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THE UNITED STATES ARMY

***A STRATEGIC FORCE
FOR THE 1990s AND BEYOND***

January 1990

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ARMY STRATEGIC ROLES

PROVIDE FORWARD-DEPLOYED GROUND FORCES FOR DETERRENCE, SUSTAINED LAND COMBAT, AND CONFLICT TERMINATION IN AREAS OF VITAL INTEREST

MAINTAIN COMBAT-READY GROUND FORCES — HEAVY, LIGHT, AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS — IN CONUS FOR IMMEDIATE CONTINGENCIES WORLDWIDE

MAINTAIN FORCES IN CONUS ABLE TO REINFORCE FORWARD-DEPLOYED AND CONTINGENCY FORCES

PARTICIPATE IN DISASTER RELIEF, EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE, AND INTERDICTION OF ILLICIT DRUG TRAFFIC

PROVIDE SUPPORT TO ALLIED AND FRIENDLY NATIONS THROUGH PEACEKEEPING, SECURITY ASSISTANCE, AND ARMY-TO-ARMY INITIATIVES

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INTRODUCTION

In the years ahead, the United States will face unprecedented challenges in an increasingly complex, volatile, and unpredictable world. This changing environment will place far-reaching demands on the US military establishment, particularly on our conventional forces.

Because of its vital roles in all aspects of our national security strategy, the Army will play an increasingly important part in our nation's response to those challenges. The Army will still, of course, have to maintain the broad range of land-force capabilities needed to support US joint commands and country teams around the world. But the Army will also have to adapt its structure to carry out the new responsibilities that the American people and our civilian leaders will expect us to perform.

The success of US post-World War II strategy, in which forward-deployed forces have had a key role, is self-evident. This strategy undoubtedly will continue to guide us for some time. Consequently, forward deployment of combat-ready forces in places where US interests require them will remain a key Army responsibility. The scope of this responsibility, however, may be reduced in the near future as a result of improved security and new arms control agreements. Our challenge will be to ensure that deterrence, stability, and ongoing arms control negotiations are not undermined by premature or excessive reductions of forces or capabilities.

Another enduring Army role will be that of maintaining a strategic reserve in the United States able to deploy immediately to trouble spots around the world in response to crises. These contingency forces must have a full range of military capabilities, because they furnish our nation with flexible options that provide the most appropriate response to meet any challenge to US national interests. The strategic reserve must also be able to reinforce forward-deployed and previously committed contingency forces, ultimately backing them by the full mobilization of the military and industrial potential of the United States should that ever be required.

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Support to allies and other partners around the world, in the form of peacekeeping operations, security assistance, and nation-building activities, has been a historical Army role. Recently, this role has acquired new meaning in view of the challenges to, and opportunities for, democracy seen in the developing world. The Army has also continued to perform its historical responsibility of providing support to civil authorities, including disaster relief and emergency assistance; and it has received new tasks in the war on drugs.

The Army's roles fulfill vital US defense needs in a complex and continually evolving international environment. These roles must be our focus as we shape the Army of the future.

TODAY'S ARMY—*TRAINED AND READY FOUNDATION FOR THE FUTURE*

Today's Army is the best trained, most ready peacetime force in our nation's history. Over the past decade, we have undergone an extensive transformation that has prepared us well for the changes ahead. This transformation is evident in our soldiers, doctrine, force structure, training, materiel, and leaders — a transformation produced by uncompromising adherence to six fundamental imperatives that guide the Army today and serve as a beacon for the future.

The first of these imperatives, and the most important, can be summed up in a single word — quality. It is this characteristic that enables the Army to fulfill its worldwide strategic roles in spite of our relatively small size. The high quality of the American soldier — a combination of intelligence, initiative, combat skill, tenacity, and physical toughness — has been a traditional source of victory in battle. The experiences of recent years have reaffirmed that quality produces the versatility needed to respond rapidly to unforeseen situations. The high quality of our soldiers has been essential in many of our recent successes, including protection of shipping in the Persian Gulf, rapid deployment of forces for operations in Panama

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and exercises in Honduras, interdiction of illicit drug traffic, fighting forest fires, and assisting in the recovery from natural disasters. These experiences have strengthened our conviction that recruiting and retaining talented men and women must continue to be our top priority in the Army of the 1990s and beyond. Therefore, if we are to attract the best our nation has to offer, we must continue to offer them the personal and professional challenges, and quality of life, equal to those of the citizens they are sworn to defend.

The rise in the quality of our soldiers has been accompanied by a renaissance in our thinking about war. The second imperative focuses on sustaining our momentum in this area by maintaining a forward-looking warfighting doctrine. AirLand Battle, the Army's contemporary doctrine, provides the basic rationale for designing forces, determining materiel needs, conducting training, and developing leaders. This doctrine recognizes the need to integrate the capabilities of Army units with those of the other services and of our allies to achieve maximum combat power and effectiveness. It establishes the foundation for the Army's disciplined evolution to the future, ensuring the Army's preparedness for the battlefield challenges of the 1990s and beyond.

As our doctrine and the security environment have evolved, so too has the composition of Army forces. That evolution must continue. Thus our third imperative is to maintain the appropriate mix of heavy, light, and special operations forces in our Active and Reserve Components. While our present force structure does not meet the current needs of all US commands worldwide, the Army can meet the highest priority US strategic requirements. As we shape the forces needed for the future, we will take into account the US need for a sustained land combat capability worldwide, other land force roles, and ongoing East-West negotiations for reducing conventional forces in Europe.

The conduct of tough, realistic training — our fourth imperative — has set a standard for armies everywhere. The investment we have made in training over the past decade has produced the

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readiness for war that is the basis for credible deterrence and capable defense. The exercises conducted at our Combat Training Centers in California, Germany, and Arkansas, as well as our recent operations around the world, stand as evidence of our training achievements. And lest we forget, tough, meaningful, and fulfilling training is a key element in encouraging the very best soldiers to stay in our ranks. Demanding training, accomplished to standard today, is one of the best investments we can make in the Army of tomorrow.

Another dramatic improvement over the past decade has been modernization, particularly in the combat equipment of our forces. Our fifth imperative is to continue to modernize our warfighting capability. The Abrams tank, the Bradley fighting vehicle, and the Apache helicopter are three examples of weapon systems fielded in the 1980s that have served this end. They, and other systems like them, are the products of a continuous process that reflects our strategy, doctrine, technological advantages, and overarching commitment to providing our soldiers the best equipment possible. Modernization enables Army forces to win rapidly on the battlefield while preserving our most valuable asset, the lives of our soldiers. Because our dollars have always been limited, Army modernization plans ensure that units likely to be the first to fight — including selected Army Reserve and National Guard units — are modernized first. To develop needed future capabilities on time, the Army will continue to emphasize aggressive research and development in the key areas of operational concepts, unit designs, materiel, and training innovations.

In the final analysis, the capabilities of the Army depend not only on the quality of our soldiers, but also on the competence of our leaders. Thus, our sixth imperative is to continue development of Army leaders. We have pioneered many joint and Army initiatives in this area, to include enhancements in formal education and training, successive operational-level experiences, and continuous self-development opportunities. Leader development for soldiers

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and civilians is our most important and lasting contribution to shaping the Army of the future.

By adhering to these imperatives, today's trained and ready Army is positioned to meet the challenges of tomorrow. The Army of the 1990s and beyond will continue to be an Army that reflects the values and ingenuity of our nation.

THE WORLD TOMORROW—*CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES*

The world is changing in a number of profound ways, and the US will have to adapt to those changes. Nonetheless, many elements of our present national security strategy will remain important in the future. The post-World War II Western strategy of containment and flexible response, in particular, has achieved unprecedented success. We have enjoyed four decades of peace between the superpowers. Our NATO allies have developed strong economies, and vast regions of the Americas, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, are now advancing politically and economically as well. Success should not, however, cause us to discard the basic elements that have made this strategy work. Rather, we must adapt them to the demands of the future because, undoubtedly, the years ahead will present traditional challenges as well as new threats and unique opportunities.

Allies and Coalition Strategy

Because of its geographic and political position in the world, the United States must rely on a coalition strategy, working in cooperation with allies and other friendly nations to protect mutual interests. The unprecedented periods of peace in Europe and Northeast Asia demonstrate this strategy's success. Cooperation with other nations has also characterized US actions in the Persian Gulf, the Middle East, Central America, and elsewhere.

Past successes, however, do not guarantee future peace. Alliance relations are becoming more complex, with several close

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allies emerging as leading economic powers in their own right. While our nation cannot allow the combined stresses of economic competition and budget constraints to compromise shared interests, it is clear that changing political and economic conditions will affect allied security arrangements. The years ahead will witness an evolution in the sharing of defense burdens and risks among coalition partners.

But as the complexity of the adjustments facing our alliances grows, there will be no substitute for the leadership that the United States has provided to the West. No other allied or friendly nation has, or is likely to develop, the necessary economic, political, and military power to replace the United States in that role. Nonetheless, the United States is not so independent that it can routinely act alone. We will continue to depend on the cooperation and support of our allies and other friends, just as they will continue to expect from us the leadership that we have provided since World War II.

The Soviet Union

The changes taking place in the Soviet Union and throughout Eastern Europe are, in large measure, a testament to the success of NATO's strategy and to the inescapable attraction of democracy and market-oriented economic systems. Containment is not only succeeding militarily and politically, it is also providing time for the rebirth of the forces of democracy now sweeping across the Warsaw Pact. There is reason for optimism that the Soviet Union will become a more open and pluralistic society, reduce the size of its excessively large land forces, and more clearly embrace the concepts of human rights and democratic political institutions.

History suggests, however, that there are equal grounds for caution. There is a potential in the Soviet regime for a retreat from reform and openness, and regression to a closed society that again confronts the external world. Nor is this potential limited to the USSR. The domestic turmoil that often accompanies vast social restructuring is aggravated throughout the Warsaw Pact by ethnic

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conflict, economic inefficiency, and political instability. This turmoil alone creates uncertainties about the future intentions of the Soviet Union toward its neighbors and the West.

Moreover, despite the Soviet Union's announced unilateral cuts, the United States and its NATO allies still face a severe force imbalance. Meanwhile, advances in Soviet military technology and overall force modernization continue. Even if the Soviets reduce the size of their Army and the quantity of their defense production in the 1990s, NATO will face a higher quality Soviet army with more powerful individual units designed for flexible offensive and defensive operations. A major lesson of the successful Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaty negotiations is that US and NATO force deployments and modernization provide irreplaceable incentives for the Soviets to negotiate in good faith. The United States and its allies must continue to apply this lesson to the negotiations on reducing conventional forces in Europe.

For the foreseeable future, therefore, deterrence and defense against potential Soviet and Soviet-supported military action in Europe and Asia will remain the most demanding challenges for the United States and its allies. In the years ahead, the West must be patient and vigilant, carefully examining Warsaw Pact military developments and bearing in mind that capabilities, not intentions, decide the outcome in battle and determine the fate of nations. Given the situation in the East, NATO clearly will remain an essential instrument for promoting stability while Warsaw Pact countries attempt to reform their political and economic structures. A strong NATO will be a fundamental guarantor of US interests, European stability, and continued peaceful relations between East and West.

The Developing World

The developing world presents new challenges to the United States. Conflicts there can pose clear threats to US security interests, and the precise time and location of these occurrences are largely unpredictable. The underlying causes of these conflicts exist within

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the developing nations themselves and will not necessarily diminish even if Soviet international behavior continues to moderate. Indeed, as more developing countries gain significant military capabilities, they may resort more readily to force in settling local disputes.

The proliferation of sophisticated weapons in the developing world vastly complicates US defense planning. At least a dozen developing countries have more than 1,000 main battle tanks, and several of these nations have more tanks than our Army has in its active units in Europe. Portable anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles are widespread and have been used with great effectiveness in Afghanistan and Africa. A number of developing states are acquiring modern fighter and attack aircraft, giving them significant long-range strike capabilities.

Ballistic and cruise missiles also are being exported to many parts of the world, and a number of developing countries could have them in the next ten years. Even more disturbing, chemical weapons are entering the arsenals of several of these nations. The result of this proliferation of advanced military capabilities is an increasing number of countries with the ability to engage in sustained, mechanized land campaigns.

The Iran-Iraq war illustrated the intensity with which the developing world can now wage war. These two countries fought for nearly a decade, using sophisticated weapons, long-range missiles, chemical agents, heavy armored formations, and a large amount of artillery. The casualties exceeded one million. We cannot rule out future wars of this type. The United States must maintain the capability of protecting vital interests wherever they are threatened. That could mean confronting a fully-equipped army in the developing world.

But the obvious challenges in the developing world should not lead us to ignore the opportunities that also are present. Not only does the United States have a wide range of economic and political interests it can pursue with developing countries, it also has a

considerable potential for enhancing mutual security. Security assistance and army-to-army initiatives provide ideal vehicles for advancing host country and US interests. The continuing challenge will be the need to reconcile economic and defense concerns.

Low-Intensity Conflict

A growing challenge to US interests and national security strategy is so-called low-intensity conflict. International drug trafficking, terrorism, insurgency, and subversion of legitimate democratic regimes pose serious threats. Low-intensity conflict can undermine important allies and other friendly nations, impede the development of democratic institutions, and hamper essential US economic and military ties. Nor are these problems limited to the developing world; as Americans know well, terrorism and drug trafficking can plague even a superpower. Clearly, low-intensity conflict is the security challenge most likely to demand a US military response with little or no warning.

The dangers of low-intensity conflict, and particularly of terrorism, are magnified by the increasing worldwide availability of sophisticated explosives and weapons. Precision-guided munitions are becoming available through illegal arms markets or from states supporting international terrorist organizations. Terrorist use of the ultimate weapons of terror — chemical, biological, and nuclear arms — is not inconceivable.

We must not forget, however, that the causes of low-intensity conflict generally are political and economic rather than military. Although the military aspects may be crucial, the solutions to low-intensity conflict go far beyond the military dimension. Military action can only be a shield against violent opponents and a source of assistance to the civil authorities responsible for political, economic, and social development. Recent history demonstrates that military might cannot substitute for effective nation building and legitimate political institutions that meet citizens' needs.

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Considering this array of challenges, the world of the future will not be any simpler nor necessarily any safer than it is today. Indeed, as the Army moves into the 1990s, we will confront a security environment that is demanding and dangerous, and we will have to do so in an era of limited defense resources.

THE ARMY OF THE FUTURE—*VERSATILE, DEPLOYABLE, LETHAL*

The Army of the future will have to be versatile, deployable, and lethal. In view of the rapidly changing international environment, the precise time, location, and nature of the threat will always be uncertain. Consequently, the exact composition of the Army element needed to overcome any specific threat will best be determined on a case-by-case basis. In the near future as well, the Army will be smaller as a result of changes in the domestic and international environments. It will rely on its ability to expand again should circumstances require it. Nevertheless, there is no doubt about the general characteristics of versatility, deployability, and lethality that Army forces will need to fulfill their strategic roles. Guided by the six fundamental imperatives, and exploiting our society's many advantages, tomorrow's Army will have unprecedented capabilities.

A Versatile Army

Versatility will be an essential characteristic of the Army of the 1990s and beyond. We must be able to defend and advance US security interests around the world against a wide array of potential threats with a relatively small force. It would be wasteful to maintain large forces uniquely specialized for every conceivable geographical area and type of combat. Therefore, a highly capable, versatile Army will be the most effective solution to worldwide requirements for ground forces. Versatility will require the right proportions of Active and Reserve Components, the correct mix of forces (heavy, light, and special operations), adequate sustainment stocks, and, above all, high quality in all aspects of the force.

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The Army of the future, consequently, will require an Active Component sufficiently large and capable of providing both the forward-deployed elements and the US-based forces needed for immediate contingencies and rapid reinforcement of forward-deployed units. We will maintain and possibly expand today's already substantial active force capabilities available for immediate contingency response. In the Army Reserve and National Guard, we will maintain those combat and support units required to sustain the operations of the active forces beyond a prudently defined initial period. Army National Guard units, backed when necessary by the rest of the Total Army, will also be needed to fulfill traditional support responsibilities to civil authorities.

The armies of many of our potential adversaries are becoming increasingly capable and sophisticated. Combat at any level of intensity would place great demands on our force structure. The Army must, therefore, maintain sufficient numbers and the correct mix of all types of units. Whether for operations in the developing world or in Europe, we would need a combination of heavy, light, and special operations units. The difference would be in the proportions of the different types of forces committed.

The ability to tailor force packages for specific missions without delays for retraining or mobilization, thus, will be essential. Versatility, therefore, demands intensive training and frequent exercises. For the Army of the future, training programs and worldwide deployment exercises will have to demonstrate the ability to configure elements from battalion to corps in size, to deploy them within anticipated contingency warning times, and to employ and sustain them as necessary to assure success.

Wherever employed, the combat power of the Army's forces must be sustainable. The need to support our forces in peacetime operations or in combat will directly affect the mix of units in the force structure of the future. We must ensure, therefore, that we have in being, or can mobilize in the necessary time, the type and quantity of support needed to execute our plans. Contingency

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operations, in particular, will demand a higher level of sustainment stocks than we currently maintain for that purpose.

Versatility will also be essential in enabling our Army to meet other challenges. We anticipate the need to support national efforts to combat drug trafficking and terrorist organizations. Assisting civil authorities in disaster relief and during other unforeseen emergencies will similarly demand adaptive and responsive Army civilians, soldiers, units, and leaders. The same will be true of the Army elements that will carry out our security assistance efforts in the future. Our focus in this area will be on programs that yield a multiplier effect in host nation armies. Leader development initiatives, training enhancements, joint exercises, and exchange programs — more than equipment transfers — frequently shape how friendly armies address their needs and help defend our mutual interests. Such activities will be given new emphasis. In addition, US offers of materiel under security assistance will be tailored to match needed military capabilities with available resources.

More than any other characteristic, the quality of our people — soldiers and civilians — will determine the versatility of the future Army. With our volunteer force, we must provide incentives to attract and retain the highest caliber men and women. This means that we will have to provide not only adequate compensation, but also a living and working environment that meets the standards of American society. Only by caring for our soldiers and their families will we be able to meet our most essential imperative, that of attracting and retaining high quality men and women.

A Deployable Army

The nature of the United States' interests around the world, and its coalition-based strategy, will require that US forces be globally deployable, often with little or no warning, from the United States or from forward bases. While operational circumstances will determine which deployment mode is best in each case, the Army must have forces prepared to execute either option.

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The Army's ability to deploy units rapidly — to reinforce our forward-deployed forces in maintaining deterrence, to support allies in defusing a crisis, and to fight — has been tested repeatedly around the world. Recent events in Panama and current trends in the international environment make it abundantly clear that rapid deployment will become even more important in the future. The conduct of exercises with allies and other friendly armies around the world has long provided a very visible demonstration of this capability. But no amount of commitment and political will to defend vital interests around the world can substitute for timely deployment of sustainable land forces capable of countering a miscalculation or deliberate aggression by an opponent.

Forward-deployed ground forces will continue to be essential although their specific numbers will change to reflect contemporary circumstances. Soviet acceptance of the President's proposal for achieving parity in conventional forces in Europe, for instance, would lead to reductions in the size of our forces based there. The locations of our bases abroad, moreover, are likely to be limited to those areas where deterrence and regional stability cannot otherwise be assured.

In the future, the United States will also have to maintain an unquestionable ability to conduct an opposed entry into combat in defense of vital interests anywhere. In many contingencies, a forced entry will only be possible, or will best be achieved, by air. As they demonstrated in Panama, Army airborne and Ranger forces, supported by strategic airlift, are uniquely capable of performing this function, and they will remain a key element in the Army of the future.

Even the most deployable and combat-ready land force, however, cannot be employed without adequate strategic lift. The United States cannot afford to risk the effectiveness and credibility of its overall defense strategy by failing to develop and field adequate worldwide lift assets. Airlift and sealift assets currently available or approved for acquisition are inadequate. This deficiency will have to be addressed in the years ahead. Of particular

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importance will be the further development of sufficient fast sealift capacity to support contingency requirements.

In the 1990s and beyond, the United States will have to rely even more heavily on the rapid deployment of Army forces from the United States to guarantee its security. Thus, despite reductions in the defense budget, it is vital that sufficient resources be allocated to correcting the serious shortfalls in US sealift and airlift.

A Lethal Army

Lethality is the assured capability to defeat an opponent, winning as quickly as possible while preserving our most valued asset — the lives of our soldiers. Lethality depends on the capabilities of units and the overall size of the force structure. Assuring the lethality of Army forces will demand a disciplined, continuous modernization effort. This will mean maintaining the capability to counter the forces of the Soviet Union, which for the foreseeable future will remain our most capable potential adversary, while at the same time fielding capabilities that can defeat other threats around the world.

Army modernization will capitalize on US advantages and strengths — particularly the qualities of our soldiers, leaders, and technology — and exploit vulnerabilities and weaknesses in our adversaries. This approach will guide all aspects of our modernization process, including the development of doctrine, force design and structure, materiel, training, and leaders.

In the 1990s and beyond, as in the present, concepts and doctrine must guide our efforts to field combat-ready forces. For the near term, AirLand Battle doctrine provides this foundation. Projecting ahead, the Army has launched the AirLand Battle-Future initiative which is designed to update all our warfighting concepts for the early twenty-first century. The Army also will continue to participate in the development of joint and combined doctrine and warfighting concepts for operations at all levels of intensity.

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Future budgets are likely to be tight, so we must assign appropriate priorities and levels of effort to all aspects of modernization. We should, concomitantly, maintain an adequate investment in our technology base in order to identify promising new technologies and make the best use of our resources. Additionally, we must avoid mortgaging the future for useful but noncritical near-term capabilities. While we will strive to ensure that our soldiers have every technological advantage, we nonetheless will need to impose appropriate procurement criteria to get the most overall value from our resources.

Modern, short-range nuclear forces will be an essential element in maintaining deterrence, as well as in assuring the lethality of the future Army. The Army's nuclear capabilities will remain an irreplaceable link between conventional forces and US intercontinental nuclear forces. To be credible, they must be visible and militarily effective, and in sufficient numbers. The Army's chemical defense and retaliatory capabilities also must be modern and effective if they are to continue their contribution to deterrence, at least until the President's announced objective for the global, phased elimination of chemical weapons is realized.

The Army's modernization strategy guides the development and fielding of future equipment, placing priority on those units whose missions require them to be first in combat, whether active or reserve. It also guides the development of long-range plans for all major functional areas. These plans promote a continuous, disciplined sequence of development, fielding, and replacement of materiel over a 30-year period. They enable the Army to take advantage of the entire range of technological advances and to allocate resources according to national priorities. Finally, these plans also help us to align resource levels with budget and program changes and to avoid the "bow waves" which have caused programs in the past to become unaffordable.

Continuous modernization also applies to the Army's facilities. The resources allocated to facilities must reflect the priority accorded

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to the functions they support. We cannot afford to take a short-sighted view, deferring indefinitely the development of new facilities or the maintenance of those we need for the present and future. On the other hand, we must divest ourselves of marginal or unneeded facilities in order to conserve resources. Furthermore, to the maximum extent, the Army must plan for full use of all facilities and avoid inefficient single-purpose uses whenever possible.

The accelerating pace of technological change will continue to offer significant opportunities to enhance the lethality and effectiveness of all types of Army forces. Indeed, the array of potentially useful emerging technologies will exceed our ability to fund their exploitation. Therefore, the greatest challenge in this area lies in selecting those key technologies that will provide the greatest increase in warfighting capability for each dollar spent.

Technologies that apply across several functional areas and enable us to develop efficient, integrated "systems of systems" will receive high priority. Especially promising are sensor and automation technologies that facilitate "seeing" the battlefield and collecting, analyzing, disseminating, and acting on battlefield information. Similarly, the Army's work on rockets and missiles, which provided the foundation for the current United States space program, continues to support the Strategic Defense Initiative and other developments for Army and joint operations. In sum, high-technology research and development is, and will remain, a central feature of the Army's modernization strategy. The Army of the 1990s and beyond will reflect significant increases in battlefield effectiveness as a result of the application of advanced technologies.

The lethality of the Army of the future will be determined, above all else, by the actual combat readiness of the force — which, in turn, is a product of training. That is why training will continue to be the cornerstone of readiness. Combat training centers will remain the key to developing the maximum lethality of Army units. These centers not only hone combat skills, they also enable us to assess the validity of our combat doctrine and to develop our officer and

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noncommissioned officer leaders. The Army will continue to provide tough, realistic training to the highest standards so that our soldiers, units, and leaders have the best possible chance of accomplishing their missions and surviving should they be committed to combat.

CONCLUSION

The nature of our vital interests and the growing complexity of the international environment will demand that the Army of the future be versatile, deployable, and lethal — qualities essential to the defense of our nation in the years ahead. Moreover, as the Army reduces its size in the coming decade, it must remain trained and ready and able to expand again should circumstances change.

We must never forget that, in the final analysis, the Army and the nation depend upon the soldiers, civilians, and families who dedicate their lives to the service of their country. Everything we do to build the trained and ready Army of the future must have, as its primary focus, the men and women of the Total Army.

As we enter the 1990s and position ourselves for the twenty-first century, the Army is assuming increased prominence in US national security strategy. The measure of our success as a strategic force will be the extent to which we protect the survival, freedom, and prosperity of the United States. By uncompromising adherence to our fundamental imperatives, and by exploiting the aggressive imagination and daring which characterize our society, we will maintain the trained and ready Army our country requires. This is the collective task of the Army, as well as our moral commitment to the nation.



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ARMY FUNDAMENTAL IMPERATIVES

QUALITY

ATTRACT AND RETAIN HIGH QUALITY SOLDIERS AND CIVILIANS

DOCTRINE

MAINTAIN FORWARD-LOOKING WARFIGHTING DOCTRINE

FORCE STRUCTURE

MAINTAIN THE FORCE SIZE AND MIX OF HEAVY, LIGHT, AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS UNITS REQUIRED BY NATIONAL STRATEGY

TRAINING

CONDUCT TOUGH, REALISTIC TRAINING

MODERNIZATION

MODERNIZE CONTINUOUSLY TO ENSURE ARMY FORCES HAVE NEEDED WARFIGHTING CAPABILITIES

LEADER DEVELOPMENT

DEVELOP COMPETENT, CONFIDENT LEADERS