MACCORDS-PHX

SUBJECT: PHUNG HOANG Advisors Handbook

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. This handbook has been prepared to insure that the advice rendered by all US Advisors who are involved in the PHUNG HOANG Program is coordinated and in accordance with the objective of the program.

2. These guidelines parallel but do not supplant existing Standing Operating Procedures, Directives, Regulations, or Circulars and should be used only for the purpose intended - guidelines.

3. It is emphasized that the advisory effort of all agencies must be directed toward the sustained attack on the VC Infrastructure. The primary operating element for the PHUNG HOANG Program is the National Police; however, it is imperative that all agencies contribute intelligence support and information necessary to ensure the accomplishment of the mission.

4. Use of this handbook should not be limited to PHUNG HOANG Advisors but utilized by all US Advisors as a reference.

[Signature]
CREIGHTON W. ABRAMS
General, United States Army
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION A
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONTENTS</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Purpose</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Viet Cong Infrastructure</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Background</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic PHUNG HOANG Documents</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Periodic Publications</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Documents Pertaining to the PHUNG HOANG Program</td>
<td>7-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Procedures</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VCI Target Personality Data Forms and Offender Dossiers</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterpart Relationships</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advisory Mission Relationships</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHUNG HOANG Advisor's Legal Position and Responsibilities</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrest and Apprehension</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Classification of Detainees: PW or Civil Defendant</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Province Security Committee (PSC)</td>
<td>16-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-Country Training</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support</td>
<td>20-22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHUNG HOANG Publicity</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Planning Guide</td>
<td>Annex A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIOCC/DIOCC Inspection Guide</td>
<td>Annex B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fingerprinting</td>
<td>Annex C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VCI Neutralization and Identification Information System (VCINIIS)</td>
<td>Annex D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Commonly Used Abbreviations</td>
<td>Annex E</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PURPOSE

The purpose of this Handbook is to provide general guidelines for PHUNG HOANG Advisors on the PHUNG HOANG Program, its mission and organization. It should also be utilized by other US Advisors whose counterparts are represented on PHUNG HOANG Committees and/or involved in PHUNG HOANG activities in order that the general advice given will be coordinated and directed towards the same objective, the neutralization of the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI).
The Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI) is defined as the political and administrative organization through which the Viet Cong control or seek control over the South Vietnamese people. It embodies the Communist Party of South Vietnam (SVN) (People's Revolutionary Party (PRP)) control structure, which includes a command and administrative apparatus with the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) at the national level. It also includes the leadership and administration of parallel front organizations, the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) with its subordinate Revolutionary Committees, and the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSVN). Both the PRP and the front organizations extend from the national through the hamlet level.

The VCI is the communist shadow government which provides money, recruits, supplies, intelligence and support to VC military units. Its primary mission is to attain effective control of the people and territory of South Vietnam by becoming a viable alternative to the GVN from hamlet to national level. Control of VC military units is vested in the VCI.
Article 4 of the Constitution of the Republic of Vietnam, promulgated in 1967 states:

"a. The Republic opposes Communism in any form;

b. Any activity designed to publicize or carry out Communism is prohibited."

In accordance with Article 4, the President of Vietnam in Decree No. 280-a/TT/SL, 1 July 1968, promulgated the PHUNG HOANG Program. The intent and aim of the Program is to utilize existing civilian and military agencies (police, paramilitary, and military forces) in a systematic and coordinated effort to destroy the Viet Cong Infrastructure throughout Vietnam.

The Government of Vietnam (GVN) chose the name PHUNG HOANG to identify the program. The Phung Hoang (PHOENIX) was adopted as a symbol of the program. In Chinese and Vietnamese mythology the Phung Hoang is a good omen of marital happiness, peace, and good fortune.

The PHUNG HOANG Program coordinates GVN agencies in the attack on the VCI by placing VCI-intelligence gathered by all agencies in one location, systematically collating anti-VCI operations (often joint inter-agency efforts) based on the PHUNG HOANG Center's data bank. PHUNG HOANG is NOT a separate agency, organization, or entity. PHUNG HOANG Centers are entirely dependent on the PHUNG HOANG Program member agencies: National Police, RF/PF, Rural Development Cadre, ARVN, Chieu Hoi, NPFF, VIS, etc.

The U.S. Advisory effort in support of PHUNG HOANG is called "PHOENIX". PHOENIX is composed entirely of U.S. advisors working with PHUNG HOANG Centers at national, regional, provincial, and district levels. Substantial reliance is placed on all other U.S. advisors to the PHUNG HOANG member agencies. PHOENIX is NOT an intelligence unit or separate command - it has no intelligence holdings or collection capability. PHOENIX personnel and staff are presently members of MACCORDS at every echelon under the direct command of the senior MACV/CORDS officer at each echelon.
Organizationally, the PHUNG HOANG Program is represented by national, regional, and provincial committees composed, at each echelon, of the heads of all participant agencies. Subordinate to these committees are PHUNG HOANG Centers. At the national government level, the PHUNG HOANG Bloc of the Directorate General of National Police coordinates the program throughout the country. There are four Corps PHUNG HOANG Centers. At the province level, Province Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Centers (PIOCCs) have been established and at district level DIOCCs have been established. The national and regional offices are tasked with planning, training, inspecting, and overall program management for subordinate echelons in their respective areas of competence. PIOCCs and DIOCCs at provinces and districts serve to coordinate collection and collation of anti-VCI intelligence and anti-VCI operations. The agencies represented on PHUNG HOANG Committees are the National Police, the Special Police, the National Police Field Force, G2, G3, the Military Security Service, Chieu Hoi Service, Vietnamese Information Service, Provincial Reconnaissance Unit, and Rural Development Cadre. The sections of PHUNG HOANG SOP No. 3 which pertain to the various echelons of PHUNG HOANG Centers are: Corps (pgs 5-18), Province (pgs 19-35), and District (pgs 37-123).
RVN Presidential Decree 280a-TT/SL dated 1 July 1968 prescribed the establishment of the PHUNG HOANG Program. The SOPs are implementing instructions issued by the authority of the Minister of the Interior by virtue of his position as Chairman of the Central PHUNG HOANG Committee. SOP No. 1 delineates the organizational structure of the program. SOP No. 2 prescribes the basic tools and working procedures of an intelligence and operations coordinating center with special emphasis on the DIOCC. SOP No. 3 is an amplification of the first two which covers in depth the operational responsibilities of each echelon of the PHUNG HOANG Program. Finally, A Current Breakout of Executive and Significant Viet Cong Infrastructure Cadres (the Green Book) defines the target of the PHUNG HOANG Program; it is a GVN/US agreed upon listing of Viet Cong positions which are considered to be of the VCI cadre.
1. The PHOENIX Biweekly
2. The MACV J2 Monthly "Summary of VCI Activities"
3. The Combined Documents Exploitation Center (CDEC) Readouts
4. Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam (CICV) Readouts
5. VCI Information System (Monthly)
6. PHOENIX End of Year Report
US Documents


4. MACV Directive 381-51, Military Intelligence National Police Field Forces (U).

5. VCI: MODUS OPERANDI (RAND Corporation"Yellow Book").


GVN Documents


2. PHUNG HOANG SOP 1, dated 23 July 1968, Confidential.
3. PHUNG HOANG SOP 2, dated 1 November 1968, Confidential.


5. Handbook, "Current Breakout of VCI Executive and Significant Cadre" (Short Title: "Green Book").


The mission of an Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Center is to neutralize the Viet Cong Infrastructure. In order to effectively do so, it is axiomatic that first you know the enemy. Therefore, files and procedures are necessary for PHUNG HOANG Centers. Once a suspect VCI is identified (name and VCI position are known), two index cards are prepared and catalogued both in alphabetical and village/hamlet files (pgs 79-81). The next step is to develop a VCI Target Folder on the individual; a good target folder will enable the cadre to be specifically targeted (you will know his habits, contacts, schedule, and modus operandi) and will provide sufficient evidence to enable the Province Security Committee to sentence him to the maximum time his importance warrants, when he is captured (pgs 82-85). Once a target folder is established, it must be subjected to case control; intelligence gaps are to be identified and information requirements levied to fill them (pgs 93-95). Other files and charts such as source control records (pgs 73-75), VCI organization charts (pgs 142-144) photographic files (pgs 97,98) and files on guides (pg 98); will each in their own way tend to sophisticate the process of specific targeting of VCI cadres. Consistently up-dated organization charts will particularly aid in the development of operations to neutralize entire VCI staff elements or organizational echelons. An IOCC is not functioning efficiently unless it regularly and successfully targets specific VCI cadres and organizations for neutralization. Files are only a tool by which to accomplish the mission.
Particular attention must be given to this important aspect. Careful, professional preparation of VCI Target Folders containing both the "VCI Target Personality Data Form" and the "Offender Dossier" for each and every member of the VCI throughout the country is the foundation from which successful operations can be run and sentencing be assured by Province Security Committees. The folders must contain all the available data on an individual and be constantly reviewed and updated. Sample form "VCI Target Personality Data Form" is in SOP No. 3 (pages 137-140). It has been reproduced and distributed to all PIOCCs and DIOCCs in sufficient copies to establish folders on every identified VCI member. "Offender Dossier" forms have also been disseminated. Full use should be made of the "Information Requirement Form" (Annex 14, SOP 3) and procedures to build the folder. Copies of source reports, captured documents, interrogation reports, Hoi Chanh debriefing reports, and all other relevant documents are to be filed in this folder so that all information on a specific target is in one place where it can be reviewed easily and quickly. Appropriate information must be constantly and systematically extracted from the documents in the folder and posted to both the "VCI Target Personality Data Form" and the "Offender Dossier".
Results achieved by a PHUNG HOANG Advisor are in direct proportion to the closeness of his relationships with his counterparts. Ideally, such relationships are based on mutual respect, trust and friendship - neither are achieved in a day. Before advice can be tendered, an advisor must comprehend a complicated situation and program. The disadvantages of youth and low rank can be overcome by initial eagerness to learn what your counterparts can teach you and by taking action only when you are sure of your grounds. The greater your friendship with your counterparts, the better you will understand and thus be able to advise them. However, do not hesitate to be firm when the situation warrants it.
All US advisors at every echelon share in the PHUNG HOANG advisory mission. This is an explicit obligation of advisors to GVN agencies with representatives who participate on PHUNG HOANG Committees and work in PIOCCs and DIOCCs (e.g., Police, Chieu Hoi, and Rural Development advisors), but is an implicit obligation of all Pacification advisors to this program, the spearhead of pacification. PHUNG HOANG personnel are responsible for close coordination and cooperation with all elements of the advisory mission and especially with the advisors to intelligence and operations agencies which participate directly in the PHUNG HOANG Program. It is the responsibility of all Senior Advisors to insure that all members of the Advisory Team are knowledgeable of and fully support the GVN PHUNG HOANG Campaign against the Viet Cong Infrastructure.
PHUNG HOANG Advisors have the same legal status in Vietnam as other US military personnel. In their role as advisors they are under the same restraints of international law, military law and regulations as other US military personnel. Their advice and assistance must be within the confines of this legal framework. Participation in actions contrary to law are expressly prohibited. If violations are observed, the advisor is to make his objections known, cease any participation in the illegal activity, and make a full report of the incident to his immediate superior for corrective action. A detailed explanation of the advisor's legal position and responsibility is found in MACV Directive 525-36, dated 18 May 1970.
A person suspected of an offense against the National Security may be arrested and taken into custody and held up to twenty-four hours for questioning and investigation by an apprehending agency other than the National Police. He must, however, be placed in National Police custody no later than twenty-four hours following apprehension. All arrests must be made pursuant to a warrant issued by a competent judicial authority, which for present purposes includes Province Chiefs, Mayors, District Chiefs and Police Chiefs. An arrest defective due to lack of a warrant, however, can later be "corrected" by issuance of a warrant ex post facto by an official having authority to do so initially. US personnel are not authorized to arrest GVN citizens. The following may execute an arrest order:

a. Judicial police;

b. Military police;

c. Military Security Service (MSS);

d. National Police (NP); which includes individuals of the National Police Field Force (NPFF); and

e. Any person who witnesses the commission of a crime, "in flagrante delicto," - citizen's arrest.

Once an individual has been turned over to the National Police, that agency must complete its preliminary inquiry and identification processing within two days. Following that, a maximum of three more days may be allowed for transfer of the suspect to the Province Interrogation Center, where a supplementary investigation may continue for as long as 30 days. The Province Chief next may expend 3 days in reviewing the dossier for adequacy, after which the case is forwarded to the Province Security Committee, which must sentence, release or refer the individual for trial by Military Court. The Committee has seven days within which to act. Deviation from the foregoing time schedule must be authorized by the Ministry of Interior.
Advisors should frame their advice as to the classification of detainees as civil defendant or PW according to MACV Directives 381-46 and 20-5. VC and NVA military personnel are to be accorded PW status and the rights of a PW under the Geneva Conventions. Civilian PRP members and VCI cadre are considered civil defendants. Certain members of the VC/NVA military may be occupying positions within the VCI. When captured these military VCI are to be accorded PW status but are to be reported as neutralized VCI even though retained in PW channels.
Province Security Committees were created in 1957 to provide an administrative method of determining the status of detainees considered threats to national security. The PSC is an administrative as opposed to a judicial body. It may impose administrative detention in the case of those persons reasonably believed to endanger the national security.

The minimum composition of a PSC is:

Province chief or city mayor. . . . . . . . Chairman
Public prosecutor/judge . . . . . . . . . . . . Legal Advisor
Sector commander . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Member
Province or city council member . . . . . . . Member
National Police Chief (NP). . . . . . . . . . . Member
Military Security Service Chief (MSS) . . . . . . Member
Chief of Internal Security. . . . . . . . . . . Briefing Officer

MOI Circular No. 2212 requires each PSC to meet at least once a week. Suspect detainees may appear before the PSC but have no such right. The members of the PSC review the dossiers of the suspects to make their determination. The PSC has several courses of action available:

1. It may release those considered innocent.
2. It may forward to Military Court those on whom sufficient evidence is available for legal conviction of a specific crime.
3. It may impose administrative detention of up to 2 years upon those reasonably believed to threaten the national security.
4. It may determine residence for those determined to be security threats.
5. It may forward the case to a civil court.
6. It may forward the case to another province for disposition.
7. It may classify the suspect as a PW and transfer him into PW channels.

8. It may recommend that the suspect be drafted into the Army.

An Tri Detention: Basic Evidence Requirements

The laws prescribing offenses against the national security define mere membership or function in the Viet Cong Infrastructure as a threat to the national security. This recognition is based upon the right of a government to protect itself from violent overthrow. Membership or function may be inferred from acts or intelligence data.

It is imperative to have available a comprehensive dossier if an-tri detention is to be obtained. There is no rigid rule regarding the amount or type of evidence necessary to support an-tri detention. However, the Province Security Committee must have a reasonable belief based on corroborated evidence that the suspect is a threat to the national security. Not being a criminal conviction, the burden of proof is less than that required by a court.

The burden of proof is on the prosecution which must show that the accused, is, in fact, a member of the Communist party or exercises a position or function in the party or any associated front organization. Proof of position or function in the Viet Cong Infrastructure is sufficient to convict.

Particular care should be taken to direct prosecution effort away from total reliance on Province Interrogation Center reports and confessions. Effort should be made to point out that other forms of evidence are much more convincing.

The elements of proof are: Membership, position or function in the VCI, as indicated by:

a. Incriminating documents - to include, but not limited to, membership lists of Communist organizations; enemy correspondence; diaries; notebooks, to include copies or extracts of such documentation; or

b. Enemy weapons or material - found in the possession of the accused when apprehended, or
c. Eye witnesses - accomplices, accessories or rallier statements regarding the position or function of the accused, or

d. Interrogation statements or confessions - are admissible and used extensively in an-tri hearings, but no suspect may be convicted on the basis of an interrogation statement alone, or

e. Intelligence reports - are admissible in that there is no prohibition against hearsay.

All intelligence and police reports, and witness statements must be included in the dossier and must be identified by number and name of source except where there is a danger of source compromise.

Once position or function within the Viet Cong Infrastructure is proven, sentencing is automatic. The Green Book indicates the duration of detention for each position or function. Renewable An-Tri detention of up to two years may be given by the Province Security Committee.
US Personnel - The in-country training of US personnel is conducted at the PHUNG HOANG Advisors Orientation Course at Vung Tau. The course is designed to acquaint both PHUNG HOANG Advisors and other personnel with those GVN agencies that support the PHUNG HOANG Program and with the problems encountered within the program. In conjunction with the orientation, a two-day DIOCC practical exercise is conducted utilizing experienced DIOCC Advisors as monitors. The intent of the exercise is to familiarize the participants with the operation of a DIOCC.

GVN Personnel - GVN personnel attend PHUNG HOANG Schools located in the four Military Regions. Each regional school is responsible for training those personnel operating within the DIOCCs and PIOCCs in their day-to-day job. The instruction includes familiarization with the capabilities of supporting agencies. All DIOCC and PIOCC personnel should attend the PHUNG HOANG School within their respective Military Regions.
All American advisors assigned to, or associated with, the PHUNG HOANG Program should be acquainted with the general guidance on support matters contained in Annex I to MACV Directive 10-20 as changed. Annex I was disseminated in the form of Change 1 (dated 1 July 1969) to MACV Directive 10-20. Further changes were contained in various messages and memorandums.

It is essential that PHUNG HOANG advisors are aware that the general guidance contained in Annex I has been further implemented within the various Military Regions by written or oral instructions. The specifics normally found in Military Region implementations are based on the local situation, local conditions and policies, and local personalities. PHUNG HOANG advisors must be flexible and both acquaint and adapt themselves to the local "ground rules" on support.

It must be noted, however, that certain aspects of support are basic throughout South Vietnam. We must continuously direct American advisory, coordinating, and supporting programs to the Vietnamese PHUNG HOANG Program.

In the supporting role, PHUNG HOANG advisors are presently committed to provide adequate support to PHUNG HOANG down to and including district level PHUNG HOANG activities. Such support includes logistical and maintenance support of PHUNG HOANG Centers at district, province, autonomous city, and regional levels.

As the reader will note in Sections I and III of Annex I, MACV Directive 10-20, primary support to PHUNG HOANG Centers (supplies, equipment, and maintenance) is based on the availability and use of monies (Vietnamese piasters). PHUNG HOANG advisors must request such monies from Province Senior Advisor's (PSA's) Advisory Pacification Funds for province and district centers, and from like funds at region and autonomous city levels for regional and autonomous city centers. The monies obtained for support of PHUNG HOANG are then used for local procurement of necessary supplies, equipment, and maintenance for the PHUNG HOANG centers. Naturally, the level of piaster support provided/obtained will be based on the availability of monies and the
relative importance attributed to PHUNG HOANG activities in the local area, as well as the initiative and resourcefulness of the individual PHUNG HOANG advisor.

Piasters to operate Regional PHUNG HOANG Schools come from the CORDS Contingency Fund. Administration for such piasters is accomplished at regional and national levels. Requests for such monies (initiated by Region) are submitted under the provisions of paragraph 7.c., MACV Directive 37-2.

As indicated in paragraphs 5 and 6, above, primary support to PHUNG HOANG activities is by means of the Vietnamese piaster - through American support systems - for local procurement of goods and services.

The logistical support for PHUNG HOANG advisory staffs is different than that heretofore mentioned for PHUNG HOANG activities. PHUNG HOANG advisory staffs are provided logistical support, for office supplies and equipment (for their use), from MACV Military Property Books. This support is provided, through military channels, by the property book accounts of the respective province advisory team of the province in which the advisors are assigned. The Corps headquarters advisory team designates the property book account to support the PHUNG HOANG staff at region level.

Difficulties encountered in providing adequate support to PHUNG HOANG Centers and for regional schools which can be directly attributed to insufficient allocation of monies (piasters), and are determined to be detrimental to the mission of the PHUNG HOANG activity, should be brought to the immediate attention of the Military Region (MR) DEPCORDS (through proper military channels). If additional monies are considered definitely required to adequately support PHUNG HOANG activities, a written request (initiated by Region) for a specific amount of additional piasters, with complete justification, should be administratively forwarded from the MR DEPCORDS to HQ MACV, Attention: MACCORDS-CDD-CA. Such requests should be initiated only if sufficient monies cannot be reallocated within the MR itself.
Difficulties concerning logistical support of PHUNG HOANG Advisory Staffs which may develop and cannot be resolved at MR level or which may require higher authority decision should be directed by written communication through command channels to HQ MACV, Attention: J-42.

Reference the two preceding paragraphs, the PHUNG HOANG Advisory Staff at MR level should forward a copy of such correspondence to the PHOENIX Directorate, Saigon, for information and monitoring purposes.
Widespread popular understanding is essential to the success of the PHUNG HOANG Program. Various GVN agencies that communicate with the population on a regular basis must be encouraged to provide meaningful publicity to the PHUNG HOANG Program. Coordination between the DIOCC, PIOCC and the local Vietnamese Information Service (VIS) and RVNAF POLWAR cadre will facilitate widespread dissemination of information about the PHUNG HOANG Program. The communications media available through VIS and POLWAR agencies includes face-to-face persuasion, posters, handbills, newspapers, leaflets, radio, television and motion pictures.

PHUNG HOANG advisors are encouraged to coordinate with Province PSYOP advisors and Province PSYOP/POLWAR/Civic Action/VIS Advisors to obtain publicity for the PHUNG HOANG Program by paralleling GVN requests through US advisory channels.
I. General:

1. NP, PSB, MSS, PRU, S-2, RD, (as appropriate) establish informant networks throughout the area of responsibility.

2. Situation section develop a current counter-intelligence estimate for the area (Province or District).

3. Prepare a counterintelligence collection worksheet listing all intelligence resources.

4. Develop a list of the VCI methods of operation in the area, i.e., tax collecting, proselyting, armed propaganda, terrorism in order of the VCI priority.

5. Levy specific intelligence collection requirements on specific agencies. (See Case Officer Operation)

II. Analyze the intelligence available:

1. Determine VCI patterns of activity.

2. Determine VCI routes used.

3. Determine VCI commo-liaison activity.

4. Determine VCI support activities.

5. Determine VCI probable courses of action.

III. Assign Case Officers to specific areas of interest, for example:

1. VCI village organizations and activities.

2. VCI district organizations and activities.

3. VCI province organizations and activities.

4. Commo-liaison activities.

5. Terrorist activities.

6. Specific individuals.
IV. Case Officers Build Intelligence:

1. VCI personality targets are assigned to case officers.

2. All available information reports, captured documents and interrogation reports on the individual are assembled in the VCI Target Folder.

3. "VCI Target Personality Data Forms" (See SOP 3, Annex 7) and "Short Form Offender Dossiers" (See MOI Cir 2212) are initiated. (These forms are securely attached to the VCI Target Folders).

4. VCI Target Folders are reviewed daily by case officers who levy Information Requirement Forms (See SOP 3, Annex 14) to fill the gaps on the VCI Target Personality Data Form and in the Short Form Offender Dossier.

5. Source reports, responses to Information Requirement Forms, Captured Documents, Chieu Hoi debriefings, interrogation reports, etc., are received by case officers who extract relevant information to be posted to the "VCI Target Personality Data Forms" and "Short Form Offender Dossiers." These reports are filed in the dossier or an Information Summary (SOP 3, Annex 8) is prepared.

6. Recommendation for an operation against the target is made when the data base will ensure a reasonable chance of apprehension and conviction before the Province Security Committee.

V. Case Officers prepare initial Operations Plan to be provided the action agency. Consider following factors:

1. The target.

2. The results required.

3. The support required from member agencies.

4. The forces available.

5. Operational security.
VI. Approval of action agency Operations Plan by PIOCC or DIOCC Chief.

VII. Conduct special training, briefings, and/or rehearsals as required.

VIII. Execute the operation.

IX. Exploit the operation and conduct critique.

X. Add intelligence to the Local Data Bank.

These operational procedures should be instituted from Central to District level, requiring Special Police to develop the plans required. All plans should be reviewed and approved by Province or District Chief or his appointed representative. At the district level the VCI Target Folders are maintained by the District Special Police case officers. For operational security purposes the active VCI Target Folders are kept in the District Special Police office which then becomes the Political Sub-Section of the Situation Section of the DIOCC. In a similar manner, normally the Operations Section of the DIOCC is physically separated from the Message and Situation Sections.
The GVN official and the US Advisor must make use of detailed intelligent inspections to determine the effectiveness and efficiency of the PHUNG HOANG PIOCC or DIOCC. An inspection checklist has been provided in PHUNG HOANG SOP No. 3, dated 1 February 1970, pages 8-17. The US Advisor should emphasize the availability of the Inspection Checklist to his Vietnamese counterpart as the need arises. The use of these documents will insure a positive PHUNG HOANG Program.
Fingerprints should be taken of suspects regardless of whether or not they are to be detained or whether or not they have a "valid" ID Card in their possession. A fingerprint check with the National Police ID Service will then confirm the validity of the ID card. In cases where the card is stolen, forged or counterfeit, the fingerprints of the offender will then be on file and where necessary a wanted listing with his prints can be published. Fingerprinting in this way will also identify and locate ex-prisoners and ralliers with valid ID cards who may again be involved in subversive activities. Further, if the individual has been previously fingerprinted in another area as a suspect this will be surfaced, will give some idea of the suspect's area of operation, and could provide the necessary information for an arrest to be ordered. Increased use of fingerprinting will undoubtedly lead to the capture of some VCI who would not otherwise be captured because of the legal status they might have achieved through legal or illegal means. Additionally, it will have a suppressive effect, both real and psychological, on the freedom of movement of the VCI. Thus, the fear of being fingerprinted may to some extent suppress VCI activity.
The VCI Neutralization and Identification Information System (VCINIIS) is a management information system which generates a series of reports providing information on PHUNG HOANG operational results and Province Security Committee (PSC) processing. Additionally, the system is to provide data on biographies of Communist offenders and operational and judicial coordination potential.

Essential to successful specific targeting is the compilation of sufficient data on suspected VCI to determine if they are, in fact, VCI. Additionally, sufficient operational data must be compiled in order to effect apprehension. The Biographic/Neutralization Report, which is to be a part of the VCINIIS, will aid in this collection process. The Biographic/Neutralization Report will display by VCI boundaries, and VCI job positions within those boundaries, biographic and neutralization data pertaining to VCI holding specific positions, including aliases and additional jobs. The report will pinpoint cases where several supposedly different positions within the Infrastructure, even at different levels, and operating within different GVN jurisdictions, are one and the same individual. This will result in a reduction of redundant effort in the compilation of specific targeting dossiers, and will encourage cooperation between diverse jurisdictional areas. Cross-referencing made possible by the reporting of additional positions and aliases, once the neutralization of a VCI is reported, will eliminate further time and effort wastefully expended compiling dossiers on individuals already neutralized. Distribution of the report for any GVN District or Province is based on the VCI area or areas with which the GVN jurisdiction is contiguous. By clearly displaying those diverse jurisdictions which may have evidence concerning a given individual, the Biographic/Neutralization Report will help insure prompt and efficient PSC processing. The pulling together of scattered information from numerous sources may result in the sentencing of VCI who would not have been convicted if evidence from only one jurisdiction were available for consideration by the PSC.

ANNEX D
Another report within the VCINIIS, having utility as both a managerial and operational tool, is the PSC Processing Report. This report contains a province-by-province, monthly and year-to-date summary of the number of VCI processed, their disposition, the rate at which they are processed, the time lapse between capture and disposition, and the number of PSC meetings.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAT</td>
<td>Action Arrow Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIK</td>
<td>Assistance in Kind</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AO</td>
<td>Area of Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APT</td>
<td>Armed Propaganda Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARVN</td>
<td>Army of the Republic of Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>Combined Action Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAT</td>
<td>Combined Action Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDEC</td>
<td>Combined Document Exploitation Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH</td>
<td>Chieu Hoi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIC</td>
<td>Combined Interrogation Center, also: Combined Intelligence Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CICV</td>
<td>Combined Intelligence Center Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDG</td>
<td>Civilian Irregular Defense Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CORDS</td>
<td>Civil Operations and Rural Development Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COSVN</td>
<td>Central Office for South Vietnam (VC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPDC</td>
<td>Central Pacification Development Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTZ</td>
<td>Corps Tactical Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DGNP</td>
<td>Directorate General, National Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIOCC</td>
<td>District Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSA</td>
<td>District Senior Advisor, also: Deputy Senior Advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FWMAF</td>
<td>Free World Military Assistance Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GVN</td>
<td>Government of South Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JGS</td>
<td>Joint General Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAT</td>
<td>Mobile Advisory Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSS</td>
<td>Military Security Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFLSVN</td>
<td>National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NILO</td>
<td>Naval Intelligence Liaison Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NP</td>
<td>National Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPFF</td>
<td>National Police Field Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NVA</td>
<td>North Vietnamese Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSA</td>
<td>Office of the Special Assistant to the US Ambassador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBR</td>
<td>River Patrol Boat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PF</td>
<td>Popular Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFF</td>
<td>Police Field Force (also NPFF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIC</td>
<td>Provincial Interrogation Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIOCC</td>
<td>Province Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRG</td>
<td>Provisional Revolutionary Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRU</td>
<td>Province Reconnaissance Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSA</td>
<td>Province Senior Advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSB</td>
<td>Police Special Branch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Province Security Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSD</td>
<td>Public Safety Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSDF</td>
<td>Peoples Self Defense Forces</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
RDC  - Rural Development Cadre
RIOCC  - Region Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Center
TCN  - Third Country National
VCI  - Viet Cong Infrastructure
VIOCC  - Village Intelligence Operations Coordinating Center
VIP  - Volunteer Informant Program (C)
VIS  - Vietnamese Information Service