

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
Marine Corps University
Corporals Noncommissioned Officers Program

CPL 0302
Jan 99

STUDENT HANDOUT

Force Protection

LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

a. TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE: Given a simulated terrorist environment, and with the aid of the reference, employ measures to protect yourself against terrorist acts, per the references. (CPL 24.6)

b. ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVES (CE): Without the aid of but per the references, identify the following:

- (1) Definition of terrorism. (CPL 24.6a)
- (2) Common characteristics of terrorist groups. (CPL 24.6b)
- (3) Short range goals of terrorist acts. (CPL 24.6c)
- (4) Internal organization of terrorist groups. (CPL 24.6d)
- (5) Two characteristics of terrorist training. (CPL 24.6e)
- (6) Anti-terrorism measures. (CPL 24.6f)
- (7) Counter-terrorism measures. (CPL 24.6g)
- (8) Personal protective measures. (CPL 24.6h)
- (9) Phases of a terrorist incident. (CPL 24.6i)

OUTLINE

1. DEFINITION OF TERRORISM. Terrorism can best be defined as, “the unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property to coerce, or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives.” The terrorists see their immediate victims as tools with which they can influence their real target, usually a government. A classic example of this was the 1972 Olympics, where eleven Israelis died at the hands of the terrorist group known as the Black September Organization (BSO). The Israelis were the immediate victims of the terrorism, but the target of the operation was the audience of an estimated one billion people who watched the incident unfold on television. The BSO was extremely successful in publicizing its view of the plight of Palestinian refugees. The bombing of the Marine Battalion Landing Team Headquarters at Beirut International Airport in October, 1983, which took the lives of 241 Americans and wounded over 100 others, was directed not at the Marines, but rather at the American people and the U. S. government. The eventual withdrawal of the Marines was a terrorist success. More recently, during relief

operations in Somalia, West Africa. The U. S. Army Rangers that were killed and wounded eventually led the United States government to withdraw from the United Nations peacekeeping efforts.

2. COMMON CHARACTERISTICS OF TERRORIST GROUPS. The effectiveness of terrorism does not necessarily lie in the act itself, but rather in the public's or the government's reaction to the act. Most terrorist groups have the following characteristics:

- a. They seek to intimidate a population by promoting fear.
- b. They are militarily weak. Even though some groups possess tanks, artillery and even aircraft, they are still weaker than the government they fight.
- c. They do not equate tactical success with mission success. Although the act may fail to achieve its desired results, it may still be a success if it publicizes the cause.
- d. They are usually urban based.
- e. They are highly mobile. Being urban based, the terrorists have access to all transportation systems. Those with international contacts also have access to forged passports and safe havens in other countries.
- f. They operate covertly. Although some large insurgent organizations have overt branches, the active terrorist cells always maintain strict security.

3. SHORT RANGE GOALS OF TERRORIST ACTS. Terrorist groups, like any other organization, have both short range and long range goals. Rarely, will a single act of terrorism accomplish a group's long range goals. Therefore, each act is designed to accomplish something specific, usually one or more of the following:

- a. Obtain Worldwide, National, or Local Recognition for Their Cause. This publicity advertises the movement and is of utmost importance. It brings national and international attention to bear on their grievances, attracts money, international sponsorship, and recruits to the cause.
- b. Cause the Government to Overreact. The government often overreacts to acts of terrorism by instituting special anti-terrorist laws allowing searches without warrants, holding people in custody without charge, or modifying the rules of evidence. These actions are seen by the people as violations of their rights and may create an atmosphere more sympathetic to the terrorist.
- c. Harass, Weaken, or Embarrass Government Security Forces. Tactics ranging from the calling of false alarms to assassinations of security personnel and the conduct of sophisticated raids and ambushes are used to reduce the effectiveness of security forces and erode public confidence in them.

d. Obtain Money and Equipment. Terrorist acts can be used to steal or extort money and equipment, especially the weapons and ammunition that is essential to their struggle. Major acts or a successful terrorist campaign can also attract foreign support.

e. Destroy Facilities or Disrupt Lines of Communications. One of the favorite targets of the Shining Path in Peru was electrical power lines.

f. Discourage Foreign Investments or Assistance Programs. If this goal can be achieved, the economy of the target country can be affected, causing an increase in unemployment and decreased government revenues. This will result in a loss of prestige for the government and economic chaos, which may lead to internal dissent.

g. Influence Government Decisions, Legislation, or Elections. There can be little doubt that the bombing of the Marine Battalion Landing Team Headquarters at Beirut International Airport in October, 1983, influenced our decision to eventually withdraw the Marines. In Italy, the Red Brigade has attempted to influence the law enforcement and judicial processes by assassinating public officials and judges who are known to be hard on terrorists.

g. Free Prisoners. This is frequently a demand of terrorists, especially airline hijackers, and it is often met. The three Black September terrorists captured at Munich in 1977 spent less than a month in custody before being released as a result of the hijacking of a Lufthansa airliner. This has happened time and time again.

h. Satisfy Vengeance. The most brutal acts of terrorism are often reserved for informants or other "traitors" to the cause. The IRA is very brutal when carrying out internal discipline of its members. Vengeance may also be of an international nature, such as the case of Armenians seeking revenge against the Turks for the slaughter of Armenians during World War I.

i. Turn the Tide in a Guerrilla War. Terrorism may be an integral part of insurgency. In rural areas, it is usually used to punish government supporters, while in urban areas it can divert government troops from the countryside where they are needed to fight guerrillas.

4. INTERNAL ORGANIZATION OF TERRORIST GROUPS. The basic unit is the cell. Types of cells usually found in a well-organized terrorist group are the operational, intelligence, and auxiliary (or support) cells. The number and size depend on the cell function, security measures employed by the government, and the sophistication of the group.

a. Operational Cell. This is the cadre -- the action arm of the group. In sophisticated groups, these cells may be highly specialized with bombers, assassins, or personnel performing other specific functions. In new or less sophisticated groups, operational cells may perform many jobs, include intelligence and support. The size is usually three to five people.

b. Intelligence Cell. This cell collects information on potential targets. It is highly compartmentalized and follows very strict security. This means that members of the cell may

know only the other members of their cell. They may not know who they take their orders from (receiving orders at drop points) or who is in other cells. The size of these cells vary greatly.

c. Auxiliary Cell. This cell usually performs support functions such as raising funds, screening recruits, and distributing propaganda. They are often larger and less strictly compartmentalized than other cells. They can consist entirely of terrorist sympathizers and supporters other than the cadre.

5. TWO CHARACTERISTICS OF TERRORIST TRAINING. The two characteristics of terrorist training are: location and training program. Terrorist training is oriented to the mission, area, and security environment in which the terrorists must operate. Most of the training is standardized. Carlos Marighella's *Mini-Manual for Urban Guerrillas*, is used as a guide in most training camps as well as the U. S. Army's *Special Forces Operational Techniques and Ranger Handbook*. Discipline is strictly enforced and trainees are watched all the time. Training for fighters may last up to one year while leadership training may last up to four years.

a. Location. Terrorists may be trained in one of two general locations.

(1) Internal Training. This is usually conducted secretly by members of the group within the target country. If secure base areas are available, permanent training facilities may be constructed, such as those established by various Palestinian factions in several Arab countries. If secure areas are not available, training can be conducted in safe houses.

(2) External Training. This is conducted by non-group members, often outside the target country. Most known international training camps are located in the Middle East with Libya boasting more than 70. The Junta for Revolutionary Coordination (JRC) has its headquarters in Havana and branch offices in Nicaragua, Mexico, United States, Canada, France, Belgium, Switzerland, East Germany, and Sweden. The countries in the former Soviet Union and eastern block countries still provide training sites, as well as China, North Korean, and Vietnam.

b. Training Program. The typical terrorist training program includes the following:

- * Individual physical and mental conditioning.
- * Weapons and explosives.
- * Political indoctrination.
- * General tactics and combat techniques.
- * Intelligence collecting.
- * Psychological warfare.
- * Survival.
- * Communications.

6. ANTI-TERRORISM MEASURES. Anti-terrorism is the preventive stage of terrorism. These measures are intended to harden potential targets and to develop procedures to detect planned terrorist actions before they take place, thereby reducing the probability of a terrorist event. Studies of terrorists' methods of operation and cases show that the best chance of success

against terrorism lies in the preventive stage; prevention is always the best posture. During this stage, consideration is given to research, information and intelligence gathering, employment of preventive measures, in-depth planning, and extensive training. There are four basic areas toward planning for and preventing terrorist attacks:

a. Criminal Information/Intelligence. Information gathering is of primary importance in any examination of terrorism, i.e. Who are the terrorists? Where are the terrorists? When and how will they strike? How do they expect to terrorize, etc. Considering this information within the context of the social, economic, and political climate of an area, you can project the terrorist threat level to your local installation.

b. Threat Assessment. Assessing the vulnerability of a unit or installation to the terrorist threat helps uncover and isolate security weaknesses. Steps can be taken to strengthen or to eliminate the weaknesses.

c. Crime Prevention. Crime prevention consists of three separated but related elements which together provide a combined effect in reducing the vulnerability of an installation, unit, or personnel to terrorist attack. The elements are:

(1) Operation Security. A threat analysis may reveal security weaknesses in the functioning of day to day operation. The security of communications systems, information activities, and personnel should be closely examined by using counter-surveillance techniques. Information collected by terrorists from communications can provide first hand knowledge about potential targets.

(2) Personnel Protection. All military personnel and family members, as well as civilians connected with the military or US government are potential victims of terrorist attacks. A threat assessment may identify specific personnel who by virtue of their rank, position, or special knowledge are particularly prone to be terrorist targets. Prevention of such attacks depends on the planning and use of personnel protection measures. The most important measure is educating persons who are likely targets to recognize the threat and act to reduce their risk.

(3) Physical Security. Sound physical security measures help prevent terrorism. The more an area is strengthened, the more difficult it becomes for terrorists to penetrate. Intrusion detection systems, proper use of lighting and fences, authority to close or restrict access to an installation, and well trained security personnel are all measures that enhance physical security. Additionally, a good crime prevention program will provide the threat analyst with information about crime statistics at the installation level.

d. Crisis Management Planning. A crisis management team is set up to become active during increased threat levels or when a terrorist incident occurs. Your special threat plan must describe the organization, training, and function of this team. When planning a crisis management team, consider the following:

* Who will make decisions and have final authority for the team as a whole.

- * Who will be members of the team and what their responsibilities will be.
- * The missions of the military police, the augmentation forces, and the installation staff.
- * Specialized training for hostage negotiators and special reaction teams.
- * Contingency plans.

7. COUNTER-TERRORISM MEASURES. Counter-terrorism measures are taken in response to terrorist incident, including direct contact with a terrorist force to end the incident with minimum loss of life and property. The steps necessary to resolve a terrorist incident is covered when performing the crisis management step covered in the anti-terrorism measures to prevent a terrorist attack. Responding to a terrorist incident requires special capabilities and considerations. First the incident must be identified as a terrorist event, rather than just a criminal incident. At this time the operation plan of your crisis management stage must be put into effect as quickly as possible. Requirements to be considered are:

- * Preparation for multiple incidents or diversionary tactics.
- * Establishment of communication.
- * Use of think-tank teams.
- * Preparation for prolonged incidents.
- * Management of the media.
- * Preparation of an after-action report

8. PERSONAL PROTECTIVE MEASURES. Your attitude towards security is most important. You can lessen your chances as well as those of your family members of becoming a terrorist target by taking some precautions. Obviously, many of the precautions that we will talk about will not apply to everyone or will apply only in certain circumstances and many of them apply primarily if you are overseas.

a. At All Times. Take the following precautions at all times:

- * Encourage security awareness in your family and discuss what to do if there is a security threat.
- * Be alert for surveillance attempts, or suspicious persons or activities, and report them to the proper authorities.
- * Vary personal routines whenever possible.
- * Get into the habit of checking in to let your friends and family know where you are or when to expect you.
- * Know how to use the local phone system. Always carry “telephone change.” Know the emergency numbers to use for local police, fire, ambulance, and hospital.
- * Know locations of civilian police, military police, government agencies, the US Embassy, and other safe locations where you can find refuge or assistance.
- * Avoid public disputes or confrontations. Report any trouble to the proper authorities.
- * Know certain key phrases in the native language, such as “I need a policeman,” “Take me to a doctor,” “Where is the hospital?” and “Where is the police station?”
- * Set up simple signal systems that can alert family members or associates that there is danger.

- * Carry identification showing your blood type and any special medical conditions. Keep one week's supply of essential medication on hand.
- * Keep a low profile. Shun publicity. Do not flash large sums of money.
- * Do not unnecessarily divulge your home address, phone number, or family information.
- * Watch for unexplained absences of local citizens as an early warning of possible terrorist actions.
- * Maintain your personal affairs in good order. Keep wills current, have powers of attorney drawn up, take measures to ensure family financial security, and develop a plan for family actions in the event you are taken hostage.
- * Do not carry sensitive or potentially embarrassing items.

b. At Home. At home take the following precautions:

- * Have a clear view of approaches to your home.
- * Install strong doors and locks.
- * Change locks when you move in or when a key is lost.
- * Install windows which do not allow easy access.
- * Never leave house or trunk keys with your ignition key while your car is being serviced.
- * Have adequate lighting outside your home.
- * Create the appearance that the house is occupied by using timers to control lights and radios while you are away.
- * Install one way viewing devices in doors.
- * Install intrusion detection alarms and smoke and fire alarms.
- * Do not "hide" keys or give them to very young children.
- * Never leave young children at home alone.
- * Never admit strangers to your home without proper identification.
- * Use off street parking at your residence, if possible.
- * Teach children how to call the police.
- * Avoid living in residences that are located in isolated locations, on one-way streets, dead-end streets, or cul-de-sacs.
- * Avoid residences that are on the ground floor, adjacent to vacant lots, or on steep hills.
- * Do not place your name on exterior walls of residences.
- * Do not answer the telephone with your name and rank.
- * Personally destroy all envelopes and other items that reflect personal information.
- * Close draperies during periods of darkness. Draperies should be opaque and made of heavy material.
- * Avoid frequent exposure on balconies and in windows.
- * Consider owning a dog to discourage intruders.

c. While Traveling. Take the following precautions while traveling:

- * Vary times and routes.
- * Be alert for suspicious-looking vehicles.

- * Check for suspicious activity or objects around your car before getting into or out of it. Do not touch your vehicle until you have thoroughly checked it (look inside it, walk around it, and look under it).
- * Equip your car with an inside hood latch and a locking gas cap.
- * Drive with your windows closed and doors locked.
- * Travel with a group of people -- there is safety in numbers.
- * Travel on busy routes; avoid isolated and dangerous areas.
- * Park your car off the street in a secure area.
- * Park in a well-lighted area if you must park on the street.
- * Lock your car when it is unattended.
- * Do not routinely use the same taxi or bus stop. Buses are preferred over taxis.
- * If you think you are being followed, move as quickly as possible to a safe place such as a police or fire station.
- * If your car breaks down, raise the hood then get back inside the car and remain there with the doors locked and the windows up. If anyone offers to assist, ask them to call the police.
- * Do not pick up hitchhikers.
- * At night, drive on well-lit streets.
- * Keep your vehicle's gas tank at least half full.
- * Use a plain car that is common in the area to minimize the rich American look.
- * Do not be predictable in your daily travel behavior; vary your travel times, your routes, and your mode of transportation whenever possible.
- * Install appropriate mirrors, locks, and other devices to secure your car against tampering.
- * Safeguard car keys at all times.

d. In Hotels. In hotels take the following precautions:

- * Keep your room key on your person at all times.
- * Be observant for suspicious persons loitering in the area.
- * Do not give your room number to strangers.
- * Keep your room and personal effects neat and orderly so you will recognize tampering or strange out-of-place objects.
- * Know the location of emergency exits and fire extinguishers.
- * Do not admit strangers to your room.
- * Know how to locate hotel security guards.

e. Air Travel Security. Take the following precautions when traveling by air transportation:

- * Use military aircraft whenever possible.
- * Avoid travel through high-risk areas; use foreign flag airlines and/or indirect routes to avoid such areas.
- * Do not use rank or military addresses on tickets, travel documents, hotel reservations, or luggage.

- * Select a window seat on aircraft because they offer more protection and are less accessible to hijackers than are aisle seats.
- * Select a seat in the midsection of the aircraft because it is not one of the two usual areas of terrorist activity.
- * Do not discuss your US Government affiliation with any other passengers.
- * Consider using a tourist passport when traveling in high-risk areas; if you use a tourist passport, store your official passport, identification card, travel orders, and other official documents in your carryon bags. Also, if you normally wear a military ring, then leave it at home or pack it in your checked baggage.
- * Use plain civilian luggage; avoid using seabags and other military looking baggage. Remove all indications of your rank and any military patches, logos, and decals from your luggage and briefcase.
- * Travel in conservative civilian clothing. Do not wear military oriented organizational shirts or military issue shoes or glasses. Avoid obvious American clothing such as cowboy boots and hats as well as American-logo T-shirts. Cover visible US-affiliated tattoos with a long-sleeved shirt.

9. PHASES OF A TERRORIST INCIDENT. There are five basic phases of every terrorist operation, they are as follows:

a. Pre-Incident Phase. During this phase the terrorist meticulously plans the operation. They may conduct reconnaissance missions, lengthy periods of training, and rehearsals. Training and rehearsals sometimes takes place in countries outside the target area. If a primary target is unavailable, or the risk is perceived as too great, an alternative target is selected. Most terrorist contingency plans include alternative targets. Only when the terrorists feel they have eliminated the "What ifs" will they move to the next phase.

b. Initiation Phase. This is the start of the operation, when the terrorists move to their target in a covert manner. Perpetrators leave for the target singly or in pairs along separate routes. Weapons and other items are sometimes sent separately to prearranged locations where they are given to the terrorist. Normally, this is a point of no return unless a mission-abort clause has been placed into the operation plan. Once the physical act has started and if for some reason it is foiled, the terrorists will then go to the contingency plan. For example, plan "B" for kidnapping is to assassinate the victim and take credit for the killing and not a bungled kidnapping.

c. Negotiation Phase. In an operation where the terrorists have taken a negotiable item such as a hostage, the negotiation phase comes into play. The negotiation phase is characterized by the terrorist demands, deadlines, talks, and tradeoffs. The terrorists will prolong this phase as long as possible to get the maximum amount of news coverage and publicity possible. The terrorists may make numerous demands in the negotiation phase, but one demand will always be present, the transportation of the terrorists to a safe haven, such as a country which is sympathetic to their cause.

d. Climax Phase. This has no set time schedule, but it may follow the initiation phase if there is no negotiable item involved, such as an hostage. Security is at its peak during this phase, and law enforcement radio frequencies and civilian media are monitored closely.

e. Post-Incident Phase. This is an extremely important phase for the terrorists. During this phase, the terrorists regroup, discuss, and critique the operation. This is a very important phase for the terrorist, they learn from and sure their successes and failures. In the absence of a negotiation phase, the terrorists exploit the media during the post-incident phase.

REFERENCES: FMFM 7-14, Combating Terrorism
FMFRP 7-14A The Individual's Guide for Understanding and Surviving
Terrorism
TC 19-16, Countering Terrorism

APPENDIX A

HISTORY OF TERRORISM

Terrorism is not a new concept. On the contrary, it has been a traditional tactic of the weak and has been with us almost since the beginning of recorded history. In 50 B.C. for example, Julius Caesar advocated the taking of hostages to ensure the obedience of conquered tribes.

An early example of the use of terrorism in opposition to established rule is the Scarri (dagger men). The Scarri were a group of extremists who belonged to a highly organized religious sect known as the Zealots which were an aggressive fundamentalist and nationalist Jewish organization that fought Roman occupation (A.D. 66-70).

The word "terror" actually comes from the Latin word meaning "Fear," but the word "terrorism" first came into widespread use during the French Revolution. During the "Reign of Terror," over 300,000 people were arbitrarily arrested and 17,000 were executed without trial. In the second half of the 19th century, radical political philosophies and the use of violence as a political tool spread throughout Europe. In the early 1900's, the emphasis of political terrorism shifted to individual acts of violence, usually directed at heads of state or members of the ruling elite. A good example is the assassination of an Archduke from Austria which eventually led to the start of World War I. In 1919, Lenin condoned and encouraged international terrorism in its modern sense.

Since World War II, terrorism has been associated with individuals or groups attempting to destabilize or overthrow existing political institutions. Terrorism has been used by one side or both sides in anti-colonial conflicts (Ireland and the United Kingdom, Algeria and France, Vietnam and France/United States); in disputes between different national groups over possession of disputed homeland (Palestinians and Israelis); in conflicts between different religious denominations (Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland), and in internal conflicts between revolutionary forces and established governments (Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, Iran, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Chile, etc.)

Terrorism, in its current form, is a product of civil unrest throughout the world, beginning in the late 1960's and early 70's. This outburst of terrorism coincided with the worldwide access to the most important weapon of modern terrorism -- not explosives or exotic detonators, but television. Terrorists are so keenly aware of the usefulness of television as a publicity medium that they have gone so far as to plan attacks to coincide with "prime time broadcasts" in the target country.

Where does the future of terrorism lie? Many feel it is only a matter of time before some group acquires nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons with which it may truly be able to hold the free world hostage. (Example: German authorities have captured illegal shipments of Russian plutonium.)

APPENDIX B

TERRORIST TACTICS

1. BOMBING. This is the most widely used attack method by terrorist groups. The purpose of terrorist bombing is to gather headlines, create fear, and destroy personnel and property. Bombing targets may be either symbolic or pragmatic, but one important point to remember is that the use of bombs is an excellent way for a small, relatively weak organization to attack a stronger opponent. The bombs themselves may range from a small soap dish type to vehicles loaded with hundreds of pounds of explosives.

2. KIDNAPPING. This is the most difficult operation for a terrorist group to successfully accomplish. The kidnapping operation must provide for a degree of security in the negotiation phase which is not present in the hostage taking situation. Successful kidnappings can gain the terrorists money, release of jailed comrades, and publicity for an extended period of time during the negotiation phase. Kidnapping is the ultimate operation for the terrorist group. Once an individual has been targeted for kidnapping, the terrorists have two broad methods to choose from. They can either abduct the individual from a static location or while enroute between static locations. Static locations are the subject's residence, place of work, or any other location he frequents on a regular basis, such as a restaurant, nightclub, church, etc. When the target is traveling between static locations, he will either be on foot or making use of some type of transportation.

a. Kidnapping a Victim on Foot. To take a victim on foot is fairly simple. The victim, through his daily routine, will provide the terrorists with day, time, and place for his kidnapping. The terrorist gains control of the victim, throws him in a vehicle and drives away.

b. Kidnapping a Victim From a Vehicle. The kidnapping site will be selected according to the security posture of the victim. The terrorists will plan the attack around the weakest point of a particular route trying to channelize the victim as much as possible. A number of ploys have been used in the past to stop vehicles such as: roadblocks, accidents, hitchhikers, stop signs, rammings, baby carriages, and policemen. Once the vehicle has been stopped, the terrorists will always be careful to direct their fire away from the intended kidnap victim and concentrate on the security personnel. The terrorists are trained and prepared to do whatever is necessary to gain firm control of the victim. Remember, if plan "A" fails, the terrorists will undertake plan "B" (ASSASSINATION).

c. Examples.

(1) Brigadier General Dozier. A classic example of a kidnapping from a static location was that of Brigadier General James L. Dozier by the Red Brigades in Verona, Italy. General Dozier was kidnapped from his residence on 17 December 1981. He was held for a period of 42 days before he was rescued by the Italian Police. General Dozier's residence was located in a multi-storied building in Verona that have been used for seven years to house senior grade U.S. officers. The building had no viable security system. General Dozier did have an armed driver

whose only duty was to drive. He had no other security personnel. The terrorists had been watching the residence for at least 30 days from positions located from across the building in a park along a river bank and at a bus stop in front of the apartment building. The techniques used were young people standing at the bus stop and young couples in the park area. The terrorists had been in General Dozier's apartment on at least two occasions, both times posing as meter readers. This fact should have been noticed as both times the meter readers were in pairs. The norm was only one meter reader. On the day of the kidnapping, four terrorists (three men and one woman) parked behind the building in a rented blue van. Two men, dressed in overalls and carrying what could have been tool bags, gained access to the building and went to General Dozier's door and rang the bell. General Dozier went to the door and asked who was there. The answer was that they were plumbers. He asked what they wanted and the terrorists explained that there was a leak in the apartment below and they wanted to see if the leak was coming from the Dozier apartment. General Dozier opened the door and led the terrorists to the utility room and into the bathroom. The building was twenty years old and leaks were a common occurrence. The terrorists could not find a leak and then used an Italian word that General Dozier did not understand. At this time, General Dozier went to the kitchen to use a dictionary he kept on the table. While he was looking up the word, he had his back to the terrorist. General Dozier was spun around and suddenly he was looking into the barrel of a silenced weapon. At this point, one of the terrorists jumped on his back forcing him to the floor. At the same time the other terrorists grabbed Mrs. Dozier, forced her to the floor, and put a weapon to her head. General Dozier was struggling until he saw the danger his wife was in and stopped struggling. The terrorists said they were from the Red Brigade and wanted money. General Dozier replied they had no money and was hit over the eye with a pistol. He was hit several more times in the stomach. Then the terrorists turned him over, handcuffed him, and put him in a padded trunk. The trunk was brought into the apartment by a third terrorist. Mrs. Dozier, in the meantime, was gagged and chained, hands and feet, while the terrorists went through papers. They asked Mrs. Dozier where the General's pistol was. She said she didn't know and her mouth was taped again. The terrorists searched for the pistol but only found the holster as the pistol was in General Dozier's office. Eventually they took General Dozier in the trunk down the elevator to the waiting van and transported him to a holding area in Padua, Italy approximately 60 kilometers away. Mrs. Dozier was dragged to the utility room in chains and the door was closed. She discovered, after the terrorists had left, that the chains were locked and that the terrorists had left the keys in the locks. She was able to unlock one of the locks but not the other, for the terrorists had left the wrong key. Unable to free herself, Mrs. Dozier banged her knees against the dryer to gain attention. The Italian family that lived below came up to see what the noise was. They found Mrs. Dozier and called the police. The police cut the chains, freeing Mrs. Dozier. Now the search was on. General Dozier was held in Padua, Italy over a supermarket. Upon arriving at the holding area, General Dozier was taken up and down the elevator in order to disorient him as to what floor he was on. Once in the apartment, he was kept in a 6' x 6' tent and chained to his bed. During his captivity, General Dozier was interrogated seven times by the same terrorist who worked off what seemed to be prepared questions. Forty-two days later, General Dozier was rescued by the Italian Police. General Dozier was debriefed and many important facts concerning kidnapping and hostage survival were learned.

(2) Aldo Moro. A classic example of a kidnapping enroute is that of Aldo Moro. Aldo Moro was the leader of the Christian Democratic Party in Italy and was trying to form a coalition government with the Italian Communist Party. The Red Brigade terrorist group was opposed to this and decided to kidnap Moro. On Thursday, 16 March 1978, at about 0820 hours, Aldo Moro was picked up in front of his home in Rome by his official car and police escort vehicle. His intended destination was the Italian Parliament. He never made it. By 0910, he had been kidnapped. Moro was a man of simple and methodical habits. For 15 years he more or less traveled the same route from his home to his office. Every morning he would stop for a few minutes at the church of San Francisco d' Assisi or at the Chapel of Santa Chiara. On the morning of 16 March, Moro stopped at San Francisco d' Assisi at 0830 hours. At 0900 the motorcade left the church and continued on its way to parliament. At some point along the route, a white Fiat station wagon with diplomatic plates moved in front of Moro's motorcade. Two other cars, a blue Fiat sedan and white Fiat sedan, also moved in at some distance behind the motorcade. About 4 to 5 minutes after 0900 hours, as the motorcade approached a stop sign, the station wagon slammed on its brakes. Moro's car, traveling at considerable speed and apparently too close to the station wagon, hit it in the rear. Moro's follow car in turn rammed into Moro's car, pinning Moro's vehicle between the station wagon and the follow car. At this point, two men carrying athletic bags got out of the blocking car and walked back as if to inspect the damage. They pulled pistols from the bags and started firing through the front side windows of Moro's car killing Moro's driver and bodyguard. At the same time, a second and third attack element went into action. The second attack element, consisting of four men dressed in Alitalia uniforms, were standing in front of a closed bar as if waiting for a bus to take them to the airport. Since many airline personnel lived in the area, this group did not seem suspicious. However, at the instant of collision, these men pulled weapons from their flight bags and rushed toward Moro's follow car. Inside the follow car, the driver and bodyguard riding in the front passenger seat were killed before they could draw their weapons. A third bodyguard who had been riding in the right rear seat managed to get out the rear door and fire three rounds before he was killed. His three shots wounded two of the terrorists. This was the terrorists only miscalculation. Their intelligence had indicated that this bodyguard usually sat in the left rear seat where they concentrated their fire. This error allowed the bodyguard to get out of the car and fire his weapon. In any event, the bodyguard was killed. The third attacking element, consisting of two terrorists, were hiding behind a row of bushes in front of a bar. A few seconds after the start of the attack, these men jumped out, ran towards Moro's car, pulled him from the back seat, and led him to a waiting blue Fiat. This was the same Fiat which had been trailing the Moro motorcade at a distance. Just after the collision, this car along with the white Fiat, moved into the attack area. The terrorists also had another car parked around the corner from the bar. When the attack was over, this car made a U-turn and acted as a lead car. It was followed by the blue Fiat carrying Moro and the white Fiat carrying other terrorists. The whole operation lasted no more than thirty seconds. It involved 12 terrorists in all, who fired 80-90 rounds and killed five bodyguards. It was a military like operation which employed excellent reconnaissance, deception, surprise, superior fire power and manpower, assault coordination, and a well planned escape. Fifty-five days after he was abducted, he was found dead in a car in central Rome. The car was found in the exact mid point of a street on which the headquarters of the Communist and Christian Democratic parties are located. The Red Brigade's symbol was clear.

3. HIJACKING. This is the seizure by force of a surface vehicle, its passengers and/or cargo. The purpose of a hijacking is to disrupt the economy, embarrass the government, gain concessions from the targeted government, and to gain popular support. The hijacking of trucks carrying food staples is a tactic used by terrorists in Latin America. The hijacking is followed by the free distribution of the cargo to the poor. Of course, the terrorists also distribute propaganda advertising their cause.

4. SKYJACKING. This is another form of hijacking involving aircraft. Skyjacking is a tactic that was used in the sixties and seventies, then died down in the early eighties. Even though security measures are tighter than ever, skyjackings are in the news.

The skyjacking of TWA flight 847 began June 1985 when a Boeing 727 landed in Athens, Greece from Cairo, Egypt and took on additional passengers. Among the passengers were two well dressed Arabs carrying shoulder bags who had arrived from Cairo the day before and had spent the night in the airport lounge, along with a third man. As it turned out, only two men managed to get seats on the aircraft. After arguing with TWA officials, the third man had to stay behind, and he was subsequently arrested in the airport. The terrorists demanded his release following the hijacking, and he later joined the hijacked aircraft in Algiers. The terrorists managed to smuggle two grenades and a 9MM Browning pistol through the airport X-ray machine by wrapping the weapons in fiberglass insulation. Twenty minutes after the plane took off, it was taken over by the two terrorists who wildly brandished their grenades and pistol and gave the pilot an order to fly to Beirut. After several trips back and forth to Algiers they finally ended up in Beirut. During the flights the hostages were beaten, made to put their heads between their knees and hands behind their heads for hours. One hostage, U.S. Navy diver Robert Stetham, believed to be a U.S. Marine, was singled out, beaten, and killed. All the hostages were robbed and systematically separated, military from civilians, women from men, and moved to certain locations in the aircraft. Some hostages were released on 30 June. The 39 remaining hostages were held for 17 days before being released through Syria to the United States. The terrorists were members of the Islamic Jihad Shi-ite Muslim group.

5. ASSASSINATION. This is the killing of a specific victim, usually by small arms or bombs. This is the oldest terrorist tactic in the book and is used today by all terrorist groups. Assassination victims could be symbolic targets, such as political figures or representatives of the U.S. government, or vengeance targets, such as policemen or military personnel. The steps in planning and conducting an assassination are the same as the kidnapping. The techniques for carrying out the act range from a lone attacker with a gun or bomb to a well planned ambush. There are several common factors in all assassinations:

- * The victims have predictable routines.
- * The victims disregard sensitive indicators and information received.
- * The victims disregard the threats posed by terrorists in their operational environment.
- * Most incidents could have been avoided by using common sense and evasive measures.

A classic example of a well planned assassination against an unsuspecting target is the killing of LtCol Charles Ray (U.S. Army) on 18 January 1982 in front of his residence in Paris, France.

Ray was entering his embassy provided vehicle when a lone gunman approached him from behind and shot him in the back of the head several times with a handgun. During the investigation, it was learned that he had established a deadly routine. He waited at the curb for the driver to pick him up every morning between 0805 and 0810 hours. He never deviated from this pattern. It was also learned that he was under surveillance by a man posing as a flower vendor who had set up his cart across the street from Ray's apartment for 30 days prior to the attack. Witnesses reported that the flower vendor did not return after the attack on Ray. This attack was claimed by the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction (LARF).

6. ARMED ASSAULTS. There are two types of armed assault: the raid and ambush.

a. Raids. These are conducted to gain arms and equipment for later use by the terrorists to destroy installations or materials. Bank robberies also are a type of raid.

b. Ambushes. A well planned ambush seldom fails. This is especially true of terrorist ambushes which are well planned, utilize diversions, lay off teams, properly rehearsed, and precisely executed. The terrorist has time on his side and will spend weeks preparing for the operation. The purpose of the ambush is to kidnap or kill the victims. The killing attack will come in the form of an explosive ambush or a weapon ambush. In an explosive ambush, a bomb may be planted in the victim's residence or office area using a ruse to gain entrance, along the route the victim travels, in a vehicle parked along side the road or a bomb attached to the victim's vehicle, in the form of a letter or parcel bomb or even inside of a remote control model airplane.

A classic example of an explosive ambush was when explosives were planted under a bridge in the attempt made on the life of General Alexander Haig (U.S. Army). The attack was made on Monday, 25 January 1979, at about 0825 hours. The terrorists had been surveilling General Haig for about 30 days to determine his routines and patterns. They learned General Haig usually traveled in a three car motorcade and took one of three different routes to Supreme Headquarters Allied Personnel Europe (SHAPE) in Belgium. One of the routes, however, had been closed for construction and limited the options on route selection. The route taken by the motorcade that morning was the most often used route. It was less congested and the preferred route of General Haig. The terrorists set the scenario for the attack as follows: One terrorist was located at a major intersection along the route. At this intersection, the motorcade could either pass through the intersection and continue along the target route or turn left onto the alternate route. The terrorist at this intersection could determine which of the two routes the motorcade would take and radio the other terrorist located on a knoll who would detonate the explosive device. The terrorist had planted the device at the southeast corner of a bridge as one travels from Oburg to SHAPE. An electrical wire led from the device and ended 150 meters away at the grassy knoll to the southwest of the bridge. The wire was connected to an electrical firing device consisting of four six-volt batteries wired in series and a plastic toggle switch. On the day of the attack, General Haig left his residence in Mons, taking the preferred route to SHAPE. The motorcade consisted of a lead car, General Haig's armored Mercedes and the follow car, an unarmed Mercedes. Traveling along the route at 30 miles an hour, the lead car was 200 yards in front of General Haig's car. The motorcade passed the Oburg cement factory and was approaching the fifty foot bridge. Just as General Haig's car passed over the bridge, the terrorist on the knoll

detonated the explosives. At the time of the explosion. The follow car was about four car lengths behind General Haig's car. The blast barely caught the rear end of Haig's car, causing only minor damage. However, the momentum of the follow car carried it into the blast and lifted it upwards and sideways. It came to rest 50 feet from the point of explosion. As soon as the explosion took place, General Haig's driver immediately accelerated but was ordered to stop by General Haig. General Haig opened the door and started to exit but was talked back into the car by his aide. General Haig got back into his car and left the scene. The attack on General Haig failed for two reasons. First, the terrorist who detonated the explosive device was too far away from the attack site, and the view was obstructed by bushes near the bridge. Secondly, the speed of the motorcade was much faster than the normal daily speed. These factors combined to cause the timing to be off. The terrorist group known as the Red Army Faction was responsible for this attack. An explosive ambush that did work was the killing of Carrero Blanco in Madrid, Spain in December 1972. The Prime Minister of Spain, Carrero Blanco, was killed by the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), Basque Nation and Freedom, in Madrid. The terrorists rented an apartment on Claudio Coello Street in Madrid. They dug a tunnel from the apartment leading under the street where they planted massive amounts of explosives. The explosives were detonated by an electrical firing device. On the morning of the assassination, Blanco followed his daily routine which included a stop at a church before proceeding to his office. He left the church, drove about one block, turned left and drove to the next corner. He then turned onto Claudio Coello Street. When Blanco's car was directly over the explosives, the terrorists set off the charge blowing Blanco and his car over a six story building. Blanco and his car came to rest on the inner balcony of the second floor. To exploit the act, the ETA wrote a book entitled *Operation Ogro, How And Why We Executed Carrero Blanco*.

(2) The weapons ambush usually involves the use of small arms and more recently the rocket launcher. Several incidents have included both such as the case of General Kroesen. On 15 September 1981, at 0722 hours, an attempt was made on the life of General Kroesen, the Commander in Chief, United States Army, Europe. The attack was carried out by the Gudrun Ensslin Commando of the Red Army Faction. The terrorists had prepared a firing position about 138 yards from the attack site which was at a stop light at a major intersection in Heidelberg, West Germany. The terrorists set up their firing position by setting up a path with handrails just below the Heidelberg University International Student Center. They then left this path and descended 54 yards further. About 100 yards from the end of the rope, they set up a pop-up umbrella type tent and four sleeping bags. This was the living area while they surveyed General Kroesen for about a week. Eleven yards below this area was the firing position. They cut a firing position in the bush just large enough to view the target area and prevent detection from below. A CB radio and antenna were also up to communicate with other terrorists following the motorcade. At 0722 hours, General Kroesen's partially armored Mercedes and his follow car stopped at the light. Four people were in the Mercedes, including the General and his wife. The two cars were in the far right lanes. As General Kroesen's vehicle stopped, two rounds of RPG-7 and four 5.56MM rounds were fired from the firing position. One 5.56MM round hit the front window on the drivers side, one hit the left rear window and one hit the top of the roof just above the General's head. General Kroesen received minor lacerations on the back of the neck, and his wife suffered a light hearing loss. After the attack, the General's driver accelerated out of the area and rushed to safety. If General Kroesen's vehicle had not been armored or fitted with bullet

resistant glass, General Kroesen, his wife, and his driver would have probably been killed. Prior to the General's driver accelerating out of the area, he attempted to get out of his vehicle, which would have proved disastrous.

7. OVERRUN ATTACK. This is a form of weapons ambush that is very simple to carry out. The victim selected will have a discernible routine which is determined by the terrorists from surveillance. They also choose the attack site and learn the capabilities of the victim's car. When they are ready to attack, they follow the victim's car, pull out to pass, put their weapons out the windows, pass the victim firing at the victim as they are passing and continue to drive away making good their escape. Another form of overrun is the use of the motorcycles.

8. HOSTAGE BARRICADE. This is an operation that involves seizing a facility and whatever hostages are available. It is different than a kidnapping in that a kidnapper hides his victims and the hostage taker confronts the authorities with the victims.

A classic example of a hostage/barricade operation was conducted by the M-19 terrorist group in Bogota, Colombia at the Embassy of the Dominican Republic. Members of M-19 took advantage of extremely lax security measures at the Embassy during the celebration of a Dominican Republic holiday. On 27 February 1980, during National Day Reception at the Embassy of the Dominican Republic, 16 terrorists from the 19th of April (M-19), armed with shotguns and small arms, assaulted the building and took 60 diplomats, Colombian officials, guests, and local employees hostage. On the morning of the attack, 12 men dressed in jogging suits were kicking a soccer ball around on a courtyard directly in front of the Embassy. Since a university was nearby and students are known to play soccer on any available patch of ground, this group attracted little attention. The distance from the courtyard to the front of the Embassy was no more than 120 feet. Inside the Embassy, two M-19 couples mingled with guests unnoticed. As the U.S. Ambassador, Diego Ascencio, appeared at the door and was about to leave the reception, the terrorists inside the Embassy pulled weapons and shot and killed two bodyguards. This was the signal for the terrorists on the outside of the building to start the attack. The soccer players took weapons from their gym bags and stormed the Embassy, shooting at the bodyguards and chauffeurs standing assembled in front of the Embassy. No police were in the area and only one guard was posted in front of the Embassy, a motorcycle drove by and dropped a duffel bag of clothes and other equipment for the hostage takers. One terrorist was killed during the assault and at least five other individuals were wounded. One of the more suspicious aspects of the takeover was the departure of the Ambassadors from socialist countries just before the attack. M-19 held their hostages for two months. After numerous negotiating sessions, the terrorists and the Colombian government reached a compromise. The terrorists flew to Havana with several of the hostages. In Cuba, the hostages were released and the terrorists remained there.

9. MAIMING. This is often conducted by terrorists as a means of administering justice to members of their organization who have made security violations, defected, or turned informant. Maiming is extremely effective because it leaves a living example of the terrorists methods for all to see and constantly fear. Kneecapping is a good example of a popular maiming technique used by the Irish Republican Army (IRA).

10. ARSON. Arson is another type of terrorist operation. It is usually conducted by terrorist groups that are not as well organized and trained as the major terrorist organizations. They are relatively simple to conduct by new terrorist groups to gain confidence and effectively gain headlines and instill fear in the populace.

APPENDIX C

OFFICE PROCEDURES

1. GENERAL. A skilled and determined terrorist group can penetrate most office buildings. However, the presence and use of guards and physical security devices create a significant psychological deterrent. Terrorists are apt to shun risky targets for less protected ones. If terrorists decide to accept the risk, security measures can decrease their chance of success.

2. OFFICE ACCESSIBILITY.

- * Offices most likely to be terrorist targets should not be directly accessible to the public.
- * Executive offices should not be located on the ground floor.
- * Locate senior personnel at the inner core of the building. This affords the best protection and control of visitors and prevents people outside the building from obtaining visual surveillance.
- * If office windows face public areas, reinforce them with bullet resistant materials and cover them with heavy curtains.
- * Monitor access to executive offices with a secretary, guard, or other individual who screens all persons and objects entering executive offices.
- * Place the ingress door within view of the person responsible for screen personnel and objects passing through the door.
- * Doors may be remotely controlled by installing an electromagnetic door lock.
- * The most effective physical security configuration is to have doors locked from within and have only one visitor access door into the executive office area. Locked doors should have panic bars.
- * Depending upon the nature of the organization's activities, deception measures such as a large waiting area controlling access to several offices can be taken to draw attention away from the location and function of a particular office.

3. PHYSICAL SECURITY MEASURES.

- * Consider installing the following security devices: burglar alarm systems (preferably connected to a central security facility), sonic warning devices or other intrusion systems, exterior floodlights, dead bolt locks on doors, locks on windows, and iron grills or heavy screens for windows.
- * If feasible, add a high perimeter fence or wall and a comprehensive external lighting system.
- * Check grounds to ensure there are no covered or concealed avenues of approach for terrorists and other intruders, especially near entrances.
- * Deny exterior access to fire escapes, stairways, and roofs.
- * Manhole covers near the building should be secured or locked.
- * Cover, lock, or screen outdoor openings, such as coal bins, air vents, and utility access points.
- * Screen windows (particularly those near the ground or accessible from adjacent buildings).

- * Consider adding a thin, clear plastic sheet to windows to degrade the effects of flying glass in case of explosion.
- * Periodically inspect the interior of the entire building, including the basement and other infrequently used areas.
- * Locate outdoor trash containers, storage bins, and bicycle racks away from the building.
- * Book depositories or mail slots should not be adjacent to, or in, the building.
- * Mailboxes should not be close to the building.
- * Seal tops, voids, and open spaces above cabinets, bookcases, and display cases.
- * Keep janitorial closets, service openings, telephone closets and electrical closets locked at all times. Protect communications closets and utility areas with an alarm system.
- * Remove names and ranks on reserved parking spaces.
- * Empty trash receptacles daily (preferably twice a day).
- * Periodically check all fire extinguishers to ensure they are in working order and readily available. Also, periodically check all smoke alarms to ensure they are in working order.

4. PERSONNEL PROCEDURES.

- * Stress heightened awareness by personnel working in the office because effective office security depends largely on the actions and awareness of people.
- * Develop and disseminate clear instructions on personnel security procedures.
- * Hold regular security briefings for building occupants.
- * Personnel should understand security measures, appropriate responses, and know who to contact in an emergency.
- * Conduct drills if appropriate.
- * Senior personnel should not work late on a routine basis. No one should ever work alone.
- * Give all personnel, particularly switchboard personnel and secretaries, special training on handling bomb threats and extortion telephone calls. Ensure a bomb threat checklist and a pen or pencil are located at each telephone.
- * Ensure the existence of secure communications systems between senior personnel, secretaries, and security personnel with intercoms, telephones, and duress alarm systems.
- * Develop an alternate means of communications, such as two-way radio, in case the primary communications systems fail.
- * Do not open packages or large envelopes in offices unless the sender or source is positively known. Notify security personnel of any suspicious packages.
- * Have mail room personnel trained in bomb detection handling and inspection.
- * Lock all doors at night, on weekends, and when the office is unattended.
- * Maintain tight control of keys. Lock cabinets and closets when not in use.
- * Lock all office rest rooms when not in use.
- * Escort visitors in the office and maintain complete control of strangers who seek entrance.
- * Check janitors and their equipment before admitting them and observe them while they are performing their functions.
- * Secure official papers from unauthorized viewing.
- * Update security clearances of employees (especially foreign nationals).
- * Do not reveal the location of office personnel to callers unless they are positively identified and have a need for the information.

- * Use extreme caution when providing information over the telephone -- remember, telephone lines may be tapped.
- * Do not give the names, positions, and especially home addresses or phone numbers of office personnel to strangers or telephone callers.
- * Do not list the address and telephone numbers of potential terrorist targets in books and rosters.
- * Avoid discussing travel plans or timetables in the presence of visitors.
- * Be alert to people disguised as public utility crews (road workers, vendors, etc.), who might station themselves near the office to observe activities and gather information.
- * Note parked or abandoned vehicles near the entrance to the building or near the walls.
- * Note the license plate number, make, model, year, and color of suspicious vehicles and the occupants' descriptions, and report that information to your supervisor, security officer, military and/or security police, or local police.

5. CONTROLLING ENTRY.

- * Consider installing a peephole, intercom, interview grill, or small aperture in entry doorways to screen visitors before the door is opened.
- * Use a reception room to handle visitors, thereby restricting their access to interior offices.
- * Consider installing metal detection devices at controlled entrances. Prohibit non organizational members from bringing boxes and parcels into the building.
- * Arrange office space so that unescorted visitors are under the receptionist's visual observation and to ensure that the visitors follow stringent access control procedures.
- * Do not make exceptions to the office's access control system.
- * Upgrade access control systems to provide better security through the use of intercoms, access control badges or cards, and closed circuit television.

6. PUBLIC AREAS.

- * Remove all potted plants and ornamental objects from public areas.
- * Lock trapdoors in the ceiling or floor, including skylights.
- * Ensure construction or placement of furniture and other items would not conceal explosive devices or weapons.
- * Keep furniture away from walls or corners.
- * Modify curtains, drapes, or cloth covers so that concealed items can be seen easily.
- * Box in the tops of high cabinets, shelves, or other fixtures.
- * Install springs on stall doors in rest rooms so they stand open when not locked. Equip stalls with an inside latch to prevent someone from hiding a device in a locked stall.
- * Install a fixed covering over the tops on commode water tanks.
- * Use open mesh baskets for soiled towels.
- * Guards in public areas should have a way to silently alert the office of danger and to summon assistance, such as a foot activated buzzer.

APPENDIX D

TERRORIST THREAT CONDITIONS

1. GENERAL. Threat conditions (THREATCON's) describe the progressive level of a terrorist threat to US military facilities and personnel. The purpose of the THREATCON system is accessibility to, and easy dissemination of, appropriate information.

2. THREATCON NORMAL. This exists when a general threat of possible terrorist activity exists but warrants only a routine security posture.

3. THREATCON ALPHA. This applies when there is a general threat of possible terrorist activity against personnel and facilities, the nature and extent of which are unpredictable, and circumstances do not justify full implementation of THREATCON BRAVO measures. However, it may be necessary to implement certain measures from higher THREATCON's resulting from intelligence received or as a deterrent. The measures in this THREATCON must be capable of being maintained indefinitely.

a. Measure 1. At regular intervals, remind all personnel and dependents to be suspicious and inquisitive about strangers, particularly those carrying suitcases or other containers. Watch for unidentified vehicles on or in the vicinity of US installations. Watch for abandoned parcels or suitcases and any unusual activity.

b. Measure 2. The duty officer or personnel with access to building plans as well as the plans for area evacuations must be available at all times. Key personnel should be able to seal off an area immediately. Key personnel required to implement security plans should be on-call and readily available.

c. Measure 3. Secure buildings, rooms, and storage areas not in regular use.

d. Measure 4. Increase security spot checks of vehicles and persons entering the installation and unclassified areas under the jurisdiction of the United States.

e. Measure 5. Limit access points for vehicles and personnel commensurate with a reasonable flow of traffic.

f. Measure 6. As a deterrent, apply measures 14, 15, 17, or 18 from THREATCON BRAVO either individually or in combination with each other.

g. Measure 7. Review all plans, orders, personnel details, and logistic requirements related to the introduction of higher THREATCON's.

h. Measure 8. Review and implement security measures for high-risk personnel as appropriate.

- i. Measure 9. As appropriate, consult local authorities on the threat and mutual antiterrorism measures.
 - j. Measure 10. To be determined.
4. THREATCON BRAVO. This applies when an increased and more predictable threat of terrorist activity exists. The measures in this THREATCON must be capable of being maintained for weeks without causing undue hardship, affecting operational capability, and aggravating relations with local authorities.
- a. Measure 11. Repeat measure 1 and warn personnel of any other potential form of terrorist attack.
 - b. Measure 12. Keep all personnel involved in implementing antiterrorist contingency plans on call.
 - c. Measure 13. Check plans for implementation of the next THREATCON.
 - d. Measure 14. Move cars and objects, such as crates and trash containers at least 25 meters from buildings, particularly buildings of a sensitive or prestigious nature. Consider centralized parking.
 - e. Measure 15. Secure and regularly inspect all buildings, rooms, and storage areas not in regular use.
 - f. Measure 16. At the beginning and end of each workday, as well as at other regular and frequent intervals, inspect the interior and exterior of buildings in regular use for suspicious packages.
 - g. Measure 17. Examine all mail (above the regular examination process) for letter or parcel bombs.
 - h. Measure 18. Check all deliveries to messes, clubs, etc. Advise dependents to check home deliveries.
 - i. Measure 19. Increase surveillance of domestic accommodations, schools, messes, clubs, and other soft targets to improve deterrence and defense, and to build confidence among staff and dependents.
 - j. Measure 20. Make staff and dependents aware of the general situation in order to stop rumors and prevent unnecessary alarm.
 - k. Measure 21. At an early stage, inform members of local security committees of actions being taken.

l. Measure 22. Physically inspect visitors and randomly inspect their suitcases, parcels, and other containers. Identify the visitor's destination. Ensure that proper dignity is maintained, and if possible, ensure that female visitors are inspected only by a female qualified to conduct physical inspections.

m. Measure 23. Operate random patrols to check vehicles, people, and buildings.

n. Measure 24. Protect off-base military personnel and military vehicles in accordance with prepared plans. Remind drivers to lock vehicles and check vehicles before entering or exiting the vehicle.

o. Measure 25. Implement additional security measures for high-risk personnel as appropriate.

p. Measure 26. Brief personnel who may augment guard forces on the use of deadly force. Ensure that there is no misunderstanding of these instructions.

q. Measure 27. As appropriate, consult local authorities on the threat and mutual antiterrorism measures.

r. Measures 28 and 29. To be determined.

5. THREATCON CHARLIE. This applies when an incident occurs or intelligence is received indicating some form of terrorist action against personnel and facilities is imminent. Implementation of measures in this THREATCON for more than a short period probably will create hardship and affect the peacetime activities of the unit and its personnel.

a. Measure 30. Continue, or introduce, all measures listed in THREATCON BRAVO.

b. Measure 31. Keep all personnel responsible for implementing antiterrorist plans at their places of duty.

c. Measure 32. Limit access points to the absolute minimum.

d. Measure 33. Strictly enforce control of entry. Randomly search vehicles.

e. Measure 34. Enforce centralized parking of vehicles away from sensitive buildings.

f. Measure 35. Issue weapons to guards. Local orders should include specific orders on issue of ammunition.

g. Measure 36. Increase patrolling of the installation.

h. Measure 37. Protect all designated vulnerable points. Give special attention to vulnerable points outside the military establishment.

- i. Measure 38. Erect barriers and obstacles to control traffic flow.
 - j. Measure 39. Consult local authorities about closing public (and military) road and facilities that might make sites more vulnerable.
 - k. Measure 40. To be determined.
6. THREATCON DELTA. This applies in the immediate area where a terrorist attack has occurred or when intelligence has been received that terrorist action against a specific location or person is likely. Normally, this THREATCON is declared as a localized condition.
- a. Measure 41. Continue, or introduce, all measures listed for THREATCON's BRAVO and CHARLIE.
 - b. Measure 42. Augment guards as necessary.
 - c. Measure 43. Identify all vehicles within operational or mission-support areas.
 - d. Measure 44. Search all vehicles and their contents before allowing entrance to the installation.
 - e. Measure 45. Control access and implement positive identification of all personnel -- no exceptions.
 - f. Measure 46. Search all suitcases, briefcases, packages, etc., that are brought into the installation.
 - g. Measure 47. Control access to all areas under the jurisdiction of the United States.
 - h. Measure 48. Make frequent checks of the exterior of buildings and of parking areas.
 - i. Measure 49. Minimize all administrative journeys and visits.
 - j. Measure 50. Coordinate the possible closing of public and military roads and facilities with local authorities.
 - k. Measure 51. To be determined.

NOTE: THREATCON measures for shipboard and for aviation facilities can be found in Appendix J of Joint Pub 3-07.2, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism.