CIVIL AFFAIRS
OPERATION

This copy is a reprint which includes current pages from Change 1.
CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS

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1–1. Purpose and Scope

a. This manual is for use by all elements of the Army in conduct of civil affairs operations. It is for use in conjunction with FM 41-5 and provides guidance concerning doctrine and procedures to be employed by commanders and staff officers in the conduct of civil affairs operations. Except as otherwise noted, the material contained herein is equally applicable to general, limited, or cold war, to include stability operations, as well as to operations of the Army conducted during peacetime.

b. Many aspects of civil affairs operations, particularly military government and martial law situations, are primarily legal in nature. Consequently, all civil affairs operations and activities which are legal in nature will be coordinated with and conducted under the supervision of the appropriate theater, army or other command staff judge advocate. The Judge Advocate General, with the aid of his corps, is the legal advisor of the Secretary of the Army and of all officers and agencies of the Department of the Army. (10 U.S.C. 3037; AR 10-5; AR 27-1.)

c. All civil affairs commanders and staff officers who have responsibility for, or authority to conduct or supervise operations of an international nature will insure that such operations are conducted in accordance with international law. Where situations exist involving international law questions or problems, the civil affairs commander or staff officer will coordinate his activities with the unit judge advocate or, if not readily available, any other judge advocate or staff judge advocate to insure that his operations are conducted in compliance with international law.

★d. This manual is in consonance with the international agreements listed below. Applicable STANAG's are listed at the beginning of each chapter. Where a STANAG is listed it applies to

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★e. Users of this manual are encouraged to submit recommended changes or comments to improve the manual. Comments should be keyed to the specific page, paragraph, and line of the text in which the change is recommended. Reasons should be provided for each comment to insure understanding and complete evaluation. Comments should be prepared using DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications) and forwarded direct to the Commanding Officer, US Army Combat Developments Command, Special Operations Agency, Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28307. Originators of proposed changes that would constitute a significant modification of approved Army doctrine may send an information copy, through command channels to the Commanding General, US Army Combat Devel-
1–2. Civil Affairs

a. Civil affairs include those phases of the activities of a commander which embrace the relationship between the military forces and civil authorities and people in a friendly country or area, or occupied country or area when military forces are present. Civil affairs include, inter alia:

(1) Matters concerning the relationship between military forces located in a country or area and the civil authorities and people of that country or area usually involving performance by the military forces of certain functions or the exercise of certain authority normally the responsibility of the local government. This relationship may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to military action in time of hostilities or other emergency and normally is covered by a treaty or other agreement, expressed or implied.

(2) Military government. The form of administration by which an occupying power exercises executive, legislative, and judicial authority over occupied territory (AR 310–25).

b. The term “civil affairs” has three common usages: civil affairs concept, civil affairs operations, and civil affairs organization.

(1) The civil affairs concept embraces the totality of the relationships of a military commander with his civilian environment.

(2) Civil affairs operations obtain for a military commander essential civilian support, reduce civilian interference with military operations, and assist in the attainment of his political-military objectives. They affect the relationship between his military forces and the civil authorities and people in his area of operations and may involve the performance by military force of some or all of the functions normally performed by civil government.

(3) Civil affairs organization, consisting of staffs and units particularly designed and trained to supervise and conduct civil affairs operations, is an integral component of the military force. It supports military forces in the conduct of tactical operations. It assists in fulfilling the military commander’s legal obligations with respect to the inhabitants, government, and economy of the area. It serves as the military agency with primary concern for the attainment of the US national objectives during and beyond the period of conflict and provides for the future transfer of most civil affairs activities to designated agencies of civil government. Civil affairs general staff interest will always be present and in overseas areas may be paramount in all civil-military relations, even though many of the activities such as the normal liaison and procurement functions are performed by organizations other than CA units.

1–3. Civil Affairs Guidelines

a. Doctrine.

(1) As defined by AR 310–25, civil affairs cover the entire spectrum of civil-military relationships ranging from advice, assistance, and civic action performed in a friendly country through military government operations in an occupied territory. They involve the relationship between the military commander and his forces, and the civil authorities and populace of a country. In effect, civil affairs constitute the bridge between the military function of defeating enemy forces striving to establish control over people and territory and the civil function of providing police protection for the populace while preserving or developing the political, economic, and social structure and desired psychological orientation of the country. The dividing line is indeterminate and can shift with changing circumstances.

(2) All military units have a capability to perform some civil affairs functions. Within existing resources this capability will be exploited.

(3) The Army will maintain the capability to perform the full range of civil affairs functions.

b. Training. Unit and individual training must recognize the military requirement for civil affairs and commanders should insure that programs enhance and improve their unit’s capability to perform civil affairs functions. The following should be emphasized:

(1) Command responsibility.

(2) Identification of civil affairs missions.

(3) Assessment of unit capability.

(4) Commanders must insure that personnel assigned their units are qualified. Continual examination of unit requirements, identifying key area for improvement, and constant assessment of unit capabilities will assist in maintenance of adequate standards of performance. Maximum advantage
should be taken of resident and nonresident courses offered by Army service schools.

c. **Operations.**

1. Civil affairs is a function of command, and all military personnel must have an appreciation of their responsibility in this field.

2. The degree to which a commander and his forces perform civil affairs activities will depend on the mission, authority, and relationship with other agencies in the area of operations.

3. Civil affairs requirements for the foreseeable future will be primarily advice and assistance to friendly governments in a host/guest environment wherein the U.S. military may or may not be the responsible U.S. agency. However, the civil affairs organization must be prepared and capable to provide the full range of activities defined in paragraph 1–2a.

### 1–4. Command Responsibilities

a. The conduct of civil affairs is as much a responsibility of command at every echelon as the planning for and conduct of combat operations. The Army, as an instrument of national policy, not only must fight when required to achieve national objectives, but must serve the ultimate goal of maintaining or restoring government, under law, within a climate of order.

b. Each commander of a military unit, regardless of its size or organizational position, must comply with the applicable provisions of international law with respect to the inhabitants, governments, and economies of occupied, liberated, or host territories.

c. The civil affairs objective assigned to a command will depend upon national policy. Although the development of policy is primarily the responsibility of nonmilitary agencies, its implementation is frequently made a responsibility of the military. Commanders must take those measures necessary for the accomplishment of their general missions, and may, under some circumstances, determine that the nature of the overall mission will necessitate major command emphasis on civil affairs. Generally, there are three sets of circumstances where this condition will prevail—

1. Cold war operations, including stability operations, necessitating military support of civil power outside of CONUS.

2. Military support of civil power in CONUS as a result of domestic disturbances, disaster, or hostile attack.

(3) Military government of occupied territory during or after the conclusion of hostilities.

d. In the case of an enemy area which is occupied, the commander normally directs and controls officials of the government and has the power to remove them from office or relieve them of authority. In the case of a friendly government in which area military forces may be present, the commander may only be concerned with liaison and measures for providing advice, assistance, or support. He may have no jurisdiction outside the physical bounds of his installation and may even share, to some degree, internal jurisdiction over his own installation with civil authorities.

e. A commander may have Civil Affairs (CA) units and personnel assigned or attached to conduct relations with local civilians and governmental agencies. In order to utilize fully the capabilities of CA units the military commander must provide adequate direction to them to insure that they are effectively employed, adequately supported, and properly supervised. In the absence of specialist personnel, he must accomplish his civil affairs mission utilizing other members of his command. For this and other reasons, it is important that the commander instill in all of his personnel a sense of responsibility for civil affairs, and simultaneously attempt to develop reserves of civilian goodwill. The extent of a command's participation in the affairs of the civilian community is as diverse as the varied situations of locale, mission, and political climate.

f. Prior to commitment, major commanders engaged in cold war, to include stability operations, or limited war operations should be provided through State Department channels a signed agreement with host governments covering relationships between military forces and the civilian authorities and population. FM 41–5 contains a detailed discussion of these agreements. These agreements normally are negotiated for the United States by the Department of State at national government level, but where long-range agreements have not been reached prior to commitment, or in circumstances where initial agreement details are left to major commanders, draft agreements covering command requirements should be prepared in advance as a recommended basis of negotiation. Prompt conclusion of such written agreements will facilitate prevention of operational handicaps, provide a basis for troop education and orientation, and fix the position of host governments in areas of possible friction. Regardless of whether a government-to-government agreement has been reached, it is mandatory
that commanders develop necessary functional working arrangements to establish coordination and harmony between military forces and local governments.

1–5. Objectives

The basic objective of civil affairs operations is to support the accomplishment of the military commander's assigned mission by—

a. Implementing those aspects of U.S. national policy as pertains to a particular area for which the military commander is responsible. Support of the commander's political-military mission may involve participation in coordinated activities with other U.S., allied, or international military components or civil agencies.

b. Assisting the commander in the discharge of his responsibilities pertaining to the civil population, government, and economy of the area.

c. Supporting or controlling local agencies in implementing measures to—
   (1) Create, restore, and maintain public order.
   (2) Safeguard, mobilize, and utilize local resources such as labor, supplies, and facilities for tactical or logistical purposes.
   (3) Control disease and epidemic conditions that might endanger the military force.
   (4) Prevent civilian interference with military operations.
   (5) Stabilize the economy.

b. Conducting operations to assist in civil emergency situations resulting from natural disaster, unrest, or enemy attack.

1–6. Civil Affairs Activities

a. To achieve his civil affairs objectives the military commander engages in various civil affairs activities which affect the relationships between military forces and the civil authorities and people in any area (including U.S. home territory) in which his forces are present. Civil affairs from the point of view of the commander's interest can be broken down into the following major activities—

   (1) Provision of civilian support for and prevention of civilian interference with tactical and logistical operations.
   (2) Provision of or support for the functions of government for a civilian population.

   (3) Community relations of the military forces.
   (4) Military civic action.
   (5) Military participation in a populace and resources control program.
   (6) Military support of civil defense.

b. Priority of command effort goes to that major civil affairs activity most directly related to the mission of the military command.

c. Psychological operations support each civil affairs activity with maximum effort provided to the priority activity.

1–7. Civil-Military Coordination

a. The Army, by the nature of its operational environment and because of its widespread deployment, has a major concern with civil-military relations and the proper coordination of these relations. Moreover, the designation of the Army by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the executive agency for civil affairs in the U.S. defense establishment places a special responsibility on the Army to organize and develop capabilities to function in this field. Coordination within the military organization, and coordination between the military organization and U.S. diplomatic, economic, and other organizations is a requirement accomplished by CA personnel in conjunction with the G5.

b. In international relations the Army is fulfilling responsibilities in connection with treaty organizations and mutual defense pacts. In all these matters the Army must work in coordination with the Department of State including the Agency for International Development (AID), the United States Information Agency (USIA), and other U.S. agencies.

c. The assistance of a number of U.S., allied or international governmental and private agencies may be available in the area of operations. The activities of these organizations directly affect the conduct of civil affairs. Federal departments and agencies may furnish technical advice and assistance to the Army as requested by appropriate authority. Public and private agencies from Allied Nations or international organizations may be authorized to work in an area in which military units have primary responsibility. Organizations of a charitable, religious, or fraternal nature, engaged in emergency relief activities, may assist the CA organization with trained personnel and supplies. Personnel of all of these agencies may operate under the direct supervision of CA units to assist in the accomplishment of command ob-
jectives. It is essential, therefore, that the work of these agencies and U.S. Army civil affairs activities be coordinated and that close liaison be maintained.

d. It is at the national level that treaties and agreements must be negotiated, and it is through Department of State channels that such negotiations are conducted. The commander should, in his own interest, maintain liaison with the ambassador and, also with the ambassador's concurrence, with certain officers of the host government, particularly at working levels.

e. Within each host country the military commander faces civil affairs problems at the various levels of government and military forces, and with the civilian population of that country. These problems are serious matters, for they affect the U.S. national interest, enhance or hamper U.S. national policy, and advance or retard the security of the United States and of the free world. Such matters as conduct of military personnel, movement of forces, maneuver rights, positioning of military defenses, storage of nuclear weapons, and transportation and placement of weapons such as missiles, are examples of mutual concern of the host civil authorities and military commanders. Some mechanism for dealing with such civil-military problems must be established. The embassy may or may not be in a position to serve as the liaison and coordinating agency at the subnational government level. In any event a civil-military contact office should be maintained for working-level liaison between the military command and the host government and its subnational echelons within established policy.

Section II. PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES

1-8. Principles of Civil Affairs Operations

Certain principles have international application and are reflected in STANAG 2055. In addition to the international principles, the following should be considered in planning for civil affairs operations:

a. Civil affairs operations are characterized by continuity and consistency in policy.

b. Responsibility and authority for the conduct of civil affairs activities are vested in the senior commander to insure uniform implementation. The commander is guided by directives from higher authority, national policies, applicable agreements, and international law.

c. Whenever possible, civil affairs operations are conducted through and with existing or reestablished civilian authorities.

d. Civilian inhabitants have a right to freedom from interference with their individual liberties and their property rights.

e. Members of U.S. Armed Forces are responsible for compliance with all requirements of law and regulation affecting their relations with civil authorities and populations.

f. The scope of civil affairs authority is varied with the locale and the situation. Five general categories of civil affairs authority are—

(1) Occupied territory. The commander of an occupying force has the right, within limits set by international law, to demand and enforce such obedience from inhabitants of an occupied area as may be necessary for the accomplishment of his mission and the proper administration of an area.

(2) Combat zone. The law of war places limits on the exercise of a belligerent's power in the interest of protecting combatants and noncombatants from unnecessary suffering and safeguarding certain fundamental human rights.

(3) Friendly territory. The degree of control exercised in the conduct of civil affairs in a friendly territory is limited by a civil affairs agreement. Regardless of the degree of control exercised by the commander he will transfer control to the recognized civil government as soon as the military and political situation permits. In a friendly territory which has an adequate civil administration, the commander may limit his civil affairs activities to the conduct of proper relations between his forces and the local inhabitants and procurement or utilization of local resources or facilities to support his military operations.

(4) Liberated territories. The territories liberated by combat operations will be returned to the control of the appropriate central government as soon as the government is able and willing to assume responsibility for administration. Until that time, the territory will be treated as an occupied territory.

(5) Other areas. The terms of international agreements, regulations, and national policy as promulgated or interpreted by higher authority dictate the scope of military authority in all other areas.
1-9. Civil Affairs Operations

a. Any project or activity of a military unit involving contact with civilians outside the military establishment or designed to influence or control civilian activities and civil organizations can be classified as a civil affairs operation regardless of the location of the activity or the size or type of the participating military unit.

b. The legal aspects of civil affairs operations may be governed by a provision of U.S. law, including the laws of a state, territory, possession, or other political subdivision of the United States and custom and international law.

c. The scope of civil affairs operations may extend from measures of liaison and coordination with appropriate local civilian agencies, to the furnishing of assistance and support to local officials and populations, or even to the assumption of responsibility for the exercise of some or all of the functions of government in the locality in question. The degree of civil affairs authority or control necessary to assure the success of operations should be consistent with law and agreements to which the United States is a party.

1-10. Factors Influencing Civil Affairs Operations

a. The pattern and objectives of civil affairs operations in any place, or with reference to any sphere of activity, depend primarily on U.S. foreign and domestic policies. For example, while a commander’s first task may be destruction of an enemy’s forces, he may have a subsequent major responsibility to help create internal stability through civil affairs operations.

b. A military command may be operational under any condition extending from peace through general war. Within this spectrum civil affairs operations may be subject to a wide variety of conditions, as—

(1) Developmental factors. Control or assistance measures pertinent to the exercise of governmental functions in a highly developed area, with complex political, economic, and social systems, compared to like measures in a developing area.

(2) Duration. From protracted assistance or control measures extending over several years or decades, pending resolution of major political, economic, or military problems, to operations prompted by transitory emergency situations and lasting but a short time.

(3) Location. Control or assistance measures undertaken in foreign territory as differentiated from measures instituted in domestic territory.

(4) Popular response. From operations involving a hostile population to measures receiving the enthusiastic support of a loyal and cooperative population.

(5) Military factors.

(a) The unlimited use of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons to the employment of conventional weapons only.

(b) The use of field armies in a general war to the use of small task forces in stability operations or Internal Defense and Internal Development (IDAID) assistance operations.

(6) Legal bases. Control or assistance measures may be authorized or required by express provision of law, such as an Act of Congress or an international agreement, or in extreme situations they may be undertaken under the principle of necessity.

(7) Civilian agencies. The existence of U.S. or local national agencies with responsibility for advising or accomplishing governmental functions or assisting military forces.

c. Civil affairs operations are influenced by the status of diplomatic relations between the United States and the government of the area which may or may not be in existence. The Department of State is the U.S. government agency held responsible by the President for foreign policy. Relations between the U.S. military command and the American ambassador or diplomatic representative require close coordination and definite delineation of responsibilities and functions. Normally this will be accomplished by means of an Executive Order issued by the President of the United States.

(1) In peacetime and under conditions of cold war, all agencies of the U.S. Government operating in a foreign country, except U.S. military forces in the field are subject to the authority of the American ambassador to that country. Coordination is usually accomplished through the “country team.” The ambassador presides over activities of this team and the MAAG or mission chief is usually the Department of Defense representative, although a senior military commander stationed in the country may also be a member. Other members include the in-country directors of the Agency for International Development (AID) and the U.S. Information Agency (USIA), embassy staff members, such as military attaches, chiefs of political and economic sections, and
others whose duties or affiliations make membership appropriate.

(2) Under conditions of limited or general war, however, supreme authority over all U.S. agencies in-country normally will be delegated to a military commander. The senior commander may be assigned a political advisor (POLAD) from the State Department to assist him in his relations with allied and neutral governments and to advise him of the point of view of the State Department on political questions.

d. The above environmental factors will require maximum flexibility and capabilities in CA organization. Implementation will require broad area and contingency planning and training in the entire range of civil affairs activities, including—

(1) The conduct of civil affairs operations such as civic action and other support of IDAID operations.

(2) Action to maintain public order or to provide for the welfare of the population, when requested by appropriate civil authority or directed by the President, in civil emergencies resulting from enemy attack, disaster, epidemic, disorder, or under conditions threatening the successful functioning of duly constituted authority.

(3) Maintenance of liaison between the military commander and the government of an area as prescribed by treaty or other agreement and the supervision of the entire gamut of other civil-military relationships of the command.

(4) Assumption of full or partial executive, legislative, and judicial authority over a country or area.

Section III. SPECIALIST PERSONNEL

1–11. Civil Affairs Functional Specialists

a. It is contemplated that specialist personnel will have had prior professional or technical training appropriate to the specialty for which they are selected. Such specialist personnel and teams receive additional specialized instruction and training in their various functions at appropriate Army installations and civilian institutions. They should have current knowledge of local conditions that might affect operations in their functional areas.

b. Upon mobilization of the USAR, this principle can be followed with little difficulty since USAR personnel assigned to CA USAR units are often individuals who work in their CA specialty in civilian life. Under circumstances where all CA requirements must be met from the resources of the active Army it becomes necessary to use personnel with MOS most closely related to the various CA specialist positions. These individuals should receive CA training designed to enable them to use their military occupational specialty skills in the fulfillment of the civil affairs mission. For certain CA specialist skills which have no MOS counterpart, it may be necessary to send active Army personnel with CA generalist training to civilian institutions for specialized training.

1–12. Civilian Specialists

a. Civilians possessing acceptable qualifications in the various CA functional specialties may be procured in accordance with applicable authorizations and policies for employment on the staffs of theater headquarters, CA area headquarters type units, or on staffs of other comparable levels of command. Employment on non-U.S. civilian personnel depends on the extent of Allied participation in a particular operation, the availability of military and civilian personnel, the level of command, and applicable policies.

b. In many overseas areas there are U.S. civilian residents who possess a wealth of current information with respect to the area, specialized functional knowledge, and language capabilities, who may be hired or temporarily transferred from another governmental agency to supplement the CA organization. Sources of these personnel may be another governmental agency which has temporarily suspended operations in the area because of hostilities, civilian employees of the armed services, commercial representatives, exchange students or professors, or representatives of private or religious organizations who have the necessary qualifications. Personnel selected may require additional training, dependent on their age, education, occupation, and previous military experience.
CHAPTER 2
CIVIL AFFAIRS ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS
(STANAG 2058)

Section I. GENERAL

2–1. Introduction

a. The civil affairs organization provides the commander with the means to perform his CA mission. It consists of all personnel and activities engaged in civil affairs operations and includes staff officers of supported units and CA units. Flexibility, and mission assignment are key factors in civil affairs organization. Each element is tailored to conduct civil affairs operations in support of a specific echelon of command or at a specific level of government.

b. Command responsibility for civil-military operations (CMO) requires coordination at the appropriate operating level within the military, with the indigenous civil government, with other agencies of the U.S. Government, and frequently with private agencies.

c. The ACofS, G5, Civil-Military Operations (CMO) is established as a general staff section at all echelons of command down to and including the division and comparable units and will be provided in all support command headquarters where appropriate.

d. A CMO Staff Section (S5) is established as required in each combat brigade, regiment, group, or comparable unit and in all other units which habitually have area responsibility and which are authorized to be commanded by colonels (06).

e. A CMO Staff Section (S5) will be established in combat maneuver battalions deployed in sta-

2–2. Organizational Placement

a. Standardization agreements provide that armies of NATO, CENTO, SEATO, and ABCA countries will accept responsibility for appropriate civil affairs administration and support and will have CA staffs and units (app H).

b. In a large command, or where CMO has become a major or primary mission of the command, the commander should consider appointing a deputy for civil-military operations.

c. The ACofS, G5, Civil-Military Operations (CMO) is established as a general staff section at all echelons of command down to and including the division and comparable units and will be provided in all support command headquarters where appropriate.

2–3. Concept of Operations

This manual covers organization and operations of civil affairs units. Organization and operations of psychological operations units are covered in FM 33–1.

a. The scope of operations conducted by CA units varies according to the specific mission assigned by higher headquarters. Whenever possible, civil affairs operations are conducted through and with existing or reestablished civilian authorities utilizing the minimum number of military personnel required for advice or supervision. As local governmental agencies become increasingly able to function with decreasing support or control, the numbers, types and size of CA units may be reduced. Disposition of units made surplus by consolidation is accomplished in accordance with the theater plan.

b. CA command support units are those provided for the operational support of field armies and subordinate commands. These units perform recurring civil affairs operations and move with the unit being supported. In a fluid or moving situation, a command support unit normally initiates only limited emergency activities in an area. The continuance or extension of these activities is carried out by designated area support units. In a static situation, a command support unit when augmented with appropriate functional teams may perform many or all of those activities normally conducted by an area support unit.

c. CA area support units may be provided for either the combat zone or the communications

FM 41–10
zone as required for predesignated missions. They normally do not move from their planned area or locale of employment as do command support units. Area support units can be tailored for specific areas such as cities, provinces, or states. These units perform CA functions and operations of a more permanent nature than command support units with the objective of reestablishing the civil government and economy as soon as possible. These units are allocated and deployed in accordance with a plan normally developed in advance of commitment and serve as backup to command support units in the combat zone. In stability operations CA units are often employed in support of U.S. Army advisors to public officials in the provinces and districts.

d. The shift from command support civil affairs operations to area support civil affairs operations usually is accomplished by having a CA unit specifically tailored and prepared for the city, province, or state to relieve an in-place CA unit that has been operating in the command support role. Area support units shift the emphasis on activities. Certain activities, such as the restoration of public order and safety, control of refugees and displaced persons, and furnishing of emergency relief, which may have received primary attention during a fluid situation, will share importance with such functional activities of government as public works and utilities, public transportation, and civil information once an area support unit has taken over. When one CA unit is directed to relieve another, the commander and principal members of the staff of the relieving unit make a personal reconnaissance of the area and confer with the staff of the headquarters to which the unit will be assigned. The commander of the unit being relieved insures that necessary actions are taken to—

(1) Acquaint the commander and staff of the relieving unit with designations, locations and commanders of higher, subordinate, adjacent and supporting units in the area, and with the characteristics and peculiarities of the area.

(2) Furnish copies of current operational directives, standing operating procedures, policy checklists, reports, and records summarizing previous activities in the area of the unit being relieved.

(3) Describe activities in progress, their relative importance, and point out additional measures that must be taken.

(4) Document commitments made to civilians or civilian officials.

(5) Furnish a list of individuals, not appointed as officials, but of value to the CA unit.

(6) Furnish information and recommendations on other items outlined in the periodic CMO reports as noted in FM 101-5.

e. In a static situation primary attention of both command and area support units may be given to long-range policies for the restoration of local institutions. Consideration may be given to reformation of institutions and the adoption of more liberal policies in the control of the inhabitants, depending on the provisions of applicable treaties or agreements and U.S. objectives. It is essential to establish a stable government and to confirm its exercise of authority.

2-4. Uniformity and Continuity

a. Economic, sociological, and political situations within the area of operations will often be complex and may be unpredictable. Detailed prior planning, however, enables the commander to employ his civil affairs organization to exercise effective control, supervision, or influence over the local population.

b. CA units must initiate activities in the combat zone as soon as an area comes within the control of the military force. Since uniformity and continuity of policies and operations are essential to success, all tactical commanders exercising civil affairs authority require civil affairs guidance from higher authority.

2-5. Types of Civil Affairs Units

a. Civil affairs units include two main elements, command and control elements and functional teams. The command and control elements and functional teams are melded into units appropriate in size and capability to the specific mission.

b. A CA platoon is the smallest control element. Although the platoon headquarters is not self-sufficient, it is designed to exercise control over a maximum of ten functional teams.

c. CA company, battalion, and group headquarters consist of a command and administrative headquarters element in which are included the appropriate staff officers and to which functional elements are added as the situation requires.

(1) These CA companies, battalions, and groups normally command a number of subordinate CA units. There are exceptions. For example, when a political subdivision is of such complexity and magnitude as to require the rank, experience, and diversity of special and professional skills that are not feasible for a CA platoon, a higher
level CA unit may be given the operational role. In many cases it may become necessary to augment this unit with the full range of functional teams to counterpart all the activities of a government. The specially tailored unit should then be concerned with only that political subdivision for which it was tailored. The commander and staff of this type of CA unit would serve as counterparts to the indigenous officials while subordinate team groupings would be concerned with administering or advising indigenous officials in the administration of the lower levels of government (e.g., boroughs, wards, districts, suburbs).

(2) The cellular concept of organization lends itself to the flexibility for assignment, attachment, organization, or reorganization of CA elements required to deal with the wide variety of CA tasks and missions.

**d.** The theater civil affairs command and CA brigade headquarters are designed to serve primarily as command elements of CA units responsible for the central government or a major political entity of a nation. These headquarters consist of a command element, a complete CA functional staff, and administrative elements for self-sufficiency.

e. Details concerning the capabilities and the organizational structure of these and other civil affairs units are contained in paragraphs 2-35 through 2-57.

2-6. Functional Teams

a. CA functional teams are cellular and vary in size and capabilities. These teams are made up of individuals who are technically qualified either to advise or supervise each of the various functions which comprise the normal range of governmental activities. CA is administered on a functional basis, with areas of specialization arranged into categories generally adaptable to the diverse social-political-economic ramifications of civilian government functions. Each function is related to a certain extent to every other function, and their interlocking relationships do not permit assignment of exclusive interest to any one functional area. Extensive liaison and coordination are also required with other military units, particularly intelligence, military police, medical, psychological operations, and those engaged in communications, construction, and supply activities. In civil affairs operations, aside from purposes of organization and training, the functional breakdown is not arbitrary but is designed to provide sufficient flexibility to fit the special requirements of any area or situation.

b. In applying these functions in any foreign land, commanders must be constantly alert to avoid the blind projection of an organizational concept from the United States or a State or locality previously encountered. By way of illustration, in many foreign countries functions other than mail-carrying commonly are assigned to postal ministries. These may include telephone and telegraph service, radio and television, bus transportation, and banking. There is seldom a valid reason for reassigning these functions. The fact that US Post Offices do not handle this is not a justification for reorganization.

★c. Teams are capable of assisting, supervising, advising, or directing civilian offices performing the same or related functions at the level of government at which their parent headquarters operates. Functional teams are attached or assigned to units on the basis of organization and need, and the size of the unit and the nature of its mission determine to a large degree the employment of the teams. For a description of the teams and their functions, see paragraphs 2-35 through 2-57. For purposes of training and operational control, the functional teams may be grouped into general categories. This separation does not necessarily reflect essential functional relationship, since each function is related to some extent to every other function.

d. Functional teams may, when authorized by their commander, represent him in direct contact with civilian officials of their corresponding function. The teams give technical advice and assistance as needed and evaluate the results. If the commander is authorized to exercise control over civilian officials, the teams supervise and coordinate the execution of orders and instructions issued. All official communications are made in the name of the commander.

e. Teams maintain close liaison with military agencies having corresponding functions; for example, public safety with the provost marshal and military police, public health with the surgeon, and legal with the judge advocate.

f. In order to maintain flexibility and to make full use of the capabilities of functional teams, it is preferable to assign teams to the highest CA unit and to attach them to lower units or assign team missions in support of specified objectives.

g. Functional teams of different sizes are organized to deal with every facet of economic-
political-sociological life of the civilian community. These teams are—

1. Arts, Monuments, and Archives.
2. Civil Defense.
3. Civil Information.
4. Civilian Supply.
5. Displaced Persons, Refugees, and Evacuees.
7. Food and Agriculture.
8. Labor (indigenous manpower).
9. Legal.
10. Property Control.
11. Public Administration.
13. Public Education.
17. Public Transportation.
20. Religious Relations.
21. Language.

h. Functional teams are cellular entities with full capabilities to perform missions in line with their respective specialties. The teams are not designed to stand alone but instead are intended to operate within a larger organization. Functional teams are provided minimal organic support (usually only sufficient transport to move their equipment) and must be provided administrative and logistical support by the parent or support unit.

2-7. Tailoring of CA Units for Operations

a. CA organization is based on the nature and ultimate size of the area of operations and the political mission of the parent military command rather than the size or composition of the troop force operating in the area. Flexibility in CA organization is obtained by the combination of appropriate CA headquarters units and functional teams required for the mission.

b. As a basis for estimating the number and type of functional teams required for an operation, the following should be considered:

1. The type of civil affairs operation.
2. Support available from non-civil affairs units.
3. Degree of control required.
4. Number and size of population centers.
5. Population density.
6. Attitude of the population.
7. Nature of economy (agricultural or industrial area).
8. Degree of economic development.
10. History of the area.
11. Estimated population movements.
13. Health conditions.
14. Labor potential.
15. Civilian supplies available.
17. Languages of the area.
18. Religious entities.
19. Extent of public communications services.
20. Religious Relations.

2-8. Tailoring of CA Units for Operations

b. As a basis for estimating the number and type of functional teams required for an operation, the following should be considered:

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2. Support available from non-civil affairs units.
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10. History of the area.
11. Estimated population movements.
13. Health conditions.
14. Labor potential.
15. Civilian supplies available.
17. Languages of the area.
18. Religious entities.
19. Extent of public communications services.
not feasible due to limitations in time and precise area information as well as such unknown factors as the attitude of the population and the extent of combat damage the area will suffer.

★ (a) In an area support situation, one approach for the CA planner is to examine the existing political and administrative structure in the area of operations and, considering the nature of the civil affairs operation to be conducted, determine the levels of government at which CA units must be deployed or civil affairs controls exercised. This amounts to grouping similar political and administrative subdivisions which will have essentially the same CA unit requirements. The appropriate levels of government will vary widely from area to area.

1. A country might include—
   (a) Small towns and rural areas.
   (b) Municipalities up to 50,000 population.
   (c) Municipalities 50,000 to 100,000 population.
   (d) Municipalities 100,000 to 250,000 population.
   (e) Municipalities over 250,000 population.
   (f) Districts (counties).
   (g) Provinces (states).
   (h) Regions.
   (i) National government.

2. The example given (1 above) would be appropriate for a highly urbanized society. In many of the underdeveloped areas of the world, however, the typical pattern consists of one large capital city which is the seat of government and the hub of commercial and transportation activity, a few medium-sized cities which are largely marketing and distribution centers, and many villages and rural areas that comprise the remainder of the country. In such cases, the CA force structure can be greatly simplified.

★ (b) In any event, the next step is to develop a “type” CA unit (i.e., a headquarters unit and suitable functional teams) to perform the civil affairs tasks at each level which has been delineated. Guidelines for selecting appropriate headquarters units are provided in paragraphs 2-35 through 2-57. Functional team requirements may be determined by examining the list of CA functional team duties set forth in paragraphs 2-35 through 2-57 and determining the degree to which these duties must be performed at each level. For example, the guidelines provided in paragraphs 2-35 through 2-57 indicate that a CA platoon is the suitable headquarters unit for both of the first two localities listed in the levels given above. However, the functional team requirements for each of these two may vary considerably. For example, in small towns and rural areas, the platoon headquarters augmented with a language team and receiving occasional advice and assistance from functional specialists assigned or attached to higher headquarters, should be sufficient to carry out the required CA functions. Thus, the unit for this level of stratification could be a small CA platoon. On the other hand, the platoon assigned to the small city of up to 50,000 normally would require that certain functional teams be assigned or attached on a full-time basis, making the size of this platoon several times the size of the platoon needed in a small town or rural area. However, at this level many of the functional teams could be expected to perform multiple functions. For example, the public administration team could oversee most of the governmental functions, the economics and commerce team could oversee most of the economic functions, the public works and utilities team could oversee all public functions and so on. Thus, a “type” unit for the small city might be a platoon headquarters, a language team, a public administration team, an economics and commerce team, a public works and utilities team, and possibly, public health, public safety, civilian supply, and displaced persons, refugee and evacuee teams depending upon the situation. The same reasoning is applied and type units are developed for each level of stratification which has been delineated. Generally, the number and type of functional teams required increases with successive levels. However, this is not a hard and fast rule which should be applied blindly. A district government, for example, may not perform as many functions as the government of a large city. In addition, in many small countries such functions as public finance and public communications may be almost totally controlled at the national level. Definitive judgments can only be based on a detailed study of the area concerned.

(c) Once type units for each level have been devised, the next step is a simple mathematical determination of the numbers of each type unit required to provide complete area coverage. Then, finally, the units are put together in a suitable organizational structure. Normally, this will conform to the existing administrative structure. However, if it is found that the span of control...
is extended excessively at any level, additional headquarters units may be introduced to reduce this span of control. For example, in a country with 30 provinces, all directly subordinate to a national government, it may be desirable to group these provinces regionally and introduce additional headquarters units to command each regional grouping. Since these additional units would have no indigenous counterpart level, they would not normally have functional teams assigned or attached.

**c.** Civil affairs headquarters teams may on occasion be used as civil affairs or civil-military operations staff elements, when such staffs are not otherwise available. In a similar manner, civil affairs functional teams may be used to reinforce civil affairs or civil-military operations staffs. As an example, a company headquarters team may be assigned as the G5 section of a division headquarters when appropriate augmentation is otherwise lacking. Or, in an operation requiring a major planning effort to insure the continued availability of essential civilian commodities, the responsible G5 staff might be augmented with a civil affairs civilian supply team.

**d.** In determining the types of functional teams required for a civil affairs unit or headquarters staff element, the presence of other US agencies, such as USAID, in the area of operations and the assignment of functional responsibilities to these agencies will be a major consideration. For example, if USAID is responsible for the agriculture, the need for civil affairs missions, civilian agencies of the US Government, such as USAID, may have primary responsibility for advising or assisting civilian government operations. Close coordination and liaison should be established with these agencies and CA units may be used to support their activities.

2-8. Selection of Command Structure for Civil Affairs Operations

a. Command over civil affairs units may be centralized or decentralized, depending on the type operation. The senior commander delegated civil affairs authority is responsible for the conduct of civil affairs operations.

b. The decision as to the method of conducting civil affairs operations, and the organization to support that method, rest with the senior commander. In developing his command structure for civil affairs operations, the senior commander should consider the following alternatives:

**1** To attach CA units, as required, to each major element in the field army(ies) and the COMMZ for operational control.

**2** To form a separate CA command at the highest level and have all subordinate CA units attached to that command for operational control. Combat support and combat service support units may on occasion be attached for operational control to a civil affairs command.

**3** To attach for operational control CA units to civil-military advisory elements of the US Government which have primary responsibility for advising or supervising civilian government operations.

**4** Some combination of (1) through (3) above.

**e.** The most responsive civil affairs operational and organizational concept envisioned for most situations is that which provides for centralized direction and decentralized operation of civil affairs. Consequently, the attachment of CA units, as required, to each major command element having civil affairs authority will be the normal arrangement. This concept requires for effective implementation as follows:

1. Proper CMO staff representation at all command echelons including joint and combined staffs.

2. Provision of adequate CA units to all commands having civil affairs authority, tailored to meet the commanders' specific needs.

**d.** In stability operations or other cold war missions, civilian agencies of the US Government, such as USAID, may have primary responsibility for advising or assisting civilian government operations. Close coordination and liaison should be established with these agencies and CA units may be used to support their activities.

**e.** When the theater commander retains civil affairs authority, he may employ the theater civil affairs command (TCAC) to formulate plans, procedures, and programs for civil affairs operations in conformity with guidance of higher authority. Should the theater commander desire to delegate civil affairs authority, he normally delegates authority for the combat zone and the COMMZ to the theater army commander when the theater army is in the operational chain of command. Even when the theater army is not in the operational chain of command, the theater commander may desire to delegate civil affairs authority, in which case he normally delegates authority for the combat zone to the field army
(army group) commander, and for the COMMZ, to theater army commander. The theater CA command immediately subordinate to the theater commander consists of a headquarters assisted by a tailored force of subordinate units. The theater army commander, when delegated CA authority, may use the CA brigade to execute the CA mission and for command and control.

Section II. CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS
STAFF SECTIONS AND PROCEDURES

2–9. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G5, Civil-Military Operations (CMO)

a. The general staff acts as a single agency in the coordination of all the principal functions of the commander. Each general staff officer is charged with primary responsibility for assisting the chief of staff in the coordination of those activities included within a specified functional field. The ACofS, G5, Civil-Military Operations (CMO) officer is the principal staff assistant to the commander in all matters pertaining to political, economic, social, and psychological aspects of military operations. He has primary staff responsibility for those actions embracing the relationship between the military forces and civil authorities and people in the area of operations to include internal assistance and development operations, and for those actions in which PSYOP techniques are used to support the achievement of command objectives by creating in target groups the emotions, attitudes, or behavior desired. In the performance of these functions, he is responsible for—

(1) Advising, assisting, and making recommendations that relate to civil affairs (CA) and psychological aspects of current or proposed operations.
(2) Preparing plans and recommending policies and procedures for CMO activities, including military government, when appropriate.
(3) Preparing CA and PSYOP estimates and conducting studies and analysis.
(4) Preparing the CA and PSYOP portions of operations and administrative logistics plans and orders.
(5) Determining the requirements for CA and PSYOP units and personnel.
(6) Supervising CA and PSYOP units that are attached or under operational control of the command.
(7) Coordinating procurement of indigenous resources.
(8) Coordinating CA functions of command in the field of government, economics, and sociology.
(9) Recommending CA policy concerning obligations between civil and military authorities arising from treaties, agreements, international law, and US policy.
(10) Advising on matters pertaining to the civil population, local government, institutions, economy, and economic resources available for military use.
(11) Coordinating civil support for tactical and combat service support operations and for preventing civilian interference with these operations.
(12) Coordinating and supervising community relations for the command in theaters of operations.
(13) Coordinating military support of populace and resources control programs.
(14) Coordinating CBR plans and operations pertaining to CA.
(15) Monitoring enemy PSYOP efforts in order to identify vulnerabilities, to analyze probable course of action, and to measure effort of friendly propaganda.
(16) Providing technical advice and assistance in the reorientation of defectors and prisoners of war.
(17) Establishing and maintaining close and continuing relations with other US government agencies, effecting necessary coordination to insure adherence to policy and integration of effort.
(18) Coordinating military support of civil defense in the area of operations.

b. PSYOP responsibilities are discussed in FM 33–1. The following paragraphs are concerned primarily with the civil affairs responsibilities of the G5.

2–10. CMO Staff Supervision

Staff supervision is accomplished by visits and by study and analysis of special and routine reports of subordinate units. G5 staff section officers, in
their inspections and visits, determine whether policies and directives of the commander are being followed and advise subordinate units and their staff sections on actions they should take. Staff supervision of CA and PSYOP units is of particular importance to insure proper conduct and effective coordination of effort in the various CMO functional areas.

2-11. Command and Staff Relationships
Personnel of G5 sections are advisors, planners, coordinators, and supervisors. As members of the coordinating staff, they should not allow themselves to become too engrossed with the details of administration and operation. General staff officers have no authority to command subordinate elements of the command, but conduct staff supervision of those activities for which they have primary general staff responsibility.

2-12. Representative CA Processes of the G5
Since, from a conceptual standpoint, CMO is the total of all civil-military relationships, no attempt will be made in this manual to enumerate every conceivable operational aspect of these relationships. As a guide for planning and training purposes, however, the following processes are typically representative of CMO and constitute the means by which the functions are performed by all elements of a military command:

a. Liaison.
(1) With other military units in the command to which assigned or attached, and with units in contiguous zones.
(2) With other US allied, and international governmental agencies in the area.
(3) With representatives in the apparatus of the indigenous government.
(4) With representatives of private agencies.

b. Negotiation.
(1) Negotiations will be coordinated with the Staff Judge Advocate.
(2) With appropriate agencies of civilian authorities over such matters as police authority, jurisdiction, licensing, taxation, use of public facilities, registrations, applicability of laws and regulations, customs, religious practices, restrictions, and other similar phases of both personal and official relationships.
(3) With private civilian individuals and organizations concerning purchases, claims, contracts, rentals, memberships, personal relationships between individuals, and other related matters.

c. Participation.
(1) In joint civil-military councils and committees.
(2) In community relations and civic action type activities.
(3) In uniservice, joint, and combined exercises and training programs so far as CMO instruction and emphasis are concerned.

d. Coordination.
(1) Among functional civil affairs specialists and between civilian counterparts and staff sections with related interests.
(2) Between all military and civil agencies in areas of mutual concern.
(3) With representatives of other US governmental, allied, and international agencies.

e. Support.
(1) For military forces from civilian labor and material resources.
(2) For civilians from military personnel, equipment, facilities, and supplies.

f. Advice.
(1) To the commander on—
(a) Relationships with civil authorities and population.
(b) Effects of operations or activities, or contemplated operations or activities, on civilian welfare and morale.
(c) Effects of civilian governmental and administrative processes, habits, activities, needs, and capabilities on his operations and missions.
(d) Relationships with US and allied agencies in civilian governmental capacities.
(e) Procedures for handling non-US labor.
(f) Treatment for civilians coming under his jurisdiction or control.
(g) All other matters concerned with affairs of his command in respect to civilian relationships.

(2) To civil authorities on—
(a) Needs and requirements of the military forces.
(b) Capabilities of military forces in cooperative ventures.
(c) Rehabilitation procedures and processes.
(d) Civil defense and disaster measures.
Technical methods calculated to improve civilian economies and social structure.

To other staff sections and to subordinate units of the command on CMO matters.

g. Control (when required) of—
(1) The circulation of civilians.
(2) Agencies of government.
(3) Economic processes and civilian activities or conditions which may affect operations.

2–13. Conduct of the Major Activities of Civil-Military Relations

a. The representative G5 processes outlined in the preceding paragraph operate in support of the major activities of the civil-military relations of a military commander. Command priority will be given to those activities which are most closely related to the command mission.

b. Under some circumstances, the primary mission of the command may be such that management of civil-military relationships becomes the major command activity. This is likely to be the case in situations involving cold war, stability operations, or IDAID assistance missions. It is equally true if the primary command mission is the provision of military support for civil defense, or the establishment of a military government in occupied enemy territory after the cessation of hostilities. Conversely, if the primary mission of the command is the destruction of hostile armed forces in a limited or general war situation then the management of the various civil-military relations activities is a supporting command function to assist the tactical forces and their logistical system. In this situation, the activity which deals with the provision of civilian support for and the prevention of civilian interference with tactical and logistical operations must have priority in the overall CMO efforts of the command. Whatever the command mission may be, measures taken to accomplish this mission should avoid alienation of the populace to improve the possibilities for winning the peace after cessation of hostilities.

c. The conduct of the major activities of civil-military relations may be varied to insure maximum support to the commander in the accomplishment of his mission.

(1) Provision of civilian support for and prevention of civilian interference with tactical and logistical operation.

(a) Civil-military operations are conducted for this purpose.

(b) In addition to their own operations, CMO staffs (and units) are able to render support to other agencies in this effort by providing them with detailed area surveys portraying institutions, population groups, commercial establishments, and industrial developments susceptible to attack or constituting a hazard to friendly operations; surveys of attitudes and reactions to friendly programs aimed at political or economic targets; surveys of substantive effects of operations designed to disrupt or destroy governmental administration, economic production, commerce or trade; and intelligence on significant personalities or industrial capabilities.

(2) Provision of or support for the functions of government for a civilian population.

(a) CA units or personnel may be assigned to provide liaison between a military command and civilian governmental agencies. In this situation the civil affairs mission may be merely to insure mutual performance of requirements laid down in an actual or implied bilateral agreement.

(b) CA units or personnel may be required to provide for the total performance of all governmental functions in either a military government situation in occupied territory or in a major civil defense emergency in CONUS, or in an intermediate state between these two extremes, such as the reinforcement or extension of governmental services by military personnel and units when the government has been weakened or disrupted by insurgency, hostile attack, or natural disaster. Even well-established governments in highly developed nations may require this type of military assistance. In the United States this was necessary for the establishment and initial functioning of the Civilian Conservation Corps during the depression and today it has been found necessary to support the work abroad of civilian agencies such as AID and USIA with military personnel and units.

(3) Community relations of the military forces.

(a) Any military organization that is stationed on foreign soil or whose personnel are present on such soil (naval personnel on shore leave, for example) exerts some degree of influence on the local community. The influence contributes or detracts from the attainment of U.S. goals in the area involved in almost direct proportion to the success or failure of the community relations program.

(b) Good community relations promote better understanding between civil and military elements and encourage cooperation between the
two groups far beyond the immediate locality in which they are initiated. Poor community relations may trigger reactions in the rest of the world. Following are some of the programs, projects, and activities in which military units may participate to promote good community relations in CONUS or overseas.

1. Information activities. Normally the Information Officer is charged with developing a good public image of the Army and insuring fair and impartial news coverage. Normally the Army has no censorship over media of public expression in the United States, its possessions, or in friendly foreign countries, therefore, cooperation obtained usually reflects cooperation extended.

2. Open houses, exhibits, and demonstrations. With limitations imposed by security and operational considerations, goodwill and community understanding are stimulated by opening military facilities to visitors, showing informative and educational exhibits, and giving demonstrations which simultaneously provide entertainment and emphasize the posture of U.S. military strength. An extension of the same general program can be conducted offpost by participation in parades, providing concerts by military bands, demonstrations by drill teams at public functions, and furnishing speakers for appearances before selected opinion-influencing groups.

3. Participation in athletic leagues or events. Joint civil-military participation in athletic contests or leagues, if properly handled, can engender goodwill, but undue partisanship will destroy any advantages accrued.

4. Orientation of personnel going abroad. Orientation programs vary in scope from passing out circulars containing helpful hints and short orientation lectures to more sophisticated orientation programs such as the instruction given personnel assigned to MAAG’s and missions. This consists of concentrated briefings on the area and country to be visited supplemented by kits of material for individual reference and study. In many cases, further orientation of personnel is conducted on the ground during the first days after arrival in a foreign country.

5. Joint civil programs. Military participation in such programs as support for orphanages or similar indigent groups, cooperation in the sponsorship of youth organizations, and participation in fund drives develops warmth and approval. In general, it can be said that making personnel, facilities, and equipment available in programs of general or specific welfare within limitations imposed by capabilities and policy directives promotes friendly attitudes worth many times the effort expended.

6. Counterpart cooperation. Many general and special staff officers in military units have counterparts in the civilian community. Close liaison and cooperation in programs of mutual interest to military and civilian agencies are advantageous to both.

7. Armed Forces Disciplinary Control Boards. Armed Forces Disciplinary Control Boards are established under AR 15-3 with membership normally composed of the surgeons and provost marshals from military installations in a designated area. In meeting with invited civilian representatives from nearby communities they make a major contribution toward improving the health and moral climate of the civilian community in the vicinity of the military installation to the advantage of both military personnel and the community.

8. U.S. Information Service. The USIS, operating under direction of the U.S. Embassy and conducting a broad program of information, cultural, and educational services for the population of a foreign country, usually will have an activity located in the vicinity of large U.S. military installations abroad. Where such activities are located in the vicinity of a military headquarters, the military units normally have representation on planning committees for liaison purposes and provide support from the military for the USIS program. The USIS frequently will have literature or movies that can be utilized by military units in their community relations program.

9. Binational association. In most overseas areas there are organizations, associations, or committees with military and civilian membership, some of which are organized primarily to improve relationships. Meetings may be held in which mutual problems are discussed, and support for various charitable, patriotic, cultural, educational, and recreational programs, events, and facilities may be made matters of joint sponsorship.

10. Unit and individual projects. In conformance with command policy, individual military units may support an orphanage, school, hospital, or similar facility on a continuing basis or in connection with specific events or holiday periods. Individual personnel may be encouraged to accept invitations to visit with local families and to reciprocate with invitations to meals in unit messes on special occasions. Military equipment and volunteer manpower may be used to assist civilian communities in the development of play-
grounds, athletic fields, or other community facilities. Families may be encouraged to accept children as guests in their homes for extended periods, particularly during summer school vacation. Many military personnel and members of their families are well qualified to lend assistance with local education programs in English and in other subjects. Assistance with local USIA programs and other educational and social welfare activities is one of the most important individual means of building goodwill in lands where people are still thirsting for knowledge and where social needs are frequently great. Care must be exercised in these programs to insure that they do not violate customs or appear as charity and therefore create resentment rather than rapport. Additional care must be exercised to insure that support to orphanages, schools, and hospitals or similar facilities will not jeopardize those operations seriously when US forces are withdrawn.

11. Advisory councils. Frequently community relations councils are established which may include as members the commander, selected members of his staff, and representatives from national or regional (depending on the locale) governmental and civic organizations (AR 360–61). These councils, which may be set up either in CONUS or overseas areas, can serve any or all of the following purposes:

(a) Medium of official liaison.
(b) Action agency for joint programs.
(c) Sounding board for reactions to specific incidents and conditions.
(d) Agency through which diverse requirements can be weighed and compromises reached.
(e) Policy group for the allocation of aid and assistance.

(c) The CMO officer has a definite staff interest in the community relations program. CMO staff participation should emphasize the programming and coordinating aspects rather than the operating responsibilities. The community relations program remains the operating responsibility of the information officer in a command, but with coordinating staff responsibility assigned to CMO officer for advice and coordination.

(4) Military civic action.

(a) The use of military personnel and resources to support or implement a national internal development program is military civic action. In a Phase I insurgency situation, particularly in the absence of a real external threat to a nation, military civic action augmented by psychological operations normally should be a primary mission of the military forces of that nation since the internal development program represents the best hope for the prevention of an active insurgency. US military personnel assigned to advise and support indigenous forces must be prepared to assist in staff planning and supervision of this program. In other phases of insurgency, military civic action continues as part of the total IDAID program to the maximum feasible extent.

(b) Military civic action is also of significance in limited and general war situations but demands more emphasis in postcombat situations.

(5) Military participation in populace and resources control.

(a) Control of the populace and resources of a country is a responsibility of its civilian governmental agencies. There are circumstances, however, in which civilian agencies may be unable to meet this responsibility. For example, a country threatened with, or weakened by insurgency, disaster, or hostile attack, may require the services of its military forces to impose effective control. Under any set of circumstances, when military forces are used to execute or support a program for the control of the civil populace and its resources, this program becomes a major activity of civil affairs.

(b) In IDAID, a populace and resources control program as part of the total internal security effort is of prime importance.

★(6) Military support of civil defense and local civil government. Military personnel, resources, and units may be committed to provide support, training, or supervision for civil defense activities in CONUS or overseas to mitigate the effects of disaster or hostile attack. When a military unit is so committed, civil affairs generally, and civil defense in particular, becomes a primary matter of the commander's concern, and he will use those resources necessary to support this activity. However, in most situations, the provision of military support for civil defense or, in the United States, military support to local civil government is a secondary mission of the military unit, and planning and training for the accomplishment of this mission must be accomplished to the same degree as planning and training for the accomplishment of any other contingency mission. CMO staff sections, in conjunction with other members of the general or coordinating staff, should insure that this planning and training is effectively accomplished.
(7) Psychological operations.

(a) Civil affairs is aimed at the intelligent handling of military contacts with civilians to produce a result that will best assist the commander in the accomplishment of his mission. Civil affairs activities can best be performed with the appropriate support of psychological operations directed toward influencing civilians who are located in areas for which the military commander has responsibility or in which his troops are operating. Overall staff responsibility for psychological operations is vested in the G5. The G5 coordinates with the G3 on assignment and use of PSYOP units and with G2 on intelligence support requirements for psychological operations. Psychological operations units provide advice regarding the psychological implications of proposed courses of action and utilize organic and indigenous personnel and equipment in the production and dissemination of propaganda in support of selected courses of action.

(b) The commander should utilize his psychological operations units to insure attainment of his civil-military relations objectives in much the same way as he uses his firepower to support his plan of maneuver. Psychological operations doctrine and techniques are contained respectively in FM 33-1 and FM 33-5.

Section III. STAFF COORDINATION FOR SUPPORT OF CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS

2-14. General
While the G5 has primary staff responsibility for the coordination of matters involving civil-military operations, this is no way subordinates the specialized interest and activities of other staff elements of a command. Primary responsibility for many staff activities affecting civil-military relations remains with the staff section normally assigned those functions (FM 101-5). However, close coordination with the G5 will be necessary for proper staff supervision of these matters. This section lists those matters of particular importance to the civil-military operations staff officer, which are performed by other staff sections but which are of mutual concern.

2-15. Assistant Chief of Staff, G1, Personnel
GI areas of interest which impact on civil-military relations include the following:

a. Personnel management of indigenous civilian employees to include availability of all skills and categories of civilian labor, conditions of employment, pay scales, fringe benefits, and employment agreements.

b. Provide army health service units, personnel, and material to supplement inadequate civilian medical facilities and supplies within the scope of US policy and international law and to augment the civilian capacity for the control of disease as required.

c. Establishment of the need for local real estate and other indigenous resources to be used for headquarters locations, housing of troops, rest, recreational, and other special service facilities.

d. Review of requirements for indigenous supplies for use in feeding and clothing civilian internees, and establish the need for facilities or materials to be used in the construction of refugee camps.

e. Plans for military assistance to the civilian populace on graves registration matters, for use of civilian labor in US graves registration activities, and the availability of land for use as cemeteries.

f. Information and assistance in the control and movement of displaced persons and refugees and maintenance of law and order in local communities.

g. Reports from provost marshal concerning conduct of military personnel in the civilian communities and recommendation for command directives concerning the conduct of military personnel in relations with the civilian populace.

h. Recommendation for military assistance for evacuation and hospitalization of civilians.

2-16. Assistant Chief of Staff, G2 Intelligence
G5 activities both require and produce intelligence information. The areas of mutual interest between the G5 and the G2 are extensive and vital. The G2 must coordinate his intelligence effort with civilian intelligence agencies. The G5 should be generally informed of such relationships and should assist the G2, where necessary, by negotiation with responsible civilian government agencies. Detailed coordination and liaison between US military intelligence personnel and civilian intelligence personnel will be direct but the G5 should be informed of and help prepare the general command policies governing such relationships. Further, the G5 should be informed
promptly whenever intelligence activities threaten to, or do, impair the overall civil-military relationships of the command. Some of the areas of mutual interest requiring close coordination between the G2 and G5 include:

a. Intelligence information collected from the local population to include line crossers, displaced persons, refugees, and evacuees.

b. The use of local agencies for guarding acquired technical enemy material for intelligence purposes.

c. Intelligence information pertaining to the population, its government, economy, and institutions.

d. Counterintelligence activities of civil affairs and PSYOP elements including civil security, censorship, control of travel, and location of collaborators.

2-18. Assistant Chief of Staff, G4, Logistics

All military operations have some impact upon the civilian populace. Fire and maneuver, barriers, and the use of special weapons are likely to bring about collateral damage and casualties to civilians. G5 prepares a CMO estimate to assist in the command decision on a course of action. Estimate should include information about population densities and configurations, which will enable the G3 to plan for the successful accomplishment of military missions while inflicting minimum collateral damage upon the civilian populace and the civilian economy. After the decision, the G5 prepares plans to support the “plan” developed by the G3. In certain circumstances civil-military operations considerations may be a factor which can affect the choice of fire support systems and plans of maneuver. While this is usually the case in internal defense operations, where the loyalty of the people is a primary consideration, it may also affect tactical operations in limited or general war. In the consideration of alternate routes of approach for an offensive operation, or of beachheads for amphibious operations the loyalties and sympathies of key segments of the population in such areas may be a deciding factor. Mutual areas of interest requiring G3/G5 coordination also include:

a. Evaluation of civil aspects of potential targets.

b. Advice and assistance in military training required by STANAG 2057.

c. Impact of plans on civil-military operations activities as well as the effect of the civilian situation on plans, and of restrictions or limitations imposed by agreements or law.

d. The availability and capability of CA and PSYOP units to support tactical plans.

e. CMO Civil Affairs or PSYOP Annexes to Operations Plans.

2-19. Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, Operations

All military operations have some impact upon the civilian populace. Fire and maneuver, barriers, and the use of special weapons are likely to bring about collateral damage and casualties to civilians. G5 prepares a CMO estimate to assist in the command decision on a course of action. Estimate should include information about population densities and configurations, which will enable the G3 to plan for the successful accomplishment of military missions while inflicting minimum collateral damage upon the civilian populace and the civilian economy. After the decision, the G5 prepares plans to support the “plan” developed by the G3. In certain circumstances civil-military operations considerations may be a factor which can affect the choice of fire support systems and plans of maneuver. While this is usually the case in internal defense operations, where the loyalty of the people is a primary consideration, it may also affect tactical operations in limited or general war. In the consideration of alternate routes of approach for an offensive operation, or of beachheads for amphibious operations the loyalties and sympathies of key segments of the population in such areas may be a deciding factor. Mutual areas of interest requiring G3/G5 coordination also include:

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e. CMO Civil Affairs or PSYOP Annexes to Operations Plans.

2-18. Assistant Chief of Staff, G4, Logistics

a. The staff responsibility of the G4 includes coordination and supervision of supply and service support for CMO activities of the command. This may range from a specified minimum calorie food supply under emergency conditions of limited or general war, to an entire range of standard and nonstandard items to support a military civic action program in an internal development effort.

b. In procuring local items, G4 and G5 must ensure that consideration is given to the effects of such procurement on the local population and economy of the area, and the U.S. balance of payments situation. The CA function of civilian supply is a two-directional operation involving the mobilization and use of resources of the civilian economy, within the bounds of national policy, international agreement, and international law, in support of U.S. military forces; and conversely, the satisfaction of essential civilian needs through military supply sources. Except in emergency situations local procurement will be avoided when subsequent importation of similar items for civilian consumption will be necessary. CA personnel assist and advise purchasing and contracting, real estate, and personnel officers in determining availability of sources, making arrangements for procurement, and weighing immediate needs against longer range requirements.

c. As a coordinating staff officer the G4 has supervisory responsibility for construction and transportation services. Activities in these fields affect the CMO activities of the command and can have a major impact on civil-military relations.

d. These activities may be performed under any condition of warfare and in postcombat situations. In internal defense assistance situations they are especially important. Engineer and transportation training, advice, and support for indigenous military forces in the conduct of military civic action projects is vital.

e. Logistical matters requiring coordination with the G5 include:
(1) Supply.
   (a) Consolidated requirements for civilian supplies to be furnished from military stocks or requisitioned from U.S. stocks.
   (b) Location of civilian supplies required for military use and reporting of availability based on a determination of civilian needs.
   (c) Plans for the distribution of supplies to civilians.
   (d) Requirements for food and medical supplies for emergency civilian support.
   (e) Requirements for insecticides, repellents, and rodenticides for protection of the health of the civil population.
   (f) Disposition of captured enemy supplies which are adaptable to civilian use.
   (g) Availability of salvage clothing and other supplies for civilian use.

(2) Services and movements.
   (a) Liaison with civil procurement agencies, locating equipment and labor required for military use, and reporting the availability based on a determination of civilian needs.
   (b) Advice and assistance to purchasing and contracting officers in making arrangements for local procurement.
   (c) Requirements for military transportation for civilian needs.
   (d) Information on availability of civilian transportation for military use.
   (e) Estimated impact of civilian traffic on highway regulation and traffic control and military traffic on civilian usage.
   (f) Measures to control civilian traffic, including use of vehicles, routes to be used, and issuance of permits.
   (g) Liaison with civilian agencies to insure coordinated dissemination and enforcement of highway regulations and traffic control plans which are applicable to civilian traffic.
   (h) Requirements for special type U.S. service units for civilian support.
   (i) Capability and availability of indigenous agencies to provide construction equipment, materiel, and personnel to support the civil-military relations program.
   (j) Availability of indigenous utilities for military use.
   (k) Information on the availability of real estate, assistance in locating desired real estate, and liaison with civil agencies for procurement of real estate.

(3) Maintenance:
   (a) Liaison with civil agencies to develop information on capability and availability of the local economy to provide maintenance facilities, equipment, and personnel for military use or support.
   (b) Rehabilitation of water supply facilities and public utilities for military or essential civilian use when such rehabilitation is beyond the capabilities of local agencies of government.
   (c) Rehabilitation of port, transportation, and communication facilities as may be directed.

2-19. Assistant Chief of Staff, Comptroller
   a. The mission of the comptroller includes responsibility for exercising technical control over all theater army finance policies, plans, and services of the command. He coordinates the financial services for the command with U.S. allied, and friendly elements within the theater.
   b. The ACofS, Comptroller maintains a close working relationship with the G5 to perform the following functions:
      (1) Monitors and recommends procedures and practices for military payment certificate control and administration, foreign currency purchases, transmission of personal funds, and control of blackmarket and counterfeiting operations.
      (2) Status of U.S. and host country funds for current and future CMO operations.
      (3) Conducts cost analysis relating to procurement practices.
      (4) Recommends allocation of finance direct support companies or establishment of specially constructed comptroller offices in support of civil affairs and PSYOP units and activities.

2-20. The Staff Judge Advocate
   a. As the legal advisor to the commander and to all members of the staff, the SJA has an especially important role to play in support of CMO activities. The G5 looks to him for advice on matters of U.S., local, and international law both customary and conventional, e.g., the Hague Regulations, the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and Status of Forces Agreements as they pertain to and affect civil-military relationships.
   b. The SJA will also directly have an affect on the civil-military relationships of a command by his own activities in three fields, in each of which he must also take into account the CMO policy of the command. These are—
      (1) Provision of claims services for civilian claimants.
(2) Procurement law matters.
(3) Jurisdiction of local courts over US personnel and activities.

★c. Establishment of civil affairs tribunals and other judicial and administrative agencies. The closure or reopening of local tribunals, including courts, boards, agencies, and commissions; and the designation of their jurisdiction, organization and procedures.

d. In situations where CA legal personnel are not available to create or supervise the operation of CA tribunals, the SJA has staff responsibility for the creation and supervision of military commissions or other military tribunals as required for the trial of civilians under the laws of war.

2-21. The Provost Marshal/Military Police

★a. The maintenance of discipline, law, and order among US military personnel has a bearing upon the relationships of the command to civilian authorities and the population.

★b. Command policy with regard to the relationship of the US military police and the civil police is a matter of common interest to the PM and the G5. While the G5 has primary staff responsibility for such command policy, its execution and day-to-day operations thereunder are primarily matters for PM concern. Under certain circumstances such as the grant of authority by a host nation, or in military government operations, the military police may be authorized to hire civilian personnel for police operations or to train and supervise indigenous paramilitary or civil police.

★2-22. The Information Officer

The impact on civil-military relations of the information officer is not limited to his participation in community relations matters. The command information program for military personnel and for the civilian employees must be coordinated with the psychological operations program, if one is being conducted. Information intended only for the education of US military personnel often will reach civilian audiences; therefore, it must be accurate and in consonance with US-released information directed at such civilian audiences or released to the world at large. In today's world the mobility of individuals and the profusion of mass communications is such that neither the information officer nor the psychological operations officer can hope to address an audience isolated unto itself. Further, news released abroad to US and international news media, and intended for audiences outside the theater of operations will also often be received in the theater of operations, where it will influence civilian audiences. Therefore, information programs must be established and thoroughly coordinated if credibility is to be retained.

2-23. The Staff Chaplain

The staff chaplain has frequent contact with the clergy, religious groups and organizations and other leaders in the communities near US military installations, both in CONUS and overseas areas. The fostering of cordial relationships with local religious representatives and leaders of allied activities and civic organizations can open the way to opportunities for religious, social, and cultural rapport between military personnel and the local civilian populace. In overseas areas in particular, good relations between the military and nationals of occupied or Allied territories may be promoted through liaison with the local clergy and by encouraging military personnel in respectful attitudes toward the various faiths, sacred rites, and places of worship. These activities will, of course, require CMO staff coordination.

2-24. Additional Details on Other Staff Relationships

In directorate type and support command staffs, the titles or designations of members of the coordinating staff may vary but the doctrinal principles enunciated in the preceding paragraphs usually will be valid.

Section IV. CIVIL AFFAIRS UNIT ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS

2-25. Civil Affairs Units

a. Civil affairs units of varying sizes and capabilities are provided to conduct civil affairs operations with a maximum economy of US personnel, maximum flexibility of employment, and a minimum practical ratio of command, administrative, and overhead personnel to operational personnel.

★b. There are both fixed TOE and cellular TOE CA units. CA functional teams may be attached to either type.
(1) Fixed TOE units.
   (a) Theater CA command (TOE 41-12).
   (b) CA Brigade (TOE 41-201).

(2) Cellular TOE units (TOE 41-500).
   (a) CA Group.
   (b) CA Battalion.
   (c) CA Company.
   (d) CA Platoon.

2-26. Employment of Civil Affairs Units
The smallest size CA units capable of performing the particular civil affairs mission involved in use I to support a military command or to provide any other civil affairs operational capability. The nature of the mission and the characteristics of the area of operations, rather than the size of the supported force, determine which CA unit or units will be employed for any particular operation.

2-27. The Theater Civil Affairs Command
The theater CA command is a specialized fixed TOE organization with a directorate type staff to assist in the fulfillment of obligations arising from treaties, agreements, or customary international law as the agent of the theater commander in the area placed under jurisdiction. (NOTE: A director has responsibilities, accompanied by commensurate authority to act for the commander, which normally include policy development, staff coordination, establishing of controls and review of effectiveness of operations.) Within the United States, the theater CA command provides support to the local civil government in reestablishing a civil government within the region damaged by enemy attack, natural disaster, or other emergency, when so directed by higher authority.

   a. Serve as a CA command in a theater of operations.
   b. Operate as a CA or Civil-Military Operations staff element of a combined, theater, or theater army command.
   c. Formulate plans, policies and programs for CA operations in support of theater military operations in accordance with established national policy and other directives.
   d. Plan for, coordinate, deploy, direct, and supervise CA activities in accordance with national policies and directives.
   e. Provide advice, assistance, and support to local governments as directed by competent authority.
   f. When appropriately augmented, establish and administer the central government of a major nation in a military government situation or in a post hostility environment.
   g. Exercise command and control over two or more CA brigades as required.
   h. Be assigned or attached to a CONUS army headquarters for a CONUS civil defense mission.
   i. Provide PSYOP planning support for the conduct of consolidation PSYOP in host, friendly, liberated or occupied countries, when PSYOP staff is not assigned.
   j. Provide advice, assistance, expertise, and support to the national civil defense organization and state level civil government in designated emergency is within the United States.

2-28. The Civil Affairs Brigade
The CA brigade is normally employed to exercise command and control (centralized execution) or command less operational control (decentralized control) over civil affairs units operating with the Army group, field army, or COMMZ. It may be employed to—

   a. Provide the command and control organizational structure to conduct civil affairs operations through and with existing or reestablished civil government and civilian authorities in an area of operations.
   b. Operate as a CA or Civil-Military Operations staff element of a field army or theater army support command.
   c. Provide the nucleus for a civil affairs command of a task force.
   d. Command and control one to six civil affairs groups in an area support role or one to six civil affairs battalions in a command support role. (CA groups may be used in lieu of CA battalions when battalions are not available.)
   e. Plan for, coordinate, and supervise civil affairs activities in area-wide support to insure accomplishment of political objectives of commanders being supported.
   f. Advise and assist the central national government of a small nation or a major subnational governmental unit of a larger nation.
   g. Plan for, coordinate, and supervise an environmental improvement program in internal defense and internal development operations.
Figure 2-1. Type organization theater civil affairs command.
**C1, FM 41-10**

**h.** Provide in-country consolidation PSYOP planning support when PSYOP staff is not assigned.

**i.** Perform military government functions similar to that of the theater CA command.

**j.** Provide advice, assistance, and support to the regional civil defense organization or state and local government in the United States in the event of enemy attack, natural disaster or other emergency.

**2-29. The Civil Affairs Group**

The CA group headquarters is a command and control team with no organic civil affairs functional capability. It may be tailored to perform CA operations by the assignment or attachment of appropriate CA functional teams. It may be employed to—

- Serve as a command and control headquarters subordinate to the CA brigade or theater CA command.
- Provide qualified personnel to fulfill the requirements of civil affairs or Civil-Military Operations staff sections for appropriate units or headquarters with civil affairs or Civil-Military Operations support requirements but without organic or attached civil affairs or Civil-Military Operations staff sections.
- Exercise command and control or command less operational control over one to six CA battalions or one to ten attached civil affairs companies in any type of operation.
- With attached appropriate CA units and functional teams, administer or perform civil affairs functions in a large city, province, or comparable political entity.

![Figure 2-2. Type organization civil affairs brigade.](image-url)
The CA battalion headquarters is a command and control team with no organic CA functional capability. It is normally tailored, however, by the assignment or attachment of appropriate functional teams to perform a functional as well as a command and control mission. It may be employed to—

a. Perform similar to but lesser roles than the CA group.

b. Provide qualified personnel to fulfill the requirement of Civil Affairs or Civil-Military Operations staff sections for those corps without organic or attached Civil Affairs or Civil-Military Operations staff sections.

c. Exercise command and control or command less operational control over one to six attached civil affairs companies in any type of operation.

d. Provide civil affairs support to a corps or similar size command.

e. Support an independent or separate division size task force.

f. Provide advice, assistance, and support to a state or large city local civil government in the United States in the event of enemy attack, natural disaster, or other emergency.
The Civil Affairs Company

The CA company headquarters is a command and control team with no organic civil affairs functional capability. It is normally tailored, however, by the attachment of appropriate functional teams, to perform a functional as well as a command and control mission. It may be employed to—

- Provide advice, assistance, and support to a medium size city or county local civil government in the United States in the event of enemy attack, natural disaster, or other emergency.

The Civil Affairs Platoon

The CA platoon headquarters is the smallest civil affairs command and control unit. It may be used alone or it may be augmented by the attachment of a number of functional teams. It may be employed to—

- Serve as a subordinate unit under any other higher civil affairs headquarters.
- Provide qualified personnel to fulfill the requirements of civil affairs or Civil-Military Operations staff sections for those brigades without organic or attached civil affairs or Civil-Military Operations staff sections.
- Exercise command and control over one to ten attached civil affairs functional teams in any type of operation.
**Figure 2-5. Type organization civil affairs company.**

*d.* Provide civil affairs support to a tactical brigade or similar command.

*e.* Administer or perform CA functions in a town, small city, or rural county or similar political entity.

*f.* Establish and supervise camps for displaced persons, refugees, or evacuees.

*g.* Support country team operations, mobile training missions, military assistance advisory group activities, internal defense and internal development operations, and similar commitments.

*h.* Provide advice, civil affairs assistance and support to a town or small city local civil government in the United States in the event of enemy attack, natural disaster, or other emergency.

**2-33. Civil Affairs Unit Commander**

Commanders of CA units perform all of the normal administrative and operational duties of unit commanders of any type military organization. The commander uses his executive officer or deputy to assist him in the performance of these and other duties. Both of these officers must be competent CA generalists as well as capable military leaders. In addition to the normal functions
of command, CA unit commanders also perform specific CA functions as required by the unit mission. These may include—

a. Planning for, assigning missions to, deploying, and supervising the activities of CA functional specialist personnel and teams.

b. Acting as a point of contact with the civil authorities and with US civilian agencies of a specified area.

c. Coordinating activities of his own unit and those of non-CA units to include such matters as—
   (1) Military civic action.
   (2) Populate and resources control.
   (3) Consolidation psychological operations.
   (4) Military support of local civil government in the United States within the region damaged by enemy attack, natural disaster, or other emergency.

d. Providing civil affairs support on a command or area basis to designated units.

e. Providing CA generalists and functional specialist training to non-CA US personnel and to allied military and civilian personnel.

f. Acting as a military governor or his representative for occupied enemy territory.

g. Providing governmental services to a civilian population in a civil defense or martial law emergency situation.

h. Commanding attached non-CA units and personnel when required for the performance of a civil affairs operation.

★2–34. Civil Affairs Unit Staff Officers

a. The staffs of CA units are organized on general staff principles in accordance with FM 101–5. They are organized as follows—
   ★(1) Theater Civil Affairs Command—Directorate Type Staff.
   ★(2) Civil Affairs Brigade—ACofS Type Staff.
   ★(3) Civil Affairs Group or Battalion—“S” or Unit Type Staff.

b. The four principal staff assistants are Director/Assistant Chief of Staff/S1, Personnel and Administration; Director/Assistant Chief of Staff/S2, Intelligence; Director/Assistant Chief of Staff/S3, Plans and Operations; and Director/Assistant Chief of Staff/S4, Supply. (The director of supply is made available to the Theater Civil Affairs Command as required. The Comptroller/Assistant Chief of Staff, Comptroller, may be established on an as required basis upon approval of the theater army commander. Determination of need for establishment of an ACofS, Comptroller, in CA organizations is based on the extent to which the CA commander is responsible for financial management. Duties and functions of the staff are as detailed in FM 101–5.

Section V. CIVIL AFFAIRS FUNCTIONAL TEAMS

★2–35. General

CA functions are considered under four broad categories—Governmental; Economic; Public Facilities; and Special. The 20 functions may be grouped under these categories for operational control and, as required, by the scope of the civil affairs mission. Every function is in some degree related to every other function and therefore coordination must be continuous. The areas of specialization are—

a. Governmental functions are those dealing with matters involving governmental activity or control, political activities, review and correction of actions of civil officials in accordance with competent directives, and implementation of policy decisions with respect to control or relationship of the people to the government in the area of operation. Their primary mission is the promotion or restoration of governmental stability in the area of operations. These functions are—
   (1) Civil Defense.
   (2) Labor (Indigenous Manpower).
   (3) Legal.
   (4) Public Administration.
   (5) Public Education.
   (6) Public Finance.
   (7) Public Health.
   (8) Public Safety.
   (9) Public Welfare.

b. Economic functions are those concerned with the economic structure of an area as a whole, and the coordination of the more specialized economic aspects and efforts in developing direct support for the military effort from local resources and discharging the command’s economic responsibil-
ity to the civil population and its government. They are significant in consideration of mutual military support, rehabilitation programs, and long range economic plans for environmental improvement. These functions are—

1. Civilian Supply.
2. Economics and Commerce.
3. Food and Agriculture.
4. Property Control.

C. Public Facilities functions are concerned with the supervision, control, and operation, where required, of facilities such as water, gas, waste disposal, electrical and other power systems, communications, transportation, and restoration or introduction of such facilities. They are particularly significant because of their close relationship to, and possible direct employment in the military effort. These functions are—

1. Public Communications.
2. Public Transportation.

a. Special functions are those concerned with people; their rights as individuals; their culture, care, religion, protection and control. Planned direction and constant supervision are essential for uniformity of operations and to the successful accomplishment of activities within this category. They have special significance to the commander, not only because of requirements under international law, but because of the intense effects they have on people’s attitudes, allegiances, and respect or distrust of his forces and operations. These functions are—

1. Arts, Monuments, and Archives.
2. Civil Information.
4. Religious Relations.

2-36. Utilization of Functional Teams and Specialists for Operations

Normally, functional teams are attached to, and operate with, a CA headquarters unit. However, individuals with special qualifications may be integrated into the unit headquarters, operate separately, or be consolidated to form appropriate teams as required in the operational area. To meet unusual situations, teams with related interests may be combined to provide functional capabilities not preplanned or which may not be available from other sources. For example, if a situation called for two civilian supply teams and only one each civilian supply and public welfare team were available, these teams could be temporarily combined to meet requirement. Again, a public safety team and a displaced persons team could be combined to provide two displaced persons teams or two public safety teams. Also, a number of identical type teams of different sizes may be combined to provide a larger team of sufficient stature and manpower to accomplish a given task. CA functional teams can also be attached to non-CA units for the performance of specific duties such as planning and supervision of military civic action. CA composite teams made up of personnel from various CA functional teams may also be created.

2-37. Functional Team Task

a. The tasks within the capability and scope of responsibility of each of the CA functional teams are enumerated in succeeding paragraphs, arranged alphabetically for ease of reference. Some of these tasks are applicable under any circumstances, i.e., peacetime, cold, limited, or general war, regardless of the degree of civil affairs authority vested in the military commander. Others are performed only when the military commander has been authorized to assume full executive, legislative, and judicial authority over a specific area and its population. The determination of these tasks to be performed in a given political or environmental situation is the responsibility of the commanders on the advice of their CA staff officers. A checklist of commonly occurring tasks, as related to the various intensities of warfare, is contained in appendix L.

b. These tasks normally are performed by CA functional teams. In the event that appropriate CA teams are not available, the responsible commander may be required to utilize non-CA units and personnel in order to accomplish his civil affairs mission. Such personnel or units should be selected on the basis of training and experience most comparable to that of CA units and personnel.

c. It will be noted that some of the tasks specified as being in the areas of competence of a given functional team will appear to overlap with those of other teams. This overlap is particularly noticeable in the civilian supply function. Clear lines of demarcation between team functions cannot, in many cases, be delineated until the civil affairs
operations have commenced, because of the impact of yet unknown situational factors. It is the responsibility of CA unit commanders to establish these lines of demarcation and to coordinate all operational efforts as expeditiously as possible to avoid duplication of effort.

★★2-38. Arts, Monuments, and Archives

This function, in its broad aspects, seeks to protect the traditional culture, customs, and arts of an area. Specifically it is concerned with maintenance or establishment of protective measures for cultural property such as important religious edifices, monuments, and movable objects including archeological, historic, scientific and artistic objects, and collections (FM 27-10 and DA Pam 27-1). This function also includes duties and tasks concerned with safeguarding and accounting for archives and official public records. The function may include concern with cultural patterns and respect for local customs and traditions. Specific tasks may include—

a. Surveying and preparing lists of—

(1) Individual objects of fine arts and monuments known or believed to be in the territory, showing their location and the names of persons or organizations having custody thereof.

(2) Repositories of archives, museums of art, libraries, and collections of archives and objects of fine art showing their locations and caretakers.

(3) Names of known authorities on fine art and archives within the country.

b. Advising commanders and other staff sections concerning fine arts, monuments, libraries, archives, and records that are or will be uncovered.

c. Preparing and publishing directives and instructions concerning the care and protection of fine art, monuments, libraries, archives, and other objects of historical and cultural value.

d. Locating, identifying, ascertaining ownership, and safeguarding objects of fine art, monuments, libraries, archives, and records.

e. Recommending return of property to rightful owners.

f. Marking protected property with such identifying symbols as may be designated by appropriate authority or international agreement.

g. Establishing a procedure for the processing of enemy archives.

h. Seizing historical records of all branches of the local government.

★★2-39. Civil Defense

The civil defense function involves all aspects of supervision, negotiation, direction, advice, liaison, and staff services in establishing or reestablishing and operating civil defense programs in the event of enemy attack, natural disaster, or other emergency in a host country or a US military area of assignment. This function is based on the policies and directives of the host country or the objectives of the United States. The statutes and regulations governing civil defense in the United States provide for—unanticipated or emergency needs for the protection of the safety and health of the people of the area in the event of attack, natural disaster, or other emergency, and for the mobilization and efficient utilization of the resources and facilities in the area to assist and aid the civil defense effort. Specific tasks may include—

c. Study of the organization, capabilities equipment, and functioning of the existing civil defense agency.

b. Preparation of plans and procedures for military support to the national or regional civil defense agencies and local civil government in the United States.

c. Maintaining liaison with the civilian government to advise and assist in carrying out civil defense programs.

d. Coordination and integration of civil defense measures with rear area security and damage control plans and supervision over civilian activities in integrated plans.

e. Strengthening the local civil defense capability by assisting or supervising in its establishment or reorganization in order to provide for natural disaster relief, air raid warning, emergency shelter, firefighting, evacuation, demolition and related activity. These measures may include—

(1) Preparatory to attack—

(a) Establishment of appropriate organizations and operations plans.

(b) Recruitment and training of personnel.

(c) Conduct of research.

(d) Procurement and stockpiling of necessary material.
(e) Provision for adequate warning systems.

(f) Construction or preparation of shelters.

(g) Evacuation of population.

(2) During attack—

(a) Enforcement of passive defense regulations.

(b) Evacuation of personnel to shelter areas.

(c) Control of traffic and panic.

(d) Control of electrical communications media.

(3) Following attack—

(a) Activities for volunteer agencies such as fire, rescue and emergency squads.

(b) Monitoring for specific hazards of special weapons.

(c) Unexploded bomb reconnaissance.

(d) Essential debris clearance.

(e) Emergency welfare measures.

(f) Immediate essential repair of vital facilities.

2-40. Civil Information

This function is concerned with the facilities employed to disseminate information to the people; coordinating the operation of public and private communication media; and assisting, aiding, directing or supervising the preparation, distribution and dissemination of necessary information through private and public agencies within the assigned area. To assist in this function, psychological operations personnel, or a specifically tailored PSYOP-oriented civil information functional team (Team HD, TOE 41-500H), may be attached to civil affairs units to support civil affairs operations (FM 33-5). Specific tasks may include—

a. Survey and analysis of available information media to include the facilities employed to disseminate information to the people, the type and extent of the information disseminated, and the degree of its acceptance by the people.

b. Preparation, distribution, and dissemination of information through armed forces radio and TV stations and civilian information media.

c. Coordination of civil information activities.

d. Recommendation of procedures for and supervision of civilian information media; including review and censorship of material to be disseminated.

e. Removal of those indigenous civilian personnel engaged in the operation of information media who are hostile to the United States, or not in sympathy with its policies and objectives.

f. Recommendations regarding measures for protection of physical facilities of information media; e.g., newspaper plants and radio and TV stations.

g. Requisition, protection, and issuance of supplies including newsprint, ink, and radio and TV parts.

h. Utilization of key civilians as soon as possible, after screening and authorization by host government of US authorities.

i. Impounding all documents, supplies, manuscripts, films, radios, recordings, TV tapes, reference libraries, and similar stocks of raw or processed material pertaining to the operation of the information media.

j. Conducting, with assistance of attached PSYOP personnel, analysis and research in psychological activities and submitting reports of findings on public opinion and morale in the area of operation.

2-41. Civilian Supply

Civilian supply involves the mobilization and use of resources of the civilian economy, within the bounds of national policy, customary and conventional international law, in support of US military forces; the satisfaction of essential civilian needs from civilian sources, and the supplementing of civilian needs from military supply sources, as required. This function includes the acts and processes needed to determine requirements and arrange for procurement and distribution of supplies to the civilian economy. It also includes responsibility for providing and distributing food and supplies made available from local resources, the armed forces of the host country or the United States. The team will analyze and compute the needs for supplies and equipment of all types, including those essential to maintain the civilian economy in a state of productive efficiency. The principal sources of civilian supplies are—reallocation of supplies from the local economy; captured enemy stocks; contributions from national and international welfare and charitable organizations; and contributions from
local, allied or US military stocks or resources in the area. Types of supplies that may be approved for issue from US military stocks consist principally of food, tentage, clothing, engineer equipment (to insure operation of essential utilities), communications equipment, medical supplies, transportation equipment, fuel and lubricants. Specific tasks may include—

a. Planning activities on the basis of strategic-logistic studies.

b. Planning for distribution of supplies based on surveys of standards of living, including health and dietary factors.

c. Reviewing agricultural and industrial patterns of the area to determine the effects of administrative policies on civilian supplies.

d. Estimating adequacy of available civilian supplies.

e. Making recommendations as to movements of essential civilian supplies, particularly food and fuel, from surplus to deficit areas.

f. Recommending supplies which should be made available from military sources and allocations to be made of such supplies.

g. Making recommendations as to supplies available for military use from civilian sources in accordance with customary and international law.

h. Negotiating with civilians to obtain support for military units.

i. Purchasing, requisitioning, or otherwise acquiring, warehousing, and accomplishing distribution of civilian supplies in accordance with established policies and applicable requirements of law.

j. Analyzing the organization of collecting and distributing agencies handling essential supplies.

k. Establishing and maintaining civilian supply records.

l. Insuring coordination of transportation facilities for the distribution of civilian supplies.

m. Conducting liaison with supply agencies to insure that military supplies are provided for civilian use as approved by the commander.

n. Insuring adequate safeguarding of essential civilian supplies.

o. Preparing procedures and programs for the transition from military civil affairs to civilian operation of civilian supply in the area.

p. Insuring that necessary organic military transportation for movement of supplies is made available when local transportation is inadequate.

q. Planning and supervision of food rationing or controlled distribution.

2-26. Displaced Persons, Refugees, and Evacuees

This function involves the processing and control of displaced persons, refugees, and evacuees. The functional team assists or supervises the establishment, administration and operation of camps; and assists in or directs the repatriation, resettlement, or movement of these people within the assigned area. Consideration must be given during the course of military operations to the deliberate movement by the enemy of refugees, evacuees, and displaced persons into friendly areas of operations. Failure to control the movement of such persons may seriously interfere with the accomplishment of the tactical mission. Specific tasks may include—

a. Survey and analysis to determine—

(1) Estimated numbers of displaced persons, refugees, and evacuees together with routes of movement to selected assembly points.

(2) Languages, customs, and attitudes of the people concerned.

(3) Adequacy of facilities and local supplies in the area in which such persons will be found.

(4) Attitudes and policies of the governments of the native countries toward such persons.

(5) Acceptability of such persons as immigrants to other nations.

b. Preparation of plans for control and supervision of the welfare of refugees, displaced persons, and evacuees (movement, housing, feeding, health services, and administrative processing).

c. Maintenance of liaison with appropriate agencies regarding plans to repatriate, resettle, or move displaced persons and refugees.

d. Planning for the orderly and secure withdrawal to places of safety of leaders and certain key personnel in the event of a retrograde movement.

e. Operation and administration of camps and planning for required construction.

f. Requisition and issuance of supplies for support of camps.
**2–43. Economics and Commerce**

This function is concerned with aiding, assisting and coordinating economic agencies, both public and private. It will include determining the location, type and availability of natural resources; developing plans for preservation, rehabilitation, or restoration of the local economy; supervising or assisting in the operation of commercial and industrial activities; establishing or reestablishing foreign trade to bolster civilian production and the economy; and recommending or directing the rationing and control of prices of critical commodities that are essential to the people within the area. Specific tasks may include—

a. Survey of commercial and industrial activity to determine the availability of local resources for military use; means for the development and use of natural resources to include location, type, and availability, means of production and distribution considered essential for military or civilian use in accordance with policy directives; requirements for machinery, raw materials, and supplies from other than local sources; and legal provisions applicable to economic matters, and to public and private agencies and institutions concerned with economic activities.

b. Preparation of recommendations and initiation of actions based on these surveys.

c. Compilation and analysis of statistics on domestic and foreign trade.

d. Information and advice to local business and commercial institutions concerning policies of the military commander.

e. Examination of price control and rationing measures instituted by the existing government to determine their extent and effectiveness, and the necessity for additional measures.

f. Development of economic measures to include—

(1) Preparation of requirements for materials to be diverted to military use in accordance with policy and guidance published by higher headquarters and applicable provisions of law (FM 27–10 and DA Pam 27–1).

(2) Determination of specific types of business enterprises including brokerage houses, exchanges, and banks to be opened or closed, taking into account policies of higher headquarters and applicable provisions of law.

(3) Recommendations on allocation of resources between military and civilian needs and between areas, industries, and plants.

g. Implementation of economic measures to include—

(1) Provisions of bonuses, subsidies, and price adjustments to encourage production and movement of required goods and materials.

(2) Economic stabilization measures to include measure to insure production of desired products.

(3) Restrictions on exports and imports to include measures to prevent exportation of supplies needed in the area, and procedures to control and allocate imported supplies to uses which will further US objectives.

(4) Supervision of commercial and industrial activities including foreign trade.

(5) Supervision of natural resources extraction.

(6) Planning the importation of supplies which will decrease dependency on US military resources.

(7) Supervision of policies and officials in price control and rationing to include prohibition of the purchase of controlled items from troops by civilians, and determination and enforcement of measures for the control of rent and rationing of dwelling space and other scarce real estate.

(8) Recommending or supervising the preparation of plans for the establishment or reestablishment and rehabilitation of local commercial activity and industrial production.

**2–44. Food and Agriculture**

This function applies to civilian production, processing, storage and distribution of foods to reduce the importation of food for military and civilian consumption. It includes estimating requirements, stimulating production and processing of needed foods; improving or directing farming methods; and recommending plans for utilization and conservation of land, forests, and marine food resources within the area of operation. Specific tasks may include—

a. Surveys of agricultural production, farming methods, conservation of lands and forests, food storage, marine food resources, and food processing.

b. Surveys to determine the location of food surplus and deficit areas.
c. Estimate of food requirements, agricultural production, and probable deficit during the period of operations.

d. Estimate of requirements for food, fertilizer, and farm machinery from other areas or military sources.

e. Recommendations for safeguarding supplies and equipment.

f. Recommendations on degree of control of all governmental food and agriculture offices.

g. Measures to encourage earliest possible resumption of agricultural production.

h. Recommendations as to restrictions on circulation and transportation of nonessential supplies to permit distribution and movement of required agricultural supplies and equipment.

i. Recommendations as to measures to avoid requisitioning the labor of farmers during critical periods; e.g., seeding and harvesting times.

j. Recommendations for obtaining capacity production.

2-45. Labor (Indigenous Manpower)

This function is concerned with assistance to, liaison and coordination with and, in appropriate cases, supervision, control, or operation of governmental and private agencies and institutions concerned with labor. In addition to activities in the labor field directed primarily to the local economy, this function includes arrangements to provide labor needs of the military forces in accordance with policies established by higher authorities and applicable provisions of law. Procurement of labor, training, relocation, housing, safety standards, policies respecting wages and hours; unemployment subsidies, compensation for injuries and the like, may be governed by an applicable civil affairs agreement. Civil affairs operations in the labor field are subject to the provisions of the Hague Regulations and the 1949 Geneva Conventions, relative to the protection of war victims. This will pose special problems for civil affairs officers (FM 27-10). Also provisions of US law and of local law relating to labor may be applicable. Specific tasks may include—

a. Plans for use of labor.

b. Determination of labor availability and procedures for procurement of labor for authorized types of work.

c. Review of applicable laws and policies respecting labor and review of status, operation, and effectiveness of local agencies, institutions, and organizations concerned with labor matters.

d. Analysis of labor relations studies of labor organizations and labor relations between employers and employees.

e. Coordination with governmental labor procurement agencies.

f. Recommendations as to priority of utilization of labor in rehabilitation of the economy.

g. Recommendations concerning utilization of civilian labor to include—

(1) Wage controls, pay scales, and schedules of hours of work.

(2) Labor relations including medical care and compensation.

(3) Payment of wages.

h. Recommendations as to changes in pertinent labor laws, regulations, policies, and practices.

i. Recommendations as to procedures to be followed, if there is evidence of enemy infiltration in the labor market, unions or governmental organizations or agencies.

2-46. Legal

This function is concerned with the legal system of the area and the application of international law in civil affairs operations. Specific tasks in coordination with the SJA may include—

a. Supporting the work of the unit judge advocate.

b. Reviewing the local organization of the bar and determining the reliability of its members.

c. Establishing necessary civil affairs tribunals and other judicial and administrative agencies, including determination of their number, types, jurisdiction, procedures, and delegation of appointing authority.

d. The closing or reopening of local tribunals, including courts, boards, and commissions; determining their jurisdiction, organization, and procedure.

e. Recommending the suspension or abrogation of laws and procedural rules applicable to local courts.

f. Making recommendations concerning the al-
eration, suspension, or promulgation of laws to include civil legislation. (It may be necessary to deny enforcement effect to local legislation or to adopt new laws essential to the control of the area in question and the protection of US Forces. Such legislation must conform to applicable provisions of US law and international law as, for example, the 1949 Geneva Conventions.)

g. Supervising the administration of civil and criminal laws by local officials.

h. Providing members for civil affairs tribunals or military government courts.
i. Reviewing or administratively examining cases tried in military government courts before referral to higher headquarters for final review.
j. Establishing a system of regular review of the legal aspects of the administration of prison institutions and the procedures for commitment.
k. Providing legal advice on civil security.
l. Drafting of penal ordinances.

2-47. Property Control

This function serves to protect property within established limits and to preserve negotiable assets and resources. It is based on a uniform and orderly system for the custody and control of property. Specific tasks may include—

a. Maintenance of registers for supplies and property transferred from civilian sources to military units.
b. Formulation of policy guidance for the utilization and safeguarding of property.
c. Review of types or classes of property to be taken into custody and analysis of civil laws pertaining to such property.
d. Preparation of schedules of property to be placed under military controls as determined by policy directives, including—

(1) Property owned by enemy governments or nationals of those governments.
(2) Property of allied governments over which temporary control will be assumed.
(3) Private property susceptible to military use.
e. Protection of all records of title, transfers, and other property transactions.
f. Review of evidence available to determine ownership.

g. Establishing a system of regular review of the legal aspects of the administration of prison institutions and the procedures for commitment.
h. Providing legal advice on civil security.
i. Drafting of penal ordinances.

2-48. Public Administration

This function is concerned with the structure and conduct of government. It encompasses methods of establishing or assisting legislative and executive agencies from national to local levels and the processes of these agencies in the administration of civil government. Included are such considerations as political parties, eligibility for franchise, elections, tenure, and all other aspects of the development and operation of the apparatus of government. Specific duties may include—

a. Surveying governmental organization at all levels.
b. Surveying lines of authority and influence having impact on political matters.
c. Analyzing effectiveness of existing agencies of government or social control.
d. Analyzing effectiveness of governmental officials and employees and of other community leaders.
e. Negotiating to gain support or cooperation for US forces.
f. Participating in joint commissions, committees, or councils concerned with governmental affairs.
g. Removing public officials who are hostile to the United States or who are not in sympathy with its policies and objectives, and securing the appointment of leaders who will further desired programs.
h. Recommending organization, functioning, staffing, and authority of agencies of government or social control.
i. Advising, conducting liaison with, supervising, controlling, or replacing organs of government.
j. Advising on legislation or recommending policy changes based on the analysis of the society and the economy of the area.

2-49. Public Communications

This function is concerned with the supervision of the postal services and of those civil communication facilities not under the direct military control of the Theater Army or command signal officer. It is also concerned with the regulatory organizations, civilian technical specialists, communication parts and materials and all interna-
tional and civil affairs agreements and directives relative to communications. Specific tasks may include—

a. Analysis of the location, functions, means, and techniques of communication facilities and postal services existing in the territory.

b. Study of the organization and administration of civilian communications. For example, postal services are often organized and administered in conjunction with telephone and telegraph services.

c. Review of existing international agreements relative to communications.

d. Analysis of requirements for communication parts and material and determination as to whether such requirements can be supplied locally or whether other sources must be utilized.

e. Study of requirements for and availability of civilian technical specialists.

f. Recommendations as to measures for protection of essential communication facilities.

g. Recommendations as to the extent communication facilities should be controlled, supervised, or operated by the technical services, the CA organization, or other military units.

h. Recommendations, in accordance with policy directives, as to the allocation of communication facilities between military and civilian use and determination of alternate means of communications available to support the local administration in the event facilities are required for military use.

i. Assistance, control, supervision, or operation in accordance with established policies of civil communications facilities and postal services.

j. Requisitions, in accordance with policy directives, of military supplies and equipment for rehabilitation and operation of communications facilities.

k. Supervision of return to civilian control of facilities no longer required for military use.

2-50. Public Education

This function is concerned with the supervision of or assistance to educational programs and institutions and public libraries. Specific tasks may include—

a. Survey and analysis of school facilities, applicable laws, courses of study, procedures for training and selection of teachers, and textbooks.

b. Recommendations for changes necessary to comply with US national policy, e.g., screening teachers or changing textbooks.

c. Determination and enforcement of restrictions on the utilization of school facilities; e.g., prohibition of billeting in school buildings when other facilities are available.

d. Supervision of administration, safeguarding of records, and conduct of inspections of schools.

e. Requisition and issue of materials and supplies for use in schools.

f. Removal of civilian personnel engaged in public education who are hostile to the United States or are not in sympathy with its policies and objectives.

g. Preparation of plans and procedures for the repair of damaged school facilities on a priority basis.

h. Assistance to, or supervision of, any new or revised educational programs.

2-51. Public Finance

This function includes control, supervision, and audit of indigenous fiscal resources; budget practices, taxation, expenditures of public funds, currency issues, and the banking agencies and affiliates. It is essential that the function be performed in an integrated and uniform manner within each national area. Specific tasks may include—

a. Analysis of taxation systems and other sources of revenue, governmental expenditures, and estimates of adequacy of public funds for performance of governmental functions.

b. Review of public laws and agencies regulating banking and financing.

c. Analysis of financial structures including types and conditions of financial institutions.

d. Analysis of types and amounts of circulating currencies, acceptance by population of such currencies, and current foreign exchange rates.

e. Recommendations as to provisions for military currency.

f. Recommendations as to establishment of currency exchange rates.
g. Establishment and enforcement of restrictions on exportation of US currency.

h. Recommendations for advances of funds to governmental or private financial institutions.

i. Recommendations for protection of public and private financial institutions and safeguarding funds, securities, and financial records.

j. Recommendations as to designation of type of circulating local currency.

k. Recommendations for control of foreign exchange.

l. Establishment of control over budget, taxation, expenditures, and public funds and determination of appropriate fiscal accounting procedures.

m. Reestablishment or revision of taxation systems in accordance with policy directives.

n. Liquidation, reorganization, opening, or closing of banks.

o. Supervision over credit and provisions for credit needs.

p. Regulation or supervision of governmental fiscal agencies, banks, credit cooperatives, and other financial institutions.

q. Recommendations as to emergency declaration of debt suspensions for specific types of debts.

★2–52. Public Health

This function is concerned with measures to preserve or restore the state of public health and to protect the health of military forces. The Geneva Civilian Convention of 1949 sets forth all the rights and obligations with respect to the wounded, sick, aged, children, expectant mothers, and all other persons not entitled to protection as prisoners of war. This convention also provides that civilian hospitals and medical transportation facilities are entitled to the same protection from attack as is provided for military medical units and facilities. Specific tasks may include—

a. Analysis of organization and functions of indigenous public health and sanitation agencies.

b. Survey of adequacy of medical, paramedical, and auxiliary personnel; and medical, and sanitation facilities.

c. Preparation of estimates of requirements for additional medical personnel, medical supplies, and materials required to maintain local facilities.

d. Provisions for the prevention, control, and treatment of endemic and epidemic diseases of the civilian population.

e. Recommendations for safeguarding supplies and facilities.

f. Arrangements for the treatment of sick and wounded civilians, including provisions for medical assistance by military units when required.

g. Plans and recommendations for rehabilitation or reconstruction of civilian hospitals and other civilian medical facilities.

h. Plans for and conducts nutritional surveys to assure the proper feeding of the civilian populace, including determination of caloric requirements for specific categories of the population such as heavy workers, children, and nursing mothers.

i. Plans for and establishes sanitary regulations pertaining to food and food handling, including regular inspections by veterinarians of sources of food supplies.

j. Measures for the restoration and protection of food and water supplies.

k. Measures for the disposal of sewage and waste.

l. Promulgation of local orders directing that civilians observe medical and sanitary measures.

m. Supervision of civilian public health officials in the enforcement of local public health laws and the performance of civilian public health services.

n. Retention, removal, or appointment of public health officials.

o. Obtaining and issuing military medical and sanitary supplies to civilian agencies and facilities in accordance with established policy.

p. Collection and burial of civilian and animal dead and maintenance of necessary records.

q. Supervision, restoration, and maintenance of public health facilities and records.

r. Rehabilitation or establishment, if practicable, of civilian industries concerned with the production of antibiotics, immunization agents and medical supplies and equipment.

★2–53. Public Safety

This function includes advising and assisting, or controlling and supervising, the local civilian officials in the creation, maintenance, or reestablish-
ment of public order and safety in the area. It involves the police, firefighting and correctional institutions. Specific tasks may include—

a. Examination of the customary method of announcing regulations to the people; and of those law enforcement methods having traditional respect among the civilian population.

b. Study of the organization, capabilities, equipment, functioning and political orientation of existing law and order agencies, confinement of facilities, and firefighting agencies.

c. Analysis of the character of the population with respect to orderliness and obedience to law.

d. Coordination with counterintelligence elements in the prevention and detection of espionage, sabotage, subversion, and civilian aid to guerrilla activities.

e. Preparation of plans, procedures, and recommendations for maintaining or restoring law and order.

f. Supervision of those civilian agencies which enforce law and maintain order with particular attention to looting; rioting; control of liquor and narcotics; collection and disposition of weapons, explosives, and implements of war in the hands of civilians; and the enforcement of regulatory and other measures of the occupant.

g. Assurance of proper notification to the populace of proclamations and notices.

h. Enforcement of orders relating to security control of the civil population, including, as necessary, establishment and operation of a pass system; registration of individuals; checkpoints; curfews; communications; control of assembly; and arrest of wanted persons.

i. Supervision of administration of jails and prisons.

j. Requisition and issuance of required police and fire department equipment in accordance with approved policies.

k. Activities regarding impounding or safeguarding supplies, materials, equipment, buildings, or areas as may be required for any civil affairs function or activity.

l. Determination in coordination with intelligence agencies of suitability of government employees and public officials.

m. Advising or supervising the establishment or reorganization of the local police, firefighting, penal and similar institutions.

★2–54. Public Transportation

This function is concerned with supervising those transportation facilities which remain under, or are transferred to, the civil government or private operators. The railways, highways, airways, and waterways form the system of public transportation, and this system must serve the armed forces as well as the civilian economy of a country. Specific tasks may include—

a. Survey of the organization, routes, and capacities of the transportation system including extent of damage and requirements for restoration.

b. Analysis of the organization, powers, and functions of regulatory agencies.

c. Recommendations as to the desirable extent of operation of the civilian transportation system by the military agencies.

d. Determination of requirements of civilian transportation system for labor, technical, engineer or other assistance, replacement parts, and fuel.

e. Recommendations as to the allocation of transportation facilities for civilian or military use and coordination of such recommendations with the appropriate military agencies.

f. Arrangements for police protection of essential transportation facilities and installations.

g. Requisitions, in accordance with policy directives, of military supplies, fuel and materials for use in rehabilitating and operating transportation facilities.

h. Supervision over facilities released from military to civilian control.

i. Insuring that all important records and files belonging to public transport organizations, agencies and officials are safeguarded until adequate examination and disposition of such can be made.

★2–55. Public Welfare

This function is concerned with emergency and continuing relief measures essential to public order and welfare. It includes assistance or control and supervision and coordination of relief activities and welfare measures; and assistance to or supervision and control of public and private welfare institutions. Included are public and pri-
Private institutions for the care of children, the aged and handicapped, and miscellaneous charitable and relief organizations. Specific tasks may include—

a. Analysis of public and private welfare institutions and applicable public law.

b. Estimate of requirements for public welfare activities.

c. Recommendations for military assistance in public welfare activities.

d. Recommendations for safeguarding appropriate establishments.

e. Establishment of requirements, requisitions according to established policy, and supervision of distribution of relief supplies from military sources.

f. Supervision of administration of public welfare laws and the regulation of public and private charitable institutions.

g. Supervision over voluntary agencies and contributions from such sources.

h. Supervision of emergency shelter and feeding centers for indigenous civilians.

2-56. Public Works and Utilities

This function is concerned with supervision and operation, where required, of such facilities as buildings and dams; water, gas, waste disposal, electrical, and other similar systems; and restoration or introduction of such services. Specific tasks may include—

a. Survey of the organization and capabilities of key installations including extent of damage.

b. Analysis of the organization, functions, and authority of regulatory agencies.

c. Recommendations as to the desired extent of operation of civilian facilities by military agencies.

d. Recommendations regarding police protection of essential facilities.

e. Determination of requirements of public utilities for labor, technical assistance, replacement parts, and fuel.

f. Recommendations as to the allocation of public utilities for civilian and military use.

g. Requisitions of military supplies and materials to aid in rehabilitating public works and utilities.

h. Supervision of civilian public utilities.

i. Acquisition of essential public utilities services from military sources.

2-57. Religious Relations

This functional team assesses the civil affairs significance of the religions and culture of the assigned area and analyzes religious and cultural factors affecting social-religious problems bearing on the various functional areas of operation of the civil affairs mission. Specific tasks may include—

a. Conducting studies on religious practices, structures, physical symbols and devices, hierarchies, and major personalities.

b. Developing codes of behavior and educating troops to reduce possibilities of offensive acts contrary to local religious customs and practices.

c. Analyzing, evaluating, and recommending solutions to potential religious-cultural problem areas.

d. Maintaining liaison with missionaries and local clergy in the area of operations.

e. Maintaining liaison with leaders of civilian religious groups to include, where appropriate, assistance to and participation in charitable endeavors.

f. Encouraging religious freedom except where the beliefs or practices pose a security threat to US Forces or endanger the lives of participants.

g. Developing areas of compromise and arbitration to lessen friction and hostility between opposing religious groups.

h. Determining restrictions on the use of religious facilities. Military utilization of religious buildings, shrines, and consecrated places for purposes other than religious is limited to use as emergency aid stations or medical installations; or for the housing of wounded personnel awaiting evacuation.

i. Seeking methods of effecting compromise between dietary habits, based on religious beliefs, and the production and distribution of foodstuffs.
CHAPTER 3
CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS IN A THEATER OF OPERATIONS
(STANAG 2055)

Section I. THEATER LEVEL CONSIDERATIONS

3-1. Theater Commander (Commander of Unified Command)

a. The conduct of relationships between foreign national governments and the theater commander in a theater of operations depends upon the degree of civil affairs authority delegated to him. The policies governing his authority will be decided at the highest level.

b. When U.S. diplomatic representatives are in the area and functioning, relations between them and the theater commander will usually be delineated by Executive Order and may include the organization of a U.S. country team.

c. When U.S. diplomatic representatives are not in the area, the theater commander normally is given full authority within national policy, to contact foreign governments in his area of operations and to advise, assist, coordinate, or exercise controls, as required. The extent of such authority will vary.

d. The theater commander must accomplish his military-political mission and comply with the applicable provision of international law, treaties, and agreements with respect to the inhabitants, governments, and economies of occupied, liberated, or host territories. He is responsible for the provision of civil affairs guidance and policy directives to all forces under his command. He is authorized, but not required, to delegate civil affairs authority to subordinate commanders as appropriate. Since Army forces have the unique capability of providing control of land areas and the population therein, implementation of civil affairs portions of the theater plan normally is delegated to subordinate Army elements of the unified command. In the event civil affairs authority is not delegated, the theater commander retains the responsibility for planning, determination of organization and procedures, and implementation.

e. In the conduct of his relations with the civil government(s) in the area, the theater commander, within the designated limitations of his authority, establishes policies and assigns missions to major subordinate commands. However, he does not normally furnish detailed instructions on the manner of execution. The theater commander utilizes civil affairs staff sections and CA units within the theater of operations at the various levels of civil government as the points of contact with local officials.

f. In the conduct of civil affairs activities in friendly territory, the theater commander may exercise some or all of those functions normally exercised by the local government. The degree of control exercised by the military commander may be prescribed by a civil affairs agreement. It is desirable, prior to the initiation of civil affairs activities in friendly territory, to conclude a formal civil affairs agreement. Since it is normally desirable to restore governmental functions to the recognized government of the area at the earliest practicable date, the military commander transfers the exercise of control to the local government as rapidly as the military situation permits.

g. The scope of the theater commander’s civil affairs activities will vary dependent on the degree of control, if any, maintained by the host government over its populace and resources. Civil affairs activities may also be limited by the provisions of any international agreement to which the United States and the host countries are parties. In general, the following sets of circumstances may exist:

(1) Where an adequate civil administration is in existence, civil affairs activities may be limited to the conduct of proper relations between U.S. forces and the civilian population, and such procurement or utilization of local resources or
facilities in support of military operations as may be authorized.

(2) Where the civil administration is inadequate, unwilling, or unable to function in all areas of normal governmental activity, the civil affairs activities of the theater commander may include exercising some of the normal functions of civil administration, as authorized by international agreements or U.S. national policy.

(3) Where civil administration is wholly inoperative, it may be incumbent upon the theater commander to perform all functions of civil government, again as authorized by international agreements or U.S. national policy. In this event, control of governmental functions should be restored to the recognized civil government at the earliest possible time.

3-2. Political Advisor

a. The Department of State, as the agency within the U.S. Government primarily charged with the development and implementation of foreign policy, may furnish a political advisor to the theater commander.

b. The duties of the political advisor are to advise the commander on established policies in such matters as governmental affairs and relations with other allied and neutral countries, and to furnish informal contact with the Department of State.

c. Contact between personnel of the theater CMO staff section and of the office of the political advisor should be habitual, informal, and characterized by mutual confidence.

3-3. Fundamental Considerations

a. The conduct of civil affairs operations within a theater is influenced by two considerations which have a determining influence upon both the concept of civil affairs operations and the command structure required to execute that concept.

(1) The legal basis for the entry of U.S. forces into a country in which operations are to be conducted is the first of these considerations. U.S. forces may be present within the territory of another sovereign nation either on the basis of an invitation from the government which it recognizes, or may enter the territory of a hostile power by force of arms against the will of the government of that nation. In the first situation, U.S. civil affairs operations will be directed primarily towards establishing effective liaison with the recognized governmental authority and providing advice and support to that government. In the second situation, U.S. civil affairs operations may involve the establishment of military control over governmental functions of the occupied territory.

(2) The second consideration involves the nature of the operation; i.e., U.S. unilateral as compared to U.S. participation in combined operations. In U.S. unilateral operation the theater commander has far greater freedom of decision in determining his concept of civil affairs operations and his command structure. In combined operations both the concept of civil affairs operations and the civil affairs command structure will be governed by international agreements to which the United States is a party. Those currently in force generally provide for integrated civil affairs operations to be achieved through a combined command as opposed to establishing separate areas of national civil affairs responsibility. When the United States engages in a war as an ally of a nation or nations with which it has concluded such an agreement, or if, in the absence of such an agreement, U.S. national policy is opposed to the establishment of separate areas of national responsibility for civil affairs operations, the theater commander will provide the U.S. element of a combined staff section. Generally the actual conduct of CA unit operations, in either the command support or area support role, is not materially modified and the principles set forth elsewhere in this manual are applicable to U.S. civil affairs operations in either unilateral or combined operations. The difference between the two involves primarily the chain of command which controls civil affairs operations in the theater.

b. Civil affairs operations generally are characterized by the fundamental concept of centralized direction at the highest practical level and decentralized execution, coupled with the integration of the military and civilian effort at the lowest echelon. Such operations require intensive planning, flexibility, and maximum adaptation to, and utilization of, local political-social structures and resources.

3-4. Plans and Orders

a. The attainment of national objectives in military operations in which U.S. Forces participate depends in a large part on recognition of the necessity for prior planning at the theater level for conduct of civil affairs operations. Detailed prior
planning is essential at all echelons of command; however, the theater commander must provide an overall civil affairs plan for guidance of his subordinate commanders in order to prescribe the objective of operations and insure continuity of policies and uniformity of their application. Such guidance must relate not only to ultimate objectives but must also be pertinent to operational phases and functional specialties.

b. Planning procedures to include the formulation of plans, coordination in the preparation of plans, assignment of planning tasks, determination of planning phases and programs, and the preparation of outline plans are fully described in FM 101–5. Planning for the conduct of civil affairs operations is a continuous process, but consists primarily of three basic steps—

(1) Compilation of essential information and data relative to missions of the major commands concerned and the actions they propose to accomplish those missions.

(2) Analysis and evaluation of assembled information to determine feasibility and capability of the various methods for accomplishing the civil affairs objectives as provided by higher authority.

(3) Preparation and dissemination of plans, directives, orders, and instructions necessary for subordinate units to plan for and execute the functions involved in their civil affairs operations.

c. At all echelons of command planning considerations include, but are not limited to the—

(1) Manner in which civil affairs operations may best contribute to the overall mission of the command.

(2) Coordination of operations with other operations.

(3) Requirements for unit and administrative support for civil affairs operations.

(4) Capability of the command to support civil affairs operations.

d. The U.S. military force carries out national policy as directed in the attainment of political objectives. Accordingly, the theater commander insures that primary attention is given in the preparation of his plan to the political-military objectives which he has been directed to attain and to limitations which may be imposed on his operations by international law, terms of treaties or agreements, and policy guidance received from higher authority. A detailed study must be made of area intelligence to include geographic and economic features; the density and composition of the population; forms and levels of government; and attitudes, customs, and traditions of the people.

e. The overall theater civil affairs plan prescribes the objectives of the operation, provides information on the anticipated phasing of the operation, and assigns civil affairs missions and furnishes guidance on the delegation of civil affairs authority to commanders of major tactical and administrative commands. Plans of major subordinate commanders to whom civil affairs authority is delegated establish the CA organization and requirements for units, and include directions on deployment of command and area support units. The overall theater plan furnishes general instructions on relationships with national or local civilian authorities, including the degree of advice or assistance to be rendered, or the degree of control, influence, or supervision to be used. Plans of subordinate commanders set forth policies pertaining to conduct of the various functions, and the levels of government at which they will be conducted. Guidance is also included on the extent of procurement of local supplies, equipment, and services for military use; and the furnishing of civilian relief, economic aid, and other matters essential to the conduct of civil affairs operations.

f. When projected operations are to extend into the territories of two or more nations, variations of objectives and policies with respect to each nation may necessitate clear differentiation in plans. Planning for deployment of units should stress simplicity and flexibility so that unforeseen requirements can be met readily with minimum disruption of the planned organization. Each civil affairs plan involving operations in countries with which suitable civil affairs agreements have not been negotiated should include drafts of agreements, covering those matters essential to the accomplishment of the plan, as a basis for agreement negotiation.

g. The theater civil affairs plan is put into effect by issuance of appropriate orders and instructions. Determination of whether civil affairs instructions are to be included in the operations or administrative order, or both, is based on the nature of the operation and necessity for direction of subordinate elements on such matters as objectives, delegation of civil affairs authority, and general policy guidance.

h. The theater civil-military operations officer is responsible for primary staff supervision of civil affairs matters within theater. Based on directives and guidance of the theater commander, civil affairs plans and operations are coordinated at all
echelons between major army subordinate commands by exchange of liaison officers, command and staff liaison, or both. Lateral commands are mutually responsible for exchange of information, requests for supporting action, and coordination in areas of mutual concern.

3–5. Handbooks

Civil affairs handbooks may be published by the U.S. theater headquarters, or, in combined operations, by the senior allied headquarters, to serve as a basis for the training of personnel assigned to civil affairs duties and to provide information and guidance on applicable policy directives for the planning and conducting of civil affairs operations. Due to variations in treaties and civil affairs agreements, as well as in objectives and policies, it is normally desirable to provide separate handbooks for each country in which civil affairs operations are to be conducted. Handbooks of a general nature, setting forth basic policies pertaining to the organization and conduct of civil affairs operations, are of particular value to non-specialist officers. These handbooks should contain basic documents such as initial proclamations, laws, and ordinances, or the provisions of civil affairs and other agreements in English and in the language(s) of the inhabitants. Such handbooks may be supplemented with other technical handbooks containing detailed procedural guidance on the various functional specialties, primarily for the use of specialist personnel. Although handbooks must include sufficient information on the political sociological and economic structure of the area of concern to permit an understanding of the actions which are to be taken, they do not constitute a primary source of area intelligence. Handbooks should be prepared in the form of ready reference guides and may contain information on the historical background and social and economic development of the country; governmental structure at national, provincial, and local levels; organization of political parties; police, security and legal systems; banking and monetary systems; civil service system; treatment of civilians; establishment of courts; as appropriate; anticipated problems in the area; and measures for the protection of U.S. and allied elements of the military force. These handbooks should be prepared in looseleaf form to facilitate revision. For sample format for civil affairs handbooks, see appendix K.

Section II. U.S. UNILATERAL CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS AND ORGANIZATION

3–6. Delegation of Civil Affairs Authority

a. The theater (unified) commander normally will reserve certain major civil affairs activities to himself, such as national government level liaison and, as appropriate, negotiation of international agreements. He will, however, normally delegate civil affairs authority to subordinate commanders. He is authorized by not required to delegate his authority for civil affairs matters in all or a part of the theater of operations to a designated deputy or to a subordinate army, navy, or air force commander. In a theater containing army units of significant size, the army component commander is normally the officer to whom this delegation is made. The subordinate commander delegated civil affairs authority may in turn, except as limited by the theater commander, subdelegate this authority to subordinate commanders. Each commander who delegates authority to conduct civil affairs operations will define the extent and degree to which this authority may be subdelegated. All delegations of authority are accompanied by the transmission of appropriate policy guidance, orders, and instructions.

b. A commander delegated civil affairs authority is responsible for civil affairs operations in his assigned area of operations. He may subassign areas of responsibility to subordinate commanders in accordance with the overall theater plan.

c. Delegation of civil affairs authority should be limited to those command echelons in both the combat zone and the communicating zone which have proper civil affairs staff representation.

3–7. Direction and Execution

Civil affairs operations in the combat zone and in the communications zone, within the framework of U.S. unilateral concepts of operations and organization, should be conducted in accordance with certain principles of general application. These principles are discussed in subsequent paragraphs.

a. Civil affairs operations normally should be conducted within a framework of centralized direction and decentralized execution.

b. Civil affairs operations should be sufficiently
flexible in concept to permit a transition from
decentralized direction and execution to a fram-
work of centralized direction and execution, de-
pending on the type of operation being conducted.

c. Civil affairs activities should be character-
ized by a continuity of operational concept and
guidance at all appropriate levels of command.

d. Civil affairs staff representation is required
at all levels of command where civil affairs au-
thority is established.

e. Civil affairs activities should, whenever pos-

sible, be conducted on politico-geographic basis
with areas of civil affairs authority delineated
along political boundaries. It is recognized that
tactical military boundaries must be employed for
this purpose under some circumstances; however,
transition to political boundaries should be ac-
complished as soon as practicable.

f. Commanders having civil affairs authority
should be furnished supporting civil affairs units
tailored with regard to the commander's mission,
the environmental situation, the civil affairs prob-
lems, and the complement of the supported US
force.

g. Civil affairs, in the last analysis, is a com-
mand responsibility and is the concern of all ele-
ments and members of a command. CA staffs and
supporting civil affairs organizations have pri-
mary and supervisory responsibility; however,
the success of civil affairs activities depends on
the concern and attention of all individuals and
units.

3–8. Civil Affairs Authority in the Combat
Zone

a. Civil affairs authority normally will be dele-
gated to the commander of the highest Army
tactical command in the combat zone. Depending
on the size of the Army force involved, this dele-
gation of authority could be to army group, field
army, corps, or division commander. Normally,
civil affairs authority will not be delegated to an
Army component less than a division in size. Civil
affairs support for a unified command with an
Army tactical element of less than division size
must be tailored specifically to meet the circum-
stances involved.

b. The field army commander normally will
delegate civil affairs authority to corps command-
ers. The corps commanders normally will further
delegated civil affairs authority to division com-
manders.

c. If the highest Army tactical unit is a corps,
the corps commander normally will delegate civil
affairs authority to division commanders.

d. If the highest Army tactical unit is a divi-
sion, the division commander normally will retain
all civil affairs authority that has been delegated
to him.

e. Neither the absence of CA authority nor the
relinquishment of civil affairs authority once
delegated relieves any commander of his responsi-
bilities for compliance with legal requirements
with respect to the inhabitants, government, and
economy within his area of concern and for the
observance of humanitarian principles by his
troops. Further, a commander of major unit not
delegated civil affairs authority, supports and
assists the CA units operating in his area, and in
turn, is supported and assisted by them.

f. Normal civil affairs activities of commanders
not delegated civil affairs authority include—

(1) Community relations of the forces under
his command to include appropriate directives for
troop conduct.

(2) Recommendations as to priorities for
the provision of civil affairs support to subordi-
nate units of his command.

(3) Provision of augmentation elements to
include PSYOP support to civil affairs units with-
in his area to meet requirements for technical
personnel which exceed the capabilities of the CA
units and are essential for civil affairs operations.

(4) Provision of logistic support to civil
affairs units operating in their areas, as required.

g. Civil affairs command elements employed in
the combat zone normally include the CA brigade,
battalion, company, and platoon headquarters.
Functional teams are provided according to opera-
tional requirements.

3–9. The Civil Affairs Brigade in the Combat
Zone

a. The brigade is the major CA unit assigned to
the field army. The brigade headquarters is cap-
able of exercising command and control over a
maximum of six civil affairs battalions. When CA
authority is delegated corps commanders, CA
battalions are attached or placed under opera-
tional control of the supported corps. The CA
brigade relinquishes command of units attached
to corps; it retains command less operational con-
control of units placed under operational control of corps. Normal allocation is one brigade headquarters per field army.

b. Normally, the civil affairs brigade will provide civil affairs support on the basis of one civil affairs battalion for each corps area and one civil affairs battalion for the Army service area.

3–10. The Civil Affairs Battalion in the Combat Zone

a. The civil affairs battalion is the major CA unit employed with corps in the Army service area. The battalion is capable of exercising command and control over a maximum of six civil affairs companies. CA functional teams, operating under direct battalion control, are provided as required. Dependent upon the Army commander's retention or delegation of CA authority to corps commanders, CA battalions may be retained under CA brigade control or attached or placed under operational control of corps.

b. Normally, the civil affairs battalion will provide civil affairs support on the basis of one civil affairs company to each division in the corps area. The battalion headquarters with attached functional teams is capable of performing corps civil affairs support functions for the corps area from division rear boundary to the corps rear boundary. However, when required, additional CA companies may be provided to support combat and combat service support elements operating in the corps rear area.

3–11. The Civil Affairs Company in the Combat Zone

a. The civil affairs company, while under the command of the civil affairs battalion, may be attached to or placed under the operational control of the supported division commander. CA companies supporting elements in the corps and army service areas normally are retained under the control of their parent battalions. The company is capable of exercising command over a maximum of ten civil affairs platoons.

b. Each company is composed of cellular teams to include a company headquarters, platoon headquarters, and functional teams. The company normally has only essential functional teams attached for support of platoon operations, but may be augmented with additional functional teams or specialists from the civil affairs battalion as required for specific missions.

3–12. The Civil Affairs Platoon in the Combat Zone

a. The civil affairs platoon headquarters is the lowest command element. Since CA authority normally is not delegated below division, CA platoons rarely will be detached from their parent companies. Platoons normally are allocated on a basis of one platoon per combat brigade with additional platoons provided for support of combat support and combat service support elements operating in the division, corps, and army service areas. Platoons are provided CA functional teams by type and number appropriate to their missions.

b. The civil affairs platoon is capable of exercising control over a maximum of ten civil affairs functional teams. The number and mix of functional teams attached will be determined by the mission assigned to the platoon. The platoon headquarters must depend on the civil affairs company for required administrative and logistical support.

3–13. Civil Affairs Authority in the Communications Zone

a. Depending on the environmental situation and other organizational implications, the highest Army echelon in the communications zone, which may be Theater Army, normally will receive a delegation of civil affairs authority from the theater commander.

★b. The senior COMMZ commander will normally delegate civil affairs authority to major subordinate commands in the COMMZ. These subordinate commands may take the form of theater army area commands (TAACOM) or other area commands having area responsibility.

c. CA units in the COMMZ provide both area support for the COMMZ and backup support to field army civil affairs units. They can provide a complete functional capability in the COMMZ as well as specialties not found in the field army civil affairs units. A minimum capability is initially provided, but may be expanded by the assignment of additional civil affairs teams or units as the situation requires.

d. Command and control elements employed in the COMMZ include CA brigade, group, battalion, company, and platoon headquarters. As in the case of the combat zone, functional teams are provided in accordance with operational requirements.
3-14. The Civil Affairs Brigade in the Communications Zone

a. In normal employment, the civil affairs brigade has attached to it three or more civil affairs group as its major operating units. The number of groups may be adjusted as required; however, when more than six groups are required, an additional brigade should be organized for each four groups.

b. The civil affairs brigade normally will be assigned to the senior COMMZ headquarters in the operational chain of command.

c. Regardless of its assignment the civil affairs brigade normally will provide appropriate civil affairs units to subordinate commanders to whom civil affairs authority has been delegated. The civil affairs brigade commander normally retains command of all civil affairs units of the brigade, but relinquishes operational control to the supported commanders.

d. The civil affairs brigade will normally provide civil affairs support to subordinate commanders who have been delegated civil affairs authority by attaching to or placing under their operational control a civil affairs group, battalion, or company as appropriate. The type of unit will be determined with regard to the mission of the supported command, the nature of the area of responsibility, population densities, economic conditions, and if possible, existing geographic and political boundaries.

3-15. The Civil Affairs Group, Battalion and Company in the Communications Zone

★a. The civil affairs group is an operational element and is also capable of exercising command and control over a maximum of six civil affairs battalions. It may be attached to a supported commander for an operational mission without battalion components or it may be employed as a command element, as required. With the addition of appropriate functional teams, the group may be used to administer or perform CA functions in a large city, province, or comparable political subdivision.

★b. The civil affairs battalion is an operational element and is also capable of exercising command and control over a maximum of six civil affairs companies. It may be attached to a supported commander for an operational mission without company components or it may be employed as a command element as required. With the addition of appropriate functional teams, the battalion also may be used to administer or perform CA functions in a large city, province, or comparable political subdivision.

★c. The civil affairs company is an operational element and is also capable of exercising command and control over a maximum of ten civil affairs Platoons. It may be attached to a supported commander for an operational mission without attached Platoons or may be employed as a command element as required. With the addition of appropriate functional teams, the company may be used to administer or perform CA functions in a medium size city or political subdivision equivalent to a county.

★d. The civil affairs platoon is the lowest CA command and control headquarters. It is capable of exercising command and control over a maximum of ten CA functional teams. When augmented by appropriate types and numbers of functional teams, the platoon can administer or perform CA functions in a town, small city, or rural county (district).

3-16. Civil Affairs Command

★a. Although civil affairs operations normally will be conducted on a basis of centralized direction and decentralized execution, conditions of environment, mission, or operational facility may make it advisable that civil affairs operations be wholly centralized.

★b. The commander of the field army, or the commander of the senior Army headquarters in the COMMZ withholds civil affairs authority from subordinate elements and directs civil affairs operations on an area wide basis. The commander of the civil affairs brigade retains operational control of all brigade assets and conducts and controls civil affairs operations throughout the area in support of tactical or area commands. The civil affairs brigade is responsive directly to the field army or COMMZ commander and all civil affairs units are responsive, in a civil affairs command channel, to the brigade. Support of subordinate commanders in the area by civil affairs units is accomplished by lateral liaison and coordination.

★c. In the event the theater (unified) commander desires to centralize all theater CA operations, CA authority will be withdrawn from subordinate commands. The brigade structures in both the combat area and COMMZ will become operational command structures responsive in CA channels to the theater command. This will neces-
situate the employment of a theater CA command headquarters at theater command level. The theater CA command (TCAC) is discussed in paragraph 2-8. The theater CA command is the highest CA operational headquarters. In cases where appropriate authority directs centralized control of the CA operation at theater, normally the theater CA command will be designated as the control headquarters. Support of subordinate commanders by CA units in the civil affairs command structure is accomplished by coordination.

d. It is envisioned that the requirement for a civil affairs command in unilateral US operations is most likely to arise in limited or general war in densely populated, highly developed areas, and in post-hostility military government situations.

Section III. UNITED STATES PARTICIPATION IN COMBINED OPERATIONS

3-17. Combined Operations

a. When US forces operate in conjunction with Allied forces, the responsibility for conduct of civil affairs operations probably will be assigned to a combined civil affairs command. Directives covering broad aims and policies for conduct of civil affairs operations by combined commands are promulgated normally at interallied governmental or command levels. The commander of a combined command complies with these civil affairs operational instructions. He insures adequate coverage in his operations plans and makes an equitable allocation of responsibilities for the implementation of civil affairs plans, to include, when appropriate, provisions for CA units and personnel. He normally delegates authority for the conduct of civil affairs to the senior commander of each national force involved. National integrity of forces is normally preserved in the organization of a combined command.

b. In the conduct of combined operations, intergovernmental agreements which have been concluded for the purpose of standardizing civil affairs operations, organization, training, procedures, and methods will, as applicable, receive full compliance of all US elements (FM 101-5 and FM 41-5).

3-18. Concept of Civil Affairs Operations for United States Participation in Combined Operations

a. For civil affairs in the combined command environment, it will be mandatory that combined civil affairs staffs be provided at all combined command levels involved in the centralized direction of civil affairs operations. This will provide a suitable structure for formulation and direction of civil affairs policy, as well as liaison and coordination among the nations represented.

b. Decentralized execution of civil affairs operations will be the normal mode of operation and can be accomplished by the adaptation of the same principles applicable to US unilateral civil affairs operations. This can be accomplished through a delegation of civil affairs authority to the commander of the US national component of the combined command for execution in those areas of the theater of operations for which the United States is responsible, subject to overall policy direction and supervision of the combined command.

c. Further delegation of civil affairs authority within the US national component line, and CA staff organization and unit support, will then follow the normal principles discussed in relation to US unilateral operations.

d. The general principles of command and area support civil affairs operations set forth below are applicable in both US unilateral and combined command environments.

3-19. Civil Affairs Command in Combined Operations

a. Centralized direction and execution of civil affairs operations may become desirable in the combined command environment, as in the unilateral US environment. It is, in fact, more likely to develop in the combined command atmosphere to support combined operations, coordinate with national governments, and assist allied nations in rehabilitation efforts. In the event of a military occupation and concomitant military government under combined command direction the need for a civil affairs command probably will be manifest.

b. When the need arises a civil affairs command responsive either to the US national component commander of the combined command, or directly to the combined force commander, can be created in much the same manner as described with regard to US unilateral operations. The major
difference lies in the need for increased combined CA staffs at all appropriate combined force levels for centralized direction, and for extensive lateral coordination at all civil affairs operational levels with civil affairs elements of other national force components.

Section IV. COMMAND SUPPORT OPERATIONS

3-20. Civil Affairs Command Support

a. Civil affairs command support activities are directed toward the support of the military mission of the tactical commander and the fulfillment of his legal obligations. The complexity of command support operations will vary with such factors as the mission of the tactical unit, fluidity of the tactical situation, density and attitude of the population, amount of partial or complete disruption of normal law and order, extent of interference with military operations by refugees, and use of mass casualty and destruction weapons.

b. Civil affairs command support units can provide direct civil affairs support to tactical combat units from brigade through field army in the combat zone. These civil affairs units move with the supported combat units.

c. Planning by the army, corps, or division G5 for the conduct of civil affairs activities in the combat zone must be coordinated with other interested staff officers and adjacent units. Planning should provide for a determination of requirements for both command and area support units, regulation of the phasing forward of these units, and measures necessary for the control of the local populace and local resources upon entry into the area.

d. Major tactical unit orders will specify and establish responsibility for civil affairs tasks to be performed by subordinate tactical commanders.

3-21. Civil Affairs Activities in Support of Major Tactical Units in the Combat Zone

a. The commander of a CA command support unit is responsible for performing the certain recurring tasks and functions, which include—

(1) Furnishing the supported unit commander and staff with information, estimates, and recommendations pertaining to civil affairs activities.

(2) Planning and supervising the training of his own unit and of other CA units attached to it.

(3) Exercising command over attached CA units that have not been further attached to tactical units.

(4) Receiving, holding, and orienting CA area support units to be deployed in the area of the supported unit.

(5) Recommending employment of CA units designated to provide area support.

b. The CA command support unit conducts essential reconnaissance and surveys of the area of operations and furnishes advice and assistance necessary for the initiation and continuation of actions required to control the civilian populace and essential civilian resources.

c. The CA unit commander makes frequent inspections to insure that civil affairs operations are being conducted in furtherance of tactical operations and in accordance with established policies and applicable provisions of law. The commander insures that all essential measures are taken to maintain law and order and to prevent disease and unrest. He insures that local officials, agencies, and installations are functioning in compliance with CA directives.

d. The location of the CA headquarters is determined from prior reconnaissance and is coordinated with the tactical unit headquarters. Both military personnel and civilians must be able to locate and identify the CA headquarters; therefore, the approaches to and the headquarters itself must be clearly marked by signs in English and the language of the area. In determining the exact location, consideration is given to—

(1) Command and control situation in the area of the supported tactical unit.

(2) Availability of necessary space and facilities.

(3) Locations of governmental offices.

(4) Local security available from troops in the area.

(5) Proximity to designated transportation routes.

(6) Availability of communications facilities.

(7) Location of higher headquarters.

e. The civil affairs functions that will require particular emphasis by the commander of a civil affairs command support unit are public health, public safety, public welfare, public administration, labor, civil information and displaced persons, refugees and evacuees.
3-22. Retrograde Movement

CA tasks during a retrograde movement include control of the local inhabitants to prevent interference with military operations and evacuation of designated civilian personnel and essential resources, supplies and equipment. Prior to a retrograde movement, flow of civilian supplies to forward areas is reduced and rearward evacuation of supplies may be of use to the enemy is accomplished, with civilian transportation being used to the maximum. In order to neutralize the value of the area to the enemy it may be desirable to destroy resources, supplies, equipment, and local facilities that may be of use to his forces. However, this destruction is accomplished only in accordance with international law and upon the authorization of a commander directing the retrograde operation. Detailed civil affairs plans for a retrograde movement must be made in accordance with the overall plan. Effective liaison between the CA unit and higher headquarters, adjacent and supporting units is essential to the control and movement of civilians, including establishment of checkpoints, emergency medical care, emergency rations, the prevention of interference with tactical operations, and the utilization of all available roads.

3-23. Airborne, Airmobile, Amphibious, and Armored Operations

Although the conduct of these operations normally requires specially trained troops, special techniques, tactics, material, or an emphasis upon certain considerations, the civil affairs principles, concepts, and techniques described in this manual generally apply. The flexibility of the CA unit permits the addition or deletion of specified functional teams to meet the requirement of particular operations.

a. Airborne or Airmobile Operations.

(1) In the planning for and conduct of civil affairs activities in support of airborne or airmobile operations, the commander must provide as a minimum—the establishment of public safety; the discharge of his legal responsibilities; and such additional activities, which may be undertaken after the airhead is secure. It also may include the local procurement of motor and other forms of transportation to increase the mobility of airborne units; the utilization of local labor, supplies, and equipment; and the protection of local resources.

(2) Civil affairs planning, which is based on the tactical plan of operations, necessitates accurate, detailed, and timely intelligence of objective areas on such matters as the attitude of the local population; movement by the enemy of inhabitants from the landing area; extent of disease, privation, and unrest among the inhabitants which may necessitate the use of civilian relief supplies from military stocks; availability of local labor for military use; and availability of local supplies and equipment for military procurement.

(3) In airborne or airmobile operations, essential command elements of the CA command support unit, augmented as necessary with functional teams, move to the objective area with the assault echelons. Since the CA units normally will not be able to assure control over civilians in the airhead until some degree of stability is established, personnel of the unit act in advisory capacities to the commanders who are responsible for the control of civilians in their respective areas. As specified in tactical directives, initial actions may include measures to freeze the civilian population in place in order to prevent interference with military operations; to assist in establishing law and order and preventing sabotage; and to provide shelter, rations, clothing, and medical care for civilians.

(4) Following an airborne or airmobile operation and when linkup with friendly forces has been accomplished authority for the conduct of CA operations may be transferred to the commanders of those major tactical units making the linkup. To assure continuity of operations, particular attention must be given to providing information and making records available to other commanders who subsequently will enter the area.

b. Amphibious Operations. In amphibious operations, personnel of the CA command support unit, augmented as required, are attached to the landing teams to advise and assist the commanders in initiating CA operations. The CA command group accompanies the amphibious task force command group. In planning for amphibious operations, particular consideration is given to the vulnerability of beachhead operations; to activities by local inhabitants which may cause congestion or confusion, to the need for absolute control over civilian circulation so that movement from and to the beachhead areas will not be impeded; and to problems which may be created by refugees. Since economy of force is a vital consideration, maximum permissible use is made of local resources. To the extent authorized by international law and when security considerations permit, it is desirable to employ local inhabitants for cargo handling, storing, and related activities.
c. Armored Operations. In armored and mechanized operations, it may be necessary to accord priority to public safety measures at the expense of other civil affairs activities because of the longer lines of communication and the extent of the area in which operations may be conducted. When an armored division is employed in pursuit or exploitation missions and is supported by an infantry division, coordination must be accomplished by tactical and CA commanders concerned on the conduct of civil affair activities to include the assurance of public safety in order not to delay the advance of the armor. When an armored division is in a static situation or occupies a defensive sector, its civil affairs activities are conducted in the same general manner as those of an infantry division.

Section V. AREA SUPPORT OPERATIONS

3-24. Civil Affairs Area Support

a. CA area support units normally base their activities in centers of population, cities that are seats of government, or control points of industrial complexes. To the maximum extent practicable, CA area support units are informed in advance of their deployment regarding the specific areas where they are to be employed to permit their making detailed analyses of pertinent area intelligence. When area training is not provided prior to the departure of these units from the continental United States, it should be furnished upon their arrival in the theater.

b. CA area support units are deployed for operations in designated areas in the combat zone and the COMMZ in accordance with the overall theater civil affairs plan. These units normally replace CA command support units previously deployed in the area of operations in support of tactical forces.

c. Upon entry into his assigned area, the commander of an area support unit confers with personnel of the CA command support unit in the area, the commanders of tactical units remaining in the area, and with local officials in order to obtain information that will enable the unit to continue effectively any CA functions initiated prior to arrival. Area surveys are reviewed or conducted promptly with assistance from personnel of the command support unit in order to verify information previously received and to provide a basis for adjustment of requirements. An attached CA area support unit remains under the operational control of the supported tactical commander until the tactical command rear boundary is moved forward of the area in which the CA area support unit is employed or until the tactical commander is relieved of CA authority in the area.

d. When a CA area support unit is initially deployed in a city during a moving or fluid situation, the jurisdiction may include surrounding rural areas. As the unit comes successively under the control of higher echelons, the extent of area over which the unit exercises jurisdiction is adjusted in accordance with the overall civil affairs plan. The extent of area over which a CA area support unit may effectively exercise control or supervision varies according to such factors as the size and geographical nature of the area; locations of political boundaries; attitude of the local population and amount of guerrilla activity; extent of agricultural and industrial employment; condition of routes of transportation; existence of communications facilities; and other pertinent considerations.

3-25. Civil Affairs Area Support Activities

a. The CA area support unit upon arrival in an area or city will assume, continue, and refine the performance of those civil affairs functions initiated by the CA command support unit it relieves. CA area support units will, in addition, initiate the performance of other civil affairs functions necessary to the performance of the area support mission.

b. CA area support operations will vary in complexity and required degree of functional specialization depending on a number of factors. CA operations at provincial or comparable level of government, for example, will involve a higher degree of specialization than operations at a municipal or lower level.

c. CA area support activities also will vary in accordance with the total social and economic environment of the area of responsibility.

(1) Activities of CA area support units in urban areas will require emphasis on measures concerned with industrial rehabilitation, development and support; economics and commerce; public finance; and other essential aspects of urban life. Civil defense will be of a greater significance than in rural areas.
(2) Activities of CA area support units in rural agricultural areas will require emphasis on many aspects of the food and agriculture function. They will include, for example, location of food surplus and deficit areas; study of agricultural methods; reclamation and conservation of land; food processing and marketing; and study of forestry and fishery operations.

d. The commander of a CA area support unit must plan for the conduct of area support operations in his assigned area of responsibility based on the total environment; must take those measures required to insure orderly transition from command to area support civil affairs operations; and must continue and expand civil affairs operations as required to support the supported commander's mission.

Section VI. OTHER AGENCY SUPPORT OF CA OPERATIONS

3–26. General
As the situation may require, military services such as preventive medicine, signal, psychological operations, engineer, ordnance, chemical, intelligence, military police, and transportation units, may be assigned or attached to, or directed to support the operations of CA units. Service support is provided CA units in the same manner as other military units are supported.

3–27. Engineers
a. Constructing camps and billets for civilians, particularly refugees and displaced persons.
b. Making necessary repairs to essential public utilities, such as water reservoirs, filtering plants, essential bridges, dams, locks and similar structures.
c. Maintaining essential public transportation facilities such as roads and railways.
d. Supporting rehabilitation projects as the situation permits and as directed by higher authority.

3–28. Army Health Service
a. Supplementing inadequate civilian medical supplies and facilities within the scope of U.S. policy and international law.
b. Augmenting civilian capability for control of disease.

3–29. Military Police
a. Securing and protecting such critical supplies, equipment, and facilities as may be determined by the responsible commander.
b. Protecting records, archives, historical and cultural structures and shrines.
c. Enforcing circulation restrictions and curfews.
d. Maintaining order and quelling frays or disturbances.

e. Controlling traffic.
f. Controlling movements of displaced persons, refugees, and evacuees.
g. Investigating serious crimes committed by civilians.

3–30. Intelligence, ASA, and Military Police
Criminal Investigation Elements
a. Screening civilian officials.
b. Locating and apprehending war criminals and enemy military personnel masquerading as civilians.
c. Detecting and preventing sabotage.
d. Detecting and preventing the transmission of information to enemy forces, unfriendly partisans, or guerrillas.

3–31. Psychological Operations Units
a. As an integral part of CA operations, civil information and public education activities are conducted in areas under friendly control to render direct assistance to military operations, gain the support of civilian populations, and facilitate the control and reorganization of occupied and liberated territory. United States policies and objectives are disseminated to the inhabitants through the use of persuasion, education, and orientation. All available media of information are utilized. As areas come under friendly military control, psychological operations units provide essential support and assistance to CA operations through the conduct of consolidation activities. In these consolidation activities PSYOP and CA units are mutually supporting, since PSYOP units will have to draw heavily on the detailed and intimate knowledge of an area and its people possessed by CA personnel and the communication facilities and techniques of PSYOP will substantially aid CA.
b. Detailed planning by all interested staff
officers is essential to avoid confusion and duplication and to insure the effective integration of psychological operations activities in the planned CA operation. The G5/S5 has staff supervision for coordination of the combined CA/PSYOP effort. Coordination with G2's and free exchange of basic intelligence and close coordination in the determination of essential elements of information (EEI) also must be accomplished between CA and PSYOP officers.

**c.** The capabilities of PSYOP consolidation activities for support of CA operations vary primarily according to the number and composition of PSYOP consolidation companies employed in the area. In general, psychological operational units in support of CA units can—

1. Supervise the reestablishment and operation of newspapers and other publication facilities.
2. Plan and supervise the operation of a fixed radio broadcasting station.
3. Operate mobile sound and film trucks and employ airborne loudspeakers.
4. Reestablish, operate, and direct the operation of motion picture installations.

(5) Supervise the distribution of newspapers, periodicals, and other materials.

(6) Prepare and conduct pictorial, photographic, art, poster, and instructional displays, and exhibitions.

(7) Utilize civilian panels to gauge the effectiveness of operations.

(8) Disseminate information and CA directives and instructions.

3–32. Signal

Signal units may assist in procurement, construction, installation, or maintenance of civilian communications facilities.

3–33. Transportation

a. Transportation units may assist in procurement, installation, maintenance, and operation of civilian transportation equipment.

b. Supplement civilian transportation facilities for movement of civilian supplies, commodities, or personnel, as the military situation permits.
CHAPTER 4
INTELLIGENCE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

Section I. CIVIL AFFAIRS REQUIREMENT FOR INTELLIGENCE

4-1. General
a. Civil affairs intelligence activities are concerned with the collection and processing of information, and the utilization or dissemination of intelligence concerning the people and the area of present or potential operations.

b. The details of intelligence structure, functions, and operations conducted under the general staff supervision of G2 are set forth in FM 100-5, FM 101-5, and the FM 30-series. Additional information is contained in the AR 380-series.

4-2. Purpose
a. Accurate, complete, and timely intelligence enables the commander and his staff to estimate, in advance of operations, the influence of civil affairs factors on the accomplishment of the mission or on the contemplated course of action of the command. It is required to develop CA annexes to plans, and to determine in accordance with policy guidance those measures which will be necessary to work with or control the local population or to relieve or adjust to political, economic, and sociological conditions in the area of operations.

b. Intelligence concerning immobilized, isolated, or bypassed enemy forces, hostile underground movements, and the activities of partisans and guerrillas, permits the planning for and employment of such friendly countermasures as the prevention of infiltration, use of local civilians to report guerrilla activities, and the separation of guerrillas from civilian support.

c. On the basis of intelligence, continuous and long-range estimates are made of the effect which military operations will have on the inhabitants and the effect which the civilian reaction will have on military operations.

4-3. Civil Affairs Intelligence Planning
a. Prior to moving into any area of operations, intelligence collection plans must be drafted and implemented by CA staff sections and units. Particular care should be taken to direct the intelligence effort to a level commensurate with the area of operations. Civil affairs intelligence requirements include but are not limited to—

(1) Topography, hydrography, climate, weather, and terrain including land formation, drainage, vegetation, and soils.

(2) Population census, location, ethnic composition, dietary habits, and health factors.

(3) Attitude of the population including ideological, religious, and cultural aspects.

(4) Governmental structure including forms, personalities, laws in being, and political heritage.

(5) Sociological factors including real power structure in area.

(6) Educational standards and facilities, important cultural activities and repositories.

(7) Communications, transportation, utilities, power, and natural resources.

(8) Labor potential including availability by type and skill, practices, and organizations.

(9) Economic development including principal industries, scientific and technical capabilities, commercial processes, banking structure, monetary system, price and commodity controls, and extent and nature of agriculture production.

(10) Effects of war damage on preceding items.

(11) Cores of resistance movements.

(12) Organization and operation of guerrilla forces in the area and the extent and degree of volition involved in local support.

(13) Hostile civilian activities including espionage, sabotage, and other factors of subversion and disaffection.

(14) Structure, orientation, capabilities, and reliability of indigenous public safety and en-
enforcement organizations including paramilitary forces.

b. Sources of classified intelligence prior to movement are primarily strategic in nature and represent the positive collection efforts of the Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, and other governmental agencies such as the State Department and various international mission and assistance groups. Among unclassified sources, particularly productive with respect to civil affairs interest are libraries, periodicals, newspapers, departments of leading universities specializing in language and area fields of interest, travel agencies, and commercial enterprises with holdings or representation in target regions. The Area Handbooks (DA Pam 550-series) are especially valuable.

c. The G5 recommends to the commander, through the G2, those items of intelligence which should be considered EEI. In appropriate situations an intelligence collections plan may be prepared by the intelligence officer of a CA unit and when complete, submitted to G2 for integration into the overall plan for the command. For detailed guidance on the preparation of a collection plan see FM 30-5 and appendix C.

d. AC and PSYOP intelligence requirements are very similar and often coincide in that the G5 will insure that EEI transmitted to the G2 consolidates the requirements for both CA and PSYOP.

4-4. Area Studies and Surveys

a. Area studies covering the gamut of civil affairs intelligence should be prepared on each country in which operations are possible or are projected. These studies supplement the published Area 1 Handbooks (DA Pam 550-series) and may be coordinated projects involving the G2 and the G5 with the supplementary assistance of G3, G4, Staff Judge Advocate, Surgeon, Engineer, Provost Marshal, and other members of the staff. Studies are a continuing requirement for any G5 or CA unit commander for each area for which his unit has contingency plans. They should be started while the unit is still in CONUS and modified and amplified during the course of military movements and operations to provide a ready source of information upon which to base plans and actions. Preferably CA units should send representatives or special study groups with advance command and control elements of the supported force to perform the requisite area study revision and to secure essential facts for operational planning. National objectives, theater policies, and future plans will provide guidance in the preparation of studies but they must generally include—

(1) Current political developments.
(2) Dossiers on important personalities.
(3) Availability, location, and cost of essential civilian supplies.
(4) Statistical data on diseases.
(5) Up-to-date material on manpower resources, skills, and employment.
(6) Housing, public utilities and services, production and merchandising facilities.
(7) Monetary stability.
(8) Statistics broken down into workable data groups covering age, sex, employment, location, and support requirements.
(9) Agriculture and industrial production and commercial distribution.

b. Area surveys are conducted on the ground, through physical reconnaissance and the exploitation of all available local sources of information, to verify and update the information previously obtained from area studies. Local sources may include the personnel and records of governmental agencies, banks, business firms, public utilities, and medical facilities, libraries, archives, mail, publications, and other communications media. During combat, initial surveys concentrate on conditions and activities which may have an immediate effect on tactical operations. More detailed surveys follow and are kept current as a basis for reevaluation of policies and new planning. Survey items include—

(1) Numbers and movements of refugees and displaced persons.
(2) Health conditions particularly with respect to contagious diseases.
(3) Adequacy of essential items of civilian supplies.
(4) Availability and potential of governmental officials.
(5) Possibilities of hostile activities by individuals or groups.
(6) General attitude of the civilian population.
(7) Facilities or supplies needed by military units.

4-5. Civil Censorship

The objectives of civil censorship are to prevent the passage of information which may assist an enemy or adversely affect any current policy of the United States or any of its allies, and to ob-
tain information which assists the United States and its allies in the attainment of their objectives. G2 exercises policy control over all types of civil censorship and both policy and operational control over all types of communication except public information media. Included are civil censorship of the postal services, domestic and international telecommunications, and area travelers. Military intelligence units perform this censorship function (see FM 45-20). G5 coordinates with G2 censorship of all public information media over which he has jurisdiction such as radio, television, cinema, stage, and the press, including periodicals and books. In a situation where CA units may operate or control the operation of other communication media, arrangements for security review will be coordinated with G2. Detailed doctrine on civil censorship is contained in FM 45-20.

Section II. CIVIL AFFAIRS SUPPORT FOR INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

4–6. General
The nature of CA assignments and the necessity for CA personnel to develop and maintain a close relationship with the civilian population and to acquire a depth of information and understanding with respect to the activities of indigenous populations put CA personnel in a favorable position to collect information of vital importance to other staff sections and agencies and to lend support to the overall intelligence effort. Among supporting activities where CA personnel may make significant contributions are—

a. Collection of all types of intelligence information for use at different levels of command.

b. Procurement.

c. Recruitment.

d. Assistance to counterintelligence personnel in the following activities;

(1) Screening civilian officials.

(2) Locating and apprehending war criminals and enemy military personnel masquerading as civilians.

(3) Detecting and preventing sabotage.

(4) Detecting and preventing the transmission of information and supplies to enemy forces, unfriendly partisans, or guerrillas.

4–7. Collection Potential of CA Personnel
Civil affairs personnel in their day-by-day operations deal with people, equipment, and documentary matter, all of which are primary sources of raw information of intelligence value. Normally when persons with information of possible value are discovered they are referred promptly to appropriate intelligence personnel for exploitation. Among sources CA personnel are likely to locate—

a. Refugees, evacuees, and displaced persons who may be interned or otherwise may come under civil affairs control or sponsorship.

b. Civilians who were associated with enemy personnel.

c. Political enemies of the hostile regime.

d. Leaders of fraternal, civic, religious, or patriotic organizations.

e. Governmental documents, libraries, or archives.

f. Files of newspapers or periodicals.

g. Industrial and commercial records.

h. Persons employed in recreational areas and occupations.

i. Political prisoners.

j. Technical equipment, blueprints, plans, or information of interest to technical intelligence personnel especially in transportation, signal, ordnance, engineer, chemical, and medical fields.

4–8. Custody of Archives
With respect to archives containing materials of intelligence value concerned with governmental, administrative or cultural matters, command policy will determine whether or not documentary matter will be removed for intelligence processing or will remain in designated repositories and be copied for intelligence purposes. As a matter of practicality documentary material is usually kept in place. In which event it is a CA responsibility to maintain, coordinate, and document the chain of custody of such matters required for use by intelligence agencies. If it is removed the intelligence agency taking the records must assume full responsibility for maintenance and documentation.

4–9. Procurement and Recruitment
Direct support of intelligence collection agencies may be provided by CA units in the procurement
of essential facilities and equipment and the recruitment of personnel.

a. Procurement. In addition to normal civil affairs procurement, CA personnel may also procure—

1. Biographical data on key persons in the civilian community or other information essential to special operations.
2. Civilian clothing and items of normal personal possession.
4. Civilian equipment such as binoculars, cameras, recording devices, radios, or weapons.
5. Documentary matter including passports, visas, vehicle operator licenses, birth and marriage records.
7. Foodstuffs, tobacco products, or alcoholic beverages peculiar to the area.
8. Barter items.
9. Civilian motor vehicles, bicycles, or domestic animals.

b. Recruitment. Through contacts with civilian organizations, leaders, and political enemies of hostile governments, CA personnel may develop rosters of personnel for screening by intelligence, or psychological operations personnel as—

1. Recruits for special operations.
2. Interpreters.
3. Informants.
4. Other specialized craftsmen, technicians, or laborers.

4-10. Civil Security

a. Maximum support is provided intelligence personnel in the detection and prevention of espionage, sabotage, subversion, aid to guerrillas, or other similar activities. Examples of areas in which CA units may provide assistance are—

1. Identification of known or suspected agents, collaborators, or sympathizers.
2. Search of public and private buildings for documents of intelligence value.
3. Discovery and confiscation of hidden weapons, ammunition, and equipment.
4. House-to-house searches for contraband.
5. Seizing and impounding mail pending instructions for screening and disposition.
6. Preventing local publication of information or opinion which is inimical to the military force.
7. Control of credit, foodstuffs, clothing, medical supplies, and related items which may be used to support guerrilla activities.
8. Restrictions on movements of personnel suspected of collaborating with guerrilla forces.
9. Destruction, surveillance, or control of potential hiding places or shelter spots of dissidents, such as abandoned mines, caves, isolated rural buildings, haystacks, or similar crop collections.
10. Collection, evaluation, and interpretation of police statistics relating to insurgency crimes, such as the recurrence of acts of terrorism.

b. While the close contacts and working relationships between personnel from CA units and the civilian population provide valuable intelligence sources and material, they have a two-way potential in that they serve friendly forces, but may provide an opportunity, as well, for exploitation by unfriendly persons and groups. CA personnel must be particularly discreet in their dealing with the civilian population. Information provided civilians should be carefully screened, and indigenous persons and agencies should be kept under continuing surveillance for indications of disaffection.

Section III. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CIVIL AFFAIRS AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

4-11. General

A close working relationship and continuous coordination between civil affairs and military intelligence is necessary at all levels of operation. This provides for a free flow of information between the two elements and eliminates duplication of effort.

4-12. Attitudes of Indigenous Personnel Towards U.S. Troops

Civil affairs and military intelligence, particularly counterintelligence, both have a concurrent requirement to determine indigenous attitudes towards U.S. troops. This, however, is a primary area of concern, determination, and evaluation for
4-16. Loyalties of Indigenous Personnel

a. Counterintelligence and civil affairs both have a concurrent requirement to determine the loyalty of local officials. This should be a continuously coordinated effort with mutual responsibilities and objectives.

b. Background investigations for indigenous labor personnel is a standard operational procedure and a civil affairs requirement. Counterintelligence units, because of their mission, are the units responsible for security investigations. Civil affairs units require background investigations of a broad nature to determine suitability for positions of trust or responsibility or public association with U.S. or allied military government. The results and adjudication of these investigations are processed through G2 and G5 and forwarded to the civil affairs unit. The objective is to minimize subversive and hostile infiltration into official or important positions through which the mission of the Army could be hindered.

c. Guerrilla support by indigenous personnel is a continuous counterintelligence EEI (essential elements of information) to be ascertained, evaluated, analyzed, and disseminated by civil affairs units. Counterintelligence activity is directed toward prevention of guerrilla support, to identify if it exists, and to neutralize it. This must be a coordinated effort from the highest to the lowest level between counterintelligence, civil affairs, and U.S. Embassy country teams in the development of programs to impair guerrilla support.

d. In stability operations, identification of the insurgent infrastructure is a primary target for the civil affairs intelligence effort.

Section IV. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF CIVIL AFFAIRS

4-17. Support of Civil Affairs Operations

a. Consolidation psychological operations, in support and reinforcement of civil information activities, form a part of civil affairs operations. PSYOP units provide trained personnel and equipment to render direct assistance in gaining the cooperation of the civil populace.

b. As areas come under U.S. military control, the immediate objective is to support the accomplishment of the tactical mission. As order and control are established, PSYOP units, by means of persuasion and psychological direction, support civil affairs activities designed to implement U.S. policies and attain national objectives. PSYOP units accomplish this function in much the same manner as they do in all other military operations; i.e., by providing advice regarding the psychological implications of proposed courses of action and employing various propaganda media in support of selected courses of action. For an elaboration of the doctrinal aspects of PSYOP in support of civil affairs operations see FM 33-1 and FM 31-23.

c. Authority of U.S. forces to initiate psycholog-
ical operations directed towards the civil population of a host country may be limited by treaties or agreements. In most cases, considerations of national sovereignty and prerogatives will require that each host nation or allied nation retain control of PSYOP directed at the population of the nation.

4-18. Capabilities of PSYOP Units
The capabilities of PSYOP activities for support of civil affairs operations vary according to the number and composition of psychological operations units available for employment in the area. In general, psychological operational teams can—

a. Plan and implement programs to gain the cooperation of the population toward achievement of U.S. short-range and long-range objectives in the area, and in the liberated or occupied country as a whole.

b. Provide for the operational control of newspaper and other publication and distribution facilities.

c. Provide for the operational control of fixed radio and television broadcasting stations.

d. Conduct mobile audio and visual operations.

e. Provide for the operation of motion picture installations and for their supervision when operated by local personnel.

f. Provide for the operational control of photographic, art, poster, and instructional displays.

g. Provide printing and processing facilities for leaflets and newsheets.

h. Conduct opinion surveys.

i. Disseminate information, directives, and instructions employing any or all of the above media.
CHAPTER 5
IMPACT ON CIVIL AFFAIRS OF EMPLOYMENT OF CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, OR NUCLEAR WEAPONS (STANAG 2103)

Section I. FUNDAMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS

5-1. Introduction

a. The variety of possible situations which could result from the use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons in warfare, makes it difficult to provide doctrine for all eventualities. The civil affairs planner and operator must insure the attainment of U.S. political objectives regardless of the environment or the level of conflict. Civil affairs planning principles remain unchanged, but the task is complicated by an absence of experience factors concerning the impact the use of such weapons will have upon a civilian government, its economy and social institutions. This chapter provides doctrinal guidance based upon available information, assessed against the historical experience of mankind in warfare, and tempered by the traditional adherence of the United States to the standards of international law concerning the responsibilities and duties of military commanders to civilian populations, and by the basic principles of humanity.

b. For general information, concerning the chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons see FM 3-10, FM 3-12, FM 21-40, and FM 101-40.

c. Modern mass destruction and mass casualty weapons systems possess capabilities that pose special hazards to civilian populations. Each type of high lethality weapon, whether used alone, in combination with one or more of the others, or with conventional weapons, has the inherent capacity to devastate civilian populations. While both friendly and enemy forces may observe varying levels and degrees of mutual or unilateral constraints in the employment of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons, observance of such constraints by the enemy cannot be assumed, nor would such observance eliminate all major civil affairs problems. It is, therefore, essential that civil affairs staffs, units, and specialists be capable of undertaking civil affairs operations that will lessen the impact of such weapons on a civilian populace and thereby facilitate the successful completion of the commander's mission.

5-2. Legal Aspects

a. Treaties governing land warfare are contained in DA Pam 27-1. A comprehensive discussion of international law is published in DA Pam 27-161-2, chapter 2 of which deals with the uses of weapons, including poisons, contamination of water, fire, toxic chemical agents, and nuclear weapons.

b. The United States is not a party to any treaty or agreement specifically precluding use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons.

5-3. Impact on the Civil Affairs Responsibilities of the Commander

a. A military commander is concerned with the impact on his mission of mass destruction and mass casualties in the civilian community resulting from disasters, internal unrest, or effects of combat. Liaison with civil authorities is needed to assure advance warning of probable interference with the commander's communications, transportation, local procurement, quartering of troops, or his supply of indigenous labor.

b. In the event of a breakdown of civil authority, the military commander may have to assume authority over the civil population and the resources of an area. A breakdown of civil authority may be accompanied by a mandate or a request to the commander to assume control; or a bilateral or multilateral agreement may authorize such assumption of temporary authority. This action may suspend the rights of the civil authorities, but it does not establish sovereignty and does
not absolve the commander of his responsibilities under international law.

c. The fact that hostilities may commence and proceed for a period of time without the use of mass destruction or mass casualty weapons does not relieve a commander of his responsibilities toward the civil population. The possibility of the sudden use of special weapons by the enemy is always present, and the commander must take adequate precautions to prepare the civilians around him for such an eventuality. In either developed or underdeveloped areas, military forces can demonstrate their concern for the welfare of the population by providing them the needed support for civil defense efforts. U.S. military support for civil defense may vary from liaison and training to the actual provision of the equipment, depending upon theater policy directives and agreements with the host country. Generally, the U.S. military commander in the area will provide technical assistance and support, usually in coordination and cooperation with the military and paramilitary forces of the host nation. The commander usually will be responsible for civil defense of the indigenous labor force operating within his base areas. In order to insure cooperation of this indigenous labor force, he may also be required to provide protective masks, food, clothing, shelter, and emergency medical care for the families of the people working for him, or even for the entire surrounding population. It must be recognized that a U.S. military installation in an area makes the area a more likely target for enemy attack, a factor which will lead to certain natural resentment against the forces. This resentment can be alleviated, if not eliminated, by coordination and correlation of plans with the host country military force as well as adequate U.S. military support for civil defense activities.

5-4. Possible Constraints

a. The use of mass casualty and mass destruction weapons may be limited by constraints contained in agreements between the parties to the conflict. The existence or nonexistence of such constraints will be of importance to all military planners and critical to the civil affairs planner. Listed in b through f below are some of the possible constraints and the favorable and unfavorable results of each on civil affairs plans and operations.

b. One set of constraints might involve refraining from use of certain types of weapons, such as lethal chemical or lethal biological weapons. Civil affairs planners in this situation would have fewer problems in the way of providing protective masks and clothing for civilians, and the public health problems, other than those pertaining to treatment of mass casualties from the use of nuclear and conventional weapons, would also be lessened. If this constraint were to result in increased use of nuclear weapons, however, the problem of maintenance and restoration of essential public facilities might become much greater.

c. Another constraint might involve limitations on deliberate attacks against major population centers with any of these weapons, which would in effect turn population centers of certain sizes into sanctuaries. Concomitantly, there might also be agreement not to use cities of these sizes for military purposes. If this were to be adopted, there might develop serious problems in the provision of civilian labor for the support of military operations. Such a constraint could also lead to many other problems including—

(1) Possible increased devastation of rural areas with partial or total loss of food production for fairly prolonged periods of time.

(2) The necessity for the large scale importation of food for the people in the city sanctuaries and the resultant delivery and distribution problems.

(3) Overtaxing of housing, public health, and all other vital facilities in population centers where rural and small town populations took refuge.

(4) These sanctuaries could at any time become major disaster areas if the enemy should suddenly abandon the constraints or threats of such action. Rumors of such action could also cause mass panic and precipitous flight. On the other hand, if the sanctuaries were respected, this might provide a means for survival of the major part of the civilian populace and greatly ease the burden of caring for mass casualties. It would also provide at least a partial means of enforcing a stay-put or standfast policy and would reduce the problems inherent in prehostilities evacuation.

d. Even if nuclear weapons and all categories of chemical and biological weapons were to be used there might be constraints upon the weapons effects sought or upon the type of target. For example there might be agreement to use only the nonlethal types of chemical agents (such as riot control or incapacitating agents) or the nonlethal biological agents (such as anticrop agents or those capable of producing only incapacitating diseases
in man). The use of such weapons under these circumstances while obviously reducing some civil affairs problems would materially increase the civil affairs tasks in other areas.

(1) Successful attacks on agricultural production would bring increased civilian supply problems concerning the importation and distribution of foodstuffs.

(2) Incapacitating agents used against population centers would also affect, at least temporarily, all the public health, public safety, and public utilities services. For example, a small, easily controlled fire could become a major disaster if it were to occur when the bulk of the local fire department was too ill to respond.

e. A major constraint on nuclear weapons might limit such weapons in ways to avoid the deliberate use of large scale fallout. Since fallout attacks people rather than physical structures, the problems of caring for civilian casualties might well be greatly increased while the problems of the restoration of essential facilities could at the same time be reduced.

f. Restraints upon the use of mass destruction and mass casualty weapons is thus not a panacea for all civil affairs problems. The net impact of constraints on the use of such weapons would probably ease many civil affairs problems but each of these constraints could well cause or magnify others. In any event, the commander must plan for civil affairs operations under any possible set of constraints in the same way and to the same degree that he must plan for tactical and logistical operations under the same conditions.

Section II. CIVIL AFFAIRS PLANNING AND ORGANIZATION

5–5. General
a. Based on the foregoing considerations, CA organizations must be formed, and civil affairs operational plans must be prepared and coordinated with friendly governments concerned. Modern warfare conducted by an alliance requires extensive international coordination of civil affairs activities, and the potential threat of mass destruction and mass casualty weapons increases the requirement for coordination to the same extent that it increases the overall civil affairs problems.

b. Planning for civil affairs operations in this environment requires consideration of essential differences between such warfare and that waged solely with conventional weapons.

(1) Nuclear weapons probably would create the greatest civil affairs problems, as these weapons destroy both people and property. In this they are akin to conventional warfare in which saturation bombing techniques are used against large population centers. The major difference is that greater warning time is available to the population in conventional warfare, as saturation techniques require longer periods to achieve the same level of destruction caused by one nuclear weapon.

(2) Chemical and biological weapons can cause massive personnel losses. These weapons can cause great fear and panic because they are unseen, largely unknown, and people have not been conditioned to their possible use. Chemical and biological agents that incapacitate a large percentage of the population for long periods of time could require massive medical treatment facilities and numbers of personnel. Chemical agents that cause irrational behavior would require extraordinary civil police support.

(3) Contamination resulting from the employment of chemical and biological weapons and radioactive fallout from nuclear bursts would create a decontamination requirement which is not common to the employment of conventional weapons.

5–6. Critical Variables

The possible effects of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons upon civil affairs operations require that the civil affairs planner consider the critical variables which are inherent in the use of such weapons. The civil affairs planner must assess the probable impact upon such operations and design a civil affairs organizational structure which can cope with these problems in a way best designed to support the political-military mission of the command. He must, at least, provide an organization which can continue civil affairs operations under the impact of any level of violence in which a military line of command could continue to operate. Among the critical variables which the civil affairs planner must consider are—

a. Attack frequencies.

b. Timing of attacks in relation to seasonal weather variations, topographical configurations, population dispersal and activity patterns, hours of day or night, stage of agricultural cycles, economic and political support expected from civilian
communities, and time-phasing of multiple attacks.

c. Method of attack (overt or covert) and mode of delivery.

d. Attack "mixes," i.e., the various combination options which the enemy could utilize against friendly targets.

e. U.S. allied, and enemy strategic and tactical objectives.

f. Civil defense planning capabilities and limitations, including organization, training, and protective shelters available.

g. Numbers and types of CA units and functional teams available.

h. Status of military operations.

i. Theater organization and procedures for disseminating warnings of chemical, biological, and nuclear attacks and of chemical, biological, and radiological hazard areas.

5–7. Civil Defense Plans and Organization

a. A major critical variable which faces the civil affairs planner is a consideration of the status of local civil defense planning and organization in the area of operation. Generally, the impact of the use of mass casualty and destruction weapons upon U.S. Army civil affairs operations will be in inverse proportion to the extent and effectiveness of the civil defense plans and organization in affected areas. To the extent that civil government can control and care for its people, the potential civil affairs problems of the Army are reduced.

b. The civil affairs planner must obtain and study all available information about the status of civil defense planning and organization in a projected or actual theater of operations to determine if it is adequate to meet the needs likely to arise. He must then make appropriate recommendations to his commander for civil affairs operations and for the requisite civil affairs organizational structure which appears to be required.

c. The initial concerns of the civil affairs planner, after finding that there is a civil defense plan for the area of operations, are to be determined if the plan covers the essential requirements to meet anticipated combat conditions. The planner also needs to know whether the civil defense organization is a military, paramilitary or purely civilian organization, its relationships with the military forces and other governmental agencies of the country concerned, sources of man-

power and the state of training and discipline, and the degree of authority it has over the population. Finally, he must know the general attitude of the population toward civil defense, and the general level of knowledge about and preparation for individual and family protective measures.

d. For planning purposes, civil defense can be divided into three time phases of action after attack—

(1) The first phase is the Emergency Phase. It lasts from the time of the attack to several days or weeks afterward, depending upon the sizes and location of the attack(s), the nature of the area, and the effectiveness of the defense organization. The object of the Emergency Phase is survival. The effectiveness of operations conducted during this phase is largely dependent upon careful preattack planning and training.

(2) Following the Emergency Phase, the Operational Recovery Phase begins at the earliest time possible. During this phase a civil defense organization must restore the essential functions of the area as quickly as possible. The main objective of this phase is restoration of critical functions. Proper preattack planning and training for operational restoration are absolutely essential. If this planning and training are delayed until after the attack, the capability for early recovery may be critically hampered. In addition, the number of casualties caused by radiation and by secondary effects of chemical weapons will be greatly increased.

(3) At the completion of the Operational Recovery Phase, the Final Recovery Phase begins. The objective of this phase is total restoration of the normal functions in the area.

e. In addition to the factors indicated in d above, the civil affairs planner will need to know what has been planned and done to provide for continuity of government, the continuity of operations of business and industry generally, and of the public utilities particularly and what is the status of public health planning and organization for emergency situations.

f. Formulation of an adequate civil defense plan is complex. Coordinated planning requires correlation of the essentials of survival in each community with the anticipated effects of specific types and levels of attacks. The planner must recognize that any catastrophic event is certain to hit more than one domestic activity simultaneously. Each separate action must complement all others because quick restoration comes only from a coordinated program of tasks.
5–8. Prehostilities Evacuation Planning  
Military plans for prehostilities evacuation of civil populations from probable combat areas and from the vicinity of rear area target complexes should consider the following factors:

a. Probable reaction of hostile power(s).

b. Loss of protective capabilities of fixed civil defense facilities.

c. Impact on logistical and civilian labor requirements.

d. Availability of suitable sanctuaries with adequate means of protecting the civil population.

e. Time, distance, and transportation factors.

f. Effects of possible surprise attack during movement.

g. Disruption of the economic, political, and social orders.

h. Emergency provision for mass subsistence support.

i. Capabilities and limitations of civilian authorities.

j. Civil affairs organizational and operational capabilities.

k. Communication media available for dissemination of information to the civil population.

5–9. Stay-Put Planning

a. Stay-put policies require strong enforcement capabilities. While enforcement should be the responsibility of civil officials, military plans must provide for emergency enforcement measures if civil authorities fail.

b. In a nuclear warfare environment where cities are targets, the civil defense posture is inadequate, and chemical or biological attacks are not anticipated, a stay-put policy may not be valid, especially when time permits evacuation. On the other hand, if a surprise enemy attack with chemical or biological weapons is practicable during the evacuation period, casualties inflicted during the movement could offset the advantages sought.

c. Where chemical and biological attacks are delivered against population centers and nuclear weapons are not being employed, a stay-put policy may be advantageous. Remaining indoors, or improperly equipped shelters, sealing windows and doors, adopting strict sanitary measures, and other expedients may reduce civilian casualties during and after such attacks.

d. A basic advantage of a stay-put policy is that maximum utilization of existing fixed civil defense organization and facilities can be made, especially where the population participates in the program as a routine part of community life.

e. When belligerents have agreed to exclude all population centers, or those above certain size, from attack, a stay-put policy would be valid. Such places would become sanctuaries. Nevertheless, the existence of such sanctuaries would particularly when swollen with refugees, provide the enemy with an important target to attack in the event he abandoned constraints.

f. Stay-put advantages and limitations for the battle area should be carefully evaluated prior to decision. Military necessity may compel complete, partial, or selective evacuation from the battle area and contiguous communities. Such evaucations could, depending on the size of the battle area, involve as many as several million people.

g. A stay-put policy will serve to facilitate permanent rehabilitation activities after combat operations have moved elsewhere, or following cessation of hostilities.

5–10. Public Health

a. CA public health planning should incorporate operating procedures based upon—

(1) Theater policy.

(2) Area studies and surveys of indigenous medical facilities, personnel, and supplies.

(3) Medical logistical support requirements.

(4) Comprehensive staff coordination.

(5) Evaluation of the specific effects of particular types of weapons systems. For example, where certain nonlethal chemical or biological agents are utilized for the purposes of temporarily incapacitating a civil populace, hospital requirements vary according to agent used. When lethal agents are used in high concentrations, hospital requirement may be zero but disposal of cadavers becomes an overwhelming problem. Wild and domestic animals are highly vulnerable to chemical and biological agents.

b. Existing civilian public health facilities, personnel, equipment, and supplies of all types, generally can be regarded as inadequate in varying degrees, for handling the variety of emergency requirements which would be caused by attacks using mass destruction or mass casualty weapons. Initial casualties may exceed surviving treatment capabilities in situations where attacks are of high or medium intensity. Rural casualties
will require evacuation in many cases to medical facilities in urban areas unless mobile or temporary hospitals have been prepositioned in rural areas. Provision of medical facilities outside of urban areas for potential use by urban populations may exceed the production and economic capabilities of the government concerned. Biological attacks may go undetected or overcome the protection afforded by immunization, resulting in a sudden and massive outbreak of disease.

5-11. Civilian Supply Planning

a. A civilian supply planning should be based on detailed coordination with the civilian government prior to the outbreak of hostilities. Emergency stockpiles established in the prehostilities phase should be positioned so as to minimize the probability of destruction in initial attacks. Plans should provide for emergency stockpile levels commensurate with anticipated operational requirements and replenishment times.

b. Civilian supply plans for civil affairs operations after a chemical, biological, or nuclear attack should anticipate that unusually large quantities of rodenticides and insecticides may be needed. Seed, fertilizer, and domestic animals may be required in some cases. Other needs could include extraordinary amounts of—

   (1) Engineer tools and equipment.
   (2) Power generators.
   (3) Food.
   (4) Clothing.
   (5) Public safety equipment and supplies.
   (6) Communications equipment.
   (7) Protective masks and clothing.
   (8) Decontaminating equipment and supplies.
   (9) Detection and warning equipment.
   (10) Construction supplies and fuel.
   (11) Water purification equipment.
   (12) First aid equipment for chemical casualties (such as automatic atropine injectors for nerve agent casualties).

c. Types and quantities of supplies actually required will depend upon evaluation of each anticipated attack environment. For example, chemical and biological weapons can be employed to leave buildings, docks, railyards, streets, vehicles, and other facilities intact while killing human beings, animals, and plants. Indirect physical damage or destruction can result from absence or disability of persons responsible for buildings, machinery, or other property. Conversely, nuclear attacks could demolish an entire city or number of cities.

5-12. Continuity of Government

Lines of succession that apply to national, provincial (regional), or local levels should be clearly established in the emergency plans of the indigenous government. Such plans should provide for alternate seats of government, preservation of essential records, and lines of succession within the civil defense structure. The civil affairs planner must be aware of these plans and take them into account in his operational planning. Civil affairs plans must include alternate solutions for the government of the area if civil government collapses, or is unable to meet the situation without military aid.

5-13. Continuity of Commerce and Industry

The procedures contained in paragraph 5-12 are also applicable to commerce and industry. Where appropriate, civil affairs plans should include key facilities lists and the requisite special procedures for emergency operation. This factor becomes of especial importance in situations where U.S. military forces are dependent upon local procurement of supplies for support of military operations.

5-14. Public Utilities

Basic criteria useful in preparing plans for restoration of water, electric power, natural gas, and communication services are—

a. The present and projected extent and condition of the physical facilities of the system.

b. The inherent vulnerability and durability of the systems during and following attacks.

5-15. CA Organizational Considerations

a. Based upon the problems which have been set forth in preceding paragraphs the civil affairs planner must develop an organization which can cope with the civil affairs problems generated by the use of these weapons. It is essential that the civil affairs portion of a theater of operations troop list provide for adequate and continuing input of civil affairs units and personnel to the theater from CONUS. CA needs would be magnified many times. The theater troop basis must also reflect the greater need of the Civil Affairs organization for communications equipment; CBR teams; medical laboratory services as well as other medical unit support; and for augmentation.
by military police, engineer, quartermaster, signal, transportation, and chemical units.

b. Chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons effects can be anticipated to cross political boundaries as well as military boundaries, thereby requiring especially close coordination of civil affairs operations. Depending on the level of destruction and disruption, the conversion of the civil affairs organizational structure from decentralized operations to centralized operations under a civil affairs command may be desirable in the nuclear environment. In addition, the probable involvement of a number of national populations, their governments, and their military forces—whether co-belligerent with the United States or neutral—will create complex requirements for—

(1) Civil affairs plans and operations of international character.

(2) Coordination of civil defense and other civil affairs activities at international and national political and military levels.

(3) Possible movements of civilian populations, or sizable segments of such populations, across national borders, to escape the initial or subsequent effects of chemical, biological, and nuclear operations.

(4) Negotiation and implementation of civil affairs agreements pertaining to multinational civil affairs operations. These agreements must provide detailed arrangements to implement STANAG, SEASTAG, and SOLOG where such documents are in force. Among matters to be covered are—

(a) Migration of nations from one country to another for the purpose of establishing permanent residence.

(b) Temporary movements of refugees or displaced persons across international boundaries.

(c) Mutually supporting civil defense plans and operational procedures to provide unity throughout a theater of operations and adjacent areas.

(d) Mutually supporting logistical plans and operational procedures insuring each civil population a reservoir of emergency supplies and equipment.

(e) Unity of effort in the civil affairs operation in each allied nation to assure—

1. Adherence to the requirements of customary and conventional international law.

2. Effective support of the war effort by each participating nation through integration of allied civil affairs' operations, mutual assistance, and controlled usage of national resources by civil populations.

c. Due to the increased complexities of civil affairs operations in chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) toxic or contaminated environments, effective CMO staff representation is of particular importance. Such staff representation should be a normal part of TOE and TD, providing CMO staff officers on the coordinating staff level in all headquarters having general or directorate staffs. Provisional capability is inadequate for planning or operational purposes in a special weapons environment. Properly qualified CA officers are needed to facilitate the development of civil affairs portions of military plans during the prehostilities phase and to assure their effective execution during hostilities.

d. To be more effective in the CBR environment, civil affairs units should be included in the prehostilities forward deployment posture of the Army. Criteria for determining the numbers and types of civil affairs units prepositioned in overseas areas is not limited to the size of the overall force alone. On the contrary, the size of the overall force may be of only incidental concern. The factors shown in (1) through (5) below must be considered.

(1) Political, social, and economic conditions prevailing in the areas of deployment.

(2) The level of development of indigenous civil defense programs and the resulting capabilities and limitations.

(3) Requirements of international law relating to civil populations.

(4) Evaluation of intentions of the enemy relating to adherence to constraints in employing chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons against civilian populations.

(5) Accomplishment of maximum actions prior to the outbreak of hostilities for the protection of civilian populations in order to lessen the dangers of civilian interference with military operations when war occurs. Otherwise, the diversion of large numbers of tactical and support troops to civil affairs operations may be required.

e. CA units delayed for use in a possible CBR environment require augmentation in at least two ways.

(1) Communications. CA units depend upon existing military or civilian communications systems for command, control, and liaison activities. In view of the threat posed by special weapons,
Section III. CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS

5-16. Civil Affairs Support Activities

In a CBR environment the CA organization must continue to provide both command support to the combat divisions and area support to the remaining U.S. forces in the theater. Succeeding paragraphs describe the minimum essential civil affairs operational considerations of particular importance for the continuance of tactical and logistical operations.

5-17. Civil Affairs Command Support Operations

Command support CA units operating in the CBR environment may find their capabilities seriously strained or exceeded. Plans must provide for immediate augmentation. In some cases, depending on the area of operations, large numbers of sick, injured, or dead enemy civilians, soldiers, and animals will be encountered. Social controls may have ceased to exist. Contamination may be widespread. The impact of these conditions on the continuance of the tactical mission will require rapid augmentation of command support CA units and very close support from area support units earmarked and trained for specific localities.

5-18. CA Area Support

a. CA area support units in supervision of, or coordination with, a civil defense program must consider such matters as circulation of traffic; movement of individuals; handling of mass casualties; construction of shelters; differences in effects of CBR attacks; warning systems; labor; firefighting and decontamination equipment and procedures. The civil defense plan must be correlated with the military commander's corresponding area damage control plan to minimize interference with military operations. Some of the same personnel and equipment may be employed dually in alerting civil defense and area damage control agencies. In postattack recovery operations, location of the boundaries of contaminated areas, and completion of decontamination processes will benefit both military personnel and civilians. In repair and reconstruction activities, equipment, technicians, labor, and material of troop units concerned and similar civilian assets should be coordinated to provide maximum recovery capability.

b. The military commander should assign the overall responsibility for civil defense operations and measures for the control of the civilian population to his CA commander. The CA unit commander coordinates his plans with appropriate command staff officers in their respective fields of interest. In his assigned area of jurisdiction, the CA unit commander is responsible for implementation of plans for military support of civil defense and for coordination of control measures with appropriate agencies of government. To the maximum extent practicable, local officials are held responsible for organization and conduct of local civil defense activities.

c. Planning is a continuing process with respect to civil defense and disaster relief since emergency methods may supplant routine measures. Patterns of official authority may change. Although emergencies can originate in any of the CA functions, the most urgent expression of emergency problems is usually in three functional areas—public health; public works and utilities; and public safety. The latter function is of broadest implication in an emergency situation. CA civil defense and public safety personnel are responsible for reporting the effectiveness of control measures and estimating public reaction to proposed solutions of emergency problems. CA civil defense and public safety personnel, in collaboration with civil government usually assume a major part in planning for emergencies, but his does not relieve CA personnel assigned to other functions.
of their technical responsibilities. The possibility of breakdown of usual political and economic processes is inherent in emergencies; therefore, consideration of extraordinary actions should anticipate most breakdowns.

5-19. Postattack Operations

a. The immediate problems of survival include locating and marking boundaries of contaminated areas, firefighting, rescue, debris removal, radiation protection, and all the other required supporting functions. As time passes, new problems arise to replace the early ones. These problems mainly involve sustaining the survivors over a period of time. Food, medical, fuel, and equipment supplies must be replenished and people should be returned to their normal environment. Operations must continue to clear areas of debris, repair and decontaminate essential facilities and material, and to control the rate of radiation dose accumulation in the population. Social problems become increasingly important and law and order must be maintained. Water pollution and the spread of disease must be controlled by the reestablishment of health and sanitation practices. Eventually, these problems are replaced by the long-range requirements, such as reestablishment of the food growing and processing industry, and reestablishment of industries to replenish and increase the stockpiles of supplies.

b. The immediate problems will be of concern to both the command support and the area support CA units. The command support units generally are concerned only with Emergency Phase Operations while the area support units will be concerned not only with Emergency Phase Operations in their areas of responsibility but also with the Operation Recovery Phase and the Final Recovery Phase. Operations in the latter two phases of postattack recovery will be based largely upon postattack resources evaluation, and examination of the status of essential facilities.

c. Resources evaluation requires estimates of the available service or product at each critical facility by time intervals after an attack, and estimates of requirements for such resources at the same time intervals. Resources requirements may arise from military needs, civilian use, or other production or recovery operations. The operation of production facilities, for example, will generate requirements for other resources such as manpower, transportation, waterpower, and various raw materials.
CHAPTER 6
COLD WAR CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

Section I. INTRODUCTION

6-1. General

a. The possibility of mutual annihilation so far has deterred the great powers from the use of their full destructive capacities as a means of achieving national objectives. This restraint, however, has not basically changed those objectives, and conflict ensues where those objectives clash. One form of this conflict, known as the cold war, occurs in a state of international tension in which political, economic, technological, psychological, and paramilitary measures short of overt armed conflict involving regular military forces are employed to achieve national objectives. This type of conflict may assume forms many of which are hardly recognizable as military. It can nevertheless produce defeat for one side or the other as complete as has ever been achieved in open battle between identified armed forces.

b. In the cold war environment, the United States and its allies are faced with the threat of widespread subversive activity directed against them and many other smaller but independent nations. Subversion takes many forms and is manifested in covert activities designed to influence, manipulate, or replace governments which are, or may become, allied with or friendly to the United States. The instability inherent in the developing nations of the world creates a target of opportunity for covert aggression. These nations are particularly vulnerable to exploitive activities by internal powers and insurgent movements by revolutionist groups seeking to win political alignments or control.

6-2. United States Efforts

a. A major part of the U.S. mutual security program is military assistance. Current U.S. military assistance legislation and directives provide that, in addition to materiel and tactical training improvements, military assistance programs should encourage civil-military cooperation in developing countries. Better relations between the government and the civilian populace may be established through the use of local military and paramilitary forces on projects helpful to economic and social development, provided such activities do not detract from capabilities to perform primary military missions. It is a basic point that Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAG's) or Military Missions in these countries must assure that host military forces realize the importance of good civil-military relationships.

b. Every American diplomatic mission overseas is headed by an ambassador or minister or in their absence a charge d'affaires. The ambassador or minister is the chief of the mission and is the personal representative of the President of the United States with full powers to act as his agent. As chief of mission he is responsible for the direction and conduct of all official relations between the United States and the country to which he is assigned. The precise manner in which the United States diplomatic mission is organized varies from country to country. Organization depends on the size of the mission, local mores, official ties between the host power and the United States and on the personality of the chief of mission. The mission includes the embassy, which is the main operational headquarters of the mission, and the representation from other agencies which may or may not be directly attached to the embassy but are responsible to the ambassador.

6-3. The Country Team

a. In every foreign country where U.S. troops are stationed, other U.S. governmental departments and bureaus, international agencies, church groups, and private institutions may be working toward common ends in at least some aspects of providing assistance and stimulating cooperative and harmonious development in the host country. The number of U.S. Government agencies alone is
impressive, and close cooperation and cordial liaison are essential if optimum results are to be achieved. Coordination, not only on the policy level but also at operating levels, will reduce costs, prevent duplication of effort, lessen the friction potential, and increase tangible results. Generally, in peacetime the ambassador is the coordinating authority for civil assistance programs. Country teams usually are established consisting of representatives of various national agencies, including the Chief of MAAG or Mission or senior military commander as the Department of Defense member, and with the ambassador functioning as head of the team (fig. 6-1).

b. The country team is a mechanism developed to coordinate this community of U.S. interests in relations with the host government. The country team facilitates understanding of mutual concerns and resolution of conflicts and interests in various policies, programs, projects, procedures, and problems of U.S. and host country agencies.

c. Some of the problems that spread across all U.S. agencies in the host country are the inflationary impact of U.S. operations, blackmarket activities, observance of host country holidays, vehicle operation, indigenous labor-employment practices, housing for personnel and office space. These problems, if not solved, can materially hamper U.S. cold war efforts.

6–4. MAAG’s and Military Missions

a. Military personnel and their families, assigned to MAAG’s and military missions have significant capabilities, disproportionate to the relatively small size of units concerned, to promote understanding, cooperation, and kinship not only between their own personnel and the civilian population, but also (through example, demonstration, and guidance) between the civilians and the military forces of the host country. In many countries there is an unsatisfied demand for education and development in various vocational and technical skills, and in every military unit and their associated families there are reservoirs of knowledge and skills which can be channeled through voluntary efforts into programs of education and assistance. The very nature of the MAAG or mission member’s role—his daily and intimate contacts with host unit personnel, participating in their daily activities, sharing in their ceremonies, bringing them a better understanding of the United States, and showing a sincere interest in their language, culture, and welfare—goes far toward producing good civil-military relations.

b. Much of the effectiveness of the individual and informal efforts of personnel in missions and advisory groups stems from their spontaneity, but no program can attain maximum results without some degree of fixed responsibility within a unit. To that end, a section should be established, even if it consists of only one officer, to coordinate civil-military relationships in each MAAG or mission, and to assist in the development of similar programs in the military forces of the host country. The requirement for promoting an awareness in the host country forces, the necessity for civilian-military affinity, and furnishing guidance in this effort, is at least as important as military instruction in training procedures, techniques of warfare, and the handling of military equipment.

c. MAAG’s or missions in developing nations
may have more extensive duties than those in developed countries where education, industry, and technical skills are relatively well-advanced and trained personnel are more numerous. MAAG’s in new countries may have expanded duties in assisting in the training of indigenous officials who are taking over the reins of governmental functions for the first time.

Section II. U.S. ARMY CIVIL AFFAIRS
PARTICIPATION IN THE COLD WAR

6-5. General

a. U.S. Army units are deployed abroad for a variety of reasons. Most of these deployments have a relationship to the requirements of the cold war and to serve as a deterrent to the outbreak of limited or general war. Even those troop units deployed primarily for their deterrent role are generally engaged in cold war activities. Troop units deployed outside the United States primarily for cold war purposes, while they may be engaged in a show of force or in a mission to safeguard the lives and property of citizens of the United States and its allies, most frequently will be dispatched to assist in the training of indigenous officials of a friendly nation which has requested such aid. The Army’s dual responsibility in cold war is to maintain operational readiness for limited or general war, and to facilitate and implement the national objectives and advance the national interest through appropriate activities in cold war. The role of civil affairs in cold war is to support this dual responsibility.

b. In planning for civil affairs cold war operations, provisions should be made for a draft civil affairs agreement which considers the political as well as the military aspects of the planned operation. Thus, as the need for such an agreement arises, it can be negotiated rapidly with such modifications as may be required. When U.S. diplomatic representatives are present and functioning in a country, an Executive order should be issued which delineates the authority and responsibilities of the military commander and the diplomatic representatives.

6-6. Cold War Activities

a. Mutual security programs have necessitated the stationing of U.S. troops on the soil of other sovereign powers under the authority of bilateral and multilateral agreements, either as security forces or to provide training assistance for foreign military units. The terms of the agreements involved and the scope of missions assigned are diverse; but, as is true with MAAG personnel, U.S. commanders and their personnel have significant capabilities for furthering U.S. foreign policy and fostering a deeper appreciation in host countries for the need for mutual civil-military understanding, cooperation and support.

b. U.S. military units have a dual capability of directly participating in military civic action projects or aiding host country military personnel with planning, technical assistance, and utilization of available resources in the development of their own civic action programs. U.S. military units possess equipment, facilities, supplies, technicians, and labor resources. Within the limitations of the military mission and U.S. national policy, these assets may be applied to achieve the local cold war objectives of the United States.

c. Personnel in the units and their dependents, as individuals, have an even greater potential for favorable influence by their personal conduct, courtesy, and attitude of friendly cooperation toward citizens of host country. Particularly worthy of exploitation is participation by U.S. and host nation individuals in jointly organized activities and programs; e.g., scouting, fraternal organizations, and women’s clubs. However, except in those cases where relatively large security forces are involved, the greatest contribution which can be made by U.S. military organizations abroad is in the nature of guidance, advice, and planning assistance for host country forces in the promotion of civil-military rapport. Results will be measured in strengthened economic and political bases, divorcement of the general population from dissident elements, and reduction in underprivilege and tension.

d. In advisory and training responsibilities, MAAG and military mission officers usually deal with the key commanders of military forces and units. These officers are also frequently involved with the civil officials of the host government: the Minister of Defense and sometimes with the Prime Minister, the titular head of state, and almost certainly with other high civil authorities in the host government. Relations of this type are particularly important when political power has a military base. If it is possible for U.S. official representatives to establish close rapport with these officials
on an informal friendly basis, official relations are likely to be facilitated.

e. Governmental administration and authority generally is delegated or divided among several levels, with certain prerogatives held at the higher levels. The precise pattern differs widely among nations, but almost all resort to some system of layering of governments so that matters of local interest can be dealt with by officials close to the people without burdening higher levels with unnecessary detail. U.S. military forces and units stationed in foreign countries have civil-military relations at almost all levels. Although higher U.S. commands may be in contact with military and civilian officials of the national government, scattered subordinate elements usually are located in the hinterland. These subordinate elements normally are more closely associated with local units of government than with national levels and may be, knowingly or unknowingly, influential in local government.

f. The problems that arise in these more remote localities are likely to include off-post activities of U.S. personnel, property rights, the initiation of civil action projects, and community relations. All U.S. military units and installations abroad must establish a good rapport with local governmental authorities. Care must always be exercised that such local arrangements conform to U.S. national and theater policy. A single point of contact or coordination should be established in such situation, but ordinarily it will not require a mechanism more elaborate than a normal CMO staff section. This staff section is actively involved in all the major civil-military activities of the command including the submission of plans and recommendations to the commander and other staff sections.

g. Cold war operations of U.S. CA organizations develop good working relationships between U.S. military forces and the local population, but concentrate on relations between host military forces and their own people. Individual CA functional specialists and teams are available for assignment to assist in the development and implementation of a definite program for the conduct of relationships with the people. The objective of their activities should be to develop proper attitudes, programs, and methods of operations in the host country military forces which provide for the rights and welfare of the population. This will not only generate confidence and cooperation on the part of the population but also have the effect of bringing together the military and the people into an effective working team. To accomplish this, civil affairs personnel must analyze and solve problems deriving from the social, economic, and political impact of military forces in the area; the use by military forces of local areas, facilities, goods, and manpower; the application of local customs to the military forces; and the social relations between military forces and civilians.
CHAPTER 7
INTERNAL DEFENSE AND INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT OF A NATION

Section I. THE INSURGENT THREAT

7-1. Introduction

a. A major threat to the security of the United States is posed by covert aggression against the freedom and well-being of many of the developing nations. To understand the full nature of this threat, and the means of meeting and defeating it, it is first necessary to understand the actual conditions which exist in developing nations. Most of these countries are in the process of transition from traditional to modern societies. This transition proceeds at an uneven pace and provokes dislocation and disruption of the traditional social and political controls, and of the economic base of the country. Modern mass communications has had its impact by facilitating the penetration of new ideas and generating new aspirations and desires among the peoples of the developing nations.

b. Although the problems of these nations would be acute even in the absence of an organized subversive insurgency effort, they are intensified and made into a direct threat to free world security by well-planned and organized campaign directed by a hard core of dedicated, professional activists. The work of these insurgents is manifested over a relatively long period of time and can be classified in the three general phases of insurgency described in detail in FM 100–20.

(1) Phase I: From circumstances in which subversive activity is only a potential threat—latent or incipient—to situations in which subversive incidents and activities occur with frequency and in an organized pattern.

(2) Phase II: The subversive movement, having gained sufficient local or external support, initiates organized guerrilla warfare, or other forms of violence against the established authority.

(3) Phase III: Guerrilla warfare operations are transformed primarily to an open war between regularly organized forces of the insurgents and those of the established authority.

7-2. Insurgent Objectives

a. An initial attack of the insurgent movement is directed toward the administrative, cultural, and communications gap found in most developing countries between intermediate level governmental echelons and the cities, towns, and villages they are supposed to administer.

b. The ultimate objective of the insurgent movement is to gain complete control of the political apparatus of the nation, for political control is the central issue. Complete political control makes possible control of all the other institutions of a society, such as the economy, military forces, judicial and police systems, and the educational processes. If the insurgency obtains this degree of control it has taken over the nation.

7-3. The Development of an Insurgency

a. Phase I, Latent and Incipient Insurgency. This phase involves no major outbreaks of violence or periods of uncontrollable insurgent activity. It covers situations where the actual conditions are such as to provide real or imagined grievances and actual or potential disaffection of significant elements of the population from their government. It is during this phase, which may last for decades, that the insurgent movement will develop its underground organization, its infrastructure, and its front groups, and will start subversion. As the insurgency and the insurgent organization develop, this phase will be marked by some overt activities which may include demonstrations, presentation of an overt “legal” opposition, strikes, and other manifestations of popular dissatisfaction. Generally, there will be little or no military activity unless subversion in the military and police forces has succeeded in laying the groundwork for a potentially successful coup d'etat. Persuasion is tried on local political officials and police to convert them to the insurgent cause or at least to get them to look the other
way in the face of subversive organizational activities. If persuasion fails, threats follow. If both threats and persuasion fail, officials are eliminated.

b. Phase II, Organized Guerrilla Warfare. In Phase II the insurgents consolidate the organization for the struggle to come. Many party members may go into hiding, establishing and proliferating underground cells—the backbone of the movement. Agitators and front-controlled news media spread antigovernment propaganda and front groups recruit sympathizers. Weapons are collected and underground communications and supply lines are established. Government agencies are infiltrated at all levels. Insurgent progress is often unwittingly encouraged by political leaders who are reluctant to admit that a revolution against their power is in being. Mob and riot actions discredit the government and demonstrate to sympathetic but passive followers that resistance to the government is possible. The objective is to gain control of towns and villages, often by taking advantage of existing disaffection toward national government and the poor communications between the government and the people. Control of villages is consolidated when “shadow governments” can operate without betrayal to the government forces. Small armed groups spring up. All these moves serve to develop insurgent channels of information concerning national government plans and activities and to assure that little or no information about insurgent activities reaches the national government.

c. Phase III, War of Movement. The situation moves from Phase II to Phase III when insurgency becomes primarily a war of movement and the insurgent expands his military forces. These forces still draw their support from well-organized undergrounds but require heavier weapons and supplies which cannot be furnished locally. By this stage the insurgent has, or is building, three types of military forces. Regional forces are the first to be formed—the regional militia. Next are village militia which are usually a part of the village underground and are normally under the direction of the village political head. Finally, there are the main military forces which may be uniformed. Regional and main forces provide cadre for their own expansion. Intelligence from village posts and from warning nets along roadways insures that training areas are relatively safe. Arms are procured in greater numbers; larger military units are trained to operate in unison; and the staff and technical facilities necessary to such operations are developed. Authoritarian political control is brought to local government in the controlled areas; political heads are nominated; and civic services are provided along with legal and taxation systems. On the edges of controlled areas the insurgents continue to extend their control, using Phase II tactics. By these means insurgents may be able to attain political and military control of as much as 95 percent of the landmass of the country, with government forces bottled up in military fortresses and around the national capital.

d. Summary. The description of insurgency in three phases, while convenient, does not mean that there is any sharp break or dividing line to mark the passage from one phase to another. Areas within the same nation may be involved in different phases of insurgency. The insurgent organization grows and develops with variances from one area of a country to another. Insurgent activities progress within the limits of the capabilities of the insurgent organization of a particular area. The actual attempt to seize national power by the insurgent movement can occur during any phase. Successful resistance to an insurgency can cause the insurgent organization to revert to an earlier phase; and, if the acute conditions of the nation have not been bettered, an insurgent organization can again begin a Phase I development no matter how severe a defeat it has suffered from its earlier attempt to seize power.

Section II. INSURGENT ACTIVITIES

7-4. Propaganda Operations

a. The insurgent’s objective is to plan substantially all operations of whatever type to have an impact on the emotions and thinking of the people and those who constitute government and its arms. Described here are the functions of what might be called the formal propaganda apparatus, the apparatus designed to put the insurgent posture and cause into words that will appeal to logic and emotions. The basic insurgent concept of operations encompasses the following key points:

(1) The major propaganda themes will be established by the insurgent national secretariat. Local leaders will be allowed some flexibility in interpreting them to the area audience. Propaganda is directed toward three target groups: the
civil population and subgroups within it; the insurgent forces, especially the armed forces and underground; and the troops and functionaries of the government being subverted.

(2) Propaganda distributed by mass media constitutes the broad base for putting the insurgent theme before its audiences. This propaganda supplements that transmitted by face-to-face discussion and argument. National and subnational propaganda units may provide materials ready for reproduction in operational areas. Propaganda is made credible. When a claim is made, an action predicted, the movement tries to make sure that the prediction is verified. Propaganda is action-oriented.

(3) The true purpose of the propagandist—and of the entire insurgent apparatus—is not merely to create disaffection and hatred toward existing government and functionaries, but to channel this disaffection so as to forward their political concepts. If “objective conditions” are sufficiently conducive, this may be accomplished fairly readily. But, to build a thriving insurgency, propaganda must not merely convince the people that their system of government must be overthrown; it must propose and advocate a system of government which will satisfy concepts of government that have been planted and nurtured among the people. These concepts will vary from one country to another.

b. The responsibilities of an insurgent propaganda unit will usually be:

(1) Working from the national plan for propaganda operations and with assistance of party members, it identifies sources of discontent and the size and power of dissident groups. It is to develop propaganda appeals exploiting areas of discontent; shaking the faith of the people and government supporters in their own government; creating a hatred among the people toward specific government functionaries singled out as targets; persuading the people that as individuals they can do nothing about the wrongs of government, that wrongs can only be alleviated by overturning the system of government; and creating a faith in the insurgent cause and insurgent victory.

(2) The propaganda unit takes advantage of fortuitous events. It broadcasts mistakes of government functionaries and troops (looting, harsh acts against the people) and possibly, in coordination with measures of civil disobedience, such as strikes and riots, encourages such mistakes.

(3) Using the underground and other means as appropriate, the propaganda unit sees that appeals are circulated to target groups by all appropriate media, and successively refines appeals by tryout and observation of responses. It keeps tab on the public image of the movement by periodic surveys of what people do and do not like about it. It coordinates propaganda operations with other ongoing political and military operations. Finally, as the movement succeeds, it provides support to local governments in areas held by insurgents.

c. A number of media will be employed, depending on equipment available and the state of development of the country. The one medium always employed is word-of-mouth propaganda by activists, front groups, and members of insurgency cells. As the movement develops, guerrilla soldiers are taught to win friends by contacts with civilians. In addition, public or clandestine meetings are held with labor groups, peasants, or members of villages and hamlets. Persuasion and force may be used at the same time. Clandestine radio broadcasts originating in-country become possible once a locale is reasonably secure. Greater availability of inexpensive transmitters and radios makes this medium extremely popular. Periodicals and handbills will be distributed via the underground. In many developing nations low literacy rates minimize the propaganda value of newspapers.

7–5. Terrorism

Persuasion, indoctrination, and organization are all reinforced with the use of terror. The murder of a village chief or a tax collector can serve the insurgent cause in several ways. First, it demonstrates its power to kill selected individuals of its choice, which may help to persuade people that safety lies with adherence to the insurgent cause. Second, each such act weakens the government which must replace the functionary or see its power in the area eroded. Third, it causes fear in other functionaries and makes them more amenable to subversion or at least to tacit acquiescence in insurgent activity. Mass terror is also used to demonstrate the weakness of the government, its inability to protect its people, or to incite blind and brutal reprisals by government forces which may drive the uncommitted to the side of the insurgents.

7–6. Intelligence

a. Victory in an insurgency goes to the side which best obtains and exploits accurate information from the people. Every successful insurgent
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effort must have accurate detailed information about its own members, its area of operations, government policies and functionaries, and the people.

b. Members of the overt and covert party, the front groups, and strong sympathizers are counted. Their distribution throughout the area is mapped. Alternative uses of key members and sympathizers are considered in view of their capabilities, skills, and acquaintances.

c. The economy of the area is evaluated to determine the best supply sources for food, arms, clothing, and equipment. Potential major suppliers and all stockage points are noted.

d. Topography, roads and communications networks, and configuration of villages of the area are evaluated along with probable sympathy of geopolitical units to determine the most favorable places for insurgent hideouts, and ways in which the area can be isolated from the centers of government power.

e. Provisions will be made during Phase I for collection of intelligence as to government operation and plans by infiltration of agents. The adequacy of coverage of government operations and timeliness of intelligence is later reviewed to determine whether existing agent networks and sources of intelligence are adequate and efforts to improve them by further infiltration will be made if they are not.

f. The number, type, and organization of functionaries of the national government in the area capital and in lower governmental echelons will be determined. Special attention will be given to functionaries who might interfere with the insurgent movement (area command, national police assigned to area, area police, foresters, agriculturalists, and so forth). Attention will be given to village chiefs and village police. The popularity of each chief and his probable sympathies will be reviewed on a village-by-village basis. Effectiveness of liaison between government and police heads, and village chiefs and police will be noted. Attention is given to the organization, staffing, and operations of local, area, and national police, and to national or area counterinsurgency planning groups if they exist. Information that government intelligence units may have about insurgent cadre members, sympathizers, and underground will be reviewed.

g. The probable sympathies of the people are taken into account. Several stratifications may be used, among which may be ethnic groups, religious groups, intellectuals, students, industrial workers, peasants, landowners, teachers, and geopolitical units, i.e., districts, towns, villages, and hamlets. The probable allegiance of personnel are noted for each method of stratification.

h. A civilian intelligence service is normally a part of the underground in towns and villages. It collects information about the village chief, council, prominent citizens, police, retail merchants, their affiliations, their attitudes toward the insurgent movement, suspected government agents, and happenings in the village believed relevant. Government-inspired political rallies and attempts at civic action will be reported.

7-7. Social Control

Social controls are measures designed to provide effective control of all relevant aspects of society. This control is reinforced by the formation of groups based on social class, occupation, physical proximity, or kinship. Each group has a warden responsible for all members, who reports to a subordinate of the insurgent village or hamlet chief, or the head of the insurgent shadow government, who in turn are watched by the passive underground, possibly covert party members, who report directly to higher authorities. Thus, the insurgent establishes parallel systems to solidify control. Therefore, temporary occupation by government troops does not seriously damage the latticework the insurgent has built. Once a village or hamlet is “organized” a very substantial effort is required to break the tentacles of the organization. In the organization of a city the same general system is used except that the city block is the basic unit to be organized.

7-8. Organization of the Villages or Hamlets

a. Before or after the above described organization has occurred, the village or hamlet may be organized for “self-defense” against government forces. Weapons are usually crude; most self-defense forces could not resist a sizable attack. Nonetheless, village or hamlet defenses provide a way to build esprit de corps and a partially trained pool of recruits for area insurgent forces and the main force.

b. As more villages or hamlets are brought under insurgent control, the supervisory superstructure is extended so that chiefs of several villages are monitored by a sector or township ad-
Section III. INTERNAL DEFENSE AND INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT

7-9. Political-Military Considerations

A country beset by subversive insurgency where the political existence of the government itself is threatened must insure that every military act at all levels of command is designed to accomplish a political end. **The political objective is the establishment, maintenance, or preservation of a government which can operate effectively under law to meet the needs and aspirations of its people.** Military objectives and the tactical operations conducted to achieve them must be compatible with and support the political objective; that is, they must be conducted in such a manner as to gain the support of the populace for the government. Tactical operations which cause unnecessary civilian casualties and damage may well provide a net advantage to the insurgents by creating sympathy for their cause and adding to popular grievances against the government. For this reason the indiscriminate use of force and especially of area weapons must be avoided. The insurgent political infrastructure is the heart of the insurgency. Elimination of the infrastructure should be primary.

7-10. Political Control

a. Political parity exists when two forces are competing for control of the political system and neither is clearly superior. There may be a struggle between residents of a village wherein both opposing forces reside or it may be between residents, and the political body of the village and their superiors who are making a concerted effort to control or regain control. It may be a combination of both forms. The government may attempt to exercise control through the next higher political echelon while village sympathy is largely with the insurgents. There could be a situation in which the mayor or village headman and members of his committee are actively supporting the national government while the police look the other way during insurgent incursions. As another alternative, parity may mean that village political leaders and police have no strong sympathy, but act to favor either side alternately when either applies force.

b. Political superiority at the village level means that, while one side exercises political power, the other also has support and can exercise some constraint over what the group with superiority can do. Like political parity, political superiority can occur in several forms. For example, government or the counterinsurgent force hold political superiority where counterinsurgent appointees hold all political offices and appoint and control police, but the insurgent exercises some influence on the behavior of the people. This influence may be exercised through establishment of cells, sympathy of some economic or racial groups, a weak shadow government, or through any or all of these.

c. Political control means the power to direct or modify all forms of societal activity and to determine the ends to which group efforts will be directed. Thus, political control has implications for the direction and regulation in domains of economics, communication, civic services, education, and so forth. **In sum, political control involves the ability to establish an ideology, to apply it to societal functions as desired, and to regulate behavior by institutions and laws. Political control is reinforced by a body of laws and ordinances that direct and restrain behavior and give legitimacy to the acts of those in power.** It involves the ability to nullify existing laws and ordinances and establish new ones. Further, the government can appoint tribunals which interpret laws, determine to whom they are applicable and whether they have been violated, and mete out punishments for violations. Acts of individuals may be either investigated and followed up and prosecuted, or dropped. Police and courts are instruments by which control is enforced.

d. Political control should be regarded as a means, and not an end in itself. A government which is faced with an insurgency and which must take strenuous measures to gain political control should utilize that control to satisfy the legitimate aspirations of its people. If grievances remain unfulfilled for long, hard won political control can again be lost. After an insurgency has once reached Phase II or III, even if political control has been regained, it can be decades before it can be safely assumed that all danger of a recurrence of insurgency has passed. The time gained by political control is precious national capital which must not be squandered.
7-11. Economic Control

a. A different problem area for the counterinsurgent is that of resource requirements and allocation of resources as an internal defense management problem. As insurgency grows, increasing demands are made on national resources. It is entirely possible that resource requirements can exceed resource availability so that the insurgent wins by default. The operational area command faces the same resource problem, but on a smaller scale.

b. Developing countries may have no explicit philosophy or established systems of economic control. A certain degree of control of wealth may be exercised by landowners and processors of goods. However, they will not, generally, control distribution systems. Beyond their areas of influence, the economic situation may be uncontrolled.

c. This is the situation before the insurgent threat is recognized. Once the threat is met, then whatever the former philosophy and practice, both sides attempt to gain the goods and surplus produced in the operational area. There are three parties to the division of goods, the two contest- ants whose demands increase, and the civil population. Specifically, the operational area economic control is the ability to define ownership and allocation of land and goods—to determine what proportion of the total available resources goes to the political and military branches of the government; and what to the military, political, and other branches of the insurgent. With economic control either side can confiscate. However, if the civil population is not given sufficient food and goods to maintain an acceptable standard of living and production, economic control can cease to be an asset.

d. Government forces must perform the normal functions such as taxation, protection of the people, maintenance of law and order, support of a military establishment, and maintenance of a growing and balanced economy. The insurgent, on the other hand, has one single goal, the seizure of power, and his organization and actions can be oriented toward that single end. He has no responsibility for protection of property or maintenance of law and order. On the contrary, he usually manages to profit from the destruction and civil dislocation brought about by his own actions, possibly compounded by inept administration. Thus, while both government and insurgents have finance departments, only the government forces must worry about the effects of government taxation policies on the overall economy. The insurgent collects “taxes” and lets the government face the inflationary consequences.

7-12. Military Control

a. In its usual form, military control means the imposition of military force according to political decision from a higher level of government, or the capability to occupy at will with military forces. This is one form of military control, control imposed from above. Another form can occur when a town or village, unsympathetic to government, organizes its own self-defense forces. Government forces may be too weak to break through the insurgent troops in surrounding areas or unable to send sufficient forces to retake the village. However, until the government force is defeated entirely, the governments has the capability of occupying any area at the cost of other commitments.

b. Several variations of the struggle for power can occur within the military-political domain. For example, the host country may employ its superior military force to occupy an area and appoint a civic governing body. However, the insurgent shadow government may remain strong because it receives public support facilitated by parallel control structures and by a political lattice-work through which it has penetrated local society. The insurgent may command obedience from almost all the people. Thus, the majority of citizens may still be contributing intelligence, funds, and materiel support to the insurgent cause literally under the nose of the newly established local counterinsurgent government and troops. In such situations, the newly established government may not be able to survive without the continued presence of strong military or police support.

7-13. Other Forms of Control

a. Given political and military domination or superiority, other forms of control can be brought to bear on all aspects of societal life. Economic controls, control of formal and informal intelligence systems and control of public information media can be applied. These forms of control make it easy to control educational institutions, the content of their instructions, community services and civic action programs, transportation and communications facilities, and the recruiting of personnel to the side in power.

b. In situations where neither side has complete political and military domination or superiority, social controls through channels such as family,
religious, or ethnic ties may well be the deciding factor. Here the proper application of psychological operations may spell the difference between success and defeat. For the psychological operations to have more than transitory effect, they must be accompanied by positive political and economic followup actions supported by sufficient military strength to provide a reasonable degree of security for those who have chosen the side of the government.

7-14. General Nature of Internal Development

a. The world is now involved in a relatively new and massive process, that of bringing about deliberately planned changes designed to improve the environment of peoples living in what were once remote areas. There is pressure for fast, dramatic, and effective results that can be seen in a relatively short time. In the past, environment has been subject to change through invention or borrowing ideas from other cultures and it has only been recently that there has been a broad base of voluntary participation.

b. Environment constitutes the aggregate of all the external conditions affecting the life and development of society. Culture is the total of what human beings have learned in common with other members of the group to which they belong, and is man's way of adapting to his environment. Technicians involved in improving environment not only must be specialists in their fields; e.g., engineering, education, agriculture, public health, but must be able to make their efforts acceptable to persons of different customs and beliefs. Some knowledge and understanding of the social psychology, economics, political science, and history are important in attaining this objective.

c. Nations attempt to preserve their culture because of a belief that their ways are superior to others. Many of the developing nations, on achieving independence, realized their competitive position is poor and could be bettered through modernization and industrialization. Generally they are willing to borrow from the culture of others when it is beneficial for them to do so, but technological ideas are more acceptable than are social or religious ones. The imbalance between technical progress and sociological and political improvements often only increases the probability of insurgency.

d. While cultures differ, there are some characteristics that are shared by almost all underdeveloped areas—

(1) Colonial Past or feudal—conditions attitude of the people toward innovators.

(2) Nationalism—stressing of own traditions sometimes to point of danger to their self-interest.

(3) Plurality of Society—nation contains more than one people, language, religion, or cultural heritage.

(4) Urban Elite—a large gulf exists between educated classes and villagers emphasized by different habits and attitudes.

(5) The Rural Peasant—peasants are tradition-oriented. The educated urban elite have difficulty in establishing good contacts with the peasant who has strong class ties to religion and kin, and is accustomed to living under the patronage system.

(6) The Economy—developing nations have a lack of industry and an inefficient agriculture. Maintenance of the economy above subsistence levels is marginal. The existing industry cannot meet expectations of the people. There is a coexistence of old and new economies which sometimes operate completely independently from one another.

(7) Rising Expectations—desires for improvement are at fever pitch.

7-15. Principles of Internal Development

a. The needs that people are aware of should be utilized in first introducing change. This is necessary in order for new ideas and methods to win the acceptance of the people and, in turn, to receive their cooperation. Participation by local people in projects involving them is essential if the change is to be accepted in the long run. There is a tendency for technicians to place too much emphasis on the technical aspect of their jobs and not enough on the human aspect. The level of technical precision and knowledge should be realistically scaled to that which can be assimilated locally. Complex innovations take more time and instruction and run a greater risk of failure. Technicians wanting to introduce change should rework or adapt these changes to fit the local environment. These frequently will require technicians to step backward from complex to relatively simple, unspecialized technologies.

b. The technician or innovator will have his initial actions judged supercritically. Since peasants and urban poor are suspicious of officials and those associated with them, unkept promises, ill-planned projects, or unexplained behavior on the
part of the technician will cause the people to lose confidence in him and harden their resistance to change.

c. Most people in developing nations are pragmatic and changes that bring dramatic results that can be visualized easily are more really acceptable. Once successful there is a tendency for the change to snowball.

d. People whose standard of living is at a bare subsistence level are reluctant to experiment with new techniques which would endanger their very existence if they failed. Experiments should not, therefore, involve risk to the livelihood of local people.

e. In introducing change, timing is important. There is need to be aware of the daily and seasonal work patterns of people and to use this knowledge in timing the start of projects. This is particularly important in agricultural areas.

Section IV. MILITARY CIVIC ACTION

7-16. General

a. Military civic action is the use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population. U.S. forces may at times advise, assist, or engage in military civic action in overseas areas.

b. Military civic action projects encompass everything from an individual act to the organization of substantial forces for large scale improvement projects to benefit the entire country. However, a factor which has been found to contribute to the desired results of a civic action project is adherence to the policy of undertaking modest projects at the local level. The impact on small village economy and welfare is almost immediate. Local officials become identified with local projects and villagers are trained by the military in techniques and procedures which enable them to maintain completed projects and initiate additional ones.

c. Military forces conducting civic action are but one of many elements, governmental and private, that are engaged in planning and bringing about change designed to meet the rising expectations of the people in developing nations. Even though the developing nation's armed forces frequently have a very high percentage of the country's total skills and resources, the general nature of the problem facing those concerned with the internal development indicates clearly that to accomplish the myriad task involved will require more than just the efforts of a nation's armed forces.

d. It is usually necessary to have a joint civil-military effort. This has bonus effects in political-sociological progress in the country. Military participation in public projects with the civilians not only contributes materially toward technical progress in the area but builds up cumulative civilian goodwill for the military unit. By strengthening the social-economic posture of the country, the military forces are able to reduce sources of civilian discontent and add materially to political stability.

e. Many of the individual projects undertaken in a military civic action program will have a superficial resemblance to community relations activities. While improved community relations of the military is an important byproduct of the military civic action effort these relations are not, at least during Phase I of insurgency, the primary product. Military civic action should be designed to make real, lasting improvements to the social, economic, and political environment. For example, if a military unit were to build, maintain, or staff a needed school this would be true military civic
action whether or not it also produced a greater civilian respect for the military. On the other hand the activity of a military unit in sponsoring an occasional outing or a meal for the children of that school would be primarily in the nature of a community relations project. As such, it would build up goodwill and a better relationship between the military forces and the people, but may be a misapplication of resources which should be devoted to true military civic action.

7–17. Criteria for Military Participation

a. Criteria for the propriety of military participation in civic action projects during any phase of insurgency include—

(1) Is it an important need, locally wanted, and beyond unaided local capabilities?

(2) Can military participation be so managed that it does not compromise civilian authority and responsibility?

(3) Does the activity support the commander's political-military mission, or at least avoid jeopardizing it?

(4) Is the activity in consonance with the country's national objectives and interests?

(5) Will participation by the military avoid wasteful or needless duplication of functions and services of other agencies?

(6) Does the activity support, supplement, or substitute for the available services of other agencies?

(7) Does the project lend itself to the participation of local people?

b. If the nation is in a Phase II or III insurgency situation additional criteria might include—

(1) Will the project stimulate the flow of needed information from the people of the area?

(2) Will the project serve to gain civilian cooperation with the populace and resources control and counterguerrilla programs?

(3) Is the project in an area which the government may reasonably expect to hold? If not, will the project improve facilities and provide a net gain in other ways to offset a possible insurgent advantage?

7–18. Relation of Military Civic Action to Other Programs

a. The criteria shown in the preceding paragraph clearly indicate the relationship between military civic action and other governmental programs. These criteria also indicate that the relative desirability of a given project may depend on the phase of insurgency involved in a given area of the country. Frequently a nation is faced with a Phase II insurgency in some areas while in other areas the situation remains in Phase I. Military forces stationed in the latter areas would normally continue to concentrate on long term improvements, unless intelligence reports indicated an imminent appearance of organized guerrilla activity. Military civic action is dependent for its proper planning on basic intelligence.

b. Generally in Phase I, military civic action will be the priority program of the military forces since it supports the national priority, internal development. While attention must be paid to proper psychological exploitation of the program, decisions on project participation and priorities will be based primarily upon basic needs of the nation and of the particular area. In Phases II and III, the priority accorded to the internal defense programs may require that military civic action projects provide prompt positive civilian reaction of a kind that will help in the successful accomplishment of the priority program; e.g., suppressing the insurgency by military action.

c. Military civic action cannot by itself produce a satisfied populace in areas where basic discontent centers around long standing political, economic, or social grievances. An economically oppressed sharecropper or a member of a neglected or mistreated religious minority will not become an enthusiastic supporter of the government overnight, just because a military unit built a school in his neighborhood. Nevertheless, the building of the school may symbolize for him the government's desire and determination to better his lot and thus dissuade him from supporting dissident movements, at least for a time. If that time is properly used to meet the basic causes of his discontent, then military civic action, as part of the total governmental effort will have served its purpose.

7–19. Psychological Exploitation

a. For optimum results in any phase of insurgency, military civic action (and other internal development programs) must be exploited by well planned psychological operations to explain to the people what is going to be done, what is being done, and what has been done for them. Care must be taken to insure that the promises made are no more than can be delivered in the time stated.

b. The rural citizen may not associate local po-
7-21. Military Civic Action Projects

a. It would be impossible to compile a definitive list of all the military civic action projects that may be undertaken because of differences in situations, environments, needs of the population, and capabilities of the people. As with other military operations, many projects will introduce themselves as targets of opportunity. General guides can be offered and specific examples suggested; however, the full range of possibilities must inevitably stem from the awareness, initiative, imagination, understanding, and indoctrination of the individuals involved.

b. Following is a list of suggested civic action programs and projects together with an indication of military units and personnel having general capabilities to support them. This list is particularly applicable to IDAID situations, but may also be helpful in developing programs for stabilized rear areas and for post-hostility environments. Civic action projects should not be undertaken without due regard for the "criteria for military participation" as listed in paragraph 7-17. Pure giveaway programs seldom achieve a lasting or significant degree of public support. Every opportunity to involve indigenous personnel and applicable host-country government agencies must be exploited. Advice and assistance may be provided responsible indigenous personnel and agencies in the following areas:

(1) Agriculture and natural resources.
   (a) Increase or improve production of animals, grain, or vegetable food products—individuals with farming experience; unit transportation; veterinary personnel.
   (b) Insect and rodent control—troops or units with land or aerial spraying devices; medical, veterinary, and certain chemical warfare personnel.
   (c) Assist local farmers moving agricultural products by providing route security and thwarting possible taxation attempts by local insurgents—all tactical units.
   (d) Construction of simple irrigation and drainage systems—units with equipment or tools; engineer units; or troop labor.
   (e) Clearing areas—units with equipment or tools; troop labor.
   (f) Grading operations—engineer units.
   (g) Forestry activities such as planting, thinning, and harvesting—individuals with forestry training or experience; troop labor.
   (h) Setting up and operating sawmills—engineer units.
(i) Devising and constructing flood controls—engineer units and troop labor.

(j) Reclamation of land and draining of swamps—engineer units and troop labor.

(k) Harvesting of crops—all troop units.

(2) Industry and communication.

(a) Assessment and development of acceptable sand and gravel resources for road work and general construction—engineer units.

(b) Installation, operation, and maintenance of telephone, telegraph, and radio systems—signal units.

(c) Construction of housing and buildings—engineers for designing and supervising; troop units for construction.

(d) Operating emergency communication centers to serve the civilian populace as well as the military, especially in times of disaster—signal units particularly, and any unit with communications equipment and personnel generally.

(3) Transportation.

(a) Construct, repair, or improve roads and bridges—engineers and troop units with labor or trucks available.

(b) Construct, repair or improve railway equipment—transportation, maintenance, and engineer units, and troop units with labor available.

(c) Construct, repair, or improve inland waterways, wharves, and harbors—engineer, transportation, and Navy units.

(d) Construct, repair, improve, or operate airfields—Air Force, transportation, engineer, army aviation, and troop units with labor available.

(e) Removal of individuals from disaster areas—all units with land, sea, or air transportation facilities and a capability for controlling circulation of individuals.

(4) Health and sanitation.

(a) Improve sanitary standards—medical and engineer units.

(b) Set up and operate dispensary units for outpatient treatment or to give first aid—medical units.

(c) Devise acceptable methods of disposing of human waste—medical units and engineer units.

(d) Provide safe water supply systems—engineer units, medical units, and troop labor.

(e) Control malaria and other insect-transmitted diseases—medical units and troop labor.

(f) Teach sanitation, personal hygiene, and first aid—medical units and any other military units that train and operate under field conditions.

(5) Education.

(a) Give basic education training (i.e., reading and writing) to military personnel—selected personnel from all military units.

(b) Provide technical training to military personnel which will be useful when individuals return to civilian status—all military units, especially service support units.

(c) Provide instructors for schools for basic education to youth and technical training for adults—all military units.

(6) Public administration.

(a) Provide guidance and assistance to public administrators in fields of organization, personnel selection, work procedures, etc.—civil affairs units and qualified personnel throughout military units.

(b) Provide guidance and assistance to public safety administrators in their police, fire protection, and civil defense activities, including disaster relief—civil affairs, military police, and engineer units and personnel.

(7) Community development, social welfare, and housing.

(a) Preparation of plans, surveying, and construction supervision and assistance for houses and community buildings such as schools, civic centers, churches, orphanages, medical centers—engineer units, particularly, and all military units generally.

(b) Sponsorship of worthy community projects such as orphanages, schools, and medical centers—all military units.

(8) Mass communication. Provide advice and assistance on best methods of informing the people through such devices as publications, films, or broadcasting—CA civil information teams, and public information, intelligence, and psychological operations units.

(9) Mapping and project surveys.

(a) Preparation of necessary maps and charts for road and railroad projects, irrigation and land development, and political subdivisions and geographical features—engineer and individuals with the ability in the fields of surveying, geodetics, and charting.

(b) Preparation of nautical charts and coastal surveys—Navy units.

(10) Paramilitary forces. Analysis of mission, structure, functioning, equipping, and training of any existing paramilitary organization to determine capability and suitability for civic action tasks—civil affairs units and personnel.
Section V. POPULACE AND RESOURCES CONTROL

7-22. Introduction

Some of the material and human resources required by insurgents may come from sources external to the country but most of their support must be derived from internal resources, particularly from the indigenous population. A successful IDAID program requires not only that internal material and human resources be mobilized in behalf of the government, but that they be denied the insurgents. The populace and resources control program, part of the internal security portion of the IDAID effort is designed to accomplish the following objectives:

a. Mobilize the material and human resources on behalf of the government.
b. Detect and neutralize the insurgent apparatus and activities of the community.
c. Sever the supporting relationship between the population and the guerrillas.
d. Assist in the provision of a secure physical and psychological environment for the population.

7-23. Populace Control

a. An insurgency exploits the desires and grievances of the populace. The insurgent leaders do not have to provide any specific program to nurture their cause but can simply be against what the government is doing and promise satisfaction of the desires for alleviation of the grievances. In addition, the people of developing countries usually want modernization and its material benefits without recognizing that such refinements require an industrial base and time. The populace control program, coordinated with the IDAID program, must recognize the desires and grievances of the populace, take action where possible to alleviate them, and explain through information media what is being done, any limiting factors, and future plans to solve the problems. The first function of populace control is to mobilize human resources for the government.

b. A country subject to insurgency will normally have an unsettled population because of ethnic divisions, prior revolutions or coups, natural disasters, famine or pestilence, nomadic customs, recent independence, or modernization. Under any of these conditions, normal individual identification and control measures break down and individuals so inclined can become active insurgents or sympathizers with little fear of recognition and reprisal. The second function of the populace control program is to identify these people and to deny the insurgents their use.

7-24. Resources Control

Although insurgent leaders attempt to attain their goals by the easiest method possible, they are always prepared to use force as the ultimate weapon. Regardless of the method used, they must employ material resources to achieve their objectives. Assets of potential use to insurgents include military, financial, agricultural, manufacturing, chemical, transportation, communications, fuel, power, and other resources. The resources control program must identify those items required by the insurgents and provide specific controls to deny their diversion to, or acquisition by, the insurgents. For this purpose close coordination at national and subnational levels is required with the internal development programs, and other aspects of the internal defense program. Certain internal defense and internal development activities may be undertaken primarily for resources control purposes, such as the provision of military protection and assistance in harvesting, collection, and storage of crops in areas subject to insurgent threat.

7-25. Centralized Planning

A populace and resources control program must be initiated and planned at the national level. The plan should be prepared by representatives of all ministries and include a determination of critical material assets, enforceable restrictions to be instituted, positive reporting and analysis procedures, supervision techniques, and an information plan to explain the program to the populace.

7-26. Decentralized Execution

Execution of the populace and resources control program must be decentralized in order to take advantage of the more detailed knowledge available to the local officials and to achieve greatest effectiveness. In addition, decentralization contributes to a prime objective of an IDAID program, namely, strengthening of the government. Supervision of local officials is required to ensure compliance, fair and equitable enforcement, and honest administration. As the program develops, those local officials who have demonstrated their capabilities and loyalty should be given more latitude to exploit opportunities in their area.
7–27. Governmental Organization for Populace and Resources Control

a. As governmental ministerial or department organization will vary by country, and within country by subordinate and local level, the organization must be closely examined to fix responsibility at all levels for implementing the populace and resources control plan. Indigenous police organizations, if adequately staffed, trained, and equipped, are ideally suited to supervise the implementation of a populace and resources control program for they provide an organized control force in being that is—(1) knowledgeable about local conditions; (2) accepted by the populace as a governmental organization with enforcement prerogatives; (3) capable of security operations; (4) able to use, and have recourse to, recorded factual data; and (5) capable of controlling transportation arteries.

b. The regular military is normally used as a backup force and as a source of personnel for administrative, intelligence, and psychological operations and other specialties. In some cases, however, military units or members may be the sole representatives of the government at the district, local, or village level. Where the military has forcibly driven the armed insurgent from an area, there should be a turnover of authority and responsibility for the populace and resources control program to the police as quickly as reliable police forces are available. This releases the military for other tasks and facilitates the population’s early return to a more normal way of life.

c. To provide for immediate augmentation of existing police forces, other organizations whose duties call for contact with the people should be used. These may include postal employees, internal revenue agents, forest rangers, conservation officials, and customs officials. Another source of manpower for the populace and resources control program is the paramilitary force. In many countries such organizations are already in being and available for immediate employment in support of the program. Sometimes, however, these forces will have already become integrated with the regular military forces, or are occupied elsewhere, and cannot be spared for populace and resources control. The recruitment of a paramilitary force may then become desirable. Generally, this task must be approached very carefully as, in an area where much of the population is suspect, arms and ammunition cannot be distributed indiscriminately. It is necessary to select, indoctrinate, and train the most reliable elements of the population. Training must be conducted carefully and systematically in order to gain and then retain the enthusiasm of this force. This force, in addition to assisting the police in the accomplishment of their assigned mission, provides a means by which the local population can participate in the government’s effort to defeat the insurgent threat.

d. Government financial agencies must counter specific insurgent financial activities to maintain or better the soundness of the currency of their country’s international credit. Insurgents have a great interest in finance. They will seek to secure funds for their own use, undermine public faith in banks or financial institutions, or destroy confidence in the monetary system.

e. Each of the ministries or departments involved in supervision of production and services establish controls and procedures which will maintain them for the people, and at the same time deny their use to the insurgents. A sound economic structure demands a firm base in the fields of agriculture, commerce, industry, and service. Care must be exercised to avoid establishment of overly optimistic production goals which, if they fail of attainment, can be used as a psychological and propaganda weapon against the government and which encourage submission of falsified reports from lower echelons.

f. The public health plan should provide safeguards to insure that medical supplies are not diverted to insurgent use or control, and that adequate steps are taken to prevent the manufacture or introduction of illicit drugs, medical supplies and narcotics. Medical aid is one of the most effective weapons available to government as well as to insurgent forces, and the control of medicine and drugs is mandatory in populace and resources control.

g. All governments maintain some form of records on their citizens and national achievements. Available official data can be supplemented by family, tribal, religious, trade, or professional records. Regardless of the source, all available data must be gathered, correlated, kept current, supplemented as required, and used to make a populace and resources control plan effective. It is preferable that the statistical functions be centralized nationally to avoid duplication, facilitate objective assessment, and detect weaknesses for subsequent planning.
7–28. The Role of the Military

a. During Phase I insurgency, the populace and resources control program emphasizes nonmilitary actions; however, indigenous military forces will participate in all phases and probably will be extensively employed during Phase II in areas where the civil government is weak or nonexistent. In addition to active participation, they can provide security for the populace and counter the threats and terrorism employed by insurgents. Military forces normally will have a subordinate or supporting role in the populace and resources control program during Phases I and II of an insurgency, but must be prepared to assume a primary role if the insurgency escalates to Phase III. Under conditions of insurgency, the civil-military relationships of the command assume more importance than usual. Civil affairs officers must be conversant with the populace and resources control plan, maintain close and continuing liaison with civil authorities, supervise execution of their command’s portion of the plan, and be prepared to assume all essential functions of the government in the event of martial rule.

b. Military intelligence personnel can make a material contribution to successful populace and resources controls. They are not restricted to political subdivisions as are many civil police and they frequently will possess more sophisticated equipment. Internal security functions including personnel security investigations, complaint investigations, security surveys and inspections, and technical inspections frequently will disclose civilian affiliations that are suspect and provide investigative leads for other agencies. Other intelligence and counterintelligence activities including penetration operations, counterespionage, counterintelligence, and security operations make them well-suited to publicize the necessity and purpose of populace resources controls. The themes used in such operations must be in consonance with national information and propaganda programs.

c. Military police by virtue of their basic police training may be assigned to support enforcement of the populace and resources control program. They may require special instruction in identifying contraband or controlled items such as chemicals, drugs, machinery, textiles, and other goods. Their efficiency usually can be improved by teaming them with local civil or paramilitary police who understand the distinctive dialects, dress, and customs of the populace. Military police teams from TOE 19–500 form Indigenous Military Police Academies and Advisory Liaison Teams capable of providing training and advice in riot control, area control, physical security, criminal investigations, police operations, and police intelligence. For detailed discussion of the military police role in populace and resources control, see FM 19–50 (to be published).

d. The training and equipment of psychological operations units make them well-suited to publicize the necessity and purpose of populace resources controls. The themes used in such operations must be in consonance with national information and propaganda programs.

e. The wide deployment of combat units, particularly into disputed areas, frequently makes them the sole representative of government in such areas. As such, they will not only be charged with providing security of the area and its populace, but also with implementing the populace and resources control plan. Positive community relationships, troop conduct, and military civic action must be emphasized to foster popular support for the government, and facilitate implementation and execution of the populace and resources control program.

f. Supply and service units possess and use military commodities and equipment desirable to the local economy. They also frequently utilize local labor and materials. These circumstances afford these units the opportunity to identify items in short supply locally, and to identify personnel who attempt to pilfer or otherwise put items to unauthorized use. No resources control program can be effective if the handling of military supplies, including those used in military civic action projects, is not closely controlled.

7–29. Legal Framework

A basic responsibility of any government is to define the rights of the government in defending itself on the one side, and the rights of individuals on the other. As part of its effort to combat insurgency, the government may suspend normal liberties. This may be accompanied or followed by a declaration of martial law or state of siege. Under these conditions, situations may develop where expediency in the immediate situation suggests to government officials that they should exceed their authority. To reduce the temptation for government officials to exceed their authority in their zeal to combat the insurgency, and as a necessary part of the overall IDAID effort, the state of ex-
existing law pertaining to populace and resources control must be carefully examined. It may prove necessary to promulgate additional legislation for the period of the emergency to endow officials with the right and the duty to act vigorously and effectively. Such emergency legislation should state precisely the preconditions necessary for its application. Arrest and search laws, in particular, should receive public and precise dissemination and should be applied with judicious restraint. Otherwise, rather than supporting the populace and resources control program, they will be a source of further disaffection and resentment.

7-30. Preparatory Planning and Actions

a. Measures designed to establish and maintain physical control of the local populace are categorized as surveillance and restrictions. These controls vary from simple identification of members of the population to absolute restriction and control of all personal life. Surveillance systems are used as an aid in detecting illegal or undesirable activities of the population. Restrictions are used to prevent guerrilla contact with the population and thereby eliminate his support by the population. These restrictions reduce or confine the activities of the people.

b. The preparatory phase includes: obtaining necessary legal authority; unifying the populace and resources control forces (police-military-paramilitary elements); organizing, training, and equipping the control force; developing a psychological operations program; preparing intelligence operations; establishing Area Coordination Centers (ACC); establishing Civil-Military Coordination Committees; and establishing and refining alert and security measures.

c. The initial period of activity requires the establishing of general surveillance measures; the intensifying of the intelligence effort; the identifying of the insurgent control apparatus; the establishing of coordination procedures with military forces in the area; and the intensifying of psychological operations to win the political allegiance of the people.

7-31. General Control Principles

a. Control of Individuals. These measures include such controls as may be necessary to insure identification, govern travel, determine residence and employment, and control distribution of commodities. Positive identification of individuals and family groups is essential to control; however, overly harsh controls must be avoided in order to prevent the population from turning to the insurgents. The ID card system, despite the obvious drawbacks of counterfeiting, alteration, and insurgent confiscation remains the most effective basic system. All other control systems can be tied in with the identification card.

b. Control of Movement. The government must be able to impose effective controls on the movement of persons and material to prevent reinforcement of the insurgent potential. No area can be considered secure if the insurgents are able to impose their own control measures. Control of movement is, however, potentially harmful to the economy and a balance between economic and security requirements must be maintained. Movement controls must be applied with regard to local conditions and will differ, for example, in application to a fishing village and an agricultural community since the pattern and timing of movement involved in harvesting and marketing fish and produce are basically different.

c. Control of Areas. Authorities should designate and publicize areas where unauthorized personnel are not allowed. Personnel may be denied access to certain areas at all times or denied entry into certain areas only during designated periods of time. Resettlement, which is the movement of individual families, groups of households, or even entire communities by the government to newly constructed villages or towns, is a means of controlling and defending the population within the contested areas.

d. Control of Activities. A variety of innocent appearing activities often provides cover for clandestine activities. The value of restricting some of these activities may at times not be sufficient to justify the price of completely hampering public expression. Some of the activities that might be restricted are political meetings, rallies and demonstrations, social and religious gatherings, labor meetings, and adult education groups. However, most of these activities should at least be brought under observation to determine if grounds exist for restricting them. Insurgents will attempt to infiltrate, subvert, and control virtually every facet of life.

e. Control of Materials. Measures for the control of materials should be designed to shut off supplies to the insurgents to the maximum degree possible and at the same time leave maximum freedom of commerce for the loyal population in the area. A variety of controls may be employed. Source controls are effective for completely registered populations or for commodities not in wide-
spread production. Import controls and licensing regulations governing flow and use of materials can be very effective in many areas of the economy. Controls on internal movement of commodities, and consumption and utilization controls through rationing and distribution regulations should also be utilized as needed. Techniques for use of these controls will vary with the security of the area, availability of supplies, and the temper of the local populace. Judicious use of material controls will require detailed intelligence data.

f. Financial Controls. Insurgent movements, as well as government activities, require financial resources, and insurgent forces depend largely upon the indigenous population for their financial support. A deliberate reduction in the supply of liquid cash may be necessary to hamper insurgent “taxation” and lessen insurgent purchasing power. It may be necessary to limit the amount of cash which merchants can accept for merchandise, thus forcing large transactions to proceed through banking channels for greater ease of control. Government loans, capitalization, and encouragement may permit the formation of cooperatives, corporations, and other commercial organizations which can be required to maintain accurate records, thereby becoming less susceptible to insurgent blackmail than are individual or family activities. In developing nations, and in communities which have been subjected to serious stress, monetary exchange may have given way to a barter economy as a basis of exchange. While a barter economy is more difficult to control, basic control measures will be required to prevent insurgent manipulation. The trade base might be gold, gems, food, tobacco, drugs, or units of labor. The critical items must be determined, and realistic, enforceable controls imposed.

g. Control of Communications. The control and restriction of communications is accomplished by censorship of communications media, licensing of operators of communications equipment; control of sales and ownership of communications equipment; and monitoring of broadcasts.

7–32. Relinquishment of Controls

With the increased success of the IDAID operation the intensity of control measures is reduced and gradual phasing out of regular military forces is possible. Police and paramilitary units continue supervision of the populace and resources control program. Intelligence and psychological operations programs continue with emphasis upon those themes that will assist in developing a solid base of political allegiance among the citizenry.

7–33. Civil Information Activities and Psychological Operations

a. Each of the component programs which make up the total IDAID effort require the support of a coordinated civil information campaign. The populace and resources control program needs a particularly strong support effort since a weak government cannot maintain itself by force alone. Support from the populace is needed to deprive the insurgent enemy of aid. The IDAID program and its military civic action component, as well as the community relations program of the military forces demonstrate to the military and civilian parts of the community that they have much in common and that the government is genuinely concerned with the welfare and progress of all law-abiding elements of the population. Tactical military successes and progress in internal development must be exploited by all information media to reinforce the populace and resources control effort by making the restraints and hardships appear worthwhile for the achievement of security, stability, and progress.

b. Most armed forces have a system to provide information to outside news media as well as to their own members, employees, and dependents. In support of the populace and resources control effort, both of these information channels must be considered. Coordinated information programs must be achieved if the government is to retain credibility. The armed forces cannot give a story to the world press and radio and expect to keep their own civilian or military population in ignorance of what has been said. Armed forces public information personnel must consider news of the populace and resources control program as an essential element of the entire civil information program and not as an independent activity. In any IDAID effort the part played by the people is crucial and they must be kept adequately informed.

c. The use of information to motivate the populace is an integral part of the IDAID effort since the population is the primary target of the conflict. Media and themes will depend upon the environment and the conditions of the particular nation as well as on the stage of the insurgency. Generally, overall propaganda objectives in support of the populace and resources control program should include the following ideas:

(1) The government acts for the long-range benefit of the people.
(2) The activities of the insurgents are harmful to the people and it is these activities which necessitate the imposition of the populace and resources control program.

(3) Insurgent leaders, activists, and guerrillas are the enemies of the people who must be denied support and supplies.

(4) Citizens of honor must declare themselves, their families, and their communities on the side of the government by full and voluntary compliance with the populace and resources control program.

(5) Populace and resources control programs will be reduced and ultimately removed as the insurgent threat is reduced and eliminated.
8–1. U.S. National Objectives in Internal Defense and Internal Development (IDAID)

Within the context of the overall national objectives of the United States in the cold war, there is included assistance to the developing nations to preserve their independence from covert as well as from overt aggression. Defense against insurgency involves more than military preparedness. For this reason, as well as for humanitarian reasons, the United States desires to provide assistance to the developing nations to meet the legitimate aspirations of their people for a better life through political, economic, and social improvement. These measures, military, political, economic, and social are intertwined, for without a successful effort in all of these fields there can be no successful IDAID program. In IDAID, there is no clear line of demarcation between military and nonmilitary measures.

8–2. U.S. Organization for IDAID

a. Description of and doctrine for the U.S. national organization for IDAID is provided in FM 100–20.

b. Description of U.S. national level in country organization is provided in and FM 31–29.

c. Doctrine and procedures for employment of U.S. Army elements having civil affairs duties and responsibilities operating in-country in support of the U.S. national objectives in overseas IDAID is provided in the remainder of this chapter.

8–3. Commitment of U.S. Forces to Assist in IDAID

a. Ideally, a country would recognize very early in Phase I insurgency that it was faced with a serious problem and would request U.S. support and assistance. Frequently, however, either the nation concerned does not recognize the full extent and implications of the problem or, for various reasons, does not wish to request external support, or does not desire to have support from a foreign army. At other times, the United States may be unable or unwilling to assist the government in power. Thus, there is no assurance that U.S. Army personnel will be committed at the time when they could achieve the most favorable results with a minimum of personnel. The situation most likely to be encountered is one in which the Army is initially limited to providing for the management of a Military Assistance Program (MAP) and the provision of Mobile Training Teams (MTT) to the host country. Frequently U.S. military advice on IDAID is not sought until the insurgency can no longer be ignored. At times, US. support may not be provided until Phase III has been reached, or until there is an overt attempt to seize power. In this case, U.S. Army personnel may be first introduced as part of a relatively large increment of U.S. Armed Forces dispatched to stabilize the situations, and gain time for the implementation of necessary reforms and internal development activities. U.S. Army efforts might include in addition to MAP and MTT, advisory support, combat service support, and the introduction of combat forces.

b. Other circumstances which must be considered include—

(1) Situations in which third powers have attempted to assist the host nation in earlier phases, but here for some particular reason the United States subsequently enters to reinforce or replace the earlier assistance effort.

(2) Situations in which the United States provides military assistance to the host nation as part of an international effort. This situation may
occur at any stage but usually does not occur until Phase II or Phase III has been reached.

(3) Situations in which U.S. or international civilian agencies have provided some nation building or community development assistance to the host country, but U.S. Armed Forces personnel have not been committed until Phase II or III has been reached.

c. When U.S. Army personnel are committed to an IDAID operation they must recognize that their mission is political as well as military. All of their actions will have civil-military implications and they will be engaged in civil affairs activities. They must study what has gone before, attempt to continue and build on successful efforts, and to learn from and avoid earlier mistakes.

d. The remainder of this chapter will outline doctrine for U.S. Army personnel with civil affairs duties beginning with those which should be undertaken in Phase I. If such personnel enter the country in a later phase, they must insure that the measures which should have been taken either are accomplished as quickly and as fully as possible and continue on with the other measures described.

The Role of the MAAG or Mission in Civil Affairs Activities

a. The U.S. MAAG or Military Mission is an instrument provided to assist the American Ambassador in the fulfillment of his assigned tasks. Where these tasks include advice and support to the host country for the planning, coordination, and execution of IDAID, the Chief of the MAAG or Mission is deeply committed to a variety of civil affairs activities. Prime among his concerns will be the problem of using military resources for the provision and support of governmental functions, for military civic action as part of internal development, for military participation in populace and resources control, and for consolidation psychological operations. While the military forces so involved are those of the host country, the Chief of the MAAG or Mission must orient his advice and assistance effort to provide maximum support to the host country forces in these civil affairs activities. Regardless of how these functions are labeled by the host country, for U.S. commanders they are civil affairs problems, which if neglected or inadequately handled, can cause the loss of the whole military and economic investment poured into the undecided and contested countries of the world. Such neglect can even facilitate insurgent seizure and contribute to turning a U.S.-travel army against the United States. It is in the developing countries that the problem is most acute.

b. The military forces in developing countries often perform functions over and above their constitutional duties of national defense and internal security. The civil affairs activities of these forces may include national resources development, cultural affairs, relief activities, reconstruction, labor assistance to civilian farmers and industries, supplementary income and self-support activities of military units and personnel, support of dependents, and civil defense. Although the civil affairs activities of the U.S. Army cover some aspects of these, it is probable that they will have to be broadly interpreted to embrace certain features necessary in developing nations. This difference will pose problems of proper coordination between the MAAG/Mission and the forces which it is supporting. Problems of this type may occur at every political-military command level of the two nations. Contributing difficulties may be lack of identity between the national objectives of the United States and those of the indigenous government, differing national concepts of government and public service, and cultural and linguistic differences between U.S. advisers and indigenous personnel. These problems can seriously interfere with full implementation of desirable IDAID programs.

The MAAG or Mission CMO Staff Element

a. The nature and character of subversive insurgency and the threat that it poses to most developing nations; the broad role which the host country’s armed forces must be prepared to assume in the execution of internal defense operations; and the involvement of the civil populace with all military elements and operations lead to the conclusion that, within the MAAG or Mission, there should be a full-time CMO staff element. This element will have primary staff responsibility for all the major activities of civil-military relations of the MAAG or Mission, and for staff supervision of the civil affairs and PSYOP advisory and support effort by U.S. military advisory personnel serving with host country military units and governmental agencies.

b. A schematic representation of U.S. IDAID civil affairs and psychological operations activities depicting the development of this staff section’s role and mission, as well as those of other in-country civil affairs and PSYOP elements, is provided in figure 8-1.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incipient Insurgency Identified (Phase I)</th>
<th>Initiation of Phase II Insurgency</th>
<th>Initiation of Phase III Insurgency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Country CI Team Established</td>
<td>Continue CA Intelligence Collection.</td>
<td>Continue CA Intelligence Collection.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMO Staff Officer Assigned to MAAG or Attache Office</td>
<td>Assist Continuation of Military Civic Action.</td>
<td>Assist Continuation of Military Civic Action.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommend Establishment of ACC</td>
<td>Insure Orientation of Unit Supporting Contingency Plan (LNO from Unit to Country Team).</td>
<td>Introduction of U.S. Forces, including CA &amp; PSYOP units, teams, and Staff Sections.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collection of CA Intelligence Preparation of CA Estimate (to include Extent &amp; Analysis of Ongoing Civilian Agency Operations for Continuation, Reduction, or Elimination).</td>
<td>Recommendations for Tailoring CA &amp; PSYOP units to be Employed with or without other U.S. forces.</td>
<td>Phased Turn-over to Military Forces of Certain Civilian Agency Operations (field operations only in some cases).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buildup of Full Scale CMO Staff Section in Senior IN-Country Command.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Priority Effect in Each Phase
c. The CMO staff element of the MAAG, Mission, or other senior U.S. in-country military headquarters has certain recurring staff responsibilities which must be monitored carefully regardless of the phase of insurgency involved. These include insuring—

(1) That each basic U.S. in-country program which involves military personnel or support is promulgated by a policy directive in the name of the Chief of the U.S. Diplomatic Mission. This directive would be binding upon all members of the country team, should specifically outline the objectives of the program, and should recite the responsibilities and contributing support expected to be assumed by or provided to each U.S. agency involved at each applicable level of the host nation government.

(2) That stress is placed on the concept of military civic action, as a part of the overall internal development program, and as a means of internal defense, rather than simply as the provision of amenities to civilians; and that U.S. military and civilian officials are trained in the planning and conducting of civic action so that credit is reflected on indigenous forces or officials.

Section II. PHASE I ACTIVITIES

8–6. Priority of Effort

a. Since the host country national priority of effort in Phase I is given to internal development, the MAAG or Mission priority of civil affairs activity in this phase will normally assist the indigenous armed forces in the planning, staff supervision, and execution of a military civic action program. This will frequently require additional civil affairs qualified U.S. personnel, at least temporarily.

b. A primary means of obtaining temporary additional help for a MAAG or Mission is by request for a Mobile Training Team (MTT) (AR 551–50). The introduction of an MTT in-country frequently will be more acceptable to the host country, especially in Phase I, than would be an increase of strength in the MAAG on a permanent basis. Host countries are also frequently more willing to allow MTT’s to work with civilian and military officials at subnational levels than to allow the introduction of longer term advisory personnel. Further, the presence of a few foreign military personnel to instruct in positive nation building or developmental techniques is less likely to arouse fears, either in the country or among its neighbors, than a proportionate increase in the number of combat advisors. For these reasons, the CMO staff element of a MAAG or Mission should strive to have the Chief, MAAG or Mission, request the services of one or more MTT’s to provide required instruction in civil affairs and PSYOP activities. Whenever an MTT is in-country the CMO staff element of the MAAG or Mission will have primary staff responsibility for its direction and support.

c. Paragraphs 8–7 through 8–9 describe the Military Civic Action MTT, which is the most common, but the same principles would be applicable to any civil affairs MTT in any phase of insurgency. Military civic action as part of the host country’s internal development program is described in chapter 7. The role of the CA MTT is to evaluate relative needs, stimulate participation, and add vitality to the program.

8–7. Military Civic Action Mobile Training Teams—General

a. U.S. Military Civic Action Mobile Training Teams have been formed for specialized assistance to other nations (AR 551–50). When de-
ployed, these teams become a part of, and work through, the MAAG’s and Missions. The work of a team may include—

1. Orientation of the MAAG or Mission staffs and other members of the country team, as appropriate, on the military civic action concept, and the role of the MAAG’s and Missions in the program.

2. A survey of the country for needs which can be met through military civic action.

3. Development of a military civic action program for the specific country.

4. Training and guidance of local forces, and technical assistance on specific projects.

b. Military Civic Action Mobile Training Teams

Military Civic Action Mobile Training Teams normally will consist of from one to five people. The teams may be composed of military officers, enlisted personnel, civilians from one of the service departments or civilians from any other governmental agency. One person, usually the senior military man or civilian, will be designated as chief of the team and will be responsible for seeing that proper procedures are followed, necessary contacts are made, reports are prepared and forwarded, and that the team functions as a unit. Thorough area orientation and knowledge of the local language will greatly aid the team chief in his contacts with the local populace. Team composition is determined by the needs of the area requesting the team, and members of a team should be qualified in the fields of activity for which the team is to be dispatched. The following fields are examples of areas of activity in which MTT's may be employed:

2. Civil-Military Relations.
3. Engineering.
5. Medicine or Public Health.
6. Community Development.
8. Agriculture.
9. Education.
11. Public Relations.
12. Communications.

c. Major assignment considerations are—

1. The team is considered for all purposes of jurisdiction and responsibility to be a part of the MAAG or Mission. Team activities are carried out under the supervision of the Chief, in coordination with representatives of the other U.S. agencies making up the country team, and are subject to all regulations concerning conduct and duty of official U.S. personnel stationed in that country.

2. Unless time or other circumstances prevent, the team is assembled prior to departure for briefing and orientation by the appropriate service departments, Defense, State, AID, USIA, and other governmental agencies. Briefings will cover current political, social, and economic conditions prevailing in the country to which the team is assigned.

8-8. Military Civic Action Mobile Training Teams—Procedures

a. While en route to the country where it will work, the team normally visits the headquarters of the unified command which supervises the MAAG or Mission of that country. The team briefs the unified commander and his staff on its mission and receives instructions, guidance, and information concerning the country. The unified command staff briefs the team and provides essential information on the latest political, economic and military situations.

b. On arrival in the country, the team reports at once to the MAAG or Mission Chief for administrative and policy orientation. As early as possible the MAAG or Mission Chief is briefed on the proposed plan for accomplishing the civic action mission. Local situations and conditions govern procedures in each case. A suggested sequence of procedure, not intended to be all-inclusive is—

1. Determine what is being done or has been done by local forces in the military civic action field. It is necessary to know the attitude of the local military forces toward the people, how the people feel about the military forces, and what projects and programs, if any, have been undertaken by the military forces to gain the respect and confidence of the people.

2. Understand the organization and capabilities of the military forces to perform military civic action projects.

3. Become acquainted with key military and other governmental officials.

4. Learn the basic economic needs of the country. Each team member can concentrate on the needs in his specific field.

5. Visit all possible sections of the country to observe social and economic conditions.

6. Prepare the portion of a program per-
taining to the activities which each specialist on the team is qualified to judge and analyze. Some of the things which should be considered in preparing such a program are—

(a) Whether the military has a tradition of participating in public affairs that brings the military and civilians to a closer understanding of each other.

(b) The basic needs of the local areas with which the military can assist.

(c) The training required to accomplish military civic action projects or prepare personnel for useful roles in civilian life.

(d) Specific projects in specific areas which the military forces can undertake with little or no additional funds. (Primary responsibility for funding military civic action projects in a country rests with the host government. Military civic action projects which require major funding should be carefully evaluated.)

(e) Whether local community councils of military and civilian representatives are used, and, if not, the desirability of instituting them.

(7) Discuss and coordinate the program or plan of action with the MAAG or Mission staff and other elements of the country team staff members.

(8) Present the completed program or plan to MAAG or Mission Chief and recommend its presentation to the country team for approval and implementation of those projects which may be undertaken at the country team level. Projects which require funding are presented to the country team for consideration and funding in accordance with current MAP procedures.

c. Reports which must be rendered include—

(1) Interim reports are submitted by the MTT Chief, monthly or more often as indicated by progress, through the Chief of MAAG or Mission to the Director of International and Civil Affairs, ODCSOPS, Department of the Army, with a copy to Commandant, U.S. Army Civil Affairs School.

(2) A final report is prepared by the team as prescribed in AR 551–50.

d. Debriefing procedures should provide for—

(1) Return to home station by way of the unified command headquarters, where the staff is briefed on results of the team efforts.

(2) If the team has been provided from CONUS, return to CONUS and report to the Director of International and Civil Affairs, ODCSOPS, Department of the Army, Defense, State, AID, USIA, and other interested agencies.

8–9. Problems To Be Overcome in U.S. Sponsored Military Civic Action Programs

a. The U.S. technician not only needs to be a specialist in his field but he must also develop the ability to teach these specialties to persons with different customs and viewpoints. Technicians who have had little or no training that will help them follow this principle will often frustrate the indigenous personnel and themselves by continuing to seek a level of technical perfection that is actually beyond the environmental limitations of the area in which they are working. Therefore, thorough indoctrination in methods of introducing modern science and techniques into new areas is imperative. The object must be to help the people improve what they already have. Insistence upon technical precision beyond the environmental tolerances of the country may accomplish the short-range goal of improving the capability of the indigenous personnel to respond to the needs of their own country. To obtain the long-range goal, the technician frequently may have to lower his own standards enough for the indigenous technicians to reach them before he can start thinking about raising indigenous standards to modern levels.

b. Communist propaganda preys on emotions and skillfully foments antagonisms to U.S. programs. Therefore, U.S. military and civilian assistance programs are more successful when conducted in such a way as to—

(1) Reach the masses of the people.
(2) Yield some tangible and prompt benefits.
(3) Involve active and constructive participation of the people.
(4) Develop pride of the people in their own achievement or status.

8–10. Other Phase I Civil Affairs Activities

a. The CMO staff element of MAAG will initiate collection of civil affairs intelligence upon which to base the civil affairs estimate of the situation. Civil affairs intelligence requirements and collection capabilities are described in chapter 4. An outline of a civil affairs Intelligence Collection Plan is shown in appendix C, and with minor modifications will serve as a basis for this work in any phase of insurgency.

b. The CMO staff element of MAAG will prepare the Civil Affairs Estimate of the Situation (FM 101–5). The initial Civil Affairs Estimate of Situation must cover the work of civilian agencies whose activities relate to any civil affairs major
activity in the country in order to avoid duplication of effort and provide for the continuation of programs and approaches which have proven successful in the country concerned.

c. The civil affairs annex to the Country IDAID Plan (FM 101-5) should cover as a minimum—

(1) Military civic action by indigenous forces and required U.S. support.

(2) Need for and type of MTTs to be requested.

Section III. PHASE II ACTIVITIES

8-11. Priority of Effort

Phase II insurgency requires that the host country governmental structure be strengthened at all levels. Emphasis probably will be placed on the use of indigenous and U.S. military personnel for this purpose. The principles set forth below, while applicable to advisors in any phase of insurgency, are especially applicable to Phase II. Frequently the U.S. Armed Forces will not have had the opportunity to provide advisors at subnational levels in an earlier phase; and the Phase II situation represents the last hope of defeating the insurgency short of a war of movement, which might require a much greater U.S. commitment. The provision of U.S. military advisory personnel at this stage of an insurgency is an application of the principle of economy of force.

8-12. U.S. Military Influence in Civil-Military Relations

For both the host country military commander, and the U.S. MAAG or Mission Chief, the relationships between the host country military forces and the civilian population of the nation are a matter of overriding importance to the entire IDAID effort. By virtue of common interest, common schooling, and similar military problem areas, the most effective point of contact between two countries may be through military channels. When such is the case the improvement of civil-military relations can best be accomplished by the Chief of MAAG or Mission. This may also be the most effective channel for suggesting the provision of U.S. military personnel as advisors at the various echelons of government.

8-13. Basic Principles for the Selection, Training, and Use of Military Advisors in IDAID Assistance Operations

a. These principles are applicable to all advisory roles in IDAID operations. They are particularly important for those positions at the subnational level where advisor is working with a military or civilian counterpart who has responsibility for some or all of the nontactical aspects of the IDAID effort. Key positions, particularly in the field, must be identified and the best qualified and trained people must be placed systematically in these jobs. The U.S. officer assigned as an advisor must have some knowledge or training in every responsibility of his counterpart so that he can avoid giving military advice that would detract from some other activity of his counterpart. He will frequently find his counterpart involved in almost every function of local government because the primary mission may be an attempt to establish government in a particular area.

b. U.S. military officers selected as advisors must be trained in all U.S. country team programs. Prior to commitment, an advisor should be told specifically what portion of the country he is going to and should be area-oriented for it in detail. This will extend his productive period without lengthening his in-country time.

c. The advisor must convince his counterpart that he understands the problems involved, is technically qualified to help solve the problems, and lastly, that he is willing to help solve the problems. The modus operandi of a successful advisor may well include a policy of allowing his counterpart some "freedom from advice" during work hours, but on the other hand, spending considerable off-duty time with him and developing close working relationships through common interests, both in work and off-duty activities. Where possible, key U.S. advisors should be quartered where they can entertain indigenous officials. U.S. advisors generally should stay in the background, letting attention focus on the indigenous officer rather than on the American. The effective advisor must look at his job in a broad
perspective. He must be curious and knowledgeable about the people in the area in which he works and not limit himself to those functional matters within a job description. Finally, the effective advisor must have a real understanding of the political reality under which his counterpart works.

d. The military subnational level advisor often may be the best means through which to present advice from U.S. civilian as well as military agencies. Frequently indigenous provincial officials may be military officers, and as such, they may tend to accept advice more readily from a military advisor than from a civilian. In almost every case however, the military advisor is in a position to at least reinforce civilian agency advice on political, economic, psychological, and sociological matters.

e. In those situations where indigenous military officers also act in a civilian capacity it is essential that all elements of the U.S. country team understand the dual military and civilian roles occupied by such officers and their total impact on the IDAID effort. A province or district chief may at the same time be a civilian official governing civilians, and a military commander affecting civilians. All U.S. advisors must avoid pressures that will result in the counterpart's attention being focused on either role to the detriment of the other.

8–14. Support of Host Nation Governmental Activities

a. The subnational level U.S. military advisor must be prepared to assist in subnational level planning and execution of the overall IDAID effort. This will include advice and assistance to his counterpart in security matters and all other internal defense matters. He should place emphasis on public administration, and the total function of government, appropriate to the extent that his counterpart is so responsible.

b. To accomplish these activities the U.S. military advisor will frequently serve as liaison between his counterpart and various U.S. in-country agencies. These may include both civilian and military agencies. One of the primary ways he can assist his counterpart is in helping him to make his own governmental system work. It will do little good if the U.S. advisor accomplishes all action by means of U.S. channels and U.S. resources, if, in the process, his counterpart does not learn how to establish procedural and functional channels for his administration and logistics within the framework of his own government. While the unilateral use of U.S. channels and resources may be necessary in emergency situations, or as an initial means of establishing influence, continued unilateral action by the U.S. advisor will be self-defeating. Misuse of the dual channel concept can also destroy rapport if the U.S. advisor continually goes over the head of his counterpart by using U.S. channels. The dual channel concept properly applied, however, can be most productive. At each echelon of the indigenous government above his own there are likely to be other U.S. advisors. While making parallel reports through U.S. advisory channels, the advisor should encourage his counterpart to submit his own requisitions and correspondence through his own channels. Thus the advisor at the next higher echelon will be made aware of the situation and can influence his counterpart to take the necessary action. Similarly, dual channels can be used for requests for action directed to any lower governmental echelon where there is a U.S. advisor.

c. The U.S. subnational advisor in assessing the situation in his area should use (and encourage his counterpart to use) the suggested sequence of procedure set forth in paragraph 8–8. While this sequence list was prepared primarily for use by civil affairs MTT's, it can also give the U.S. advisor a method for obtaining a reasonably complete picture of the situation in his area and a basis upon which he can advise his counterpart. Unless he is the first one to be assigned to the area, the advisor should also learn what his predecessor has done, or failed to do, and what other agencies are doing, and build upon that foundation.


a. Subnational level advisors contribute to the administration of USAID and other U.S. agency programs in the areas where they are located by supporting their activities. Many advisors can expect to spend more than half of their time in the civil support area. In functions such as civil affairs and psychological operations, a major subnational level U.S. advisor's staff should have an officer devoting full time to these activities. Generally, the support rendered by subnational level advisors in these fields may include—

(1) Assistance in the creation, management, and utilization of an ACC for each operational area as a primary means of obtaining requisite coordination of all IDAID activities.
(2) Total or partial administration of certain specialized programs such as returnees or refugees.

(3) Relief assistance to refugees and the civil population.

(4) Technical support such as providing engineer officers to inspect self-help projects or to work with indigenous public works staffs.

(5) Influencing the indigenous military and paramilitary forces to participate in military civic action projects that bear upon the overall USAID effort.

(6) Providing security and administrative support in messes, transportation, communication, and billeting for personnel of USAID, USIA, and other U.S. agencies.

(7) Joint activities, including reporting, sitting together on local councils, and advising indigenous governmental officials.

(8) Psychological operations reinforcing the indigenous government's efforts.

b. It can be expected that USAID, USIA, and other U.S. agencies will use subnational level advisors in some of the following ways:

(1) Reinforcing advice to indigenous governmental officials as the opportunity arises in planning self-help projects, procurement of materials, rapid payment of relocation funds and indemnification monies, and similar matters that affect the civil population.

(2) Monitoring projects in progress.

(3) Periodically providing materials for the local economy and overseeing receipt and disposition of materials and supplies.

(4) Managing USAID originated imprest funds for use in short-range and stopgap actions.

(5) Reporting information concerning the status of projects in his district.

(6) Monitoring the general status of the civil populations, functioning of cadres, and receipt of returning or defecting guerrillas or refugees from guerrilla areas.

(7) Acting as a continuous observer, evaluator, and reporter on the civil scene within his district.

(8) Conducting civil information programs.

c. The military advisor at the lowest levels will probably not have a U.S. civilian counterpart. Therefore, he must receive directions from all of the U.S. country team elements and will represent the entire United States effort between the periodic visits of specific representatives of various U.S. agencies.

8–16. Other Phase II Activities

The numerous civil affairs and psychological operations activities of the subnational level U.S. military advisory personnel require the establishment of a full CMO staff section in the senior U.S. country headquarters (MAAG or Military Assistance Command). This staff section, in addition to continuation and expansion of Phase I activities, must prepare plans for the possible introduction of U.S. Army CA and PSYOP units into the country as the situation may require.

Section IV. PHASE III ACTIVITIES

8–17. Priority of Effort

a. When an insurgency has reached Phase III, the government of the country is literally fighting for its existence, and the U.S. military element assisting that government must emphasize that part of the internal defense involving tactical operations against insurgent forces. For U.S. civil affairs advisors and CA units of supporting U.S. forces this means that, at least in those areas where serious combat actions are underway, priority of civil affairs activity must emphasize provision of civilian support for and prevention of civilian interference with tactical and logistical operations. Of all internal defense civil affairs operations, this phase of insurgency brings into play civil affairs activities most closely akin to those of limited war.

b. From the point of view of civil-military relations, however, a war of movement in an insurgency environment basically is different from a situation of equal combat intensity in a war between nations. The difference is that even in Phase III of an insurgency the ultimate goal for all military operations remains the gaining of the loyalty of the people for their government. Without the support of at least a majority of the people, no government can hope to survive a Phase III insurgency. Thus while the civil affairs activities may be basically similar, and involve the same techniques as those in limited war, the emphasis which must be placed on civil affairs in defense against insurgency is much higher than it would be in a situation where the people were patriotically supporting their government in a war against a clearly foreign enemy.
c. Psychological operations in support of civil affairs activities in a Phase III insurgency are of paramount importance. The people must be persuaded toward loyalty to their government while that government and its allies appear to be causing great damage and death all around them. These persuasive efforts must be made by all civilian and military elements of the government and of those of its allies, and, for the U.S. elements, is a delicate task. U.S. forces have a sophisticated psychological operations capability at their disposal and access to considerable material goods that can be distributed among the people. Both must be handled in such a manner that they reinforce the indigenous government's efforts to win over the people, and do not complicate the problem by injecting and magnifying the U.S. image between the people and their government. The U.S. advisor does this by remaining as much as possible in the background while the indigenous military unit or official he is advising reaches out to the people. As a member of a U.S. military unit conducting operations among the people, he must constantly seek to bring the indigenous official onto the scene to make it obvious that the American unit is assisting the indigenous government and is acting only in its behalf.

d. Therefore, civil affairs and psychological operations support to the combat units of both the indigenous and U.S. forces must be provided in much greater depth and breadth than normally is required in limited or general war. Indigenous units down to and including battalions will require skillful advice and assistance in maintaining the balance between the influence of U.S. and their own civil affairs and psychological operations efforts. If the indigenous forces do not have adequate CA and PSYOP units, similar U.S. units may have to be provided for such support down to and including brigade level to assist the indigenous forces in extending the government to the people through persuasion and good administration. In a Phase III insurgency the lack of stability and viability of the government may well reach into the middle echelons of administration; and the military forces, U.S. or host country, must in the interest of their own operations, as well as for political reasons, provide at least minimal governmental services in the territory which they hold or seize.

8-18. Community Relations

a. Unless the U.S. forces (and their host country allies) understand the requirement for good community relations and proper conduct, the best planned civil affairs and PSYOP effort by CMO staff elements and units will be of little value. The rules of troop behavior required in a counterinsurgency situation are complicated. U.S. personnel must not only conduct themselves to the best advantage; but, by their example as well as by their advice encourage the indigenous military to improve its conduct. Mere generosity on the part of U.S. troops is not enough, particularly when that generosity is practiced with an unconscious show of wealth, a disregard for local custom, or is accompanied by loud or unusual behavior.

b. In addition to the normal civil affairs training requirements for U.S. Army personnel, at least three additional training requirements must be added for U.S. troops committed in an internal defense operation—

1. Preembarkation training for all personnel to include detailed and specific treatment of conduct among civilians in the area of operations.

2. Training for all officers, and senior non-commissioned officers, destined for duty in internal defense operations or other service in developing countries in using community relations techniques to the advantage of the host nation.

3. In-country orientation courses for all military personnel.

c. These same rules apply to official U.S. behavior. Great care must be taken in local procurement of labor, real estate, and supplies, to avoid unnecessary disruption of the economy by pricing local civilians out of the market for things they must have in order to live.

8-19. U.S. and Combined CA Units Operations

a. U.S. CA units should be attached to U.S. tactical commands for civil affairs support of the commander's mission. Indigenous military civil affairs personnel must be trained for similar use with their own tactical commands and for the formation of combined U.S.-indigenous force civil affairs units that will provide U.S. tactical commands civil affairs support with built-in language, economic, political, and cultural knowledge.

b. When a U.S. troop buildup occurs, in-country coordination of the United States effort at subnational level becomes exceedingly important. If these are to be elements of a U.S. tactical unit operating in a subnational governmental area, the U.S. military advisor to the chief of that area
needs to know their plans and operations. Without such coordination, there is likely to be confusion of action among indigenous officials followed by protests through separate U.S. and indigenous channels. The best method of avoiding such problems and obtaining requisite support for U.S. units operating in the area is to have the CMO staff element of the U.S. military command establish and maintain liaison with the Area Coordination Center (ACC). The U.S. military advisor should be the point of contact with the local government, if an ACC has not been established, and operations in the area should be coordinated with him. In the event of a serious emergency which requires immediate action affecting the local government or people, or if the U.S. military advisor is not available, direct liaison may be established with the local government by the command CMO element. The U.S. military advisor should be fully informed as soon as he can be contacted.

c. The U.S. military advisor to a host country operational area generally will provide the U.S. forces operating in that area with liaison to indigenous officials. However, U.S. troop units should not rely upon the U.S. military advisor to local governments to provide liaison for them to U.S. civilian agencies. This liaison should be performed by their own CMO elements, although the U.S. advisor should also be kept informed.

8-20. Military Civic Action by U.S. Forces

a. The principles of military civic action described in chapter 7 apply with equal validity to programs undertaken by U.S. forces.

b. A U.S. unit preparing for a military civic action mission must inventory its goods and skills in coordination with other elements of the U.S. country team against the needs of the locality in which it is located, and establish programs that will fit into the environment and will help the people toward a better life.

c. CA units, when available, are well qualified to plan, supervise and provide specialized assistance in the performance of military civic action projects of U.S. forces. Overall planning and coordination of such projects with other developmental activities of U.S. and host country agencies is a matter of primary interest to the CMO element of the staff. This element should monitor the program to insure that—

(1) Military civic action by U.S. forces is supplemental to and does not detract from the area of major emphasis, that is the conduct of civic action by indigenous forces.

(2) A proper balance is maintained between the provision of treatment and environmental health improvement measures. Joint policy directives outlining the USAID public health program provide specific guidance for all U.S. advisory and operational personnel for the training and integration of health workers into the indigenous system.

(3) Recognition is given to the varying relationships between U.S. tactical units and the people. U.S. military civic action plans are phased so that unilateral U.S. action, required initially to break insurgent control and gain intelligence, is accomplished, but that subsequent steps in the U.S. military civic action program in a given area are designed to transfer credit to indigenous government agencies.

d. Military civic action is an important subsidiary task of tactical units committed in search and destroy, or in clear and hold operations. The length of time a unit is committed to an area will dictate the type projects undertaken, but the importance of military civic action to the overall success of the operation must not be overlooked. The CMO staff officer of the committed tactical unit should contact the U.S. operational area advisors and the local ACC so that military civic action can be coordinated with the indigenous government, and other U.S. agencies. Such coordination may be difficult in case of rapid commitment. In search and destroy operations it is particularly difficult to anticipate specific military civic action requirements. Two steps may be taken to cope with this problem; first, the development of a list of materials for stockage and support of military civic action in rapid commitment; secondly, advance coordination with USAID representatives to prepare lists of civic action projects which are desired for possible areas of commitment. These lists should be compared, priorities established, and then given to the tactical units as a basis for selection of military civic action projects on commitment to any of these areas.

e. USIA and psychological operations units should exploit military civic action but must be careful not to focus attention on U.S. units at the expense of the indigenous government in this effort.

8-21. Populace and Resources Control by U.S. Forces

a. The requirements for psychological operations support prior to, during and after populace
and resources control operations is even greater than for military civic action since the latter program speaks for itself, whereas the former almost always needs careful explanation and justification.

b. The basic principles of populace and resources control are described in chapter 7 and these apply with equal validity to populace and resources control actions by U.S. forces.

c. In the operation of a populace and resources control program, paramilitary forces may be the most essential element. One means of providing for better coordination with these units in areas where U.S. forces are committed, is through the conduct of integrated populace and resources control operations; that is, operations conducted by a combined force of paramilitary personnel and U.S. military personnel. If this is successfully accomplished, the paramilitary organization will not only increase in overall effectiveness, but the U.S. military forces involved will have extended their own capabilities to secure an area, gain intelligence, and effectively impose populace and resources control.

8–22. Other Phase III Activities

a. The same situation which applies to indigenous military units taking over areas previously under insurgent control will also frequently apply to the U.S. units in the same role. Until the civil branch of the indigenous government can respond to them, the people taken under control are a military civil affairs problem. The answer to the U.S. commander's problems in this respect is combined civil affairs operations that will allow the first authority and assistance that reaches the indigenous people to be indigenous even though the indigenous organization is backed, supported, advised, and trained by U.S. or other allied personnel.

b. In Phase III, many U.S. Government civilian agency's operations are impaired or even stopped altogether because of the security situation. In such cases, U.S. military personnel, with appropriate skills, may be used to take over this work in contested areas. U.S. CA units may be of particular assistance to USAID in this by providing personnel to maintain the USAID operation wherever possible, or by assuming USAID missions and functions in the areas of combat operations.
CHAPTER 9
CIVIL AFFAIRS SUPPORT OF UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE OPERATIONS

Section I. NATURE OF UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

9-1. Unconventional Warfare

a. General.

(1) Commanders designated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) are responsible for the conduct of unconventional warfare (UW). Such designated commanders include commanders of unified and specified commands and joint task force commanders.

(2) As part of this responsibility, such commanders designate specific areas for the conduct of unconventional warfare operations.

(3) As required, the commander has the authority to establish a Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force (JUWTF) Headquarters to plan for and to conduct unconventional warfare operations within his area of responsibility.

(4) Unconventional warfare consists of military, political, psychological, or economic actions of a covert, clandestine, or overt nature within areas under the actual or potential control or influence of a force or state whose interests and objectives are inimical to those of the United States. These actions are conducted unilaterally by United States resources or in conjunction with indigenous assets and avoid formal military confrontation.

b. Concepts. UW is conducted to exploit military, political, economic, or psychological vulnerabilities of an enemy. It is implemented by providing support and direction to indigenous resistance forces where appropriate, or by unilateral operations of U.S. UW forces. Its conduct involves the application of guerrilla warfare and selected aspects of subversion, political warfare, economic warfare, and psychological operations in support of national objectives.

9-2. Unconventional Warfare Operations

Unconventional warfare operations may be covert, clandestine, or overt in nature. Covert operations are conducted in such a manner as to conceal the identity of the sponsor, while clandestine operations place emphasis on concealment of the operation rather than the identity of the sponsor. Overt operations do not try to conceal either the operations, or the identity of the sponsor. In an established theater of operations in which significant ground operations by a conventional U.S. military force will be undertaken, UW is conducted primarily to complement, support, or extend conventional operations. Within geographical areas under enemy control or influence, to which conventional forces will not be deployed, UW may be conducted as an economy of force measure, and to reduce or dissipate the enemy potential.


The major U.S. Army military force that has an effective UW capability is the U.S. Army Special Forces Group, a force developed and trained to fulfill requirements for the Army to participate in unconventional warfare operations.

9-4. Responsibilities for the Conduct of Unconventional Warfare

a. Responsibility for developmental action in each of the categories of unconventional warfare has been delegated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to that department or agency having primary concern. The U.S. Army is responsible for guerrilla warfare and related ground activities within its capabilities.

b. Within geographical areas designated as unconventional warfare operational areas (UWOA), U.S. Army Special Forces are assigned single or multiple missions but must be prepared to assume responsibility for all aspects of unconventional warfare.
Section II. CIVIL AFFAIRS FUNCTIONS IN UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

9-5. General

a. Civil affairs operations in support of UW are designed to obtain for a military commander essential civilian support or reduce civilian interference and assist in the attainment of his political-military objectives. Any project or operation of a military unit pointed toward support for, or the exercise of influence or control over civilians and civilian organizations outside the military establishment can be classified as a type of civil affairs operation, regardless of the participating unit. In UW operations the majority of CA operations may not be performed by CA staffs or units, but by other elements of the military committed to UW operations.

b. In unconventional warfare, civil affairs embraces the relationship between UW forces (U.S. Army Special Forces), and the people and institutions of an area; also the relationship between the resistance forces, the people, and institutions. In all phases of unconventional warfare, the U.S. commander in an area and the leaders of resistance forces must give constant attention to these civilian relationships in order to obtain support from civilians and conversely to deny support to the enemy.

c. Civil affairs activities of UW elements must be closely integrated with other activities which affect the indigenous resistance forces, the people, and the institutions of an area.

9-6. Operational Support of Unconventional Warfare Operations

a. Objectives. The general objectives of civil affairs operations in support of unconventional warfare, whether performed unilaterally by U.S. units or in conjunction with resistance forces include measures to advise and assist in—

(1) Obtaining maximum civilian support for the resistance force and other UW operations.
(2) Denial of civilian support to the enemy.
(3) Preparation for establishing control of the civilian population by a friendly conventional force or civil government.
(4) Aiding the military commanders in using resistance and paramilitary forces in conjunction with his overall effort as UW operational areas and UW resources are uncovered.

b. Support During Offensive Operations. The civil affairs aspects of UW operations are an important and continuing consideration from its inception to its completion. As appropriate, CA elements contribute to all plans that have an impact on current and future activities. Since Special Forces and resistance force commanders are more dependent upon civilian support than are commanders of conventional forces, much of the initial planning is concerned with obtaining that support. Initially, the preponderance of the CA effort will be assisting with that planning designed to influence or obtain controls over civilians and their resources. Civil affairs planning for all fields of UW should, as a minimum, consider the following:

(1) Analysis of the Theater Army Commander’s political-military mission to determine its effect on the U.S. resistance forces’ operations within a given area.
(2) Organization of resistance forces, paramilitary forces, auxiliary, and, in some aspects, the underground.
(3) Civil affairs training required for Special Forces personnel and units prior to infiltration into operational areas.
(4) Number and type of CA units and personnel required to support any phase of the operation.
(5) Civil affairs intelligence pertaining to the target area.
(6) The civil-military relations aspect of local purchase, requisition, and confiscation in support of operations.
(7) The existing indigenous political organization(s) factions thereof, and its key members; the relationship between resistance and paramilitary organizations within the target area.
(8) An awareness of tentative plans for occupation, reestablishment or support of a particular government, or the establishment of a completely new government.

c. Support of Operational Areas.

(1) During the initial formation of a resistance force, civil affairs elements may not be directly involved in the formative process within the UW. However, the most significant civil affairs contribution during early phases of a UW operation usually will be performed in areas under friendly control. In this environment civil affairs elements have the capability for assisting in recruiting individuals indigenous to a target area to
assist in training UW forces and in the conduct of operations; procuring special materials indigenous to the area; and providing information obtained through personal contact with indigenous personnel with respect to the unconventional warfare operational area.

(2) Civil affairs activities may be considerably expanded after area control is established. UW operational element commanders should request appropriate assistance from civil affairs specialists when the mission to advise the overall resistance movement, as well as to train the guerrilla force, overtaxes his resources. Individuals selected for a single mission, or in exceptional situations, complete civil affairs units that have been trained in UW operations may be infiltrated into the operational area and attached to the Area Command. These personnel or elements may be used to advise, supervise, or assist indigenous resistance elements in establishing and performing those governmental and related functions required for their continued operations. This may include a full range of CA functions within a UW OA where area supremacy is established.

d. Link-Up Operations.

(1) During all phases of an unconventional warfare operation there is a continuing requirement for liaison between civil affairs and unconventional warfare staffs and operational control bases at all levels. This liaison must be established at the earliest practical time, in that this will provide a means of updating and exchanging information that may have an impact on the committed UW forces and CA elements designated to operate within the UW OA during and after link-up.

(2) Prior to link-up with conventional forces, there will be numerous demands made of Special Forces and other UW resources for information and intelligence that will be beyond their capability to provide. Civil affairs, although it will have a relatively low priority in established EEI, can materially benefit from information developed during any operation. Information of the following nature will be of value and assistance to civil affairs in formulating and finalizing plans for uncovered UW OA's and resources, and will provide the basis for a smooth transition of control from Special Forces to the conventional force commander and the civil affairs elements.

(a) Personality files—identification and cataloging of local leaders as to honesty, reliability, and political motivations.

(b) Advance information on hidden catches of weapons, food and other essential commodities, records, funds, valuables, and other materials that will assist CA operations.

(c) Identification of troublemakers, dissidents, organized resistance groups, and those considered to be politically unreliable.

(d) Information concerning civil-guerrilla relationships established through the normal course of their operations. The manner and fairness of the resistance force dealings with the local population can be converted to the advantage of the CA after link-up.

(3) During link-up operations, civil affairs liaison personnel and operational elements accompanying conventional ground forces will be in a position to take immediate steps to put into effect those programs and operations previously planned. Civil affairs personnel can recommend locations and establish refugee collection centers, help establish control and check points, and through contact with local officials begin the process of establishing formal governmental control over the area. Uncovered UW resources and guerrilla forces will be of immense value in apprehending known collaborators, and establishing and manning check points, control points, and securing supply and equipment depots.

... e. Post Hostilities Operations. When link-up operations between friendly conventional forces and sponsored resistance forces are completed, the ability of the resistance force to support offensive operations gradually diminishes. It is at this time that consideration is given to demobilizing the resistance elements in sectors occupied by friendly forces or placing them in a combat support or combat service support role. The decision regarding the transfer of resistance forces to the national government concerned is made at an appropriate level and the political, economic, and social implications of such a transfer are paramount considerations.

(1) Demobilization operations by U.S. forces may take one or a combination of the following courses:

(a) The resistance force with all arms and equipment may be released to the recognized government.

(b) The resistance force, less U.S. supplies, arms, and equipment may be released to the recognized government.

(c) The resistance force may be demobilized and relocated by the United States.

(2) Civil affairs elements should assist U.S. authority in the demobilization. Special Forces may be required to support this demobilization
process, using their intimate knowledge of the resistance force and personalities of its leaders, and turning over records that were maintained during operations as background to civil affairs elements responsible for the demobilization. Actions taken by civil affairs to affect demobilization and return of personnel to a normal status may include:

(a) Recommendations to the ground force commander on the utilization of uncovered resistance forces no longer required for UW operations.

(b) Assisting in the indoctrination, retraining of the demobilized force before integration into the civilian community.

(c) In instances where deep-rooted animosities and political frictions have developed, recommend resettlement areas and assist in relocating personnel in this category.

(d) Advise and assist the ground force commander and the local government officials in settling administrative problems inherent in a post-hostilities phase which include completion of administration, care of sick and wounded, collection of weapons, munitions, and other combat type equipment.

9-7. Training

a. UW training for Civil Affairs personnel. Training of CA personnel for employment in a theater of operation in support of unconventional warfare operations must include as a minimum—

(1) Basic familiarization with UW operations and their correlation to the overall politico-military program of the United States.

(2) The interrelationship between UW and civil affairs activities.

(3) The interrelationship between civil affairs and other activities supporting UW operations.

(4) Responsibilities and functions conducted at all levels of command in support of UW operations.

(5) Civil affairs personnel being assigned to work directly with Special Forces operational elements, particularly during the latter phases of UW Operations, should be Special Forces trained and qualified, and capable of participating in UW activities.

b. Civil Affairs Training for UW Personnel. UW personnel being committed into operational areas to work with or in conjunction with indigenous resistance or paramilitary forces, should be familiar with such matters as the political leadership and structure of governmental organizations in-country, and economy and culture of their designated operational areas. Although most of this information is normally obtained by the operational elements through general and detailed area studies, an understanding of the impact that the overall civil affairs and PSYOP policies has in support of the theater effort is essential. Training in applying civil affairs functions and techniques is essential for the UW operator, and should as a minimum include the following:

(1) Advice and techniques in obtaining civilian support within an operational area.

(2) Organization of civilian support into administrative and logistical support elements.

(3) Establishing and maintaining a favorable relationship between the overt resistance force and the local population.

(4) Advice and guidance in dealing with political leaders within operational areas.

(5) Familiarization with programs that can be instigated in the early phases of operation to insure a smooth transition of control of resistance forces during and after link-up operations.

(6) The role of the UW operator as a civil affairs advisor.
CHAPTER 10
CIVIL AFFAIRS IN CONUS

Section I. COMMUNITY RELATIONS

10-1. Principles and Policies
Basic principles and policies applicable to community relations programs in CONUS are contained in AR 360-61, other of the AR 360-series, AR 60-20, AR 95-1, AR 600-21, and AR 600-50.

10-2. Activities and Operations
a. Community relations activities in CONUS embrace both organizational relations and informal activities. Organizational relations include those formal, official, and interorganizational contacts between military and civil authorities and the organizations each represents.

b. For a discussion of specific projects and activities useful in operating a CONUS community relations program, see paragraph 2-13.

Section II. DOMESTIC EMERGENCIES

10-3. Federal Martial Law
a. Among the domestic emergency situations that may justify recourse to martial law are flood, earthquake, windstorm, tidal wave, fire, epidemic, riot, civil unrest, or other extraordinary circumstances beyond the control capability of normal governmental officials. In such circumstances, a military commander may, on instructions from higher authority or on his own initiative if the circumstances do not permit delay, take such action as necessary to maintain law and order and assure the performance of essential governmental services. As government in the United States is a civil responsibility, the degree of military intrusion into the field of government, and correspondingly, the scope of military authority, is circumscribed by the necessities of the case.

b. Although in the United States no declaration of martial law is necessary, it is customary for the President, the governor of a state or territory, comparable officials of other political subdivisions, or the military commander in question, to publish a proclamation informing the people of the nature of the emergency and the powers which the military authorities are assuming. Such a proclamation by itself confers no authority on the military commander. It does serve, however, to define the area of military control and the specific governmental functions and responsibilities to be exercised by the military authorities.

c. As martial law is a temporary and extraordinary regime, great care must be taken in drafting proclamations, orders, instructions, regulations, or any other martial law directives. Such pronouncements must not assert more authority than is justified under the circumstances, must particularize the powers to be exercised; and must not have the effect of perpetuating the emergency or enlarging its scope. For more detailed information concerning military assistance to civil authorities see DA Pam 27-11, FM 19-15, and AR 500-50. For general application of civil affairs doctrine, see FM 41-5.

d. Detailed doctrine pertaining to authority for planning, conducting, and terminating military operations directed at control of domestic disturbances in CONUS (and oversea areas) is contained in FM 19-15 and AR 500-50.

10-4. Disaster Relief Operations
Even in the absence of hostile attack, military units with their disciplined manpower, technical experts, emergency equipment, stockpiled supplies, and transportation and communication capabilities often are called upon for disaster relief missions. Operations vary with the locale and nature of the emergency. In the initial phases,
certainly, there will be rescue operations distribution of relief supplies, care for the injured, burial of the dead, prevention of the spread of disease, preclusion of looting, control of traffic, and restriction of the circulation of individuals. The situation may involve control measures, some degree of civil administration, or important consideration of liaison and coordination. Disaster relief teams usually are composite organizations consisting primarily of technical service personnel. CA units possess specialists with training and skills appropriate and adaptable to provide either staff planning and direction, or operating elements. (See Public Law 875, 81st Congress, as amended, 42 USC, 1855-1855G (Natural Disaster Relief Act 1950); AR 500–60; and FM 19–15.)

Section III. MILITARY SUPPORT OF CIVIL DEFENSE

10–5. Scope

This section contains doctrine for civil affairs planning and operations in military support of civil defense, including disaster relief. The provisions of this section have particular application to the continental United States; however, when not in conflict with public law or other proper authority, they are equally applicable in the states of Hawaii and Alaska and in US territories. See AR 500–60 and AR 500–70 for discussion of definitions; Department of Defense policies, responsibilities; Regional Civil Defense Coordinating Boards; Office of Emergency Planning; Department of the Army responsibilities, concepts, and policies, and implementation.


★a. The Office of Emergency Planning (OEP), Executive Office of the President, is the central agency for national emergency policy formulation and direction of national operations. Its activities include, but are not limited to, working closely with the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency and operating the National Resources Evaluation Center (NREC). The NREC, permanently staffed with representatives from key Federal departments and agencies, is concerned with peacetime planning as well as readiness for emergency operations. It places particular emphasis on the application of advanced computer techniques to tasks of damage assessment and resource evaluation. Along with these advanced computer activities, the NREC has developed manual methods for performing situation analysis and resource evaluation to meet emergency needs.

★b. The agency of the Federal Government with the primary duty of advising, guiding and assisting the states and their political subdivisions is the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DCPA), a part of the Department of Defense. DCPA is also responsible for carrying out DOD civil defense responsibilities. DCPA has eight regional offices throughout the United States. The regional offices work with state and other local civil governments.

c. All states have legislation authorizing a program of civil defense. Each state has a civil defense director charged with advising the governor and other state officials concerning civil defense matters. He also assists each political subdivision of the state in establishing and maintaining a local civil defense organization. State adjutants general and their staffs prepare plans for military support of civil defense. In the event of attack, a state adjutant general and his military headquarters will be brought into active Federal service. A state adjutant general will then be under the command of the CONUS army commander in whose area he is located, and will exercise operational command of the military support forces operating within his state.

★d. The Civil Defense Warning System is a combination of Federal, state, and local systems. The Federal portion is termed the National Warning System (NAWAS), and it is essentially an extension of the military warning and detection systems that feed into the combat operations center of the North American Air Defense Command at Colorado Springs, Colorado. NAWAS consists primarily of three DCPA warning centers. These centers are located at the NORAD Combat Operations Center, DCPA Region 5 Headquarters (Denton, Tex.), and Washington, D.C. Backup centers are located at each of the other DCPA regional headquarters. All are linked by a special voice communications system to several hundred warning points throughout the nation. These warning points, manned on a 24-hour basis, are located at key Federal facilities, state capitals, and many cities. Through a relay system, these warning points send information to local authorities who are responsible for warning the local populace.

e. The Emergency Broadcast System (EBS),
established by Executive Order of the President, is designed to provide local, state, and national (including regional) units of government with a means of communicating to the general public. The EBS plan provides for the use of most of the facilities and personnel of the broadcast industry to operate a functional system during a national emergency.


★a. The United States Continental Army Command (CONARC) and the CONUS armies comprise the basic structure through which military support of local civil government is planned and implemented in the 48 contiguous states and the District of Columbia. Further decentralization is accomplished by assignment of responsibilities to commanders of military installations and units. In the states of Alaska and Hawaii and in US territories, military support of local civil government is planned and implemented by the appropriate unified command. The military chain of command parallels that of civil government thereby permitting effective military cooperation with state authorities through rapid coordination of military support requirements, reduction of response time; and flexibility in military support operations.

b. Army support of civil authorities in a civil defense emergency is considered a responsibility second only to combat operations. All available Army units in CONUS, both active Army and Reserve component, not committed to higher priority defense tasks, (AR 500–70) will be employed as required for essential missions in the event of a civil defense emergency. These units are included, as appropriate, in contingency plans for the execution of civil defense support missions.

c. General doctrine for the employment of US Army Forces in military support of local civil government is contained in FM 20–10.

★10–8. The Role of the Civil Affairs Organization

The basic responsibility of the CA organization in the local civil government support mission is to be prepared to—

a. Assist civil authority.

b. Temporarily replace civil authority under the powers of Federal martial law when civil control and leadership have been destroyed or rendered ineffective.

★10–9. Civil Affairs Role of Other Units in Civil Defense

Where CA units are not available for performance of civil affairs functions during military support of local civil governments, other military units must assume these duties. Such units should, in addition to being given basic civil affairs training, be provided special training in the activities enumerated in paragraph 10–10.

10–10. Basic Civil Affairs Tasks

Military support to civil authorities in civil defense operations must supplement and be coordinated with state and local capabilities. In this effort, the basic tasks discussed in AR 500–70 include—

a. Restoration of utilities.

b. Emergency clearance of debris and rubble from streets, highways, airports, docks, rail centers, and shelters.

c. Fire protection.

d. Rescue, evacuation, and hospitalization.

e. Recovery and disposition of the dead.

f. Radiological monitoring, biological, and chemical agent detection, and CBR decontamination.

g. Movement control.

h. Maintenance of law and order.

i. Issue of food, essential supplies, and materiel.

j. Emergency provision of prepared food and facilities for food preparation.

k. Damage assessment.

l. Provision of interim communications.

10–11. Civil Affairs Functional Tasks

CA units and teams can be utilized in the planning, supervision, or performance of any of the basic tasks enumerated in paragraph 10–10. In addition any or all of the following additional civil affairs tasks may be required:

a. Negotiating civil-military agreements to facilitate military support plans and operations in accordance with the provisions of AR 500–70 and instructions received from appropriate higher headquarters.

b. Preparing area surveys, studies, and esti-
mates for use in operational and logistical planning.

c. Conducting surveys of public information and communications media and preparing civil information plans and programs for emergency implementation as required.

d. Furnishing technical advice, assistance, and supervision in governmental, economic, and sociological functions.

e. Supervising the distribution of relief supplies.

f. Providing advice and assistance in public safety, public health and welfare matters, or supervising such activities.

g. Assisting in or supervising the restoration of commerce and industry.

h. Providing public works and utilities rehabilitation assistance, advice, and supervision.

i. Controlling refugee movements, to include provision of measures for family reunification, camp administration and operations, and relocation and resettlement activities.

j. Providing support to existing civil government or providing the nucleus and framework for emergency government missions to include—

(1) Establishing and operating civil affairs tribunals when the civil courts are unable or unwilling to function.

(2) Full performance of the tasks shown in a through i above.

(3) Recruitment and training of civilians for governmental functions.

(4) Planning and execution of the transfer of governmental functions back to civil authority.

10–12. Planning Factors

a. References—

(1) Unclassified information on employment of CB weapons—FM 3–10.

(2) Classified information on employment of chemical weapons (FM 3–10B) and biological weapons (FM 3–10A).


(4) Field behavior of chemical, biological, and radiological agents—TM 3–240.

(5) Chemical protective clothing policy and utilization of certain chemical units and equipment in combat areas—AR 700–62.

(6) Protective clothing and accessories—TM 10–277.

(7) Training exercises in CBR and nuclear defense—FM 21–48.

(8) Individual protective measures during chemical and biological operations and nuclear warfare—FM 21–41.

(9) Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense—FM 21–40.

(10) Operational aspects of radiological defense—FM 3–12.

(11) CBR decontamination—TM 3–220.


b. Predicted impacts of hostile attacks by—

(1) Nuclear and thermonuclear weapons.

(2) Biological weapons.

(3) Chemical weapons.

(4) Conventional weapons.

(5) Combinations of nuclear, thermonuclear, biological, or chemical, and conventional weapons.

(6) Overt or covert means of delivery.

c. Predicted postattack civil and military capabilities and resources to include consideration of—

(1) Availability of suitable prepositioned control equipment and supplies.

(2) Reliability of specific disease endemicity factors as guides to establishing priorities of effort for disease control.

(3) Effectiveness of control measures in determined geographic locations and climatic conditions.

(4) Controls required for coordinating time-phased recovery operations with other civil-military activities, such as radiological or chemical decontamination and debris clearance.

(5) Availability of trained and knowledgeable civilian or military labor.

d. Predicted availability of CA units and civil affairs trained personnel.

e. Predicted military support requirements for provision of emergency—

(1) Power sources.

(2) Communications equipment and supplies.

(3) Operation of facilities. In such cases, military personnel requirements will include—

(a) Engineer specialists.

(b) Signal specialists.

(c) Civil information, psychological operations, and public safety officers.

(d) Intelligence officers.

(e) Administration specialists.

(f) CBR specialists.
f. Supporting teams of specialists required from other military resources would include Medical, Quartermaster, Engineer, Transportation, CBR, Aviation, Signal, Military Police, Psychological Operations, and Intelligence.

10–13. Civil Affairs Planning

★a. It is essential that the Army headquarters and installations concerned participate in formulation of civil defense plans and in the evaluation of their effectiveness during exercises. A basic requirement is civil affairs training for all military personnel, active and reserve, for emergency operations in support of local civil government. Such training should be area and target oriented to insure familiarity with applicable contingency plans and potential postattack environmental conditions. In this connection, CA USAR units should be employed wherever available for the conduct of special area studies and surveys, as well as for other assistance in planning. Plans should provide for augmenting non-CA military units with CA teams and skills as required.

★b. The nature, scope, and duration of conventional, nuclear, chemical, and biological attacks influence the allocation and tailoring of civil affairs units for operations in support of local civil government.

c. Associated considerations include population densities, level of social and economic development, political arrangements, civil defense capabilities, and concurrent military requirements. Specific existing bases of allocation such as those contained in tables of organization and equipment should not be relied on completely as adequate for emergency operations.

d. In order to accomplish assigned missions, civil affairs units may require augmentations of both special equipment and personnel. In this connection, the use of military personnel in a casual status and reserve and retired military personnel, as required by the needs of the situation, should be considered. Such personnel can provide both CA and non-CA units with a variety of useful civil defense skills which would not otherwise be available.

e. Areas of operation may range from a devastated local community to several states. Massive regional destruction may necessitate use of one or more CA Area Headquarters units, with supporting CA and other specialist teams, to meet the needs of the situation.

★f. In all civil affairs operations in support of local civil government, operational priorities must be included in plans to control the relative order and time-phasing by which operations will be conducted in target areas. In the event of massive attack there may not be sufficient CA resources to meet all needs simultaneously. CA resources must be initially distributed, managed and used in conformance with established priorities based upon predetermined criteria for restoration of critical areas. Because of the broad scope of civil affairs activities, it is particularly important that the civil affairs support plans reflect complete assessment of priority requirements derived from area surveys, predetermined criteria, and early damage assessment reports.

g. Military necessity may require removal of all or part of the military force prior to completion of the support mission. It is essential that plans of both the military and the civilian authorities take this into account. Solutions should be tested in exercises and revised as appropriate. Civil affairs units must anticipate such requirements, including certain situations in which units must be withdrawn and leave behind only a portion of the most essential personnel for mission completion. The cellular structure of most CA units permits a great degree of flexibility for this purpose.

h. CA units should be included in military support plans wherever practicable; however, civil affairs activities are basically complementary to, rather than a substitute for, civilian efforts, and will be directed toward the strengthening of the civil government's capabilities. CA units surviving attacks and available for support may represent only a small portion of the total effort required.

10–14. Coordination with Civilian Agencies

a. In both preattack and postattack phases of military planning and operations in support of CONUS civil defense, civil affairs units coordinate with other Federal, State, and local organizations as required to facilitate accomplishment of their support mission. Specific objectives of coordination are to provide for efficient and effective plans and operating procedures and to preserve all practicable bases for continuity of effort (see AR 500–70 and the National Plan for Civil Defense).

b. Coordination with state and local agencies is accomplished between military echelons and levels of civil government with corresponding planning
or operations requirements. A fundamental objective of coordination of planning and operations at the state and local levels is to facilitate continuity of effort under all conditions, including those created by the establishment of martial law.

c. In the preparation of military plans, existing civil government plans at local levels should be assessed, to include relationships of city, county, and township governmental units and the capability for unity of effort in emergencies. Where metropolitan areas cross state lines, an additional problem exists which will necessitate coordination of interstate effort.

d. Coordination with many nongovernmental public and private groups and organizations is equally necessary. Examples include public utilities companies, industrial and business organizations, private clubs, church groups, and educational institutions.


a. In military support operations conducted under conditions in which the civil government is functioning, CA units normally are employed as part of a military task force tailored to provide the requisite assistance. While CA units assist in all aspects of support operations according to their capabilities, casualties among government officials and employees may necessitate emergency integration of CA teams or specialists into the civil government in order to preserve vital continuity. Examples of the types of CA teams or specialists which may be required include Public Health, Public Works and Utilities, Economics and Commerce, Public Safety, Civil Information, Public Welfare, and Food and Agriculture. Military support operations should be accomplished in a manner permitting the full utilization of the remaining civil defense and other civilian organizations.

b. Only in those circumstances in which the civil authority has been destroyed or rendered incapable of further operation does the military assume complete control. In these situations, the military remains in authority and the status of martial law exists only until the civil authority is again able to assume its sovereignty. All available CA units and specialists, active Army, Reserve component, and Retired may be needed. Where such units and specialized personnel are not available in adequate numbers, consideration should be given to augmenting the civil affairs activities of non-CA units with such CA personnel as are available. Operations must be conducted in such a manner as to preserve the continuity of the Civil Defense Program if possible, and facilitate reestablishment of civil government at the earliest possible date.

c. In every situation, transition operations are of special interest. Once civil functions are assumed by military personnel, it becomes necessary to provide for replacement of the military by civilians. Return to civil control should be accomplished activity by activity and function by function in order to assure continuity of operation, to provide for needed interfunctional coordination during transition, and to release military personnel for other assignment in the minimum possible time.

d. During military support operations within the boundaries of a single state, CA units normally would function as part of the military task force made available to the federalized state military headquarters. Exceptions may occur in a specific local situation in which a civil affairs unit constitutes the entire military capability committed.

e. Under some circumstances, the exercise of military control may become extremely complicated because of the size of areas involved, existing political boundaries, or similar reasons. In these situations, it may become desirable to centralize military control under some equivalent of a civil affairs command. This command would control operations through state headquarters which are still operational, or through CA units or other military units in the area as required. This would free CONUS Army commanders and CONARC from operating details which might impede performance of other missions. Where practicable, the civil affairs command should be collocated with a Civil Defense Regional Headquarters.

f. Where CA units and individual specialists are available they will be especially valuable in organizing and supervising postattack control measures. A typical metropolitan area will have limited numbers of technical specialists and trained labor in its regularly employed government work force. Augmentation by military specialists and labor may be required during emergencies for operations and for replacement of casualties among key personnel.

g. CA civil information teams may assist, or if required, replace lost state or local civil defense public information personnel. Basically, civil information under postattack circumstances is concerned with informing the public, through ex-
isting or improvised media, concerning their role in emergency operations. The objective of civil information activities is to aid the military commander in accomplishing his mission by gaining the support of the people and by stimulating cooperation in carrying out actions essential to protection of life and property and to expeditious recovery from the effects of the attack. Types of information disseminated to the public may consist of civil defense instructions, technical advice, or official reports concerning the status of recovery operations. Information released to the public should conform to established security policies and procedures set forth in Army regulations. Policies and procedures should be coordinated with the command intelligence officer. To minimize actual or potential panic, it is essential that news vacuums be avoided, as well as the spread of subversive or spontaneous rumors. Contents of releases must be accurate and factual. Where available media are limited, only information essential to keep the public informed should be released.

10-16. Evacuation Operations

a. Where states or localities have received sufficient warning time to conduct selective evacuations prior to attacks, CA units or functional teams may be used to assist in the operation of existing evacuee camps or to supervise the establishment of additional camps. Under some emergency conditions, CA evacuation operations may involve large-scale collection, transportation, administration, logistical support, and resettlement activities. Where circumstances require, evacuees should be assembled at collection points where they can be registered, and provided emergency first aid, rations, and clothing as needed. Those requiring further medical care should be hospitalized if possible. Uninjured men, with their consent, should be assigned to general labor pools, except where professional or technical skills are noted. These individuals can be used in their basic or a closely related skill. Single women, with their consent, should be assigned to assist in messing facilities, emergency hospitals, administrative tasks, or similar activities. Young children, their mothers, expectant mothers, and the elderly or infirm should be moved by the most expeditious means to evacuate camps located outside the target area.

b. Current civil defense policy emphasizes shelter, rather than evacuation, as the action to be taken by the U.S. public immediately prior to an attack. This is based on increased weapons yields, decreased warning times, and the difficulties of controlling large-scale movements of civilians. Maximum use of shelter will also aid in reducing panic. It will also be beneficial under conditions of chemical and biological attacks, as civilians have only minimal protection capabilities such as protective masks, air filtering equipment, and medical assistance. Therefore, official orders to move large groups of civilians normally will be given only in those situations where weapons effects exceed the shelter protection capabilities, or in the postattack period to remove nonessential civilians to areas which are better able to provide requisite facilities, or are in less danger of further attack. Where destinations are not designated in civil defense plans, they must be considered in contingency plans developed by the military for emergency support operations. Duration of stay at such destinations must also be taken into account.

c. Movement under emergency conditions may take place whether ordered or not. Preattack and postattack control may present serious problems beyond the capabilities of the civil authorities. Military support plans must anticipate this problem and provide for it by assigning specific tasks to appropriate military units. While such tasks normally will be performed in cooperation with civil authorities, under some circumstances the military forces may have to exercise complete control. In any event, military operational facilities may be used to provide for emergency feeding and medical care. Military personnel may have to direct people into holding areas where controlled movement can be organized to return them to their homes or to relocation sites.

10-17. Special Training Requirements

a. Many Federal, state, and local agencies may have only limited numbers of trained personnel available to produce emergency estimates to serve as a basis for resource decisions and operations. This situation could require temporary integration of military personnel into the structure of the surviving civil defense system in the attack area. It is essential that these military personnel, particularly CA specialists, be thoroughly familiar with emergency procedures and systems, especially those standardized in the national civil defense program. Under such conditions, normal military techniques and procedures may not be completely applicable and could generate unnecessary and dangerous confusion. Accordingly, in addition to any other required training, civil affairs
personnel, or other military personnel who may perform similar emergency duties, should receive special instruction in the areas mentioned in b below.

b. Training of CA or non-CA units for operations in support of CONUS civil defense must be consistent with the operational requirements of appropriate contingency plans and the training directives of higher authority. The scope of minimum essential training should include—

1. Effects of mass destruction and mass casualty weapons.
2. CBR defense.
3. Preattack planning, including preparation of area studies.
4. Postattack recovery measures.
5. Civil defense program management, including—

(a) Policy formulation.
(b) Organizing and staffing for civil defense operations.
(c) Operation of Emergency Operations Centers (EOC).
(d) Acquisition of intelligence.
(e) Civil information.
(f) Management of emergency resources.
(g) Shelter and shelter system management.
(h) Damage assessment.
(i) The preparing and conduct of readiness exercises.
(j) Liaison and coordination requirements and procedures.
(k) Administration.
(l) Communications.
(m) Transportation.
(n) Handling of evacuees.
CHAPTER 11
POST COMBAT SUPPORT OF ALLIES

Section I. INTRODUCTION

11-1. General

a. When the territory of a friendly country has been ravaged by war, has been exploited economically beyond a point where self recovery can be expected, or has been so suppressed politically that its citizens lack the essential fundamentals of self government, the United States in such emergency situations may assume, in accordance with the rules of land warfare, responsibility for supporting that country with or without benefit of a formal agreement. The assumption may be one of total responsibility or it may be shared with other nations. Support may be direct, or through an international body such as the Organization of American States or the United Nations.

b. The U.S. Army is charged with being prepared for service as may be required to support the U.S. national interest. Although the role of support of allies is not always assigned to the Army, or to other military services, responsibility for preparedness for such duty continues. This involves planning, training of personnel, structuring of units, and possible prestockage of supplies.

c. The recipient of this support may be a friendly state or a state that has only recently become associated with the United States. It may be located anywhere in the world and be at any stage of economic or cultural evolution. There may be and usually is an agreement between the United States and the state to define relationships between U.S. forces and the local population. The agreement should include such matters as the authority and conditions under which U.S. forces may be employed in the area, the facilities and services which each country may provide to the other, and the degree of authority which the military commander may assume regarding normal functions of civil government. In emergency situations where no agreement exists, one should be negotiated as rapidly as possible unless it is in the best interests of the United States not to do so with a particular government. See FM 41–5 for appropriate civil affairs agreements.

11-2. Relationships

a. Contacts with indigenous citizens, officials, and unofficial leaders are an essential part of these support operations. Number, frequency, and character of such contacts vary widely and merely making contact does not alone guarantee success. Failure to establish appropriate contact does, however, assure failure of mission. These contacts should become working collaborations. Individuals in the U.S. Army and individuals in the indigenous military and civilian environment should think of themselves as working partners in an interrelated process, each knowing the contribution he should make and the contribution expected of the other, and neither impinging on responsibilities of the other.

b. Since the Department of State is charged with primary responsibility for foreign policy, major commands may have political advisors (POLADS), who represent the Department of State, especially if no ambassador is accredited to the country. Department of State counsel is of great importance in routine matters as well as in the crucial policy decisions made by military commanders. The role of the POLAD in such missions is of greater operational significance than it would be under combat conditions, since this type of mission is basically political.

c. U.S., international, or third country civilian organizations, such as the International Red Cross and World Health Organization will probably be active in the country. These agencies may be public or private. The host country will have granted authorizations, which normally specify their areas of interest. The projects of these international bodies should, and often do, complement U.S. sponsored programs. Although their re-
sources are often from U.S. origins, the Army has little or no authority over their activities while they act within their agreements with local authorities. U.S. Army personnel should cooperate with, and gain cooperation from their representatives.

d. If military units of another foreign country are operational in the same area, their status, mission, and responsibilities should be clearly explained in appropriate directives disseminated to U.S. Army personnel. All military units usually will be part of a combined command that includes U.S. forces, but each national force may have assigned functions or geographical areas.

Section II. PLANS

11-3. Initial Planning

a. Operations are governed by national level decisions. Directives should be communicated as soon as published to all advisor, program, and project personnel. Usually implementing instructions by intermediate headquarters are needed for application of policy in specific situations. Under no circumstance should such instructions replace or delay distribution of policy guidance publications.

b. If encouraging change is part of the U.S. objective, the feelings of local people should be judged carefully and recommended changes be presented as advantageous and consistent with local social evolution. It is futile to attempt to make basic social changes quickly. Forms of government, occupational methods, marketing customs, family and tribal controls, and religious standards are some of the many fields in which people may be reluctant to deviate from established practices. To be worthwhile, a reform effort should be one that will last. Short-range projects should fit into long-range programs and long-range programs should not ignore the present or the near future.

11-4. Personnel Qualifications

Personnel for such operations should be competent soldiers, qualified in the skills in which they are to specialize, and temperamentally equipped to work effectively with people of other nationalities. People in this assignment should have, or be willing to acquire, some knowledge of at least one language used by the people in the area of operations. Grammatical excellence and fluency are desirable although not necessary. Some knowledge is essential, if only to be able to communicate intelligently through an interpreter.

11-5. Background Influences

Policy directives should state clearly what ends are to be attained. However, local conditions, many of which are not subject to U.S. influence, determine choice of methods. Among these factors are—

a. Effects of hostile military occupation.

b. Political, legal, and social heritage.


d. Current development status of the economy.

e. War damage.

CMO staff sections of headquarters of U.S. Army units committed to such a program, and commanders of units must take all of these background influences into account in making their CMO estimates of the situation. While there is usually no hostile force involved, the other factors which should be considered for estimates and plans are all equally applicable to this mission.

Section III. OPERATIONS

11-6. Civil Affairs Aspects of the Operation

For the U.S. Army, a commitment to this type operation is a commitment to what is primarily a civil affairs mission. The priority civil affairs activity normally is the support of the functions of government. Other major civil affairs activities which may be involved in support of the priority activity will usually include—

a. Participation in populace and resources control.
authority effectively throughout the national territory, little will have been gained in the long run. All other activities are pointed toward support of this major activity. The U.S. effort should include coordination with host country agencies at all levels in the planning and execution of all parts of the program, and demonstration to the people of the respect in which that government is held by the representatives of the United States.

b. Actual assistance in public administration may be desired, particularly in developing nations or in nations which have been so badly damaged that they must reconstitute an administration utilizing relatively untrained or inexperienced personnel. The problem probably will be acute at intermediate and local levels. In this situation CA Public Administration and all the other functional teams can be used to provide operational support and formal or on-the-job training for host country personnel. These teams may actually perform governmental functions on a temporary basis in the immediate postconflict period.

c. Examples of such assistance by functional teams could include—

1. Public Finance Team—Drafting of local budgetary procedures and assistance in drafting a basic budget.

2. Public Welfare Team—Assistance in the creation or reconstitution of institutions such as orphanages and old people's homes.

3. Public Education Team—Demonstration of teaching techniques at all school levels and introduction of audiovisual means for adult education programs for illiterates.

11–8. Other CA Activities

a. In war ravaged countries, and in many developing nations, people have become accustomed to the use (or misuse) of resources without regard for the common welfare. In any event, such nations are apt to experience a prolonged period of severe shortages of items necessary for the proper creation or reconstitution of an economy. Shortages may make laborers unwilling to work, or unwilling to do the kinds of tasks which are required. These conditions, and others which might include a flourishing black market, may necessitate a populace and resources control program. While the nation may not at the time be faced with an insurgency, the allocation and control problems will be very similar to those of a nation engaged in internal defense operations. Techniques as described in chapter 7, may be used to remedy the situation. U.S. CA personnel, and other military personnel acting under CA guidance and supervision, may be used to plan, advise, train, and assist in a populace and resources control program. They are most likely to be required in the detailed planning phase; and here the Public Safety, Legal, and all of the Economics functional teams will have a part to play. Preferably U.S. military personnel should not be used in the actual enforcement processes as this would give the operation the appearance of a foreign occupation and might well do more harm than good. Accordingly, a decision to use U.S. units for such purpose should be made only by the senior U.S. commander in the country.

b. All of the environmental improvement measures which a host country may undertake (chap 6) and the military civic action outlined for U.S. and host country forces (chap 7 and 8) will be applicable in the postcombat situation. A major contribution of U.S. forces should be the stimulation, training, and equipping of host country military and paramilitary forces to undertake military civic action projects. These projects should fit the overall program and complement the work of other agencies. U.S. units should normally also participate in military civic action projects directly, but should present them as having been planned and accomplished under the aegis of the appropriate host country governmental agency.

c. U.S. units will place emphasis upon their community relations and train and advise host country military forces to do likewise. U.S. Army community relations activities, if they are to succeed in their purpose, should be clearly labeled as activities of U.S. military forces. It is essential to note the difference between military civic action projects and community relations projects. Military civic action is intended to help the host country in its nationbuilding program, while community relations are matters directly between the U.S. forces and the general populace.

d. Military support of civil defense may play a smaller but important part in the overall effort even if there is no threat of further armed conflict. The same or similar organizational techniques and programs are useful to prepare for and to meet natural disaster situations which may arise. The host country military forces should be encouraged to assist the civilian populace in organizing and preparing for disaster situations and for providing prompt relief, rescue, and rehabilitation work if disaster should strike. Here, too, U.S. forces should participate and may do so in
the name of the United States as well as providing support to host country efforts.

e. Consolidation psychological operations are essential to build or restore a sense of nationhood and responsible citizenship, particularly where the populace is war weary. Psychological operations are a vital instrument in explaining the need for programs which may be unpopular, such as populace and resources control, and for the hard work and sacrifices required from the people to improve the environment. These operations should not gloss over difficulties and errors, but present the problems and the solutions proposed and instituted by local government in the most favorable light possible, consistent with the facts of the case. CA civil information personnel should provide overall policy direction and train and assist host country governmental agencies and information media in the accomplishment of this program. As in internal defense, no other civil affairs major activity can be performed with optimum results without appropriate and effective civil information and psychological operations support.

11-9. Transition to Civil Authority

The object of these operations is to provide for termination of military responsibility and transfer of all functions to host country civil authority, or to civilian agencies of the U.S. Government, or international bodies. This may involve a fairly short period or these operations may extend for years. In any event, planning for termination of U.S. Army operations and for smooth turnover of functions to civilian agencies should be an integral part of every phase of the operation. Turnover should be expedited and eased if those who are to assume responsibility can be encouraged to come in while U.S. Army personnel are still on the job, observe the operation, and gradually assume the mission. This will provide maximum continuity and minimum disruption for the people who are affected by the particular operation.
CHAPTER 12
MILITARY GOVERNMENT
(STANAG's 2055, 2056, 2057, 2058, and 2065)

Section I. INTRODUCTION

12-1. The Nature of Military Government

a. Military government is the form of administration by which an occupying power exercises executive, legislative, and judicial authority over occupied territory. It is established and maintained for governing—

(1) Occupied enemy territory.
(2) Allied or other territory recovered from an enemy (including neutral territory and areas unlawfully incorporated by the enemy into its own territory) unless or until these territories are the subject of a civil affairs agreement, or the rightful authority is able to assume power.

b. The authority of the occupant is supreme over the occupied territory and population. Within limits of international law, the occupant may exercise the functions of government itself and exclude the local authorities. The intensity and extent of controls will vary with circumstances and policy. Performance of some governmental functions by authorities of the previous government is not inconsistent with a military occupation, so long as the power and purpose to exercise supreme authority in the territory are maintained by the occupant. In other words, the conclusion of an agreement between the occupant and the indigenous government concerning the authority to be exercised by each does not necessarily bring military government of the area to an end.

c. Military government depends on skills and training not customarily expected to be part of the attributes of military officers. The problems involved are not the same kind of military problems encountered in the strategy of a campaign or in the tactics of a battle. Nevertheless, it is quite clearly a military responsibility in the sense that once a commander has occupied territory he must assume the obligation for the government of the civil population. In at least the first phase of his occupation, he will carry out his obligations with soldiers. But their duties will not be those of battle; they will be administrative in nature and political and economic in character. Only the authority will be military.

d. This does not mean that military government is exercised without legal responsibility. A commander acting as a military governor, or his deputy delegated to act as governor is granted sweeping powers but at the same time is closely bound both by international law and the law of his own country. This requires him to have at his disposal expert legal counsel and advice.

12-2. Basic Principles

There are many basic principles which are applicable to the establishment of military government. Important principles include:

a. International law requires the occupant, so far as he is able, to maintain an orderly government in the occupied territory.

b. No nation may expect to gain a lasting victory from modern warfare without taking into account the future activities and orientation of the enemy civil government and population.

c. An organization must be planned; it cannot be improvised.

d. To be effective, military government must act as both the instrument and, if adequate guidance has not been provided, the creator of foreign policy.

e. Military government is not a permanent regime, and from the outset plans must be made for the transfer of power to civil authority.

12-3. Rationale for the Creation of a Military Government

Since land forces have the unique capability of
providing control of the enemy’s land areas and the population therein, and enforcing surrender terms after victory has been assured, the implementation of the military government portions of the national plan for occupied territory is normally a mission of the land forces. U.S. military policies historically have assigned military government responsibilities to the Army. The Army, in effect, is required to replace civil authority in territory it has conquered or occupied, with military rule until civil authority is either restored by treaty or inaugurated with U.S. consent or can otherwise legitimately assume power.

12-4. Responsibility and Authority of the Military Governor

The military governor is the military commander or other designated person who, in an occupied territory, exercises supreme authority over the civil population subject to the laws and usages of war and to any directive received from his government or from his superior.

12-5. Occupied Territory

Occupied territory is territory under the authority and effective control of an armed force. Territory is considered occupied by the United States when U.S. forces have taken firm possession of such territory for the purpose of holding it. The number of troops necessary to maintain the authority of the occupant will depend on the density of the population, its degree of subservience to the occupant, the nature of the terrain, and similar considerations. It is not necessary that troops be physically present in all quarters of the occupied territory; it is sufficient that the occupying forces can, within a reasonable time, send detachments of troops to make the occupant’s authority felt within any district. A mere proclamation that certain areas are occupied (so-called “paper-occupation”) is not sufficient to establish occupation, however, the fact that occupation is in effect must be proclaimed. Similarly, the occupant may need to assume only a minimum of government functions if the local government is effective and not hostile to the occupant.

12-6. Limitations Imposed by International Law and Agreement

a. General Principles. The general principles of customary international law and applicable international agreements will be faithfully observed in the conduct of military government (FM 27-10). The most important treaty provisions on the conduct of belligerent occupation are to be found in Annex 2, The Hague Convention No. IV, embodying regulations, respecting the Law and Customs of War on Land of 1907 (HR), and the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 1949 (GC). It is particularly important that CA personnel have a thorough understanding of this latter agreement since it is one of the primary legal sources governing the conduct of relations with the populations of belligerent and occupied territories.

b. Respect for Existing Law. The occupant must respect the existing law “unless absolutely prevented” from doing so (Art. 43, HR). Penal laws may be repealed or suspended only in cases where they constitute a threat to the occupant’s security or an obstacle to the application of the GC (Art. 64); e.g., those penal laws which are in conflict with the humanitarian principles of the convention. The extent to which laws are to be suspended or abrogated by the United States in occupied territory is a matter to be determined at congressional, presidential, or secretarial level and will be prescribed in directives to the U.S. commander. Detailed doctrine on the limitations imposed by international law on the administration of punitive justice in occupied territory is contained in paragraphs 12-25 through 12-27.

c. Treatment of Population.

(1) Under the GC, fair, just, and reasonable treatment of inhabitants of occupied areas is required. It is an essential basis of military policy, if political-military-economic objectives are to be achieved and the occupation is to be successful, that the inhabitants do not become either future enemies or permanent liabilities. Further, just treatment encourages the support and cooperation of the inhabitants and thereby reduces the effort of the occupant. This policy does not prohibit necessary punitive and disciplinary measures essential to good order but does not forbid recourse to capricious or unnecessarily harsh treatment.

(2) The term “protected persons” may be generally defined as nationals of a Party to the Geneva Civilian Convention of 1949 who, at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves in the hands of a party to a conflict or occupying power of which they are not nationals (Art. 4, GC). Other protected persons are found in Art. 3, GC. No protected person may be punished for an offense he or she has not personally committed. Collective penalties and all measures of intimidation or terrorism are prohibited. Pi-
lage is prohibited. Reprisals against protected persons and their property are prohibited (Art. 33). The taking of hostages is prohibited (Art. 34).

(3) The importance of the recognition of human rights such as respect for personal and property rights, the sanctity of marriage, the inviolability of the home, and freedom of religious worship cannot be overemphasized.

d. Protection of Cultural Property.

(1) Cultural property is defined as any property of great importance to the cultural heritage of a people, such as monuments of architecture, art or history; archaeological sites; buildings which are of historical or artistic interest; works of art, manuscripts, books, and other objects of artistic, historical or archaeological interest; scientific collections and important collections of books or archives; or reproductions of the property defined above. Buildings used for cultural or religious purposes are included in the definition of cultural property.

(2) Armed forces are bound to refrain from any use of cultural property and its immediate surroundings for purposes which are likely to expose it to destruction or damage, and to refrain from any act of hostility directed against such property. These obligations may be waived only in cases where military necessity imperatively requires such a waiver. Armed forces must also undertake to prohibit, prevent, and if necessary, put a stop to any form of theft, pillage, or misappropriation of, and any acts of vandalism directed against cultural property and religious edifices (FM 27-10).

e. Publication of Regulations. Article 65 of the GC provides—

The penal provisions enacted by the Occupying Power shall not come into force before they have been published and brought to the knowledge of the inhabitants in their own language. The effect of these penal provisions shall not be retroactive.

Accordingly, proclamations, ordinances, orders, and instructions intended to be binding upon the inhabitants will be published in written form, both in English and in the language(s) of the inhabitants and dated. All such regulations addressed to the inhabitants are given the widest feasible publicity within their area of application.

PLANNING

12-7. Planning Factors

a. The status of the nation to be governed is one of the factors that has to be taken into consideration. Is it a highly sophisticated, industrialized, and modern complex? Is it primarily an agricultural society? Is it an underdeveloped area? Different numbers of men with different kinds of skills will be called for depending on the answers to such questions.

b. The size of the population to be governed is another factor.

c. The objectives of an occupying power with regard to the state of the local economy have a bearing. Is the economy to be maintained or is it to be placed on a higher level?

d. Fewer occupation personnel are required if the people of the area are given the responsibility for local government with the occupying power maintaining directive and controlling jurisdiction to insure that the authority of the occupation is complied with.

12-8. Armistice Planning

Hostilities are often terminated by the conclusion of an armistice. Although armistice agreements normally are signed by military officers, their political importance is such that the Department of State and other nonmilitary departments of the U.S. Government have a significant interest in their terms and should be coordinated with them. When an occupation is to follow an armistice, the agreement will contain provisions as to the powers of the occupant and the obligations of the government submitting. It is important that these provisions be chosen with foresight and drafted with skill, and that consideration be given to economic and political matters as well as those which are of a strictly military character. Inadvertence may result in hindering the occupation authorities; ambiguity may embarrass them; needless severity may produce a reaction against the government that dictated the terms.

12-9. Planning Procedures

a. Since detailed prior planning is essential at all echelons of command within the area of operations, the area or senior U.S. commander must provide an overall civil affairs plan for the guidance of his subordinate commanders in order to prescribe the objectives of civil affairs operations and insure continuity of policies and uniformity of their application.
b. The military force serves primarily as an instrument of national policy in the attainment of political objectives. Accordingly, the area or senior U.S. commander insures that primary attention is given in the preparation of his plan to the political-military-economic objectives received from the appropriate Department of Defense authority and to limitations which may be imposed by the rules of customary international law, or terms of treaties or agreements. Consideration is given to the mission of the command; policy guidance received from higher authority on political, economic, and sociological matters; and the degree of control or influence to be exerted over local agencies of government. A detailed prior study must be made of area intelligence to include geographical and economic features; the density and composition of the population; forms and levels of government; and attitudes, customs and traditions of the people. Information on sources of area intelligence is contained in chapter 4.

c. The overall area civil affairs plan prescribes the objectives of operations, specifies the depth and extent of the area to be covered by projected operations, provides information on the anticipated phasing of the operation, furnishes guidance on the delegation of civil affairs authority to the commanders of major tactical and administrative commands, establishes the CA organization and requirements for units, and includes direction on the deployment of command and area support units. The overall plan furnishes general instructions on the conduct of relationships with national or local civilian authorities and the degree of control, influence, or supervision to be utilized. Policies are set forth pertaining to the conduct of the various CA functional specialties and the levels of government at which they will be conducted. Guidance is also included on the extent of procurement of local supplies, equipment, real estate and services for military use; the furnishing of civilian relief; economic and military aid from U.S. resources; offshore procurement; and on other matters essential to the conduct of civil affairs operations. When projected operations are to extend into the territory of two or more nations, variations of objectives and policies with respect to each nation necessitate clear differentiation in plans. Planning for the deployment of units should stress simplicity and flexibility so that unforeseen requirements can be met readily with minimum disruption of the planned organization.

12–10. Planning for the Transfer of Authority

a. Military government authority should be transferred to a U.S. or allied civilian authority when the political situation allows. This may occur shortly, or many years, after the termination of hostilities. Planning for this transfer should begin when national policy has been determined and communicated to the command and should be continuous. Normally some considerable period of advance warning will be given prior to the date of actual transfer, but this may not provide sufficient time for planning for the turnover to civil authority.

b. Preferably, the civilian officials who are to take over from the military government should come in well in advance of the takeover date and gradually be integrated into the control structure to provide for continuity of policy and effectiveness of operations.

c. This planning should be accomplished jointly, at least in the latter phases, by the military governor's staff and the incoming civilian agency.

12–11. Chain of Command

A civil affairs chain of command is used in areas where subordinate tactical and administrative commanders are not authorized to conduct military government operations. In such a situation the senior U.S. commander controls operations through a unit, or staff section, which supervises and directs the activities of the CA units within its area of concern. It is normally desirable that military government operations be centralized in the CA organization when the military situation is no longer critical, and prior to the transfer of the operation to a civil agency of government. The factor determining the type of command channel employed is the tactical or occupational nature of the military mission. The CA chain of command provides the desirable uniformity and continuity of operations not always possible when military government is directed by a number of subordinate tactical or administrative commanders. Close command and staff liaison between the commanders of CA units and commanders of tactical or administrative units should be maintained when the CA chain of command is employed in order to produce coordinated action. The employment of the CA chain of command does not deprive tactical and administrative commanders of their organic CMO staff sections, it does not relieve them of obligations imposed by treaties, agreements or customary international law to
insure that humanitarian or other principles are observed by their troops.

12-12. Allied Military Government Organization

a. If the U.S. forces which are operating in conjunction with troops of other countries occupy enemy territory, the military government of the area concerned may become an international responsibility. In an international command, military government planning and supervision may be carried out through an integrated military government staff. Integration of personnel may be accomplished at all command levels but should not extend to the command of CA units of one nation by officers of another.

b. Directives covering broad aims and policies for the initiation or conduct of military government operations by a combined or allied command are promulgated by a higher national, allied, or international authority. At the headquarters of a combined or allied command, an advisory or consultative body may be established for the purpose of furnishing policy guidance and effecting coordination with the governments concerned. The composition of this body is not limited to representatives of allied nations responsible for the conduct of the operations; it may include representatives of other nations not participating in, but concerned with, the operations.

c. The division of occupied territory into zones to be administered by separate states is to be avoided. Disparity in policy and practice is inevitable in zonal administrations. The resulting lack of uniformity will be severely damaging to the success of the occupation. Zonal boundaries tend to harden into international boundaries, and establishment of zones may eventually lead to the dismemberment of an occupied country. Occupied countries thus divided into zones eventually may become international sore sports.

Section III. CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS

12-13. General

a. Military government operations are circumscribed by both legal and policy considerations. They are directed towards the control of the government, the economy, and the populace of the area. For that control to be ultimately effective it must be based upon standards of conduct which impress upon the populace the fairness and justice of the occupant.

b. The occupying force cannot expect the populace to act in the desired manner unless that populace is properly informed. The populace is officially informed of the lawful orders of the occupying force by the publication of regulatory matter. Mere compliance with the legal requirements for the dissemination of this regulatory matter is insufficient in most cases; and it is a function of CA civil information activities, assisted by consolidation psychological operations, to actually spread the orders and directives effectively to the people. (See FM 33–1 and FM 33–5 for doctrine and techniques pertaining to psychological operations.)

c. Military government operations call for the utilization of all the varied skills available in CA units, since those operations cover the gamut of the activities of a society. The organization, capabilities, and functions of CA units and the functional teams available in the CA organizational structure are described in chapter 2.

d. Controls are established at those levels of government where the conduct of governmental activities can be directed or supervised with the greatest efficiency, uniformity, and consistency with established policies. Certain functional specialties, such as public communications and public finance, normally are most effectively controlled or supervised at a high level of government; but other functional specialties, such as public health and public welfare, are best controlled or supervised at each level of government. In any case, the military government organization should parallel the structure of indigenous government at each control level.

e. Military government operations require resourcefulness and adaptability in coping with the variety of situations that may be encountered. Efficiency of operations depends upon the establishment and maintenance of consistent policies. Consistency is attained, however, not by rigid patterns of operations, but by rigorous analysis followed by discriminating response to the essential elements of each situation.

f. The commander of the area of operations or senior U.S. commander insures that subordinate commanders can implement the military govern-
ment portions of the operations plan by insuring that qualified personnel are provided for the CMO staffs of subordinate commands, providing CA command and area support units for deployment at the required time and place in accordance with the overall area of operations plan, and insuring the timely issuance of the area of operations plan.

g. Although the claims service is a responsibility of the SJA, civil affairs personnel should make every effort to assist the SJA to see that lawful claims against the United States are promptly settled and that false claims are denied. With claims, as with requisitions, failure to pay the inhabitants promptly may cause hardship and leave a resentful feeling which works against U.S. interest.

h. In order to safeguard the health of the U.S. forces stationed in the country and to minimize the amount and cost of required relief measures, military government public health activities will receive a high order of priority.

i. Archives and records, both current and historical, of all branches of government of the area are of immediate and continuing interest to the local government and to the military. It is essential to locate and protect them.

12-14. Civil Affairs Enactments

a. Published regulatory matter such as proclamations, ordinances, laws, instructions and the like, which are intended to be binding upon the populace, are known collectively as civil affairs enactments.

b. Unless otherwise stated, civil affairs enactments issued prior to occupation are effective and binding within the occupied territory upon occupation. However, penal provisions of such legislation shall not be retroactive and shall not come into force before they have been published and brought to the knowledge of the inhabitants in their own language. It may often prove difficult to reach a satisfactorily clear and idiomatic translation. The matter is important, however, and great pains should be taken to provide such a translation. The inhabitants cannot be expected to comply unless they understand, and it is the translation, not the original English, that informs them. However, in areas of U.S. responsibility, the English version prevails in the event of disagreement in meaning. English is the authentic version for both penal and civil type enactments.

c. Provisions concerning proclamations and ordinances have been standardized by agreement between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada under the Standardization Program (SOLOG), and identical provisions are included in a Standardization Agreement among NATO, SEATO, and CENTO Armed Forces (STANAG). For such provisions, see STANAG 2056 (app H).

d. Subordinate commanders report to the higher commander the issuance of any enactments within their respective areas of authority to include the date, place of issuance, and area of application. Higher commanders may require the submission of copies of all regulations published by subordinate commanders.

12-15. Proclamations

a. In advance of an actual occupation, the theater commander prepares documents necessary to conduct civil affairs operations in conformance with the policies of higher authority. In preparing his initial proclamation, he considers such factors as U.S. national objectives, requirements of international law, and measures required for the security of his forces. The initial proclamation should be stated in brief, simple terms; and it should contain initial instructions to the population of an occupied territory. The points outlined in (1) through (6) below, which apply primarily to civil affairs administration of occupied territory, are appropriately modified by the terms of a civil affairs or other agreement to show relationships in liberated territory between the military and local civil authorities when civil affairs activities are to be conducted pursuant to such agreement.

(1) Declaration of the fact of occupation. The declaration is a formal notice of the fact of occupation. In the declaration, the extent of area and the people covered by the occupation are defined.

(2) Purpose and policy of the occupation. A general statement of the purpose and policy of the occupying force as designated by higher authority is included in the proclamation.

(3) Supremacy of the military commander of the occupying force. A declaration of the supremacy of the military commander is essential if the fact of military control is to be made known to the inhabitants and compliance with military directives assured. Announcement is made of the commander’s authority and of the suspension of local political ties with, and obligations to, the enemy national government. In addition, the inhabitants are informed that they will be required to obey the orders of the military commander and his subordinates and to abstain from all acts or
words of hostility or disrespect to the occupying force.

(4) Obligations, duties, and rights of the inhabitants. Confirmation is given that, unless the military authority directs otherwise, local laws and customs will continue in force, local officials will continue in office, and officials and employees of all transportation and communications systems and of public utilities and other essential services will carry on with their regular tasks. Assurance is also given that persons who obey the instructions of the military commander will be protected in their persons, property, religion, and domestic rights and will be allowed to carry on their usual occupations.

(5) Statement of additional proclamations and ordinances. Advance notice is given of subsequent proclamations and accompanying ordinances which will specify in detail what will be required of the inhabitants.

(6) Miscellaneous matters. The proclamation includes the place and date of signing, the signature and title of the issuing authority, and such other matters as the commander considers appropriate.

b. The tone and character of the proclamation may be affected by the—

(1) Political-military objectives to be attained.

(2) The degree of the precariousness of the occupation.

(3) Requirements to be place on governmental agencies and civil population.

(4) Traditions, customs, and desires of the local population.

(5) Treaties, agreements, or the rules of customary international law affecting the occupation.

c. Subsequent proclamations, numbered in sequence, and supplemented by ordinances, are prepared as necessary to set forth detailed rules governing the conduct of the population.

12–16. Ordinances

a. An ordinance is an enactment issued under the authority of the commander of the area of operations or military governor promulgating detailed rules of law or procedures for the administration of his area of responsibility as a whole. Necessary ordinances will be prepared in advance of the operation. Among other matters, ordinances should deal with offenses against the occupant or liberator, establishment of courts, current and exchange regulations, rationing, and price control.

b. The format of ordinances should be standardized to the following extent: (See app G for sample ordinance.)

(1) Ordinances should be numbered in sequence.

(2) They should consist of a series of main subdivisions called articles.

(3) They should contain definitions of any terms used in them which are ambiguous or unfamiliar to the persons to whom they are addressed.

(4) The final article in each ordinance should specify the effective date of the ordinance.

(5) Ordinances should be signed by the military governor or by some authorized subordinate.

12–17. Notices and Directives

a. Notices (orders and instructions) differ from other legal documents such as proclamations and ordinances. They are local in scope and are issued to control or direct the civil population and governmental authorities. The purpose of notices is to prevent civilian interference with military operations or to provide detailed information as to the method of complying with the provisions of previously issued documents. Examples of subject matter contained in notices are—hours of curfew; travel restrictions; and limitations on the operations of agencies of government. Authority to issue notices should be delegated to those subordinate commanders having area authority.

b. Directives are issued to specified persons such as civil officials and are distinguished from those notices, orders, and instructions which are published for the information and compliance of the general public. Directives may be issued under the authority of the theater commander, and this authority should also be delegated to those subordinate commanders having civil affairs area responsibilities.

12–18. Gazettes

a. It may be desirable to establish an official gazette for publication of enactments binding upon the inhabitants, as well as for other purposes.

b. Instructions pertaining to the operations or internal administration of civil affairs units are transmitted through command channels and are not published in a gazette.
12-19. Techniques of Control

a. Administrative controls over a population may be coercive, in the case of measures which can be enforced, or noncoercive, with respect to measures which offer incentives. Whenever and wherever possible, noncoercive controls are employed. The strongest measure available may be withholding some desired assistance. Measures intended to cause every member of the population to cooperate should not involve the use of force. The people as individuals must be induced to recognize their interest in the common good. They may be offered an otherwise unobtainable incentive, or it may be made more convenient for them to cooperate. The best medium for exercise of control over the masses is through public officials and leaders. This lends emphasis to the importance of selecting and supporting civilian administrative machinery whose members not only are capable and cooperative but who possess prestige and popularity with the remainder of the population.

b. Among noncoercive administrative measures which may be adopted to secure goodwill and acceptance of an announced policy or desired course of action are—

(1) Declaration of policy. A declaration of policy is an overall statement of U.S. objectives, aims, and policies with respect to the area in which operations are conducted. Although a statement of policy is one of the least severe of noncoercive administrative devices, it may be accompanied by announcement of penalties for failure to comply.

(2) Establishment of standards. Published standards guides may provide an effective means for spotchecking and improving local procedures. Standards guides may be of particular value in the conduct of such functional specialties as public health, public transportations, public utilities, and public communications.

(3) Setting of examples. Elements of the U.S. military force should stress correct conduct of troops in public places and among the local inhabitants. CA personnel should strive to be prompt in making replies to inquiries, punctual in keeping appointments, and accessible to local officials. Emphasis should be given to the promotion of respect for local laws, customs, and traditions. Another means of setting an example is through demonstration; that is, by exhibition of a preferred method or device. The expectation is that the superiority of the demonstrated method or device will encourage voluntary acceptance. Demonstrations may be particularly suited to such matters as child care and public health and sanitation through the use of mobile clinics, soil testing, deinfestation of grain, care of poultry, and operations of communications equipment. Agencies of civil government are encouraged to make maximum use of improved techniques.

(4) Educational campaigns. Educational campaigns are useful to familiarize the inhabitants with an idea, action, or policy in order to secure cooperation, increase the scope of local interest, and raise standards. Educational campaigns may be prepared by the various CA functional specialists in coordination with the civil information officer to furnish information on such matters as sanitation, food and agriculture, and the source and amounts of imported civilian supplies. Within the various functional specialties such as public health, public works and utilities, public communications, and public transportation, technical periodicals and other publications may be prepared and furnished to the respective local agencies of government.

(5) Conferences. Conferences with local officials constitute the most frequently used method of clarifying and interpreting laws, policies, or procedures which are of mutual interest. Discussions in conferences not only serve to shown an interest on the part of CA personnel in local activities or projects but also provide a most effective method of obtaining the acceptance of advice. When questions arise on especially complex problems, effective action may be obtained by discussing the subject in gradual stages until a time is reached at which the entire matter can be summarized. It may be desirable to conduct daily informal conferences with the chiefs of the various agencies of government.

(6) Conciliation and mediation. In both conciliation and mediation, a third party helps to resolve a dispute between two other parties. Conciliation and mediation may be advantageous to reconcile divergent groups of leaders in following a common policy since the voluntary nature of such agreement tends to provide more active support of the agreed decision.

(7) Submission of reports and review of records. The submission of reports and review of records provide a valuable method of obtaining information, controlling operations, observing efficiency, verifying conditions, and checking the accuracy of actions taken. Since this method extends the effectiveness of CA personnel beyond that of most other control processes, it should be used to the maximum practicable extent.

(8) Compliance through publicity. Compli-
ance through publicity may be used to obtain a desired result through the use of favorable or adverse publicity or comment with respect to a specific activity or selected civilians. There is no resort to legal means of compulsion. Since people as a whole usually respond to publicity concerning themselves, publicity may in appropriate circumstances be used to influence the entire population.

(9) Miscellaneous. There are other noncoercive measures which may be used. Among these are subsidies and the granting of other tangible and intangible benefits. The payment of a subsidy which grants a material or financial reward for following a desired policy or plan, or other payments by the United States, such as those for local procurement of supplies and services, are examples of this type of measure.

c. Coercive controls apply restraint in requiring the inhabitants of the area to follow an announced policy. In the case of certain violations, administrative penalties may be applied, while in others the violator may be referred for appropriate judicial action. Among coercive controls which may be considered are—

(1) Licensing. A license is a permit or privilege to engage in some activity otherwise prohibited, but the purpose is regulation or revenue, not prohibition. Licensing must be preceded by a law or directive making it illegal for a person or organization to engage in a specified activity without a license. The advantages of licensing as a control device are—the burden of proof placed upon the licensee; the self-discipline generally resulting from the fear of loss of special privilege; and the considerable assistance to law enforcement in difficult technical areas of administration. The effectiveness of a licensing system depends on inspections to insure compliance, and this might require a large staff.

(2) Investigation. An investigation is the act of searching for facts and often concerns an alleged error, deficiency, or incident of misconduct. The person or agency being investigated may be required to justify the conditions which have been uncovered or to show cause for the deficiencies observed.

(3) Inspection. Inspection may be used for the physical surveillance of the operations of civil government or the performance of activities involved in the production or transportation of products. It may be employed to disclose instances of active sabotage or to uncover violations of directives. A few competent inspectors may extend their influence over a large part of the population.

When an inspector is technically qualified, he may also furnish valuable instruction to the persons whose activities are inspected. If continuous operation is essential, as in the case of such vital activities as the production of food, practice of medicine, operation of water systems, communication lines, and transportation systems, inspections provide a particularly valuable method of control. Inspection permits the continued operation of important activities, enables small numbers of competent personnel to be widely effective, promotes constructive policy, and provides a strong disciplinary influence.

(4) Apprehension of violators. Apprehension of violators includes actions taken in searching for, finding, and detaining persons who violate enactments. The successful conduct of military government operations necessitates that violations be detected and violators identified and punished. Since compliance with the intent of directives may be obtained from most local civilians, the latter may develop a vested interest in the enforcement of such directives. As a result, when others violate directives, those who comply often furnish information on which the apprehension of violators may be based.

(5) Taxation. Taxation is the raising of revenues by the requirement of compulsory payments. Taxation may be used as a charge for a specific act and, under appropriate conditions, as a means of control of the local economy. Taxation has the same weakness as other methods of control, i.e., to be effective each violation must be identified and proved. In addition, the incentive is to violate rather than comply with the law.

12-20. Enforcement

a. In the initial stages of an occupation, the enforcement of enactments is accomplished, under the staff supervision of the responsible commander's G5 staff sections, and by civil affairs units assisted by civilian police. When civil police and other civil agencies lack sufficient enforcement capabilities, military police or other military units may be required, although, if possible, troop enforcement is limited to such matters as emergency measures, crimes against the military, and traffic control.

b. Civilian violators of regulations are brought for prosecution before military government courts or, if authorized by the theater commander, before the civil courts of the occupied territory. Military government courts with jurisdiction over the local population normally are not established.
in friendly territory except when authorized by the terms of agreements or other consensual arrangement.


a. During an occupation the occupant may, under international law, establish military government courts. These courts are established primarily for the purpose of providing an authority in which violations of the occupant's legislation may be adjudicated. When the established local courts of the occupied area are unable to function, or when such action becomes necessary to insure the effective administration of justice, military government courts may administer the ordinary criminal or civil law of the occupied area. This jurisdiction should be returned to the local courts of the occupied area in accordance with policy directives.

b. The commander normally delegates authority to appoint military government courts to those subordinate commanders having area responsibility for the conduct of military government. For reasons of practicality this authorization normally does not go below the level of division commanders in tactical organizations and comparable units. Authorization extended to civil affairs commands depends not on size or level of the units but on their missions.

12-22. Types of Courts

a. Criteria as to composition and jurisdictional limitations of military government courts are set forth by the theater commander. Usually there are three categories of courts, superior courts, commissions, and boards, patterned as to size, qualifications of members, jurisdiction, and limitations on maximum punishments somewhat like courts-martial. A superior court in the system should be designated to conduct legal proceedings involving protected persons, as defined in the GC, when the death sentence or imprisonment in excess of 2 years is authorized for the offense charged (FM 27-10). Courts must adhere to every pertinent provision of the GC and should conduct their operations procedurally, so far as practicable, in a manner which will be understood by local populations.

b. Commissions may be appointed by an authorized commander to hear special cases not normally within the jurisdiction of established courts such as accusations of espionage against non-local civilians. Commissions try cases involving unusual circumstances or exceptional seriousness. Membership, procedures, and jurisdiction are prescribed by the appointing authority. Military commissions which constitute judicial bodies should not be confused with commissions created to administer specific projects or other operational programs.

c. Boards are established to process certain quasi-judicial issues. The appointing authority may specify procedural rules or instruct the board to set its own rules, but the appointing authority must define the board's jurisdiction. A board may consist of one officer but often numbers two or three. Boards pass on requisition demands; property control orders; labor issues; valuation of utilities, real property, and services; and like administrative matters.

12-23. Jurisdiction of Military Government Courts

a. As to Territory. Jurisdiction extends to the whole of the occupied territory. When only a portion of a political subdivision is occupied, jurisdiction is assumed over each part as occupation becomes an actual or constructive fact.

b. As to Persons. Jurisdiction extends to all persons in the occupied territory other than prisoners of war, members of the occupying forces, or members of armed forces of states allied with the occupant. Persons serving with, employed by, or accompanying the armed forces are sometimes made subject to the jurisdiction of such courts. Persons subject to United States military law (see UC of MJ, Art. 2) do not fall under the jurisdiction of local courts of an occupied area unless expressly made subject thereto by a directive of occupation authorities.

c. As to Offenses. Jurisdiction extends to violations of a proclamation, ordinance, or order issued by occupation authority, violations of the law of war (if other courts are not established for the adjudication of such cases), and violations of indigenous criminal or civil laws which continue in force after the area has been occupied.

12-24. Procedures

a. Care is taken in preparing the judicial organization, procedures, and rules of trial to make sure that every pertinent requirement of the GC has been met. The system must have rational simplicity. While this may sometimes entail radical departures from formal U.S. judicial practices and rules of evidence, the basic guide remains the United States Manual for Courts Martial. (See
All courts shall give consideration to provisions of the law of the country in which they sit, so far as those laws have not been suspended by United States or allied authority. In particular, they shall give effect to procedural safeguards and substantive rights, the recognition of which is compatible with international law and American standards of justice. In adjudging any sentence, particularly one including confinement, consideration should be given not only to the crime committed but also to the availability of facilities and officials necessary to the prompt execution of the sentence. Under no condition may one assume that American practices are common, or even comprehended, in other lands. For example, the common American practice of suspending execution of part or all of an imposed sentence would be considered in many parts of the world as a reprimand of the police, the prosecutor, or the court of original jurisdiction. In the disrupted circumstances inherent in military occupation, suspension of a sentence does not possess the probational and rehabilitational characteristics found in a settled society.

b. Care should be taken, in appointing military government courts, to select officers of sound judgment and judicial temperament. These courts should be manned by legally trained persons to the maximum extent possible. It is mandatory that officers appointed to military government courts have a good understanding of the policies and objectives of the occupation. Such an understanding tends to promote rational and consistent action. Considerable continuity in the membership of the courts is also advantageous, since it tends to result in like penalties for like offenses.

c. Harsh or erratic punishments generate resentment and undermine respect for the courts by the inhabitants. In establishing, for example, the extent of the fines that a military government court is to be empowered to impose, the effect that the fine in the foreign currency will have upon the inhabitants of the occupied territory, not the significance to an American of any suggested sum in dollars, should be given consideration.

d. Every essential of justice should be safeguarded. The accused should be assured a fair hearing; receive adequate notice of the charges in advance of trial; be given adequate opportunity to prepare his defense; enjoy the right to counsel; be enabled to present evidence necessary to his defense; call witnesses in his defense; cross-examine witnesses presented by the prosecution; and, unless he freely waives such assistance, be aided by an interpreter. Adequate provision should be made for review of administrative examination of cases by the military government legal staff. The right to petition for review shall be provided. (See MCM, 1969, Rev, and Art. 73 of the GC.)

12-25. Limitations in Penal Laws

The GC imposes important limitations on the administration of punitive justice in occupied territory. The Convention establishes the following guiding principles:

a. The penal laws of the occupied territory remain in force, except that they may be repealed or suspended by the occupying power where they constitute a threat to its security or an obstacle to the application of the Convention. Those laws relating to recruitment and bearing of arms, laws dealing with political processes, such as the rights of assembly and suffrage, and laws establishing racial discrimination may, for example, well be deprived of effect. The tribunals of the occupied territory normally continue to function in respect to offenses covered by those laws which are continued in effect (Art. 64).

b. The occupying power may promulgate penal provisions essential to maintain orderly government of the territory; to insure the security of the occupying power; or to enable the occupying power to fulfill its obligations under the Convention (Art. 64). Alleged violations are triable before properly constituted nonpolitical military courts sitting in the occupied country (Art. 66).

c. As to the penal provisions mentioned above, if an offense was solely intended to harm the occupying power, and did not constitute an attempt on life or limb of a member of the occupying forces or administration, nor a grave collective danger, nor seriously damage the property of the occupying forces or administration or the installations used by them, it shall be punished by internment or simple imprisonment, the duration of which is proportionate to the offense (Art. 68). It may not be punished by a deprivation of liberty more serious than simple imprisonment, such as imprisonment at hard labor or solitary confinement. The limitation in Article 68 does not preclude the imposition of other penalties, such as fines, in addition to simple imprisonment or internment, so long as the additional penalty is not a further deprivation of liberty, and so long as the total punishment is proportionate to the offense.

d. The penal provisions promulgated by the oc-
cupying power may provide for the imposition of the death penalty only in case of espionage, or of serious acts of sabotage against the military installations of the occupying power, or of intentional offenses that cause death (para 2, Art. 68). (Although this Article also provides that the named offenses must have been punishable by death under the law of the occupied territory at the time the occupation began, the United States, and certain other governments, have reserved the right to impose the death penalty without regard to this particular limitation.)

e. The Protecting Power, as provided in Article 9 of the GC, shall be notified of all proceedings involving the death penalty or possible imprisonment for 2 years or more. Not until 3 weeks after this notification reaches the Protecting Power may the trial begin (Art. 71).

12–26. Drafting of Penal Ordinances

In the drafting of penal ordinances, account must be taken of the following matters:

a. Care must be taken to insure that, in any enumeration of offenses punishable by death, the requirements of the second paragraph of Article 68 of the GC are met.

b. The requirements of notice and of 3 weeks delay in those cases in which the death penalty or imprisonment for 2 years or more is involved will present difficult problems, to which the following considerations are pertinent:

(1) From the point of view of the occupying power, violations of the occupant's directives vary greatly in their seriousness according to the circumstances of the case. Entering a forbidden area, for example, might constitute either a technical violation or, under other circumstances, a very serious offense meriting imprisonment for 2 years or more.

(2) It would be a serious impediment to the administration of justice, if, as to all violations of the occupant's legislation, notice and 3 weeks' delay were unavoidable. Many small cases, deserving some very moderate punishment, would be needlessly magnified and the value of prompt correction as a deterrent would be lost. Delay also increases the difficulty of producing witnesses.

c. For the foregoing reasons, it is desirable that the procedure of military government courts should be so contrived as to make possible an early separation between those cases which do or do not require notification to the Protecting Power. When a preliminary investigation of charges is made, this procedure may serve as an appropriate instrument for determining whether the individual should be tried for such an offense as might permit imprisonment of 2 years or more and would accordingly require notification to the Protecting Power.

12–27. Local Courts

a. Article 64 of the GC provides that tribunals of the occupied territory shall continue to function in respect of all offenses covered by the penal laws of the occupied territory, subject, however, to three exceptions—

(1) The consideration that any obstacle to the carrying out of the Convention should be removed.

(2) The necessity for insuring the effective administration of justice.

(3) Where they constitute a threat to the occupying power.

b. It is the duty of the occupant to insure the effective administration of justice. Normally, this is to be accomplished through the continued functioning of the local courts. If by reason of being corrupt or unfairly constituted, these courts do not insure justice, then the military governor should take appropriate measures to cause that end to be attained. He might remove certain judges and appoint others in their stead. He might allow the old judges to carry out only certain duties, e.g., to hand over records and do other things necessary to enable the administration of justice to go forward. He might even use courts of his own creation to administer the penal law. In short, the occupant is to see to it that the law is properly administered, by the existing judges if possible. He must, in any event, insure that there is a fair and effective administration of justice.

Section IV. RESTORATION OF GOVERNMENT

12–28. Political Objective

a. Normally it will be the ultimate objective of U.S. occupation to leave behind a government which will not be a threat to future peace and world stability. This may best be accomplished through the establishment of an efficient and popularly accepted government, stable economic and financial conditions, and respect for law and order.
b. After active combat has ceased, requirements of the military situation are greatly diminished and considerations of long-range policy become dominant. Plans for reformation or restoration of the institutions of the occupied country can now be put into full effect. It becomes possible to adopt a policy of greater liberality toward the inhabitants. Consistent with established policy for the occupation, a sound indigenous administration is developed and confirmed in the exercise of responsibility, always subject to the paramount authority of the occupier. An informed populace capable of self-government is fostered by means of newspapers representing various opinions, by permitting public discussion and the formation of acceptable political parties as rapidly as is practicable, and in due course by the holding of free elections. Measures will be shaped toward the transfer of authority to a local civil agency according to directive.

12–29. Treatment of Hostile Governments

a. No assumption can be made as to whether the national government of the enemy will come under the control of the occupant at the conclusion of active combat. A submission of the government might not have occurred; the enemy government might have yielded only a portion of its territory to the occupant; or, although the entire country is occupied, the enemy government itself might have withdrawn into exile. Each of these situations must be treated on its particular facts within the framework of overall U.S. objectives.

b. Where the national government of the enemy has come within the power of the occupant, the question arises as to how to treat the resulting situation. Broadly, three possibilities are conceivable as indicated in (1) through (3) below. Various courses may be revised within each of these broad possibilities; however, the choice to be followed is a matter for highest policy decision. Personnel coming into contact with this situation should avoid any unwarranted action or statement that might prejudice this freedom of choice. The training of personnel should prepare them to execute any course that may be adopted.

(1) Replacing the defeated government and building a new structure. This course should be adopted only as a last resort. It should be necessary only if the old regime has completely collapsed, or if it is so hostile or such a threat to the peace that it cannot be allowed to exist. This extreme treatment would necessitate a protracted occupation and a deep commitment by the occupying power. The obstacles to success are obvious and grave. In any case where so fundamental a reconstruction is contemplated, the military government personnel for this purpose require very special preparation.

(2) Proceeding with the defeated government. The government that has submitted may be accepted tentatively as the basis for further development, under the control of the occupying power. Individuals whose past gives no promise of useful service will be excluded from office. A program may be inaugurated looking toward the strengthening of the administration, the reform of political institutions, and the development of responsible self-government. It does not follow, from the fact that a submitted government may have become a cobelligerent, that the occupant is bound to give it unqualified support. This sort of acceptance does not necessarily imply approval or condonation. Its significance may be simply that in working toward ultimate objectives, the government already in being has been found to be the most convenient base from which to start.

(3) Installing new personnel within the existing framework of government. By this approach, the members of the defeated government would forthwith be turned out and a new group acceptable to the occupant would be installed in the offices of government. This course might be adopted in favor of the leaders of an underground movement or a committee of national liberation. A major concern, in considering such a course, must be the question of whether a group thus installed would command the support of the country and give the best promise of achieving permanently satisfactory conditions.

12–30. Retention or Removal of Government Personnel

a. Military government personnel should avoid acting as operating officials of the civil government, but should reply, to the maximum extent possible, on the services of personnel of the occupied territory. Persons thus employed should be reliable, qualified, and respected by the community and should be willing to comply with directives. They should be protected from hostile elements in the population.

b. Immediate convenience ordinarily points to the retention of administrative personnel. Presumably they will know their jobs and can carry on essential activities. It may be, however, that virtually every officeholder and employee in the existing government is either overtly hostile to the
occupying forces or is so intimately associated with an organization opposed to the occupation that his removal is indicated. It is recognized that the occupant may lawfully remove public officials from their posts. However, the occupant may not in any way apply sanctions to, or take any measures of, coercion or discrimination against them should they abstain from fulfilling their functions for reasons of conscience (Art. 54, GC). The policy regarding removal should be prescribed in a directive to the senior U.S. commander. Where officeholders are automatically retained, it ordinarily will be desirable to make clear to the community that this is only a provisional arrangement for immediate administrative convenience and implies no approval or condonation of such persons.

c. The occupying power may compel persons, including public officials, to perform work which is necessary either for the needs of the army of occupation, or for the populace, such as burying military and civilian dead, or feeding, sheltering, clothing, transporting, or caring for the health of the population of the occupied country. The limitations on such work prescribed in Article 51, GC, will be observed.

Section V. RESTORATION OF THE ECONOMY

12-31. Economic Policies

a. Both self-interest and concern for the welfare of the occupied country can be expected to lead the United States, as occupant, to adopt a comprehensive economic policy. The outlines of this policy normally will be set forth in the directive to the senior U.S. commander. Government departments in addition to the Department of Defense and the Department of State will have an important concern in these matters. For example, so far as such a highly technical matter as the control of currency is concerned, it is to be expected that the Treasury Department will share in framing the directive and will maintain a continuing interest in its execution. It should be remembered that fiscal and various other economic measures of an occupation have significant consequences in the home country of the occupying force.

b. The revival of the domestic economy of the occupied territory will, according to the limitations set out in the theater military government directive, be an objective of the occupation. The effort has several ends such as the well-being of the local population, the provision of supplies for the armed forces, and the reduction of the burden on U.S. and allied shipping. The directive to the senior U.S. commander should specify the level at which the local economy should be assisted, maintained, rehabilitated or restored. The restoration of a war shattered economy, even to the modest extent attainable during an occupation, runs into numerous elements, such as the repair of factories and the salvaging of equipment; the provision of credit; and the restoration of channels of distribution. Comparable measures must be taken to restore agricultural production.

c. The maintenance of a sound currency as the circumstances permit will be one of the tasks of the occupant. The occupying power may be able to count upon a national bank of issue to provide the requisite currency, or may find it necessary to provide a financial agency and to issue occupation currency. The occupant should insure the stability of any currency that it may issue and should take other measures to prevent inflation. A military government, like other governments, may be called upon to devise and administer policies for managing the currency, and must prepare plans to that end.

d. Taxes must be collected for the support of the government of the area concerned. In the conditions to be expected in the wake of combat, this task calls for resourcefulness. Military government personnel should be prepared to give direction to this effort. Military procurement activities in an occupied area must be closely coordinated with civil affairs activities. Procedures must be prescribed for the procurement of facilities, utilities, services, including direct hire labor, and supplies. International law imposes certain restrictions both on the type and quantity of property which may be requisitioned. For example, the occupant may not requisition foodstuffs, medical supplies, or other necessary articles for use by the occupation forces and administrative personnel without taking into account the requirements of the civilian population (Art. 55, GC). Requisitioning of supplies and facilities in occupied territory is governed by Article 51 and 52 of the HR and by Articles 55 and 57 of the GC.
APPENDIX A

REFERENCES

A-1. Army Regulations (AR)

15-3 Armed Forces Disciplinary Control Boards.
27-25 Claims Under Reciprocal International Agreements.
60-20 Operating Policies.
95-1 Army Aviation—General Provisions.
140-108 Civil Affairs Branch.
310-25 Dictionary of United States Army Terms.
350-20 Civil Affairs Training.
360-61 Community Relations.
500-50 Civil Disturbances.
500-60 Disaster Relief.
500-70 Civil Defense.
551-50 Training of Foreign Personnel by the United States Army.
600-21 Equal Opportunity and Treatment of Military Personnel.
600-50 Standards of Conduct for Department of the Army Personnel.
614-134 Military Assistance Officer Program (MAOP).
633-50 Prisoners of War; Administration, Employment, and Compensation.
633-51 Civilian Internees Administration, Employment, and Compensation.
638-40 Care and Disposition of Remains.
700-62 Chemical Protective Clothing Policy and Utilization of Certain Chemical Corps Units and Equipment in Combat Areas.

A-2. Field Manuals (FM)

3-10 Employment of Chemical and Biological Agents.
(S)3-10A Employment of Biological Agents. (U)
(C)3-10B Employment of Chemical Agents. (U)
3-12 Operational Aspects of Radiological Defense.
5-26 Employment of Atomic Demolition Munitions (ADM).
10-63 Handling of Deceased Personnel in Theaters of Operations.
14-3 Comptroller Support in Theaters of Operations.
19-15 Civil Disturbances and Disasters.
19-40 Enemy Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees.
20-10 Military Support of Civil Defense.
21-40 Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense.
21-41 Soldier's Handbook for Defense Against Chemical and Biological Operations and Nuclear Warfare.
21-48 Chemical, Biological and Radiological (CBR), and Nuclear Defense Training Exercises.
24-1 Tactical Communications Doctrine.
24-18 Field Radio Techniques.
27-10 The Law of Land Warfare.
30-Series
(M) 30-31 Stability Operations—Intelligence (U).
31-16 Counterguerrilla Operations.
31-21 Special Forces Operations—U.S. Army Doctrine.
(S) 31-21A Special Forces Operations—U.S. Army Doctrine. (U).
31-22 U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Forces.
33-5 Psychological Operations—Techniques and Procedures.
41-5 Joint Manual for Civil Affairs.
45-20 Civil Censorship.
100-5 Operations of Army Forces in the Field.
100-10 Combat Service Support.
100-15 Larger Units, Theater Army—Corps.
(C) 100-20 Field Service Regulations—Internal Defense and Internal Development (U).
101-5 Staff Officers’ Field Manual; Staff Organization and Procedure.
101-10-1 Staff Officers’ Field Manual; Organization, Technical, and Logistical Data, Unclassified Data.
101-31-1 Staff Officers’ Field Manual; Nuclear Weapons Employment Doctrine and Procedures.
(S) 101-31-2 Staff Officers’ Field Manual; Nuclear Weapons Employment Effects Data (U).
101-31-3 Staff Officers’ Field Manual; Nuclear Weapons Employment Effects Data.
101-40 Armed Forces Doctrine for Chemical and Biological Weapons Employment and Defense.

A-3. Joint Chief of Staff Publication (JCS)
Pub 2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).
(C) Pub 3 Joint Logistics and Personnel Policy and Guidance (U).

A-4. Department of the Army Pamphlets (DA Pam)
27-1 Treaties Governing Land Warfare.
27-11 Military Assistance to Civil Authorities.
27-153 Procurement Law.
27-161-2 International Law. Vol II.
39-3 The Effects of Nuclear Weapons.
310-1 Index to Administrative Publications.
550-Series Area Handbooks.
690-80 Administration of Foreign Labor During Hostilities.

A-5. Technical Manuals (TM)
3-210 Fallout Prediction.
3-220 Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Decontamination.
3-240 Field Behavior of Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Agents.
5-227 Design and Techniques for Military Civic Action.
10-277 Protective Clothing, Chemical Operations.

A-6. Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE)
3-500 Chemical Service Organization.
29-500 Composite Service Organization.
33-500 Psychological Operations Organization.
A-7. Miscellaneous

UCMJ—Uniform Code of Military Justice.
APPENDIX B

CA COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

1. The commander's decision is influenced by the political, economic, and sociological characteristics of the area of operations in addition to other considerations. A civil affairs estimate, accordingly, assists the commander in reaching a decision by evaluating for him political, economic, and sociological conditions and weighing the effects of these conditions on differing courses of action.

2. FM 101-5 contains detailed information on preparation of estimates of the situation and a form and example of a CMO staff estimate for use as guides. The form of CMO estimate in FM 101-5 is particularly suited for use by the G5 or S5 staff officer of a tactical or administrative command. The form contained in this appendix is designed primarily for the CA unit commander. In the analysis and comparison of appropriate CA actions, the various functional specialties are grouped in such a manner as best to facilitate their considerations.

3. The remainder of this appendix shows a sample form or format for an estimate of the situation suitable for use by the commander of a CA area headquarters, brigade, group, battalion, or company. This guide for preparation of an estimate is a modification of the basic form contained in FM 101-5; and presents a logical and orderly method for examination of the factors affecting the accomplishment of the mission to determine the most suitable course of action for the unit as a whole. The basic form for the commander's estimate is arranged to insure investigation of all pertinent factors. When time permits, a complete written estimate may be made. When time does not permit, as is usual in smaller units, the form may be used as a checklist to insure consideration of all factors essential for a decision.

4. Form for CA Unit Commander's Estimate of the Situation

(CLASSIFICATION)

Unit or Area
Place
Date and Time

COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

Map or chart references: (As necessary for understanding of the estimate.)

1. Mission

A concise statement of the task and its purpose. The overall politico-military mission is the controlling factor of the estimate. If the civil
affairs mission is multiple, determine priorities. If there are immediate
tasks, prescribed or deduced, necessary to the accomplishment of the
mission, such tasks should be listed in this paragraph. Guidance from
the G5 of the supported command or in the absence of such guidance
the analysis of the CA unit commander, will determine which of the
major civil affairs activities will have command priority of effort.

2. The Situation and Considerations

a. Determine and analyze those factors which will influence your
choice of a course of action as well as those which affect the capabilities
of the enemy to act adversely. Consider such of the following and other
factors as are involved:

   (1) Characteristics of the area of operations including its physical features, climate, and basic political, economic, and psychological
   factors. Consider also the following specific points:
   (a) Attitudes of the population—whether cooperative or uncooperative.
   (b) Availability of local material and personnel to support civil affairs operations.
   (c) Number of displaced persons, refugees, and evacuees in the area.
   (d) Amount and type of war damage suffered by the economy, particularly in the transportation, public utility, and communication fields.
   (e) Status and character of civil government.
   (f) State of health of the civilian populace.

(2) Enemy strength and disposition. Note all enemy capabilities which could possibly affect the accomplishment of your mission and estimate the relative probability of their adoption. These capabilities may include the following:
   (a) Relative enemy strengths and combat capabilities, to include special attention to unconventional weapons and the possibility
   of their employment.
   (b) Sabotage—include all capabilities for military, political, and economic sabotage possible of execution by agents, guerrillas,
   and partisans.
   (c) Espionage—include all methods for which the enemy is known or estimated to be capable, together with the extent of such
   activity.
   (d) Subversion—include all types of propaganda, treason, disaffection, sedition, and similar acts affecting friendly troops and local
   civilians.
   (e) Movement by the enemy of displaced persons, refugees, and evacuees into the area.
   (f) Passive resistance, such as refusal to serve in required capacities.

(3) Civil affairs situation and nature of operations to be supported. Review general policy guidance from higher headquarters and consider pertinent terms of relevant civil affairs agreement or rules and conventions of international law. Other factors to be considered include:
(CLASSIFICATION)

(a) Review of current problems faced by the supported command.

(b) Estimate the impact of future plans of the supported operation pertinent to your mission.

(c) Determine the availability of military or civilian relief supplies for diversion to the civilian populations.

b. Assumptions. Matters which are assumed, but not known, to be valid for the purpose of your estimate.

c. Special Factors. Items not covered by any of the above categories which require special recognition and treatment in your estimate, such as the possible employment of mass destruction weapons by the enemy and the effect of such employment on your mission.

d. Own courses of action

(1) Note all practicable courses of action open to you which, if successful, will accomplish your mission.

(2) Priority will be given to that major civil affairs activity which most directly relates to your mission. One of the following major civil affairs activities will have that priority:

- Provision of civilian support for and prevention of civilian interference with tactical and logistical operations.
- Providing and supporting the functions of government for a civilian population.
- Community relations.
- Military civic action.
- Military participation in a population and resources control program.
- Military support of civil defense.
- Consolidation psychological operations. Normally, consolidation psychological operations will always be in support of the other activities and it, too, will be geared to provide maximum support to the priority activity.

(3) The work of the functional teams assigned or attached to the unit will be designed to support command priority. The following checklist will serve as a reminder of the various specific activities for which you may be required to exercise control or supervision:

(a) Governmental
   2. Labor.
   3. Public Administration.
   4. Public Education.
   5. Public Finance.
   7. Public Safety.
   9. Legal.

(b) Economic
   1. Civilian Supply.
   2. Economics and Commerce.
   3. Food and Agriculture.
   4. Property Control.

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(c) Public Facilities.
   1. Public Communications.
   2. Public Transportation.

(d) Special.
   1. Arts, Monuments, and Archives.
   2. Civil Information.
   3. DP's, Refugees, and Evacuees.
   4. Religious Relations.

3. Analysis of Opposing Courses of Action.
   Determine the probable effect of each significant difficulty on the success of each of your own courses of action. At this stage of estimate, eliminate those difficulties which have little or no effect on your selection of a course of action. A difficulty will not influence your choice of a course of action if it affects all alternatives equally.

4. Comparison of Own Courses of Action.
   Weigh the advantages and disadvantages of each of your own courses of action (in the light of the governing factors of the situation) and decide which course of action promises to be the most successful in accomplishing your mission. In arriving at a decision, the commander may assign particular weight to one or more of the factors listed in paragraph 2 and may consider additional factors such as those policy decisions affecting the conduct of civil affairs under special political situations.

5. Decisions, Conclusion, or Recommendations.
   Translate the course of action selected into a concise statement of what the unit as a whole is to do, and so much of the elements of who, when, where, how and why, as may be appropriate.

   COMMANDER

(CCLASSIFICATION)

NOTES

1. The estimate may be a thorough, complete, written document or it may be a brief mental evaluation. In preparing his estimate the CA unit commander will normally rely on his staff for evaluation and recommendations pertaining to their principal fields of interest. (See FM 101-5.)

2. The commander's decision is not confined to the statement of decision made in paragraph 5 of the estimate but may include additional implementing instructions, supplementary decisions, admonitions, or warnings to clarify his intent or furnish guidance to his staff or subordinate commanders.
APPENDIX C

CA INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PLAN

C-1. General

Civil affairs intelligence requirements are discussed in detail in chapter 4 of this manual. This appendix is intended for guidance to and use by CA units in preparing their intelligence collection plan. Non-CA units may incorporate the matters listed herein in their overall units intelligence collection plans, as required.

C-2. Format

A suggested format for the Civil Affairs Intelligence Collection Plan is indicated below. For further details concerning use of a collection plan and worksheet, see FM 30–5.

(CLASSIFICATION)

Format for CA Intelligence Collection Plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Essential elements of information (EEI)</th>
<th>Analysis of essential elements of information (indications)</th>
<th>Collecting agency or source</th>
<th>Specific request or orders to agency</th>
<th>When and how to report</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. What is the attitude of the populace toward</td>
<td>1a. Behavior or conduct indicating—</td>
<td>All Branches</td>
<td>1a. Include a short summary of any change in attitude noted during the period giving details of specific actions, which indicate any of the following: (1) Confidence and cooperation. (2) Doubt and suspicion. (3) Apathy and indifference.</td>
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<tr>
<td>a. Its own government.</td>
<td>(1) Confidence and trust through compliance with laws, etc., acceptance of change, approval of civilians selected for positions of authority; lack of support of resistance or insurgent movements. (2) Cooperation as shown by reporting violators of laws; making constructive suggestions. (3) Doubt and suspicion as manifest by ill-tempered compliance, reluctance to accept employment with the government of CA; drawing unfavorable comparison with situation in other zones. (4) Apathy and indifference.</td>
<td>b. In addition to the above, include questions in public opinion questionnaire that indicate which of the three attitudes listed under 1a above is prevalent.</td>
<td>1a. Include in periodic report.</td>
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<td>b. The hostile force.</td>
<td></td>
<td>c. Analyze all press releases not censored prior to publication, and statements of radio commentators to detect criticism of CA operations or circulation of rumors and propaganda. Cover theatrical performances, musical recitals and films for the same purpose.</td>
<td>b. Same as 1a.</td>
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<td>c. CA activities.</td>
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<td>d. Make continuous study and analysis of fraternization in area noting trends, impressions and conclusions as to trends.</td>
<td>c. Same as 1a.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1. What is the attitude of the populace toward</td>
<td>1a. Behavior or conduct indicating—</td>
<td>CA Units</td>
<td>d. Same as 1a.</td>
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<tr>
<td>a. Its own government.</td>
<td>(1) Confidence and trust through compliance with laws, etc., acceptance of change, approval of civilians selected for positions of authority; lack of support of resistance or insurgent movements. (2) Cooperation as shown by reporting violators of laws; making constructive suggestions. (3) Doubt and suspicion as manifest by ill-tempered compliance, reluctance to accept employment with the government of CA; drawing unfavorable comparison with situation in other zones. (4) Apathy and indifference.</td>
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<td>b. The hostile force.</td>
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<td>c. CA activities.</td>
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<th>Collecting agency or source</th>
<th>Specific request or orders to agency</th>
<th>When and how to report</th>
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<tr>
<td>e. Keep bulletin boards, trees, building walls, etc., under periodic surveillance for posters and unauthorized handbills and notices.</td>
<td>Military Intelligence Units</td>
<td>g. Monitor all forms of communications originating with citizens for statements of interest to CA.</td>
<td>g. Same as 1a. Include specific details. Send two copies of the translation of such matter direct to designated headquarters.</td>
<td>g. Same as 1a.</td>
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<td>f. Investigate thoroughly all requests for permission to hold meetings; ascertain ostensible purpose and follow through to determine real purpose. If real purpose is other than that given at time of request, report complete details including names, number attending, time and place of meeting, and what transpired, with conclusions as to real purpose.</td>
<td>Displaced Persons</td>
<td>2a(1) Maintain tabulated record of number and nationality of people moving into and out of the area.</td>
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<td>(1) Labor shortages. (2) Loss of need for workers or specialists in industry or agriculture. (3) Insufficient food, housing, clothing, or fuel. (4) Incidence of disease.</td>
<td></td>
<td>2a(2) Maintain record of persons in camps; number received each week; number discharged each week. Determine destination of discharges and purpose of going there; origin of persons received and reasons for leaving former place of residence; occupation of wage earners. (3) Breakdown the above categories by sex and age groups.</td>
<td>b. Same as 1a.</td>
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<tr>
<td>c. Economic and political implications of failure of emigrants to adapt themselves to community life or to be accepted by the community.</td>
<td>CA Units</td>
<td>b. Determine reasons for large groups of people moving into or out of the area. Also determine number of political fanatics coming into the area.</td>
<td>b. Same as 1a.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>d. Possible presence and effects of large numbers of dangerous fanatics among groups.</td>
<td>Labor</td>
<td>c. Maintain record of labor requirements; shortages and overages in the area by requirements such as industry</td>
<td>c. Same as 1a.</td>
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</table>

2. Do migrating populations constitute a problem? What are the social and political effects of such movement?

2a. Tabulated record showing number and nationality of people moving into and out of the area.

b. Indications of cause to include—

(1) Labor shortages. (2) Loss of need for workers or specialists in industry or agriculture. (3) Insufficient food, housing, clothing, or fuel. (4) Incidence of disease.

c. Economic and political implications of failure of emigrants to adapt themselves to community life or to be accepted by the community.

d. Possible presence and effects of large numbers of dangerous fanatics among groups.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Essential elements of information (EEI)</th>
<th>Analysis of essential elements of information (indications)</th>
<th>Collecting agency or source</th>
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<td>and agriculture; by location; tabulation of the unemployed by profession, skill, or occupation.</td>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>d. Maintain record of status of housing, food, fuel, and clothing in the area to show requirements, shortages, and overages.</td>
<td>d. Same as 1a.</td>
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<td>Public Health</td>
<td>e. Maintain record of status of health in the area to show number sick in hospitals, in homes, type of illness, probable cause, whether or not contagious.</td>
<td>e. Same as 1a.</td>
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<td>Public Administration</td>
<td>f. Determine political significance of migrating populations and degrees to which they adapt themselves to community life and/or are accepted by the community.</td>
<td>f. Same as 1a.</td>
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<td>Civil Information and Public Safety</td>
<td>3a. Registration of political party.</td>
<td>3a. Same as 1a.</td>
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<td>b. Political meetings and rallies.</td>
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<td>c. Membership drives and campaigns or other tactics used to stimulate party membership.</td>
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<td>d. Party funds.</td>
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<td>e. Party publicity.</td>
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<td>f. Public reception and interest in party platform and activity.</td>
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<td>g. Evidence of influence from outside the area.</td>
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<td>h. Allegiance of any local group or element to a central party or organization.</td>
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<td>i. Failure of membership to show allegiance to own party in local election.</td>
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<td>j. Political attitudes, allegiances, interest and activities of returning or repatriated individuals to the area.</td>
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<td>k. Power struggles within the elite group of party organs and underlying reasons.</td>
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<td>l. Deviations from policy or propaganda line by key party members.</td>
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<td>m. Defections of key members or groups from party and reasons for these defections.</td>
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<td>n. Affiliations with labor, religious, youth, women,</td>
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<td>paramilitary and other groups.</td>
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<td>(2) Observe political attitudes, allegiances, interest and activities of returning or repatriated natives.</td>
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<td>Economic and Related Functional Specialties</td>
<td>d. Peruse mail of community leaders and recently returned or repatriated natives to determine political attitudes, allegiances, interest, and activities.</td>
<td>4a. Maintain continuing study of economic situation as it might disrupt standards of living in the area. Analyze results of food and fuel shortages, lack of adequate housing; lack of transportation to move commodities within area; effect of shutdown of essential or vital industries; probable results of unemployment caused by layoff of workmen; effect of serious floods or drought; effect of black market activities on agriculture and industry; existence of undistributable surpluses; hoarding of commodities; cause and duration of black market as it pertains to items necessary for health, comfort, or well-being of populace.</td>
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4. What economic problems are serious in the area? What are their causes? What will be the estimated duration?

4a. Economic disruption as evidenced by—
   (1) Food shortages.
   (2) Fuel shortages.
   (3) Lack of adequate housing.
   (4) Transportation shortage.
   (5) Excessive unemployment.
   (6) Serious floods or drought.
   (7) Disorganization of normal trade and production systems.
   b. Existence of undistributable surpluses.
   c. Bank failure or runs on financial institutions.
   d. Hoarding of currencies, commodity barter and black market activities.
   e. Widespread complaint on economic difficulties.
   f. Lack of confidence in the currency.

4a. Economic disruption as evidenced by—
   (1) Food shortages.
   (2) Fuel shortages.
   (3) Lack of adequate housing.
   (4) Transportation shortage.
   (5) Excessive unemployment.
   (6) Serious floods or drought.

(CLASSIFICATION)
5. What is the extent of crime and misdemeanors in the area?

6. What are the attitudes of educators or leaders of schools and universities? What are they teaching? What are their qualifications, backgrounds, beliefs, ideas advocated, and the strength of their following?

5a. Number of arrests for commission of law violations over and above what is normal. Type of violation, frequency, against whom committed, and whether increasing or decreasing.

6a. Degree of success or failure of reorientation programs toward U.S. policy.
   b. Organization of secret societies in colleges and schools.
   c. Presentation of lectures and theories directed against U.S. objectives and policies, methods used, and results obtained.
   d. Regimentation of local youth in schools and colleges.
   e. Student demonstrations.
   f. Influence exerted by political parties or other outside groups; efforts to set up junior organizations to develop student following.
   g. Efforts toward restricting attendance to politically approved or satisfactory individuals.

6b. Be alert to detect technical compliance with rules, regulations, laws, proclamations, and instructions while attempting to thwart the purpose of the law by evading its scope or retarding its implementation. Priority of collection effort will be given to violations of Populace and Resources Control laws, decrees, and regulations.

6c. Maintain a constant study of attitude of teachers and educators to determine: what they are teaching, strength of their following, methods used to eliminate or perpetuate ideologies inimical to U.S. policy. Determine degree of success or failure of reorientation programs toward U.S. policy. Detect organization of secret societies in colleges or schools. Examine critically lectures and theories directed against host nation and U.S. policies. Analyze reactions of students to such lectures and theories. Determine to what extent native youth is regimented in schools and colleges. Report all student demonstrations, determine causes. Ascertain influences exerted upon students by political parties or
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<td>other outside groups; what junior organizations are being developed among the student body. Detect efforts being used, if any, to restrict school attendance to those students approved or satisfactory to certain groups or organizations.</td>
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Notes:
1. The intelligence worksheet is most conveniently prepared in columnar form. The advantage is in the concise presentation of each EEI, together with the analysis of the element into indicators, probable sources of information about the various indications, the specific mission, and the reporting procedures to be applied to each.
2. Form a. Column one lists the EEI generally in order of importance. EEI's may include one or all of the foregoing as well as others, depending on the situation.
3. In column two is the result of a mental analysis of each EEI listing indications or points of evidence that shed light on the questions implicit in the EEI.
4. Column three indicates the probable best collecting agency or best source of the needed items of information.
5. Column four delineates specific instructions for gathering information, as well as instructions relative to assembling, evaluating, and reporting.
6. Column five prescribes when and where, and how to report.
APPENDIX D
LOGISTICS

D-1. General

a. This appendix is prepared as a guide for personnel charged with responsibilities for the use of civilian resources for the support of military forces, and provision of military supply support for civilian populations and agencies. This information applies primarily to circumstances of limited or general war. In peacetime situations, U.S. military use of civilian resources will be limited in general to normal offshure procurement procedures. U.S. military support of a civilian populace will be minimal and will conform to international agreement. Civilian supply in IDAID situations is discussed in chapter 7.

b. Within an Army force, the supply organization is the aggregate of the commands, staffs, units, operations, procedures, control, and management needed to plan and carry out the supply support of military operations and such other activities as may be directed.

c. The CA organization is the aggregate of the staffs, units, and activities that contribute to the military mission through support or control of local agencies to prevent civilian interference with military operations. It assists the military commander in the fulfillment of his obligations with respect to the inhabitants, government, and economy of the area, and is a contributive means for the attainment of national objectives beyond the war.

(1) The CA organization, in support of military operations, distributes to civilian users supplies for the relief of disease, starvation, and alleviation of such unrest as may interfere with the military mission. It locates local supplies, equipment, and labor required for military use; reports their availability based on an assessment of civilian needs; and determines the effect of their use for military purposes on the local economy. It also provides advice and assistance to purchasing and contracting officers and other personnel charged with the local procurement of supplies, real estate, facilities, labor, and services.

(2) The CA organization maintains liaison with civil authorities; makes recommendations as to supplies which should be made available from military sources; and analyzes the need for supplies and equipment of all types. This includes consideration of the essential factors of production necessary to maintain the civilian economy in a state of productive efficiency. It also recommends and provides guidance and advice on the general scope of military assistance with respect to rehabilitation or restoration of the economy, stabilization procedures, and the satisfaction of essential civilian needs through military supply sources. Unless otherwise directed, no economic rehabilitation is undertaken except that which can be accomplished from resources programmed and made available from within the command.

D-2. Planning

a. General or coordinating staff responsibilities for supply planning are vested, depending upon the type of command, in the section headed by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G4; Assistant Chief of Staff, Supply; Director of Supply and Maintenance; or Director of Supply. In each case, the CA organization provides recommendations and advice on pertinent civil affairs matters as identified in FM 101-5, particularly availability of indigenous resources for support of military operations, and requirements for military support of civilian populations and institutions.

b. Recommendations and advice at the headquarters responsible for theater or force-level planning are influenced by considerations of force mission, international agreements, involvement of other governmental agencies or bodies, policy on rehabilitative measures to be taken with respect to the local economy, and capabilities of allied nations with forces in the area to assist in support operations. It is the responsibility of commanders at all levels to provide information on resources which may be utilized for support of military operations and estimates of requirements for support of civilian populations.
c. Since specific policies vary for each country or area in which operations are conducted, only general factors and considerations can be listed.

(1) Basic premises.

(a) Full use is made of the material resources, facilities, and services of the area for the purpose of supporting the military mission.

(b) Except in IDAID operations and when otherwise directed, provision of military supplies to civil populations is limited to that essential to prevent disease, starvation, or such other causes of unrest as might interfere with military operations.

(c) In IDAID operations, civic action programs normally will require provision of supplies to civilian agencies and the distribution of supplies through military channels.

(d) The caloric value of rations for civilian consumption normally will be included as part of guidance concerning the extent to which U.S. forces may provide support to the population of a country.

(2) Additional considerations.

(a) Urban areas are largely dependent on outside food sources. Rural areas normally are self-sustaining, and rural populations probably will require little or no emergency food allocations.

(b) It can be estimated that 10 percent of the population in cities in excess of 100,000 people will require subsistence and medical supply support indefinitely. This percentage can be scaled downward in smaller municipalities and may need to be increased in larger cities.

(c) Requirements for medical supplies should be based on estimated civilian combat casualties and major endemic diseases in the area.

(d) The clogging of military channels may be avoided by holding imports in storage areas and utilizing local resources to the maximum. This will depend on the adequacy of harvests or stocks of local supplies to meet civilian needs as each military objective is reached.

(e) Supplies intended for distribution to civilians in an area of active military operations should be rapidly distributed for immediate consumption or use. Major preparation, processing, or detailed handling should not be required. As the military situation becomes relatively stabilized, such bulk type supplies as unprocessed foodstuffs, cloth to be made into clothing, or lumber for the construction of shelter may then be suitable.

(f) Establishment of priorities and phasing of deliveries must be compatible with the timing of supplies required for the support of military operations.

(g) Fertilizers, seeds, tools, or repair parts may serve to accelerate local production of needed supplies at low cost. This would also free valuable shipping space for other uses.

(h) Requirements for support of civilians must be specific as to quantity and time, or as to needs for a specific project.

D-3. Military Supply Support

a. The principal sources of supplies for civilian support are reallocation of supplies from the local economy, captured enemy stocks, contributions from acceptable national and international welfare and charitable organizations, contributions from local or allied resources in the area, and U.S. military stocks.

b. Types of supplies that may be approved for issue from U.S. military stocks consist principally of food, tentage, clothing, engineer equipment to insure operation of essential utilities, medical supplies, transportation equipment, and fuel and lubricants. The supply organization establishes, controls, manages, and operates the facilities through which such supplies are made available for civilian support in response to requisitions placed by units charged with the civilian supply function. These units are also responsible for the issue of supplies to authorized civilian agencies or groups. Issue may be accomplished either by drawing directly from depots or supply points when adequate transportation is available or by requesting delivery to specified points where issue can be made to local governmental authorities.

c. Supply installations which receive, store, and issue supplies for civilian support are identified in supply and distribution plans. These plans assign specific missions and, as implemented by administrative orders and other instructions, prescribe requisitioning and supply procedures to be followed.

(1) Under certain circumstances, and particularly upon the initiation of military operations in a theater, supplies for support of civil affairs operations may be provided on an automatic basis. As the operation progresses, CA officers are responsible for developing plans and programs for the coordination of requisitions from the units in whose areas ultimate distribution to civilian agencies will be made.

(2) Requisitions for military supplies for civilian support are processed in the same manner as those for all other military supplies and af-
forded priorities consistent with support for the command mission. Depending upon the situation, supplies required for civilian support must be strictly controlled and may require command approval for issue.

d. The CA organization normally requires civilian agencies receiving support to maintain records in such detail as is necessary for a full and proper accounting of supplies provided from military sources, as well as of contributions made by allied governments and nonmilitary agencies.

(1) When supplies are transferred to the local government or civilian agencies for distribution or for reallocation, authorized signatures must be obtained on receipts.

(2) Accountability for military stocks used for civilian support is maintained until the supplies are issued to appropriate civil agencies. Further accountability, to include storage, processing, and final distribution to end users, is normally the responsibility of civil agencies operating under the supervision of CA personnel.

(3) Central accounting controls are maintained to provide information on which to base continuing requirements for civilian supplies, and insure that supplies are not issued in excess of essential minimums. Statistical evaluations at local, regional, and national levels assist in determining the effectiveness with which civilian supply operations are being accomplished.

D-4. Support from Other Sources

a. As previously indicated, supplies for civilian relief or economic aid may be obtained from local resources, captured enemy stocks, and by contributions of national or international agencies.

b. Within the area of operations, the aggregate of supply requirements, military and civilian, is reviewed to determine those supplies which should be obtained through local procurement. Directives of the commander, based on applicable legal limitations, furnish guidance to subordinate commanders on available methods of procurement. Except in situations of grave emergency to the command, local procurement for military use which will result in subsequent importation of similar items for civilian use will not be permitted.

(1) Procurement of supplies and equipment is done by purchasing and contracting officers appointed in accordance with policies and procedures established by the Department of the Army. Purchasing and contracting officers may also be designated agent finance officers for the purpose of making cash purchases.

(2) CA units assist and advise purchasing and contracting officers in making arrangements for local procurement. Procedures for local procurement by CA units conform to those prescribed for all military units operating in the area.

c. Maximum efforts are made to exploit those captured enemy supplies which are suitable for civilian use. Basic policy with respect to captured enemy materiel is as follows: All captured enemy materiel is either turned in or reported to the capturing units' DS/GS supply unit for disposition instructions. The captured equipment is inventoried by nomenclature quantity and condition code and reported to the materiel management center for disposition instructions. Materiel which is of no direct military value to U.S. forces or is not required for support of allied military or paramilitary forces but is suitable for civilian use may be released to CA units for distribution. The allocation of captured supplies to civilian use in the area of their location reduces requirements for civilian supplies and the transportation necessary to move such supplies from rear areas. Intelligence requirements demand, however, that care be taken to safeguard or evacuate captured materiel in satisfaction of technical intelligence requirements.

D-5. Military Use of Resources

xConsistent with the policy that maximum use be made of local resources in the support of military operations, logistical planning gives consideration to projects involving the reconstruction and rehabilitation of local facilities for military use. In such planning, both military and civilian requirements are considered in the light of the total mission of the command. Use of existing local facilities serves not only to reduce the need for military construction effort, but may promote desired economic development in the area. The CA organization provides the point of contact for military commands and other agencies requiring local supplies, services, and facilities. When procuring local property by requisition or seizure, a type receipt as shown in figure D-1, Requisition/Seizure Receipt, should be used. Form may be reproduced locally.

D-6. Procurement of Real Estate

a. The acquisition and disposition of real estate are functions of the Engineer. These functions are performed in accordance with the terms of agree-
RECEIPT IS HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGED OF THE FOLLOWING PROPERTY WHICH HAS BEEN REQUISITIONED/SEIZED BY THE UNDER-SIGNED, ACTING FOR AND IN BEHALF OF THE U.S. ARMED FORCES:

ITEM OR ITEMS: __________________________________________________________ (DESCRIBE FULLY, INCLUDING QUANTITY)

LOCATION: ____________________________________________________________ (IDENTIFY BY ADDRESS OR OTHERWISE WHERE THE PROPERTY WAS WHEN IT WAS REQUISITIONED/SEIZED)

OWNER: _______________________________________________________________ (NAME AND ADDRESS OF OWNER, IF KNOWN)

CUSTODIAN: __________________________________________________________ (NAME AND ADDRESS OF PERSON IN CUSTODY OF PROPERTY AT TIME OF REQUISITION/SEIZURE)

VALUE: _______________________________________________________________ (ESTIMATED)

CONDITION: _________________________________________________________ (DESCRIBE QUALITY OF PROPERTY)

DATE: ________________ (DATE PROPERTY REQUISITIONED/SEIZED)

PURPOSE: ____________________________________________________________ (PURPOSE FOR WHICH PROPERTY WAS REQUISITIONED/SEIZED)

PERIOD OF USE: ______________________________________________________ (TEMPORARY OR PERMANENT; IF TEMPORARY, ESTIMATE DURATION)

NAME OF PERSON MAKING REQUISITION/SEIZURE

____________________________________________________

GRADE AND IDENTITY NO.

____________________________________________________

UNIT DESIGNATION

____________________________________________________

DATE

Figure D-1. Requisition/Seizure Receipt.
ments, the law of land warfare, and applicable theater policies.

b. Adequate prior planning is essential to the effective determination of requirements and allocations of areas and facilities.

c. Although control over all activities concerned with real estate is centralized, the acquisition of real estate has a strong and direct impact on the economy of the area of operations. G5 accordingly determines the availability of real estate for military use, any limitations that should be imposed on such use, and the effect of such utilization on the local economy. G4 develops policies on the requisitioning and administration of real estate and makes allocations of areas, billets, and facilities to users. G1 suballocates shelter and quarters for the use of staff sections and personnel within the headquarters.

d. CA units assist engineer real estate officers in locating desired properties and facilities. Engineer real estate officers insure that requests for utilization of real estate are within the allocations made by G4 and maintain, in coordination with CA units, inventories of available real estate.

e. Effective coordination of real estate requisitions may necessitate the establishment of area real estate allocation boards including CA and other representation from the various commands concerned.

D-7. Procurement of Labor (Indigenous Manpower)

a. Maximum use is made of local resources of labor in support of military operations. Theater policies, based on legal or treaty requirements and U.S. policies with respect to local economic considerations, are promulgated on such matters as the procurement and distribution of labor, uniform wage scales, and conditions of employment. When the availability of local labor has been determined by G5 in accordance with theater policies, the report of availability is furnished to G1, the allocating staff agency.

b. Civilian labor procurement and administration is performed by unit labor officers, civilian personnel officers, or area labor officers in coordination with appropriate CA units. CA units locate local labor for using agencies and establish and maintain such minimum records as are necessary to insure adherence to prescribed policies and directives. CA units are not responsible for such matters of administration as hiring, payment for services, or maintenance of employment records.

c. Refugees are utilized to the maximum practicable extent as a source of local civilian labor.

D-8. Civilian Casualties

a. It may be necessary for military aid stations to administer emergency type treatment to civilians during active military operations and, when feasible, to evacuate seriously wounded or critically injured civilians. The extent of military treatment and evacuation of civilian casualties depend upon the requirements of the military situation and the availability of military medical facilities. Whenever possible, civilian casualties are evacuated to the nearest civilian medical installation. If civilian medical facilities are not available, the administrative order of the command concerned should outline evacuation procedures.

b. When civilian casualties are to be evacuated to military medical installations, evacuation is accomplished through the military evacuation system on a priority basis second to military casualties.

c. If civilian ambulances are not available for the transport of civilian casualties, trucks, private cars, or animal-drawn carts are utilized. When military transportation must be provided, available air, rail, or motor transportation, including empty vehicles moving to the rear, are employed. Provisions are made, where necessary, for the transportation of civilian casualties by litter or improvised means.

d. When sick and wounded civilians have been evacuated to military medical facilities, they are segregated from military personnel and transferred to civilian facilities as soon as their physical condition permits. Accordingly, measures are taken, whenever practicable, to rehabilitate civilian hospitals on a first priority basis.

D-9. Movement of Civilian Supplies

a. Transportation includes the utilization of civilian and military transportation for the movement of civilian supplies. Use of public transportation facilities not operated by the Transportation Corps for military purposes is coordinated through the G5 of the command charged with the control or supervision of such facilities.

b. When authorized by competent authority, civilian transportation may be requisitioned for military use. In the allocation of civilian transport between military and civilian use, careful consideration must be given to the terms of the civil affairs agreements for the movement of food,
clothing, medical, and other supplies. Except in emergency situations, civilian vehicles should not be used for military purposes. Civilian vehicles are returned to their proper owners as soon as effective control over their use can be exercised by civilian authorities.

c. Upon entry into an area previously under enemy control, all civilian vehicles, trucks, and animal-drawn carts required for the transportation of civilian supplies are organized into transportation pools for operation under the supervision of CA units in the area. The organization of vehicles into pools provides the most effective means for the movement of civilians and transportation of essential civilian supplies. To the maximum practicable extent, such vehicles are operated by their owners.

d. When local or captured enemy supplies and facilities are not available, minimum amounts of fuel, lubricants, tires, and spare parts from military stocks, and essential military maintenance facilities, are made available by the responsible military commander for utilization by civilian transportation pools under the supervision of CA units. Issues of supplies are made against approved trip tickets and are restricted to the controlled employment of the vehicles in meeting the approved transportation needs of the community involved. Commanders of CA units estimate future requirements for military stocks for fuels and lubricants in advance and submit the necessary requisitions through appropriate command or supply channels.
APPENDIX E
DISPLACED PERSONS, REFUGEES, AND EVACUEES
(STANAG 2091)

E-1. General

a. Application. The CA tasks discussed herein are applicable under circumstances of armed conflicts with CA authority vested in the military commander. In certain circumstances during peace and cold war, where the military commander is not vested with CA authority, CA functional teams may assist, advise, and support allied civilians or indigenous military and governmental authorities in the performance of these tasks.

b. Definitions.

(1) A displaced person is a civilian who is involuntarily outside the national boundaries of his country.

(2) A refugee is a civilian, who by reason of real or imagined danger, has left his home to seek safety elsewhere.

(3) An evacuee is a civilian removed from his place of residence by military direction for reasons of his own security or the requirements of the military situation.

E-2. Control

a. During combat operations effective control of the movement of civilians is of primary importance. Disorganized masses seriously impair the movement of military units, endanger security, and threaten the health of the military force. Displaced persons and refugees also constitute a potent weapon which the enemy may use to disrupt friendly military operations. It is essential that civil administration be reconstituted at the earliest practicable time to prevent the movement of the local populace from interfering with military operations. Constructive direction to the local populace through civil authorities reduces the possibility of such interference.

b. The theater commander plans and prepares directives covering policies and procedures for care, control, and disposition of displaced persons, refugees, and evacuees. All commanders are under the legal obligation imposed by the rules of international law, including the Geneva Convention of 1949, to provide a minimum standard of humane care and treatment, to establish law and order, and to protect private property. Additional humanitarian consideration are observed whenever possible, providing they do not result in interference with military operations.

c. Detailed planning for the care and control of displaced persons, refugees, and evacuees should include such matters as the authorized extent of migration and evacuation; location and establishment of camps; standards of care; status and ultimate disposition of displaced persons and refugees from allied, neutral, or enemy countries; extent of local governmental authority over non-national civilians; and designation of routes for refugee movement, military and civilian police to provide traffic control, intelligence detachments to screen personnel, and CA units to supervise camp operations.

(1) During a fluid situation, it is desirable to billet refugees with the local population in nearby communities to the greatest practicable extent rather than to move them to the rear through assembly areas to camps. When frontline tactical units have advanced sufficiently, it is advantageous to permit the early return of refugees to their homes. Logistical support requirements may, however, delay the return of refugees to centers of population. In a static or slow moving situation, it may be necessary to collect and move all refugees to the rear.

(2) All movements of displaced persons, refugees, and evacuees to the rear are made on designated secondary roads. Maximum utilization is made of local transportation and police.

(3) The ultimate disposition of refugees is to allow them to return to their homes as quickly as tactical considerations permit. This reduces the burden on the military force and the civilian economy for their support and lessens the danger
of disease which accompanies the grouping of people in confined areas. When refugees are returned to their homes, they can assist in the restoration of their towns and contribute to their own support.

(4) The ultimate disposition of displaced persons is to resettle them, preferably in their own country or in any area of their choice consistent with U.S. policy and international agreements. The early resettlement of such displaced persons shortens the period of time during which they are a responsibility of the military commander. In either a fluid or a static situation, displaced persons are formed in groups and moved through assembly areas to displaced person camps as soon as the tactical situation permits.

(5) The ultimate disposition of evacuees will vary with the reasons for evacuation, but generally they will be returned to their places of residence. However, circumstances may dictate their resettlement in other areas of their choice within the scope of U.S. policy and the terms of international agreements.

d. To prevent infiltration by guerrillas, enemy agents, and escaping members of the hostile armed forces, it is essential to establish control points; screen displaced persons, refugees, and evacuees; search suspected individuals; and impose restrictions on movement. Although screening activities may be performed initially by military police, intelligence, or other type units, they are most effectively conducted by using friendly and reliable local police or civilians under the supervision of CA units. Administrative controls must be conducted with care to prevent the alienation of people who are sympathetic to U.S. objectives.

E-3. Evacuation

a. Whenever possible, the rearward evacuation of communities in forward combat or other areas is avoided. Evacuation removes civilians from areas where they can maintain themselves; provides material for enemy propaganda; arouses resentment; complicates the control of their movement; increases the difficulties of maintaining adequate security. It also necessitates the use of military transport and the expenditure of additional food, fuel, clothing, and medical supplies; and may create epidemic conditions and decrease availability of facilities to support military operations.

b. If tactical considerations require, civilians may be removed from forward areas and not be permitted to return to their homes until the advance of friendly elements has resulted in the establishment of a new forward zone. The removal of civilians may be partial or complete, as security considerations require. If practicable, livestock should be evacuated with the civilians. When civilians have been removed from an area, they are not permitted to return to their homes until authorized. However, when the military situation permits, civilians may be returned to their homes under escort in order to rescue livestock or minimize personal losses which may impair the local economy.

(1) The decision for this action must be made by the division or higher commander. A rearward evacuation beyond the division rear boundary is made only after coordination with corps or field army.

(2) Civilians are evacuated to the rear only when necessary to—

(a) Remove them as a hindrance to military operations.

(b) Provide for increased security of troops and installations and to safeguard information.

(c) Provide for their safety and welfare by removing them from the frontlines.

(3) Civilians may be evacuated when—

(a) There is time for the evacuation to be accomplished.

(b) Density, character, and composition of the population render such evacuation necessary.

(c) Means are available to accomplish the evacuation.

(d) Routes are available for the evacuation.

(e) Areas are available to absorb the evacuees.

(f) Distances involved are not prohibitive.

(g) Fallout from nuclear attack has not made movement Impactable.

c. Duties of a CA unit commander in an evacuation include—

(1) Supervising the execution of plans for evacuation.

(2) Arranging for the employment of civilian transportation to the fullest extent possible for the transport of civilians.

(3) Arranging for the establishment and maintenance of feeding stations along routes.

(4) Insuring that plans for reception have been made.

(5) Arranging for establishment of civilian collecting points and civilian assembly areas.
d. When a decision is made to accomplish the mass evacuation of a community, detailed plans are made to prevent stragglers or uncontrolled groups from disrupting forward movement of military units and supplies. Mass evacuation planning includes—

(1) Transportation. Maximum use will be made of civilian transportation. If this is not available, military vehicles should be requested for the old, the very young, and the sick.

(2) Distance. The distance of the move from the point of departure should be no greater than is necessary to meet the minimum objective for which the movement is planned.

(3) Fallout. Where radioactive fallout has occurred, or is anticipated, precautions are taken to avoid moving civilians downwind from the actual or anticipated nuclear attack.

(4) Screening. Security screening and documentation of evacuees should be accomplished at the earliest possible moment.

(5) Identification. If possible, every evacuee is provided with and required to wear visibly on his person a tag identifying him by name, or is provided an official identification card indicating the locality from which evacuated and bearing other pertinent information.

(6) Briefing of evacuees. Briefing to explain the purpose of the move, restrictions on personal belongings, and the methods of passive air defense is accomplished by leaflets, loudspeakers, posters, or other means available prior to beginning the movement.

(7) Impedimenta. Each person is allowed to take a predetermined allowance of personal effects.

(8) Rations. If the move will require not more than 2 days, rations may be issued at the time of departure to each person evacuated, or rations may be issued at designated points en route.

(9) Priority. The mission will determine categories and timing of evacuations of specific groups.

(10) Assembly areas and camps. Housing should be such that it will not endanger the health of the evacuees, nor unnecessarily increase the suffering caused by the evacuation. Issues of food, fuel, clothing, and medical supplies are furnished in advance to the assembly area receiving the evacuee.

(11) Medical care. The health and physical well-being of the evacuees are difficult problems.
tions. Equipment or materiel in certain categories, capable of immediate conversion to military use by hostile forces and not capable of evacuation, such as petroleum products, weapons, means of heavy transport, and public communications equipment may be destroyed.

E-4. Collecting Points

Civilian collecting points are temporary areas designated for the assembly of small numbers of displaced persons, refugees, and evacuees prior to their evacuation. At collecting points, only minimum emergency relief for limited periods is provided. Collecting points should be in defilade, accessible by road, and near water.

E-5. Assembly Areas and Camps

a. An assembly area provides a temporary assembling place for displaced persons, refugees, and evacuees in preparation for further movement to camps or for settlement in local communities. Assembly areas, which are generally designed to accommodate a larger number of persons than a civilian collecting point, provide additional emergency relief to include food, clothing, medical supplies, medical treatment, and limited shelter. In assembly areas, the process of screening to segregate prisoners of war and civilian internees for separate handling by military police units is continued. In addition, action is commenced to segregate civilians by nationality or ethnic groups in preparation for movement to designated camps. A continuous effort must be made to identify and segregate individuals whose interests are inimical to those of the United States and its allies.

b. Assembly areas and camps serve as temporary or semipermanent places for the grouping of displaced persons, refugees, and evacuees prior to the return of such persons to their normal places of habitation, resettlement in local communities, repatriation to their own countries, or other designated disposition. Normally, they are located in the field army rear area or in the communications zone. Camps may utilize available civilian accommodations or military construction.

(1) In these camps, a further segregation of displaced persons and refugees takes place according to nationality or ethnic group. Continuing action is taken to detect enemy civilians who should be interned; examine civilians for communicable and other diseases; prepare individual identification records; reestablish family groups; provide food, clothing, and additional medical care; and prepare individuals for future disposition.

(2) In the designation of locations, care is taken to avoid those which are in the vicinity of profitable targets, such as vital communications centers and large military installations. In the selection of local facilities, consideration is given to the temporary or semipermanent nature of the facilities to be established, and to such factors as weatherproof roofing, solid floors, ventilation, provisions for water supply, sewage and waste disposal, and proximity to local sources of food supply. Another factor in camp location is whether inhabitants will be a source of indigenous labor.

(3) The specific type of authorized construction, which is the minimum necessary to satisfy the requirements of the particular situation, varies according to local climate, anticipated permanency of the particular camp, number of camps to be constructed, extent of local sources of labor and materials, and the availability from military resources of engineer materials and assistance. Whenever possible, construction is accomplished by the displaced persons, refugees, and evacuees themselves, or by local agencies of government employing civilian labor. Local sources of materials are utilized to the maximum practicable extent in accordance with legal limitations.

(4) The administration and operation usually is directed by a CA platoon under the supervision of its company headquarters. The parent CA company provides technical advice, support, and assistance, and may furnish additional platoons and functional teams or specialists, such as displaced persons, public health, public welfare, or public safety teams, at any particular camp according to the requirements of the particular situation. In the event that additional functional teams or specialists are required beyond the capabilities of the CA company, the company commander requests necessary assistance from the CA battalion. Because of the large numbers of displaced persons, refugees, and evacuees for whom control and care normally must be provided, maximum attention must be given to the use of local civilian personnel to provide the cadre for camp administration. This cadre should be organized and trained prior to the opening of the camp. Whenever practicable, civilian personnel should be obtained from public and private welfare organizations and employed under military supervision.
(5) Inmates of camps should be required not only to establish and maintain the organization for internal camp administration but also to assist in maintaining the physical security of the installation. Within the limitations imposed by international law, camps should provide the necessary labor for their own operations and within applicable limitations should be considered as a source of labor. Allied liaison officers and representatives of international organizations and of local governments are conducted on visits to camps as required.
APPENDIX F
CIVIL DEFENSE AND REAR AREA PROTECTION
(STANAG 2079)

F-1. General

a. Doctrine for Rear Area Protection (RAP) is contained in FM 19-45-1 (TEST).

b. It will be noted that the civil affairs tasks discussed herein are applicable under circumstances of limited or general war with civil affairs authority vested in the military commander. In certain circumstances during peace and cold war, where the military commander is not vested with civil affairs authority, CA functional teams may assist, advise, and support allied military governmental or civilian authorities in the performance of these tasks.

c. Civil defense, area damage control, and rear area protection planning and operations should be mutually supporting. Preattack planning will give consideration to such matters as camouflage, circulation of traffic, movement of individuals, blackouts, construction of shelters, warning systems, labor, firefighting and decontamination procedures, equipment, and personnel. In postattack recovery operations, radiological survey and decontamination processes will benefit both military personnel and civilians. Civilian and military firefighting equipment and labor potential can be coordinated or pooled, where advantageous, as can medical services. Any major movement of civilians as the result of an attack will have a direct bearing on the circulation of military traffic. In repair and reconstruction activities, equipment, technicians, labor, and materiel of troop units concerned and the capabilities of civilian population should be coordinated to the maximum advantage of both.

d. The G5 has general staff supervision over civil defense activities and may assign the responsibility for civil defense planning and measures for the control of the civilian populace to the CA unit commander. The CA unit commander is responsible for implementation of civil defense plans and for coordination of control measures with appropriate agencies of government. To the maximum extent practicable, local officials are held responsible for organization of local civil defense activities and effective conduct of civil defense measures.

e. Civil defense planning is not confined to protective measures against weapons in the mass destruction category, but must include protection against all types of warfare, and against all forms of natural disaster such as floods, fires, and earthquakes. In the development of civil defense plans, consideration is given to—

   (1) Correlation with the area damage control plan.
   (2) Provisions for emergency repair of vital
installations, fire prevention and protection, disposal of enemy explosive ordnance, and emergency hospitalization of civilian personnel.

(8) Maximum utilization of existing local plans, organizations, and facilities.

(4) Mutual support provisions to enable both military and civilian rescue and working parties and their equipment to be employed in the installations and facilities of either.

(5) Establishment of civilian control centers in the vicinity of control centers, whenever feasible, in order to receive air raid warnings, dispatch orders, direct emergency services, and coordinate measures between military and civil organizations and facilities.

(6) Coordination of neighboring civil defense organizations particularly when the boundaries of military sectors cross political boundaries.

(7) Establishment of civil defense organizations in towns and cities where they do not already exist.

(8) Establishment of civil defense organizations at provincial and national levels as soon as the situation permits.

(9) Organization and training of personnel of fixed support installations or facilities for provision of emergency hospitalization, housing, feeding, and mobile reserve teams capable of rapid movement for the performance of police, rescue, fire, medical, and engineering services.

(10) Plans for the evacuation of cities and towns rendered unsafe as a result of nuclear attack or natural disasters, and necessary transportation and control.

(11) Development of protective measures against guerrillas, infiltrators, and subversive elements during a period of disruption or disorganization.

(12) Education of the local population in civil defense operations and provisions for the dissemination of information, orders, and instructions requiring group action, and assignment of individual responsibilities.

f. The CA unit commander coordinates the activities of the various functional specialists who supervise the local agencies of government and civil defense services most closely related to their respective specialties. Organization or augmentation of the following types of services is desirable in most situations.

(1) Police services.
(2) Fire services.
(3) Warden services.
(4) Public health services.
(5) CBR defense services.
(6) Rescue and engineering services.
(7) Communications and transportation.
(8) Public welfare services.
(9) Local information bureaus.

g. Logistical planning should include provisions for anticipated requirements of civil defense equipment and supplies in order that unscheduled diversions from military stocks will be minimized. The stockpiling of selected salvage items such as material for shelter construction, clothing and blankets will assist in reducing the drain on military stocks. Civil defense equipment and supplies which should be available for issue to the local government may include firefighting and other heavy equipment, tools, and civilian relief supplies.

F-3. Rear Area Protection

a. In rear areas, civil affairs operations increase in scope and complexity. Displaced persons, refugees, and evacuees moving back from combat areas must be fed, sheltered, and controlled. Civilian administration is reconstituted; and programs are instituted to support military operations, prevent disaffection, relieve distress, and initiate rehabilitative measures. Steps must be taken to alleviate disease, hardship, idleness, and inequalities of an economic, political, or social nature.

b. In rear area protection operations, a maximum effort should be made to use available loyal indigenous personnel to assist in security of the area. Civil affairs programs can play an important role in rear area protection operations. Examples of civil affairs operations which can muster civil assistance are—

(1) Increasing the efficiency of the local administration so that orders, intelligence, requests, and information pass expeditiously in either direction between the military commander, the civil administration, and the populace.

(2) Improving the efficiency of the civil police and its image with the populace in order to enhance its effectiveness in security, control, and intelligence.

(3) Improving local health through public health measures to enhance the government image, increase civilian productivity, and eradicate contagious disease.

(4) Initiating or improving public welfare activities, such as centers for the aged.

(5) Locating and negotiating for civilian resources required for military use.
(6) Organizing or modernizing public facilities such as water distribution, sewage disposal, power, communications, and transportation to increase the general efficiency and productivity of the area.

(7) Preparing and disseminating information through military and civilian information and psychological operations media.

F-4. Counterguerrilla Operations

a. It is essential that initial civil affairs operations be directed primarily toward gaining control of the populace in land areas occupied or liberated by the military force. Guerrillas depend on the active support of the local inhabitants for food, medical supplies, shelter, intelligence, and personnel. No effective guerrilla movement can exist without the passive sympathy of the local population; therefore, a basic objective of counterguerrilla operations is to separate guerrilla forces from civilian support. Since guerrillas thrive on confusion and the disorganization of government, civil affairs operations are conducted to engender stable conditions through local relief, restoration of law and order, a resumption of agricultural production, reestablishment of local government and measures to enlist the active support and sympathy of the local populace. Appropriate consideration is given to the use of rewards for friendly assistance, imposition of punishment for collaboration with guerrillas, employment of propaganda media, and imposition of necessary restrictive measures.

b. When the local populace collaborates with hostile guerrilla forces, rigid controls and restrictions are imposed. Such controls and restrictions may be relaxed subsequently according to the requirements of the situation. Punishment for violation of regulations and restrictions must be just and deserved to prevent exploitation by guerrillas. Maximum publicity is given to those offenses for which punishment is imposed. In order to reduce collaboration with guerrillas, it may be desirable to impose strict rationing controls on the production, distribution, and consumption of food, clothing, medical, and other supplies.

c. Planning for rear area protection is initiated without delay, is continuous, and includes plans to prevent, minimize, and combat enemy guerrilla activities. Planning for defense against guerrilla action requires a detailed analysis of intelligence of the area of operations including the enemy, weather, terrain, national characteristics, customs, beliefs, and desires of the people. Consideration is given to political and economic policies that are necessary to gain control of the area and its populace. Plans must be effectively coordinated with adjacent commands and vigorously implemented in all areas to prevent the movement of guerrillas.

d. Local and national police security detachments and other formations of local personnel and displaced persons are organized and utilized to guard critical installations against sabotage and to function as information collecting agencies. In rear areas, local civilians who are dependable and sympathetic are employed in security units and as agents and informers to infiltrate guerrilla units and report their movements and locations. Labor and service units may be utilized in the storage and distribution of supplies and the preparation of defensive works.

e. Screening of local civilian employees is essential to prevent information of military operations and troop movements from falling into the hands of guerrillas and infiltrators.

f. It may be necessary to provide essential items of supply to segments of the civilian populace, including victims of resistance force attacks, groups which have been relocated or concentrated for security reasons, and other civilians whose resistance to insurgent forces may be weakened by hunger and distress. These supplies initially will be limited to such survival items as food, medical supplies, clothing, fuel, and construction material. Emergency supplies must be safeguarded and controlled to insure equitable distribution and their denial to hostile elements.

g. No guerrilla movement will achieve success without the willing or coerced support of a portion of the civilian populace. The following are suggested methods of control of civilians which may be adopted by CA units:

(1) Confiscate weapons to reduce their availability to guerrilla seizure. Establish an accountability system for those weapons retained by civilians.

(2) Register all civilians and set up an identity card system.

(3) Establish a curfew with due consideration for civilian needs.

(4) Set up circulation controls.

(5) Suspend such personal rights as may be necessary and legally permissible to allow searches and arrest on suspicion.

(6) Evacuate designated areas.
(7) Provide security for friendly civilians and their families.
(8) Establish a reporting system covering treatment of wounds and administration of medical aid.
(9) Furnish relief supplies as required.
(10) Conduct educational forums to counter guerrilla propaganda and outline positive programs.
(11) Secure reports on absentee employees.
(12) Maintain control and accountability over foodstuffs, medicine, livestock, raw material, or other matter which may be of assistance to guerrillas.
(13) Establish rationing systems for critical items.
(14) Confiscate property of collaborators.
(15) Censor media of public communication.
(16) License all forms of transportation.
(17) Establish an information program with the support of psychological operations personnel to publicize measures taken, reasons therefor, and punishments for noncompliance.
(18) Reward civilians who contribute actively to counterresistance programs.
(19) Restore normal community processes of public health, safety, education, communications, transportation, waste disposal, water supply, legal processes, and other expressions of civil government and administration.
(20) Introduce necessary governmental and legal reforms.
(21) Stimulate production of agricultural products and other essential goods.
(22) Increase development and utilization of local resources.
(23) Improve community relations activities.
(24) Encourage civic action programs.

h. Counterguerrilla operations present legal and political problems of great complexity and sensitivity. Guerrillas, depending upon their status under international law, may be equated to regular armed units of the enemy or be regarded simply as brigands and bandits. For information concerning legal rules applicable to guerrillas and the use of local inhabitants in counterguerrilla operations, see FM 27-10.
APPENDIX G
SAMPLE ORDINANCES AND NOTICES (STANAG 2056)

1. The sample ordinances and notices contained in this appendix are models for preparation of similar documents in military government situations and may not apply to all situations. They have no application in situations short of full assumption of executive, legislative, and judicial authority by the U.S. military commander.

2. This appendix does not include samples of proclamations, as such documents are usually statements of far-reaching policy determination prepared at the highest governmental and military command levels for the signature of a supreme commander or figure of similar stature. They are intended for dissemination through affected countries and areas and all available channels, including civil affairs channels, are employed. CA personnel normally will not be involved in the drafting of such proclamations.

EXAMPLE OF AN ORDINANCE PERTAINING TO THE CIRCULATION OF CURRENCY IN OCCUPIED TERRITORY

ORDINANCE NO. 51
CURRENCY

ARTICLE I
Allied Military Currency

1. Allied Military Currency notes bearing local denominations and in readily distinguishable form shall be legal tender in the occupied territory for the payment of any debt expressed in terms of the local currency.

2. Allied Military Currency Notes will in all respects be equivalent to any other local currency which is legal tender and of equal value.

3. No person shall discriminate between Allied Military Currency Notes and any other local currency which is legal tender and of equal value.

ARTICLE II
Prohibited Transactions

4. Except as authorized by the Civil Affairs Administrator, no person shall make or enter, or offer to enter, into any arrangement or transaction providing for payment in or delivery of a currency other than Allied Military Currency or Notes or local currency which is legal tender and of equal value.

ARTICLE III
Penalties

5. Any person violating any provision of this Ordinance shall, upon conviction by a Civil Affairs Court, be liable to any lawful punishment, other than death, as the Court may determine.
ARTICLE IV

6. This Ordinance shall become effective upon the date of its first promulgation.

General, United States Army
Civil Affairs Administrator

EXAMPLE OF AN ORDINANCE PUBLISHED IN OCCUPIED TERRITORY SPECIFYING PENALTIES FOR CRIMES AND OFFENSES

ORDINANCE NO. 4

PROHIBITION OF WEARING OF MILITARY UNIFORMS

ARTICLE I

1. No former member of the armed forces and no other civilian shall at any time wear or display on his person or clothing any military decorations, medals, or badges or rank or any miniatures thereof.

ARTICLE II

2. From the effective date of this article, no former member of the armed forces and no other civilian shall at any time wear a military uniform or any part thereof, in its regulation color and pattern.

3. The wearing of garments which have been produced by dyeing a uniform a color other than (indicated denied colors) or by remodeling it into a civilian pattern will be permitted, provided such dyed or remodeled garments may not be readily identified as a uniform. This provision does not apply to headgear of any military uniform, which will in no event be worn.

ARTICLE III

4. The term “military uniform” shall mean any uniform of—
   (a) Any branch of the armed forces, including any armed forces prior to ____________
   (b) The Party, its formations or affiliated or supervised organizations, and
   (c) Any para-military organization, and police uniforms similar thereto, and shall include all outer garments, including shirts and headgear but not including boots, shoes, or socks.

ARTICLE IV

5. The term “insignia” shall include but shall not be limited to collar, sleeve or shoulder ornaments or devices, distinctive braid and distinctive buttons of any of the organizations listed in Article III.

6. The term “military decorations and medals” shall include but not be limited to decorations and medals awarded to military personnel or to civilians for services related to the organizations listed in Article III, or for any other services related to military operations, but will not include decorations or medals granted or authorized by the government of any of the United Nations.

7. The term “military insignia and badges of rank” means insignia and badges or rank of any of the organizations listed in Article III.
ARTICLE V

8. The senior official at each level of government will initiate and carry out a program for the remodeling and dyeing of uniforms and for the collection and distribution of clothing to those without adequate clothing. He is responsible for the distribution of clothing between communities within the areas under his jurisdiction. For these purposes, mayors and county councilors shall have power to requisition surplus clothing. Without limiting individual responsibility hereunder, mayors and county councilors shall be responsible for insuring compliance within their areas of the terms of Articles I, II, and III hereto.

ARTICLE VI

9. Any person violating any of the provisions of this Ordinance shall upon conviction by a Civil Affairs Court be liable to any lawful punishment, other than death, as the Court may determine.

ARTICLE VII

10. Article II and III of this Ordinance shall become effective on ________________. Articles I, IV, V, and VI shall become effective on ________________

General, United States Army
Civil Affairs Administrator

EXAMPLE OF A NOTICE SPECIFYING HOURS OF CURFEW IN OCCUPIED TERRITORY

NOTICE
CURFEW

Until further notice no person within __________ will be permitted to circulate on the streets or outside his own house without a permit of Civil Affairs authorities between the hours of _______ and _______.

Any persons found in the streets without such permit between those hours will be severely punished.

All persons are further warned that military guards are instructed to shoot any person seen outside his house after hours attempting to hide or escape.

Major General, United States Army
Commanding General
APPENDIX H

APPLICABLE STANAG'S AND SOLOG'S

H-1. Types of international standardization agreements included in this appendix are:
   a. STANAG—(STANdardization AGREement); NATO Military Agency for Standardization (MAS).
   b. CENTO STANAG—(STANdardization AGREement); applicable to nations of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO).
   c. SEASTAG—(South East Asia Standardization AGREement); applicable to nations of the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).
   d. SOLOG—(Standardization of Operations and LOGistics); A non-materiel agreement applicable to the American, British, Canadian, and Australian (ABCA) nations.

H-2. The agreements in this appendix, except as otherwise indicated, have been ratified by the NATO, CENTO, SEATO, and ABCA nations.

H-3. The STANAG's and SOLOG's which are similar in their provisions have the SOLOG number in parenthesis next to the STANAG number.

STANAG AGREEMENT 2055 (SOLOG 29)
CIVIL AFFAIRS/MILITARY GOVERNMENT

PRINCIPLES OF OPERATION

DETAILS OF AGREEMENT

GENERAL

1. It is agreed that the NATO Armed Forces will adopt the principles of operation for Civil Affairs/Military Government contained in the succeeding paragraphs.

SCOPE

2. The following general principles apply to all Civil Affairs and Military Government operations; they are the basis for initial planning purposes in the absence of specific guidance:
   a. Humanity. The principle of humanity prohibits the use of any degree of violence not actually necessary for the purpose of the war. War is not an excuse for ignoring established humanitarian principles. To a large extent these principles have been given concrete form in the law of war; but because all of these principles have not become legal rules, a military commander should consider whether a proposed course of action would be humane even though not prohibited by international law.
   b. Benefit of the Governed. Subject to the requirements of the military situation, the principle of governing for the benefit of the governed should be observed.
c. Reciprocal Responsibilities. The commander of an occupying force has the right, within the limits set by international law, to demand and enforce such obedience from the inhabitants of an occupied area as may be necessary for the accomplishment of his mission and the proper administration of the area. In return for such obedience, the inhabitants have a right to freedom from unnecessary interference with their individual liberty and property rights.

d. Command Responsibility. Responsibility and authority for the conduct of Civil Affairs/Military Government operations are vested in the senior military commander, who is guided by directives from higher authority, national policies, applicable agreements and international law.

e. Continuity of Policy. Continuity and consistency in policy are essential to the success of Civil Affairs/Military Government operations. Therefore, it is fundamental that overall policy be developed at governmental or top command levels and transmitted through normal command channels.

f. Inclusion of Civil Affairs/Military Government Aspects in Plans and Orders. It is essential that military directives, plans and orders contain guidance to insure the accomplishment of the Civil Affairs/Military Government mission.

g. Economy of Personnel. The duties of Civil Affairs/Military Government personnel should be confined where possible to supervision over existing or reestablished civilian authorities.

h. Integration in Combined Operations. In Combined Operations, integration of Civil Affairs/Military Government may be preferable to establishing separate areas of national responsibility. The decision of the commander of the occupying forces in the matter will depend upon the circumstances confronting him. If integration is decided upon, this will be achieved by exercising Civil Affairs/Military Government control through a combined command. Such integration should be included at appropriate command levels, but should not extend to the command of Civil Affairs/Military Government units or detachments of one nation by officers of another.

STANAG 2056 (SOLOG 39)

STANDARD CIVIL AFFAIRS/MILITARY GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS (PROCLAMATIONS AND ORDINANCES)

DETAILS OF AGREEMENT

GENERAL
1. It is agreed that the NATO Armed Forces will follow the policies and procedures for Civil Affairs/Military Government documents such as proclamations and ordinances, indicated in the succeeding paragraphs.

SCOPE
2. All initial proclamations and appropriate ordinances should receive the approval of the governments concerned prior to promulgation.
3. Initial proclamations should contain, where appropriate, the following:
   a. Declaration of the occupation. This is formal notice of the fact of occupation and of the extent of the area over which the armed forces assume jurisdiction.
   b. A statement as to the purpose and policy of the occupation.
c. A declaration of the supremacy of the theatre commander. This is an essential prerequisite to the administration of any Military Government. It should announce with a Military Governor has been appointed and that political ties with, and obligations to, the enemy government, if any, are suspended. It should announce that inhabitants will be required to obey orders of the theatre commander and his subordinates and to abstain from all acts or words of hostility or disrespect to the occupying forces.

d. Confirmation that, unless the military authority directs otherwise, local laws and customs will continue in force, local officials will continue in office, and officials and employees of all transportation and communications systems and of public utilities and other essential services will carry on with their regular tasks.

e. Assurance that persons who obey the instructions of the military authority will be protected in their persons, property, religion, and domestic rights and will be allowed to carry on their usual occupations.

f. A statement that further proclamations or ordinances will accompany or follow the initial proclamation, specifying in detail what is required of the inhabitants.

g. Place and date document is signed, signature and military title of the issuing authority.

h. In the event the situation above is a Civil Affairs Administration of a liberated territory, rather than an occupation, the preceding paragraphs a to f should be appropriately modified.

4. Subsequent proclamations, numbered in sequence, contain detailed rules governing the conduct of the population. These rules of conduct may also be set forth in ordinances.

5. The format of Ordinances should be standardized to the following extent:

a. Ordinances should be numbered in sequence.

b. They should consist of a series of main subdivisions called Articles.

c. They should contain definitions of any terms used in them which are ambiguous or unfamiliar to the persons to whom they are addressed.

d. The final Article in each ordinance should specify the effective date of the ordinance.

e. Ordinances should be signed by the Military Governor or by some authorized subordinate.

6. Proclamations and ordinances will be published in all such languages as may be necessary to insure that they are understood by members of the occupying force and by the inhabitants of the occupied territory.
SCOPE

2. The introduction of Civil Affairs and Military Government subjects for instruction, the method of providing the information and the amount of time to be devoted to each subject of instruction will be decided by the Service concerned.

3. Training will be conducted to familiarize all military personnel with Civil Affairs and Military Government operations. The following subjects will be included:
   a. The purpose and necessity of Civil Affairs and Military Government in military operations.
   b. Rules and conventions governing war, with emphasis on the enforcement of law, preservation of order, and the prevention of wanton destruction of civilian property, communications, records, etc.
   c. Organization and functions of Civil Affairs and Military Government staffs and units.
   d. The individual soldier's relation to Civil Affairs and Military Government operations.

4. Training in Civil Affairs and Military Government conducted in courses of command and staff schools or colleges will be preceded by training outlined in paragraph 3 above and will include the following subjects:
   a. Comparison of systems of government.
   b. Training and employment of Civil Affairs and Military Government units and personnel.
   c. Civil Affairs and Military Government planning.
   d. The combined or interallied aspects of Civil Affairs and Military Government operations.
   e. The methods of including Civil Affairs and Military Government problems in instructional training exercises.

5. Courses for Civil Affairs and Military Government personnel will include the following subjects:
   b. Comparative government, national, state or provincial, and lower levels.
   c. Organization of the Army.
   e. Staff functions and procedures.
   f. Rules of land warfare and appropriate maritime law.
   g. Civil Affairs/Military Government organization.
   h. Civil Affairs/Military Government functions including courts, public safety, public health and others.
   i. Local procurement in support of military operations.
   j. Logistical organization and procedures of the Armed Forces.
   k. The nature of interallied Civil Affairs/Military Government operations.

   1. On mobilization, regional and language training.

6. Courses conducted at combined training centres will be similar to the courses for Civil Affairs/Military Government personnel with additional emphasis on interallied operations.
STANAG 2058 (SOLOG 41)
CIVIL AFFAIRS/MILITARY GOVERNMENT
PRINCIPLES OF ORGANIZATION

DETAILS OF AGREEMENT

GENERAL
1. It is agreed that the NATO Armed Forces accept the principles of organization for Civil Affairs/Military Government as shown in the succeeding paragraphs.

SCOPE
2. Civil Affairs/Military Government is a command responsibility.
3. The function of Civil Affairs/Military Government is supervised and directed by the commander, assisted by an appropriate staff.
4. Civil Affairs/Military Government operations are performed executively by Civil Affairs/Military Government units or detachments insofar as practicable.
5. The organization for Civil Affairs/Military Government is flexible in order to function effectively under varying situations and contingencies.
6. Integration of Civil Affairs/Military Government personnel is desirable in combined operations. The decision of the Commander of the occupying forces in the matter will depend upon the circumstances confronting him. If integration is decided upon it should not normally extend to the command of Civil Affairs/Military Government units or detachments of one nation by officers of another.
7. The Armed Forces of the NATO countries will accept responsibility for appropriate administration and support required by attached Civil Affairs/Military Government personnel or units of any of the other Armed Forces.

STANAG NO. 2065 (SOLOG 42)
TRAINING PRINCIPLES FOR NATO ARMED FORCES

DETAILS OF AGREEMENT

GENERAL
1. It is agreed that the NATO Armed Forces accept the following principles for training in Civil Affairs/Military Government.

SCOPE
2. Introduction of Training
   The introduction of Civil Affairs/Military Government training, the method of providing the instruction and the amount of time devoted to training will be decided by the Service concerned.
3. Basic Training
   Basic orientation in Civil Affairs/Military Government will be provided for all Service personnel on active duty.
4. Further Training
   a. Additional general instruction should be given to all officers on active duty to impart a knowledge at least equivalent to that required
in regard to organization and operation of administrative and technical services.

b. Advanced instruction will be given at high level military schools at which officers are trained for command and staff assignments.

5. Maneuvers and Exercises

Maneuvers and other training exercises will when practicable include problems requiring the participation of Civil Affairs/Military Government units and personnel.

6. Training on Civil Affairs/Military Government Personnel

a. Civil Affairs/Military Government personnel will receive military training.

b. The functional training provided for specialist personnel will be designed to adapt their civilian specialties to military operations.

c. Civil Affairs/Military Government personnel will receive appropriate regional training in accordance with their planned assignment.

d. Civil Affairs, Military Government personnel assigned to a theater or area having an interallied command should normally receive additional training at a combined training center and/or school.

STANAG NO. 2079 (SOLOG 48)

REAR AREA SECURITY AND REAR DAMAGE CONTROL

DETAILS OF AGREEMENT

GENERAL

1. It is agreed that the NATO Armed Forces will establish a system providing for Rear Area Security and Rear Area Damage Control based on the principles and instructions contained in the succeeding pages and Annexes A and B.

SCOPE

2. This agreement is intended to provide for such planning as must be done by Field Armies, Communications Zones and/or Sections, and compatible commands, and units and installations within these commands. Whilst Rear Area Damage Control covered herein deals only with damage to military installations, it must be realized that damage to any civilian installation will have a repercussion on the military situation. It is emphasized that this agreement does not grant any additional powers to the NATO Forces with respect to civilian authorities and civilian responsibilities. Cooperation with national military and civilian officials is essential at all levels and will be accomplished through the national military authorities.

DEFINITIONS

3. The following definitions will be used in dealing with these subjects—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TERM</th>
<th>DEFINITION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rear Area</td>
<td>For the purpose of this STANAG, Rear Area includes:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a. The Land Communications Zone.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. The rear of the Land Combat Zone in which are located the bulk of the logistical installations (Army Service Area).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TERM</td>
<td>DEFINITION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rear Area Security</td>
<td>The measures taken prior to, during and/or after an enemy airborne attack; sabotage action, infiltration, guerrilla action and/or initiation of psychological or propaganda warfare to minimize the effects thereof.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rear Area Damage Control</td>
<td>The measures taken in military operations prior to, during, and after a mass destruction attack or natural disaster, to minimize the immediate effects thereof.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**GENERAL PRINCIPLES**

4. The following general principles concerning the preparation, use and format of plans and orders are applicable to both Rear Area Security and Rear Area Damage Control—

   a. For the Field Army, Communications Zone, Sections of the Communications Zone, and comparable Commands, it is desirable that responsibility for rear area security and for rear area damage control be combined in a single operation.

   b. An effective system for rear area security, rear area damage control and administrative support must possess the following characteristics:

      1. A definite fixing of geographic responsibilities for these activities.
      2. A single commander responsible for all three functions in the same geographic area.
      3. A control organization which prevents conflict and competition between agencies responsible for rear area security, rear area damage control, and administrative support and includes an operation centre (and alternate operations centre if required) for all three functions and the necessary communications.
      4. Provision for prompt integration of transit or lodger units into plans.

   c. The commander's plan for rear area security and for rear area damage control should be included in appropriate paragraphs of an Operations Order and/or appropriate annexes.

   d. Close coordination of plans for rear area security and rear area damage control is necessary at all levels.

   e. Full use should be made of automatic data processing equipment and other electronic and communications equipment to receive, collate and disseminate intelligence, radiological data including fallout and other data, and to assist in the control of rear area security and rear area damage control operations.

**REAR AREA SECURITY**

5. In addition to the general principles outlined in paragraph 4, the following principles are applicable in the planning for rear area security:

   a. The objective of rear area security planning is to prevent enemy interference by surface or airborne forces with administrative support operations and to destroy the hostile forces involved.

   b. Rear area security depends upon—

      1. Troops assigned the primary mission of rear area security (e.g., national territorial troops, combat troops).
      2. Other combat troops located temporarily within the area.
(3) Service troops assigned within the area.

c. All units are responsible for their local security, but, normally, service troops will not be allotted any security task other than that of their own installation.

d. Tasks of other than service troops may include, but are not necessarily limited to—
(1) Relief and rescue of attacked installations and units.
(2) Route patrolling and convoy protection.
(3) Surveillance of possible redoubt areas of guerrillas or infiltrators.
(4) Planning for defence of possible drop and landing zones.
(5) Finding, fixing and destroying enemy forces operating in rear areas.

6. Annex A outlines, in the Operation Order format, those items of basic information (other than that which would normally go into the order) that should be included in a typical rear area security operations plan or order. This is not to be construed as a complete order, nor is the information shown to be considered all of the possible additional information that might be required. (Annex A omitted.)

REAR AREA DAMAGE CONTROL

7. In addition to the general principles outlined in paragraph 4, the following principles are applicable in the planning for Rear Area Damage Control—

a. The army service area and communications zone contains lucrative targets for attack by mass destruction weapons. Detailed plans are therefore required to minimize the damage effects of such an attack.

b. Rear area damage control plans are prepared, based upon an assumed degree of damage, to ensure provisions of the means for minimizing personnel casualties and damage to installations resulting from enemy action or natural disaster. They are based upon the existing command organization; the scope of the plans depending on the size of the area, location and size of installations and communication routes and facilities. Subordinate commanders will prepare detailed plans based upon the overall plan.

c. Rear area damage control measures provide for, but are not necessarily limited to—

(1) Prior to an attack:
   (a) Clear lines of authority and responsibility down to the lowest level.
   (b) Adequate communications and warning systems to include fallout warning.
   (c) Proper dispersion within and between installations continuously planned and executed.
   (d) Preparation of necessary plans and SOP, to include reporting of information required for poststrike analysis.
   (e) Organization equipping, and training of all personnel in rear area damage control operations.
   (f) Appropriate use of cover and concealment.
   (g) Allocation, organization, and full utilization of available transportation net and equipment, to include alternate plans.
   (h) Deception measures.

(2) During and after an attack:
   (a) Rapid assessment of the damage and its immediate action on operations.
(b) Control of personnel and traffic either in coordination with the local civilian authorities or by the military when essential for continued military operations when the civilian police are inoperative.

(c) Fire prevention and firefighting.

(d) First Aid and evacuation of casualties.

(e) Protection against chemical, biological, and radiological hazards.

(f) Emergency supply of food, clothing and water.

(g) Explosive Ordnance reconnaissance and disposal.

(h) Initiation of salvage operations.

d. Available service units will normally furnish personnel, equipment and specialized assistance to carry out rear area damage control measures. The number of labour and rescue squads each unit will furnish will be prescribed in the current rear area damage control plan.

e. Fallout from an atomic detonation poses a serious threat to the safety of personnel and the utilization of materiel and may be a limiting factor in the planning for and conduct of these operations (e.g. exposure time may be critical).

8. Annex B outlines, in the Operation Order format, those items of basic information (other than that which would normally go into the order) that should be included in a typical rear area damage control plan or order. This is not to be construed as a complete order, nor is the information shown to be considered all of the possible additional information that might be required. (Annex B omitted.)

NOTE: The following agreement, currently in draft form, has not been ratified and is included here for information only:

**STANAG NO. 2091 (4TH DRAFT)**

**REFUGEE CONTROL**

**DETAILS OF AGREEMENT**


**GENERAL**

1. The NATO Nations agree the following principles for the guidance of Commanders of NATO Armed Forces operating on land who may be required to prevent refugee movement from interfering with military operations within Allied Command Europe (ACE). It should be noted that the term “refugee” excludes “evacuees” who are civilians, residents or transients, who have been ordered to move by a friendly national authority, and whose movement and accommodation are planned and controlled by this authority.

2. The term “national authorities” in this STANAG has the same meaning as the corresponding term in MC 36/2. It includes all national authorities with whom the Commanders of NATO Armed Forces may have to deal on refugee matters, normally through national commanders. The term “Commanders of NATO Armed Forces” has the same meaning as the term “Allied Commanders” referred to in the same document.

**INTRODUCTION**

3. It is emphasized that the following is only a guide to Commanders of NATO Armed Forces, and the extent to which parts or all of this guide can be applied must be judged in the light of existing circumstances.
4. In formulating the measures to be taken, the overall problem must be considered against the background of circumstances likely to prevail at the time. Nuclear warfare and the increased range of the air arm enable an enemy to stimulate panic and fear among the civilian population, including those at the rear of the fighting troops. The enemy might compel large numbers of civilians to flee their homes and to take to the roads. Should this happen, refugees would use all means of transport. Unless controlled, they may, for example:
   a. risk their own lives;
   b. obstruct the movement of military traffic;
   c. cause confusion by spreading rumours;
   d. incite disobedience to orders;
   e. cloak enemy infiltration.

5. Interference with military operations by refugee movement may have a serious effect on the general conduct of war. Such interference may be experienced at all levels of command. It is therefore essential that all Commanders of NATO Armed Forces are aware of:
   a. the responsibilities of national authorities which are listed in paragraph 7;
   b. their own responsibilities and the measures which they may have to take; these are stated in paragraph 8.

6. The national authorities, who are normally responsible for the planning and the implementation of all measures pertaining to refugees, agree within ACE on the following:
   a. The “stay-put” policy should be enforced. This means that each nation will do everything which is humanly possible to prevent any movement of population. Such movement as does take place should be rigidly controlled.
   b. Should refugee movements occur, routes and areas essential to Allied military operations must be kept clear of refugees.
   c. All actions taken with respect to refugees must be in consonance with the applicable provisions of the “Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12th August 1949” and other rules of war.
   d. Movements of evacuees must be regarded as an exception to the “stay-put policy.”

RESPONSIBILITIES OF NATIONAL AUTHORITIES

7. National authorities are normally responsible for all measures pertaining to refugees. For the information of Commanders of NATO Armed Forces, these may be summarized as follows:
   a. Planning implementing measures to enforce a “stay-put” policy; to activate the plans for the control of refugees; to take care of refugees who are in or enter their own territory; to bring unauthorized movement under control; to remove refugees from areas of military operations in order that interference may be avoided; and to transfer them to earmarked assembly and holding areas.
   b. Coordinating their plans and directives with Commanders of NATO Armed Forces, furnishing them with any estimated figures available in their planning and keeping them informed on general matters.
   c. Organizing and conducting the security screening of refugees.
   d. Organizing and conducting the medical screening and the screening for NBC contamination.
e. Providing for the transportation, administration and final disposition of refugees. If need be, arranging for any transit of refugees to another country. Movement or shipping of same to another country must be subject to international bilateral agreements concluded by national authorities (also see paragraph 6c, above).

f. Organizing a system for reporting refugee information to appropriate higher and adjacent national authorities, and exchanging information with Commanders of NATO Armed Forces concerned. This exchange of information may be extended, if needed, to authorities on either side of the frontier, when movements of refugees are likely to concern, at short notice, a neighbouring country.

RESPONSIBILITIES OF NATO ARMED FORCES COMMANDERS

8. Commanders of NATO Armed Forces are responsible for:

a. Assisting national authorities in the preparation of their plans for the control of refugees (see paragraph 10).

b. Requesting, if needed, national authorities to implement these plans (see paragraph 11).

c. Assisting in the implementation of national plans for the control of refugees when requested by national authorities, (see paragraph 12). This assistance will take place only when, in the judgment of the Commanders of NATO Armed Forces concerned:

(1) refugee matters might have a measurable effect on military operations;

(2) such assistance will not adversely affect the accomplishment of their military mission.

d. Assuming direct control where such action is essential to the progress of Allied military operations but only when the national authorities are no longer able to fulfill their mission effectively (see paragraph 13). In case of assumption of direct control by Commanders of NATO Armed Forces, the action imposed upon refugees, in consideration of the military mission, will take into account the general rules of humanity which prevail in relations between Allied military forces and civilian populations.

9. To facilitate the assumption by Commanders of NATO Armed Forces concerned of the above stated responsibilities, guidance is provided at paragraphs 10 to 13. In this respect, Commanders of NATO Armed Forces shall also, in consultation with national authorities, organize the necessary local contacts between their subordinates and appropriate national authorities. It must be noted that, for wartime, the following guidance may have to be adapted according to the provisions of the agreements and/or arrangements concluded between Commanders of NATO Armed Forces and national authorities within the framework of MC 36/2.

10. Assisting the Preparation of National Plans for the Control of Refugees.

a. The Commanders of NATO Armed Forces will assist national authorities by giving, on a need-to-know basis, only such information concerning the military plans which is essentially needed by these authorities to make their own plans.

b. The Commanders of NATO Armed Forces will also assist national authorities in co-ordinating these plans with the military operational plans. The aim of such co-ordination is to ensure that the operations of the NATO Armed Forces shall never be hindered by refugee movements. This co-ordination should cover:
(1) measures to enforce the "stay-put" policy (see Annex A (DofA)), including psychological measures.
(2) the appropriate time to enforce the stay-put policy;
(3) restrictions to be imposed on refugee traffic to include areas and routes to be kept free of refugees for operational purposes;
(4) organization of assembly and holding areas, routes and diversions for refugees;
(5) security measures, including handling of suspected persons among the refugees, and passing to Commanders of NATO Armed Forces of information collected from interrogation;
(6) guidance to be given to small NATO units so that, when faced with minor refugee problems, they may act in consonance with plans for the control of refugees;
(7) the exchange of relevant information between national authorities and Commanders of NATO Armed Forces concerned during the implementation of the plans.

c. The plans for the period of tension and the initial period of hostilities should be co-ordinated in peacetime. Contingency plans made in peacetime will follow the same rule.

d. During the period of tension and operations this co-ordination should be permanent and include the implementation of plans.

11. Requesting National Authorities to Implement their Plans for the Control of Refugees. The request will be made by Commanders of NATO Armed Forces concerned when, in their opinion, this enforcement is advisable. They will take into account, inter alia, the following factors:

a. That the enforcement of national plans is normally a national responsibility.

b. That the enforcement of the "stay-put" policy and measure or the control of refugees may be progressive. The degree of progressiveness will be determined by:

(1) the peacetime psychological preparation of the population;
(2) the geographic situation of the country;
(3) the troop movements that may occur;
(4) the means at hand to enforce the policy.

c. That the intervention of the Commanders of NATO Armed Forces must be justified by operational necessity.

12. Assisting in the Implementation of National Plans. When, according to paragraph 8c, the decision to assist in the implementation is made by the Commanders of NATO Armed Forces concerned, they will reach an arrangement with the appropriate national authorities on the following points:

a. Organization of the chain of command of NATO Forces assisting national authorities for this purpose. As far as possible these Forces should be placed under operational control of the national commanders.

b. Period during which assistance will be rendered.

c. Powers granted to the Commander of NATO Armed Forces. In principle these powers will be the same as those granted to the similar national authorities. Such powers must in all cases ensure the security of the Allied Forces.

d. Restrictions as to the employment of NATO Forces, imposed by the necessity to regroup the Forces; to keep good relations between the NATO troops and the population; to act legally according to the rules of the country concerned, etc.

e. Necessary logistic support of refugee control operations.

a. When the conditions stated in paragraph 8d exist, the Commanders of the NATO Armed Forces concerned will inform higher NATO authority and, as far as possible, higher national authorities, of their decision.

b. They will, on consultation with national authorities, assume operational control over the national forces and organizations committed previously to the enforcement of the plans for the control of refugees.

c. As far as possible, their plans will take into account those of the national authorities.

d. The plans of the Commanders of NATO Armed Forces will aim at relinquishing control of refugees to national authorities at the earliest possible time. In any case, the action of Commanders of NATO Armed Forces will be necessarily limited by the existing state of NATO operations.

e. The Commanders of NATO Armed Forces concerned will make plans, when considered appropriate, to meet the contingency of assuming direct control. To facilitate this, Annex A states the main points of national plans for refugees. The Commanders of NATO Armed Forces will extract from this general scheme what is necessary to reach their aim. When establishing check-points, they will, if possible, include national police or national military personnel in these check-points.

Annex A to Details of Agreement of STANAG 2091 (4th Draft)

NATIONAL PLANS FOR REFUGEES

GENERAL

1. The following list of main points is provided for Commanders of NATO Armed Forces in order to assist them in:

a. Assuming their responsibilities, especially those stated in paragraphs 10 and 12 of the Details of Agreement.

b. Keeping in mind those points which should be included in national plans. When plans are being co-ordinated by national authorities with the Commanders of NATO Armed Forces, as stated in paragraph 7, the Commanders can, if they consider that relevant points have been overlooked, bring them to the attention of the national authorities concerned.

c. Selecting those points needed to reach their aim, when assuming direct control, as stated in paragraph 13.

MAIN POINTS

2. a. Psychological Measures

   (1) Evacuation plans: The evacuation plans should be published and the public should be assured that the plan will be put into operation if necessary. To avoid rumours, the population must be informed constantly, comprehensively and objectively by all available means, with special emphasis on matters concerning its welfare.

   (2) Hazards of unauthorized flight: The population should be warned that refugees may, on route:

      (a) risk their lives possibly more than if they remained at home;

      (b) be exposed to privation;
(c) run the risk of losing their property.

(3) Rumours: The population must be instructed in possible consequences of rumours.

(4) Passive local protection: The population should be indoctrinated in the protection offered by existing shelters and houses, and the manifold protective advantages of cellars and basements against nuclear fallout, blast effects and radiation.

(5) Fallout information: The public should frequently be informed of the extent and intensity of fallout.

b. Restrictive Measures.

(1) Curfew or other restriction on freedom of movement.

(2) Barrage lines on rivers, canals, outskirts of cities, etc., employed as check-points.

(3) Prohibition of the use of private and public vehicles.

(4) Rationing of motor fuel.

CONTROL OF POSSIBLE REFUGEE MOVEMENTS

3. a. The aim of such control is twofold:

(1) to avoid any interference with NATO military operations;

(2) to bring the refugee movement under control and stop it as soon as possible.

b. This control must be established at the source of the movement and at the border passes and may take the form of:

(1) deflection from essential military routes or areas into temporary assembly and holding areas;

(2) deflection into predetermined assembly and holding areas.

c. This can be done by a series of check-points. These check-points should be established under the following conditions:

(1) Tasks: To keep the designated routes and areas clear of refugee movements, and move the refugees in compliance with the refugee control plan.

(2) Location: At the approaches to the routes or areas required for military use; at deflection points along the routes followed by refugees.

(3) Composition: According to task.

(4) Communications: Check-points will be linked by mobile patrols and equipped with radio. Also, they will be provided with loud-speakers/megaphones and, if needed, provisions should be made for interpreters to ensure that refugees can be addressed in their own language.

(5) Commanders: The check-point commander will be designated by the Chief of the agency or unit responsible for the check-point. Written orders will include the provision that check-point duty personnel will receive, obey and pass on to relieving personnel these written orders from their Headquarters and oral orders from officers whose identity and authority is established beyond doubt.

ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANCE

4. The administrative assistance readily afforded to refugees may be a factor in establishing confidence and so facilitating control. Administrative assistance to refugees may take one or more of the following forms:

a. food;

b. clothing;

c. medical aid including hospitalization;
d. temporary shelter;
e. transport.

SECURITY
5. The screening and interrogation of refugees has to be organized to detect enemy agents and ensure the security of operations.

INFORMATION
6. A system of passing information to appropriate higher or adjacent authorities, if necessary on both sides of a border must be organized.
**APPENDIX I**

**SAMPLE CIVIL AFFAIRS AGREEMENT**

**CENTRAL EUROPE**

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**SAMPLE CIVIL AFFAIRS AGREEMENT**

**BETWEEN**

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND,
THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS,
THE REPUBLIC OF GERMANY,
THE GRAND DUCHY OF LUXEMBOURG,
AND THE KINGDOM OF BELGIUM

**NOTE:** This agreement is purely hypothetical in character and content. This sample does not necessarily cover all areas of interest of a civil affairs agreement. Facts and circumstances, area of operations, and the
time element may contribute additional areas of accord. This document is intended for instructional purposes only and its use for other purposes is not authorized.

PREAMBLE

1. This agreement establishes procedures whereby the UNITED STATES and its Allies, pursuant to the provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, unite and cooperate as Allied Nations in a common effort to defeat the forces of any attack. Changes to this agreement or further refinements by the contracting states that are considered necessary for the prosecution of the war to its final conclusion will be the subject of supplemental or subsequent agreements or special arrangements as may be required by the Allied forces in areas of vital importance.

2. This agreement, relating to administrative and jurisdictional questions which will arise in the course of military operations on Continental Europe, is intended to be essentially temporary and practical. It is designed to facilitate, in so far as possible, the accomplishment of the following objectives:

   a. The speedy, total, and final defeat of the common enemy; the liberation of the territory of Allied Nations who are party to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; and the resumption of those nations in their historic places among the nations of the world.

   b. The direction and coordination of any assistance the authorities of the receiving States will be able to render to the Allied Forces who are operating in the continental territories of the receiving States.

   c. The adoption in that territory of all measures deemed necessary by the Supreme Allied Commander and in consonance with customary and conventional international law for the successful conduct of his operations.

Article 1

Definitions and Designation of Authority

3. For the purpose of this agreement the terms listed below shall have the following meanings:

a. The term “territory” means all territory under the sovereignty of the government of the receiving State as of 1 January.

b. The term “Senior Representative of a Sending State” means the Commander of the sending State Forces in the receiving State regardless of the style of his official title. This representative is hereinafter referred to as the “Commanding General.”

c. The term “Receiving State Armed Forces” means the receiving States Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, Coast and Geodetic Survey, Public Health Service, and such other organizations as are or hereinafter may be, designated as components of the Receiving States Armed Forces.

d. The term “military law” means the military, naval, and air force laws and regulations of the Sending State Armed Forces.

e. The term “Members of the Sending State Forces” means personnel of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, Coast and Geodetic Survey, Public Health Service, and all other uniformed members of organizations which are subject to military law; sending State civilians who are employed by, accompanying or serving with the
sending State Forces and who are not members of the sending State Forces and who are employed by or who are accompanying those forces and are subject to military law.

f. The term "Displaced Person" means a civilian who is involuntary outside the national boundaries of his country.

g. The term "refugee" means a civilian, who by reason of real or imagined danger, has left his home to seek safety elsewhere.

h. The term "Forward Zone" means that part of the Area of Operations required for the conduct of war by the field forces of the Commanding General. The rear boundary will be designated by the Commanding General and will be changed by him from time to time to conform to the movements of the armed forces.

i. The term "Interior Zone" means all other areas of the receiving State.

j. The term "Military Areas" means certain sections or portions of the Interior Zone such as river ports, fortified areas, railroad and communications centers, airfields, and troop concentrations and supply areas of vital importance to military operations. The government of the receiving State shall make such designations upon being advised of the determination by the Commanding General that such actions are necessary in view of the requirements of military operations. Such designation shall be terminated as soon as practicable, after the Commanding General determines that the military situation permits such removal without endangering the conduct of military operations or the security of the sending States forces.

k. The term "Facilities" as used in this agreement means government-owned or privately-owned plants, mines, factories, hospitals, institutions, buildings, materials, products, processes, etc., including government provided or privately-provided services, located or provided in the territory of the receiving State or its commonwealth or possessions and supplied to the sending State.

l. The term "Real Estate" includes lands and interests therein, leaseholds, standing timber, permanent buildings, improvements, and appurtenances thereto. This includes improvements to the buildings or land thereof, but does not include machinery, equipment, or tools, which have been affixed to or which have been removed from land or buildings or may be removed without destroying the usefulness of the structure.

Article 2

Supreme Authority and Responsibility

4. Military authority and responsibility. In order to provide the exchange of information necessary for the full coordination desired, and to insure prompt, effective, and coordinated operations hereunder:

a. The accomplishment of the military objectives referred to in paragraph 2, hereto, being largely dependent upon the operations of the Allied Forces, Supreme Command authority over all military operations within the sending State Zone is hereby vested in the Supreme Allied Commander. Such authority confers upon the Supreme Allied Commander all authority necessary to insure that all measures permitted and recognized by the laws of war, by international agreements, and by recognized principles of international law are taken which are deemed necessary for the successful conduct of his operations.
b. Upon the request of the Commanding General, the police or other official personnel of the receiving State or any other political subdivision thereof in the Forward Zone, by order, may attach or assign nationals of the receiving State, including police and official personnel, to the forces of the Commanding General and such receiving State nationals shall, until such orders are revoked by the issuing authority, be subject to the authority of the Commanding General.

c. The Commanding General shall have full power to negotiate for and accept the surrender of enemy forces; or to conduct armistice proceedings; or other arrangements for the cessation of hostilities. The Military Delegate of the receiving State attached to his command will be informed and consulted in any negotiations for a general cessation of hostilities.

d. The governments of the receiving States pledges to use all of its resources and powers to support and assist the Commanding General in the conduct of the military operations contemplated by this agreement by placing the resources of the receiving State at the disposal of the Commanding General when he requests them as necessary for the successful conduct of his military operations. The foregoing, however, shall not require the government of the receiving State to place at the disposal (for military operations) of the Commanding General those resources which are required for the minimum essential needs of the civilian population.

5. Political authority and responsibility.

a. The sovereignty of the government of the receiving State over all the territory of the receiving State is mutually recognized and accepted. The conduct of the administration of the territory and responsibility thereof will be entirely a matter for the authorities of the receiving State.

b. The primary responsibility for governmental activity in the territory of the receiving State, shall be in the government of the receiving State and the political subdivisions thereof. The receiving State government will exercise responsibility for the civil administration subject to such special arrangements as may be required in areas of vital importance to the Allied Forces.

c. The Commanding General, insofar as the military situation permits, will provide advice, assistance, and support to the national and local governments of the receiving State in the discharge of such responsibilities.

d. The Commanding General is authorized to exercise authority over the civilian population and resources, insofar as the same is consistent with the laws of war and authorized by the government of the receiving State; in those areas.

(1) Which are designated as a Forward Zone or Interior Zone as defined in paragraph 3 hereof, or

(2) Which are designated as a Military Area in the Interior Zone as defined in paragraph 3 hereof, or

(3) Which are in an area where combat operations are being conducted.

e. In emergencies affecting military operations or public law and order in any territory of the receiving State where no authority is in a position to put into effect the measures deemed necessary by the
Commanding General for the proper conduct of military operations, or affecting the security of the forces under his command or the restoration and maintenance of public law and order, the Commanding General may take such measures as would normally go within the province of the receiving State governmental authorities in similar situations.

Article 3

**Jurisdiction Over Areas**

6. In any military area the Commanding General may take all measures deemed necessary by him for the conduct of military operations and in particular to assure the security and efficient operation of such installations. Subject to these provisions, the national and local authorities, as may be appropriate, will be responsible for the territorial administration and the control of the inhabitants residing in such military areas.

7. In the Forward Zone:

   a. The government of the receiving State will take all measures deemed necessary by the Commanding General to accomplish the objectives stated in paragraph 2 hereof.

   b. At the request of the Commanding General the government of the receiving State will declare a state of seige to exist in specified areas and will declare martial law when deemed necessary by the Commanding General.

8. In the Interior Zone:

   The conduct of the administration and responsibility therefor, including the exercise of martial law under a state of seige, will lie exclusively within the province of the government of the receiving State, subject in military areas to the special authority of the Commanding General and subject to the temporary and exceptional authority of the Commanding General conferred upon him under the provisions of Article 2.

9. In military areas and in areas where the local government has been rendered ineffective through disaster, guerrilla and/or nuclear attack, military authority will participate in local governmental activities only to the extent necessary to assure public law and order and prevent interference with military operations. Local government will be reestablished as early as is feasible.

Article 4

**Military Delegates**

10. Administration and Jurisdiction.

   a. In accordance with Article 18 of this Civil Affairs Agreement, a Delegate will be appointed for the present theater of operations. Other Delegates may be appointed in accordance with the development of operations.

   b. The Delegate will have at his disposal an administrative organization and a Military Delegate with liaison officers for administrative duties. The Delegate's particular task will be to centralize and facilitate relations between the Allied Military Command and the receiving State authorities.

   c. When the powers conferred on the Delegate by law of the receiving State are transferred to higher authorities, those authorities will execute the obligations of the Delegate under this agreement.
11. In the Forward Zone:

a. The Delegate will take, in accordance with laws of the receiving State, the measures deemed necessary by the Supreme Allied Commander to give effect to the provisions of Article 1, hereto, and in particular will issue regulations and make appointments in and removal from the public services.

b. In emergencies affecting military operations or where no receiving State authority is in a position to put into effect the measures deemed necessary by the Supreme Allied Commander under paragraph a of this Article, the latter may, as a temporary and exceptional measure, take such measures as are required by military necessity.

c. At the request of the Supreme Allied Commander, the Military Delegate will take such action consistent with his powers specified by his appointing authority under the state of siege in accordance with law of the receiving State's delineation zones as may be necessary.

12. In the Interior Zone:

a. The conduct of the administration of the territory and responsibility thereof, including the powers under the state of siege, will be entirely a matter for the authorities of the receiving State and the Supreme Allied Commander at the latter's request in order that all measures may be taken which the latter considers necessary for the conduct of military operation.

b. Moreover, certain zones or portions of the Interior Zone (known as military zones) may be subjected to a special control due to their vital military importance; for example, ports, fortified naval areas, aerodromes, and troop concentration areas. In such zones the Supreme Allied Commander is given the right to take all measures considered by him to be necessary for the conduct of operations, and, in particular, to assure the security and efficient operation of such installations. Consistent with these provisions, the conduct of the territorial administration and the responsibility therefor will be nevertheless solely a matter for the authorities of the receiving State.

13. The liaison officers mentioned in paragraph 10b of this Article, placed by the Military Delegate at the disposal of the receiving State administration, will insure liaison between the said administration and the Allied Forces.

14. Other questions arising as a result of the liberation of continental territories of the receiving State which are not dealt with in this Article shall form the subject of separate arrangements. Special arrangements will be made to secure the observation by the Allied forces of the receiving State regulations concerning the exchange of currency and export of capital and will be set out in appropriate agreements.

Article 5

Refugees and Displaced Persons

15. The government of the receiving State assumes all responsibility for the collection, evacuation and control of refugees and displaced persons within the territory of the receiving State, provided, however, that the collection, evacuation, and control of refugees and displaced persons in the Forward Zone or in any military area shall be, if the Commanding General so requests, under the supervision and direction of his representatives.
16. The government of the receiving State also assumes responsibility for furnishing the necessary food, clothing, shelter, and medical supplies for refugees and the Commanding General will provide similarly for displaced persons and persons who have not become integrated in the economy of the receiving State or who are homeless.

17. The government of the receiving State agrees that all operations concerning traffic, control centers, and the processing and screening of refugees and displaced persons will be made in consultation with representatives of the Commanding General and will be coordinated so as to result in the minimum interference with military operations.

18. The government of the receiving State will grant sending State authorities free access to all refugee and displaced persons camps and centers and will cooperate with sending State authorities in all processing and screening operations.

19. Upon evidence from the government of the receiving State that it is unable to meet its responsibilities in full under this Article, supplemental supplies from resources available to the sending State will be provided in accordance with priorities established by the Commanding General.

20. The Commanding General will make available to the government of the receiving State civil affairs personnel to the greatest extent possible in consonance with the requirements of the military operations, to aid, support, and assist in planning and operations under this Article, whenever called upon to do so by the government of the receiving State.

**Article 6**

**Guerrilla Action**

21. In recognition of the potential danger of guerrilla actions detrimental to the objectives of this agreement:

   a. The government of the receiving State assumes basic responsibility for both preventing and combating guerrilla actions.

   b. Neither the governments of the receiving State nor the forces of the sending State will commit acts of terrorism or reprisal against the civil population because of guerrilla actions nor will it permit such acts by any other persons.

   c. The sending State will assist the government of the receiving State in disseminating information to the civilian population to include the following:

      (1) Explanations for the presence of the forces of the sending State and agencies in the territory of the receiving State and of the activities of those forces and agencies.

      (2) Facts about the character, aims, and support of the guerrilla leadership.

   d. The government of the receiving State and the forces and agencies of the sending State will collaborate in identifying causes of unrest and dissatisfaction among the civilian population and in identifying and employing ways and means of ameliorating the basic difficulties, particularly those having social, political, and economic attributes.

   e. The forces of the sending State will take no direct action against guerrillas except as necessity may require. The forces of the sending State will, however, furnish logistical support to the government
of the receiving State in its actions against guerrillas if such actions are necessary.

Article 7
Nuclear Attacks

22. In recognition of the potential danger of future chemical, biological, nuclear attacks by enemy forces and his agents affecting the civilian population of the receiving State, and in agreement on the urgent necessity of immediate action required in such attacks and of the coordinations needed for rear area damage control, approval is made of the following measures:

a. The Supreme Allied Commander is authorized to exercise authority over the civilian population and resources of the receiving State in any area in the territory of the receiving State in which the capabilities of the government of the receiving State have become inadequate because of one or more nuclear explosions in the area.

b. The forces of the sending State and its agencies in such circumstances and to the extent that the attributes of the situations will permit, will provide emergency assistance to the civilian population affected to include food, shelter, medical aid, and transportation.

Article 8
Publicly Owned Facilities and Real Estate

23. The government of the receiving State will furnish such publicly owned facilities and real estate needed by the sending State forces in connection with their use of receiving State railroads, inland waterways (including ports, dockyards, and ship repairing facilities), roads, posts, airfields and accommodations, telephone, telegraph, and radio communications, together with any other facilities, or real estate which may be required by the Commanding General for military purposes in accordance with subsequent or supplemental agreements.

24. At the request of the Commanding General such facilities and real estate as may be agreed upon to dispose for the exclusive use of the sending State forces will be operated under his exclusive jurisdiction and control.

25. The government of the receiving State upon request of the Commanding General will give its consent to the rebuilding, reconstruction, enlargement, modification, repair, or alteration of any such facilities as in his judgment may be necessary for military purposes.

26. Subject to certain provisions, the Supreme Allied Commander shall, as soon as practicable, release all property which comes into the hands of forces operating under his command in the receiving State. The competent authorities of the receiving State shall, in respect of such property, resume their normal administrative functions and powers.

Article 9
Requisitioning

27. The sending State forces may, in accordance with the provisions of this Article, procure through the receiving State in the territory of the receiving State such privately owned or furnished facilities or real estate as they may require for their needs providing such procurements do not reduce the minimum essential requirements for the health, well being and safety of the civilian population.
28. At the request of the Commanding General or his nominees, the receiving State authorities will requisition in accordance with prices and wages prevailing at the place where the requisitioning is done, such facilities and real estate which the Commanding General determines are necessary for the needs of his command.

29. In situations within the provisions of paragraph 5d and e, the right of requisitioning is delegated to the Commanding General or his nominees who will exercise that right with the same force and effect as though such requisitioning were done by the receiving State authorities.

30. In order that the local requirements of the sending State forces may have the least possible disruptive effects on the economy of the receiving State the sending State military authorities and the receiving State civil authorities will consult together whenever operations permit as to the stores, supplies, labor and real estate which procurement agencies and individual officers and men of the sending State forces will be permitted by the Commanding General or his nominees to procure locally by requisition, purchase or hire. The sending State military authorities will place such restrictions as are agreed to be necessary on procurement or purchase whether by its agencies or by its troops.

31. Reimbursement of receiving State suppliers for supplies, services or facilities provided by them to the sending State armed forces will be accomplished by the receiving State authorities. Any necessary financial adjustment between the sending State and the receiving State in connection with the reimbursement of receiving State suppliers, will form the subject of a separate agreement.

Article 10
Currency (Military Payment Certificates)

32. The sending State forces are authorized to import into or out of the territory of the receiving State currencies in circulation in such territory as well as foreign currency, in such quantities and for such purposes as may be required for the conduct of military operations.

33. Members of the sending State forces may be paid with sending State Military Payment Certificates in such form and in such denominations as shall be decided upon by the government of the sending State. It will be unlawful for any person other than members of the sending States forces to be in possession of such sending State Military Payment Certificates. The government of the receiving State will undertake legislation which will prohibit possession of the sending State Military Payment Certificates by unauthorized persons.

34. Sending State Military Payment Certificates exchangeable for receiving State or other currencies at the sending State finance offices or other designated financial institutions which may be authorized to conduct such transactions. Rates of exchange will be established by competent authorities of the receiving State and representatives of the Commanding General. Purchase of receiving State currency by sending State personnel from any other source will be unlawful.

35. Sending State Military Payment Certificates will be legal tender at all sending State installations, including post exchanges, messes, and clubs, by personnel authorized to possess such certificates.

36. Receiving State currency will be placed at the disposal of the sending State forces in such amounts as are requested by the Command-
37. The possession of monetary instruments, such as money orders, travelers checks, or other checks, sending State currency or non-receiving State currency by members of the sending States forces shall not be deemed in violation of this agreement or of the receiving State laws.

38. The notes denominated in local currency which have been printed for the needs of Allied forces, as well as the notes denominated in local currency which will be printed in the future for the same purpose will be issued by the bank under control of the national government or authorized governmental financial organ.

39. The notes denominated in local currency which have been printed for the requirements of the Allied forces, and which have been placed at their disposal, will be considered as having been issued by the receiving States authorized financial branch.

40. The Allied forces will retain in their possession the notes denominated in local currency which have been placed at their disposal prior to the signature of this agreement.

41. The notes denominated in local currency which have not actually been placed in circulation, or which have not yet been placed at the disposal of the Allied forces, will in the future be placed in circulation or placed at the disposal of those forces only by the receiving State’s authorized financial branch. The necessary arrangements will be made to place these notes at the disposal of the appropriate authorized financial body, who subject to the provisions of the succeeding paragraph (42) will be free to use these notes at its convenience.

42. The receiving State’s financial institution will place at the disposal of the Allied forces at the request of the Supreme Allied Commander such amount of local currency as the Commander declares necessary for the use of the Allied forces in the receiving State in such denominations, such types, and at such places as the Commander shall request.

43. Allied military authorities shall keep a record of use of local currency at their disposal. Receiving State authorities shall be kept fully informed, and as regularly as practicable, of all expenditures in these notes. A representative shall be specially appointed for this purpose by the State’s financial institution.

44. The Allied forces will not introduce into the receiving State other notes than those which have been made available to them by the State’s official financial body. The notes of the receiving State’s Bank used in the receiving State by the Allied forces will also be subject to the provisions of this agreement. However, if it should become essential in the conduct of military operations to cause notes other than those of the receiving State furnished hereunder to be used, such notes shall only be used by the Commander as an exceptional and temporary measure and after consultation with the authorities of the receiving State.

45. The foregoing dispositions will also apply to coins manufactured or to be manufactured for the requirements in the receiving State for the Allied forces.

46. The financial arrangements which will be made with the receiving State authorities in connection with the notes and coins dealt with in this agreement and with the other costs arising out of operations or
activities in the receiving State shall be negotiated between the sending
State and receiving State authorities.

47. The appropriate currencies of the respective sovereign countries
of Belgium, Germany, and Luxembourg shall be exchangeable at the mili-
tary finance centers of the sending State in the following ratios:

a. 50 Belgian francs per US dollar (1F=$0.02).
b. 3.571 Netherlands guilders per US dollar (1G=$0.28).
c. 4 German deutschemarks per US dollar (1M=$0.25).
d. 50 Luxembourg francs per US dollar (1F=$0.02).
e. 0.4167 British pounds per US dollar (1£=$2.40).

Article 11
War Materiel

48. War Materiel belonging to, used by, or intended for use by enemy
military forces or formations of members thereof, and which is captured
by, or otherwise falls into the hands of the sending State forces in the
territory of the receiving State, may be used or otherwise disposed of
by such forces without regard to its possible receiving State ownership
or claims.

a. War materiel falling into the hands of forces operating under
the command of the Supreme Allied Commander shall be excluded from
the operation of the succeeding paragraphs of this Article.

b. The term “war materiel” means any arms, equipment or
other property whatsoever belonging to, used by, or intended for use by
any enemy military or paramilitary formations or any members thereof
in connection with their operation.

c. The Supreme Allied Commander shall have the right to re-
tain any war materiel falling into the hands of forces operating under
his command, subject to the provisions of paragraphs d, e, and f below.

d. Where the Supreme Allied Commander requires any materiel
which prima facie appears to the receiving States authorities prior to
its acquisition by the enemy to have been in receiving State ownership
and not to have been produced or constructed by order of the enemy,
such materiel shall be:

(1) If private property, requisitioned, except in the cases
where military operations will not permit the immediate execution of
the formalities of requisition. Such requisition will be executed as soon
as possible.

(2) If public property, used in accordance with the provi-
sions of reciprocal aid agreements.

e. The provisions of the preceding paragraph do not apply to
war materiel produced or constructed in the receiving State by order
of the enemy. However, when the Allied forces will no longer need such
materiel not consumed or destroyed, it shall be dealt with in accord with
succeeding paragraphs of this Article.

f. (1) The war materiel referred to in paragraph d, above, not
required by the Supreme Allied Commander shall be released directly
to the receiving State authorities.

(2) Any other war materiel not required by the Supreme
Allied Commander, which may be released by him to the receiving State
authorities operating through the procedures established by the Com-
bined Chiefs of Staff, shall be treated in accordance with the succeeding
paragraphs of this Article. The receiving State authorities will be re-
responsible for accounting as may be necessary to the other Allied Nations for all war materiel handed over to them under such conditions by the Supreme Allied Commander.

49. The receiving State authorities will accept responsibility for the protection and, in the event of the owner or his accredited agent not being present, the administration of any property referred to in Article 8, paragraph 26, above, which is not in public or private ownership of the receiving State, and does not belong to any state or national of a state with which any of the Allied Nations has been at war at any time since D Day.

50. The authorities of the receiving State will assume responsibility for the custody, in accordance with receiving State law, of any property referred to in Article 8, paragraph 26, above, which belongs to any state or national of a state with which any of the Allied Nations has been at war at any time since D Day. It is understood that the receiving State authorities will be responsible for accounting, as may be necessary, to the other Allied Nations for all property referred to in this paragraph.

51. Nothing in this Article shall affect the exercise of the right of the Supreme Allied Commander to requisition any property.

52. Nothing in this Article shall affect the arrangements which have been or may be agreed between the competent Allied and receiving State authorities concerning the use and disposal of vessels captured or found by Allied forces in the course of operations for the liberation of Europe.

Article 12
Censorship and Publicity

53. In the Forward Zone and in military areas the Commanding General, under a memorandum of understanding with the government of the receiving State, may exercise the right of strict military censorship of the press, radio, cinema, posts, news agencies and overall media of mass communication.

54. In the Interior Zone censorship, as provided for in the foregoing paragraph, will be established and operated by the government of the receiving State upon the request of the Commanding General.

55. Newspapers and publications intended for the primary use of the sending State troops and not intended for sale or distribution to the receiving State people shall not be subject to censorship or other controls by the receiving State authorities.

56. a. In the Forward Zone the Supreme Allied Commander will exercise the right of strictly military censorship of the press, radio, cinema, news agencies and in general all publications. It is contemplated that this right will be exercised in so far as possible through a tripartite organization.

b. In the Interior Zone the receiving State services will consult the censorship authorities of the Supreme Allied Commander on all matters relating to military operations and will carry out the military censorship instructions communicated by him.

57. Newspapers and publications intended for Allied troops other than those of the receiving State and not for distribution or sale to the public of the receiving State shall not be subject to any control from authorities of receiving State. The same provision will apply to the dis-
patches of press representatives intended for publication outside of the receiving State.

58. Equipment used or intended for use by the various organs of publicity enumerated in paragraph 56 above e.g., premises, plant, supplies, will not be requisitioned by the Supreme Allied Commander except on grounds of urgent military necessity or by agreement in each case between the Delegate and the Supreme Allied Commander or their representatives.

59. The receiving State services responsible for publicity will facilitate in every possible manner the task of the Supreme Allied Commander. They will be instructed to collaborate with him in regard to the issue of notices to the population necessitated by the conduct of operations or by the security requirements of the Allied Forces or of the population itself.

Article 13
Relief Supplies

60. The government of the receiving State, to the optimum of its capabilities, agrees to assume full responsibility for the furnishing of the necessary food, clothing, shelter, and medical supplies for all needy, refugees and displaced persons within the territory. The Commanding General agrees, within the limits of logistical capabilities and to the extent that the exigency of the military situation permits, to assist and provide limited support to the needy, refugees and displaced persons within the receiving State whose care is beyond receiving State capability or to supplement or augment receiving State relief supply expenditures so as to provide for the minimum needs of the needy, refugees and displaced persons whom the receiving State government cannot provide and who have not become integrated in the receiving State economy.

61. The cost of any and all sending State relief supplies furnished to the receiving State authorities for distribution to the needy, refugees and displaced persons, except refugees and displaced persons under sending State control, will be charged to the receiving State government and adjusted between the parties in final settlement of all claims which one party may have against the other after the cessation of hostilities.

62. In order to permit the Commanding General to determine receiving State relief capabilities, the receiving State government agrees to submit to the Commanding General such periodic reports as to the importation, storage and distribution and current status of supplies from whatever source obtained as the Commanding General may request. The receiving State government also agrees to permit the Commanding General or his authorized representative to inspect receiving State storage installations, books, and records relating to the importation and distribution of relief supplies. The receiving State government further agrees to submit such periodic reports as the Commanding General requests as to number, location, and capabilities of refugee and displaced person camps or assembly areas the amount of relief supplies received from international relief agencies or other sources and the total number of needy (including refugees and displaced persons) receiving the relief supplies from the receiving State, the sending State or other sources.

63. The receiving State government agrees to furnish storage facilities for sending State relief supplies without cost to the sending State government and to undertake the responsibility for the distribution of such relief supplies as may be allocated and turned over to the receiving
State by the sending State supply installations. In connection with such
distribution and storage the receiving State government agrees to main-
tain and implement adequate records, bookkeeping and periodic inventories
and to permit inspection and render accounting thereof as provided in
paragraph 62.

64. Sending State relief supply packages and containers will be
clearly marked, stamped, branded, or labelled as to their origin, nature,
and contents to indicate to the people of the receiving State the sources
and purposes of such supplies. The receiving State government agrees
not to delete or alter said markings, stamps, or labels, and to publicize
the civilian relief program with the aim that the people of the receiving
State will achieve greater recognition of the mutual support and joint
effort of the receiving State and the sending State against a common
enemy.

65. The receiving State government agrees to undertake and promul-
gate and strictly enforce laws to prevent black market operations in,
and the hoarding of, food, medical, and other critical supplies of the
civilian populations.

66. Local procurement of civilian relief supplies shall be in accord-
ance with Article 9 of this agreement.

Article 14
Charges and Payments

67. Charges and payments as proper should be made for the facili-
ties, utilities, services, and supplies furnished in accordance with Article
8, hereto, together with any other charges and payments thereof which
properly should be made under any other Article of this agreement, as
well as charges for receiving State currency placed at the disposal of the
Commanding General shall be the subject of a later agreement.

Article 15
Military Post Offices

68. The sending State armed forces may conduct a military post
office in the territory of the receiving State where sending States troops
or organizations are located for their own needs.

69. Postal matter originating from members of the sending States
armed forces mailed in Army postal units to addresses in receiving State
where final delivery is effected by the receiving State postal organiza-
tions, postal matter originating in receiving State post offices addressed
to members of the receiving State forces shall bear sending State postage
in the first instance and receiving State postage in the second instance
at the rates prescribed by the International Postal Union Regulations.

70. The exemptions provided for previously shall apply equally to
imports and exports by the persons and agencies described therein which
are effected by means of the mails.

71. When and as circumstances permit, such postal operations shall
be conducted under an international postal agreement.

Article 16
Protection of Cultural Property

72. The government of the receiving State assumes primary respon-
sibility for the protection of cultural property. When such property falls
into the hands of the sending State forces it will be afforded appropriate
protection until it can be turned over to the representatives of the receiving State government.

Article 17
Delegation of Authority and Power

73. Any and all of the powers and authority given herein to the Commanding General may upon proper and timely notification to the receiving State government, be redelegated by him to the commander of any major sending State force or forces under his command.

Article 18
Representatives and Administration

74. a. The Commanding General will designate an officer of his command as his representative to the government of the receiving State. Such officer will be attached to the staff of the Ambassador of the sending State to the government of the receiving State and will have the duty of keeping the receiving State head of government fully informed on all matters concerning this agreement.

b. The government of the receiving State will designate a representative who will represent the receiving State at the headquarters of the Commanding General and who will be authorized to receive for the government of the receiving State all communication from the Commanding General. The representative of the government of the receiving State will also be responsible for centralizing and facilitating relationships between the sending State armed forces and the national and local governments of the receiving State.

Article 19
Amendments and Miscellaneous

75. Supplemental instruments involving interpretations or amplification of the provisions hereof, or concerning additions or amendments hereto, shall upon proper execution thereof be considered a part hereof.

76. At any time, either signatory party hereto may request an appropriate conference for the purpose of adding to this agreement, deleting parts thereof, or for the purpose of substituting language of the agreement.

Article 20
Economic or Reciprocal Aid Programs

77. Economic aid programs or reciprocal aid of any character will form the basis of subsequent agreements. Any other questions arising as a result of the military operations of the sending State (in particular questions relating to finance and currency and the attribution of the cost of maintaining and supporting the civil administration in disaster areas) which are not dealt with in this agreement shall be regarded as remaining open and shall form the subject of further negotiations as circumstances may require. The question of jurisdiction over such merchant seamen of non-receiving State nationality as are not subject to Allied service laws will require treatment and should form the subject of separate arrangements or supplemental agreements.

Article 21
Procurement and Utilization of Local Labor

78. The government of the receiving State will assume maximum responsibility for furnishing the sending State forces with adequate
skilled and unskilled labor to meet military requirements within its territorial limits. In return, sending State forces will endeavor to:

a. Procure such labor to the maximum extent possible through government channels with the understanding that local laws, customs, and wage scales will be followed in the employment of all labor.

b. Insure that local nationals will be utilized as extensively as practicable in order to reduce the need to import workers.

c. Insure that the above provisions will apply uniformly to all elements of sending State forces throughout the area.

**Article 22**

Stipulations and Authentication

79. This agreement will become effective upon signature by authorized representatives of the sending State and the receiving State and will continue in force for a period not to exceed two (2) years. After six (6) months notice to authorities, either party may renounce this agreement. In this appropriate event the parties will immediately consult to make satisfactory arrangements to meet existing conditions.

80. Done in quadruplicate, in English, French, Dutch, and German, the four texts being equally valid.

In witness hereof, the respective plenipotentiaries have affixed their signatures and seals to this agreement:

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND

FOR THE KINGDOM OF BELGIUM

FOR THE GRAND DUCHY OF LUXEMBOURG

FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

FOR THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS
CIVIL AFFAIRS INFORMATION REQUIRED FOR PLANNING AND OPERATIONS

Information required for civil affairs planning and operations broken out by civil affairs functions is shown below. This information is required to support contingency plans for each country or area where it is anticipated that U.S. forces may be committed for any type military operation. Information should be obtained, screened, and stored in peacetime and updated as indicated.

Section I. GENERAL

A. Geography.

1. Location and Size.
   a. Location in relationship to neighboring countries as well as longitude and latitude.
   b. Total land area.

2. Physical Features.
   a. Waterways and ports.
   b. Topography.
   c. Natural resources.
   d. Road and rail nets.

3. Climate.
   a. Seasonal abnormalities—temperature, atmospheric pressure, humidity, rainfall, and prevailing winds.
   b. Characteristics and statistics.

4. Political Geography.
   a. Politically organized areas—political regions.
   b. Effectiveness of administration of political area in relation to geographic arrangement.
c. Concentrated settlements.
d. Boundaries.
e. Dependent areas.
f. Sources of raw material.
g. Principles or traditions which command loyal support—state of development—different ideas.

B. History.

1. Brief history of the development of the area, influence exerted by major powers in development, divisions or partitions resulting from wars, treaties, and major geographic or political factors to the current status of the area. Form of government currently in effect and previous forms of government, colonial status, extent of political control of other areas, degree of control over the population exercised by current government and susceptibility of existing government toward major powers. Political organization of the area.

2. Brief coverage of each international treaty to which subject area or country is signatory, status of forces agreements and summary pronouncement of national policy pertinent to the subject area or country.

C. People.

1. Population.
   a. Numbers.
   b. Distribution and density.
   c. Birth and death rates.
   d. Biographical sketches of prominent personalities.
      (1) Name.
      (2) Address.
      (3) Business, profession, or occupation.
      (4) Political affiliation.
      (5) Education.
      (6) Religion.

2. Culture and Social Structure.
   a. Culture.
      (1) Standard of living—principal livelihood and housing.
b. Social Structure.
   (1) Family life.
   (2) Man's role.
   (3) Woman's role.
   (4) Community life.
   (5) Sex and marriage customs.
   (6) Organizations and associations.

c. Ethnic Groupings.

3. Languages.
   a. Map showing language distribution.
   b. Minority groups.
   c. Standardization of language.

4. Religion.
   a. Types of religious sects by number and geographical locations.
   b. Funeral and burial practices.
   c. Religious problems.
   d. Eating and dietary habits.
   e. Sexual mores, to include interrelations and intermarriage with alien personnel.
   f. Written and unwritten laws of conduct and human behavior.
   g. Theological implications of indigenous religion(s).

D. United States Interest.
   Annually
   1. U.S. military units and teams in area and their activities.
   2. U.S. government organizations in area and their interests.
   4. Legal agreements and treaties.
   5. Trade and commercial interests.
Section II. ARTS, MONUMENTS, AND ARCHIVES

A. General Conditions and Problems.
   1. Description of conditions of the arts and monuments.
   2. Advancements in the field of art over the past ten years.
   3. Influence of outside countries on the arts.

B. Art.
   1. Location, type, use and significance of all works of the fine arts.
   2. Population attitude toward art treasures, sculpture, painting, literature, and music.
   3. Government policies and agencies dealing with the arts.
   4. Agencies through which arts are performed.
      a. Private.
      b. Government.
   5. Advancements in science.
   6. Artists organization and control.

C. Monuments.
   1. List and location of historic monuments and sites.
   2. Present attitude and care of these monuments and sites.

D. Archives.
   1. List and location of archives.
   2. Varieties of archives.
      a. Public archives.
      b. Semipublic archives.
      c. Ecclesiastical archives.
      d. Private or family archives.
   3. Contents or category of archives.
      a. Historical.
      b. Current documents.

E. Agencies and Institutions.
   1. List and location of agencies and institutions.
   2. Present use of agencies and institutions.
   3. Control of agencies and institutions.
      a. Private.
      b. Government.
      c. Other.

Frequency of updating required

5 year intervals
Section III. CIVIL DEFENSE

Frequency of updating required

A. Organization. Annually
   1. Civilian or military jurisdiction.
   2. Cellular organization—rural and urban.
   3. Areas of responsibility.

B. Plans. Annually
   2. Evacuation and dispersal plan.

C. Equipment. Annually
   1. Warning and communication system.
   2. Shelter capacity, location, and adequacy.
   3. Training facilities.
   4. Rehabilitation capabilities.

D. Correlation with other civic agencies such as fire, police, medical, military, etc. Annually

Section IV. CIVIL INFORMATION

Frequency of updating required

A. General Conditions and Problems. Annually
   1. Effect of geographic, social, economic, political factors.
   2. Reading, listening, viewing habits.
   3. Rural-urban differences.
   4. Anticommunist appeal.
   5. International outlook.
   6. How well developed are mass communications.
   7. Techniques used to measure impact.

B. Newspapers. Annually
   1. Name.
   2. Location.
   3. Ownership.
   5. Publication.
   7. Format.
   8. Editorial policies.
   10. Employees.
   11. Equipment.
   12. Plant.
   13. Sources of supply.
C. Other publications.  

1. Periodicals and books.  
   a. Name.  
   b. Location.  
   c. Ownership.  
   d. Circulation.  
   e. Publication dates.  
   f. Language.  
   g. Format.  
   h. Policies.  
   i. Procedures.  
   j. Employees.  
   k. Equipment.  
   l. Plant.  
   m. Revenue.  

D. Broadcasting Stations (Radio and Television).  

1. Name.  
2. Location.  
3. Ownership.  
4. Frequency.  
5. Power sources.  
6. Coverage area.  
7. Equipment.  
13. Revenue.  
14. Number of receivers.  

E. Other Communications Media.  

1. Motion pictures.  
   a. Studios.  
   b. Ownership.  
   c. Location.  
   d. Personnel.  
   e. Production policies and methods.  
   f. Equipment.  
   g. Plant.  
   h. Distribution.  
   i. Supply.  
   j. Outlets.  
   k. Number of theaters.  
   l. Number of seats.  
   m. Number of imports and exports.  
   n. Revenue.
2. Legitimate theaters.
   a. Name.
   b. Location.
   c. Ownership.
   d. Personnel.
   e. Seating capacity.
   f. Production policy.
   g. Procedures.
   h. Circuit.
   i. Number of theaters.
   j. Seating capacity of each.
   k. Revenue.

8. Miscellaneous means of communications.
   a. Private printing facilities.
   b. Loudspeakers.
   c. Town criers.
   d. Billboards.
   e. Posters.
   f. Entertainment.

Section V. CIVILIAN SUPPLY

A. General Conditions and Problems.

1. Peculiarities of climate, geography, etc., which might influence civilian supply.

B. Storage, Refrigeration and Processing Facilities.

1. Storage space-available and required.
   a. Food.
   b. Other supplies.

2. Refrigeration available and required.
   a. Food.
   b. Other supplies.

3. Processing facilities available and required.
   a. Food.
   b. Other supplies.

C. Distribution Channels.

1. Food.
2. Clothing.
3. Essential durables.
D. Dietary and Clothing Requirements and Customs.

1. Food.
   a. Available.
   b. Required.
2. Clothing.
   a. Available.
   b. Required.
3. Customs which might influence civilian supply.

E. Production Excess and Shortages. Annually

Section VI. DISPLACED PERSONS, REFUGEES, AND EVACUEES

A. General Conditions and Problems. Annually

1. History of displaced persons and refugees.
   a. World War II.
   b. Post-World War II.
2. Exodus of persons.
   a. Volume.
   b. Disposition.
   c. Present status.
   d. Potential demands for return.
   e. Special returnee problems.

B. Existing Population Dislocations. Annually

1. Displaced persons.
   a. Number.
   b. Former and present residence.
   c. Reason for displacement.
   d. Attitude.
2. Refugees.
   a. Number and location.
   b. Reason for movement.
   c. Attitude, treatment, and utilization.
3. Evacuees.
   a. Extent of evacuations, location, and reason for evacuation.
   b. Treatment, utilization, and attitude of evacuees.
4. Other refugee and displaced persons (including allied nationals).
   a. Population (DP's—by nationality and ethnic group).
b. Distribution.
c. Relative absorption into community.
d. Major occupational categories.
e. Loyalty to and identification with the community.
f. Economic status.

5. Status (health and welfare) of institutionalized (camps, villages, prisons, etc.) persons of interest by type.
   a. Health.
   b. Utilization.
   c. Orientation.
   d. Housing, feeding, and clothing condition.
   e. Anticipated duration of institutionalization.

C. Potential Population Dislocation.

   Annually
   1. DP's (by origin).
   2. Refugees.
   3. Volume of dislocation by region.
   4. Direction of major flow.
   5. Troop support required per thousands of population.
   7. Special problems.

D. Agencies, Facilities, and Programs for Care and Control of Displaced Persons and Refugees.

   Annually
   1. Governmental and private agencies involved in displaced persons and refugee activities.
      a. Organization.
      b. Scope and powers.
      c. Relationships to international organizations.
      d. Emergency reserve personnel adaptable to DP&R activities.
   2. Policies and operations of area DP&R agencies—by agency.
      a. Policy and procedures in:
         (1) Evacuation and control.
         (2) Assembly center (or other grouping) administration.
         (3) Camp or village security.
         (4) Camp physical plant layout.
         (5) Construction, materials, engineering of physical plants.
(6) Health and medical care facilities.
(7) Supplies and food.
(8) Welfare services.
(9) Screening and indoctrination.
(10) Resettlement.
(11) Resources expenditure:
Available.
Utilized by area agencies.
Required by U.S. standards.
(12) Steps needed and resources required to convert existing facilities to U.S. standards for similar use.

b. Biographical analysis of agency personnel.

Section VII. ECONOMICS AND COMMERCE

A. General Conditions and Problems. Brief coverage of natural and developed resources. Self-sufficiency of the area or dependence upon other sources for food, machinery, or vital minerals and supplies. Extent of development and capability of railroads and canals and the civil aviation system. Development of industry, agricultural pursuits, and natural resources. Development of power potential and undeveloped potential. Summary of important trade agreements and extent of participation in world trade.

B. Description of Economic System.
1. National policy and controls.
2. Private enterprise.

C. Structure, Key Officials, and Business Leaders. Annually

D. Resources.
1. Human.
2. Natural.

E. Statistics.
1. Per capita (e.g., income, savings, consumptions, etc.).
2. Aggregate (e.g., GNP, national income, etc.).
3. Ratios (e.g., unemployment, productivity, occupations, etc.).

F. Goals and Programs. 5 year intervals
1. Short range.
2. Intermediate range.
3. Long range.

G. Internal Movement of Goods Annually

H. Exports/Imports. Annually
1. Type.
2. Quantity.
4. Influence.

I. Commerce. 5 year intervals
1. Domestic Trade.
   a. Wholesale and retail distribution system.
   b. Markets and fairs.
   c. Weight and measure standards.
   d. Cooperatives and public markets.
2. Foreign Trade.
   a. Principal items of export and import.
   b. Tariff system, customs, duties.
   c. Trade agreements.
   d. Balance of payments.

J. Industries. 5 year intervals
1. General.
   a. Location of main industrial centers.
   b. Names of important companies.
   c. Labor—skills and distribution.
   d. Power sources and capacities.
   a. Types (machinery, chemical, textile, etc).
   b. Locations (province, city, etc).
   c. Capacity.
3. Processing Industries. Types, locations, capacities.

K. Agencies, Institutions, and Programs. 5 year intervals
1. Government organization.
2. Trade associations and chambers of commerce.
3. Laws governing commerce and industry.
4. Subsidies, monopolies, etc.

L. Price Control and Rationing. Annually
1. Stabilization.
2. Variation of prices.
3. Control measures and techniques.
4. Commodities under price control.
5. Distribution.
   a. Essential commodities.
   b. Imports and exports.
   c. Ration controls.
   d. Production and distribution.
   e. Effect on demands.
   f. Types and status of markets.

6. Control systems.
   a. Price control program.
   b. Rationing program.
   c. Raw materials.
   d. Financial.

7. Legislation.
   a. Price control legislation and items subject to price control.
   b. Rationing legislation and items subject to rationing.

Section VIII. FOOD AND AGRICULTURE

A. General Conditions and Problems. Annually
1. Importance of agriculture in total economy.
2. Extent to which farming meets needs of country.
3. Principal problem areas.
4. Attitude of farm population.

B. Agricultural Geography. 5 year intervals
1. Locations of principal farm areas.
2. Types of soil.
3. Influence of climate and topography.
4. Types of crops.
5. Farm to market road net.
C. Agricultural Products and Processing.

1. Livestock and dairy products (types, amounts, methods of processing, refrigeration, warehousing, etc).
2. Crops (types, amounts, methods of processing, storage, etc.).
3. Poultry (types, amounts, methods of processing, storage, refrigeration, etc.).

D. Agricultural Practices.

1. Extent of mechanization.
2. Improvement programs.
3. Conservation programs.
4. Pest and disease control.

E. Land Holding System and Reform Programs.

F. Fisheries.

1. Commercial (no. companies, location, type of fish, type of crafts, fishing areas, methods of processing, storage, annual production, etc.).
2. Private (policy, rules, regulations, type of fish, fishing areas, etc.).
3. Restocking program.
4. Problem areas.

G. Forestry.

1. Reforestation and afforestation programs.
2. Importance of forestry to the country.
3. Forestry service or administration.
4. Hunting (control, laws, regulations, types of games, etc.).
5. Products and their processing.

H. Agencies, Institutions, and Programs.

2. Private.

I. Food Production.

1. Type.
2. Quantity.
3. Processing.
4. Location, size, ownership of warehouses.
5. Types and quantity of food supplies stored.

J. Applicable Laws and Regulations Governing Food and Agriculture.
Section IX. LABOR

Frequency of updating required

A. Organization. Annually

1. National level.
2. Other levels.
3. Key personnel with biographical sketches.

B. General Conditions and Problems. Annually

C. Labor Force. Annually

1. Employment data and trends.
2. Available manpower and labor supply by special classes.
3. Ages and distribution.
4. Unemployment.
5. Labor productivity.

D. Agencies, Institutions, and Programs Annually

1. Government labor policy.
   a. Labor laws and working conditions.
   b. Role of government.
   c. Government job placement controls.
   d. Wages and other incentives.
2. Labor organizations.
   a. Organizations—type, size, location, leadership, and political influence.
   b. Strength membership.
   c. Relations with domestic, foreign, international labor organizations.
   d. Total potential labor force, type, distribution, mobility, and ages.
3. Social insurance.
4. Labor disputes (including mechanisms for settling).

E. Wages and Standards (including hours and working conditions). 5 year intervals

Section X. LEGAL

Frequency of updating required

A. The System of Laws. 5 year intervals

1. Civil and criminal codes.
   a. Origins.
   b. Procedures.
   c. Penalties.
2. Political crimes.
B. The Administration of Justice.

1. Historical development.
2. Agencies—national and local.
3. Courts and tribunals—types of jurisdiction (including administrative tribunals).
5. Personnel.
   a. Judiciary.
   b. Prosecutors.
   c. The Bar.
   d. Legal training.
   e. Political controls.

Section XI. PROPERTY CONTROL

A. General Conditions and Problems. Brief coverage on classification and administration of property, imposition of controls and status of property records.

B. Agriculture and Industry.

1. Type.
2. Location.
3. Ownership.
4. Influence.

C. Property Laws.

2. Evidence of ownership.
   a. Methods of recording.
   b. Locations of title registers.
   c. Agencies established for registering ownership.
3. Transfer of ownership.
   a. Confiscations.
   b. Rightful owner.
   c. Restore to custodian.
   d. Methods.

D. Government, Private and Foreign Ownership.

2. Private.
E. Foreign Holdings.

1. Type, size, and location.
2. Ownership.
3. Influence.

Section XII. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

A. General System of Public Administration.

1. Political traditions.
   2. Political stability.
4. Constitutional system.
5. Civil rights and practices.
6. Political factions, movements, and dynamics.

B. Structure of National Government.

1. Executive Branch.
   a. Organization.
   b. Powers.
   c. Policies.
   d. Administration.
2. Legislative Branch.
   a. Organization.
   b. Powers.
   c. Composition of membership.
   d. Pressure groups.
   a. Organization.
   b. Powers.
   c. Composition of membership.
   d. Pressure groups.
4. Methods of selection of key officials.
5. Biographical sketches of key officials.
   a. Name.
   b. Address.
   c. Position in government.
   d. Political affiliation.
   e. Education.
   f. Religion.
   g. Former business, profession, or occupation.
   h. Attitude toward the United States.
6. Potential officials and biographical sketches.
C. Structure of Government at Other Levels. Annually

1. Province.
2. District.
3. City.
4. Relations with national government.
5. Biographical sketches of key officials.
   a. Name.
   b. Address.
   c. Position.
   d. Political affiliation.
   e. Education.
   f. Religion.
   g. Former business, profession, or occupation.
   h. Attitude toward the United States.
6. Potential officials and biographical sketches.

D. The Armed Forces. Annually

1. Historical background.
2. Organization, size, and mission.
   a. Defense establishment.
   b. Army.
   c. Navy.
   d. Air Force.
   e. Paramilitary forces.
   f. Political control and effectiveness.
3. General military policy.
5. Foreign influence.
   b. Percentage of total budget.
   c. Military pay.
7. Quality and source of manpower.
   a. Key officers and qualifications.
   b. Recruitment.
   c. Conscription.
   d. Reserves.
   e. Training.
   f. Mobilization plans.
8. Logistics.
9. Weapons and equipment.
10. Ranks, uniforms, and insignia.
11. Loyalty and morale factors.
E. Political Parties.

1. Noncommunist parties.
   a. Strength.
   b. Organization.
   c. Policies.
   d. Leaders with biographical sketches.
   e. Training.

2. Communist Party.
   a. Strength and capabilities.
   b. Organization.
   c. Policies and objectives.
   d. Role in international communist movement.
   e. Relation to domestic government.
   f. Internal party politics.
   g. Strength of opposition to communist party.
   h. Leaders with biographical sketches.
   i. Training.

F. International Affairs.

1. Agencies.
2. Extent of subject to foreign control.
3. Foreign relations.
4. Relations with international organizations.

Section XIII. PUBLIC COMMUNICATIONS

A. General Conditions and Problems.

B. Postal Systems.

1. Extent and frequency of service.
   a. Metropolitan.
   b. Rural.
2. Censorship.
3. Private carriers.
4. Parcel post service.
5. Other functions.
   a. Postal savings.
   b. Money order service.
   c. Issuance of licenses.
   d. Tax information service.
C. Telephone. Annually
1. Exchanges and local service.
2. Long line systems and connecting grids.
3. Priority usage.
4. Censorship.
5. Private systems.

D. Telegraph. Annually
1. Exchanges and local service.
2. Long line systems and connecting grids.
3. Priority usage.
4. Censorship.
5. Private systems.

E. Radio and Television. Annually
1. Transmitting stations (no., type, and location).
2. Channels, frequencies and trunklines.
3. Hours of operation.
4. Censorship.
5. Propaganda usage.
7. Foreign broadcasts.

F. Other. Annually

G. Applicable Laws Governing Communications Systems. 5 year intervals

Section XIV. PUBLIC EDUCATION

A. Organization. Annually
1. National level.
2. Other levels.
3. Key personnel with biographical sketches.

B. General Conditions and Problems. General development of the educational system of the area, requirements placed upon individuals, significant achievements in recent years and educational level of the population. 5 year intervals
C. Agencies, Institutions, and Programs.

1. Government agencies and policies.
2. Educational system.
   a. Administration and controls.
   b. Preprimary and primary schools.
   c. Secondary schools.
   d. Vocational and special schools.
   e. Higher education.
   f. Teacher education.
   g. Private schools.
   h. Adult education.
3. Evaluation of educational system.
4. Private and public organizations.
   a. Influential and pressure groups.
   b. Youth organizations.
   c. Religious groups.

D. School Facilities Including Textbooks, Equipment, Etc.

1. School facilities (no., location, and capacity).
2. Textbooks, equipment, and supplies.

E. Teachers and Teacher's Training.

1. Number.
2. Wage scale.
3. Educational level of teachers.

F. Influence of Politics on Teachers, Textbooks, and Students.

Section XV. PUBLIC FINANCE

A. Organization.

1. National level.
2. Other levels.
3. Key personnel with biographical sketches.

B. General Conditions and Problems.

1. Fiscal and economic policies.
2. Special conditions and problems.
3. Accounting systems used.
C. Monetary System.

1. Currency.
2. Reserves or backing of currency.
3. Issuing authorities.
5. Controls.
7. Governmental authorities.
8. Other legal instruments of exchange.

D. Budgetary System and Current Budget.

2. Budgetary analysis.
3. Governing authorities and controls.
4. Analysis of budgetary procedures.
5. Patterns of expenditure and distribution.

E. Sources of Government Income.

1. Analysis of taxation—amount of taxes collected, method of collection, and type of taxes.
2. Formulation of tax policies.
3. Investments.
4. Other sources of governmental income.

F. Financial Institutions.

1. Banking institutions—facilities, location, capital, and credit policies.
2. Investment institutions.
   a. Stock institutions.
   b. Controlling authorities and controls exercised.
   c. Miscellaneous investment companies.
3. Insurance companies (no., size, and location).
4. Specialized savings institutions.

G. Foreign Exchange. Trade balances, controls, and restrictions.

H. Applicable Laws and Regulations.
Section XVI. PUBLIC HEALTH

A. Organization. Annually
   1. National level.
   2. Other levels.
   3. Key personnel with biographical sketches.

B. General Conditions and Problems. Annually

C. Agencies and Institutions. Annually
   1. Hospitals.
      a. Number.
      b. Capacity—number of beds.
      c. Location.
   2. Other medical facilities.
      a. Public.
      b. Private.

D. Medical Personnel. Annually
   1. Numbers—doctors and nurses.
   2. Location.
   3. Training.
   4. Traditional medical practices—native medicine, theory of disease, and religious beliefs.

E. Medical Equipment and Supplies. Annually
   1. Surgical and dental equipment.
   2. Testing equipment.
   3. Drugs.
      a. Availability.
      b. Shortages.
   4. Other supplies

F. Diseases. Annually
   1. Incidence.
   2. Control programs.
   3. Dietary deficiencies.

G. Environmental Sanitation. Annually
   1. Food—regulations governing food and drugs.
   2. Water control and supply.
   3. Disposal of sewage and waste.
Section XVII. PUBLIC SAFETY

Frequency of updating required

5 year intervals

A. General Conditions and Problems. Determination of police domination over the individual. The primary consideration in this area is whether the existing institutions; i.e., police, fire, and penal, may be used by the occupying force to carry out both the primary mission of the combat commander and the day-to-day control and bodily protection of the local population.

B. Police System. Annually

1. Organizational on all levels.
   a. Types of police forces and criminal investigative agencies.
   b. Cellular organization.
   c. Areas of responsibility—jurisdiction.
   d. Chain of command.
   e. Names of key personnel in various police organizations and biographical sketches.

2. Equipment.
   a. Arms and special armament—military capabilities.
   b. Modern crime-fighting equipment.
   c. Traffic control equipment.
   d. Riot control equipment.
   e. Police communications.
   f. Transportation.

3. Personnel.
   a. Number—strength.
   b. Method of selection.
      (1) Political, racial, and religious requirements.
      (2) Reliability as impartial enforcement of existing and future rules and regulations.
      (3) Caliber of members, morale, and status and scope of training.
   c. Promotion basis.

4. Functions and Authority.
   a. Criminal action.
   b. Civil ordinances.
   c. Disorder and disaster control.

5. Police regulations that differ from the traditional American concept of law and order.
   a. General.
   b. Identification system.
c. Restrictions on travel, gatherings, and curfew
d. Restrictions on ownership of firearms.

6. Miscellaneous.
a. Other methods of enforcing law and order such as the influence of religious leaders, family ties, and role of military.
b. Psychological effect on the native population.

C. Penal Institutions.

1. National and Local.
   a. Prisons and jails (no., location, and capacity).
   b. Concentration camps and labor camps (no., location, and capacity).
   c. Reformatories and other penal institutions (no., location, and capacity).

2. Organization.

3. Government agency exercising control.

4. Inmates breakdown.
   b. Criminal.
   c. Juvenile.
   d. Sex.

5. Adequacy—sanitary and health conditions.

6. Treatment of prisoners.

7. Probation.

8. Parole.

D. Fire Protections.

1. Organization.
   a. In general, the same as for the Police.
   b. Political aspects.

2. Equipment.
   a. Type, location, and adequacy of existing equipment and facilities.
   b. Adaptability of local military firefighting equipment.

3. Personnel.
   a. Strength and mode of selection.
   b. Training status and efficiency.
   c. Names of key personnel and political reliability.
4. Miscellaneous.
   a. Particular problems in certain areas such as overcrowded cities, narrow streets, and local water pressure.
   b. Possible use of equipment in controlling riots and other public disasters.

Section XVIII. PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION

A. General Conditions and Problems. Annually

B. Rail Transport. Annually
   1. Miles of railroad by type and gauge.
   2. Type, number, and condition of rolling stock.
   3. Location of switch yards.
   4. Major rail terminals (number, size, location, and condition).

C. Vehicular Transportation. Annually
   1. Miles of road by type, condition, and road net.
   2. Street systems and condition.
   3. Vehicles and public conveyances by type, number, and ownership (include cars, trucks, buses, street cars, etc.).

D. Water Transportation. Annually
   1. Size, location, type, use, and ownership of all floating vessels.
   2. Location of all port facilities and services.
   3. Identification of sea routes.
   4. Inland waterways and utilization.

E. Air Transportation. Annually
   1. Location, size, and use of all air fields.
   2. Number, size, use, and ownership of all aircraft.

F. Other Transportation. Annually

G. Travel, Status, of Tourist Travel, Restrictions, Regulations, and Volume by Geographical Area of People Leaving and Entering.
NOTE: Items of General Importance Common to All Transportation Systems.

1. Ownership.
2. Regulatory agencies and licenses.
3. Financial structure.
4. Administration.
5. Operation and revenues.
7. Trade associations.
8. Personnel and labor relations.

Elements Relative to Each Specific Transport System To Be Covered in Detail.

1. Location and mileage.
2. Condition.
3. Effect of seasonal variation.
4. Special traffic hazards and problems.

Section XIX. PUBLIC WELFARE

A. Organization.

1. National level.
2. Other levels.
3. Key personnel with biographical sketches.

B. General Conditions and Problems.

1. Availability of consumer goods and services—sources, internal and external.
2. Housing capability.
4. Major social problems.
   a. Juvenile delinquency.
   b. Alcoholism.
   c. Narcotic addiction.
   d. Health problems (malnutrition and disease).
   e. Unemployment.
   f. Social changes (caused by communists, technology, population relocations, etc.).
   g. Poverty and dependency.
5. Public assistance.
   a. To whom granted.
b. Basis upon which granted.
c. Types of relief and medical care provided.

C. Agencies, Institutions, and Programs.

1. Social insurance.
   a. Health insurance.
   b. Accident insurance.
   c. Old age, disability, and survivors’ pensions.
   d. Unemployment.
   e. Family assistance.
   f. Other.

2. Welfare services—government and private.
   a. Child welfare (adoption, maternal, etc.).
   b. Mentally and physically handicapped.
   c. Aged and indigent.
   d. Relief and public assistance.
   e. Emergency and war relief.

3. Institutions.
   a. Orphanages (number, location, and capacity).
   b. Homes for the aged (number, location, and capacity).
   c. Mental institutions (number, location, and capacity).
   d. Physical therapy (number and location).
   e. Hospitals (number, location, and number of beds).

4. Programs.
   a. Recreational.
   b. Vocational.
   c. Health.
   d. Child care.

5. Welfare personnel.
   a. Professional standards.
   b. Volunteer assistance.
   c. Number available by type of organization.

   a. Financial plan (how funds are obtained).
   b. Laws and regulations.
   c. Organizational structure.

7. Regulations governing public welfare.
Section XX. PUBLIC WORKS AND UTILITIES

Frequency of updating required

A. General Conditions and Problems. Annually

B. Public Works. Annually

1. Public buildings (including hospitals)—use, size, and location.
2. Roads and streets.
3. Bridges.
4. Port facilities (harbors).
5. Airports and railroad terminals.
7. Dams (flood control).

C. Public Utilities. Annually

1. Power system, including power generating plants and distribution systems.
2. Water system, including source dams, degree of pollution, filter plants, and ownership.
3. Gas works—size, location, source, and ownership.
4. Sewage collection systems and disposal plants.
5. Garbage and refuse disposal.
6. Storm drainage systems.

NOTE: Items of general importance to all Public Works and Utilities:

1. Ownership.
2. Regulating agencies and licensing.
3. Financial structure.
4. Administration.
5. Operations and revenues.
7. Trade associations.
8. Personnel and labor relations.

Elements relating to each specific Public Works or Utility to be covered in detail:

1. Locations of plants, line systems, nets, and connecting grids.
2. Condition.
3. New construction requirements.
4. Available resources for construction.
5. Priority of usage.
Section XXI. RELIGIOUS RELATIONS

Frequency of updating required

A. Religions in the Area.

1. Organized.
2. Unorganized.
3. Relations among religions and religious leaders, both indigenous and missionary.

B. Clergy.

1. Number, location, and education of clergy.
2. Influence of clergy.

C. Religious Beliefs.

1. Major tenets of each religion, to include as a minimum such concepts as:
   a. Faith.
   b. Impact of faith on life.
   c. Concept of the hereafter.
   d. Means of salvation.
   e. Rites of cleaning and purification.
   f. The impact of religion(s) on value systems and the verities of life.
2. Degree of religious convictions in lives of indigenous populace.

D. Worship.

1. Forms of worship of each religion.
2. Places of worship of each religion.
3. Frequency of worship of each religion.
4. Significance of worship of each religion.

E. Relation Between Religion and Motivation of Indigenous People.

F. Relation Between Religion and Trans-Cultural Communication.

G. Socio-Economic Influence of Religion(s).

1. Influence of religious leaders.
2. Influence of religion(s) on society.
3. Economic influence of religion(s).
   a. Religious ownership of property and other possessions.
   b. Teachings of religion(s) about private property.
   c. Relationship of religious and economic leaders.
H. Interrelation With Government.

1. Relationship of religious leaders and government officials.
2. Role of religion(s) and religious leaders in Armed Forces.
3. Political influence of religious leaders.

I. Religious Schools.

1. Location, size, and attendance.
2. Influence.
3. Relationship with nonreligious schools.
APPENDIX K

SAMPLE

CIVIL AFFAIRS HANDBOOK OUTLINE

CIVIL AFFAIRS HANDBOOK

FOR

Prepared by

(Date)

US ARMY MILITARY HISTORY INSTITUTE

WWW.SURVIVALEBOOKS.COM
SECTION I

GENERAL

Reference: (DA Pamphlet or other basic documents which is basis for general data. List pages of reference document under subparagraphs as appropriate. All directives to which reference is made must be available to the user of the CA planning document. If a reference is not assumed to be readily available to the user, the preparing command will provide a copy of the reference for each of the copies of basic document which is forward.)

A. DEFINITIONS

1. Civil Affairs.
2. Civil Affairs Operations.
3. Civil Affairs Agreements.
5. Proclamation.
6. Ordinance.
7. Orders, Instructions, and Directives.

B. CIVIL AFFAIRS OBJECTIVES. To be extracted from appropriate OPLANS, special publications, or FM 41-10 (Civil Affairs Operations).

C. CIVIL AFFAIRS POLICIES. To be based on policies and assumptions contained in appropriate OPLANS and the following additional assumptions as applicable.

1. Normal diplomatic channels of communications will be available to provide assistance and guidance in the development of CA proclamations and general claims policies.
2. The U.S. forces will not be required to assume control of government functions. However, U.S. forces may be requested by the legally constituted government to assume full or partial control of some national or local functions of government.
3. Dislocation and damage may require U.S. support, particularly in the area of public health, refugee control, civilian supply, public safety, and civil relief.

NOTE

THE POLICIES ON OPERATIONS CONTAINED HEREIN ARE FOR ILLUSTRATION PURPOSES ONLY, AND MAY OR MAY NOT APPLY TO A SPECIFIC COUNTRY OR SITUATION.

4. The economic and technical aid program of the U.S. agencies will continue as required by existing conditions. U.S. military forces may be required to assume responsibility for these programs.
5. The primary responsibility for the exercise of control over inhabitants, institutions, facilities, and resources remains with the friendly government.
6. In an area uncovered by U.S. forces that is not under the control of a local government recognized by the friendly government, commanders will conduct operations to restore law and order with the objective of restoring civil functions to the friendly government as soon as circumstances permit.
7. U.S. assistance will promote the general growth or restoration of a reliable economic, political, and social structure.

8. CA activities and operations will be conducted in accordance with international law and existing treaties and agreements in effect.

D. CIVIL AFFAIRS ORGANIZATIONS. To include general capability, mission, and organization of each unit assigned in OPLANS.

E. MILITARY AUTHORITY. To include the scope of military authority applicable to the country and situation in the categories listed below.

1. Friendly Territory.
2. Liberated Territory.
3. Occupied Territory.

SECTION II

CIVIL AFFAIRS FUNCTIONS

A. GOVERNMENTAL.

1. Public Administration.
   a. Brief organizational chart of the existing government with greatest detail reserved for local levels such as state, county, and village equivalents.
   b. Anticipated problem areas.
   c. Policy of operation on:
      (1) Retention of local officials.
      (2) Temporary appointment of local officials.
      (3) Identity documents, curfew exemptions, travel exceptions, and similar privilege documents.
      (4) Proclamations, ordinances, and orders.
   d. Specific actions to be taken or avoided.

2. Legal
   a. Organizational chart of structure of existing judicial system. Explanaton of court jurisdiction, type of cases handled, judicial procedure, and major differences between local and U.S. legal proceedings.
   b. Anticipated problem areas.
   c. Policy of operation. (To be presented in laymen's terms tailored to the anticipated situation.)
   d. Specific actions to be taken or avoided.

3. Public Safety.
   a. Brief organizational or functional chart of those agencies concerned with the maintenance of public order and safety to include national, provincial, and local agencies. Include an evaluation of the capabilities, efficiency, and law enforcement policies accepted by the inhabitants.
   b. Anticipated problem areas.
   c. Policy of operation. (Policy will be extracted from other appropriate publications and modified to fit the country involved and the anticipated situation. A check list will be provided as a guide for minimum coverage required to meet the tactical commander's requirements.)
   d. Specific actions to be taken or avoided.

   a. Organizational chart of the public health services available to include the location of major facilities such as hospitals and the capabilities of each.
b. Anticipated problem areas.
c. Policy of operation to include:
   (1) General U.S. policy for relief of suffering, treatment of infirm and insane, use of military supplies for treatment of civilians, and handling of dead.
   (2) Specific guidance on control and distribution of local medical supplies, sanitation requirements for population, and administration of public health activities such as hospitals, sanitariums, institutions for the insane and maimed, and orphanages.
d. Specific actions to be taken or avoided.

5. Public Welfare.
a. Organizational chart of existing public welfare agencies to include areas of major interest and the location of major public welfare centers and the services they provide.
b. Anticipated problem areas.
c. Policy of operation. Policy on provision of emergency food supplies, clothing and shelter, distribution of local supplies, and assistance that should be provided local public welfare agencies.
d. Specific actions to be taken or avoided.

a. Organizational chart of the governmental and private financial institutions. Include interrelated functions if appropriate. Locate and identify financial institutions that serve as repositories for liquid assets.
b. Anticipated problem areas.
c. Policy of operation. (Unless directed by higher authority, financial institutions will not be operated in the absence of trained civil affairs officers of responsible personnel selected by the allied government of the country concerned. The tactical commander should take every reasonable action to secure and protect the assets of financial institutions and report the circumstances to higher headquarters.)
d. Specific actions to be taken or avoided.

7. Public Education.
a. Organizational or functional chart of the educational system to include the type of system and the political tendencies of teachers and administrators.
b. Anticipated problem areas.
c. Policy of operation. Maintain and preserve educational facilities as permitted by the military requirements of the tactical situation. (Policy on permitting schools to operate will depend on the country involved and the military-political situation.)
d. Specific actions to be taken or avoided.

a. Organizational or functional chart showing the labor organizations in the country to include the approximate membership. Include any regional aspects and affiliations between labor groups.
b. Anticipated problem areas.
c. Policy of operation to include:
   (1) General rules that pertain to recruiting of labor for military support purposes.
   (2) Special policies relating to the use of labor by U.S. forces in the country concerned.
   (3) Authority and limitations of commander in the hiring of local labor.
d. Specific actions to be taken or avoided.
   a. Organizational or functional chart.
   b. Anticipated problem areas.
   c. Policy of operation.

B. ECONOMIC FUNCTIONS.

1. Economics and Commerce.
   a. Functional breakdown of the major economic activities in the country. Map showing the location of important industries and critical natural resources as appropriate.
   b. Anticipated problem areas.
   c. Policy of operation. (Unless directed by higher headquarters, tactical commanders will normally be concerned only with protection and preservation of industrial facilities and preventing enemy use of products and natural resources.)
   d. Specific actions to be taken or avoided.
   e. Location and identity of heavy industry or major commerce centers.
   f. Continuation of any price control and rationing system in effect at the same level if practicable.
   g. Measures to prevent hoarding and black marketing.
   h. Control of requisitions and purchases by the military which injure the local economy.

2. Food and Agriculture.
   a. Organizational chart of any existing governmental organizations that administer or control the production and distribution of food. Map of the principal food producing areas and identity of food products by type and quantity that exceed the needs of the local inhabitants.
   b. Anticipated problem areas.
   c. Policy of operation to include the following:
      (1) Locate and safeguard agricultural stocks and food supplies. Insure an equitable distribution of these products on the basis of need.
      (2) Requisition additional civilian supplies from higher headquarters when an emergency situation demands.
      (3) Continue farm and crop activity when the military situation permits.
   d. Specific actions to be taken or avoided.

3. Property Control.
   a. Location and identity of the following types of property:
      (1) Property of third nations capable of direct military usage.
      (2) Property of allied nationals.
      (3) Property and enterprises owned wholly or in part by a third government or by nationals of countries other than the one in which military operations are planned.
      (4) Property that has a vital usage for maintenance of the civilian economy where the owner or management is unknown or absent.
   b. Anticipated problem areas.
   c. Policy of operation. To include efforts to safeguard the property indicated in a above. Include general policies concerning property control as pertains to the country concerned.
   d. Specific actions to be taken or avoided.
4. Civilian Supply.
   a. Functional chart or flow diagram indicating the normal agencies and method of distribution used to provide civilian supplies.
   b. Anticipated problem areas.
   c. Policy of operation to include:
      (1) Locating and safeguarding essential supplies.
      (2) Requisitioning of emergency supplies through normal channels when not available locally.
      (3) Reporting excess civilian supplies in the area that might be used elsewhere.
   d. Specific actions to be taken or avoided.

C. PUBLIC FACILITIES.
   (1) Public Works and Utilities.
      a. Location and functional description of all major public works and utilities. Include the governmental agency and method of operation that control these activities.
      b. Anticipated problem areas.
      c. Policy of operation. To include priorities for operation and rehabilitation of public works and utilities. (Priority to those that contribute to the military operations and those that contribute to the health and welfare of the inhabitants.)
      d. Specific actions to be taken or avoided.

2. Public Communications.
   a. Charts showing any governmental agency concerned with the operation and control of public communications systems. Include a map showing the areas served by each type of communications.
   b. Anticipated problem areas.
   c. Policy of operation to include:
      (1) Safeguarding of communications installations to insure maximum operational capability.
      (2) Control of facilities to preclude their use for purposes other than military and essential civilian needs.
   d. Specific actions to be taken or avoided.

3. Public Transportation.
   a. Provide charts showing any governmental agency concerned with the operation and control of public transportation. Include a map showing the areas served by each type of transportation.
   b. Anticipated problem areas.
   c. Policy of operation to include:
      (1) Safeguarding of transportation facilities and fuels to insure maximum operational capability.
      (2) Control of facilities to restrict their use to military and essential civilian requirements.
   d. Specific actions to be taken or avoided.

D. SPECIAL FUNCTIONS.
   1. Civil Information.
      a. Organizational or functional chart indicating the governmental or private structure of agencies that control civil information media. Indicate method and degree of control to which the population is accustomed.
      b. Anticipated problem areas.
c. Policy of operation to include:
   (1) Safeguarding and closing if necessary, all public and private information media until competent personnel are available to supervise their operation.
   (2) Use of operating personnel and equipment of newspapers, journals, and radio/TV installations.

   d. Specific actions to be taken or avoided.

2. Displaced Persons, Refugees, and Evacuees.
   a. Governmental agencies charged with the responsibility for care and handling of refugees, displaced persons, and evacuees to include supplies and services available from each.
   b. Anticipated problem areas.
   c. Policy of operation to include:
      (1) U.S. policy and "Legal" responsibilities of the commander regarding refugees, displaced persons, and evacuees.
      (2) Extract of guidance from FM 41-10 and other official publications modified to fit the country involved.
      (3) Allied policy pertaining to the particular country not in conflict with U.S. and USARPAC policy.
   d. Specific actions to be taken or avoided.

3. Arts, Monuments, and Archives.
   a. Locate and identify objects of fine arts, monuments, libraries, archives and records, and other objects of historical and cultural value. Include the names of known authorities on fine arts and archives within the country.
   b. Anticipated problem areas.
   c. Policy of operation to include:
      (1) Protection of fine arts, monuments, and archives by the use of guards and "Off Limits" signs.
      (2) Caution troops not to desecrate objects of art and local fetishes and symbols unless directed by competent authority to destroy them.
   d. Specific actions to be taken or avoided.

4. Religious Relations.
   a. Organizational chart of the principal religious groups in the country. Include a map showing areas of concentration of religious sects if applicable.
   b. Anticipated problem areas.
   c. Policy of operation. To insure troops do not desecrate religious facilities and that no use is made of religious buildings except for emergency care. Include any policy applicable to the country concerned and to the particular religious customs and beliefs found there.
   d. Specific actions to be taken or avoided.

SECTION III
REPORTS

A. Types of reports to be submitted.

B. Addresses and suspense for reports.

C. Format.
SECTION IV

SAMPLE DOCUMENTS

A. Proclamations.
B. Ordinances.
C. Orders.
D. Instructions.
E. Directives.
F. Civil Affairs Agreement.
G. Status of Forces Agreement.
H. Civil Affairs Reports.
I. Civil Affairs Checklist.
J. Area Survey Checklist.
APPENDIX I

CA FUNCTIONAL CHECKLIST

1. This checklist of civil affairs functions is intended as a guide for non-CA units and personnel who may become involved in civil affairs activities, as well as for CA staff officers and units. Those items listed within each functional area indicate the activities generally to be performed under all situations, in addition to those particularly pertinent to the intensity of conflict concerned. Performance of these functions will be accomplished within the framework of applicable policy guidance and directives of higher headquarters.

2. It is recognized that a number of these listed activities will be beyond the capabilities of non-CA units and personnel. However, this checklist will at least assist the commander in identifying and isolating his civil affairs problems and, as appropriate, permit him to seek trained assistance.

3. This list is not exhaustive, but does contain those civil affairs tasks, the performance of which can be commonly anticipated at all levels of command in one form or another. A statement of all functional team capabilities is contained in chapter 2. (CA Functional Checklist follows.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Functional area</th>
<th>All situations</th>
<th>Cold war to include stability operations</th>
<th>Limited and general war</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARTS, MONUMENTS, AND ARCHIVES</td>
<td>Advise the commander about protection of traditional culture, customs, and arts of an area. Recommend measures for protecting and safeguarding cultural properties such as religious buildings, monuments, and objects of archaeological, historic, and artistic value. List location of historic buildings, monuments, libraries, and relics. Determine guidelines on use of cultural and historic buildings for emergencies. Develop list of authorities on fine arts and archives. Prepare program and assist in troop education concerning importance of preserving arts, monuments, and archives. Develop and maintain cultural data for the area.</td>
<td>Same as under &quot;All situations&quot; in primarily advisory role to host government.</td>
<td>Same as under &quot;All situations,&quot; plus: Within command policy, assist in restoration of significant monuments and art objects. Assist in locating and returning arts, relics, monuments, libraries and similar properties to their rightful place and ownership.</td>
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<td>Functional area</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIVIL DEFENSE</td>
<td>Prepare required civil defense plans.</td>
<td>Advise local government:</td>
<td>Implement all civil defense plans.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Recruit personnel for training in locating shelters and evacuation routes.</td>
<td>On civil defense planning.</td>
<td>Insure sufficient police are available to control traffic and panic.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Provide for stockpiling necessary food and medical supplies.</td>
<td>On sufficient shelters for population.</td>
<td>Educate population in use of protective measures in CBR attack.</td>
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<td>Provide for adequate warning systems.</td>
<td>On emergency supplies (food, water, medical supplies).</td>
<td>Assist in activation of all emergency and voluntary personnel, emergency welfare measures, and repair squad for vital facilities.</td>
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<td>Provide for volunteer agencies, i.e., fire, police rescue and emergency squads.</td>
<td>Establish liaison with local U.S. representatives in area:</td>
<td>Assist in implementing debris removal plan.</td>
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<td>Provide for explosive ordinance removal.</td>
<td>On adequate warning system.</td>
<td>Same as “Occupied friendly,” plus:</td>
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<td>Provide for emergency welfare services.</td>
<td>On populace control.</td>
<td>Establish decontaminating stations.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Advise commander on civil defense plans and measures.</td>
<td>On recruiting and training of personnel.</td>
<td>Enforce all passive defense measures.</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIVIL INFORMATION</td>
<td>Advise commander on use of civil information to support military operations.</td>
<td>Provide assistance in shelter marking.</td>
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<td>Develop a community relations plan.</td>
<td>Provide advice on proper welfare measures to be taken.</td>
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<td>Establish liaison with U.S. and host country military and civilian information agencies and media.</td>
<td>Establish working relationship with USIA, and with host country, international, and other civil information agencies.</td>
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<td>Keep current information on political, economic, and sociological aspects of the area.</td>
<td>Advise and assist in establishing programs to:</td>
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<td>Explain U.S. presence in host country.</td>
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<td>Familiarize U.S. personnel with the customs and traditions of the host country.</td>
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<td>Win the respect of the people for the U.S. and the legally constituted host government positions.</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIVILIAN SUPPLY</td>
<td>Plan for relief supplies for immediate needs of populace.</td>
<td>Establish working relationship with host nation, USAID, and voluntary agency personnel who control civilian supplies.</td>
<td>Prepare procedures and programs for the transition from military to civilian operation in the area.</td>
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<td>Determine availability of civilian supplies for military use.</td>
<td>Coordinate movement of supplies from USAID and voluntary agency sources, utilizing military</td>
<td>Plan and supervise food rationing or controlled distribution, as required.</td>
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<td>Acquire and distribute civilian supplies in accordance with policy and applicable law.</td>
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<td>Assist in moving essential civilian supplies,</td>
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<td>Same as “Occupied friendly,” plus: Secure control of all governmental and commercial supply facilities and personnel until they can be screened for acceptability.</td>
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<td>Establish and maintain civilian supply records.</td>
<td>transportation if necessary. Establish and supervise the operation of temporary and semipermanent camps required to provide immediate emergency relief for R&amp;D/P; and prevent interference with operations.</td>
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<td>Assure coordination of civilian and military transportation facilities for distribution of civilian supplies. Coordinate with refugee control personnel to insure adequate supplies are available. Establish and supervise the operation of temporary and semipermanent camps required to provide immediate emergency relief for R&amp;D/P; and prevent interference with operations.</td>
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<td>Assure safeguarding of essential civilian supplies. Take measures to salvage captured supplies and turn them over to civilian authorities for use. Assist in providing security for movement of civilian supplies. Establish and supervise the operation of temporary and semipermanent camps required to provide immediate emergency relief for R&amp;D/P; and prevent interference with operations.</td>
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<td>Insure that civilian supplies reach their intended use and destination, and are not diverted into black-market channels.</td>
<td>Establish and supervise the operation of temporary and semipermanent camps required to provide immediate emergency relief for R&amp;D/P; and prevent interference with operations.</td>
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<td>Determine caloric requirements of population categories such as heavy workers, children, and nursing mothers. Conduct surveys of: Normal standards of living, including health and dietary factors. Establish and supervise the operation of temporary and semipermanent camps required to provide immediate emergency relief for R&amp;D/P; and prevent interference with operations.</td>
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<td>Agricultural and industrial patterns and effects of military operations on civilian supplies. Conduct surveys of: Agricultural and industrial patterns and effects of military operations on civilian supplies. Establish and supervise the operation of temporary and semipermanent camps required to provide immediate emergency relief for R&amp;D/P; and prevent interference with operations.</td>
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<td>Collection and distribution facilities handling essential supplies.</td>
<td>Establish and supervise the operation of temporary and semipermanent camps required to provide immediate emergency relief for R&amp;D/P; and prevent interference with operations.</td>
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<td>Advise commander concerning all aspects of civilian supply.</td>
<td>Establish and supervise the operation of temporary and semipermanent camps required to provide immediate emergency relief for R&amp;D/P; and prevent interference with operations.</td>
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</table>

**DISPLACED PERSONS, REFUGEES, AND EVACUEES (DP, R&E)**

Estimate in advance probable impact of DP, R&E on operations. Plan specific measures to control movement of DP, R&E and provide emergency relief. Insure that intelligence screening of refugees is accomplished. Operate DP, R&E camps as required. Resettle DP, R&E in accordance with U.S. policies and objectives. After officials are appointed and a government compatible with U.S. objectives and policy is

|                |               | In coordination with U.S. and host country agencies and officials, determine responsibility for handling DP, R&E, and specific measures required to provide emergency relief and control of movement. Advise host country and U.S. agencies and officials concerning military operations which will create DP, R&E problems and require support. Establish and supervise the operation of temporary and semipermanent camps required to provide immediate emergency relief for R&D/P; and prevent interference with operations. |

Same as "Occupied friendly," except:

- Insure that intelligence screening of refugees is accomplished.
- Operate DP, R&E camps as required.
- Resettle DP, R&E in accordance with U.S. policies and objectives.
- After officials are appointed and a government compatible with U.S. objectives and policy is
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<tr>
<td>Coordinate activities of all agencies responsible for providing relief to DP, R&amp;E.</td>
<td>Advise and assist host country and U.S. agencies and officials responsible for operation of DP, R&amp;E camps and relief measures.</td>
<td>R&amp;E by friendly government.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Plan for evacuation of DP, R&amp;E to rear areas when required.</td>
<td>Supervise and coordinate the actions of U.S. tactical forces in controlling DP, R&amp;E.</td>
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<td>Plan for ultimate disposition of DP, R&amp;E by return to their homes, resettlement, or repatriation.</td>
<td>Insure that evacuation from tactical areas is coordinated with responsible agencies and officials. Support actions to return, resettle, or repatriate DP, R&amp;E within established policy.</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECONOMICS AND COMMERCE</td>
<td>Establish working relationship with USAID, Embassy, and host country and international economists. Evaluate effectiveness of monetary and fiscal policies and make recommendations when appropriate. Advise commanders of measures to be taken to control inflation. Conduct feasibility studies for establishment of new industry. Advise and assist in the establishment of programs in: Export expansion. Industrial expansion. Vocational training. Price stabilization. Implementation of economic assistance programs. Plan and program for inputs necessary to get priority industries operating. Assist in establishing priorities to get industries operating. Assist in establishing or continuing price control and rationing programs as necessary. Recommend and program for necessary economic assistance. Assist in the prevention of unnecessary exploitation of economic resources.</td>
<td>Same as under &quot;Occupied friendly,&quot; plus: Take control of all economic and commerce offices. Screen government economic and commerce officials and restore those who are acceptable.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Determine availability of local resources for military and civilian use. Determine governmental structure as related to economics and commerce. Develop list of key industries. Determine economic controls being used. Establish liaison with government, university and industry economists. Advise commander of the effect of military operations on production and prices. Conduct surveys of: Means of production. Channels of distribution. Types and volume of commodities entering foreign trade. Location of industry and raw materials. Prices to include any commonly used indexes. Assistance programs.</td>
<td>Establish working relationship with USAID, Embassy, and host country and international economists. Evaluate effectiveness of monetary and fiscal policies and make recommendations when appropriate. Advise commanders of measures to be taken to control inflation. Conduct feasibility studies for establishment of new industry. Advise and assist in the establishment of programs in: Export expansion. Industrial expansion. Vocational training. Price stabilization. Implementation of economic assistance programs. Plan and program for inputs necessary to get priority industries operating. Assist in establishing priorities to get industries operating. Assist in establishing or continuing price control and rationing programs as necessary. Recommend and program for necessary economic assistance. Assist in the prevention of unnecessary exploitation of economic resources.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>FOOD AND AGRICULTURE</strong></td>
<td>Advise commander of effect of military operations on food and agricultural production and distribution. List key personnel involved in agriculture and food production. Determine structure of Ministry of Agriculture. Establish liaison with technical specialists working in food and agriculture. Conduct surveys of: Food and fiber production, Food and fiber requirements, Processing and storage facilities, Marketing system, Availability of credit, Agricultural education, Land tenure.</td>
<td>Establish working relationship with USAID, host country, and international agricultural personnel. Advise and assist in the establishment of programs in: Improvement in marketing, Livestock improvement, Crop improvement, Agricultural training, Demonstration farms, Improved irrigation, Use of fertilizer and pesticides. Assist in providing security for planting and harvesting of crops. Assure measures are taken to salvage captured food stocks.</td>
<td>Determine location of food deficit and surplus areas. Plan and program for necessary relief supplies. Estimate requirements for agricultural inputs from other areas. Assure measures are taken to insure earliest possible resumption of agricultural production. Assure adequate labor is available for planting and harvesting. Assure levels of breeding livestock and seeds are maintained. Assure soil and forest resources are protected.</td>
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<td><strong>LABOR</strong></td>
<td>Conduct surveys to determine: Manpower currently in communities by skills and age group. Unusual and current employment of above. Customary conditions of work, including tools, supervisory methods, and standards of compensation. Unusual labor requirements imposed by catastrophe, combat, local economic development, indigenous authorities, the enemy, and friendly military forces. Controls on pay and conditions</td>
<td>Assist local governments: In planning, establishing, manning, structuring, or administering, if needed, units of ministry of labor dealing with labor economics, apprenticeship, safety, employee-employer relations, union affairs, insurance, sex and age limitations and retirement. In planning, establishing, structuring, administering, if needed paramilitary work organizations.</td>
<td>Assist recognized local authorities in planning, establishing, structuring, manning, or administering indigenous labor resources. Recommend labor legislation, as appropriate. Assist commander and direct local government in planning, establishing, structuring, manning, or administering indigenous labor resources. Promulgate labor legislation, as appropriate. Insure compliance with Hague and Geneva Conventions.</td>
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<td>of work imposed by governmental, quasi-governmental, and independent agencies.</td>
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<td>Structure of labor organizations; relationship to the government; political and social composition, strength and influence; nature of organization (draft or industrial).</td>
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<td>Methods, authority, and effectiveness of indigenous private and public employment exchanges.</td>
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<td>Advise: Commander and U.S. elements of availability of labor, appropriate compensation (including termination and other bonuses), conditions of employment, supervisory methods. Indigenous officials, other leaders, potential employees, and information media, as appropriate, of U.S. employment, actual or planned.</td>
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<td>Prepare legal studies concerning applicable U.S., host nation and international law.</td>
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<td>Establish liaison with host nation judiciary and bar; with other U.S. agencies as appropriate; and with international legal organizations.</td>
<td>Review analyze, evaluate, and recommend suspension modification, amendment or retention of current or proposed local law. Supervise the local judicial system and make appropriate changes as needed. Review and evaluate local judiciary to determine adequacy of judicial system. Establish supervision over local bar.</td>
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<td>Prepare studies of organization and functioning of local judicial system and bar.</td>
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<td>Recommend modifications concerning judiciary and court system.</td>
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<td>Advise commander concerning all aspects of law affecting CA activities. Coordinates all legal functions with the</td>
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<td>Advise and assist host nation in drafting of legislation necessary for establishment or reestablishment of</td>
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<td>Establish liaison with judiciary and bar and assist in establishing, or reestablishing, functioning judicial and professional systems.</td>
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<td>judiciary and court system.</td>
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<td>Establish liaison with</td>
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<td>Advise and assist in the drafting of legislation for the improvement of judicial administration.</td>
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<td>and assist in establishing, or reestablishing, functioning judicial and professional systems.</td>
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<td>Assist in planning and providing for security of all judicial records.</td>
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<td>Review and evaluate</td>
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<td>stability in administration of justice.</td>
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<tr>
<td>PROPERTY CONTROL</td>
<td>appropriate staff judge advocate.</td>
<td>Advise host nation in establishment or revision of policy and procedures concerning custody and administration of property.</td>
<td>Advise, assist or implement establishment, reestablishment or revision of procedures concerning custody and administration of property.</td>
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<td>Determine classifications of property to be taken into custody, if required. Analyze civil laws pertaining to property. Formulate policy and procedures concerning custody and administration of property. Conduct survey to determine: Private property with potential military use. Government property with potential military use. Assure return of all property taken into custody to legal owners. Advise commander concerning all aspects of property control.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Prepare or assist in preparation of enactments necessary to the enforcement of U.S. policy and international law. Establish and supervise the functioning of military government courts. Establish repositories and supervise existing repositories for legal documents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION</td>
<td>Survey governmental organization at all levels. Survey lines of authority and influence having impact on political matters. Analyze effectiveness of existing agencies of government or social control. Study effectiveness of government officials and employees, and other community leaders. Negotiate to gain support or cooperation for U.S. forces.</td>
<td>Recommend to host nation the organization, functioning, staffing, and authority of agencies of government or social control at all levels of government. Advise on legislation, regulations, or policies based on the analysis of the society and the economy of the area. Participate on joint commissions, committees, or councils concerned with governmental affairs.</td>
<td>Same as “Occupied friendly” and: Screen key indigenous personnel for use in implementation of property control. Block and control all negotiable assets and resources of potential military use not contained in other functional areas.</td>
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- Same as “Occupied friendly,” plus:
- Remove persons who are inimical to the United States or who are not in sympathy with its policies and objectives, and secure appointment of leaders who will further desired programs.
- Temporarily appoint key officials after consultation with respected civilians of the area.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Functional area</th>
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<tr>
<td>PUBLIC</td>
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<td>Establish liaison with USAID and DOD agency responsible for U.S. military communications in the geographical area.</td>
<td>Coordinate transfer of civilian communication facilities required by military forces.</td>
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<td>Same as under “Occupied friendly,” plus: Assume full control of all communication agencies. Seize and impound postal facilities, mail, stamps, and postal monies. Remove all officials and restore those screened and found acceptable.</td>
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PUBLIC EDUCATION


PUBLIC FINANCE

Determine structures and responsibilities of financial organization. Establish working relationship with other U.S. and host country agencies, and Determine status and/or need for currency for host country. Determine need for same as “Occupied friendly,” and: Screen key financial personnel.
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<th>Functional area</th>
<th>All situations</th>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>International organization in country.</td>
<td>Occupation currency.</td>
<td>Determine need for MPC.</td>
<td>Both from government and commercial world to determine those acceptable to United States and Allies for resumption of operations.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Establish liaison with host nation public health agencies and with other agencies, U.S., international or private (WHO, USAID, USIA, PANAM Sanitary Bureau, CARE, missionary agencies). Advise and assist host nation in effective organization and operation of public health service to include conversation and employment of all resources.</td>
<td>Same as in “Cold War” and: Assume temporary direction and control of local public health institutions, supplies and personnel as required. In nuclear environment plan for and execute required analysis of food and water supplies for contamination. Estimate impact of nuclear weapons casualties on indigenous public health resources and requirements for military supplement of resources.</td>
<td>Same as in “Occupied friendly,” except: Assume direction and control of all public health organizations and facilities. Screen officials and other personnel of public health agencies for suitability and remove and replace them as required.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public Health</td>
<td>Survey civilian public health situation to include: Organization of public health service. Capabilities and distribution of medical personnel. Location and capabilities of medical facilities. Location and adequacy of medical supplies. Sanitary practices and location and adequacy of sanitation facilities. General status of health of populace. Environmental factors affecting public health. Sanitary state and adequacy of food and water. Status of veterinary services. Epidemiologic conditions. Estimate possible need for medical support and supplies from</td>
<td></td>
<td>Initiate, as required, a U.S.-sponsored public health program to supplement local efforts with</td>
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<td>Plan for return of direction and control of public health administration to local officials as soon as</td>
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<td>military resources for local populace. Estimate medical support facilities and supplies available for military use from local resources. Advise commander on all aspects of public health.</td>
<td>particular reference to water purification, mass immunization and other medical and sanitary measures. Advise and assist in indigenous veterinary efforts particularly in predominantly agricultural environments. Provide emergency medical treatment for civilians. Assist host nation in training public health personnel.</td>
<td>practicable.</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAME AS &quot;Occupied friendly,&quot; except: Collect and take into custody all arms and ammunition and other implements of war. Use military police or other tactical forces to staff police, fire protection and penal agencies as required. Keep commander informed of level of hostility within the local populace. Screen officials and other public safety personnel for suitability, and remove and replace them as required.</td>
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### PUBLIC SAFETY

Advise commander on the status of public safety in the area of operations. Determine the organizational structure of the police agencies, fire protection services and penal system. Develop list of key personnel in police, fire protection and penal organizations. Analyze capabilities of police to maintain law and order in all situations. Advise commander on character of population with respect to obedience to law. Prepare plans and procedures to maintain or restore law and order during all civil emergencies. Conduct Surveys of police, fire protection and penal agencies to determine: Degree of training. Status of equipment. Auxiliary forces available. Condition of facilities. Operational effectiveness. | Establish liaison with USAID, host country and other agencies concerned with public safety activities. Advise and assist in the development of programs to improve training, equipment facilities and operational effectiveness of police, fire protection and penal agencies. Assist in the development of auxiliary forces to support police agencies in the maintenance of public order. Develop contingency plans for military support of police agencies in keeping the public order. | Assist recognized local authorities to: Establish or re-establish police and fire protection agencies as necessary. Enforce all laws and ordinances after populace has been duly informed. Establish control over all penal installations; insure utilization of acceptable control personnel. Control circulation of civilian personnel. Establish measures to control arms and ammunition, i.e., sale, possession, registration and use. Develop plans and procedures for return of control to friendly country as soon as practicable. | |
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<td>Survey organization, routes, and capacities of the transportation system. Analyze powers and functions of regulatory agencies. List key personnel involved in transportation. Conduct surveys of: Transportation equipment and source of replacement parts. Bulk fuel requirements and source. Maintenance capabilities. Minimum transportation requirements for civilian use. Key facilities in the transportation network, including port, rail, air, and highway. Advise commander on all aspects of public transportation.</td>
<td>Establish liaison with host country, USAID, and other U.S. agency transportation personnel. Provide technical assistance and advice to host country in: Operation of the transportation system. Improvement in the training program. Equipment modernization. Improvement of maintenance facilities. Establishment of movement priority and movement control programs. Coordinate use of port terminal operations, both air and sea. Prepare plans and make recommendations for utilization of transport facilities for civilian use.</td>
<td>Determine and recommend extent of operation of civilian transportation by military agencies. Assure provision of essential transportation facilities for civilian use and determine civilian facilities available for military use. Recommend and arrange for protection of key transportation facilities. Coordinate and assure the supply procurement, and allocation of critical materials.</td>
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<td><strong>PUBLIC WELFARE</strong></td>
<td>Conduct surveys to: Determine the extent of the welfare problem. Ascertain the number and condition of welfare facilities. Determine the amount of welfare supplies needed for emergency relief. Establish the number and location of civilian welfare organizations available. Establish the number presently on welfare rolls. Determine the population of</td>
<td>Assist local government in analysis of public and private institutions for improvement of existing institutions or construction of new ones. Assist in screening local laws for suitability. Estimate requirements for public welfare. Plan for protection and evacuation of inhabitants of welfare institutions. Establish liaison with representatives of USAID and other agencies in the area.</td>
<td>Assist local government in: Rehabilitation of welfare facilities. Supervision of public and private welfare organizations. Establishment and supervision of emergency distribution points. Establishment of emergency centers for housing and feeding for indigenous civilians. Monitor activities to assure that: Local welfare laws applicable and are enforced. Local welfare is established.</td>
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<td><strong>PUBLIC WORKS AND UTILITIES</strong></td>
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<td>Establish liaison with USAID. Provide technical assistance in and advice to host country in: Operation of utilities. Technical training program. Modernization and expansion. Protection of key facilities. Prepare plans and make recommendations for providing minimal service, e.g., water, in the event of natural disaster or enemy attack.</td>
<td>Survey damage to essential facilities and recommend restoration priorities. Recommend extent of operation of civilian facilities by military agencies. Recommend allocations of utilities for civilian and military use. Request military supplies and materials to assist in rehabilitation of public utilities. Assist in initial operation of facilities returned to civilian control. Provide minimum essential requirements from military sources during an emergency.</td>
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<td><strong>RELIGIOUS RELATIONS</strong></td>
<td>Advise commander on significance of religions and cultures of the area and of possible effect on military operations. Survey religious practices, structures, physical symbols and devices, hierarchies, and major personalities. Educate U.S. troops concerning local religious customs to reduce possibility of offending. Analyze, evaluate, and recommend solutions to potential religio-cultural</td>
<td>Emphasis is placed on advice to the host nation concerned in the areas of activity listed under “All Situations.”</td>
<td>Within command policies, assist in restoration of religious facilities and worship. Assist in locating and returning religious funds and properties to the rightful ownership.</td>
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- problem areas. Maintain liaison with missionaries and local clergy.
- Provide liaison with religious groups and, as required, provide limited assistance to and participate in beneficial activities and charitable endeavors.
- Encourage religious freedom except where belief or practices threaten security of U.S. forces, or endanger the lives of participants.
- Develop areas of comparison and arbitration to lessen friction and hostility between opposed religious groups.
- Determine general restrictions on and permitted use of religious facilities in emergencies.
- Seek methods of compromise between religious dietary habits and the production and distribution of foodstuffs.

Preserve essential freedom of religion; however, curb religious practices and beliefs which pose a security threat to U.S. forces; and remove religious leaders advocating such practices and beliefs.

Issue directives on the use of religious facilities.
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W. C. WESTMORELAND,
General, United States Army,
Chief of Staff.

Official:
KENNETH G. WICKHAM,
Major General, United States Army,
The Adjutant General.

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