such nature and quantity that they can be man-packed or transported by any means available. Supply procedures and support requirements, especially at the small unit level, should be standardized as much as possible and included in unit SOP's. For example, a one-day requirement for individual, company, battalion and regimental/brigade basic loads of rations, ammunition, medical, signal and other selected essential supplies can be computed using experience factors gained in actual operations. Using this one-day requirement as a standard, supply levels can then be planned based on the length and type of anticipated operations. To facilitate timely support of given operations, standard requirements for companies, battalions and regiments/brigades can be packaged, rigged for air drop or helicopter delivery, and positioned in base areas, ready for immediate delivery.

b. Required quantities of selected expendable and combat essential items should be stocked at secure locations, such as security posts or combat bases, and should be sufficient to support the unit for the number of days of the planned operation. To preclude giving any indication of imminent operations in a given area, it is essential to establish stock levels of all types of supply (to include aviation gasoline in many instances) at outposts and combat bases throughout the tactical area. This action should be taken far in advance of the execution date for
operations in the area concerned. While this approach appears to invite dissipation of stocks and to constitute uneconomical dispersion of supplies, it is essential. Operations against an enemy who has fled the area at the first signs of a logistical buildup waste not only supplies, but time, manpower, morale, and prestige.

c. Dispersed stockage will facilitate support of combat patrols and larger elements operating in relatively inaccessible areas. Stocks of this nature can be quickly supplemented or replaced, as used, by aerial resupply, provided this does not endanger security by focusing attention on the operation and if there is reasonable assurance that the supplies and equipment will not fall into the hands of the enemy. Under these conditions, resupply requests from using units should be handled by the fastest available means, primarily radio, but also relying on runners and prearranged signals when the situation requires. Supporting units should respond with expedited supply action, accomplishing required administrative accountability at a subsequent time.

d. Tactical units should normally receive support from the closest combat operations base or other supply base in or near the area in which they are working. In those instances where resupply of the tactical units must be made by air, consideration should be given to the desirability of using stocks from supply points near the departure airfield. This action may preclude an unnecessary handling of supplies to resupply the forward operations/supply base. When points of contact are used for resupply, these points of contact will be changed frequently during the operation to accommodate the movement of the operation, to insure more rapid response to resupply requirements, and to confuse the enemy. In planning for operations, the combat bases or supply bases which are to provide support should be designated, and prearranged rendezvous points for resupply established. Supply requirements can therefore be called for by code name on a phased basis, or if the situation dictates, delivered on call at other prearranged points.

e. The principle of self-sufficiency should be followed to the maximum practicable extent when units are operating in hostile areas for extended periods and when timely resupply cannot be effected. In carrying out this concept, only essential supplies should be obtained from the local economy. Rapport must be established between the government and the population in operational areas, to insure that support is readily available and that on-the-spot payment will be made in a satisfactory manner. In areas where food is available, commanders should be provided with funds to purchase food. This will tend to deny food to the enemy. In remote areas where food is normally in short supply, and in order to assist in establishing a feeling of mutual confidence and support, operational forces should consider using food and other needed civilian supplies as payment for services rendered by the civilian community, rather than monetary payment. These supplies should be requested from nearby consolidated supply areas and distributed by the commander in the name of the government.

f. In consideration of the concept of minimum essential supplies and equipment for operating units, it is imperative that the individual soldier be taught the importance of conservation and maintenance of his limited supplies and equipment. Preventive maintenance must be continually emphasized. This is of prime importance in those areas where adverse weather and terrain conditions necessitate more than normal maintenance and where indigenous forces are not fully familiar with the importance of maintenance to the efficient usefulness of weapons and equipment. Mobile maintenance teams from combat service support units should be available to using units to assist in preparing for operations and in rapid recovery from completed operations. In those operations where maintenance services cannot accompany combat units, direct exchange of unserviceable items, such as weapons and radios, must be provided for in the selected stockage which is positioned at security posts or combat bases.

g. Personnel are instructed to destroy discarded supplies and equipment to prevent conversion by the insurgents into vital food needs, weapons or other items. Procedures should be established to safeguard against the loss of equipment by individual soldiers. Such proce-
dures might include an educational program indicating the danger to the unit and to the individual through failure to safeguard equipment, payment by the soldier for lost items, disciplinary measures where circumstances indicate negligence or carelessness, frequent equipment checks by patrol leaders and commanders, and, in a positive light, reward or commendation for those who continually accept responsibility for the security of their individual equipment.

96. Hospitalization and Evacuation

a. Direct medical support of counterinsurgency operations may be as unconventional as the combat operation itself. Since these operations normally involve small, mobile combat units with few or no organic medical personnel, initial emergency medical treatment will be by attached aidmen, by the buddy system, or by self-aid. Because of the shortage of sufficient numbers of qualified medical personnel, training of all combat soldiers should emphasize the practical application of emergency treatment, i.e., pressure bandages, tourniquets, splints, recognition of shock, and so forth, to insure essential initial treatment. Medical personnel must be trained and qualified to accompany airborne units on operations, or to parachute into isolated areas to provide additional medical support to operational units.

b. Units operating in remote areas may be required to hold casualties for extended periods of time before evacuation can be effected. When the combat situation allows, medical evacuation should be accomplished expeditiously to the nearest medical facility, using the best available means of transportation. Emphasis should be placed on air evacuation of wounded, supplemented by porters and pack animals. Evacuation procedures should be reflected in unit SOP's, and be flexible enough to facilitate use of various modes of transportation appropriate to the terrain and operational conditions. The commander and staff of the indigenous force must be advised of the necessity for including medical evacuation in their operational planning. Knowledge of an existing plan for medical evacuation will improve the morale, and consequently, combat effectiveness, of the counterinsurgency force.

c. When operational conditions permit, medical personnel accompanying counterinsurgency units should provide all possible medical treatment, equipment, and supplies to the civilian sick and injured. Excess depot stocks or medicines approaching unserviceable dates could be specifically provided for this purpose.

97. Transportation

a. The objective of transportation planning for counterinsurgency operations is to provide a reliable transportation system responsive to the requirements of tactics and logistics, capable of operating over varied and difficult terrain, and employing the various modes of conventional transportation and those unconventional means not organic to units. Control of transportation should pass to the appropriate commander during operations, reverting to the parent unit upon completion of the mission.

b. Certain unique transportation problems must be considered in providing transportation support to counterinsurgency operations. Support must be provided under all conditions. Minimum essential items required in support of unit operations, which cannot be man-packed by the soldier or carried by organic vehicles because of terrain conditions, must be transported by other modes of transportation, such as bicycles, indigenous porters, pack animals and rafts and sampans. Such modes of transportation should be planned far in advance, and SOP's and control organizations developed to control their use. These procedural guides should be flexible enough to enable the various modes of transportation to be selected based on terrain, environmental and operational conditions. Unconventional modes of transportation will back up aerial logistic support to forward isolated areas as necessary to accomplish the mission.

c. SOP's should include provisions for security of the resupply element, not only on its way to the unit concerned, but on its return trip. Based on availability and the nature of operations, tracked and/or armored vehicles may be effectively employed for security of convoys and as logistical carriers.
98. Construction

Construction performed by tactical units operating in hostile areas will normally be limited to pioneer activities. This includes provision of shelters, the clearing of trails and drop zones by machete, and construction of access roads, bridges and ferries.
CHAPTER 9
COMMUNICATIONS

99. General

This chapter will cover basic communications requirements in support of counterinsurgency operations. It covers not only the communications systems required in support of the Special Action Force operations within a disturbed country, but also the general civilian and military communications of the indigenous forces within the country. Throughout it should be remembered that military civic action in provision of better indigenous communication facilities, to include training for indigenous personnel, not only serves the normal purposes of military civic action, but also provides additional active communications support and facilities for the tactical aspects of counterguerrilla warfare.

100. The Communications Problem in Counterinsurgency

For protection against attack by counterinsurgency forces, insurgent elements generally attempt to operate in terrain which is rugged and inaccessible to large, conventionally equipped military forces. These areas generally are mountainous, swampy, or jungle in nature. Within these areas it is difficult to obtain reliable, secure, and rapid communication for both the insurgents and the counterinsurgency forces alike. The various communications methods which may be used to support counterinsurgency operations are the following:

a. Radio. The most flexible, reliable, and rapid method of communication in rugged terrain is radio. The ability to communicate by radio over mountains, through swamps and to a lesser extent, through jungle makes radio an extremely valuable means of communications in the hands of counterinsurgency forces. However, the use of radio under these conditions requires prior planning, good training, communications security and thorough maintenance.

b. Wire. The establishment of wire lines in rugged terrain is generally impractical, primarily because of the difficulties in laying wire through areas with marginal roads. While it is often possible to lay wire by aircraft where there are no roads, such wire lines are easy prey for destruction by either insurgent forces or the weather. In countries or areas faced with problems of insurgency, wire communications are not considered as a major method of communication except in those areas which are well-populated and controlled by security forces.

c. Other Methods of Communications. Other traditional means of communication, such as use of messengers, visual signals, and sound signals also play a role in providing communications. However, their use and effectiveness in support of counterinsurgency operations is generally limited by time and distance.

101. Communications Resources

The civilian and military communications systems within a disturbed country or area are generally primitive and inadequate by modern standards. In most cases, they will pose a serious problem to counterinsurgency forces.

a. Civilian communications facilities will usually be limited. Equipment will likely be obsolescent, unreliable and located only in heavily populated urban areas. Major cities usually will have some form of a local telephone system, but in rural areas, telephone systems will be marginal or nonexistent and radio or messenger service will likely provide the only links in communications.

b. As a rule, military communications in disturbed countries or areas generally will be better and more dependable than their counter-
part civilian communications. Indigenous military units situated in designated areas or zones usually will be linked together by radio. However, much of their equipment will probably be of World War II vintage and may often be of other than US manufacture. While better than the civilian radio systems, military radio communications still will probably not meet modern standards and probably will not adequately meet counterinsurgency communication needs.

c. When communications are poor or marginal in quality, counterinsurgency forces are at a disadvantage. Consequently, one of the major requirements in the support of counterinsurgency operations is the improvement of existing communication. A village radio system for both security and administration is vital to the operation of an effective counterinsurgency operation. The hardware for this radio system will frequently be developed and funded through USOM channels and resources.

102. Communications Requirements

The requirement for improving communications in a country faced with insurgency may be fulfilled in two ways. New communications equipment may be introduced into the country and/or the already existing communications facilities and methods may be improved. In either case, the first step in any program of communications improvement is the development by the SAF/MAAG planner of a comprehensive and thorough survey of the communications systems as they exist. The survey should be as complete as time permits and should give a complete picture of the various communications systems in the country. These include the military communications system, the civilian system, the police system, and any other special system which might exist. The survey should include but not be limited to the following:

a. Communications general background.
b. Wire.
c. Radio.
d. Other methods of communications.
e. Radio broadcasting stations and television.
f. Communication training.
g. Electric power.
h. Special factors.
i. Sources of information for survey.
j. Recommendations.

103. Measures to Improve Communications

Measures which may be taken to improve existing communications in a country faced with insurgency, in addition to the introduction of new equipment, are as follows:

a. Establishment of better and more thorough maintenance procedures to include special maintenance shops and/or techniques.
b. Modification of existing equipment for increased effectiveness.
c. More effective use of equipment and personnel.
d. Modification of the communications system. However, modification of the existing communication system is generally a major undertaking which requires the full support of the host government.
e. Establishment of a training program to increase the number and raise the caliber of communications personnel. The program may include the establishment of schools, special courses, and supervised on-the-job training. Overall training should stress the practical aspects of communications, rather than concentrating on theory. One manner in which maximum effectiveness can be obtained, particularly with limited numbers of personnel, is to cross-train personnel in equipment and procedures.

104. Tactical Considerations

When insurgency reaches phase II or III intensities, more emphasis must be placed on tactical communications. The success of counter-guerrilla operations, both defensive and offensive, depends now more than ever directly upon reliable and rapid communications. Even though all methods and means of communication are used, the method of primary importance is radio. Through radio, effective and rapid control may be established and maintained over widely scattered and dispersed units, particularly those operating in rugged and adverse terrain. In addition, radio can be used by villages and hamlets to provide rapid...
and early warning of guerrilla attacks and for the dissemination of timely information regarding insurgent activities. With regard to the use of radio in counterguerrilla operations, consideration should be given to the following:

a. Radio intercept serves as a means by which well-organized insurgent forces may learn of impending counterguerrilla operations in time to escape or evade an attack. Communications therefore should stress security even though specific operations may often be designed to be accomplished so rapidly that guerrilla elements will not be able to take advantage of their intercepted information. The following are a few of the standard communications techniques which can be applied to assist in maintaining security:

1. Stations can use different frequencies for transmission and reception.
2. Transmission sites can be changed frequently; transmissions can be made just prior to moving to a new location.
3. Transmissions can be made at scheduled but irregular intervals.
4. Brevity codes to reduce the length of transmission should be used as often as possible.
5. Keep transmission to a minimum.
6. Encrypt all transmissions.
7. Avoid predictable operations in communications.

b. It is important that counterinsurgency forces at all levels be able to rapidly and effectively communicate with one another. This communications capability does not have to be direct, but the systems used should insure that there is a minimum of delay involved.

c. Although transistorized, modularized and single-sideband (SSB) radios are in use for our own forces it is likely that the standard radios of World War II will comprise for some time the principal types available for counterguerrilla communications.

105. U.S. Army and Special Action Force (SAF) Communications

a. U.S. Army communications channels into a disturbed country or area will be provided by one or more terminal stations of the Defense Communication Agency Network, an integrated world-wide U.S. military communications system. This system, providing immediate voice and teletype circuits, has the capability for linking terminal commands as well as with CONUS.

b. Within the Special Action Force (SAF), integral special forces communications elements will provide communications for subordinate units of the SAF and, if required, provide a link between an operational base and elements of the SAF operating in remote areas of the country.

c. The special forces operational base communication complex, described in FM 31–21 can, with little modification, support the SAF in counterinsurgency operations.
106. General

a. Fields in which the U.S. can provide support to a developing nation in countering the threat of insurgency, whether potential or actual, are—civic action, community development, social projects, health and sanitation, education, agriculture, transportation, communications, labor and youth activities, police, and military activities. Inherent in each and overlapping all fields of activity is the politico-psychological field. This field, interwoven with each of the other programs, is of extreme importance and may very well be the final determining factor in the success or failure of all areas of endeavor. Every action or inaction of the local government, and all aspects of the support provided by the U.S. have both political and psychological implications. As such, psychological operations programs are part of all activities in countering subversive insurgency and are indispensable to the overall U.S. effort.

b. When preparing plans for the conduct of psychological operations at both the national level and the local level, and in all phases of insurgency, it must be borne in mind that there are three major target audiences—the armed forces of the host country, the civil population, and the insurgent. The first two of these audiences must understand that U.S. participation in the counterinsurgency effort is both legal and necessary; that the U.S. is participating at the invitation of proper authority in the host country as an act of collective security; that actions of the United States are designed not to isolate or crush the host nation; and that United States participation is temporary and is advisory in nature, without any desire for territorial aggrandizement. The third audience, the insurgent, must be induced to cease his activities to the maximum extent possible, and as a minimum, an insurgent propaganda campaign seeking to capitalize on the presence of U.S. forces must be countered in advance by the proper use of the above-mentioned themes apropos to the situation.

107. U.S. Army Psychological Operations Responsibilities

Psychological operations are the responsibility of many governmental agencies and departments as well as the services. While each military service has responsibilities for psychological operations in support of its own activities, the U.S. Army is the only service which always operates in the close environment of people. Psychological operations take place mainly in the environment of armies and of soldiers, of guerrillas and local defense forces, and of the people who live on the land. The Army, therefore, has responsibility for maintaining organized units with the primary mission of providing psychological operations support, and is capable of conducting these operations in a primitive and hostile ground environment, or advising and assisting indigenous military forces in conducting such operations. The Army is also responsible for the formal training of officers and men in psychological operations, and is the only service that maintains school facilities for instruction and professional training in psychological operations.

108. U.S. Army Psychological Operations Capabilities

a. The Army has resources, in both individuals and units, for the conduct of psychological operations in counterinsurgency. The employment of these capabilities in specific psychological operations must be coordinated with other government agencies responsible for associated or parallel functions and be in consonance with host country's objectives and desires. Radio, press, and audio visual means are
available as tools to implement the psychological operations program.

b. Army psychological operations officers may be assigned to the staffs of unified and specified commands, and to MAAG's and Missions. Psychological operations units are assigned to army component commands, and, in addition to the usual planning functions, provide Mobile Training Teams (MTT), and operational assistance for cold war and counterinsurgency psychological operations. U.S. Army psychological operations forces are organized into two echelons, from which the commanders of unified commands, chiefs of MAAG's and Missions, and Army Attaches, as appropriate, may draw in order to conduct or support psychological operations. The first echelon is composed of counterinsurgency psychological operations units which are part of a SAF. The second echelon units are the theater, theater army, and field army type units authorized by a cellular TOE with the inherent flexibility of tailoring the organization of teams with the skills and equipment needed for specific mission requirements. They are committed when the capabilities of the SAF and local in-country command assets are exceeded.

(1) SAF psychological operations unit. (Advisory and support.) The SAF psychological operations unit is trained for cold war and counterinsurgency psychological operations, including language and area training. This unit is composed of specialist teams trained to support and augment other U.S. agency operations, and to advise and train indigenous military forces on basic psychological operations planning, to include themes, targets, and media, intelligence, printing, and audio visual operations. The unit also can, in the rare instances when it is required, provide operational assistance in the field through its printing and audio visual units, as well as its specialist personnel.

(2) Theater army and field army units. The theater army and field army psychological operations units are area oriented and trained in the conduct of strategic or country level propaganda operations employing specialized assets for propaganda research and analysis, content development, radio and loudspeaker broadcasting, printing, and consolidation operations. While the printing facilities of the theater army unit are primarily fixed-plant or heavy-mobile, they can back up in-country activities. This organization also provides mobile training teams in support of MAAG, Mission, and Attaché requirements and procedures. The field army psychological operations unit has loudspeaker and light-mobile printing capabilities which may be employed as additional backup support to other psychological operations elements as required.

109. Planning and Coordinating

a. The country internal defense plan contains the objectives for U.S. psychological action, propaganda and information programs in the area, and the desired approach for advice, guidance, and coordination of the responsible indigenous military and civilian agencies. A coordinated information and psychological operations program which supports and exploits the positive actions of the indigenous government and the support rendered by the U.S. will help to close any gap between the government and the people and provide a basis for long-range, popular support of the established authority.

b. Coordinated planning and programming for mass communication support and advice to the indigenous government will normally be conducted through the establishment of a Country Team subcommittee for psychological operations. This subcommittee, usually chaired by the public affairs officer (PAO)—the USIS station director—in his role as primary coordinator of U.S. psychological operations activities, will be formed with representation from each of the other U.S. departments and agencies on the Country Team. Meeting on a periodic basis, the subcommittee formulates psychological plans, programs and activities, and coordinates the requirements and operations of all the agencies based upon the policy directives of the Country Team. Problems or recom-
mendations that cannot be resolved by the committee through direct contact with the separate agencies are forwarded to the Chief of the Country Team for decision.

c. In countries where the insurgent threat is critical, and U.S. agencies become more active in operations, it may be necessary to establish a full time inter-agency psychological operations staff working group. This working group acts as a staff for the subcommittee and provides the day-to-day research, analysis, and planning necessary for a coordinated, positive, military/civilian indigenous propaganda program.

d. Planning guidance, propaganda intelligence, and opinion target analysis and propaganda analysis, prepared by the psychological operations working group are integrated with similar information from indigenous sources. This information is the basis for the U.S. advisory effort or operational assistance for the conduct of psychological operations at all levels in the country. At lower levels, locally available information will augment information and guidance received from higher authority.

e. Counterinsurgency psychological operations, planned at the national level, differ in some respects from those planned for the local level. Programs implemented at the national level are in support of national strategy and objectives and employ radio and printed communications generally addressed to the entire country. Local psychological operations are more closely tuned to local intelligence and addressed to more specific target groups in support of civic actions, tactical operations, or other programs in a particular area. Materials used in national level operations exploit the broad aspects of the counterinsurgency program as it affects the majority of the population. As such, the material is general in scope and deals primarily with national policy and programs. If regional radio stations are available, more specific propaganda is employed by these stations towards this segment of the population. In countries with large or important minority ethnic groups, psychological operations also include efforts conducted in the minority languages.

f. Local psychological operations hold the key to success of a national program in cold war and counterinsurgency situations. For an effective and credible program, military and civilian psychological planning and operations must be integrated and coordinated at this level. In most situations, the only psychological operations and information representatives at the lower administrative and military command levels are Army psychological operations personnel.

110. Employment of Psychological Operations Resources

a. General.

(1) In the conduct of cold war and counterinsurgency activities, the U.S. Army psychological operations resources are used generally to accomplish the following missions:

(a) Provide advice to the commander and his staff on psychological operations and the psychological aspects and implications of all operations, activities or inactivities of the command.

(b) Through the MAAG, Mission or Army Attache, provide advice and training support for the development of psychological operations capabilities in indigenous armed forces and paramilitary forces.

(c) Provide operational advice and assistance to indigenous forces in the actual conduct of psychological operations.

(d) Develop military requirements for and support U.S. civil agencies.

(2) In areas where potential or actual insurgency exists, the Army may become involved in one or more of these missions concurrently dependent on the level of insurgency in the particular area. Participation in these missions is discussed in the following paragraphs.

b. Training Support to MAAG’s or Missions.

(1) MAAG’s and Missions are responsible for establishing psychological operations capabilities within indigenous forces by providing training advice
and assistance through the employment of individual advisors or mobile training teams. In addition, U.S. forces provide training advice and assistance to friendly foreign governments in counterinsurgency operations, and conduct or assist in the conduct of psychological operations. The terms of reference for MAAG's and Missions provide for qualified U.S. psychological operations officers on their advisory staffs, who evaluate the requirements for adequate indigenous psychological operations forces and training. The MAAG/Mission advisory effort includes—

(a) Advice in organizing psychological operations units.

(b) Providing necessary mass communications equipment for supported psychological operations units.

(c) Establishing psychological operations schools.

(d) Augment the capabilities of USIS and support other U.S. civil agencies.

(e) Advise in the preparation of propaganda programs, materials and the conduct of psychological operations.

(2) The type and capabilities of psychological operations forces organized in friendly foreign nations through the military aid program are evaluated in the context of cold war and hot war requirements. In those countries where potential or incipient insurgency exists, the emphasis is placed on the development of psychological operations forces to provide an internal counterinsurgency operational capability. The type of units organized and the training provided emphasize psychological activities at the local level among the civilian population. These requirements are supported by a more sophisticated military psychological planning and production capability at the national level to support field requirements.

c. Advice and Assistance to Indigenous Forces.

(1) In those foreign countries supported by the U.S., the normal activity of army psychological operations personnel is to provide advice in the conduct of psychological operations by the indigenous forces. Planning is directed to insure adequate coverage of the whole country. Only in cases where local psychological operations forces are nonexistent or inadequate should it be necessary to provide operational assistance. It is normally not politically acceptable or prudent to have U.S. military personnel actually conducting psychological operations for the indigenous government. The use of military psychological operations in counterinsurgency operations augments activities of the civilian information agencies and is closely coordinated with them. This is required because the target audiences of both agencies overlap and are often identical, particularly in those cases where U.S. advisors are working directly with paramilitary forces, self-defense forces and tribal groups.

(2) The Role of the Individual.

(a) The purpose of psychological operations in combatting subversive insurgency is to gain and maintain the loyalty of the people towards the government and specifically to win back the support of those elements of the population which are supporting the insurgent force. Every representative of the government, including the personnel of indigenous military forces, is a reflection of the character, vitality, progressiveness and attitude of the government. In many areas of the country, the only members of the national government with whom the people come in contact are military personnel. The manner in which these military personnel act in their association with the people has a definite effect upon their attitude to-
wareds the government. Arrogance on the part of officers and enlisted men towards civilians will turn them away from the government. Recklessly driven and speeding military vehicles have adverse effects on the people. On the other hand, if the soldier treats his fellow citizens with respect, assists them as occasions arise, and maintains a friendly attitude at all times, he is doing a great part in winning support of the population. He is performing his task in the conduct of positive psychological operations. The role of the individual soldier cannot be overemphasized. His face-to-face contact with the people, a reflection of the government he represents, is a powerful force in the psychological battle between the opposing forces. While this is a normal command responsibility, the psychological operations advisor can do much to emphasize its importance to the overall psychological operations program.

(b) Similarly, the role of the U.S. officer and enlisted man is of great importance in psychological operations. Personnel on duty in foreign countries, particularly in the countryside, have a profound effect on the image the civilian has of the United States. The importance of being a “grass roots ambassador” is apparent in order to offset the image of the United States projected by the communists. All personnel must be imbued with a spirit of helpfulness and understanding of the local people and their problems.

d. Support to U.S. Civil Agencies.

(1) As the official U.S. overseas information and propaganda agency, USIA, through its overseas service (USIS), conducts operations on a world-wide basis. In some areas operations in support of Country Team requirements have been so extensive that they strain the capabilities and resources of USIS, especially in emergency situations requiring immediate action. In this regard, the personnel and materiel assets of army psychological operations organizations are often called upon to augment existing USIS facilities. In most cases these army resources would be deployed to provincial/village level where they are capable of operating effectively under hostile or primitive conditions.

(2) The range of support which army psychological operations are capable of furnishing U.S. civil agencies includes propaganda research, analysis, intelligence, content development, news collection, broadcast monitoring, and the hardware of mass communications media, together with pertinent skills. These elements may be in direct support of the PAO, and under the administrative control of the MAAG, Mission or Army Attache. While use of army psychological operations assets to augment USIS occurs primarily in potential subversive insurgent areas, it may be necessary to continue such support during periods of higher intensity insurgent activity.

(3) Support requirements for other agencies are provided as directed.

(4) It is reiterated that psychological operations, particularly at the local level, must be conducted by indigenous personnel and attributed wholly to the host government.

(5) It is vital that the key communicators in the host country be employed and that face-to-face communications be utilized wherever possible.

(6) The lack of radios and movie theaters, and the high illiteracy rate, etc., will preclude the use of sophisticated communication media and the operator must seek other means of disseminating propaganda based on local facilities and patterns of behavior, e.g., use of itinerant troubadors and puppet shows.
CHAPTER 11
INDIGENOUS PARAMILITARY FORCES

111. General

a. Paramilitary forces are distinct from the regular armed forces of any country, but resemble them in organization, equipment and mission.

b. The size and organization of paramilitary forces will vary considerably in countries which are likely targets for subversive insurgency. In some countries, paramilitary units provide the major source for both internal and external security. In other countries, paramilitary forces are relatively small, being comprised primarily of police organizations concerned with law, order, and internal security.

c. This chapter describes some of the types of indigenous paramilitary units which might exist in some countries, the necessity for these forces, their capabilities, and some problems which may be encountered in screening, organizing, equipping, supplying, training, and paying them.

112. Paramilitary Organizations

There are numerous titles for the various paramilitary organizations located in the different parts of the world, such as civil or home guard units, constabulary police, volunteer defense corps, gendarmerie and many others; however, this chapter will be limited to a discussion of only four general types: civil police, civil guard, self defense units, and civil defense groups.

a. Civil Police. Most governments depend primarily on a police force to constitute the first line of defense against subversion and insurgency. Police are normally trained and equipped to deal with conspiracy, subversion, and minor forms of violence. Police are also a sensitive point of contact between the government and its citizenry, close to focal points of unrest, and recognized as keepers of law and order over a long period of time. Generally, police are armed and wear a uniform. They perform police and internal security duties throughout the country. They exercise law enforcement, intelligence and countersubversive duties as directed by appropriate authority. They also support indigenous army units in punitive actions and relieve military units of internal security duties in pacified areas. If the insurgency escalates into a phase II situation, the organizational capabilities of the police force in the affected area may rapidly deteriorate and be eliminated as an effective law enforcement agency. In a phase III situation, where areas change hands frequently, police may lose their identity completely. In most countries, civil police may be divided into three types—national police, municipal police and rural police. In some countries rural police functions may be performed by the national police.

(1) National police are comprised of both uniformed and nonuniformed armed personnel and are directed and supervised by an agency of the national government. This agency, usually headed by a civilian, may also be responsible for administering the nation's armed forces. National police perform police functions that relate to law enforcement and security measures which are promulgated at the national level. National police are organized along military lines and their authority transcends all political boundaries within the country.

(2) Municipal police are uniformed civilian police who perform law enforcement missions in urban areas. They are usually under control of the town or city authorities. These police are armed and may possess limited quantities of short range radios. Their au-
authority usually extends only to the town or city limits.

(3) Rural police functions as mentioned in (1) above, may be performed by the national police. In some countries, rural police may be organized to perform law enforcement functions under the control of the head of a political subdivision such as a province or district. The organization is usually geared to small detachments to perform short term and short range functions. Rural police posts may have radios to communicate with their headquarters and/or adjacent posts, but frequently this will not be the case.

b. Civil Guard. Normally, the civil guard is a provincial security type force, charged with the primary mission of providing internal security within a given political subdivision. The organization of these units, however, may be similar to regular army units. They are frequently constituted from volunteers indigenous to the area, whose knowledge of the terrain and people is equal to that of the insurgents. Civil guard units are composed of uniformed and armed personnel and have the primary mission of relieving the national army of internal security duties. Armament for civil guards will consist primarily of individual weapons, light machine guns, and small mortars. Communications equipment, at best, will be provided on an austere basis. Civil guard units are usually of battalion and company size and may be trained to perform limited combat tactical missions. More often they are charged with enforcing the law and maintaining public order and security in rural areas. In its security role, civil guard units conduct raids, ambushes, and limited objective attacks, either alone or with self defense units, regular army units, or with both. Civil guard units may be called upon to reinforce security posts under insurgency attack or to pursue the insurgents after their withdrawal.

c. Self Defense Units. The self defense units are normally found to be the primary paramilitary force charged with the responsibility for the security of the villages and hamlets, guarding headquarters, bridges, and key intersections, local airstrips, and conducting limited offensive missions. These units are made up of local volunteers and organized into platoons or squads. They are prepared to defend their villages at all times. These units man local outposts in villages and towns, engage in periodic around-the-clock perimeter patrols of the community and maintain local alert forces available for defense missions. In limited offensive missions, self defensive units employ patrols, ambushes and raids. To a lesser extent, they participate in large scale attacks with the civil guard, regular army, or both. Additionally, they may assist emergency relief missions in local areas stricken by fire, flood, storms, or other natural disasters. Self defense units are armed and, often, wear a uniform which identifies them as belonging to the self defense organization.

d. Civil Defense Groups. Although these groups are somewhat similar to self defense units in mission, organization, capabilities, and functions, they are treated separately because of their origin, status, and method of management and support. Also, the requirement for these forces is generated only after an escalation of the insurgency to a phase II situation. Civil defense groups are more likely to be identified with primitive tribes in distant and remote areas, people in rural areas, minority ethnic groups, and miscellaneous groups such as workmen's militia, youth organizations and female auxiliaries. They are usually a non-uniformed, unpaid, part-time volunteer force. Except for the miscellaneous group, they are organized and trained to provide local and internal security of their own hamlet or village when these have been organized and fortified. They are armed with light weapons and in some cases with only shotguns, carbines, and an occasional pistol or rifle. The primitive tribal groups, which are of special interest to SAF advisory training personnel, may also be organized and trained for a limited counterinsurgency role as hunter-killer teams, trail watchers, and for border surveillance, and to lesser extent in the ambush and raid of insurgent forces.

113. Necessity for Paramilitary Forces

a. In countering insurgency, it is dangerous for the national government to utilize all its
114. Responsibilities of the Indigenous Government

a. When civilians cooperate or join the paramilitary units in campaigning against the insurgents, it must be remembered that they do so at a certain sacrifice and risk to themselves. This fact is often forgotten or ignored. In soliciting civilian cooperation, the government, particularly the armed forces, must be ready to assume some responsibilities. Most important of these responsibilities is the protection of the lives and property of the civilians who run the risk of being listed for reprisal by the insurgents. The government should also provide funds for families of those members who are killed in action. Additionally, financial aid should be provided for the support of the families of paramilitary force personnel whose military duties prevent them from pursuing their regular occupations.

b. Being aware of these responsibilities is not enough. It is important that the government assure the people that it stands ready to reward citizens who demonstrate their loyalty by cooperating with the armed forces.

115. Training Paramilitary Forces

a. Requirements.

(1) The paramilitary force training program should insure the development of basic military skills and, at the same time, promote long-term benefits by providing citizenship training.

(2) Instruction given to paramilitary forces should be based on local geographic considerations and emphasize those tactics and techniques which are most applicable to the particular unit and its respective mission.

(3) Paramilitary training programs should insure that behind all counterinsurgency actions stands the operative governmental authority for which the paramilitary force acts only as an agent. Throughout the conduct of military training programs, attention should be focused on the government's plans and policies which must be implemented.

(4) Training programs should emphasize instruction for positive political behavior, protection of the population under combat conditions, and rendering military civic action in both secure and crisis areas.

(5) The control of available training centers or areas should be centralized to assure maximum utilization of all facilities.

b. Type Training Programs. Suggested training programs for paramilitary units are contained in appendix VII.

116. U.S. Assistance

Assistance for organizing, equipping, and training paramilitary forces may be provided through the Military Assistance Program, the U.S. AID Mission (for civil police), or other elements of the Country Team. The MAAG/Mission in the host country provides and directs the advisory support effort involving the MAP. Representatives of U.S. AID Mission are responsible for supervising the assistance provided by that agency. The Special Action Force, under command of the MAAG/Mission or other
U.S. component provides advisory personnel and mobile training teams to advise, train and provide operational assistance for paramilitary forces. In coordination with representatives of U.S. AID Mission, the military police detachment and other appropriate elements of the Special Action Force may be required to assist in the training of the civil police.

117. Pay and Benefits

a. A standard prescribed pay scale for paramilitary forces favorable to that of the indigenous civilians should be established to alleviate morale problems.

(1) Monetary payments for self defense type personnel should be based on that of the local economy. In certain circumstances it may be advisable or appropriate to provide part or all of the compensation for self defense personnel in the form of commodities in kind, particularly foodstuffs, provided from U.S. surplus stocks under PL 480.

(2) Civil guard units should be paid on a standard which is in consonance with operational requirements.

(3) Payments should include compensation for lengths of service, and allocations for dependents and special skills.

b. Paramilitary personnel should be paid in proportion to the time devoted to the cause.

c. A survival benefits program should be established for dependents of paramilitary personnel.

d. Payments should be timely and accurate. From past experience this has proven to be one of the most critical factors.

118. Supply and Equipment

Equipment and supplies for the various indigenous paramilitary forces may be provided through the national government's military logistics system. Advantages which might accrue from such a support arrangement are—

a. Accounting and control.


c. Cooperation between military and paramilitary units.

d. Economy in administration and overhead.
PART FOUR
TRAINING
CHAPTER 12
TRAINING REQUIREMENTS FOR U.S. ARMY COUNTERINSURGENCY FORCES

119. General

a. Training of U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Forces stresses the development of skills, concepts, and procedures that must be taught to host country forces and the learning and teaching techniques required to impart these skills to individuals whose cultural background differs from that of the U.S. soldier. Training emphasis on what and how to teach indigenous forces will vary, according to the country requirements, force composition, and U.S. programs. However, U.S. standards of training for combat, combat support, and combat service support units provide the basic guides for preparing U.S. forces to advise host military authorities in the organization and methods of employment of indigenous forces combating insurgents. Individual training for U.S. personnel should include development of proficiency in basic MOS skills, area orientation, varying degrees of language skill, and physical conditioning. When feasible, maximum cross training should be given to members of mobile training teams. Training of MTT’s should emphasize instructor skills to include techniques for teaching by demonstration with minimum use of language (voice) and proper techniques for use of interpreters. Consult FM 3–10 for guidance and information concerning training in the use of chemical weapons.

b. Courses of instruction are given by the U.S. Army Special Warfare School and the U.S. Army Civil Affairs School to provide selected officers and noncommissioned officers with a working knowledge of counterinsurgency operations including civic action programs and activities. For course lengths and POI see the current school catalogue published by USCONARC.

120. Special Action Forces

The commander of the special forces group is responsible for the training of all assigned and attached units in the SAF. Normally, those professional skills contained in the various augmentation detachments are MOS-qualified prior to assignment to a SAF. However, the commander must make provisions for service school training of selected personnel in specialized courses such as civil affairs, engineer, medical, psychological operations and intelligence. Area orientation and language training requirements for each SAF differ. The base SAF in CONUS, however, can provide limited predeployment training for detachments in consonance with assignment requirements. Training missions within the SAF are assigned consistent with the availability of instructors, training facilities, and the type training required. Training supervision is centralized and accomplished through the normal chain of command.

121. Special Forces Training

a. Training Objectives. The highly developed capability of special forces to organize, equip, train, and direct indigenous forces, together with their knowledge of guerrilla warfare tactics and techniques makes them effective in counterinsurgency support operations. Special forces predeployment training should also include, as a minimum, the academic subjects listed below. This additional training presumes that Army Training Program requirements have already been satisfied.
b. Area Study. Scope: Geography; population and ethnic groups; communications and transport; industry and agriculture; history; general character of the society; sociology and nationalism; attitudes and reactions; customs and taboos; social values and patterns of living; religion, education, sects and cults; structure of the family; current domestic political situation in the country; national and tactical organization for counterinsurgency operations; U.S. assistance programs; armed forces; paramilitary forces; insurgent forces; civilian defense group concept; physical security; evasion and escape; intelligence situation briefing; public order and safety; returnee briefing; and current intelligence.

c. Democracy vs Communism. Scope: American democracy and political theory; American foreign policy; communist philosophy and objectives; country criticism of the U.S.; and comparison of the democratic and communist systems.

d. Language Study. Scope: Subfluency level of attainment and concentration on military terms and most commonly used words and phrases.

e. Counterinsurgency Operations. Scope: Background; patrolling; intelligence; psychological operations and civic actions; immediate action drills; small unit counterinsurgency tactics; search and seizure techniques; host country air operations to include airmobile operations; methods of instruction in the host country; and tactical deficiencies of host country troops.

f. MOS Training. This training is provided on the basis of MOS requirements.

(1) Weapons and operations. Scope: Organization of the village; development of training and operations programs; records, orders, and reports; familiarization in basic psychological operations; preparation of field expedient ranges, training areas, and conduct of training; a wide variety of rifle and hand grenades, rocket launchers, mines, mortars, and recoilless rifles; and indigenous weapons.

(2) Engineering and Demolitions. Scope: Village construction and defense; construction planning; engineer tools and construction equipment; concrete construction techniques; water supply and waste disposal systems; defensive works construction; military airfields and heliports; gasoline and diesel engine maintenance and repair; and use and maintenance of mine detectors.

(3) Medical. Scope: Village health program; physical diagnosis; drugs; helminthic diseases; gastro-intestinal diseases; respiratory diseases; hepatitis; malaria; dermatology; nutritional diseases; dental procedures; potable water supply, waste disposal, night soil; animal (rodent) and insect-borne disease control; treatment of eye and ear infections; emergency child birth; shock and hemorrhage; burns, wound management and soft tissue injury; venereal disease; chemical and physical agents; medical intelligence; immunization procedures; training in organizing and equipping a 25-bed field hospital and supporting it logistically.

(4) Communications. Scope: Organization of village communication system; preparation of a communications training program and conduct of instruction; visual and audio communications means; radio sets; operational maintenance; public address systems; electrical lighting systems and generators; telephones and switchboards; preparation of expedient codes and review of code systems; field expedient antennas; fundamentals of electronic equipment repair; reduced distance nets; and increased distance nets; and indigenous equipment.

g. MOS Cross Training. In addition to specific MOS training, the special forces operational detachment personnel are cross trained in the other MOS skills to include—

(1) Weapons.

(2) Engineering and demolitions.

(3) Medical.

(4) Communications.
h. General Subject Selected Personnel. The environment in which a special force detachment is normally employed may require skills not assigned to the detachment. Selected personnel in the detachment will require specialized training or a specialist may be attached to the detachment to provide the skills required. An example that has been most common is a requirement for a vehicle mechanic within the detachment.

i. Special Forces Operational Base. During field training exercises the SF operational detachment C, with appropriate augmentation should establish and operate an SFOB. Subordinate detachments and MTT's should be realistically dispersed over a wide area and be provided logistics and administrative support. Communications procedures should be thoroughly tested.

122. Augmentation Units

a. General. Training for augmentation detachments of the SAF should be integrated into the special forces group training program for area orientation, language training, common subjects, and field training exercises. Physical conditioning should be stressed in order to develop an ability to function under adverse climatic and sanitary conditions. Positions requiring professional skills should be filled by personnel who are already trained.

b. Civil Affairs Detachment. Training for personnel assigned to the Civil Affairs Detachment in a SAF should include a detailed review and study of the functional areas of civil affairs to include low level actions as they apply to the anticipated area of employment. The scope of training should include all levels of civic action programs.

c. Medical Detachment. In addition to MOS training, members of the medical detachment should receive instruction in the treatment of diseases indigenous to the area of anticipated deployment. The medical and preventive medicine specialist should be given extensive on-the-job training in local hospitals and dispensaries.

d. Engineer Detachment. Members of the engineer detachment should receive instruction in both combat support and civic action subjects. Training should emphasize field expedients and the use of locally available materials. The following subjects should be covered in the program of instruction:

(1) Field fortifications.
(2) Construction and repair of roads, railroads, and airfields.
(3) Bridges, ferries, and rafts.
(4) Waterways.
(5) Building construction.
(6) Sanitation and water supply.
(7) Area damage control.
(8) Assistance to agriculture.
(9) Power production.
(10) Use and maintenance of engineer-type equipment.
(11) Engineering and design.
(12) Construction planning and management.

e. Military Police Detachment. As a part of area orientation, members of the detachment should receive detailed instruction in subjects relating to civil and military law of the anticipated area of deployment. This orientation should emphasize authority and jurisdiction. The program of instruction should include, as a minimum, the following subjects:

(1) Military and paramilitary police in riot control to include riot control formations, use of chemical agents and equipment, and mob psychology.
(2) Area control operations to include police patrolling; operation of checkpoints; road blocks and strong points; personnel identification systems; civil defense; police security investigations; and customs enforcement control.
(3) Police public relations to include rescue squad operations, safety planning, fire protection measures, sponsorship of civic actions, schoolboy patrols, athletic leagues, and town “clean up.”
(4) Physical security operations to include physical security surveys; security of ports, airports, railroads, oilfields, and terminals; security of critical public utilities, industrial facilities, and mili-
tary installations; and security of critical and sensitive materials.

(5) General investigation and police subjects to include circulation control of individuals, traffic control, training and supervision; military and civilian prisoners, prisoners of war; law and order, criminal investigation, crime prevention; weapons instruction; and communications.

(6) Development of a police intelligence system which will complement criminal investigation and military intelligence efforts.

(7) Military police combat patrols, striking force operations, route and area reconnaissance, and airmobile operations.

f. Military Intelligence Detachment. Members of the MI detachment should receive detailed instruction on the organization and functions of U.S. and indigenous intelligence systems in the anticipated areas of deployment. As a minimum, the program of instruction should include—

(1) Intelligence and counterintelligence functions in counterinsurgency operations to include support for civic action programs, psychological operations, and military and paramilitary operations.

(2) Clandestine intelligence operations and techniques for selected personnel.

(3) Combat intelligence operations for anticipated area of employment.

g. Psychological Operations Detachment. The members of the unit should receive detailed instruction in the various communication media being utilized in the anticipated area of deployment. They should also receive instructions on agreed activities between both U.S. and indigenous agencies having psychological activities responsibilities. Special emphasis should be placed on training of all assigned personnel in psychological operations in support of—

(1) Area orientation (detailed).

(2) Counterinsurgency operations.

(3) Intelligence, police and related countersubversion operations.

(4) Civic action programs.

(5) SAF operations in remote areas.

(6) Preparation of psychological operations programs.

h. ASA Special Operations Detachment (SOD). Initially the SOD will be trained as directed by the chief of USASA. In addition to technical training, the SOD's receive pre-assignment instruction in languages, airborne, ranger and similar subjects. Other training will be in accordance with the training programs established by the commander of the SAF to which the detachment is assigned.

123. Brigade Size Backup Forces

a. General. Backup forces, like the SAF's, are specifically oriented for deployment to particular areas of the world. Accordingly, each U.S. Army division designated is required to develop training programs for the brigade and its subordinate elements selected for deployment to areas in which the capabilities of MAAG's and SAF's have been exceeded. Unit training programs must be modified to accommodate counterinsurgency training for the brigade as a tactical unit but with primary emphasis being placed on the use of brigade elements organized as mobile training teams (MTT). Personnel assigned to MTT's should be thoroughly trained in their respective MOS skills and personnel within each MTT should be given MOS cross-training to the extent practicable. FM 31-16 provides information and guidance for training of the brigade and its subordinate elements in its tactical counter-guerrilla role.

b. Training Objectives. The backup forces training objectives are—

(1) To be proficient in MOS skills.

(2) To be highly proficient in counterinsurgency operations.

(3) To understand the role of backup forces in the Army Special Warfare Program.

(4) To be familiar with the designated area.

(5) To maintain language skill levels through refresher training.
c. **Area/Country Orientation.** This program will closely parallel the area study program conducted by the SAF. When the backup force orientation is directed to a region with several nations, country priorities may be established based on the best available intelligence. Brigade commanders may elect to assign each battalion and its augmentation a particular country. A typical subject schedule would include the following:

(1) Geography.
(2) Communications media and transportation systems.
(3) History.
(4) Religion, cults and sects.
(5) Industry and agriculture.
(6) Nationalism, customs and taboos.
(7) Government.
(8) Armed forces.
(9) Insurgent forces.
(10) U.S. Assistant Program.
(11) U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Groups.
(12) Intelligence Briefing.

d. **Language Study.** Language proficiency for personnel assigned to the backup force will be in accordance with standards prescribed by appropriate headquarters. Each division might maintain a pool of native-speaking or school-trained linguists to support the brigade. It is important that personnel assigned to MTT's learn to speak and read words and phrases which are pertinent to their duty position. For example, the machine gunner in the infantry MTT should learn words and phrases which will enhance machine gun instruction to indigenous troops. The language training program should provide for maximum use of existing laboratory equipment, training facilities and assigned instructors. Professional civilian instructors may be provided on approval of Department of Army. Backup force personnel should be encouraged to enroll in appropriate language courses available through the general educational development program. Additionally, quotas can be obtained to send selected individuals to the U.S. Army Language School. Since linguistic skill deteriorates rapidly through disuse, backup force language proficiency instruction should include minimum refresher training of one hour per week of supervised practice. For this purpose each division should maintain a minimum of one qualified instructor per assigned language. Normally the very limited number of instructors and language facilities available will require that language instruction be centralized, for control and scheduling, at brigade or higher level.

e. **Guerrilla Tactics and Techniques.** In addition to instruction contained in the area orientation study program, backup force personnel should receive instruction in the tactics and techniques employed by guerrillas. A method by which this training may be accomplished is by participation as guerrillas in the regularly conducted special forces training exercises.

f. **Engineering/Demolitions.** Personnel assigned to backup force MTT's should receive training in antipersonnel mines, antitank mines, hand grenades, trip flares, and those engineering subjects likely to be of use.

g. **Medical.** Instruction in sanitation, severe weather hygiene, and subjects in first aid appropriate to the area of operation should be provided all personnel in the backup force.

h. **Communications.** All personnel in the MTT's should be provided familiarization instruction in the use and operation of portable radio sets, to include selected international morse code emergency formats.

i. **Civic Action.** The U.S. Army Civil Affairs School provides a course of instruction for officers scheduled for a counterinsurgency assignment. This course is described in section V below. Civic action training for MTT personnel should emphasize the role and conduct of the individual soldier and techniques for accomplishment of simple projects at the “grass root” level.

j. **Survival, Evasion and Escape.** All members of the provisional brigade backup force should be provided instruction in survival and evasion and escape with emphasis on techniques applicable to the designated area of operations.

k. **Physical Conditioning.** All personnel must be physically conditioned to perform and endure adverse climatic and dangerous sanitary conditions.
124. Training Requirements

a. Combat Units. The deployment of combat units to support a host country will be made only under exceptional circumstances, and then as a show of force or to conduct counterinsurgency operations in phase III. Except for those infantry, armored, and artillery units organic to the designated brigade backup forces, only minimal additional training is required. Usually an abbreviated area/country orientation program will suffice. In this respect area orientation should emphasize those subjects which will enhance military operations, such as terrain studies, indigenous military force organizations, tactics and techniques, and the enemy.

b. Combat Support Units. These type units may be required for deployment in an early phase of insurgency to provide both military and civic action operational assistance to the indigenous military forces or agencies of the host country. Predeployment training should include as a minimum area/country orientation, organization, tactics and techniques of indigenous forces to be supported, and language instruction for selected personnel. The program of instruction should include civic action functions and practical work on projects which can be executed within the units' capabilities. Special instruction should be provided in the care of equipment and supplies in preparation for anticipated deployment to countries possessing unusual climatic conditions.

c. Combat Service Support Units. Training requirements for combat service support units will be as indicated for combat support units. Commanders, staffs and selected personnel should become thoroughly familiar with and be trained to support both U.S. and indigenous forces in the host country. Medical service units should be trained to treat diseases and recognize health and sanitary hazards which are indigenous to the anticipated country of deployment.
1. General

JCS Pub 1

Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage.

JCS Pub 2

Unified Action Armed Forces.

(C) AR 10–122

U.S. Army Security Agency (U).

(C) AR 105–87

Electronic Warfare (electronic countermeasures and electronic counter-countermeasures) (U).

AR 320–5

Dictionary of U.S. Army Terms.

AR 320–50

Authorized Abbreviations and Brevity Codes.

(FOUO) AR 380–8

Policy Guidance for Security of Special Forces Activities.

AR 380–200

Armed Forces Censorship.

(C) AR 381–25

Army Intelligence Collection Instructions (U).

(C) AR 381–100

Intelligence Corps, U.S. Army Missions, Functions, and Employment of Personnel and Units (U).

AR 381–115

Counterintelligence Investigative Agencies.

(C) AR 381–205

Procedures Facilitating Intelligence Exploitation of Captured Enemy Personnel (U).

FM 1–5

Army Aviation; Organization and Employment.

FM 1–15

Aviation Battalion, Infantry, Airborne, Mechanized and Armored Divisions.

FM 1–100

Army Aviation.

FM 5–1

Engineer Troop Organizations and Operations.

FM 5–15

Field Fortifications.

FM 5–31

Use and Installation of Boobytraps.

FM 5–162

Engineer Construction and Construction-Support Units.

FM 5–188

Engineer Topographic Units.

FM 6–20–1

Field Artillery Tactics.

FM 6–20–2

Field Artillery Techniques.

FM 7–20

Infantry, Airborne Infantry, and Mechanized Infantry Battalions.

FM 7–30

Infantry, Airborne, and Mechanized Division Brigades.

FM 8–5

Medical Service Units, Theater of Operations.

FM 8–10

Medical Service, Theater of Operations.

FM 8–35

Transportation of the Sick and Wounded.

FM 9–1

Ordnance Service in the Field.

FM 9–3

Ordnance Direct Support Service.

FM 10–10

Quartermaster Service in Theater of Operations.

FM 10–17

Quartermaster Organization and Service in Army and Corps.

FM 11–8

Field Radio Relay Techniques.

FM 11–20

Signal Operations, Theater of Operations.

FM 11–21

Tactical Signal Communication Systems, Army, Corps, and Division.

FM 11–40

Signal Corps Pictorial Operations.
FM 11-50  Signal Battalion, Armored, Mechanized and Infantry Division.
FM 17-1    Armor Operations.
FM 17-36   Divisional Armored and Air Cavalry Units.
FM 19-5    The Military Policeman.
FM 19-10   Military Police Operations.
FM 19-15   Civil Disturbances and Disasters.
FM 19-20   Military Police Investigation.
FM 19-40   Handling Prisoners of War.
FM 20-32   Land Mine Warfare.
FM 21-5    Military Training.
FM 21-6    Techniques of Military Instruction.
FM 21-10   Military Sanitation.
FM 21-31   Topographic Symbols.
FM 21-50   Ranger Training and Ranger Operations.
FM 21-76   Survival.
FM 21-77   Evasion and Escape.
(C) FM 21-77A Evasion and Escape (U).
FM 23-series
FM 24-16   Signal Orders, Records and Reports.
FM 24-18   Electronic Warfare (ground based) (U).
(C) FM 24-150 Field Radio Techniques.
FM 30-5    Combat Intelligence.
(S) FM 30-9A Military Intelligence Battalion Field Army (U).
FM 30-10   Terrain Intelligence.
(C) FM 30-15 Intelligence Interrogation (U).
FM 30-19   Order of Battle Intelligence.
FM 31-15   Operations Against Irregular Forces.
FM 31-16   Counterguerrilla Operations.
(C) FM 31-20 Special Forces Operational Techniques (U).
FM 31-21   Guerrilla Warfare and Special Forces Operations.
(S) FM 31-21A Guerrilla Warfare and Special Forces Operations (U).
FM 31-30   Jungle Operations.
(C) FM 31-40 Combat in Fortified Areas and Towns.
FM 31-50   Mountain Operations.
(CM) FM 32-5 Community Security (U).
(S) FM 32-10 United States Army Security Agency in Support of a Field Army (U).
FM 33-5    Psychological Operations.
FM 41-5    Joint Manual for Civil Affairs/Military Government.
FM 41-10   Civil Affairs Operations.
FM 55-6    Transportation Services in Theater of Operations.
FM 55-15   Transportation Corps Reference Data.
FM 57-10   Army Forces in Joint Airborne Operations.
FM 57-35   Airmobile Operations.
TM 5-258   Pile Construction.
TM 5-302   Construction in the Theater of Operations.
TM 5-332   Pits and Quarries.
TM 5-337  Bituminous, Concrete and Expedient Paving Operations.
TM 5-342  Logging and Sawmill Operations.
TM 5-370  Railroad Construction.
TM 5-632  Insect and Rodent Control.
TM 5-634  Refuse Collection and Disposal; Repairs and Utilities.
TM 5-700  Field Water Supply.
TM 5-728  Engineer Foundry Practices.
TM 5-742  Concrete and Masonry.
TM 5-766  Electric Power Generation in the Field.
TM 57-210  Air Movement of Troops and Equipment.
DA Pam 21-81  Individual Training in Collecting and Reporting Military Information.
DA Pam 30-26  A Guide to the Collection of Technical Intelligence.
(C) DA Pam 30-100  Intelligence Collection Guide: Telecommunications (U).
(C) DA Pam 30-102  Intelligence Collection Guide: Identification of SMD (U).

2. U.S. Marine Corps

FMFM-21  Operations Against Guerrilla Forces.
APPENDIX II
EXAMPLES OF CIVIC ACTION

Examples of military civic action that may be performed in one or more parts of a country faced with insurgency are indicated below.

1. Use of individual talents or knowledge, acquired in the military service or prior to military service, by soldiers to provide advice and assistance in helping to solve problems of the people. This includes farmers, mechanics, teachers, medical personnel, administrative personnel, engineers, fishermen, electricians, carpenters, lawyers, or any other special talent possessed by the individual soldier.

2. Provision of troop labor for construction projects, harvesting crops, or preparation of ground for planting.

3. Provision of safe water supply by providing advice, assistance, and material for digging wells or installing simple pumps and filtration systems.

4. Supervision, advice, and assistance in construction of simple access roads from hamlets to villages and to main roads, to include construction of simple bridges and culverts.

5. Supervision, advice, and assistance in construction of community development projects to include markets, schools, community buildings, nurseries, dispensaries, canals, and houses.

6. Provision of emergency medical treatment and evacuation of civilians by armed forces facilities.

7. Provision of ambulance service to civilians when not required for army personnel.

8. Assistance by military doctors or aidmen in civilian medical facilities.

9. Supervision, advice, and assistance in instituting public hygiene and insect and rodent control programs.

10. Provision on a temporary basis of facilities or equipment not locally available, such as a portable generator for lighting the village school one or two nights a week to permit adult education classes, providing heavy equipment for assistance in construction or repair work being accomplished by civilians, or providing transportation of heavy or bulky materials for civilians for construction projects.

11. Provision of escort for convoys of critical products to markets where they are badly needed.

12. Establishment of military-civilian councils at village and hamlet levels to promote better relations, discuss mutual problems and provide for mutual assistance.

13. Provision of teachers for primary level and adult literacy schools, until public education organizations can assume this task.

14. Sponsorship, organization, and training of youth and women's groups until this can be assumed by the government.

15. Provision of a means of communication between hamlet, village, and district offices by using existing military means and tying in with civilian community facilities where available, or using spare army equipment until civilian facilities can be established.

16. Provision of emergency food, clothing, medical support, and shelter for civilians in the event of insurgent attack, fire, flood, crop failures, or other disaster.

17. Provision of advice and assistance to civilian agencies, both private and governmental, to enable them to accomplish their mission more effectively. This may range from pure technical advice to provision of personnel, supplies, and equipment on a temporary basis.

18. Provision of assistance and advice to the local paramilitary units in the training of hamlet and village defense forces.
19. Provision of technical advice and supervision of hamlet and village administrations until this can be assumed by civilian agencies.

20. Operation of local administrations where they are inoperative or nonexistent, until appropriate civilian agencies can take over.

21. Provision of security for hamlets and villages until this can be accomplished by other means.

22. Provision of surplus or salvage items. For example, salvage generators given to technical or vocational schools to provide cutaway models, salvage or surplus medical equipment given to welfare agencies for distribution to needy installations, and turning over to public health officials medical supplies which will shortly become salvage due to expiration date of effectiveness and which are not required by the army.

23. Construction of public buildings, defense works, and public facilities of secure hamlets, model villages, or relocated villages to reduce the time required to establish the hamlet or village, and provide assistance to villages in construction of homes and preparation of ground.

24. Conduct open house activities at military installations, and participate in civil ceremonies when the security situation permits.

25. Coordinate the establishment of military dependent communities, or integrate military dependents into the community, with local officials to provide maximum assistance and cause the least disruption of normal activity.

26. Contribute to local welfare agencies at every opportunity, either by providing funds or by providing personnel or equipment.

27. Supervision, advice, and assistance in establishing indigenous public services to include police, paramilitary police, civil defense unit, fire protection, disaster relief, and physical security.
APPENDIX III
SECURE POPULATION CENTERS

1. General

In addition to military and paramilitary actions undertaken to defeat insurgency, the civilian population can and must play a decisive role if the insurgency is to be defeated. This appendix presents the principles of a concept for the organization of villages or hamlets into mutually supporting complexes. This concept envisions all members of a village being organized for their own mutual support into a village complex. This mutual support not only includes defense, but also will include other activities, such as the general economic improvement of the village, public health, village sanitation, and extensions of democratic principles and procedures through such things as the formation of village and hamlet committees. Thus, by organizing villages or hamlets into complexes, there will be derived not only the initial advantage of security of the complex from outside insurgent attack, but also the following secondary advantages:

a. Insurgent forces will be prevented from establishing and maintaining contact with local inhabitants.

b. Identification of insurgent elements living outside the complex will be made easier.

c. With civilians grouped together, general civilian control measures will be made easier.

2. Establishment of Village Complexes

a. The establishment of village complexes is a serious course of action in the counterinsurgency battle. Since the establishment of village complexes usually will involve at least some degree of resettlement of inhabitants, such a step will have deep and far-reaching effects amongst the populace. Without very careful planning, the establishment of village complexes may hurt, rather than help, the counterinsurgency program. Therefore, it is important that a thorough study of the counterinsurgency situation be made before a program of establishing village complexes begins. Such a study should answer the following questions:

(1) Does the situation actually warrant the establishment of village complexes?

(2) Is the development of village complexes within the capability of counterinsurgency forces?

(3) Does the terrain or area favor the establishment of village complexes?

(4) How will the inhabitants react to the establishment of village complexes? If reaction is unfavorable, how can this be changed?

(5) Will the advantages accrued by the establishment of village complexes outweigh the disadvantages?

b. Plans, though varying for each province or subarea of the country, should consider—

(1) Establishment of priorities for development of complexes in each province or subarea.

(2) Selection of village complex sites.

(3) Methods by which villagers will be induced or motivated to enter into the village complex program voluntarily.

(4) Procurement of materials for construction of village complex defense systems.

(5) Engineer assistance to help prepare the defense system.

(6) Training of villagers so that they can defend themselves.

(7) Organization of the village complex administration system, to include appointment and duties of the village council, committees, and other agencies.
3. Security Concept of the Village Complex

The concept of the security of the village complex is not only that of a static defense, but through the use of patrols and mobile reserves is also an offensive defense. The security of the village complex includes—

a. A secure zone around the entire perimeter of the village complex in which village security forces, organized into paramilitary units, are continually on patrol, particularly during the hours of darkness.

b. Division of the village complex for defensive purposes into areas of responsibility with each village or area generally patrolled by security forces of that village or area.

c. Establishment of a limited number of routes on which all traffic is checked in and out of the village complex. A minimum number of routes will be utilized at night. During the day, additional routes may be used for miscellaneous reasons, such as reducing the distance farmers must travel to and from their fields.

d. Maintenance of a mobile reserve at village level to move rapidly to the assistance of any one village in the complex which might be under attack. This reserve will generally be made up of paramilitary units. The village complex concept envisions outside military assistance from regular military forces in case of large scale guerrilla attacks.

e. Establishment of an intelligence network in the community for the purpose of developing information about guerrillas in the area and to insure the prompt exposure of any undercover insurgent sympathizers in the community.

4. Organization and Training for Village Security Forces

In view of the importance of village security forces, special emphasis must be given to the organization, equipment, and training of these forces. The military commander of the counter-insurgency forces assists in this program of organizing and training these village security forces by—

a. Providing initial training cadres and training facilities.

b. Providing training aids where possible.

c. Organizing and providing facilities for communicating between the village complex and regular counterinsurgency forces. Through these communication facilities there will be passed not only information concerning the guerrillas, but also word of any guerrilla attack against the complex.

d. Providing reconnaissance patrols of regular counterinsurgency forces which will further contribute to the security of the village complex.

5. Economic Improvement

Activities to improve the economic situation within the village complex will include such military-civic actions as are listed in appendix II.

6. Extension of Democratic Procedures

These activities consist of the normal administration by village officials, and also include committees within each village who act as advisory groups to village officials. The military, political, psychological and economic leaders of the village complex are a part of the overall control committee.

7. Summary

The initial aim of the village complex concept is to locate traffic between guerrilla sympathizers physically located among the population and the guerrilla forces, regular and militia-type, which live in the open country. Within the villages are political, propaganda, economic, intelligence and terrorist elements which support the guerrilla forces. When this support has been effectively stopped, the guerrilla, in order to exist, is forced to smash the established barriers surrounding the village complex. A concurrent aim of the village complex concept is the total participation by all members of the community in providing for their own defense. This is accomplished by the integration of military, political, economic and sociological activities into one operation.
APPENDIX IV
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY

1. General

In areas where insurgent forces are known or suspected to be operating, the security of all forms of transportation is a serious problem. Good security and safety from insurgent attack requires careful prior planning, detailed training, responsive movement procedures and, particularly, a complete awareness of the seriousness of the problem. This appendix describes certain procedures that may be used to improve the security of road, rail, and inland waterway movements. In addition, certain counterambush techniques will be considered as far as they affect friendly mounted forces.

2. Preventing and/or Minimizing Ambushes

The only effective method to prevent an ambush is to avoid it. However, since avoidance is not always possible, other methods for minimizing ambushes must be found. Some of these other methods are as follows:

a. Timely, accurate intelligence is an effective means for reducing the effectiveness of guerrilla ambushes. Such intelligence can be developed by a variety of methods. One particularly important source of intelligence is the loyal population. The security and well-being of local civilians should be established and maintained.

b. In guerrilla infested areas where jungle growth is particularly thick, programs may be undertaken to clear the roadsides of jungle growth, either manually or through the use of defoliants.

c. For the protection of particularly important convoys or routes, troop units may be positioned along the route and/or used to conduct route or area reconnaissance.

d. The known patterns of insurgent activities may provide planning factors for countering future ambushes.

e. The use of air cover as convoy support is important. When aircraft are employed in this role they help prevent and/or minimize the effect of ambushes.

3. Military Classification of Roads

In an insurgent area, highway or road systems may be identified according to estimated risks from insurgent activities. One system, using a color code, is as follows:

a. Green Roads. These roads generally are within the limits of major cities and secure areas. Normally, military personnel are permitted to travel unarmed in any type vehicle on these roads.

b. Yellow Roads. These are roads upon which there is limited risk of insurgent ambush. Along these roads, the pattern of insurgent activity will take the form of sniping at odd vehicles and/or minor hit-and-run attacks. In an insurgent area the majority of roads will be yellow. In considering a specific route, however, various degrees of risk may be encountered. The following procedures should be applied to movement of military, police or civilian vehicles on Yellow Roads:

1. All military personnel traveling in vehicles should be armed.

2. Each military vehicle should carry at least two men.

3. Convoys should be responsible for their own protection.

4. Whenever possible, air cover will be provided.

5. Whenever possible, armed escort vehicles will be provided with a desirable ratio of one armed escort vehicle to every five “soft” vehicles.

6. Vehicles should be close enough to each other to render mutual assistance.
in case of emergency, but not so close that a small ambush will catch several vehicles.

(7) Travel at night should be restricted to cases of operational necessity.

(8) Irregularity of movement should be practiced to make guerrilla planning more difficult.

(9) Additional precautions may be specified for certain sectors of the road. Examples of these additional precautionary measures are as follows:

(a) Mounted and dismounted patrols should reconnoiter and patrol ahead if possible, and to the flanks of the convoy.

(b) Check points should be established and single vehicles required to halt and wait until a "provisional" convoy of four or five vehicles can be formed. When a single vehicle must travel alone, reconnaissance by fire may flush small ambushes. Extreme caution must be exercised on return leg of round trip when an alternate route is not available.

c. Red Roads. These are roads lying within active combat areas. Convoys traveling on Red Roads can expect to be ambushed at any point, and all movements of vehicles on Red Roads will be of a tactical nature. In addition to the measures outlined for Yellow Roads, the following measures should be implemented:

(1) Convoys will always be escorted by armored vehicles and supporting troops.

(2) Travel at night will be limited to operational necessity.

(3) Whenever possible, armed aircraft or observation aircraft should be assigned for reconnaissance and to assist in control of the convoy.

4. Standing Operating Procedures (SOP)

Every unit should have complete and comprehensive orders or plans covering movement by roads. These should cover in detail the following points:

a. Appointment and Duties of Convoy and Vehicle Commanders.

(1) A commander must be detailed for each convoy. The convoy commander will position himself where, according to the circumstances, he can best accomplish his mission. This will not necessarily be in the first or last vehicle. An armored vehicle or an armed soft vehicle, such as the ¼ ton truck with LMG mounted, should be used as the commander's vehicle. Radio communications must be provided for movement control of convoys and notification to alert forces of an ambush. In addition, provision must be made for passage of command in the event the commander becomes a casualty.

(2) A vehicle commander must be detailed by name for each vehicle. The vehicle commander's primary mission is to command the troops in his vehicle and control the vehicle should the convoy be ambushed.

b. Organization of the Convoy.

(1) Reconnaissance elements will travel ahead of the convoy. These elements will attempt to trigger prematurely any potential ambush.

(2) Vehicles in convoys should not be overloaded with personnel or equipment. If vehicles are loaded to their maximum, troops will be unable to effectively use their weapons. In a 2½ ton truck, for example, 16 or 18 individuals should be the maximum carried. Similarly, the number of men carried in other types of vehicles must be restricted to ensure freedom of movement.

(3) Personnel in troop-carrying vehicles must be constantly on the alert and be prepared for immediate action. Selected individuals should be posted as lookout-men or guards. In large vehicles it is usual that four men are posted, two at the front and two at the rear of each vehicle, with each assigned an area of observation covering 90° from the center of the road.
to the side in each direction. These guards should be armed with automatic weapons as well as with smoke and fragmentation grenades. Phosphorous smoke grenades are particularly useful as an antiambush weapon. If ambushed, the posted guards fire to cover disembarking troops. The guards may also assist in control of the convoy by informing the vehicle commander when the vehicle following halts or drops back.

(4) Armored escort vehicles can be placed in various parts of the convoy. In addition, the armored escort vehicle may serve as a mobile CP for the convoy commander. When large convoys move on main roads, vehicles should be divided into blocks of five or six, with armored escort vehicles placed in each block. The armored escort vehicles has two important functions during an ambush action: first, it provides immediate protection for personnel caught in the killing zone by driving into the ambush and engaging the enemy at point-blank range, and second, it provides direct fire support for the counter attack.

(5) Radio communications should link all command elements of the convoy and any reinforcing alert forces.

c. Location and Disposition of Weapons.

(1) Automatic weapons. Standard or improvised mounts constructed so that guns can be quickly removed from the truck are recommended. Weapons should be placed to ensure that immediate automatic fire can be brought to bear on any ambushing party.

(2) Crew-served weapons. These weapons should be distributed throughout the length of the convoy to provide indirect fire support. They can easily be removed from a vehicle and rapidly placed into firing position or they can be fired from a vehicle bed.

(3) Rifle Grenades. All men armed with rifle grenades should be trained to fire them immediately upon contact.

Phosphorous grenades are particularly effective, for they not only produce an immediate and effective smoke screen, but are also a feared and painful casualty producer.

d. Preparation of the Vehicles. It should be stressed that armed troops in a vehicle must have all-around visibility. They should be able to fire their weapons without hindrance and be able to disembark quickly. “Soft” vehicles should be “hardened” as much as possible, using such material as sandbags and armor-plate. One simple and readily available method of “hardening” a soft vehicle such as the 2½ ton truck consists of placing a single row of sandbags, stacked five high, down each side of the truck. This single row of sandbags will stop most small arms fire. A wooden bench may be rigged down the middle of the truck bed on which troops sit facing outwards. In addition, the following general preparatory actions should be taken:

(1) Vehicles should normally have tarps and bows removed.

(2) The tail gate should either be removed or be capable of being placed in a horizontal position upon instant notice.

(3) “Chicken wire” should be placed over the open windows of larger trucks to prevent insurgents from throwing grenades into the cabs of vehicles.

(4) A cutting or deflecting bar should be attached to the front of vehicles to prevent barrier cables or wires stretched across roads from decapitating or otherwise injuring personnel riding in the vehicle. This is particularly important in the case of the smaller vehicles such as the ¼ ton truck.

(5) Beds of trucks and floors of vehicle cabs should be protected by at least one layer of sandbags to minimize casualties from mines detonating under the vehicle.

e. Immediate Action Procedures. Whatever precautions are taken and whatever preparations made, the properly planned ambush will always be an unexpected encounter. Immediate
action drills are simple courses of action designed to deal with the problem of the unexpected encounter. They aim particularly at neutralizing the ambush and regaining the initiative through immediate and positive action. Experience indicates that it is near-fatal to halt in an area which guerrillas have carefully chosen as a killing zone. From superior tactical positions they endeavor to bring heavy and effective fire to bear on convoy elements in the killing zone.

(1) The basic immediate action procedure, therefore, is to endeavor to continue moving when fired upon, to halt only when the killing zone is either cleared or before entering it, and to counter-attack immediately from the flanks of their own choosing. Therefore, when vehicles are fired upon—

(a) Drivers should not stop, but should attempt to reach positions which are clear of fire.

(b) Lookout men and guards should immediately bring fire to bear on the estimated ambush positions. Men in each vehicle will fire all available weapons to disrupt and confuse the enemy.

(c) As vehicles clear the killing zone they should stop to permit occupants to detruck in order to take immediate offensive action.

(d) Vehicles other than armored escort should not attempt to run the gauntlet of the ambush. Commanders halted clear of the area should detruck their troops in order to take immediate offensive action.

(e) Elements of the convoy under attack will immediately effect communications with other elements of the convoy and/or with other friendly forces who may provide support.

(2) Troops in vehicles which are unable to drive clear of the area should take action as follows:

(a) Immediately open fire and launch grenades on the estimated ambush positions.

(b) Dismount from the vehicle on command and attack ambush positions.

(c) Troops mounted in a "hardened" vehicle may not be required to evacuate the vehicle immediately. They will fire all available weapons at guerrilla ambush positions and await the first "lull" in the initial guerrilla fire, or for supporting fire from friendly armored escorts or area-fire type weapons, as appropriate. Dismounting will then take place on order and in manner similar to the dismounting procedure from a soft vehicle.

(3) Immediate action procedures should be rehearsed frequently by infantry units. Where miscellaneous vehicles are formed into a convoy, two or three immediate action procedure drills should be held before the convoy enters the danger zone.

5. Counter Ambush Procedures

a. General. Guerrillas are particularly sensitive to threats to their rear or flanks. Offensive action to develop such threats can best be carried out by troops which are beyond the limits of the killing zone. Commanders so situated should launch an immediate flanking attack on guerrilla ambush positions, using as supporting fire any crew-served weapons which are available. It is difficult to launch an attack quickly from positions ahead of the ambush, because troops will have moved ahead of the scene of action and will require reorientation. In this case, the attack must be mounted as quickly as troops can be assembled and brought back to the scene of action. It is difficult to prescribe precise courses of action in these counterattack situations and it must be made clear at the convoy commander's briefing which particular subordinate commanders, if any, are to act on their own initiative. For example, friendly forces may be on both sides of a killing zone. In this case, a determination must be made as to which group will mount the main encircling attack against the guerrilla ambush positions. If both groups attack at the same time, without coordination, an inter-unit clash may result. It may be made standard practice that those
troops which have not yet entered the killing zone should launch the counterattack.

b. Armored Vehicle Tactics. Armored vehicles can assist in counterattack actions by driving into the ambush and engaging the guerrillas at very short range. In this way the armored vehicle will be able to—

(1) Reduce the pressure on friendly troops which might be caught in the killing zone.

(2) Provide direct fire support for the counterattack.

c. Training. The counterambush techniques outlined above should be practiced in varying situations until the natural reaction to a guerrilla ambush is the application of immediate action procedures followed by the counterattack procedures described.

6. Briefing

All personnel traveling in the convoy will be thoroughly briefed prior to movement. This briefing will include—

a. Details of route, speed, check points, order of march and maintenance of intervals and contact between vehicles.

b. Personnel loading of vehicles.

c. Distribution of weapons.

d. Appointment and duties of vehicle commanders and vehicle guards.

e. Immediate action to be taken in the event of guerrilla ambush.

f. Counterattack plans.

7. Security

Maximum precautions should be taken to prevent guerrillas from gaining information concerning vehicle movements. Points to consider are—

a. Telephone systems may not be secure.

b. Radio messages may be intercepted.

c. Loyalty of civilians cannot be guaranteed.

d. Fixed regularity or pattern in the movement of convoys invite ambush.

e. Information concerning the timing, route, and composition of a convoy should be disseminated on a need-to-know basis and as close to departure time as possible.

f. Plans should be formulated for alternate routes and deceptive measures.

g. Convoys should be assembled at the latest possible time before departure.

8. Communications

Provision must be made for communications in the movement of all convoys. Requirements will exist for communications for the convoy commander to control his convoy. In addition, there will be a requirement for a means of communication whereby other forces with a support capability may monitor the progress of the convoy or establish two-way communications.

a. The principal means of communication within a convoy will be radio. The convoy commander in particular must be able to communicate at all times with the leading element as well as the rear element of his convoy. In addition to radio, various visual and audio signals, such as smoke grenades and whistles may often be employed.

b. When helicopters and/or other aircraft accompany the convoy as escort, it is essential that the convoy commander be able to communicate with these aircraft. It is desirable that escort aircraft be able to monitor frequencies within the convoy. While other friendly forces in the area may monitor the convoy frequencies, it is more likely that in the event of an ambush on the convoy, they will be alerted on an established emergency frequency.

9. Protection of Railroads and Trains

Railroads are particularly vulnerable to guerrilla attack because the movement of a train is directly determined by the condition of the rails. The cutting of rails can produce effects comparable to direct attacks on trains, particularly when the guerrilla objective is to stop a train or prevent the delivery of critical goods. Even when friendly forces dominate the area, there is always a potential for deliberate sabotage and overt attack against railroad lines. General protective measures may include—
a. Security Measures. Measures which may be taken to protect rail movements include but are not limited to the following:

1. Trains should run on irregular schedules.
2. Railroad security elements should both precede and follow individual trains.
3. Flat cars loaded with sand may be pushed in front of each train to guard against derailment by mines or cuts in the tracks.
4. Automatic weapons should be mounted to deliver fire along the right-of-way as well as into adjacent areas.
5. A right-of-way may be cleared on each side of the rail line to the range of small arms fire and the cleared area declared a restricted zone. Should clearance of the entire right-of-way be impractical, areas around critical locations, such as defiles, tunnels, and bridges may be cleared.
6. Air cover of train and reconnaissance along the right-of-way may be made at unscheduled intervals.
7. Guard posts may be established at critical installations and rail facilities such as tunnels, bridges, and stations.

b. Train Guards.

1. Train guards may be assigned from civil police, military police or other troop units specially qualified for security duty. Economic use of personnel and greater efficiency will result if units are attached to a particular railroad organization or division for the specific purpose of providing security for railroad operations.
2. The guard force on a cargo train should be concentrated in one or two positions and should have radio communications with friendly units in the area that can provide support in the event of ambush.

10. Protection of Inland Waterways

Critical points such as bridges, locks, dams, and restricted areas along rivers and waterways should be guarded continously. Points offering favorable ambush sites should be cleared of vegetation to the range of effective small arms fire. Security measures may include—

a. Irregular schedules for movement.

b. Mounting automatic weapons on all craft.

c. Adequate communication means for each craft.

d. Establishment of waterway patrols in fast, heavily armed craft.

e. Patrol of waterways from the air.

11. Conclusion

Guerrillas should know that every ambush they execute may result in rapid, violent, and relentless pursuit by friendly forces. Such action, executed automatically as a matter of first priority, is most important to the overall effort to reduce the effectiveness and frequency of guerrilla ambushes. First, it ensures an early relief of the ambushed unit; second, it increases the possibility of friendly forces making contact with the guerrilla ambush party before it disperses; third, it reduces the time available to the guerrillas to destroy the ambushed forces and to loot vehicles; and, finally, successful pursuit operations will improve the morale of friendly units while having a corresponding opposite effect upon the guerrilla forces. An air cavalry unit or helicopter or parachute alert force, positioned with aircraft ready for instant employment, provides an excellent relief and pursuit capability. Armored personnel carriers and/or armored reconnaissance vehicles may also be used in the pursuit role since they have the mobility means required. Pursuit of guerrilla ambush forces must be initiated with the least possible delay, with only that degree of caution required to prevent falling into a larger and perhaps the primary guerrilla ambush.
1. General

Successful pacification of subversive insur-
gency requires the isolation of the insurgent
from internal and external support. Measures
described in the succeeding paragraphs are ad-
dressed to this problem.

2. Population Control Measures

The nature and scope of measures necessary
to defeat the enemy in a designated area may
require actions by military commanders which
impinge on the liberty and property rights of
the citizens of the affected area. Such actions
would normally be preceded by an announce-
ment of a declaration of emergency by the head
of the government. Application of the strictest
of population controls may be required. Martial
law would be declared only as a last resort. Ini-
tially, all travel is controlled, including trade
entering or leaving the area. The leaders of the
community, including the business men, are
made to realize that they have no choice other
than to support the government forces with
information of the insurgents. Even during
this drastic phase of control, however, the mili-
tary must continually emphasize positive meas-
ures to win over the people. Civil affairs pro-
grams must ensure that essentials such as fuel,
food, and medicines are brought into the area
under military control. Special population con-
trol measures may be taken to control the
population and to minimize its ability to collab-
orate with the guerrillas. Some control meas-
ures which may be completely or partially in-
stituted are—

a. Confiscation of weapons and ammunition
to reduce availability to insurgents, with an as-
sociated licensing and accountability system for
those who may be authorized possession. It is
important that the authorities maintain control
in this area to ascertain that authorized weap-
ons are not being used to assist insurgents.

b. Registration of all civilians, and establish-
ment of an identity system which cannot easily
be altered or duplicated. This will include reg-
istration of all non-residents and aliens enter-
ing the area.

c. Establishment of a curfew, with due con-
ideration of civilian needs, to reduce the op-
portunity for contact with the enemy. This
must be effective in controlling the population
elements who may want to contact the guer-
ollas, and yet must not cause undue hardship
on those persons who have a legitimate require-
ment for moving about within the area or de-
parting from the area. Examples of these per-
sons are fishermen whose activities are related
to the tides, farmers who must transport per-
ishables to market at some distant point, medi-
cal personnel and clergy.

d. In the imposition of travel restrictions,
care should be exercised to insure that persons
are able to perform legitimate and necessary
travel. Such travel, for example, includes au-
thorization of farmers to go to and from their
fields, to transport their produce to market, etc.
In addition, medical personnel and clergy are
often required to perform considerable travel
in accomplishing their services. The activities
of each person who has special travel permis-
sion should be carefully observed. Patrols, road
blocks, and the frequent changing of check-
points are some of the methods employed in the
enforcement of travel restrictions and curfews.

e. Establishment of restricted areas, from
which civilians are prohibited, to reduce the op-
portunity for sabotage, espionage, and ter-
rorism.

f. Suspension of civil rights to permit search
of persons, property, and houses, and arrest
and confinement on suspicion. These are
drastic measures from the civilian point of
view, and enforcement should be accomplished
in a very careful and circumspect manner.
g. Evacuation of areas to forestall acts of collaboration, or for the protection of the civil population. This may entail the relocation of entire hamlets or villages, or the relocation or exchange of suspected individuals or families to unfamiliar neighborhoods, away from relatives or friends who may be serving with the insurgents. See appendix III.

h. Controlled possession of drugs and medicines to reduce availability to the guerrillas. This entails limiting possession to persons who logically need drugs and medicines in the normal treatment of the civil population.

i. Establishment of a reporting system whereby administration of selected drugs, treatment of specific wounds or injuries, and medical aid must be reported.

j. Establishment of a reporting system whereby absentee employees are immediately reported for investigation.

k. Controlled licensing of those raw materials which may be of value to the insurgents, such as nitrates and other chemicals, building materials, and fuel.

l. Registration of all livestock, and establishment of a system of accountability to reduce their availability to the guerrilla.

m. Establishment of a price control and rationing system on essential food, fuel, clothing, and medical supplies to minimize diversion to the insurgents.

n. Confiscation of property, real and personal, of those individuals adjudged guilty of collaboration.

o. Imposition of stringent monetary controls to deny use of guerrilla funds to the civil population.

p. Denial of public utilities beyond areas which can be controlled by the government.

q. Censorship.

r. Prohibiting possession of radio transmitting devices and printing machinery, except those expressly authorized and controlled.

s. Licensing and control of all forms of transportation.

t. Requiring the population to live within secure areas to deny contact with the enemy.

u. Establishment of a system of awards, citations, rewards, and other public recognition for those civilians actively contributing to counterinsurgency operations. Public recognition will be given only when the government can furnish protection. Publicity does not apply to persons who are working clandestinely for the government.

v. Publication of appropriate proclamations, edicts, orders, notices, and other official declarations, informing the civil population of the measures taken and the punishments that may be given for noncompliance.

w. Immediate publicity for any acts on the part of army or civilian authorities in aiding or assisting the civilian population in any way. This is important in offsetting the harassment of the added restrictions placed upon the population.

x. Establishment of an information program directed at the civil population and designed to explain, justify, and publicize measures taken. This should be supported by psychological operations designed to influence the attitude and behavior of the civilian population in favor of operations against the insurgents.

y. Exemplary conduct on the part of Army and civil personnel and agencies in the enforcement of control measures. Prompt disciplinary action at the place of commission, with attendant publicity, must be taken for any misuse of authority or undue harassment by military and civil personnel in the enforcement of established control measures.

3. Area Organization and Control

a. In order to isolate guerrillas from the people, control of an area must be established so that the actions necessary to identify and eliminate hard core, willing supporters can be implemented, and those who are apathetic or neutral in attitude can be persuaded to support the government. This control of an area must be accomplished by seizing the initiative according to a cohesive, coordinated plan to regain the freedom to act, rather than react.

b. Upon dividing or selecting an area for pacification operations, the following specific actions are required:
(1) Special emphasis is placed on the establishment of an intelligence net to produce detailed and accurate intelligence of the target area.

(2) Ranger forces are reinforced to insure an adequate operational screening capability in the area.

(3) Completion of the orientation of troops that are to move into the area, and initiation of training in civic action and psychological operations techniques.

(4) Movement of a substantial force into the area.

(5) Establish and stock a base of operations.

(6) Establish a curfew and notify the population that they are in a controlled area. The area would be defined for the people, with the explanation furnished of the conditions that they must meet before control measures will be lifted. Substantially, they must learn to police themselves.

(7) Divide the area into battalion and company operational areas.

(8) Announce a general amnesty for any insurgents who voluntarily surrender. Concurrently, the area would be saturated with a positive psychological operations campaign, explaining to the people that the area is to be cleared and that some of their privileges will be returned once the population refuses to support the insurgents.

(9) Introduce medical teams with special interrogation training to set up a treatment center at the base and establish mobile teams. The patients, by interrogation through conversation, will furnish much information about guerrillas and local conditions. A recovered patient is one of the best possible future informants.

(10) Assign military police teams to work with local and national police to develop information to produce the desired intelligence of the target area.

4. Denial Operations

   a. Operations are initiated simultaneously with other counterinsurgency operations to deny guerrilla elements the benefit of safe havens across international boundaries, and support by an external sponsoring power. These operations require effective measures to secure extensive land borders or seacoast areas and to preclude communication and supply operations between a sponsoring power and the guerrilla forces.

   b. The methods of contact and delivery of personnel, supplies, and equipment whether by air, water, or land must be determined at the earliest possible time. Detailed surveillance of border areas must be conducted continuously to determine the—

   (1) Location of ingress/egress routes and crossing sites.

   (2) Frequency of crossing.

   (3) Volume of traffic.

   (4) Type of transportation.

   (5) Terrain conditions.

   (6) Probable locations of safe havens across the border.

   c. Military units may be given the primary mission of preventing ingress/egress across a boundary or shore line, or they may be required to conduct denial activities concurrently with the conduct of combat operations against the guerrilla force.

   d. The surveillance and control of extensive coastal areas normally require the use of—

   (1) Coordinated ground patrols on the shore line.

   (2) Coordinated offshore sea patrols of the shore line and river delta areas.

   (3) Reinforcing aerial, visual, and photographic surveillance of the offshore waters and the shore line.

   (4) Static observation posts along the shore line in the vicinity of river mouths, good ground lines of communication, and accessible portions of the shore line.

   (5) Effective centralized control and coordination of all these activities.

   (6) An effective system of licensing and
identifying all friendly military and civilian watercraft using the offshore waters.

e. While certain definite portions of an international land boundary may be placed under effective surveillance and control by the use of static security posts, reaction forces, ground and aerial observers, electronic listening posts, and patrols, the continuous surveillance and control of an entire extensive land border is extremely difficult. Since it is not possible to place military forces at all the crossing sites, a priority system for the sites requiring military forces is often established.
APPENDIX VI
GUIDELINES FOR ADVISORS AND MEMBERS OF MTT'S

1. General

The guidelines contained in this appendix are based on the experiences and recommendations of U.S. commanders and individuals involved in the support of counterinsurgency and other operations abroad. It is recognized that each participant must develop personal guidelines based on his own and his counterpart's personalities. Therefore, these guidelines are provided as general principles which permit considerable latitude in application.

2. Professional Duties and Interests

a. Always remember that you are the guest of a friendly government and an advisor to an element of its counterinsurgency force.

b. Permit the troops to know and trust you. Respect their customs, religions, culture, and beliefs. Use the native language at every opportunity but volunteer to teach English to interested officers and enlisted men.

c. Keep abreast of what is going on in the unit, keep in close contact with commanders and staff officers to obtain information, and constantly follow up on leads obtained.

d. Information from your counterpart cannot be accepted with blind faith. It must be checked—discreetly and diplomatically—but checked.

e. National politics, economy, customs, and educational development often dictate procedures which are considered inefficient and uneconomical in our Army. Avoid an arbitrary attitude towards these procedures. Try to understand them before recommending changes.

f. Continually stress the advantages of good military/civilian community relations; these are civic action at its best.


g. Be able to explain or discuss basic U.S. policy. Continually formulate in your mind how you will answer inevitable questions on current topics of the day.

h. Don't hesitate to begin a project because you won't be in the country long enough to complete it. Get it started and sell your successor on completing it.

i. Don't give up your efforts to analyze training because it is conducted in the native language; get an interpreter and find out all the details.

j. Encourage initiative and inventiveness. You will find that the average indigenous officer will follow orders to the letter, particularly in field operations. Even if a modified course of action subsequently appears to be more appropriate, he will rarely deviate, or request permission to deviate, from his original instructions. The advisor can improve this situation in two ways—first, he can encourage his counterpart to request changes in orders when the need is obvious; and, second, he can encourage his counterpart to be receptive to such requests from his own subordinates. Self-confidence must be developed in the subordinate, and a corresponding confidence felt by the senior in the judgment of his junior leaders.

k. Encourage frequent command inspections. Indigenous commanders often show a reluctance to inspect, relying primarily on correspondence and reports to evaluate the effectiveness of their units. By persuasion and demonstration convince your counterpart of the value of direct personal knowledge and the necessity of conducting frequent command inspections to determine state of training, maintenance, and combat readiness. Field expedient methods may be required to maintain items damaged by lack of maintenance or technical service support.

l. Encourage the unit to keep a journal of
major events for historical purposes. An advisory filing system which includes a suspense or periodic check system is essential. Security considerations will govern the use and disposition of these systems.

m. Develop an appreciation of the workload of the indigenous commander. He will be unable to spend the entire day with you although he will probably never call this to your attention. Make yourself available at all times, but let him have sufficient time to run his unit and do his paper work.

n. Conform to and stress the use of the chain of command by commanders and advisors at all echelons. Keep your counterpart informed of any advice you give to his subordinates, and keep your own subordinates and superiors informed. Your subordinates may be able to implement procedures which you cannot. Your superiors may be able to help you implement procedures at your level.

o. Do not become involved in personality clashes between indigenous officers; they are often more concerned with person-to-person relationships than with organizational frameworks.

p. When advice is rendered, be sure of your facts and be certain that it is within the capability of the unit to carry it out. Remember, your counterpart is responsible for all his unit does or fails to do. This does not excuse a lack of aggressive action when it is obvious the risk will be rewarded by success.

q. Advise against mistreating suspects or prisoners.

r. Constantly encourage the strengthening of unit esprit. As in all wars, this will sustain the unit in the face of difficulties.

s. Persuade indigenous personnel to pass information up, down, and laterally.

t. Don’t hesitate to make “on the spot” corrections; however, do it tactfully.

u. Understand that many indigenous soldiers may be illiterate, and that some do not speak even their own language well. Training must be repetitious and must emphasize practical work rather than lecture or conference-type instruction.

v. Don’t lose a single opportunity to learn about the area of operations, guerrilla fighting, and security in rear areas. This knowledge will be valuable to you the rest of your military career.

w. Don’t make promises which you cannot or should not carry out.

x. Don’t let indigenous personnel substitute your chain of command for theirs.

3. Advisory Techniques

a. Do not rush to establish yourself with your counterpart.

b. Advising works both ways. Set an example for your counterpart by asking his advice; you will get many good ideas from him.

c. Approach the subject under discussion from a different direction and with different words until you know that your ideas are understood.

d. Don’t be afraid to advise against a bad decision but do it in the same manner you would recommend a change of action to an American commander for whom you have respect and with whom you work on a daily basis.

e. It may take some time for the idea to germinate, but after planting an idea, let your counterpart take the credit for its initiation and practice. Your satisfaction is in the overall result obtained.

f. Transact important business directly with your counterpart to insure his full understanding of difficult subjects. Written advice will also serve as a check list for your counterpart. Prepare materials in a form that he can adopt and issue “as is”.

g. When seeking information on sensitive or controversial subjects, work from the “soft sell” to the request for official information; i.e., first, an oral recommendation; second, informal note; third, semiofficial letter; fourth, an official letter requesting information on which to base a “required” reply to higher headquarters.

h. Exercise patience in all your dealings with your counterpart. Never expect the job to be done at the snap of a finger; never snap your fingers.

i. If you find it necessary to make a sugges-
tion or recommendation implying criticism of existing policy or procedures, do so in private, never in the presence of superiors or subordinates of the commander. To change a policy or procedure, a written report to your superior with a copy (and translation if necessary) for your counterpart may be effective.

j. Always praise at least some part of what your counterpart does or plans. If a critique is required, include tactful suggestions for a modification of procedures or plans.

k. Present your suggestions carefully, in detail, with adequate reasons.

l. If there is a language comprehension problem with your counterpart, use highly qualified interpreters on important matters, followed by written memorandums. It must be recognized that some of our interpreters are marginal in ability.

m. Before advancing important ideas, brief your interpreter thoroughly and give him a chance to consult a dictionary prior to your scheduled meeting. No matter how well prepared you are, you will be at a definite disadvantage if your interpreter is not briefed, even if you are presenting a written plan.

n. Become familiar with the age and experience of commanders and staff officers at each echelon.

o. Don't accept a “yes” answer at its face value; “yes” may mean only that the person to whom you are talking understands what you have said, but it may not indicate that he accepts your suggestion. Occasionally, it is used to cover a failure to understand. When he indicates that he accepts your suggestion, it may never be implemented.

p. Don't present too many subjects at one time or prolong unnecessarily the discussion of any one subject; it is better to have another conference at a later time.

q. If custom permits, give advice in the form of demonstration; teach by example, but don't persist in doing the job yourself.

4. Personal Attitude and Relations

a. A careless word or action can negate the good will and cooperation built up by the U.S. with great effort and at considerable cost.

b. Avoid criticism of local politics in your discussions with indigenous personnel.

c. Study your counterpart to determine his personality and background, and exert every effort to establish and maintain friendly relations.

d. Set a good example in dress, posture, and conduct, as well as in professional knowledge and competence.

e. Emphasize the importance of doing things on time by being punctual yourself.

f. Treat the person with whom you work as equal in every respect.

g. Show an interest in indigenous customs, language, history and peoples. Your ideas will be more readily accepted if you show an understanding of theirs.

h. Develop a sense of responsibility toward the unit being advised to the degree that you can feel a personal gratification for a job well done.

i. Most peoples desire appreciation, recognition, and understanding; they seek security and attention; they like to feel important, like to contribute, and like to belong. In brief, they react to these things just as you do.

j. Make a special effort to keep physically fit.

k. Participate actively in the military, social, and athletic functions of your unit. While engaged with the enemy assist your counterpart as an additional staff officer. He may have an inexperienced staff or none at all. Record the action as well as possible and conduct an after-action critique.

l. As time progresses you may think that you are doing all the “bending over backwards”. If you observe carefully, you will find that this isn't so and that your counterpart is meeting you halfway.

m. Maintain your sense of humor.

n. Keep in mind the seriousness and urgency of your mission.

o. Don’t be discouraged. Suggestions and advice which may appear to have been disregarded may have been made the standard for the unit.

p. Be aware of all problems, but don’t accept
or become involved in your counterpart's minor, everyday problems. Place your advisory emphasis on the overall effort. Do not be tied down to the CP, if your counterpart cannot or will not leave it. Checking on your subordinates helps you know what is going on in the unit.

5. Social and Military Customs
   a. Accept invitations to social events and ceremonies, in accordance with policy, customs and good taste.
   b. Don't fail to observe and recognize military courtesy.
   c. Practice moderation in your consumption of alcoholic beverages and observe established custom by abstention if required.
   d. From time to time, invite your counterpart to your mess for social functions or as your dinner guest if custom permits.
   e. If you cannot accept a social invitation, send your regrets in writing.
   f. If you are not of higher grade, treat your counterpart exactly as if he were your U.S. senior.
APPENDIX VII
SAMPLE TRAINING PROGRAMS

1. General

This appendix contains examples of training programs for civil guard, self defense and hamlet militia type units. It is useful as a guide to show the types of subjects and relative time devoted to each during a training program for these types of units.

2. Civil Guard (12 Wk.—588 Hr.)

a. Basic Combat and Advanced Individual Training (352 hr.—8 wk.).

(1) General subjects—(160 hr.),

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject Description</th>
<th>Day</th>
<th>Night</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) Care and Cleaning</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>(b) Inspections</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(c) Commanders Time</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
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<td>(d) Ceremonies</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>(e) Military Courtesy and Customs</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(f) Psychological Warfare in Counterguerrilla Warfare</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(g) Civic Action</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(h) Organization and Missions of CG</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i) Dismounted Drill</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(j) Physical Training and Hand to Hand Combat</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(k) First Aid</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(l) Tropical Hygiene</td>
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<tr>
<td>(m) Maintenance and Supply Economy</td>
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<tr>
<td>(n) Procuring Information about Local Insurgents</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(o) Communications Procedure in Counterguerrilla Warfare</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(p) Demolitions, Mines, Booby Traps, Illuminants</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

(q) Field Fortifications and Expedient Obstacles __ 4
(r) Hand Grenades, Rifle Grenades, and Pyrotechnics _____________ 6
(s) Land Navigation in Swamp, Mountain and Jungle _____________ 8 4
(t) Individual Day Training: Counterguerrilla Warfare Day Combat Techniques _____________ 4
(u) Individual Night Training: Counterguerrilla Warfare Night Combat Techniques _____________ 8
(v) Survival Training in Swamp, Mountain and Jungle _____________ 1
(w) Chemical Training _____________ 2
(x) Proficiency Testing _____________ 2

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(2) Weapons.

(a) Rifle squads (178 hr.).

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<td>3. BAR Qualification</td>
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(b) LMG section (166 hr.).

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<td>3. Carbine Qualification</td>
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5. SMG Familiarization ______ 4
6. Night Firing ____________ 12
7. Quick Reaction Firing ______ 11
___ ______
154 12

(c) Mortar section (174 hr.).
1. Mortar Qualification ______ 82
2. Pistol Qualification ______ 13
3. Carbine Qualification ______ 42
4. Rifle Familiarization ______ 10
5. SMG Familiarization ______ 4
6. Night Firing ____________ 12
7. Quick Reaction Firing ______ 11
___ ______
162 12

(3) Tactics.
(a) Rifle squad (14 hr.).
1. Attack in Swamp, Jungle, and Mountain ______ 8 4
2. Defense and Retrograde in Swamp, Jungle, and Mountain ______ 2
___ ______
10 4

(b) LMG section (26 hr.).
1. Attack in Swamp, Jungle, and Mountain ______ 14 4
2. Defense and Retrograde in Swamp, Jungle, and Mountain ______ 8
___ ______
22 4

(c) Mortar section (18 hr.).
1. Attack in Swamp, Jungle, and Mountain ______ 8 4
2. Defense and Retrograde in Swamp, Jungle, and Mountain ______ 6
___ ______
14 4

b. Basic Unit Training (236 hr.—4 wk.).
(1) General subjects (32 hr.).
(a) Inspections ____________ 9

(b) Civic Action ______________ 5
(c) Psychological Warfare in Counterguerrilla Warfare ____________ 6
(d) Care and Cleaning ____________ 12
___
32

(2) Tactical training and squad firing (204 hr.).
(a) Movement ______________ 16
(b) Occupation and Organization of Bivouac Area ______ 4
(c) Squad Battle Drill ______ 2
(d) Immediate Action Drill: Reaction to Ambushes ______ 4
(e) Technique of Fire and Combat Firing ______ 12
(f) Squad Night Firing ______ 4 12
(g) Squad Defense and Area Security ____________ 4
(h) Squad Check Points: Population Surveillance Techniques ______ 2 4
(i) Squad Attack in Swamp, Jungle, and Mountain ______ 6 4
(j) Squad Recon Patrol: Surveillance of Local Area ____________ 6 4
(k) Squad Combat Patrol: Seeking Insurgent Contact ____________ 6 4
(l) Squad Ambush ______ 6 4
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(o) Platoon Ambush on Paths and Roadways ______ 2 4
(p) Platoon Attack in Jungle, Swamp, and Mountains ______ 6 4
(q) Platoon Raid of Insurgent Camp ____________ 6 4
(r) Platoon Raid and Search of Insurgent Village ______ 6 4
(s) Platoon Assistance of a Friendly Post ______ 6 4
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3. Self Defense Unit Training Program (6 Wk. —360 Hr.)

a. General Subjects.

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<td>(5) Civic Action</td>
<td>14</td>
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<tr>
<td>(6) Survival</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7) Communications and Counterguerrilla Operations</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8) Procurement of Information About Local Insurgents</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(9) Maintenance and Supply Economy</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(10) Tropical Hygiene and First Aid</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(11) Hand to Hand Combat</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(12) Land Navigation</td>
<td>8 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(13) Expedient Obstacles and Field Fortifications</td>
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Subtotal Hours — Gen Sub | 89 4 |

b. Weapons.

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<td>(2) Shotgun Qualification</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Automatic Rifle Familiarization</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Individual Night Firing</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>(5) Quick Reaction Firing</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) Technique of Fire and Combat Firing</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7) Squad Night Firing</td>
<td>4 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8) Hand Grenades, Rifle Grenades, and Pyrotechnics</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>6 4</td>
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Subtotal Hours — Weapons | 93 28 |

c. Tactics.

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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Individual Nighttime Combat Techniques in Counterguerrilla Warfare</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Squad Battle Drill</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Squad Reaction to Ambushes (Immediate Action Drill)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Squad Ambush</td>
<td>6 4</td>
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<tr>
<td>(6) Squad Surveillance of a Local Area (Reconnaissance Patrol)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7) Squad Seeking Insurgent Contact (Combat Patrol)</td>
<td>6 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8) Squad Attack in Swamps, Jungles, and Mountains</td>
<td>6 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(9) Squad Population Surveillance Techniques (Check Points)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(10) Squad in Defense and Security of an Area</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(11) Platoon Battle Drill</td>
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<tr>
<td>(12) Platoon in Defense: Area, Installation, and Operational Base Security</td>
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<td>(13) Platoon Ambush</td>
<td>2 4</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(15) Platoon Raid of Insurgent Camp</td>
<td>6 4</td>
</tr>
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4. Hamlet Militia Training Program (2 Wk. —120 Hr.)

b. Weapons.
   (1) Carbine Familiarization __ 12
   (2) Shotgun Familiarization __ 4
   (3) Hand Grenades ____________ 4
   (4) Night Firing _____________ 4 4

   Subtotal Hours —
   Weapons ___________ 24 4

c. Tactics.
   (1) Guerrilla Tactics in Attack
       of Hamlets _____________ 4
   (2) Organization of the Hamlet
       and Field Fortifications 12
   (3) Defense of the Hamlet Perimeter ___________ 8 4
   (4) Alarm System and Alert
       Procedures _____________ 2 2
   (5) Underground Tunnel Con-
       struction and Conceal-
       ment Within the Hamlet 10 2
   (6) Counterattacks of Guerrilla
       Penetration _____________ 4 4
   (7) Fire and Movement ___________ 3
   (8) Harassment Tactics and
       Use of Hidden Firing Po-
       sitions _____________ 2

   Subtotal Hours —Tact-
   ics _____________ 45 12

Subtotal Hours __________ 98 48

Total Hours ____ 360 = 280 + 80

4. Hamlet Militia Training Program (2 Wk. —120 Hr.)

a. General Subjects.
   (1) Commander's Time _______ 6
   (2) Mines, Booby Traps, and Il-
       luminants _____________ 5 3
   (3) Duties of Gate and Fence
       Sentry _____________ 3 1
   (4) Hand and Arm Signals____ 3
   (5) Procurement of Insurgent
       Information ___________ 4
   (6) Hand to Hand Combat____ 4
   (7) First Aid and Tropical Hy-
       giene _____________ 4

Subtotal Hours —Gen-
   eral Subjects _______ 29 4
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  - Civil guard
  - Engineer detachment
  - Medical services
  - Military intelligence detachment
  - Military police detachment
  - Psychological operations detachment
  - Special forces
- USASA

Mobile army surgical hospital

Mobile training teams:

- Armored cavalry
- Artillery
- Civil affairs
- Engineer
- Infantry
- Medical
- Military intelligence
- Military police
- Psychological operations
- Special forces
- USASA

Morale services

National agencies:

- Department of state
- U.S. Agency for international development
- U.S. Information agency

Natural disasters

Operational detachments

Organization—Continued

- Special action force
- Special forces
- USASA detachment

Paramilitary forces

- Assistance, U.S.
- Civil defense group
- Civil guard
- Civil police
- Counterinsurgency forces
- Convoy
- Special action force
- Supply and equipment
- Training
- Special action force
- Phases/levels of insurgency
- Photography
- Political subdivisions

Population control:

- Censorship
- Civil rights
- Confiscation
- Curfew
- Drugs and medicines
- Evacuation of civilians
- Licensing
- Livestock, registration
- Monetary control
- Price control
- Registration
- Reporting absentees
- Restricted areas
- Travel restrictions

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Psychological operations

Psychologicai operations detachment

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AGO 6448A
By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

EARLE G. WHEELER,
General, United States Army,
Chief of Staff.

Official:

J. C. LAMBERT,
Major General, United States Army,
The Adjutant General.

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- Bde (5)
- Regt/Gp (3) except
  - SW Gp (20)

NG: Corps, Div, Div Arty, Bde, Regt/Gp, Bn (2); Co/Btry (1).

USAR: Same as active Army except one (1) copy to each unit.

For explanation of abbreviations used, see AR 320-50.