Civil Affairs
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

September 2003

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Headquarters, Department of the Army
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Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

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Preface

This manual establishes the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) used by individuals, teams, and units of United States (U.S.) Army and United States Marine Corps (USMC) Civil Affairs (CA) forces, as well as planners of civil-military operations (CMO) at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of operation. The TTP prescribed in this manual are used when engaging other government agencies, indigenous populations and institutions, international organizations, and other nonmilitary entities in support of conventional and special operations (SO) missions. This manual elaborates on doctrine contained in Field Manual (FM) 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations.

The focus of FM 3-05.401 is on “how to” conduct CA operations and CMO at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of operation and at the national, provincial, and local levels of government. The intent is to establish a common foundation for how CA soldiers—regardless of Active Army or Reserve Component (RC) affiliation—apply their skills to accomplish their mission in Service, joint, interagency, and multinational environments.

Using the perspective of the CA planning team, the CA generalist, and the CA functional specialist, FM 3-05.401 illustrates how to identify and conduct CA tasks and activities that are products of mission analysis. This manual also discusses how to prepare for deployment, conduct operations, redeploy, and perform postmission activities.

As with all doctrinal manuals, FM 3-05.401 is authoritative, but not directive. It serves as a guide and does not preclude CA personnel or units from developing their own standing operating procedures (SOPs). The TTP this manual presents should not limit CA soldiers from using their civilian-acquired skills, training, and experience to meet the challenges they will face while conducting CA activities and providing support to CMO.

The USMC has adopted this publication as a nondirective reference publication to supplement existing USMC doctrine on CMO.

The proponent of this manual is the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS). Submit comments and recommended changes to Commander, USAJFKSWCS, ATTN: AOJ K-DT-CA, Fort Bragg, NC 28310-5000.

Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.

This manual does not implement any international standardization agreements (STANAGs).
...you will take every step in your power to preserve tranquility and order in the city and give security to individuals of every class and description—restraining as far as possible, till the restoration of civil government, every species of persecution, insult, or abuse, either from the soldiery to the inhabitants or among each other.

General George Washington, 19 June 1778

Chapter 1

Introduction

The focus of CA is to engage the civil component of the operational environment by assessing, monitoring, protecting, reinforcing, establishing, and transitioning—both actively and passively—political, economic, and information (social and cultural) institutions and capabilities to achieve U.S. national goals and objectives at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of operation both abroad and at home.

1-1. The unique skills of the CA soldier are required across the range of full-spectrum operations incorporating all elements of national power. As the primary coordinator of CMO, he must be able to perform effectively in the four types of military action—offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations—in Service, joint, interagency, and multinational environments. His focus, whether contemplating the factors and conditions inherent to the commander’s battlespace or physically engaged in battlespace operations, is on the civil component of the operational environment.

1-2. CA soldiers enter the CA branch (38), functional area (39C), operations career field (39), or obtain the CA skill qualification identifier (D) with a variety of backgrounds, experience, and expertise. Military operational and planning expertise, enhanced by CA training and coupled with the skills and capabilities obtained in the civil sector, make CA soldiers unique in the Army. Individually and collectively, as members of general staffs, planning teams, specialty teams, functional specialty teams, civic action teams, or CA teams, they apply their knowledge and talents in various ways to meet the needs of the supported commander. CA soldiers gain area expertise by maintaining regional focus, cultural awareness, and when possible, language skills. This area expertise helps the commander to assess the impact of civil considerations on military planning and operations.

1-3. During the planning process, CA soldiers provide the commander with a perspective of the nonmilitary factors—civil areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events (CASCOPE)—that shape the operational environment. In both war and military operations other than war (MOOTW), CA/CMO planners contribute to the common operational picture (COP) by helping the commander and staff to visualize the entire situation. They do
this by analyzing the civilian component of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available—time available and civil considerations (METT-TC), as described in FM 3-0, Operations. This analysis includes—

- Establishing, if needed, a civil-military operations center (CMOC) as early as possible to facilitate collaborative coordination with the nonmilitary agencies operating in the area of operations (AO).
- Determining what, when, where, and why civilians might be encountered in the AO, what activities those civilians are engaged in that might affect the military operation, and vice versa.
- Determining measures of effectiveness (MOEs) that generate the definition and conditions for success.

1-4. CA soldiers advise the commander on the operational capabilities of CA planning, tactical, and specialty teams. CA soldiers articulate the value of CA teams and CMO in enhancing the effectiveness of military operations. They also advise the commander on the risks associated with not engaging the civil component of the operational environment through CMO.

1-5. CA soldiers help shape the environment for successful achievement of the desired end state of an operation. According to FM 3-0, missions in any environment require Army forces prepared to conduct any combination of these operations:

- Offensive operations aim at destroying or defeating an enemy. Their purpose is to impose U.S. will on the enemy and achieve decisive victory.
- Defensive operations defeat an enemy attack, buy time, economize forces, or develop conditions favorable for offensive operations. Defensive operations alone cannot normally achieve a decision. Their purpose is to create conditions for a counteroffensive that allows Army forces to regain the initiative.
- Stability operations promote and protect U.S. national interests by influencing the threat, political, and information dimensions of the operational environment through a combination of peacetime developmental, cooperative activities and coercive actions in response to crisis. Regional security is supported by a balanced approach that enhances regional stability and economic prosperity simultaneously. Army force presence promotes a stable environment.
- Support operations employ Army forces to assist civil authorities, foreign or domestic, as they prepare for or respond to crises and relieve suffering. Domestically, Army forces respond only when the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) directs. Army forces operate in support of the lead federal agency (LFA) and comply with provisions of U.S. law, to include the Posse Comitatus and Stafford Acts.

1-6. At the strategic and operational levels of operation, especially during the implementation of geographic combatant command theater engagement plans, the application of some CA activities can mitigate the need to apply other military operations in a crisis response. When a crisis is unavoidable, groundwork laid by those CA activities can also facilitate rapid decisive operations.
1-7. CMO are inherent to all military operations. Some of the common roles performed by CA soldiers include—

- Providing the primary interface with all civilian agencies and organizations (indigenous, U.S. government [USG], nongovernment, and international) in the AO.
- Establishing and maintaining a CMOC to facilitate interagency collaborative coordination.
- Analyzing the civil component of the AO for CASCOPE to determine the impact of the civil environment on military operations, as well as the impact of military operations on the civil environment.
- Monitoring operations to minimize the negative impacts of both sides, to identify requirements for follow-on CA activities and CMO, and to identify when MOEs have been achieved.
- Assisting commanders at all levels to fulfill their responsibilities inherent in CMO directly (by conducting CA activities) and indirectly (in an advisory role).
- Facilitating transition of operations from military to civilian control.

1-8. CA soldiers also perform specialized roles. These roles include—

- Supporting dislocated civilian (DC) operations.
- Identifying and, if necessary, facilitating negotiations for foreign nation support (FNS) resources and facilities for use by U.S. forces.
- Enhancing force protection and situational awareness by engaging routinely with local agencies, government and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and civilian authorities.
- Assessing conditions in the AO in terms of the 16 CA functional specialties and providing support to civil administration in them, as required.
- Other tasks described in FM 41-10 and associated joint publications (JPs).

1-9. During posthostilities operations, which include operations in areas where conflict has subsided while combat operations continue elsewhere, CA soldiers establish and maintain a CMOC, assess current conditions, and determine the requirements for meeting emergency needs. They draw upon civilian-attained skills to assist U.S. and foreign conventional forces, special operations forces (SOF), government agencies, and civil authorities in returning affected areas to normalcy. In doing so, CA soldiers enhance force protection and help set conditions for the transition of day-to-day functions to host nation (HN) or third-nation authorities so that U.S. forces may transition and redeploy.

1-10. FM 41-10 addresses what CA soldiers are expected to do. This FM addresses how CA soldiers might accomplish the inherent tasks of CA activities across the range of full-spectrum operations.
HISTORY

However well the functions and responsibilities of the military government of an occupied territory may be enumerated, there must inevitably remain a vast number of problems without precedent, tasks without pattern, administrative pioneering without blazed trails. Many historical principles repeat themselves, but many incidents occur but once. In consequence, the CA “soldier” frequently must thread a way where guideposts are lacking, where common sense and native ingenuity, appreciation of a special environment, adaptability to unwonted concepts of life, all are paramount. This does not mean that intricate maneuvers are required to solve unexpected problems. On the contrary, the simplest and most direct actions often dispose of situations fraught with grave dangers.

_Civil Affairs Studies: Illustrative Cases from Military Occupations_,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
1944

1-11. Modern CA forces and activities have their roots in the military governments of World War II. The legacy of these roots is retained in the 16 CA functional specialties found in the specialty teams of the various CA units (Figure 1-1).

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• Public Health  | • Public Transportation  
• Public Works and Utilities  
• Public Communications  | • Food and Agriculture  
• Economic Development  
• Civilian Supply  | • Emergency Services  
• Environmental Management  
• Cultural Relations  
• Civil Information  
• Dislocated Civilians  |

_Figure 1-1. The 16 CA Functional Specialties_

1-12. The unit commander’s responsibility for CMO, however, is historically entrenched in the earliest days of the U.S. Army. The quote by General George Washington used at the beginning of this chapter illustrates some of the CA activities outlined in FM 41-10 that support the commander’s mission. These activities include operations that—

• Fulfill responsibilities of the military under U.S. domestic and international laws relevant to civilian populations.
• Minimize civilian interference with military operations and the impact of military operations on the civilian populace.
• Coordinate military operations with civilian agencies of the USG, civilian agencies of other governments, and NGOs.
• Exercise military control of the civilian populace in occupied or liberated areas until control can be returned to civilian or non-U.S. military authority.

• Provide assistance to meet the life-sustaining needs of the civilian population.

• Provide expertise in civil-sector functions normally the responsibility of civilian authorities. That expertise is applied to implement U.S. policy to advise or assist in rehabilitating or restoring civil-sector functions.

1-13. Although CA forces have changed orientation and configuration over the years, the CA activities have not. These activities are inherent across offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations. History provides us with many examples of the various roles played by CA soldiers in past military operations. The following examples of late 20th century operations illustrate some of the activities listed in the previous paragraph. These examples serve to illustrate some of the challenges CA soldiers encountered in the past, as well as the types of roles CA soldiers can expect to play in operations of the 21st century.

Operation URGENT FURY—Grenada, 1983

In October 1983, a power struggle within the Marxist government of the island nation of Grenada resulted in the arrest and subsequent murder of Marxist Prime Minister Maurice Bishop and several members of his Cabinet by elements of the People’s Revolutionary Army. In response to an appeal from Grenada’s governor general and a request for assistance from the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, U.S. forces, in conjunction with contingents of the security forces of several neighboring Caribbean states, invaded Grenada on October 25. The mission was to oust the People’s Revolutionary Government, to protect U.S. citizens, and restore a lawful government. All major objectives were accomplished within 3 days.

Although soldiers from the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (Bn) (Airborne [A]) accompanied the invasion force, there was no defined role for CA forces during combat operations. In fact, no CA planners were involved in the planning of this contingency operation. Planners from the 96th CA Bn (A) deployed to the Atlantic Command before D-day to determine and coordinate the role of the CA Bn, but they received no definitive guidance from the Commander, United States Atlantic Command or his staff. This lack of a defined CA mission continued through December when operations transferred to a residual force. Consequently, CA soldiers operated on an ad hoc basis, doing what they felt was best to support the commander in taking care of people and restoring services in a friendly country.

The initial invasion force consisted of the 1st and 2d Ranger Bns, operating on the southern portion of the island, and the 22d Marine Amphibious Unit, operating on the northern portion. No CA soldiers accompanied these combat forces. The first CA officer—a first lieutenant from the 96th CA Bn (A)—arrived with the 2d Brigade (Bde), 82d Airborne Division, on 25 October. A three-man team from the 96th CA Bn arrived on 26 October with the 3d Bde, 82d Airborne Division. For the next 3 days, priority of fill for deploying aircraft went to combat forces. Additional CA assets were allowed to deploy only after it became evident that their expertise was sorely needed. Unit commanders, untrained in CMO, found their forces quickly overwhelmed tending to the needs of civilians who were suffering from prehostilities neglect, as well as the results of combat operations.
On 29 and 30 October, soldiers of the 96th CA Bn and 1st Bn, 4th Psychological Operations Group, arrived in Grenada to form what would become the CMOC. The CMOC provided centralized control over damage assessments, DC operations, FNS procurement, and Psychological Operations (PSYOP) support to populace and resources control (PRC) activities. It also provided liaison and support to United States Agency for International Development (USAID), United States Information Service (USIS), various government agencies of Grenada, and international relief organizations (IROs). Other soldiers of the 96th CA Bn, assisting the G-5 of the 82d Airborne Division, supervised a prisoner of war camp using a multinational guard force. These soldiers also supervised the restriction of Cuban and Russian officials to their respective Embassies, and tended to the daily health and welfare of all prisoners and restricted personnel.

The 358th CA Bde deployed the first RC CA soldiers to Grenada on 9 November. A public welfare team and a public works and utilities team surveyed and assessed damage to telephone exchanges, water and sewage systems, and electrical power distribution systems. These teams supported USAID by supervising the reconstruction of these public utilities. They also established strong working relationships with various agencies of the Grenadine government while helping to reconstruct the infrastructure of the island. One CA officer, sent to Grenada because of skills obtained as a member of the City of Philadelphia Convention and Business Bureau, was instrumental in helping to revitalize Grenada’s tourism trade. Others helped revitalize schools.

CA operations were transferred on 7 December to a residual force CMOC consisting of six Active Army CA soldiers and two RC CA soldiers. CA operations in Grenada ended in August 1985.

Operation RESTORE HOPE—Somalia, 1992

Mohamed Siad Barre, president and dictator of Somalia since 1969, fled the country in January 1991, taking with him the gold and foreign currency reserves of the Central Bank worth an estimated U.S. $27 million. Bitter dispute over who would legitimately lead the country resulted in a civil war. The intense violence created a humanitarian crisis of great proportions throughout the southern portion of Somalia. United Nations (UN) efforts, which included a small force of military observers in Mogadishu and an airlift of food to the capital and outlying areas, proved ineffective. Interclan violence and bands of armed militia confined the observers to the Mogadishu Airport and hindered the humanitarian relief efforts of international organizations. In December 1992, the United States, along with several other UN members, launched the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) to provide security for the humanitarian effort and to return Somalia to normal conditions.

The Commander, United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), quickly formed Joint Task Force (JTF) Somalia, the U.S. portion of UNITAF, in late November. The JTF was organized around the headquarters (HQ) of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force. Ground forces included Army forces (ARFOR) (10th Mountain Division), Marine Corps forces (MARFOR) (1st Marine Division), SOF (3d Special Forces Group), and the 13th Corps Support Command (COSCOM).
The mission of JTF Somalia was to provide security for the overall relief effort and to assist IROs in providing humanitarian assistance (HA). The commander’s intent was to avoid involvement in disarmament or in the rebuilding of Somalia. This fact would influence the number and type of CA forces allocated to the JTF.

Planning for CA participation began with the arrival of the commander of Company C, 96th CA Bn (A), at USCENTCOM HQ. He was told that United States Army Reserve (USAR) CA soldiers would not participate in the operation, and that he would have to rely solely on Active Army CA assets. He divided his company’s six Civil Affairs direct support teams (CADSTs) evenly between the 10th Mountain Division and the 1st Marine Division, and at the direction of the JTF J-3, attached his Civil Affairs tactical headquarters support team (CATHST) to the UN Humanitarian Operations Center. He then deployed directly to Somalia with the JTF staff on 11 December.

The three MARFOR CADSTs arrived in Somalia on 21 December, 12 days after the first Marine elements landed at Mogadishu. The three ARFOR CADSTs arrived on 28 December, approximately coinciding with the arrival of the initial elements of the 10th Mountain Division.

The CADSTs did not receive a clear mission statement until they arrived in Mogadishu and were briefed by the military deputy of operations of the UN Humanitarian Operations Center. The CA mission was to provide liaison between military commanders and representatives of IROs operating in humanitarian relief sectors throughout Somalia. A major factor missing from the mission statement was the relationship between the JTF and the Somali people in returning their country to normal conditions. This oversight would affect the daily operations of the JTF.

Although the United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC) was not deploying RC CA soldiers to this operation, three RC CA officers of 321st CA Bde did obtain deployment orders through the U.S. Army Reserve Personnel Center. Affiliated with 13th COSCOM through the Army’s Capstone program, these soldiers participated in planning from the time the 13th COSCOM received a warning order to deploy and were included on the COSCOM’s time-phased force and deployment list (TPFDL). They arrived in mid-January 1993 and redeployed with 13th COSCOM in June 1993. Activities conducted by these few CA forces in Somalia included staffing CMOCs in humanitarian relief sectors throughout Somalia; coordinating and facilitating IRO requests for security escorts, passes and identification cards, space-available seating on JTF aircraft, and other miscellaneous requests, such as the return of confiscated weapons; conducting medical and engineer assessments of orphanages, feeding centers, health clinics, schools, roads, bridges, and minefields; conducting meetings with local Somali groups to identify local elders, assess needs, and determine civilian attitude toward coalition forces; providing liaison between local Somali leaders and IRO representatives; coordinating medical and engineer civic action projects to foster good relations and enhance force protection; training representatives of coalition forces to plan and conduct CMO; and conducting handoff of CA operations to coalition forces.

One deficiency in the JTF organization was the failure to have a trained CMO staff officer at every level from JTF to battalion. With all operations clearly focused on support to civilians, this oversight created a void in CMO planning. Other than the rules of engagement (ROE), the JTF had no centralized CMO plan or policy regarding
interaction with civilians and direct requests for assistance by local nationals. Consequently, many subordinate units, left to handle unfamiliar situations without clear guidance, undertook activities on their own accord that were beyond the scope of their mission and that were better suited for IROs. These same units later complained that they were victims of a phenomenon known as “mission creep,” which took resources from their primary mission to address unforeseen requirements.

**Operation SUPPORT HOPE—Rwanda and Zaire, 1994**

The JTF of Operation SUPPORT HOPE deployed from the United States European Command (USEUCOM) on or about 22 July 1994 in response to the humanitarian crisis in Rwanda and Zaire. The objectives set for the JTF were to assist efforts to establish water purification and distribution systems in Goma; establish an airhead and cargo distribution capability at Entebbe; provide round-the-clock airfield services at Goma, Kigali, and Bukavu; provide logistics management support to UN and other agencies; and protect the force.

The JTF commander selected an ad hoc team of personnel within his command to run his CMOC, which began operations on 28 July 1994 at Entebbe, Uganda. The selected soldiers had experience in peace operations and expertise as regional foreign area officers, but none had trained or been briefed on how to organize and run a CMOC. CMOC Entebbe’s initial focus was strictly on logistics functions.

The initial main effort for international humanitarian response was actually in Kigali, Rwanda. The United Nations Rwanda Emergency Office established the On-Site Operations Coordination Center in Kigali to coordinate the international response.

Meanwhile, soldiers from the 353d CA Command (CACOM) were activated in July 1994, mobilized at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and briefed about CMOC lessons learned by members of C/96 CA Bn who had been in Somalia. They then sat at Fort Bragg for several days because they could not get seats on deploying aircraft. After some attrition, the CA team finally arrived in Rwanda on or about 7 August 1994 and immediately established CMOCs at Goma, Zaire, and Kigali, Rwanda.

The JTF experienced an initial lack of understanding of the situation and inability to effectively interact with NGOs working in the same sector or geographical area. Delayed deployment of trained CA soldiers, therefore, significantly inhibited initial military contribution to the main efforts of HA operations.
JTF Operation PROVIDE REFUGE—United States, 1999

In 1999, the United States participated in an international effort to provide safe haven for Kosovar Albanian refugees to relieve the strain on Macedonia, host to approximately 140,000 refugees fleeing death and oppression from neighboring Kosovo. From 5 May to 31 July 1999, Fort Dix, New Jersey, became a reception and processing center for 3,547 Albanians en route to new lives in the United States.

Operation PROVIDE REFUGE was truly an interagency CMO. The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) was the LFA that oversaw the reception, billeting, medical screening, and processing of the Kosovar Albanians for temporary resettlement in the United States. Other federal agencies included the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), the Department of State (DOS), and the Department of Defense (DOD). Nongovernment agencies, known collectively as the Joint Voluntary Agency (JVA), included the Immigration and Refugee Services of America, Amnesty International (AI), and the American Red Cross (ARC).

At the direction of DOD, 1st COSCOM from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, deployed a JTF on 1 May 1999 to Fort Dix to set up and operate the temporary camp while the Kosovar Albanians completed the immigration process. The JTF commander, realizing a need for soldiers knowledgeable in DC camp operations, requested CA support for the operation. His request was denied at United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). To meet the commander’s needs, the commander, XVIII Airborne Corps, deployed one member of the Corps G-5 to head up the J-3’s CMO section.

Initially one-deep, and later augmented by four soldiers of the 358th CA Bde performing annual training at Fort Dix, the CMO section provided support and advice to the JTF commander and to the representatives of the various agencies brought together for this uncommon domestic operation.

Some of the responsibilities of the CMO section were to—

- Advise the JTF commander on all CMO issues within the JTF area of responsibility (AOR) and area of interest in accordance with (IAW) the interagency memorandum of agreement (MOA).
- Provide staff CMO presence, such as attendance at daily interagency meetings (0930), command and staff briefings (1600), and any special meetings called by the military or task force leadership.
- Conduct daily walk-throughs to assess camp life, monitor morale, and quickly identify problems for referral to the appropriate agency or provider, and exercise diplomacy in identifying shortfalls, developing solutions, and making recommendations.
- Attend “Village” council meetings and report CMO issues developed or identified at these meetings to the appropriate JTF staff section.
- Provide interagency liaison between federal agencies, NGOs, and the JTF, and meet briefly each day with representatives of the JVA, DHHS, DOS, INS, AI, and ARC.
- Identify refugees with English language skills. Forward names, buildings, and room information to DHHS or other appropriate personnel.
Operation STABILIZE—East Timor, 1999–2001

The former Indonesian province of East Timor fell into turmoil in September 1999 after the passing of a provincial referendum calling for independence. Due to the organized terrorism by militias, East Timor suffered loss of infrastructure, displacement of the civilian population, and disruption of the economy and agricultural output. Many major humanitarian agencies rushed to provide aid. These agencies included the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the International Rescue Committee (IRC), among others.

In reaction to an estimated 2,000 deaths, torching of 75 percent of the country, and displacement of approximately 180,000 civilians, the international community, under a UN resolution, created a peacekeeping force. This force, International Force for East Timor (INTERFET), was created to ensure stability and bring security to the province. Australia, United Kingdom, France, New Zealand, South Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines comprised the coalition forces.

Recognizing the need for close cooperation with the military to coordinate the humanitarian operation, the UN humanitarian coordinator established a civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) component in INTERFET. The CIMIC team developed a one-page conceptual framework for CIMIC and presented it to the force commander. This framework specified two sets of deliverables: (1) coordination arrangements, primarily to deconflict the intended use of the same resources, and (2) specific arrangements to coordinate the use of military resources in direct support of HA operations.

Twelve soldiers from B Company, 96th CA Bn (A), augmented by four RC personnel, deployed to Australia on 21 September 1999 to participate in planning for the peacekeeping mission. Their initial mission was to establish and operate a CMOC for INTERFET. Force protection requirements prevented their immediate departure from Darwin, Australia, but they arrived in Dili, East Timor, on 3 October—several days after the main force.

Once in East Timor, force protection constraints prevented the team from executing the original plan of conducting needs surveys and assessments. For example, the tactical support teams (TSTs) were not allowed to leave the INTERFET compound to conduct HA assessments. This situation did not change for the duration of the U.S. INTERFET deployment and remained in effect even after members of the 322d CA Bde assumed the CA mission on 10 November 1999. Nevertheless, this CA force was successful in two key areas: (1) the coordination of interagency relief to the population, and (2) assisting in the return of over 100,000 refugees from West Timor.

When the UN assumed the role of the administrative interim government of East Timor in the form of United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), the INTERFET peacekeeping force transitioned to become the UN Peacekeeping Force (PKF). The U.S. presence downsized and, while the United States was not a part of the UNTAET or PKF, the United States maintained an independent presence to show political support for the UN effort. The 322d CA Bde maintained a rotational CA liaison officer (LNO) to the joint staff of United States Support Group East Timor (USGET). USGET CA LNO planned and coordinated ongoing U.S. engineering and medical projects by U.S. military teams in East Timor. The CA LNO served as LNO to the UN PKF and its component forces, as well as the various diverse departments within the UNTAET government, and coordinated relief efforts with many of the NGOs and international organizations in East Timor. At the peak of operations, there were military forces from 24 nations and over 180 NGOs and international organizations in-country.
Operation ANACONDA—Afghanistan, 2002

In response to the terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001, the United States and the United Kingdom initiated the military phase of the global war against terrorism on 7 October 2001 with Operation INFINITE JUSTICE, later renamed Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. U.S. objectives of this operation included acquiring intelligence on the resources of the al Qaeda terrorist organization and the Taliban government, preventing the use of Afghanistan as a safe haven for terrorists, developing relations with groups opposed to the Taliban, supporting opposition forces in their struggle, and facilitating the delivery of humanitarian supplies to the Afghan people. Within two months, opposition forces, supported by an international coalition, succeeded in toppling the Taliban government and scattering Taliban and al Qaeda forces. However, the scattered forces still posed a threat, particularly in the eastern part of the country.

Operation ANACONDA developed as part of the ongoing effort to root out Taliban and al Qaeda forces from caves and strongholds dug deep into the Shah-I-Kot mountains of eastern Afghanistan. Conducted 1–17 March 2002, it was a combined ground tactical operation that initially involved U.S. and Afghan forces and, later, included coalition forces from Australia, Canada, Germany, Denmark, France, and Norway.

Operation ANACONDA called for U.S. special operations and conventional forces, along with Anti-Taliban Forces (ATF), to conduct unconventional warfare (UW) and combat operations to deny egress routes to Pakistan through the Khowst-Gardez area. U.S. forces consisted of elements of 5th Special Forces Group (SFG), known as Task Force (TF) Dagger, and the 3d Bde, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). Preparation included organizing and training the ATF for the operation and providing HA to the distressed populace in the area.

The lead planning agent—HQ, TF Dagger—moved from Uzbekistan to Bagram, Afghanistan, to create a forward presence for planning. Since there was no CA/CMO planner on his staff, the commander of TF Dagger requested CMO planning support from the Combined Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (CJCMOTF). The CJCMOTF directed CMOC South, located in Kabul, to provide one CA planner familiar with SF operations to work under the auspices of the TF Dagger information operations section. The CA planner, a member of the 96th CA Bn (A), reported several days prior to execution of Operation ANACONDA and eventually transitioned his duties to a 4-person team from the CJCMOTF.

A Special Forces operational detachment A (SFODA) from TF Dagger was operating in the Khowst-Gardez area for 8 days before Civil Affairs Team A (CAT-A) 41, from 96th CA Bn (A), arrived. The SFODA’s focus as on conducting combat-oriented assessments (for example, military capabilities and targeting) and UW training.

The CAT-A’s mission was to support UW operations by overseeing HA operations in 17 provinces of the area and to create a positive relationship with local leaders in the area prior to the combat phase of Operation ANACONDA. Over a 2-week period, the CAT-A executed the CA activities of host-nation support (HNS), military civic action (MCA), and support to civil administration. Specifically, it conducted CMO-oriented assessments; facilitated the local hire of cargo vehicles and, in the absence of materiel handling equipment, individuals to transfer cargo by hand from aircraft to the vehicles; supervised an engineer project to repair a bridge required to support the movement of HA supplies; and delicately managed operations in an environment in which political
leaders, appointed by the interim government of Afghanistan, and local warlords, who did not necessarily accept the interim government as legitimate, were often at odds with each other.

Elsewhere in the theater, five members of 352 CACOM, working at the CJCMOTF, planned and managed the delivery of HA supplies into the Khowst-Gardez area. They configured pallets (also known as “Home Depot” packages due to the preponderance of building materials) in Bagram and called CAT-A 41 when the supplies were inbound.

At times, the security situation limited CAT-A operations to the vicinity of the supporting airfield. As a force protection measure during the distribution of supplies, the CAT-A moved with ATF, local police, or SFODA forces. Conversely, the HA operations enhanced the force protection of the SFODA by promoting rapport between the SFODA and ATF. When ATF soldiers saw their families were taken care of, absenteeism among ATF trainees was diminished, allowing ATF to focus on the mission. Another benefit of including ATF and local police in HA operations was to promote the legitimacy of the provincial government among the populace.

1-14. The historical examples provided general insights for future operations. These insights include—

- Every command level must have a CMO staff element that is visible and involved in all aspects of preparing for, executing, and transitioning military operations.
- CA/CMO planners must be integrated early with the supported staff.
- The commander must have a well-formed intent for CMO that is understood down to the lowest level.
- CA activities at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels must be integrated into a centralized CMO plan that supports the combatant commander’s plan.
- Many of the commander’s CMO and force protection challenges can be minimized if CA teams accompany or follow immediately behind combat elements.
- The CMOC should be considered for every operation.
- CA elements need to be properly equipped to operate successfully in both the military environment and the civil arena (they must have their own vehicles, communications equipment, and digital access to both secure and nonsecure networks).
- International organizations and NGOs are a reality and must be integrated into the plan to exploit their strengths and minimize their potential negative impact.

**THE FOG OF MILITARY OPERATIONS**

It is the responsibility of combatant commanders to plan and conduct CMO. CMO contribute to shaping the battlespace and supporting the geographic combatant commander’s theater engagement plan.

*JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations, 8 February 2001*
1-15. All units experience a condition or period during which full knowledge and understanding of the total situation in an AO is sketchy. This “fog of military operations” occurs during war as well as MOOTW. It also occurs across the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of operations simultaneously. Initially amorphous, the situation starts to take shape and gradually becomes clearer as operations progress.

1-16. The fog of military operations contains both military and civil components that are scattered and intertwined within the AO. Dissipating the fog requires the military and civilian participants of an operation to understand their respective roles at each of the levels of operation (strategic, operational, and tactical) to maximize available resources and create a synergistic effect. For example, attack of the fog requires deliberate, on-the-ground assessments of both the military and civil situations; integration of multiple (military and civilian) information sources to identify the various threats to the mission or military force; and simultaneous engagement of both the military and civil centers of gravity.

1-17. Military forces generally focus their efforts against the military threats and centers of gravity. Civilian (interagency, multinational, HN) participants of an operation generally focus their efforts against the nonmilitary threats and civilian centers of gravity. As operations progress, the priority of effort shifts, based on METT-TC and CASCOPE, between military (mil-mil), CMO (mil-civ), and civilian (civ-civ) operations until, ultimately, the military and CMO efforts are secondary to, and support, the efforts of indigenous populations and institutions.

1-18. At the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of operation, CA soldiers bridge the gap between the military and civil components during war and MOOTW. Whether functioning as members of an interagency work group, as part of a large military force, or as isolated individuals or teams, they assess and monitor the civil component, engage civil objectives in support of the military operation, and facilitate eventual transition of operations to indigenous civilian solutions. Figures 1-2 through 1-6, pages 1-14 through 1-16, depict this concept in a typical operational environment. With modification, these figures can be used to portray general operations during war or MOOTW. Appendix A provides further information on symbology used in graphics.
Figure 1-2. Environment Prior to the Introduction of U.S.-Led Military Forces

Legend:
- Enemy units, such as infantry and artillery. Enemy units appear as both black and white diamonds.
- Civil components, such as areas (A), structures (S), capabilities (C), organizations (O), people (P), and events (E).
- Color denotes status: (black) requires critical support/military lead; (dark gray) requires partial support/civil lead; (light gray) requires no support.

NOTE: Application of indigenous elements of power—political, military, economic, information—falls against the threat.

Figure 1-3. Initial Phases of U.S. Military Operations—Main Effort Is Mil-Mil

Legend:
- Enemy units, such as infantry and artillery. Enemy units appear as both black and white diamonds.
- Civil components, such as areas (A), structures (S), capabilities (C), organizations (O), people (P), and events (E).
- Color denotes status: (black) requires critical support/military lead; (dark gray) requires partial support/civil lead; (light gray) requires no support.

NOTE: Priority of effort is military-to-military destructive engagements.
Figure 1-4. Subsequent Phases of U.S. Military Operations—Main Effort Is Mil-Civ

Legend:
- Enemy units, such as infantry and artillery. Enemy units appear as both black and white diamonds.
- Civil components, such as areas (A), structures (S), capabilities (C), organizations (O), people (P), and events (E).
- Color denotes status: (black) requires critical support/military lead; (dark gray) requires partial support/civil lead; (light gray) requires no support.

NOTE: Main effort shifts to military-to-civilian constructive engagements as military targets are defeated.

Figure 1-5. Subsequent Military Operations—Main Effort Is Mil-Civ and Civ-Civ

Legend:
- Enemy units, such as infantry and artillery. Enemy units appear as both black and white diamonds.
- Civil components, such as areas (A), structures (S), capabilities (C), organizations (O), people (P), and events (E).
- Color denotes status: (black) requires critical support/military lead; (dark gray) requires partial support/civil lead; (light gray) requires no support.

NOTE: Military-to-civilian engagements, simultaneously coupled with civilian-to-civilian engagements, become the main effort. This occurs at the strategic/national, operational/provincial, and tactical/local levels of operation.
CA METHODOLOGY

The problem of achieving maximum civilian support and minimum civilian interference with U.S. military operations will require the coordination of intelligence efforts, security measures, operational efficiency, and the intentional cultivation of goodwill. Failure to use CA assets in the analysis of political, economic, and social bases of instability may result in inadequate responses to the root causes of the instability and result in the initiation or continuation of conflict.

JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations, 8 February 2001

1-19. Commanders seek to achieve national goals and objectives at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of operation. The focus of all CA operations is to help commanders to engage the civil component of their operational environment. CA activities and tasks in this effort include assessing, monitoring, protecting, reinforcing, establishing, and transitioning political, economic, social, and cultural institutions. CA soldiers conduct these activities and tasks both actively, through direct contact, and passively, through observation, research, and analysis.

1-20. The CA methodology describes how CA soldiers, elements, and units approach all CA operations and CMO. It consists of six steps:

- Assess.
- Decide.
• Develop and detect.
• Deliver.
• Evaluate.
• Transition.

The first five steps together are known as AD3E.

1-21. The CA methodology is applied equally by CA soldiers at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of operation. At each level, it supports the commander’s ability to visualize, describe, and direct operations in his exercise of battle command while engaging all elements of national power. It also helps present the COP and orchestrate a common operational response (COR) to produce common operational effects (COEs), as shown in Figure 1-7.

Figure 1-7. Depiction of the COP, COR, and COE
1-22. A brief explanation of the six steps of the CA methodology follows. Each step will be covered in detail in succeeding chapters of this manual.

- **Assess**: Assess current conditions against a defined norm or established standards. This assessment begins at receipt of the mission and continues through the mission analysis process. This step looks at the nonmilitary factors (CASCOPE) that shape the operational environment. It is conducted for each of the 16 functional specialties as well as the general aspects of the AO. The product of this step is an initial estimate and restated mission statement.

- **Decide**: Decide who, what, when, where, why, and how to focus CA assets and activities toward a COE. This step encompasses CA course of action (COA) analysis, COA decision, and creating the CA/CMO plan. The plan should direct task-organized CA elements to create or observe those conditions or events that would either mitigate or trigger a specific CA/CMO response. It should also address all CA/CMO activities in civil lines of operations from initial response through transition to other (military or civilian) authorities. The products of this step include the commander’s intent for CMO, defined CA priorities of effort, defined MOEs, and the CA annex.

- **Develop and detect**: Develop rapport and relationships with the nonmilitary participants of the operation (including the affected populace) and detect those conditions or events that would call for a specific CA/CMO response. CA elements accomplish this through numerous activities, such as facilitating the interagency process in the CMOC, conducting deliberate assessments, hosting meetings, supporting DC control points, and monitoring public information programs and CA/CMO-related reports from the field. The products of this step include continuous assessments, revised or updated plans, formalized CMOC terms of reference, and fragmentary (FRAG) orders.

- **Deliver**: Engage the civil component with planned or on-call CA activities (PRC, FNS, HA, MCA, emergency services, and support to civil administration), as appropriate. This step is executed according to synchronized plans. It represents a COR by CA soldiers, non-CA soldiers, international organizations, NGOs, and HN assets. The product of this step is an executed mission.

- **Evaluate**: Evaluate the results of the executed mission. This step validates the CA/CMO concept of operations (CONOPS) and supports the management of MOEs. Performing this step is akin to conducting a CA “battle damage assessment.” Evaluators look at the effects of the operation on each of the 16 CA functional specialties, determine the sustainability of any projects or programs initiated during the execution phase, and recommend follow-on actions. Products of this step include trip reports, after-action reports (AARs), new mission requirements, and execution orders for transition plans.

- **Transition**: Transition CA operations or CMO to follow-on CA units, other military units, HN assets, UN organizations, international organizations, NGOs, and other civilian agencies, as appropriate. This step is CA’s direct contribution to a sustainable solution, and the commander’s ability to secure the victory. This step is executed according to synchronized transition plans. The outcome of this step includes
successful transition of authority or relief-in-place, and programs that are durable and sustainable by the follow-on force or organization.

1-23. Elements of the common problem-solving and decision-making processes used at various levels of command are embedded within the steps of the CA methodology. The CA methodology takes these processes one step further by focusing on transition—the step that secures the victory. Table 1-1 demonstrates how the CA methodology and these processes are related.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CA Methodology</th>
<th>Basic Problem-Solving Steps</th>
<th>SO Operational Planning Procedures</th>
<th>JOPES Deliberate Planning</th>
<th>Crisis-Action Planning</th>
<th>MDMP</th>
<th>Troop-Leading Procedures</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assess</td>
<td>Identify the Problem</td>
<td>Receive Mission</td>
<td>Phase 1: Initiation</td>
<td>Receive Mission</td>
<td>Receive Mission</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Identify Facts and Assumptions</td>
<td>Initiate the SOMPF</td>
<td>Phase 2: Crisis Assessment</td>
<td>Analyze Mission</td>
<td>Issue a Warning Order</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Conduct Mission Analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>Decide</td>
<td>Generate Alternatives</td>
<td>Send CONOPS to Mission Tasking Headquarters</td>
<td>Phase 2: Concept Development</td>
<td>Phase 3: COA Development</td>
<td>Develop COAs</td>
<td>Make a Tentative Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Analyze the Alternatives</td>
<td>Attend Mission Conference/Orders Briefs and Conduct Predeployment Site Survey</td>
<td>Phase 3: Plan Development</td>
<td>Phase 4: COA Selection</td>
<td>Analyze COAs</td>
<td>Start Necessary Movement</td>
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<td>Compare the Alternatives</td>
<td>Receive CONOPS Approval</td>
<td>Phase 4: Plan Review</td>
<td>Compare COAs</td>
<td>Conduct a Preliminary or Initial Assessment</td>
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<td>Make a Decision</td>
<td>Refine Concept Into OPLAN, CONPLAN, Supporting Plan, or OPORD</td>
<td>Phase 5: Supporting Plans Development</td>
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<td>Conduct Briefback</td>
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<td>Produce Orders</td>
<td>Issue the Complete Order</td>
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<tr>
<td>Develop and Detect</td>
<td>Execute the Decision</td>
<td>Deploy</td>
<td>Phase 5: Execution Planning</td>
<td>Rehearse</td>
<td>Supervise</td>
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<td>Deliver</td>
<td>Execute the Decision</td>
<td>Execute the Mission</td>
<td>Phase 6: Execution</td>
<td>Execute</td>
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<tr>
<td>Evaluate</td>
<td>Assess the Results</td>
<td>Document Results of Mission</td>
<td>Assess</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transition</td>
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<td>Redeploy</td>
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*Legend:
CONPLAN – Concept Plan
JOPES – Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
OPLAN – Operation Plan
OPORD – Operation Order
SOMPF – Special Operations Mission Planning Folder

Table 1-1. Comparison of the CA Methodology and the Various Problem-Solving and Decision-Making Processes
1-24. The CA methodology is not necessarily linear. It can be depicted as a spiral in which new missions are spawned during the evaluation phase, starting the process over again. Several spirals may also occur simultaneously and, at times, overlap as operations become more complex (Figure 1-8).

Figure 1-8. Two Ways to Depict the Spiraling Effect of the CA Methodology
CA AND INFORMATION OPERATIONS

1-25. Information operations (IO) are actions taken to affect adversary, and influence others' decision-making processes, information and information systems while protecting one's own information and information systems (FM 3-0). IO are primarily shaping operations that create and preserve opportunities for decisive operations. Offensive and defensive IO affect the enemy's ability to execute military actions. In conjunction with the related activities of public affairs and CMO, IO also affect the perceptions and attitudes of indigenous populations and institutions, their leaders, and international nonmilitary participants in an operation.

1-26. Like CMO, IO is the responsibility of the commander. Many military organizations will have an IO cell within their planning staffs. This IO cell conducts thorough and detailed IO IPB, determines mission-specific IO themes, and coordinates and integrates the various IO elements listed in Chapter 11 of FM 3-0. Although the IO planning cell may be the mission-planning authority for a specific mission, the S-3, G-3, or J-3 remains the sole tasking authority.

1-27. The CA methodology is the CA contribution to IO. For example—

- Preliminary and deliberate CA assessments provide the civil perspective of the AO that rounds out IO IPB.

- The application of CASCOPE during the decide phase focuses CA assets on essential aspects of the IO campaign to which other military assets may not have access.

- CMOC operations during the develop and detect phase and the application of CA activities during the deliver phase create relationships, detect attitudes, and provide concrete actions that, in turn, contribute to the commander's campaign to mitigate the effects of enemy IO, as well as to mitigate adverse effects stemming from misinformation, rumors, confusion, and apprehension.

- Monitoring and evaluating MOEs during the evaluate phase provide feedback on the success or failure of specific IO themes.

- Successful transition to durable and sustainable civil solutions underscores the ultimate message that the United States is not an occupying power.

1-28. The relationship between CA/CMO planners and the IO cell is strictly a coordinating relationship. At a minimum, CA activities and CMO must be synchronized so as not to violate CA plans, programs, policies, or IO themes established for the mission. Tools, systems, and operations that effectively support the synchronization of CA and IO include—

- Shared information management tools, such as the Army Battle Command System (ABCS), to include—
  - Global Command and Control System.
  - Synchronization matrix (templating).
  - Fire effects cell and nonlethal effects cell.
The Targeting Board (Joint Targeting Coordination Board's Joint Integrated Prioritized Target List).

1-29. These and other examples of the coordination routinely conducted between CA and IO specialists are addressed below and throughout this manual.

**CA and IO in Kosovo**

The joint operations center (JOC) within NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR) at KFOR Main, in the city of Pristina, had an IO cell consisting of U.S. Air Force officers, a U.S. Army PSYOP plans section, and a Norwegian Army public affairs office (PAO) team. Additionally, the KFOR J-9 assigned an operations (OPS) cell consisting of U.S. CA officers to the JOC. At times, the J-9 OPS cell sought the assistance of the IO cell to disseminate information in support of CMO using PAO and PSYOP resources.

For example, during the winter of 1999–2000, CA specialists, working with the UNHCR, would coordinate for shipments of coal to fuel a power plant that supplied power to Serb, Albanian, and Roma communities. The power plant systems were commonly known as Kosovo A and Kosovo B. Each complex had multiple generating plants, where Kosovo A was a 1950s-era system consisting of about a half dozen factory-style smokestacks, and Kosovo B was a newer system built in the late 1970s. Oddly, the older system was the more reliable of the two systems.

It started to become increasingly clear to both the Democratic League of Kosovo and the former Ushtria Clirimtare E Kosoves (UCK, also known as the Kosovo Liberation Army or KLA), now known as the Kosovo Protection Force (KPF), that UN Security Council Resolution 1244 strictly defined the KFOR mission. As such, Multinational Brigade (MNB) East U.S. forces, specifically those of the 1st Infantry Division, would conduct missions, such as patrolling in the ground safety zone to interdict Liberation Army of Presheva, Medveja, and Bujanoc weapons smuggled into Serbia’s Presevo Valley.

Albanians then began to interdict most lines of communication and main supply routes that included buses from Nis, Serbia, and trains carrying passengers as well as commodities. This interdiction consisted not only of rocket attacks but also crimes of opportunity as criminals seized coal as it came up from the MNB South and MNB West AO.

To facilitate the establishment of a safe and secure environment and to restore Kosovo to normalcy, the J-3, along with the J-5, consisting of one U.S. CA officer in the J-5 Plans, a Norwegian Army officer, and a Turkish Army officer, plus the J-9, consisting primarily of U.S. Army CA officers, requested support through the JOC Director. Specifically, the J-3 wanted a COA that addressed the disruption of the shipment of coal and the increasing tide of violence toward various means of transportation.

The J-9 JOC OPS cell, in conjunction with the IO resources of PAO channels and PSYOP media through PSYOP Plans JOC element, disseminated the message that busing would cease for an undetermined time period until the violence stopped. Additionally, PSYOP disseminated messages that cooperation with the legitimate government was imperative for a return to normalcy.
Through this dissemination of information and closely coordinated actions of the J-9 OPS cell with IO and various MNB HQ and United Nations Mission in Kosovo Police (UNMIK-P) stations, the local populace began to cooperate with UNMIK-P. UNMIK-P were then able to identify the coal thieves so that the amount of available coal to Kosovo A and Kosovo B increased. In turn, rolling blackouts of electricity minimized and heat to key facilities, such as hospitals, also increased.

The increase of heat and minimization of rolling blackouts further restored the local population's confidence in the legitimate government, thus facilitating the restoration of a safe and secure environment.

The J-9 OPS cell maintained this relationship with IO and PSYOP throughout the mission, and would often engage support of IO and PSYOP to stress approved campaign themes that in turn nurtured the CA relationship and rapport with the local community.

**PREPARING FOR DEPLOYMENT**

1-30. CA soldiers must be ready for deployment at all times. They must be prepared to accomplish their assigned missions on short notice. They will not have lengthy “train up” periods before deployments and, therefore, are personally responsible for their individual preparedness. In that regard, CA soldiers stay ready for employment by—

- Staying physically fit.
- Staying proficient in basic tactical soldiering skills.
- Maintaining a regional focus according to the planning affiliation of their parent CA unit:
  - Keeping current in regional issues by routinely reviewing open source materials for current information on the region of their CA unit.
  - Reviewing OPLANs of their supported unit or organization for accuracy and inclusion of specialty areas.
  - Participating in overseas deployments for training in-theater.
- Keeping current in the TTP associated with their assigned position or specialty:
  - Participating in Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) exercises, combatant command exercises, and combat training center exercises.
  - Seeking and maintaining certifications.
- Keeping current in the TTP associated with their basic branch.
- Keeping personal lives, especially families and finances, prepared for possible deployments.

1-31. A CA soldier’s civilian background may have a bearing on his military position. In some cases, the scope of the position may be focused on areas not normally encountered by the soldier in his daily capacity. To be well-rounded and proficient in all aspects of their military duties, CA soldiers should seek additional training or experience, such as—

- Affiliating with local specialty groups.
- Pursuing membership in professional organizations.
• Subscribing to professional publications associated with the functional specialty.

• Attending local, national, and international training opportunities in the specialty profession.

1-32. Appendix B provides a list of affiliations and professional organizations associated with each of the 16 functional specialties that offer the opportunities listed above.
Chapter 2

Integration With Supported Organizations

Participants (at the Conference on Information Sharing in Complex Humanitarian Emergencies) noted that good preparation should include more than just knowing about the host country and its people. There should be information about past and ongoing local and international activities; personnel, resources, and capacities already in place on the ground; as well as the condition of existing infrastructure, such as telephone lines or potable water sources. Participants further agreed that responsibility for knowing and sharing this information begins during predeployment planning and continues through mission implementation and into postconflict reconstruction. Gathering this information should be part of each organization’s preparation, participants said.

United States Institute Of Peace Report, 
Taking It to the Next Level: 
Civilian-Military Cooperation in Complex Emergencies, 
31 August 2000

OVERVIEW

2-1. CA soldiers and teams are involved in planning at every level from DOD to the maneuver battalion. At the DOD level, CA/CMO planners develop and review directives, coordinate with DOS and other national agencies, and provide CA guidance to the geographic combatant commanders. At the combatant command level, CA/CMO planners develop and review CA plans, programs, and policies in support of combatant command campaign plans and peacetime military engagement (PME) activities. At combatant command, Army, and JTF levels, CA/CMO planners participate in contingency planning, recommend CA troop lists, and integrate the deployment of CA assets into the TPFDL. At all command levels from JTF to battalion, including special operations commands (SOCs), CA/CMO planners participate in the MDMP by analyzing COAs for the civil component of METT-TC, advising the commanders of their CMO obligations, and developing and monitoring the commander’s centralized CMO plan. At theater and corps support commands, CA/CMO planners help commanders manage rear-area operations. CA/CMO planners identify and coordinate the CA activities conducted by CA assets in support of the CMO plan. These responsibilities are replicated or modified when working in interagency or multinational environments.

CA PLANNING ASSOCIATIONS

2-2. CA/CMO planning is a shared responsibility of both Active Army and RC CA elements. It requires continuous coordination between the full-time members of combatant command staffs, the drilling members of CA reserve units, and the members of Active Army CA units.
2-3. United States Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), in conjunction with the USACAPOC, assigns CA planning associations between CA units and combatant commands, as well as divisions, corps, theater support commands (TSCs), COSCOMs, SOCs, and selected RC units. Planning associations are designed to improve wartime planning, mission capability, mobilization, and deployability. These associations are based on current Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) requirements and are included in the campaign plans of the supported combatant commanders.

2-4. Once a planning association is established, the supported commander provides the supporting CA unit with a mission letter. At corps level and below, this mission letter is normally prepared by the G-3/S-3 with input by the G-5/S-5. At unified and subunified commands, it is prepared by the J-3 with input by the senior CMO staff officer. The mission letter provides unit-specific guidance regarding plans and operations in the supported command’s AOR. It greatly influences the way a CA unit may organize, equip, and train to meet mission requirements.

2-5. FM 41-10 outlines the composition of CA planning teams and where they are located in CA organizations. Figure 2-1, page 2-3, depicts the level of commands with which the planning teams are associated and the levels of operation at which each team generally focuses.

2-6. Regardless of the associated level of command or level of operation, and to establish a positive working relationship with the supported organization, the supporting CA unit should immediately seek answers to the following questions upon notification of a planning association:

- What full-time position or function on the supported staff is responsible for CA/CMO planning?
- What planning and plan review processes does this staff undertake?
- How does the CA planning team participate in the campaign and operation plan review cycle and contingency planning cycle?
- Where does the CA planning team physically set up to integrate into the supported staff’s operational configuration?
- What kind of equipment and resources does the CA planning team need to be fully functional with the supported staff?
- How soon can the CA planning team receive copies of supported command policies, training calendars, or SOPs?

2-7. These questions are addressed for various levels of command and organizational structures later in this chapter. Before discussing options to these questions, a general discussion on integrating with supported staffs and organizations is appropriate.
Figure 2-1. CA Planning Team Support to Commands and Levels of Operation
PLANNING TEAM INTEGRATION WITH A SUPPORTED STAFF

2-8. A staff is a group of individuals organized to assist a commander to make and implement decisions. The staff is usually organized according to a traditional staff structure, but a commander may focus and reorganize the staff to conform to his personal decision-making techniques or to the unique demands of a specific mission. Figures 2-2 through 2-4, pages 2-4 through 2-6, depict the typical staff structures a CA planning team will encounter at various levels of command.

Figure 2-2. Typical Organizational Structure of a Joint Staff
Figure 2-3. Typical Corps or Division Staff Structure
A common requirement for CA planning teams at all levels is to join an existing staff and become an effective staff element as quickly as possible. CA teams are not alone in this requirement, but they often are the teams least understood by the commanders and staffs they support. This misunderstanding, coupled with the idiosyncrasies of group dynamics and group development, often put a CA planning team at a disadvantage when trying to establish itself as a contributing element of a supported staff.

Successful CA planning teams understand group dynamics and the stages of group development. When the team joins an established group, it changes the makeup of the staff and modifies the staff’s method of operations. The following discussion uses Tuckman’s model of group development to illustrate how to meet the challenges of staff integration. This model consists of five stages: forming, storming, norming, performing, and adjourning. The role of the CA planning team is then discussed.

**FORMING**

The forming stage is characterized by awareness. Individuals become acquainted with one another’s unique identities and personal skills. Staff members need to know how each member fits into the organization and how they relate to the organization’s goals. The CA planning team must be able to communicate to the supported commander and staff the team’s purpose,
mission, capabilities, requirements, and the benefits it brings to the organization, as well as other information pertinent to the mission. A team briefing that covers the following topics may be useful:

- **Team organization** (by position, name, and shift).
- **Team purpose** (to analyze and monitor the civil considerations of the commander’s battlespace, focusing on the CASCOPE that may affect or be affected by military operations).
- **Team mission** (for example, CAP3T augments the combatant commander’s J-5 section at combatant command HQ [Forward] not later than [NLT] date-time group [DTG] to plan and coordinate theater-level CMO plans, policies, and programs in support of Operation X).
- **Capabilities** (24-hour operations, writing plans and orders, and conducting briefings).
- **Requirements** (for example, access to secure and nonsecure digital networks, security support when traveling to coordination meetings in-theater, and logistics support).
- **Benefits to the organization** (for example, increased situational awareness and force protection, links to HNS to augment CSS requirements, links to NGOs and third-nation authorities to alleviate stress to rear-area units from the mounting needs of the local populace, and management of interagency operations through the CMOC).
- **Other pertinent information**:
  - Experience level of the team members, to include mission-related military and civilian skills and backgrounds.
  - CA force structure supporting higher and adjacent units.
  - Recommendations for team utilization to support the commander’s current and future missions, if known.

**STORMING**

2-12. The storming stage is characterized by conflict. It involves resistance and feelings of hostility among members of the staff. Hostility may be expressed subtly, such as failing to include CA team members in important discussions, or openly, such as arguing with team members over perceived encroachments in staff territory. Hostility such as this is usually rooted in a misunderstanding of the CA role on the staff. Team members must manage conflict with professionalism, which means being patient, encouraging open discussion of the issues, and continuously educating fellow staff members on how CA activities and CMO relate to their staff functions.

**NORMING**

2-13. The norming stage is characterized by cooperation. This stage capitalizes on the education process started earlier. Effective staff members recognize the synergistic effect of various capabilities among the staff and include others in decision-making processes. Collaboration becomes a staff norm. CA team members should continue to share information and be open to giving and receiving feedback from fellow staff members.
PERFORMING

2-14. The performing stage is characterized by productivity. Staff members value the contributions and ideas of others, promote interdependencies, and solve problems creatively. CA team members contribute to establishing milestones for success and identifying when these points are reached. They keep focused on setting the conditions for transition of military operations to civilian control.

ADJOURNING

2-15. The adjourning stage is characterized by separation and transition. This may occur when the mission is complete and the supported unit redeploys as a whole, or when CA team members are replaced by follow-on CA elements. In the latter case, the supported staff recycles back to stage one with the arrival of the new team. In either case, CA team members execute transition plans, ensure seamless battle handoff and continuity, participate in evaluating staff accomplishments, and provide important feedback regarding staff performance and working relationships. They write an AAR to assist future or follow-on CA teams, and they submit lessons learned to the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), the Marine Corps Lessons Learned System (MCLLS), the Joint Universal Lessons Learned System (JULLS), and the CA database, as appropriate.

ROLE OF CA PLANNING TEAM

2-16. To be effective members of a supported staff at any level of command, the CA planning team must be proficient in standard staff functions and procedures. The following paragraphs discuss the role of the CA planning team as strategic-, operational-, or tactical-level staff members. These roles apply equally in Service, joint, interagency, or multinational environments.

2-17. CA planning team members are, first and foremost, leaders. As with all leaders, CA planning team members must internalize the following direct leadership skills described in FM 22-100, Army Leadership, to achieve excellence:

- Interpersonal skills include communicating, team building, supervising, and counseling.
- Conceptual skills include competence in handling ideas, thoughts, and concepts.
- Technical skill is skill with things (equipment, weapons, and systems)—everything from the tactical radio in the team vehicle to the computer that keeps track of CA and CMO activities to the reachback system that provides timely and accurate information to the planning team. Team members must know their equipment and how to operate it.
- Tactical skills include knowing doctrine and fieldcraft. Fieldcraft consists of the skills soldiers need to sustain themselves in the field.

2-18. Leader skills are reflected in the following characteristics of a staff officer, listed in FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations. CA planning
team members who develop these skills and characteristics will find it easier to integrate with the members of a supported staff:

- Competence.
- Initiative.
- Creativity.
- Flexibility.
- Confidence.
- Loyalty.

In addition, the CA planning team members should be—

- Team players.
- Effective managers.
- Effective communicators.

2-19. CA planning team members must know the extent of their authority to make decisions without the commander’s approval that affect the overall operation. The commander specifies the CA planning team’s authority based on the team leader’s maturity and experience, the commander’s confidence in the team leader’s abilities, and other factors. This authority allows the team to exercise initiative to operate within its area of expertise or responsibility when there is a deviation beyond tolerance from the original plan. Knowledge of the commander’s intent guides specific decisions within the team’s authority.

2-20. CA planning team members must effectively manage time and the timeline for CA/CMO activities. They must synchronize this timeline with the unit’s timelines. Continuous synchronization with the staff is necessary for the four basic timelines used by the staff—troop-leading procedures (TLPs), friendly critical events, logistics, and enemy critical events. The staff can thus identify required actions, decisions, and recommendations. During the planning process, primary staff planners use input from the current CA/CMO timelines to develop the overall timeline for future operations.

2-21. Staff activities focus on assisting the commander in mission accomplishment. FM 101-5 discusses the common staff and staff officer responsibilities and duties that achieve this end. The CA methodology supports these common staff tasks, which include—

- Advising and informing the commander.
- Preparing, updating, and maintaining staff estimates.
- Making recommendations.
- Preparing plans and orders.
- Assessing the execution of operations.
- Managing information within areas of expertise.
- Identifying and analyzing problems.
- Conducting staff coordination.
- Conducting training.
- Performing staff assistance visits.
Performing risk management.
Conducting staff inspections.
Performing staff administrative functions.
Supervising staff section and staff personnel.

2-22. FM 101-5 also discusses specific and unique responsibilities and duties of the coordinating, special, and personal staff groups. CA planning team members must be thoroughly familiar with the unique functions of each staff member and how the various staff sections interact with and relate to CMO.

CA TEAM INTEGRATION WITH A SUPPORTED UNIT OR ORGANIZATION

2-23. The following paragraphs expand on the previous discussion. The focus is on integrating with units or organizations in general.

2-24. Integration is the act or process of bringing separate entities—people, capabilities, and organizations—together to form a unified whole that is greater than the sum of its parts. For CA soldiers, integration may mean participating in the creation of an organization, such as a JTF or a multiagency humanitarian mine action (HMA) team. More often than not, however, it means joining with an existing organization that is already in the process of conducting operations. **This organization may be Army, joint, coalition military, or civilian.** Regardless of the makeup of the unit or organization, successful integration of CA units, teams, and individuals requires planning, coordination, understanding, and patience. Table 2-1, page 2-11, depicts the command and support relationships and their inherent responsibilities (per FM 3-0).

2-25. Integration starts during the mission planning and preparation phases. CA/CMO planners must consider and resolve, as early as possible, several issues pertaining to the employment of CA assets. These issues include the following, as well as any other administrative, operational, or logistical issues that could affect smooth operations upon arrival at the supported organization:

- Operational purpose (mission).
- Operational requirements (specified and implied tasks).
- Command relationships (attached, operational control [OPCON], or tactical control [TACON]).
- Logistical support requirements (classes of supply I, III, V, VII, IX, X).
- Role of team or unit members in the security plan of the supported unit or organization.

2-26. Once notified of a mission tasking, CA/CMO planners should make contact with the supported organization as early as possible. Planners should seek direct liaison authorized (DIRLAUTH) with the supported organization if authorization was not granted in the warning order, tasking order (TASKORD), or FRAG order. Frequent contact with the supported organization during planning and preparation facilitates successful integration later.
Table 2-1. Army Command and Support Relationships and Inherent Responsibilities Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IF RELATIONSHIP IS:</th>
<th>INHERENT RESPONSIBILITIES ARE:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attached</td>
<td>Gaining unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPCON</td>
<td>Gaining unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACON</td>
<td>Gaining unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned</td>
<td>Parent unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct Support (DS)</td>
<td>Parent unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reinforcing (R)</td>
<td>Parent unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Support Reinforcing (GSR)</td>
<td>Parent unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Support (GS)</td>
<td>Parent unit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE 1.** In North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the gaining unit may not task-organize a multinational unit (see TACON).

**NOTE 2.** Commanders of units in DS may further assign support relationships between their subordinate units and elements of the supported unit after coordination with the supported commander.
2-27. Upon arrival at the supported unit location, the senior CA soldier must accomplish several responsibilities as soon as possible. These include—

- Reporting to commander, sponsor, or designated point of contact (POC). This action should be taken as soon as possible after linking up with the supported unit or agency. The purpose of this action is to inform the commander or sponsor that the CA asset has arrived. This action affords the opportunity for initial introductions, receipt of initial commander’s guidance, and coordination of a time to brief pertinent CA information to the commander, sponsor, and supported staff.

- Briefing the commander, sponsor, and supported staff. This briefing may be formal or informal, but it must be tailored to the mission. It should contain an overview of the CA mission, organization, equipment, strength, and status. It should also address any unresolved issues of which the commander or sponsor ought to be aware and which possibly could be resolved with their assistance.

- Conducting a leader’s reconnaissance. The CA unit commander or team leader gets oriented to the environment in which he will be operating. This orientation includes determining or obtaining—
  - Assigned billeting and workspace areas.
  - Location of CMOC and other high-visibility areas and conference rooms.
  - Copies of policies and SOPs not received during predeployment preparation.
  - Key POCs among the supported staff and the staffs of higher and lower organizational levels, as well as lateral and local civil agencies and NGOs.
  - Locations of higher and lower organizational levels, as well as lateral and local civil agencies and NGOs via map reconnaissance and physical reconnaissance.
  - Threat levels, off-limits areas, ROE, uniform and security requirements within the security perimeter, as well as movement of soldiers outside the security perimeter.
  - Locations of logistics and administrative support activities; for example, fuel point, postal distribution center, sundry items purchase, laundry and bath facilities, and gymnasium.

- Establishing operations. Designated CA unit or team members set up and establish operations with the supported unit or organization according to the priorities of work established by unit or team SOP. Generally, priority actions include the following:
  - Integrate into the security plan of the supported unit according to the supported unit's SOP. Integration includes assignment and preparation of fighting positions and briefing on contingency plans in effect.
  - Introduce team members to all supported staff.
  - Become a part of the staff information loop, head count, and unit order of movement.
- Set up tent for CMOC if hard site is unavailable or inappropriate.
- Establish communications and digital connections with supported unit, as applicable.
- Establish communications and digital connections with lower, adjacent, and higher-level CA elements, as applicable, including the establishment of contingency communications plans during periods of disrupted operations.
- Establish communications and digital connections with key civilian agencies in the AO, as applicable, including the establishment of contingency communications plans during periods of disrupted operations.
- Set up work area with all additional equipment needed to operate effectively, such as facsimiles (FAXs), computers, and furniture. Coordinate with supported unit to fill shortfalls, as required.
- Set up map board with overlays showing the tactical situation (location of all units and maneuver graphics) and the civil situation (CMO graphics showing locations of CASCOPE in the AO that affect military operations). If the map is in an open area, it should be covered when not in use and should contain no classified information.
- Set up shifts if the supported unit requires 24-hour operations.
- Determine the team leader's place in the briefing sequence of the daily briefing to the supported commander.
- Conduct an initial area assessment of the AO, taking notes and creating sector sketches.
- Establish initial personal contact with the indigenous population and institutions, NGOs, international organizations, and FNS personnel.

2-28. Once the CA unit or team is operational, its focus turns to maintaining operations with the supported unit. Doing so involves keeping abreast of current and future operations by participating in routine meetings and briefings, as well as any restricted meetings and briefings in which CA or CMO-related issues may come up. The senior CA leader determines when the meetings or briefings are pertinent. Also, a CA representative should be on all briefing agendas to keep the supported unit informed of current CA/CMO issues, even if it means reporting no change in status.

2-29. CA operations do not occur autonomously. Whether performed during war or MOOTW, CA operations occur within the operational boundaries of a commander or civilian representative (for example, a U.S. Ambassador) who is responsible for all operations within those boundaries. The responsible commander or civilian representative must be kept informed of all that goes on in his AO, no matter how insignificant an event may seem. This is especially critical with CA operations because of the far-reaching implications of some CA activities.

2-30. Depending on the tactical or security situation, freedom of movement for CA teams or individuals may be restricted. Entry into the AO by another unit or organization must be coordinated in advance. During military
operations, failure to coordinate or follow procedures established by the commander will often impede the ability of CA soldiers to perform their mission. On the other hand, failure to educate commanders on the operational requirements of CA missions leads to misunderstanding and imposition of undue restrictions on CA teams. These restrictions sometimes influence CA soldiers to take irregular measures to circumvent commanders’ authority.

In Bosnia, we had three “mobile teams”: the Project Action Group (PAG); the Displaced Persons, Refugees, and Evacuees (DPRE) Action Group (DAG); and the Economic Action Group (EAG). All three teams had freedom of movement in the three allied brigade areas, but had trouble operating in the American brigade sector. Each team addressed the problem differently. The DAG and PAG relied heavily on our allied officers, who were exempt from American force protection measures and other restrictions, to get them into and out of the American brigade sector. The EAG took the Civilian Ph.D. political advisor with them, using his General Officer-equivalent status to bypass the bureaucracy.

Notes of a U.S. CA Officer on Operations During Operation JOINT GUARD.
29 November 2000

CA/CMO INTEGRATION AT THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

2-31. The authority for CA activities and CMO originates at the national level. The President of the United States and the National Security Council (NSC) develop the national security strategy (NSS). The NSS establishes how the United States will use its diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power to protect or promote the worldwide interests, goals, and objectives that are vital to its national security.

2-32. Government agencies representing each of the elements of national power, in turn, develop supporting strategies to the NSS. For example, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), the JCS, and geographic combatant commanders, in turn, develop the national military strategy (NMS). The NMS defines the military’s role in executing the NSS during war and MOOTW.

2-33. Congress has long recognized that successful implementation of security policy at the national level relies on the ability of agencies representing the instruments of national power to work together. The National Security Act of 1947, as amended, established the NSC to advise the President on the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security. The National Security Council System (NSCS) is a process to coordinate executive departments and agencies in the effective development and implementation of national security policies. The current NSCS organization is shown in Figure 2-5, page 2-15.
Figure 2-5. Current National Security Council System Organization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NSC</th>
<th>Regular Attendees</th>
<th>Statutory Advisors</th>
<th>Required as Needed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>President</td>
<td>Vice President</td>
<td>Secretary of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Required as Needed</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>NSC/PC</th>
<th>Regular Attendees</th>
<th>Statutory Advisors</th>
<th>Required as Needed</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secretary of State</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
<td>Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deputy Secretary of the Treasury or Undersecretary of the Treasury for International Affairs</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary of Commerce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deputy Secretary of Defense or Undersecretary of Defense for Policy</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deputy Attorney General</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deputy Director of CIA</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vice Chairman of JCS</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deputy CoS to the President for Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CoS to the Vice President</td>
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<td></td>
<td>National Security Advisor to the Vice President</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Deputy Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs</td>
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<td>Deputy National Security Advisor</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>NSC/PCC Regional</th>
<th>NSC/PCC Functional</th>
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<tr>
<td>Europe and Eurasia</td>
<td>Democracy, Human Rights, and International Operations (Chaired by Asst. to the President for Natl. Security Affairs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Hemisphere</td>
<td>International Development and Humanitarian Assistance (Chaired by the Secretary of State)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia</td>
<td>Global Environment (Chaired by Asst. to the President for Natl. Security Affairs and Asst. to the President for Economic Policy in concert)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>International Finance (Chaired by Secretary of the Treasury)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Near East and North Africa</td>
<td>Transnational Economic Issues (Chaired by Asst. to the President for Economic Issues)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>Defense Strategy, Force Structure, and Planning (Chaired by Secretary of Defense)</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Arms Control (Chaired by Asst. to the President for Natl. Security Affairs)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Proliferation, Counterproliferation, and Homeland Defense (Chaired by Asst. to the President for Natl. Security Affairs)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Intelligence and Counterintelligence (Chaired by Asst. to the President for Natl. Security Affairs)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Records Access and Information Security (Chaired by Asst. to the President for Natl. Security Affairs)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Legend:
Asst. – Assistant
CIA – Central Intelligence Agency
Natl. – National
2-34. Although the organization of the NSCS and the basic interagency process changes with each administration, the purpose of the NSC remains the same. For example, note the following excerpts of National Security Presidential Directive 1 (NSPD-1):

This document is the first in a series of National Security Presidential Directives. National Security Presidential Directives shall replace both Presidential decision directives and Presidential review directives as an instrument for communicating presidential decisions about the national security policies of the United States...

The NSC Principals Committee (NSC/PC) will continue to be the senior interagency forum for consideration of policy issues affecting national security, as it has since 1989...

The NSC Deputies Committee (NSC/DC) will also continue to serve as the senior sub-Cabinet interagency forum for consideration of policy issues affecting national security...

Management of the development and implementation of national security policies by multiple agencies of the United States Government shall usually be accomplished by the NSC Policy Coordination Committees (NSC/PCCs). The NSC/PCCs shall be the main day-to-day fora for interagency coordination of national security policy. They shall provide policy analysis for consideration by the more senior committees of the NSC system and ensure timely responses to decisions made by the President...

The existing system of Interagency Working Groups is abolished.

* The oversight of ongoing operations assigned in PDD/NSC-56 to Executive Committees of the Deputies Committee will be performed by the appropriate regional NSC/PCCs, which may create subordinate working groups to provide coordination for ongoing operations...

Except for those established by statute, other existing NSC interagency groups, ad hoc bodies, and executive committees are also abolished as of March 1, 2001, unless they are specifically reestablished as subordinate working groups within the new NSC system as of that date.

NSPD-1, Organization of the National Security Council System, 13 February 2001

2-35. Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 2000.13, Civil Affairs, states the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict) (ASD(SO/LIC)) shall work “within the interagency process as appropriate, translate national security policy objectives into specific defense policy objectives achievable through civil affairs activities [and] supervise the formulation of DOD civil affairs activities in plans and policies.” Additionally, the ASD(SO/LIC) shall act as the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) POC for DOD to “coordinate civil affairs activities as they relate to the activities of other U.S. Government Agencies, international, nongovernmental and nonprofit organizations and the private sector, in accordance with applicable laws and regulations.”
2-36. The joint staff provides operational input and staff support through the CJCS for policy decisions made by the OSD. U.S. Army CA/CMO planners at the joint staff provide premission input for CMO issues. In some instances, they may participate as members of assessment teams dispatched to evaluate situations for NSC/PCCs. Most of the time, however, they perform critical liaison duties between the CA/CMO planners of the geographic combatant commands and the joint staff representatives of NSC/PCCs.

2-37. As campaigns and major operations develop, tasks and objectives that directly support military operations but are the responsibility of other agencies are identified. When commanders and planners identify these objectives, they submit them through the joint force commander (JFC) to the joint staff for consideration and nomination to interagency working groups. Formal and task-specific interagency working groups coordinate policy and assign tasks among the various departments and agencies. (Policy, objectives, and task assignments are outlined in a political-military (pol-mil) plan for specific campaigns and operations.) Once a department or agency accepts a task, it reports through the interagency working group to the joint staff. The joint staff links the JFC to this process.

2-38. JP 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, discusses the interagency environment. It describes joint doctrine designed to achieve coordination between the combatant commands of the DOD and USG agencies, NGOs, and regional and international organizations during unified actions and joint operations. Many military activities require interagency coordination, which the joint staff routinely accomplishes with the OSD, DOS (with many involved offices and bureaus), CIA, NSC staff, Department of Justice (DOJ), USAID, and others, depending on the circumstances. There are times when the combatant commander may also directly participate IAW the Unified Command Plan (UCP).

2-39. CA/CMO planners at the DOD ensure that CA/CMO-related decisions, guidance, and directives, resulting from NSC/PCC meetings and validated by the appropriate agency HQ, are passed to the appropriate geographic combatant command HQ for validation and execution.

CA/CMO INTEGRATION AT THE GEOGRAPHIC COMBATANT COMMAND HEADQUARTERS

2-40. As stated previously, the CJCS, the JCS, and geographic combatant commanders are responsible for translating the NSS into an NMS. The SECDEF uses the NMS to prepare the Defense Planning Guidance and the JSCP. From the JSCP, the combatant commander develops specific strategic objectives and programs in his theater of operations. From these goals and objectives, the combatant commander can develop campaign plans, theater engagement plans (TEPs), and OPLANs. The combatant commander's plans and programs must have a defined end state. To approach this end state, the combatant commander conducts continuous engagement throughout the geographic region, sometimes overseeing multiple operations across the range of military operations simultaneously.

2-41. Within a theater, the geographic combatant commander is the focal point for collaborative planning and implementation of regional military
strategies that require interagency coordination. Coordination between the combatant commander’s staff and other USG agencies may occur through a country team or within the combatant command at a CMOC or CMOC variant, such as an interagency planning cell or HA coordination center. For most operations, the CMOC must also be accessible to non-USG agencies (special representatives of the UN Secretary-General, NGOs, HN agencies, and businesses) for collaborative planning and coordination. If the geographic combatant commander does not have a standing CMOC, he establishes the CMOC as soon as possible to maximize the benefits of cooperation and coordination among the various interagency players.

2-42. Figures 2-6 and 2-7, pages 2-19 and 2-20, demonstrate models for coordination between military and nonmilitary organizations in both domestic and foreign operations. CA/CMO planners should note the locations for coordination with nonmilitary organizations in each model. CA/CMO planners must be intimately involved at each of those locations. Chapters 4 and 5 discuss the CMOC in more detail.

CA/CMO FULL-TIME POSITIONS OR FUNCTIONS ON THE COMBATANT COMMAND STAFF

2-43. Figure 2-8, page 2-21, shows the geographic regions of responsibility of each of the combatant commanders. Since each theater of operations has unique concerns and considerations, each geographic combatant commander views the conduct of CMO and the employment of CA assets in his theater from a different perspective. One may look at CMO primarily as a logistics function and assign planning responsibility to the Logistics Directorate (J-4). Another may see CMO as purely a special operations function and assign planning responsibility to the SOC (SO J-7). Yet another may see CMO as integral to peacetime engagement operations and assign planning responsibility to the staff of a standing JTF. The key challenge for the CA/CMO planner is to keep abreast of the issues the combatant commander is facing and be able to influence his thought processes in the strategic and operational application of CA forces and activities and CMO. Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC) Pub 1, The Joint Staff Officer’s Guide, and the combatant command staff SOP provide more information on how the combatant command staff operates.

STAFF PLANNING AND PLAN REVIEW PROCESSES

2-44. Whatever the concerns of the combatant commander, each combatant command staff follows the joint operation planning process as outlined in JP 5-0, Plans. Joint operation planning encompasses planning for the full range of activities required for conducting joint operations. These activities include the mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment of forces. The JOPES provides single process, interoperable planning and execution for both war and MOOTW. Joint operations planning is categorized as campaign, deliberate, or crisis-action planning.

2-45. JOPES and the participation of CA/CMO planners in joint operations planning are discussed throughout this manual. Appendix C provides examples of various products that result from CA/CMO planning processes and operations.
Figure 2-6. Model for Coordination Between Military and Nonmilitary Organizations (Domestic Operations)
Figure 2-7. Model for Coordination Between Military and Nonmilitary Organizations (Foreign Operations)
Figure 2-8. Geographic Regions of Responsibility by Combatant Command and the Supporting CACOM
ROLE OF THE CA PLANNING TEAM IN THE CAMPAIGN OR OPERATION PLAN REVIEW CYCLE AND CONTINGENCY PLANNING CYCLE

2-46. The CA planning team participates in joint operation planning according to the JSCP. Depending on the factors of METT-TC, the CA planning team may be a CAP3T from a CACOM (Figure 2-9) or a CAPT-B from a CA battalion (Active Army) (Figure 2-10). Due to the time-sensitive nature of crisis-action planning and the inherent challenges of activating RC soldiers on short notice, the CAP3T will most often participate in deliberate planning. Crisis-action planning will most often involve full-time CA/CMO planners on the combatant command staff with augmentation by the CAPT-B.

| Assignment: | Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC), CACOM |
| Personnel: | Team Chief |
| | Plans Officer |
| | Policy Officer |
| | Assistant Plans Officer |
| | Assistant Policy Officer |
| | Team Sergeant |
| | Assistant Team Sergeant |
| | CA Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) (2) |
| | Administration Specialist (2) |

Figure 2-9. Composition of CAP3T (USAR)

| Assignment: | CA Battalion (Active Army) |
| Personnel: | Team Leader |
| | Operations Officer |
| | Plans Officer |
| | Public Health Advisor |
| | Operational Law Officer |
| | Logistics Advisor |
| | Operations NCO |
| | CAT-A Augmentation (2) |
| | Intelligence Analyst |

Figure 2-10. Composition of CAPT-B, CA Battalion (Active Army)

2-47. Joint operation planning for CMO requires comprehensive study and analysis of many interrelated factors. Good deliberate planning facilitates crisis-action planning. Coordination with nonmilitary organizations during both deliberation planning and crisis-action planning is essential to successful plans and operations.

2-48. To effectively participate in the planning process, the CA planning team—whether a CAP3T or a CAPT-B (Active Army)—must perform the following tasks (which are not all-inclusive or necessarily in sequential order):

- Review the NSS and NMS.
- Review UN, unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral treaties and agreements to which the United States is signatory.
• Review the pol-mil plan.
• Review any additional guidance from the JCS.
• Review alliance and coalition plans.
• Understand the combatant commander’s strategic intent and his operational focus.
• Read the primary planning document (campaign plan, OPLAN, CONPLAN, functional plan, or supporting plan).
• Read all supporting annexes and appendixes to the primary planning document for CA/CMO-related assumptions and activities; validate the accuracy of these assumptions and activities.
• Establish and maintain a CMOC for coordination with nonmilitary organizations.
• Analyze the geographic AO defined in the primary planning document according to METT-TC, focusing on the strategic-level civil considerations (Chapter 3).
• Obtain the combatant commander’s intent for CMO. It should include orientation on the civil strategic and operational centers of gravity, protection of friendly strategic and operational centers of gravity, phases of operations (such as prehostilities, lodgment, decisive combat and stabilization, follow-through, and posthostilities), and end state. Be prepared to offer specific recommendations to assist the commander in defining his intent for CMO.
• Identify specified, implied, and essential CMO tasks for military forces.
• Identify specified, implied, and essential CA tasks for CA forces.
• Apportion CA forces against CA task requirements and ensure the forces are included in the time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD).
• Write the CMO annex to the campaign plan, OPLAN, CONPLAN, functional plan, or supporting plan.
• Incorporate CMO considerations into the primary planning document and supporting annexes and appendixes, as appropriate (for example, ROE, indirect fires, IO, logistics, interagency operations, and civil engineering support).
• Analyze and archive reports from the field.
• Catalog resources and POCs that will be useful in updating future plans and conducting future operations.
• Monitor and participate in CMO-related boards, such as the joint targeting coordination board (JTCB), Joint Facilities Utilization Board (JFUB), joint civil-military engineering board (JCMEB), and joint environmental management board (JEMB).

JP 3-57 contains additional guidance for planning CMO at the joint level.
CA PLANNING TEAM LOCATION WITHIN THE SUPPORTED STAFF'S OPERATIONAL CONFIGURATION

2-49. CA/CMO planners must be integrated into the highest levels of the combatant command staff. The most logical location for the CA planning team is in the J-5, Plans and Policy Division. This division does long-range planning and prepares campaign, concept, and operation plans. Members of the team may also augment the J-3, Operations Division, to monitor current CMO, or the J-4, Logistics Division, to integrate FNS into logistics plans.

2-50. The planning team must consider where to establish and maintain the CMOC for coordination with nonmilitary organizations. Techniques for establishing and maintaining a CMOC are found in Chapters 4 and 5.

CA PLANNING TEAM EQUIPMENT AND RESOURCES

2-51. The CA planning team must arrive well prepared to perform its CA/CMO staff planning function. This means the team must be self-sufficient to a certain degree, so it can immediately go to work with minimal disruption to the supported staff. At a minimum, the team should have the materials to maintain—

- Daily staff journals.
- CA workbooks.
- Situation maps and overlays.
- Resource card files.
- Records of specific CA/CMO incidents.

Appendix D provides examples of these CA/CMO products.

2-52. All team members must have current, verifiable security clearances at the appropriate security level for the plans on which they will be working. The team must bring adequate and compatible automated data processing (ADP) equipment and supporting software to allow the team to access classified military networks, as well as unclassified international organization/NGO systems. Finally, the team must be thoroughly familiar with all policies and SOPs of the supported element.

2-53. The team must also come equipped with vehicles, individual uniforms, and other team and individual equipment appropriate to climate, supported unit SOP, and other mission requirements.

CA/CMO INTEGRATION AT THE SUBUNIFIED COMMAND AND SERVICE COMPONENT HEADQUARTERS

2-54. A subordinate unified (subunified) command is a command established by commanders of unified commands to conduct operations on a continuing basis according to criteria set forth for unified commands. A subunified command may be established on an area basis (for example, JTF 6) or a functional basis (for example, a theater SOC). Commanders of subordinate unified commands have functions and responsibilities similar to those of unified commands and exercise OPCON of assigned commands and forces within the assigned joint operations area.
2-55. A Service component HQ is the HQ of one of the subordinate organizations that constitute a joint force, such as the Army Service Component, the Air Force Service Component, the Navy Service Component, and the Marine Corps Service Component. In the context of this section of this manual, the Service component HQ is a numbered organization, such as the 3d U.S. Army, the 9th U.S. Air Force, or the 6th Fleet. The Service component HQ may function as a joint force component command (for example, joint force land component command, joint force air component command, or joint force maritime component command), or a combined joint task force (CJ TF) when designated by the geographic combatant commander.

2-56. Within the subunified command AO or the Service component HQ, the commander is the focal point for collaborative planning and implementation of military operations that require interagency coordination. As with planning at the geographic combatant command HQ, coordination between the commander’s staff and other USG agencies may occur through a country team or within the subunified or Service component command HQ at a CMOC. For most operations, the CMOC must also be accessible to non-USG agencies (special representatives of the UN Secretary-General, NGOs, HN agencies, and businesses) for collaborative planning and coordination. If the subunified command or Service component commander does not have standing CMOCs, they establish the CMOC as soon as possible to maximize the benefits of cooperation and coordination among the various interagency players.

CA/CMO FULL-TIME POSITIONS OR FUNCTIONS ON THE SUPPORTED OR SUBUNIFIED STAFF

2-57. Subunified commands that engage in CA/CMO planning are often joint organizations. As such, their HQ are normally organized similarly to a geographic combatant command HQ. As is the case with the geographic combatant commands, the subunified commander views the conduct of CMO and the employment of CA assets in his AO from a unique perspective and may place the full-time CA/CMO planning function in a number of possible staff positions. The key challenge for the CA/CMO planner is to keep abreast of the issues the commander is facing and be able to influence his thought processes in the strategic and operational application of CA forces, activities, and CMO.

2-58. Service component command HQ are organized according to Service doctrine. An organization may or may not have a designated full-time CMO position. Responsibility for routine CA/CMO planning most likely will fall to the operations or planning directorate of the Service component command staff.

STAFF PLANNING AND PLAN REVIEW PROCESSES

2-59. The subunified command and Service component HQ staffs work closely with the geographic combatant command staffs to produce and review plans. They follow the joint operation planning process as outlined in JP 5-0. The commander and his staff develop a detailed OPLAN or OPORD, along with supporting TPFDD, within the JOPES crisis-action planning guidelines as directed by the combatant commander. They determine applicability of existing OPLANS, CONPLANS, functional plans, and campaign plans, if any,
to maximize the benefits of prior deliberate planning. Appendix C discusses JOPES and CA/CMO planner participation in joint operations planning.

ROLE OF THE CA PLANNING TEAM IN THE CAMPAIGN OR OPERATION PLAN REVIEW CYCLE AND CONTINGENCY PLANNING CYCLE

2-60. The CA planning team is normally a CAPT-B from a CACOM or a CA brigade (Figure 2-11). The CA planning team must be familiar with the joint and Service-specific operational procedures employed by the subunified command or Service component HQ. The CA planning team participates in operational planning when activated for short-term contingencies or long-term operations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assignment:</th>
<th>HHC, CACOM or HHC, CA Brigade</th>
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<tr>
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<td>CA Specialist</td>
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Figure 2-11. Composition of CAPT-B (USAR)

2-61. To effectively participate in the planning process, the CA planning team must perform the following tasks (which are not all-inclusive or necessarily in sequential order):

- Review combatant command campaign plans, OPLANs, and CONPLANS, as appropriate.
- Review UN, unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral treaties and agreements pertaining to the JTF’s specified AO to which the United States is signatory.
- Review the NSS and NMS.
- Review the pol-mil plan.
- Review any additional combatant command guidance.
- Understand the subunified or Service component commander’s intent and his operational and tactical focus.
- Obtain the subunified or Service component CCIR.
- Read the primary planning document (OPLAN, OPORD, or supporting plan).
- Read all supporting annexes and appendixes to the primary planning document for CA/CMO-related assumptions and activities; validate the accuracy of these assumptions and activities.
- Establish and maintain a CMOC for coordination with nonmilitary organizations.
- Analyze the subunified command or Service component AO defined in the primary planning document according to METT-TC, focusing on the operational-level civil considerations (Chapter 3). This analysis includes, but is not limited to, knowing and understanding past and
ongoing local and international activities; international organization and NGO personnel, resources, and capacities already in place in the region; and the condition of existing infrastructure.

- Obtain the subunified or Service component commander’s intent for CMO. It should include orientation on the civil operational centers of gravity, protection of friendly operational centers of gravity, phases of operations (such as prehostilities, lodgment, decisive combat and stabilization, follow-through, and posthostilities), and end state. Be prepared to offer specific recommendations to assist the commander in defining his intent for CMO.

- Identify specified, implied, and essential CMO tasks for military forces.

- Identify specified, implied, and essential CA tasks for CA forces.

- Apportion CA forces against CA task requirements and ensure the forces are included in the TPFDD. Ensure commanders at all subordinate levels have a CA representative on their staff.

- Determine the operational mission, configuration, and location of the CMOC.

- Write the CMO annex to the OPLAN, OPORD, or supporting plan.

- Incorporate CMO considerations into the primary planning document and supporting annexes and appendixes, as appropriate (for example, ROE, indirect fires, IO, logistics, interagency operations, and civil engineering support).

- Analyze and archive reports from the field.

- Catalog resources and POCs that will be useful in updating future plans and conducting future operations.

- Monitor and participate in CMO-related boards, such as the J TCB, J FUB, J CMEB, and J EMB.

JP 3-57 contains additional guidance for planning CMO at the joint level.

CA PLANNING TEAM LOCATION WITHIN THE SUPPORTED STAFF'S OPERATIONAL CONFIGURATION

2-62. The CA/CMO planning function on the subunified command or Service component HQ staff should reside in the staff element that does long-range planning and prepares OPLANs and OPORDs. The CA/CMO planners' role includes overseeing, advising, and coordinating CMO activities; recommending command policy for CMO; ensuring compliance with the policy; analyzing civilian impact on military operations and the impact of military operations on civilians; and supporting other USG agencies in-country.

2-63. The planning team must consider where to establish and maintain the CMOC for coordination with nonmilitary organizations. Techniques for establishing and maintaining a CMOC are in Chapters 4 and 5.
CA PLANNING TEAM EQUIPMENT AND RESOURCES

2-64. CA team members should refer to paragraphs 2-51 through 2-53, page 2-24. The team also must have transportation and tactical communications capabilities commensurate with that of the supported unit and nonmilitary agencies in the AO.

CA/CMO INTEGRATION AT THE JOINT TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS

2-65. A JTF is a military force, under a single commander, composed of elements of two or more U.S. military Services. It can be formed by the SECDEF, a unified command commander, or another JTF commander to conduct a single mission and be dissolved at the completion of that mission at the direction of the establishing authority. Two examples are JTF Somalia, which conducted Operation RESTORE HOPE from December 1992 to May 1993, and JTF Bravo, which, at the time of this publication, continues operations that began in 1983 to promote multinational cooperation in Central America.

2-66. The JTF commander is responsible for accomplishing specific operational missions as assigned by the establishing commander. The organizational structure of a JTF will depend on the missions to be fulfilled, the capabilities and strengths of the component elements of the forces assigned and attached, and the phasing of the contemplated operations. The JTF HQ may be formed around a standing JTF HQ, such as JFC’s JTF for Civil Support; augment a core Service component HQ, such as the commander of the 1st Marine Division did for JTF Somalia; or form an ad hoc HQ from various contributors, such as JTF Eagle, formed by JTF Bravo in response to Hurricane Mitch in 1999.

2-67. During operations, the JTF HQ must provide the basis for a unified effort, centralized direction, and decentralized execution. Doing so includes tying interagency efforts with the military effort in the JTF AO. As the operational focal point for interagency coordination, the JTF commander must accommodate additional staff members to meet the requirements of interagency operations.

2-68. At both the operational and tactical levels, the JTF conducts interagency collaborative planning and coordination through the CMOC. The CMOC must be accessible to both USG and non-USG agencies (USAID representatives, special representatives of the UN Secretary-General, NGOs, HN agencies, and businesses). The JTF commander establishes the CMOC as soon as possible to maximize the benefits of cooperation and coordination among the various interagency players. For most JTF operations, this means establishing the CMOC as early as the initial planning stages of the operation.

CA/CMO FULL-TIME POSITIONS OR FUNCTIONS ON THE JTF STAFF

2-69. The JTF commander may come from any of the Service components. Although he organizes his staff as necessary to carry out all duties and responsibilities, he will normally defer to an organization with which he is comfortable. That organization may or may not have a designated full-time
CMO position. Active Army CA/CMO planners may find themselves called upon to assist in the formation of a JTF. These individuals must ensure the commander includes dedicated CA/CMO planners on his primary staff and on the primary staffs of all subordinate commanders. The essential challenge for a CA/CMO planner on the primary staff is to keep abreast of the issues the JTF commander is facing. He must be in a position to influence the commander’s thought processes in the operational and tactical application of CA forces and activities, as well as the CMO of his subordinate unit commands. The following example illustrates the challenge faced by CA/CMO planners.

Planning CA/CMO Support for JTF Somalia

On 29 November 1992, the commander of C Company, 96th CA Bn (A) deployed to USCENTCOM to assist in the final planning of Operation RESTORE HOPE. Upon analyzing the mission, the U.S. Army major recommended that CA forces supporting the operation include one CA brigade at the JTF level and one CA battalion to each of the JTF’s divisions (the 1st Marine Division and the 10th Mountain Division). When he was informed that USAR CA assets would not be activated for this mission, he revised his recommendation. Support at the JTF level would come from his CATHST of five CA soldiers while each of the JTF’s divisions would get three CA CADSTs of four soldiers each.

On 5 December 1992, the commander deployed to Camp Pendleton, California, to be the CA advisor to J-3, JTF Somalia. On 11 December 1992, he deployed with the JTF J-3 main body to Mogadishu, Somalia. The CATHST arrived 2 days later.

At the direction of the J-3, the CA company commander and his team established a CMOC at the United Nations Operation Somalia Humanitarian Operations Center (UNOSOM-HOC), located approximately one mile from the J-3 at the JTF HQ. In this role, the CATHST coordinated and facilitated all humanitarian relief organization requests for security and other assistance required to support the relief operations. A United States Marine Corps (USMC) officer performed liaison duties between the CMOC and the JTF staff.

The physical separation of the CMOC from the JTF HQ and the practice of using a non-CA-trained officer to conduct liaison with the JTF J-3 precluded the CATHST from participating in daily staff operations. Consequently, the JTF commander did not benefit from professional advice, and CA/CMO planning at the JTF level was limited for the duration of the operation.

STAFF PLANNING AND PLAN REVIEW PROCESSES

2-70. The JTF staff follows the joint operation planning process as outlined in J P 5-0 and J P 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures. The commander and his staff develop a detailed campaign plan, OPLAN, or OPORD, along with supporting TPFDD, within the JOPES crisis-action planning guidelines as directed by the establishing authority. They determine applicability of existing OPLANS, CONPLANS, functional plans, and campaign plans, if any, to maximize the benefits of prior deliberate planning.
CA PLANNING TEAM PARTICIPATION IN THE PLANNING PROCESS

2-71. Depending on the factors of METT-TC, the CA planning team may be a CAPT-A from a CA brigade (Figure 2-12), a CAPT-B from a CA battalion (Active Army) (Figure 2-10, page 2-22), or a CAT-B from a CA battalion (Active Army) (Figure 2-13). The CA planning team must be familiar with joint operational procedures as outlined in various JPs. The CA planning team participates in joint operation planning for a JTF when activated for short-term contingencies or long-term operations.

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<td>Team Sergeant</td>
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<td>CA Specialist</td>
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Figure 2-12. Composition of CAPT-A (USAR)

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<tr>
<th>Assignment:</th>
<th>HQ, CA Company (Active Army)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Personnel:</td>
<td>Company Commander</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Theater Plans Officer</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Theater Liaison Officer</td>
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<td>Operations Officer</td>
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<td>1st Sergeant</td>
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<td>Supply NCO</td>
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<td>Administration Specialist</td>
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Figure 2-13. Composition of CAT-B (Active Army)

2-72. To effectively participate in the planning process, the CA planning team must perform the following tasks (which are not all-inclusive or necessarily in sequential order):

- Review combatant command campaign plans, OPLANs, and CONPLANs, as appropriate.
- Review UN, unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral treaties and agreements pertaining to the JTF’s specified AO to which the United States is signatory.
- Review the NSS and NMS.
- Review the pol-mil plan.
- Review any additional combatant command guidance.
- Understand the JTF commander’s intent and his operational and tactical focus.
- Obtain the JTF CCIR.
- Read the primary planning document (OPLAN, OPORD, or supporting plan).
• Read all supporting annexes and appendixes to the primary planning document for CA/CMO-related assumptions and activities; validate the accuracy of these assumptions and activities.

• Establish and maintain a CMOC for coordination with nonmilitary organizations.

• Analyze the JTF’s AO defined in the primary planning document according to METT-TC, focusing on the operational-level civil considerations (Chapter 3). This analysis includes, but is not limited to, knowing and understanding past and ongoing local and international activities; international organization and NGO personnel, resources, and capacities already in place in the region; and the condition of existing infrastructure.

• Obtain the JTF commander’s intent for CMO. It should include orientation on the civil operational centers of gravity, protection of friendly operational centers of gravity, phases of operations (such as prehostilities, lodgment, decisive combat and stabilization, follow-through, and posthostilities), and end state. Be prepared to offer specific recommendations to assist the commander in defining his intent for CMO.

Although an endstate may be difficult to define in peace operations, strive to refine the mission to ensure one exists. Being prepared early to develop the [CMO] mission statement and coordinate it with higher authority may allow a commander the opportunity to clearly identify an endstate(s).

*Joint Task Force Commander’s Handbook*,
February 1995

• Identify specified, implied, and essential CMO tasks for military forces.

• Identify specified, implied, and essential CA tasks for CA forces.

• Apportion CA forces against CA task requirements and ensure the forces are included in the TPFDD. Ensure commanders at all subordinate levels have a CA representative on their staff.

• Determine the operational mission, configuration, and location of the CMOC.

• Write the CA annex to the OPLAN, OPORD, or supporting plan.

• Incorporate CMO considerations into the primary planning document and supporting annexes and appendixes, as appropriate (for example, ROE, indirect fires, IO, logistics, interagency operations, and civil engineering support).

• Analyze and archive reports from the field.

• Catalog resources and POCs that will be useful in updating future plans and conducting future operations.

• Monitor and participate in CMO-related boards, such as the J TCB, J FUB, J CMEB, and J EMB.

*JP 3-57* contains additional guidance for planning CMO at the joint level.
CA PLANNING TEAM LOCATION WITHIN THE SUPPORTED STAFF’S OPERATIONAL CONFIGURATION

2-73. The CA/CMO planning function on the JTF staff should reside in the J-5, Plans and Policy Division. This division does long-range planning and prepares OPLANs and OPORDs. It provides politico-military oversight for all aspects of the JTF’s operations, to include FNS, noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs), HA, and ROE. The CA/CMO planners’ role includes overseeing, advising, and coordinating CMO activities; recommending command policy for CMO; ensuring compliance with the policy; analyzing civilian impact on military operations and the impact of military operations on civilians; and supporting other USG agencies in-country. (JP 5-00.2 includes information on JTF J-5 organization and responsibilities.)

2-74. The planning team must consider where to establish and maintain the CMOC for coordination with nonmilitary organizations. Techniques for establishing and maintaining a CMOC are in Chapters 4 and 5.

CA PLANNING TEAM EQUIPMENT AND RESOURCES

2-75. CA team members should refer to paragraphs 2-51 through 2-53, page 2-24. The team also must have transportation and tactical communications capabilities commensurate with that of the supported unit and nonmilitary agencies in the AO.

CA/CMO INTEGRATION AT THE THEATER AND CORPS SUPPORT COMMANDS AND AREA SUPPORT GROUP HEADQUARTERS

2-76. CSS functions are performed across the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of operations by various support commands, groups, and battalions. Although the organizational structure of these support units may vary over time based on METT-TC, their purpose remains consistent—to sustain military forces throughout war or MOOTW.

2-77. The hierarchy of logistics support functions in a theater flow from TSC through the area support group (ASG) at echelons above corps (EAC) to the COSCOM and below. Each support organization operates within defined geographical boundaries from bases or base clusters. The senior commander of the base or base cluster normally assumes command and control (C2) responsibility for all logistics functions, as well as rear-area operations, within the defined support area. This responsibility usually encompasses—

- FNS to augment operational and tactical logistics.
- Support to NEOs.
- Support to DC operations.
- Establishment of PRC measures in the rear area.
- Support to HA organizations in the rear area.
- Liaison with HN authorities for rear-area security, emergency services, and other issues.
- Support to humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA) programs.
2-78. FM 54-40, Area Support Group; FM 63-3, Corps Support Command; FM 4-93.4, Theater Support Command; FM 100-16, Army Operational Support; other doctrinal references; and the unit tactical SOP contain more information on how the unit operates.

2-79. TSC, COSCOM, and ASG operations are, by nature, interagency-intensive. The commander of each organization must provide the basis for a unified effort, centralized direction, and decentralized execution. As the operational focal point for coordination with nonmilitary organizations in his assigned support area, the TSC, COSCOM, and ASG commander must accommodate additional staff members to meet the requirements of interagency operations.

2-80. The TSC, COSCOM, and ASG conduct interagency collaborative planning and coordination through the CMOC. The CMOC must be accessible to both USG and non-USG agencies, such as USAID representatives, special representatives of the UN Secretary-General, NGOs, HN agencies, and businesses. The support unit commander establishes the CMOC as soon as possible to maximize the benefits of cooperation and coordination among the various interagency players. For most support operations, establishment of the CMOC begins as early as the initial planning stages of the operation.

CA/CMO FULL-TIME POSITIONS OR FUNCTIONS ON THE TSC, COSCOM, AND ASG STAFF

2-81. The ACofS, G-5, CMO, is responsible for full-time CA/CMO planning on the TSC and COSCOM staffs. The G-5 staff section is small compared to the other principal sections of the staff. To be effective, all members of the CMO staff section must be trained in functional area 39C, Civil Affairs.

2-82. There is no full-time S-5 position on the ASG staff. The S-5 position is coded “required/not authorized” and, therefore, is not filled on a full-time basis. Upon deployment, the ASG may be authorized an S-5. Until that time, the CA/CMO planning function normally falls under the ASG S-3.

2-83. Other sections that have CMO planning responsibility are the HNS section of the TSC and the HNS logistics directorate of the ASG. The members of these sections are normally not trained in CA, but they know the logistics needs of the force and are familiar with the legal and procedural requirements to obtain HNS from the HN in which they are operating.

STAFF PLANNING AND PLAN REVIEW PROCESSES

2-84. Each of the CSS organizations’ staffs plan using the MDMP. As mentioned previously, the MDMP is a single, established, and proven analytical process used by the Army to assist the commander and staff in developing estimates and plans.

2-85. The CA/CMO staff officer participates in all planning and war-gaming events undertaken by the CSS organization staff. CA considerations in MDMP are in Appendix C. Additional information on MDMP is in FM 101-5.
CA PLANNING TEAM PARTICIPATION IN THE PLANNING PROCESS

2-86. The CA planning team for a TSC is normally a CAPT-A from a CA brigade (Figure 2-12, page 2-30). The CA planning team for a COSCOM and an ASG is normally a CAT-C from a CA battalion (USAR) (Figure 2-14). At the TSC and COSCOM, the CA planning team participates in the planning processes through the ACofS, G-5, according to the TSC or COSCOM SOP. At the ASG, the CA planning team participates in the planning processes through the S-3 according to the ASG SOP.

| Assignment: | Headquarters, CA Battalion (USAR) |
| Personnel:  | Battalion Commander                  |
|            | Battalion Executive Officer          |
|            | S-1                                 |
|            | S-2/3                               |
|            | S-4                                 |
|            | Command Sergeant Major              |
|            | CA Specialist                       |

Figure 2-14. Composition of CAT-C (USAR)

2-87. During peacetime, the planning process may mean providing planners to the TSC, COSCOM, or ASG staff on a short-term, contingency basis through temporary tours of active duty (TTADs) or active duty for special work (ADSW) tours. Another option is to maintain constant communication with the G-5 or S-3 staff element by using the U.S. Postal Service, military couriers, and secure automation technology. When activated for short-term contingencies or long-term operations, the CA planning team reports to the CSS unit HQ and becomes a full-time, active part of the CSS unit staff.

2-88. To effectively participate in the planning process, the CA planning team must be familiar with CSS unit operations as described in the doctrinal publications listed in paragraph 2-78, page 2-33. The CA planning team must also perform the following tasks (which are not all-inclusive or necessarily in sequential order):

- Review the campaign plans, OPLANs, CONPLANs, and HNS plans, as appropriate, of commands two levels up, as well as the NEO plans of the combatant command and the U.S. Country Team.
- Review UN, unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral treaties and agreements pertaining to the CSS unit’s specified AO to which the United States is signatory.
- Review the NSS and NMS as they apply to the operation in which the CSS unit is participating.
- Review the pol-mil plan.
- Review any additional higher-level command guidance.
- Understand the CSS unit commander’s intent and his operational focus.
- Obtain the CSS unit CCIR.
• Read the primary planning document (OPLAN, OPORD, or supporting plan).
• Read all supporting annexes and appendixes to the primary planning document for CA/CMO-related assumptions and activities; validate the accuracy of these assumptions and activities.
• Establish and maintain a CMOC for coordination with nonmilitary organizations.
• Analyze the CSS unit’s AO defined in the primary planning document according to METT-TC, focusing on the operational-level civil considerations (Chapter 3). This analysis includes, but is not limited to, knowing and understanding past and ongoing local and international events and activities; international organization and NGO personnel, resources, and capabilities already in place in the region; and the condition of the existing infrastructure.
• Obtain the CSS unit commander’s intent for CMO. It should include orientation on the civil operational centers of gravity, protection of friendly operational centers of gravity, phases of operations (such as prehostilities, lodgment, decisive combat and stabilization, follow-through, and posthostilities), and end state. Be prepared to offer specific recommendations to assist the commander in defining his intent for CMO.
• Identify specified, implied, and essential CMO tasks for military forces.
• Identify specified, implied, and essential CA tasks for CA forces.
• Apportion CA forces against CA task requirements and ensure the forces are included in the TPFDD. Ensure CSS unit commanders at all subordinate levels have a CA representative on their staff.
• Determine the operational mission, configuration, and location of the CMOC.
• Write the CA annex to the OPLAN, OPORD, or supporting plan.
• Incorporate CMO considerations into the primary planning document and supporting annexes and appendixes, as appropriate (for example, ROE, indirect fires, IO, logistics, interagency operations, and civil engineering support).
• Analyze and archive reports from the field.
• Catalog resources and POCs that will be useful in updating future plans and conducting future operations.

CA PLANNING TEAM LOCATION WITHIN THE SUPPORTED STAFF’S OPERATIONAL CONFIGURATION

2-89. The TSC, COSCOM, or ASG commander exercises C2 over operational logistics support activities from a logistics operations center (LOC) and a command post (CP). If performing as a base cluster commander, the TSC, COSCOM, or ASG commander establishes a base cluster operations center (BCOC) to plan, coordinate, and control rear operations among the bases in the cluster. He forms the BCOC from his own staff assets and from those of other elements in the cluster.
2-90. The CA planning team must set up where it can best support the CA/CMO staff planners of the TSC, COSCOM, and ASG. It must have access to all primary staff sections, as well as to elements such as the HNS section of the TSC and HNS logistics directorate of the ASG. Depending on METT-TC, this location may be either the LOC or the BCOC.

2-91. The planning team must also consider where to establish and maintain the CMOC for coordination with nonmilitary organizations. Techniques for establishing and maintaining a CMOC are in Chapters 4 and 5.

CA PLANNING TEAM EQUIPMENT AND RESOURCES

2-92. As an augmentation element to an established staff section, CA planning team members may find themselves looked upon as outsiders or temporary help. Depending on the situation, the commander and staff, and other factors, CA planning team members may or may not receive the full support they require to accomplish their mission. CA planning team members must be well versed in the techniques of project management and the challenges of group dynamics on team building and problem solving. The team must have transportation and tactical communications capabilities commensurate with that of the supported unit and nonmilitary agencies in the AO. For additional information, CA team members should refer to paragraphs 2-51 through 2-53, page 2-24.

CA/CMO INTEGRATION AT THE CORPS HEADQUARTERS

2-93. The corps is the largest tactical unit in the U.S. Army. It conducts combat operations in support of operational objectives. The corps conducts Army, joint, interagency, and multinational operations across the full range of military operations and is tailored for the theater and the mission for which it is deployed. It responds to short-notice crisis situations, as well as full-scale mobilization as a total force or as a force provider.

2-94. A corps may be employed under an Army HQ as part of a larger Army force, it may be the ARFOR HQ of a JTF, or it may serve as a JTF HQ. (More information on CA/CMO planning at the JTF is provided in paragraphs 2-65 through 2-75, pages 2-28 through 2-32.) Each configuration has unique considerations for CA/CMO planners. FM 100-15, Corps Operations, other doctrinal references, and the corps tactical SOP include more information on how the corps operates.

2-95. During all operations, the corps HQ must provide the basis for a unified effort, centralized direction, and decentralized execution. Doing so includes tying interagency efforts with the military effort in the corps AO. As the operational focal point for coordination with nonmilitary organizations, the corps commander must accommodate additional staff members to meet the requirements of interagency operations.

2-96. The corps conducts interagency collaborative planning and coordination across full-spectrum operations through the CMOC. The CMOC must be accessible to both USG and non-USG agencies—USAID representatives, special representatives of the UN Secretary-General, NGOs, HN agencies, and businesses—in the corps AO. The corps commander establishes the CMOC as soon as possible to maximize the benefits of
cooperation and coordination among the various interagency players. For most corps operations, establishment of the CMOC begins as early as the initial planning stages of the operation.

CA/CMO FULL-TIME POSITIONS OR FUNCTIONS ON THE CORPS STAFF

2-97. The ACofS, G-5, CMO, is responsible for full-time CA/CMO planning on the corps staff. The G-5 staff section is small compared to the other principal sections of the corps staff. The G-5 section generally consists of a colonel, two additional field grade officers, two senior NCOs, and a DA civilian. To be effective, all members of the CMO staff section must be trained in functional area 39C, Civil Affairs.

STAFF PLANNING AND PLAN REVIEW PROCESSES

2-98. Each corps has operational responsibilities in at least one theater operation plan. The corps staff periodically reviews and updates the corps portion of the plan IAW guidance from the geographic combatant commander. Once employed, planning at the corps level is a continuous process that occurs concurrently with corps operations. The process of maintaining a running estimate of the situation keeps the commander armed with viable options.

2-99. Because the corps may perform as an Army force or a joint force, staff members must be familiar with both the MDMP and JOPES. The MDMP is a single, established, and proven analytical process used by the Army to assist the commander and staff in developing estimates and plans. The JOPES provides single-process, interoperable planning and execution for both war and MOOTW. Joint operations planning is categorized as campaign, deliberate, or crisis-action planning.

2-100. The corps G-5 participates in all planning and war-gaming events undertaken by the corps staff. CA considerations in MDMP and JOPES are found throughout this manual. Additional information on MDMP can be found in FM 101-5. Additional information on JOPES can be found in JP 5-0.

CA PLANNING TEAM PARTICIPATION IN THE PLANNING PROCESS

2-101. Depending on the factors of METT-TC, the CA planning team may be a CAPT-A from a CA brigade (USAR) or a CAPT-B from a CA battalion (Active Army). The CA planning team participates in the corps’ continuous planning processes through the ACofS, G-5, according to the corps SOP. During peacetime, the planning process may mean providing planners to the ACofS, G-5, on a short-term, contingency basis through TTAD or ADSW tours. Another option is to maintain constant communication with the G-5 staff element by using the U.S. Postal Service, military couriers, and secure automation technology. When activated for short-term contingencies or long-term operations, the CA planning team reports to the corps HQ and becomes a full-time, active part of the corps staff.

2-102. To effectively participate in the planning process, the CA planning team must be familiar with corps operations as described in FM 100-15, as well as joint operational procedures as outlined in various JPs. The CA
planning team must also perform the following tasks (which are not all-inclusive or necessarily in sequential order):

- Review the campaign plans, OPLANs, and CONPLANs, as appropriate, of commands two levels up.
- Review UN, unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral treaties and agreements pertaining to the corps' specified AO to which the United States is signatory.
- Review the NSS and NMS as they apply to the operation in which the corps is participating.
- Review the pol-mil plan.
- Review any additional higher-level command guidance.
- Understand the corps commander's intent and his operational and tactical focus.
- Obtain the corps CCIR.
- Read the primary planning document (OPLAN, OPORD, or supporting plan).
- Read all supporting annexes and appendixes to the primary planning document for CA/CMO-related assumptions and activities; validate the accuracy of these assumptions and activities.
- Establish and maintain a CMOC for coordination with nonmilitary organizations.
- Analyze the corps' AO defined in the primary planning document according to METT-TC, focusing on the operational-level civil considerations (Chapter 3). This analysis includes, but is not limited to, knowing and understanding past and ongoing local and international events and activities; international organization and NGO personnel, resources, and capabilities already in place in the region; and the condition of the existing infrastructure.
- Obtain the corps commander's intent for CMO. It should include orientation on the civil operational centers of gravity, protection of friendly operational centers of gravity, phases of operations (such as prehostilities, lodgment, decisive combat and stabilization, follow-through, and posthostilities), and end state. Be prepared to offer specific recommendations to assist the commander in defining his intent for CMO.
- Identify specified, implied, and essential CMO tasks for military forces.
- Identify specified, implied, and essential CA tasks for CA forces.
- Apportion CA forces against CA task requirements and ensure the forces are included in the TPFDD. Ensure commanders at all subordinate levels have a CA representative on their staff.
- Determine the operational mission, configuration, and location of the CMOC.
- Write the CA annex to the OPLAN, OPORD, or supporting plan.
Incorporate CMO considerations into the primary planning document and supporting annexes and appendixes, as appropriate (for example, ROE, indirect fires, IO, logistics, interagency operations, and civil engineering support).

• Analyze and archive reports from the field.
• Provide input to the corps’ IO cell.
• Catalog resources and POCs that will be useful in updating future plans and conducting future operations.

JP 3-57 contains additional guidance for planning CMO at the joint level.

CA PLANNING TEAM LOCATION WITHIN THE SUPPORTED STAFF’S OPERATIONAL CONFIGURATION

2-103. The corps commander exercises C2 through the ABCS from a command group and three CPs. The command group consists of the corps commander and selected personnel. It allows the commander to make a personal situation assessment, to provide leadership and guidance, and to make decisions. The corps CPs are normally echeloned into a tactical CP, a main CP, and a rear CP. The tactical CP controls corps close operations. The main CP synchronizes all corps operations and plans future operations. The rear CP performs rear security operations and sustainment of the entire corps.

2-104. The CA/CMO planning function on the corps staff resides with the ACofS, G-5, CMO. When deployed, this section normally locates in the main CP where it integrates with the current operations cell, the plans cell, the deep operations coordination cell, the intelligence cell, the fire support coordination cell, the command and control warfare (C2W) cell, and the CSS cell. The G-5’s role includes overseeing, advising, and coordinating corps CMO activities; recommending corps command policy for CMO; ensuring compliance with the policy; analyzing civilian impact on military operations and the impact of military operations on civilians; and supporting other USG agencies in the corps AO.

2-105. The CA planning team supports the ACofS, G-5, in the performance of these functions using one of several options based on METT-TC. One option is to locate the entire team at the main CP. This option provides the G-5 with the maximum number of CA soldiers to meet all CMO planning and operational requirements while conducting 24-hour operations. Another option is to locate the entire team at the rear CP where it focuses on rear operations in support of the corps rear operations commander. A third option is to split the team between both CPs; for example, putting the plans officer and team noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC) in the main CP and the rest of the team in the rear CP. This option allows the G-5 to focus on current corps operations and oversee the planning of future operations while maintaining strong representation on the rear operations staff.

2-106. The CA planning team must also consider where to establish and maintain the CMOC for coordination with nonmilitary organizations. Techniques for establishing and maintaining a CMOC are in Chapters 4 and 5.
CA PLANNING TEAM EQUIPMENT AND RESOURCES

2-107. CA team members should refer to paragraphs 2-51 through 2-53, page 2-24. The team also must have transportation and tactical communications capabilities commensurate with that of the supported unit and nonmilitary agencies in the AO.

CA/CMO INTEGRATION AT THE DIVISION HEADQUARTERS

2-108. The division is the largest Army organization that trains and fights as a tactical team. Each division is capable of independent operations, performs tactical missions in offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations over a wide range of environments and, for limited periods, is self-sustaining. Corps augment divisions as the mission requires.

2-109. Traditionally, the division operates as part of a U.S. corps. The division may deploy as part of a JTF without its traditional corps HQ and supporting corps units. In these types of operations, a division often works directly for the JFC and, therefore, division staffs must know joint doctrine and TTP.

2-110. Divisions are not normally designated as a JTF HQ. Divisions assigned to a JTF normally conduct traditional tactical operations but may be involved in nontraditional actions, such as interagency operations or operations with the indigenous population and institutions. A JTF may designate a division under its C2 as the ARFOR HQ, the senior Army HQ within the JTF. An ARFOR HQ may provide support normally associated with the Army Service component within the AO. The division commander could also be responsible for all land combat forces through his appointment as the joint force land component commander (JFLCC). As the JFLCC, the division commander controls all Army, Marine, and multinational ground forces in the AO.

2-111. As with the corps, each division mission and configuration has unique considerations for CA/CMO planners. FM 71-100, Division Operations; other doctrinal references; and the division tactical SOP include more information on how the division operates.

2-112. During operations, the division HQ must provide the basis for a unified effort, centralized direction, and decentralized execution. Doing so includes tying interagency efforts with the military effort in the division AO. As the operational focal point for coordination with nonmilitary organizations at the tactical level, the division commander must accommodate additional staff members to meet the requirements of interagency operations.

2-113. The division conducts interagency collaborative planning and coordination across full-spectrum operations through the CMOC. The CMOC must be accessible to both USG and non-USG agencies—USAID representatives, special representatives of the UN Secretary-General, NGOs, HN agencies, and businesses—in the division’s designated AO. The division commander establishes the CMOC as soon as possible to maximize the benefits of cooperation and coordination among the various interagency players. For most division operations, establishment of the CMOC begins as
early as the initial planning stages of the operation. Chapters 4 and 5 discuss the CMO in more detail.

**CA/CMO FULL-TIME POSITIONS OR FUNCTIONS ON THE DIVISION STAFF**

2-114. The ACofS, G-5, CMO, is responsible for full-time CA/CMO planning on the division staff. The G-5 staff section is small compared to the other principal sections of the division staff. The G-5 section generally consists of a lieutenant colonel, a company grade officer, two senior NCOs, and a DA civilian. To be effective, all members of the CMO staff section must be trained in functional area 39C, Civil Affairs.

**STAFF PLANNING AND PLAN REVIEW PROCESSES**

2-115. Each division has tactical responsibilities in at least one theater operation plan. The division staff periodically reviews and updates the division’s portion of the plan IAW guidance from the geographic combatant commander and the corps commander. Once employed, planning at the division level is a continuous process that occurs concurrently with division operations. The process of maintaining a running estimate of the situation keeps the commander armed with viable options.

2-116. The division staff plans using the MDMP. As mentioned previously, the MDMP is a single, established, and proven analytical process used by the Army to assist the commander and staff in developing estimates and plans.

2-117. The division G-5 participates in all planning and war-gaming events undertaken by the division staff. CA considerations in MDMP are found throughout this manual. Additional information on MDMP can be found in FM 101-5.

**CA PLANNING TEAM PARTICIPATION IN THE PLANNING PROCESS**

2-118. Depending on the factors of METT-TC, the CA planning team may be a CAT-C from a CA battalion (USAR) (Figure 2-14, page 2-34), a CAT-B from a CA battalion (Active Army) (Figure 2-13, page 2-30), or a CAT-A from a CA battalion (Active Army) (Figure 2-15). The CA planning team participates in the division’s planning processes through the ACofS, G-5, according to the division SOP. During peacetime, the planning process may mean providing planners to the ACofS, G-5, on a short-term, contingency basis through TTAD or ADSW tours. Another option is to maintain constant communication with the G-5 staff element by using the U.S. Postal Service, military couriers, and secure automation technology. When activated for short-term contingencies or long-term operations, the CA planning team reports to the division HQ and becomes a full-time, active part of the division staff.

| Assignment: | CA Company (Active Army) |
| Personnel: | Team Leader |
| | Team Sergeant |
| | Team Engineer |
| | Team Medic |

Figure 2-15. Composition of CAT-A (Active Army)
2-119. To effectively participate in the planning process, the CA planning team must be familiar with division operations as described in FM 71-100. The CA planning team must also perform the following tasks (which are not all-inclusive or necessarily in sequential order):

- Review the campaign plans, OPLANs, and CONPLANs, as appropriate, of commands two levels up.
- Review UN, unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral treaties and agreements pertaining to the division's specified AO to which the United States is signatory.
- Review the NSS and NMS as they apply to the operation in which the division is participating.
- Review the pol-mil plan.
- Review any additional higher-level command guidance.
- Understand the intent and tactical focus of the division commander.
- Obtain the division CCIR.
- Read the primary planning document (OPLAN, OPORD, or supporting plan).
- Read all supporting annexes and appendixes to the primary planning document for CA/CMO-related assumptions and activities; validate the accuracy of these assumptions and activities.
- Establish and maintain a CMOC for coordination with nonmilitary organizations.
- Analyze the division's AO defined in the primary planning document according to METT-TC, focusing on the tactical-level civil considerations (Chapter 3). This analysis includes, but is not limited to, knowing and understanding past and ongoing local events and activities; international organization and NGO personnel, resources, and capabilities already in place in the region; the condition of the existing infrastructure; types, status, and potential uses of civil structures in the AO; and the intentions and potential actions of the local populace in response to military operations in the AO.
- Obtain the division commander's intent for CMO. It should include orientation on the civil operational centers of gravity, protection of friendly operational centers of gravity, phases of operations (such as prehostilities, lodgment, decisive combat and stabilization, follow-through, and posthostilities), and end state. Be prepared to offer specific recommendations to assist the commander in defining his intent for CMO.
- Identify specified, implied, and essential CMO tasks for military forces.
- Identify specified, implied, and essential CA tasks for CA forces.
- Apportion CA forces against CA task requirements and ensure the forces are included in the TPFDD. Ensure commanders at all subordinate levels have a CA representative on their staff.
- Determine the tactical mission, configuration, and location of the CMOC.
• Write the CA annex to the OPLAN, OPORD, or supporting plan.
• Incorporate CMO considerations into the primary planning document and supporting annexes and appendixes, as appropriate (for example, ROE, indirect fires, IO, logistics, interagency operations, and civil engineering support).
• Analyze and archive reports from the field.
• Provide input to the division's IO cell.
• Catalog resources and POCs that will be useful in updating future plans and conducting future operations.

CA PLANNING TEAM LOCATION WITHIN THE SUPPORTED STAFF'S OPERATIONAL CONFIGURATION

2-120. The division commander exercises C2 through the ABCS from a command group and three CPs. The command group consists of the division commander and selected personnel. It allows the commander to make a personal situation assessment, to provide leadership and guidance, and to make decisions. The division CPs are normally echeloned into a tactical CP, a main CP, and a rear CP. The tactical CP controls division close operations. The main CP synchronizes all division operations and plans future operations. The rear CP performs rear security operations and sustainment of the entire division.

2-121. The CA/CMO planning function on the division staff resides with the ACofS, G-5, CMO. When deployed, this section normally locates in the main CP where it integrates with the current operations cell, the plans cell, the deep operations coordination cell, the intelligence cell, the fire support coordination cell, the C2W cell, and the CSS cell. The G-5's role includes overseeing, advising, and coordinating division CMO activities; recommending division command policy for CMO; ensuring compliance with the policy; analyzing civilian impact on military operations and the impact of military operations on civilians; and supporting other USG agencies in the division AO.

2-122. The CA planning team supports the ACofS, G-5, in the performance of these functions using one of several options based on METT-TC. One option is to locate the entire team at the main CP. This option provides the G-5 with the maximum number of CA soldiers to meet all CMO planning and operational requirements while conducting 24-hour operations. Another option is to locate the entire team at the rear CP where it focuses on rear operations in support of the division rear operations commander. A third option is to split the team between both CPs; for example, putting the team leader and a CA NCO in the main CP and the rest of the team in the rear CP. This option allows the G-5 to focus on current division operations and oversee the planning of future operations while maintaining strong representation on the rear operations staff.

2-123. The CA planning team must also consider where to establish and maintain the CMOC for coordination with nonmilitary organizations. Techniques for establishing and maintaining a CMOC are in Chapters 4 and 5.
CA PLANNING TEAM EQUIPMENT AND RESOURCES

2-124. CA team members should refer to paragraphs 2-51 through 2-53, page 2-24. The team also must have transportation and tactical communications capabilities commensurate with that of the supported unit and nonmilitary agencies in the AO.

CA/CMO INTEGRATION AT THE BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS

2-125. The Army has several types of maneuver brigades: divisional brigades, separate brigades, and the Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT). Each type of brigade is organized to conduct successful tactical engagements across the range of operations. Whether the brigade is organized as an air assault, airborne, armored, aviation, light infantry, mechanized infantry, or SBCT, its primary mission is to deploy on short notice and destroy, capture, or repel enemy forces, using maneuver and shock effect. Brigades also conduct various MOOTW activities independently or as part of a joint or multinational HQ in peacetime and conflict environments.

2-126. Divisional brigades normally operate as part of a division. Separate brigades are organized for and normally conduct sustained operations under corps control. The SBCT will be organized and equipped to enable rapid deployment to meet the challenges of small-scale contingency operations while possessing significant utility for divisions and corps engaged in a major theater war (MTW). In either case, brigades are task-organized, as directed, and most often perform tactical tasks under the command of a division, corps, or a JTF HQ.

2-127. More information on how the brigade operates may be found in FM 1-111, Aviation Brigades; FM 7-30, The Infantry Brigade; FM 71-123, Tactics and Techniques for Combined Arms Heavy Forces: Armored Brigade, Battalion Task Force, and Company Team; FM 71-3, The Armored and Mechanized Infantry Brigade; other doctrinal references; and the brigade tactical SOP.

2-128. During all operations, the brigade HQ must provide the basis for a unified effort, centralized direction, and decentralized execution. Doing so includes tying interagency efforts with the military effort in the brigade AO. As the operational focal point for coordination with nonmilitary organizations at the tactical level, the brigade commander must accommodate additional staff members to meet the requirements of interagency operations.

2-129. The brigade conducts interagency collaborative planning and coordination across full-spectrum operations through the CMOC. The CMOC must be accessible to both USG and non-USG agencies—USAID representatives, special representatives of the UN Secretary-General, NGOs, HN agencies, and businesses—in the brigade’s designated AO. The brigade commander establishes the CMOC as soon as possible to maximize the benefits of cooperation and coordination among the various interagency players. For most brigade operations, establishment of the CMOC begins as early as the initial planning stages of the operation. Chapters 4 and 5 discuss the CMOC in more detail.
CA/CMO FULL-TIME POSITIONS OR FUNCTIONS ON THE BRIGADE STAFF

2-130. The brigade S-5 is responsible for CA/CMO planning. For many brigades, the S-5 position is coded “required/not authorized” and, therefore, is not filled on a full-time basis. Upon deployment, the brigade may be authorized an S-5. Until that time, the CA/CMO planning function normally falls under the brigade S-3.

2-131. Some brigades or brigade-equivalent organizations do have full-time S-5s. These include the separate brigades, the Ranger Regiment, and SFGs. These organizations normally have a small section that consists of a company grade officer and an NCO. To be effective, the members of the S-5 section must be trained in functional area 39C, Civil Affairs.

2-132. Brigade staffs that do not have S-5 sections tend to ignore the CMO function if it is not emphasized by the brigade commander. Commanders without S-5s who are attuned to their CMO responsibilities would do well to have all staff members share the CA/CMO planning responsibility. Each staff member analyzes his battlefield operating system (BOS) function for civil considerations using METT-TC and CASCOPE as discussed in Chapter 3. In this way, the commander ensures that he has considered the impact of CASCOPE on his operations, as well as the impact of his operations on those civil factors.

STAFF PLANNING AND PLAN REVIEW PROCESSES

2-133. Brigade operations are dynamic. During combat, the brigade quickly transitions between offensive, defensive, retrograde, and other tactical operations, such as passage of lines, relief operations, and linkup. During stability operations or support operations, the brigade may be required to transition just as quickly.

2-134. The brigade staff uses the MDMP for all planning, whether conducting routine operations or working in a time-constrained environment. As mentioned previously, the MDMP is a single, established, and proven analytical process used by the Army to assist the commander and staff in developing estimates and plans. Additional information on MDMP can be found in FM 101-5.

CA PLANNING TEAM PARTICIPATION IN THE PLANNING PROCESS

2-135. Depending on the factors of METT-TC, the CA planning team may be a CAT-B from a CA battalion (USAR) (Figure 2-16, page 2-46) or a CAT-A from a CA battalion (Active Army) (Figure 2-15, page 2-41). The CA planning team participates in the brigade’s planning processes when directed. The team is normally attached to the brigade for planning and operations. If the brigade has a full-time S-5, the CA team augments the S-5 section. If there is no full-time S-5, the CA team leader normally assumes duty as the brigade S-5. In either case, the CMO staff officer participates in all planning and wargaming events undertaken by the brigade staff. CA considerations in MDMP are found throughout this manual.
Assignment: HQ, CA Company (USAR)
Personnel: Team Leader
          Operations Officer
          1st Sergeant
          Civil Affairs NCO (2)
          Civil Affairs Specialist

Figure 2-16. Composition of CAT-B (USAR)

2-136. During peacetime, a CAT-B from the CA battalion (USAR) that has a planning association with the brigade's parent unit may provide planners on a short-term, contingency basis. These team members might perform this planning through TTAD or ADSW tours. Another option is for the CAT-B to maintain constant communication with the full-time individual responsible for the brigade's CMO planning by using the U.S. Postal Service, military couriers, and secure automation technology.

2-137. To effectively participate in the planning process, the CA team must be familiar with brigade operations as described in the doctrinal publications listed in paragraph 2-127, page 2-44, and the unit tactical SOP. The CA team must also perform the following tasks (which are not all-inclusive or necessarily in sequential order):

- Review the campaign plans, OPLANs, and CONPLANs, as appropriate, of commands two levels up.
- Review UN, unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral treaties and agreements pertaining to the brigade's specified AO to which the United States is signatory.
- Review the NSS and NMS as they apply to the operation in which the brigade is participating.
- Review the pol-mil plan.
- Review any additional higher-level command guidance.
- Understand the intent and tactical focus of the brigade commander.
- Obtain the brigade CCIR.
- Read the primary planning document (OPLAN, OPORD, or supporting plan).
- Read all supporting annexes and appendixes to the primary planning document for CA/CMO-related assumptions and activities; validate the accuracy of these assumptions and activities.
- Establish and maintain a CMOC for coordination with nonmilitary organizations.
- Analyze the brigade's AO defined in the primary planning document according to METT-TC, focusing on the tactical-level civil considerations (Chapter 3). This analysis includes, but is not limited to, knowing and understanding past and ongoing local events and activities; international organization and NGO personnel, resources, and capabilities already in place in the region; the condition of the existing infrastructure; types, status, and potential uses of civil
structures in the AO; and the intentions and potential actions of the local populace in response to military operations in the AO.

- Obtain the brigade commander's intent for CMO. It should include orientation on the civil operational centers of gravity, protection of friendly operational centers of gravity, phases of operations (such as prehostilities, lodgment, decisive combat and stabilization, follow-through, and posthostilities), and end state. Be prepared to offer specific recommendations to assist the commander in defining his intent for CMO.

- Identify specified, implied, and essential CMO tasks for military forces.

- Identify specified, implied, and essential CA tasks for CA forces.

- Apportion CA forces against CA task requirements and ensure the forces are included in the TPFDD. Ensure commanders at all subordinate levels have a CA representative on their staff.

- Determine the tactical mission, configuration, and location of the CMOC.

- Write the CA annex to the OPLAN, OPORD, or supporting plan.

- Incorporate CMO considerations into the primary planning document and supporting annexes and appendixes, as appropriate (for example, ROE, indirect fires, IO, logistics, interagency operations, and combat engineering support).

- Analyze and archive reports from the field.

- Provide input to the brigade's IO cell, as applicable.

- Catalog resources and POCs that will be useful in updating future plans and conducting future operations.

**CA PLANNING TEAM LOCATION WITHIN THE SUPPORTED STAFF’S OPERATIONAL CONFIGURATION**

2-138. The brigade commander exercises C2 through the ABCS from a command group and three CPs. The command group consists of the brigade commander and selected personnel. It allows the commander to make a personal situation assessment, to provide leadership and guidance, and to make decisions. The brigade CPs are normally echeloned into a tactical CP, a main CP, and a rear CP. The tactical CP controls brigade close operations. The main CP synchronizes all brigade operations and plans future operations. The rear CP performs rear security operations and sustainment of the entire brigade.

2-139. The CA/CMO planning function on the brigade staff resides with the S-5. When deployed, this section normally locates in the main CP where it integrates with the current operations cell, the plans cell, the deep operations coordination cell, the intelligence cell, and the fire support coordination cell. The S-5's role includes overseeing, advising, and coordinating brigade CMO activities; recommending brigade command policy for CMO; ensuring compliance with the policy; analyzing civilian impact on military operations and the impact of military operations on civilians; and supporting other USG agencies in the brigade AO.
2-140. As mentioned previously, the CA team either augments an existing brigade S-5 section or fills the role of the S-5 section in brigades without full-time S-5s. The CA team performs the functions listed above using one of several options based on METT-TC. One option is to locate the entire team with the tactical operations center (TOC) at the main CP. This option provides the S-5 with the maximum number of CA soldiers to meet all CMO planning and operational requirements while conducting 24-hour operations. Another option is to locate the entire team at the rear CP where it focuses on rear operations in support of the brigade rear operations commander. This option is viable only when augmenting an existing S-5 section. A third option is to split the team between both CPs, such as putting the team leader and a CA NCO in the main CP and the rest of the team in the rear CP. This option allows the S-5 to focus on current brigade operations and oversee the planning of future operations while maintaining strong representation on the rear operations staff.

2-141. The CA team must also consider where to establish and maintain the CMOC for coordination with nonmilitary organizations. Techniques for establishing and maintaining a CMOC are in Chapters 4 and 5.

2-142. The CA team has more of an active role in supporting tactical operations than the planning teams of higher HQ. The CA team leader must balance his planning function with requirements to conduct CA activities in support of the commander’s CMO; for example, conducting area assessments, facilitating DC operations and other PRC measures, identifying and facilitating FNS, and conducting liaison with civilian authorities and NGOs.

**CA PLANNING TEAM EQUIPMENT AND RESOURCES**

2-143. CA team members should refer to paragraphs 2-51 through 2-53, page 2-24. The team also must have transportation and tactical communications capabilities commensurate with that of the supported unit and nonmilitary agencies in the AO.

**CA/CMO INTEGRATION AT THE BATTALION HEADQUARTERS**

2-144. Maneuver brigades contain three to five maneuver battalions that are task-organized to accomplish the tactical missions assigned to the brigade. Task organizing consists of cross-attaching companies (for example, tank and mechanized infantry companies) between battalions in the brigade to capitalize on the capabilities of each in support of mission requirements. A battalion organized in such a manner is called a battalion task force. For the purpose of this section, the term battalion will be used to mean both battalion and battalion task force.

2-145. Maneuver battalions accomplish missions and tasks as part of a brigade's operation. Whether part of an air assault, airborne, armored, aviation, light infantry, mechanized infantry brigade, or SBCT, the battalion's primary mission is to deploy on short notice and destroy, capture, or repel enemy forces, using maneuver and shock effect. Maneuver battalions conduct various MOOTW activities when the brigade operates independently or as part of a joint or multinational HQ in peacetime and conflict environments.
2-146. Occasionally, battalions will conduct operations directly under the control of a division or an armored cavalry regiment, such as when they are participating in the covering force of the higher HQ, acting as a reserve, or forming a tactical combat force in rear-area operations.

2-147. More information on how the battalion operates may be found in FM 7-20, The Infantry Battalion; FM 71-2, The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force; FM 71-123; other doctrinal references; and the unit tactical SOP.

2-148. During all operations, the battalion HQ must provide the basis for a unified effort, centralized direction, and decentralized execution. Doing so includes tying interagency efforts with the military effort in the battalion AO. As the operational focal point for coordination with nonmilitary organizations at the local tactical level, the battalion commander must accommodate additional staff members to meet the requirements of interagency operations.

2-149. The battalion conducts interagency collaborative planning and coordination across full-spectrum operations through the CMOC. The CMOC must be accessible to both USG and non-USG agencies—USAID representatives, special representatives of the UN Secretary-General, NGOs, HN agencies, and businesses—in the battalion’s designated AO. The battalion commander establishes the CMOC as soon as possible to maximize the benefits of cooperation and coordination among the various interagency players. For most battalion operations, establishment of the CMOC begins as early as the initial planning stages of the operation. Chapters 4 and 5 discuss the CMOC in more detail.

CA/CMO FULL-TIME POSITIONS OR FUNCTIONS ON THE BATTALION STAFF

2-150. The battalion S-5 is responsible for CA/CMO planning. With the exception of the Ranger battalions and some Army National Guard battalions, the S-5 position on a maneuver battalion staff is coded “required/not authorized” and, therefore, is not filled on a full-time basis. Upon deployment, the battalion may be authorized an S-5. Until that time, the CA/CMO planning function normally falls under the battalion S-3.

2-151. On effective battalion staffs, all staff members share the CA/CMO planning responsibility. Each staff member analyzes his BOS function for civil considerations using METT-TC and CASCOPE as discussed in Chapter 3. In this way, the commander ensures that he has considered the impact of CASCOPE on his operations, as well as the impact of his operations on those civil factors.

STAFF PLANNING AND PLAN REVIEW PROCESSES

2-152. Battalion operations are dynamic. During combat, the battalion quickly transitions between offensive, defensive, retrograde, and other tactical operations, such as passage of lines, relief operations, and linkup. During stability operations or support operations, the battalion may be required to transition just as quickly.
2-153. The battalion staff uses the MDMP for all planning, whether conducting routine operations or working in a time-constrained environment. Additional information on MDMP is in FM 101-5.

**CA PLANNING TEAM PARTICIPATION IN THE PLANNING PROCESS**

2-154. The CAT-A from a CA battalion (USAR) (Figure 2-17) is normally attached to the battalion for planning and operations. If the battalion has a full-time S-5, the CA team augments the S-5 section. If there is no full-time S-5, the CA team leader can assume the S-5 position or augment the S-3 section, based on METT-TC analysis. In either case, the CA team leader participates in all planning and war-gaming events undertaken by the battalion staff. CA considerations in MDMP are found throughout this manual.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assignment:</th>
<th>CA Company (USAR)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personnel:</td>
<td>Team Leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Team Sergeant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CA Specialist (2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 2-17. Composition of CAT-A (USAR)*

2-155. During peacetime, a CAT-A from the CA battalion (USAR) that has a planning association with the brigade's parent unit may provide planners on a short-term, contingency basis. These team members might perform this planning through TTAD or ADSW tours. Another option is for the CAT-A to maintain constant communication with the full-time individual responsible for the battalion’s CMO planning by using the U.S. Postal Service, military couriers, and secure automation technology.

2-156. To effectively participate in the planning process, the CA team must be familiar with battalion operations as described in the doctrinal publications listed in paragraph 2-147, page 2-49, and the unit tactical SOP. The CA team must also perform the following tasks (which are not all-inclusive or necessarily in sequential order):

- Review the campaign plans, OPLANs, and CONPLANs, as appropriate, of commands two levels up.
- Review UN, unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral treaties and agreements pertaining to the battalion’s specified AO to which the United States is signatory.
- Review the NSS and NMS as they apply to the operation in which the battalion is participating.
- Review the pol-mil plan.
- Review any additional higher-level command guidance.
- Understand the intent and tactical focus of the battalion commander.
- Obtain the battalion CCIR.
- Read the primary planning document (OPLAN, OPORD, or supporting plan).
• Read all supporting annexes and appendixes to the primary planning document for CA/CMO-related assumptions and activities; validate the accuracy of these assumptions and activities.

• Establish and maintain a CMOC for coordination with nonmilitary organizations.

• Analyze the battalion's AO defined in the primary planning document according to METT-TC, focusing on the tactical-level civil considerations (Chapter 3). This analysis includes, but is not limited to, knowing and understanding past and ongoing local events and activities; international organization and NGO personnel, resources, and capabilities already in place in the region; the condition of the existing infrastructure; types, status, and potential uses of civil structures in the AO; and the intentions and potential actions of the local populace in response to military operations in the AO.

• Obtain the battalion commander's intent for CMO. It should include orientation on the civil operational centers of gravity, protection of friendly operational centers of gravity, phases of operations (such as prehostilities, lodgment, decisive combat and stabilization, follow-through, and posthostilities), and end state. Be prepared to offer specific recommendations to assist the commander in defining his intent for CMO.

• Identify specified, implied, and essential CMO tasks for military forces.

• Identify specified, implied, and essential CA tasks for CA forces.

• Determine the tactical mission, configuration, and location of the CMOC.

• Write the CA annex to the OPLAN, OPORD, or supporting plan.

• Incorporate CMO considerations into the primary planning document and supporting annexes and appendixes, as appropriate (for example, ROE, indirect fires, IO, logistics, interagency operations, and combat engineering support).

• Prepare and archive reports.

• Catalog resources and POCs that will be useful in updating future plans and conducting future operations.

CA PLANNING TEAM LOCATION WITHIN THE SUPPORTED STAFF'S OPERATIONAL CONFIGURATION

2-157. The battalion commander exercises C2 through the ABCS from a command group and three CPs. The command group consists of the battalion commander and selected personnel. It allows the commander to make a personal situation assessment, to provide leadership and guidance, and to make decisions. The battalion CPs are normally echeloned into a tactical CP, a main CP, and a combat trains CP. The tactical CP controls battalion close operations. The main CP synchronizes all battalion operations and plans future operations. The combat trains CP performs rear security operations and sustainment of the entire battalion.

2-158. The CA/CMO planning function on the battalion staff resides with the S-3 at the main CP. If there is a battalion S-5 section, it normally locates in
the main CP where it integrates with the operations and plans cell, the intelligence cell, and the fire support coordination cell. The CMO staff officer’s role includes overseeing, advising, and coordinating battalion CMO activities; recommending battalion command policy for CMO; ensuring compliance with the policy; analyzing civilian impact on military operations and the impact of military operations on civilians; and supporting other USG agencies in the battalion AO.

2-159. As mentioned previously, the CA team augments the battalion S-3 or S-5 section. To do this, it must operate out of the TOC at the main CP. The CA team must also consider where to establish and maintain the CMOC for coordination with nonmilitary organizations. Techniques for establishing and maintaining a CMOC are in Chapters 4 and 5.

2-160. The CA team has more of an active role in supporting tactical operations than the planning teams of higher HQ. The CA team leader must balance his planning function with requirements to conduct CA activities in support of the commander’s CMO (conducting area assessments, facilitating DC operations and other PRC measures, identifying and facilitating FNS, and conducting liaison with civilian authorities and NGOs).

CA PLANNING TEAM EQUIPMENT AND RESOURCES

2-161. CA team members should refer to paragraphs 2-51 through 2-53, page 2-24. The team also must have transportation and tactical communications capabilities commensurate with that of the supported unit and nonmilitary agencies in the AO.

CA/CMO INTEGRATION AT THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES HEADQUARTERS

2-162. JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, defines special operations as those operations conducted “to achieve military, political, economic, or informational objectives by unconventional military means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas. These operations are conducted across the full range of military operations, independently or in coordination with operations of conventional, non-special operations forces. Political-military considerations frequently shape special operations, requiring clandestine, covert, or low visibility techniques and oversight at the national level. Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets.”

2-163. SOF are those components of Army special operations forces (ARSOF), Air Force special operations forces (AFSOF), and naval special warfare (NSW) forces that are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support SO. ARSOF consist of Active Army Ranger and Army special operations aviation (ARSOA) forces, as well as Active Army and RC SF, PSYOP, and CA.

2-164. Operational control over assigned SOF within a theater is exercised by the appropriate theater SOC for the joint operations area; for example,
Special Operations Command, United States European Command (SOCEUR), or Special Operations Command, United States Central Command (SOCCENT). Paragraphs 2-54 through 2-64, pages 2-24 through 2-28, include further detail on CA/CMO integration at the SOC level.

2-165. SOF elements may be designated as a JTF HQ. When a SOF element is designated as a JTF, it will be designated as a joint special operations task force (JSOTF). The JSOTF is normally formed around elements of the SOC, or the SFG HQ or similar component level HQ, and is augmented by SOF members from the other Services. The JSOTF consists of the SOF components of two or more U.S. military Services, and may contain some conventional forces as well.

2-166. SFGs normally establish and operate from a Special Forces operational base (SFOB). SFGs conduct sustained operations normally coordinating the activities of up to three forward operational bases (FOBs). The SFG will task-organize SF operational detachments (SFODs) to conduct SF missions in any operational environment—permissive, uncertain, or hostile.

2-167. CA/CMO support to SOF is provided by the CA battalion (SO) and CA battalion (Active Army) for rapid deployment operations. The CA battalion (SO) is apportioned to the theater SOC, and is further task-organized to support subordinate SOF elements under OPCON of the SOC commander. The CA battalion (SO) is task-organized to provide CMO staff support to all echelons of SO; however, it is most effective when employed in support of SF. The remainder of this section will primarily discuss the relationship between the CA battalion (SO) and SF units. CA integration with other SO units can be inferred.

2-168. The CA battalion (SO) or CA battalion (Active Army) provides varied levels of planning or operational CA support (depending on METT-TC) to the following SO missions and collateral activities:

- Foreign internal defense.
- UW.
- Foreign humanitarian assistance.
- Coalition support.
- IO.
- Security assistance.
- HMA.
- Counterdrug.
- Combat search and rescue.
- Direct action.
- Special reconnaissance.

2-169. As with conventional forces, each SO mission and configuration has unique considerations for CA/CMO planners. Additional information on how the CA unit participates in each of these SO missions is contained in Chapter 6 of FM 41-10; FM 3-05.20, Special Forces Operations; the FM 3-05.20 series of
manuals for the SO missions and collateral activities; other related doctrinal references; and the SOF unit tactical SOP.

2-170. During operations, SOF HQ must provide the basis for a unified effort, centralized direction, and decentralized execution. Doing so includes tying interagency efforts with the military effort in the joint special operations area (JSOA). As the operational focal point for coordination with nonmilitary organizations at the tactical level, the commander must accommodate additional staff members to meet the requirements of interagency operations.

2-171. SOF at all levels conduct interagency collaborative planning and coordination across full-spectrum operations through the CMOC. The CMOC must be accessible to both USG and non-USG agencies—USAID representatives, special representatives of the UN Secretary-General, NGOs, HN agencies, and businesses—in the JSOA. The commander establishes the CMOC as soon as possible to maximize the benefits of cooperation and coordination among the various interagency players. For most SOF operations, establishment of the CMOC begins as early as the initial planning stages of the operation. Chapters 4 and 5 discuss the CMOC in more detail.

CA/CMO FULL-TIME POSITIONS OR FUNCTIONS ON THE GROUP AND BATTALION STAFF

2-172. The S-5, CMO, is responsible for full-time CA/CMO planning on the SFG and battalion staff. The S-5 staff section is small compared to the other principal staff sections. For many SOF units, the S-5 position is not filled by a full-time staff officer until deployment. Until that time, the CA/CMO planning function normally falls under the unit S-3. To be effective, all members of the CMO staff section must be trained in functional area 39C, Civil Affairs.

STAFF PLANNING AND PLAN REVIEW PROCESSES

2-173. Each SFG has tactical responsibilities in at least one theater operation plan. The group staff periodically reviews and updates the group's portion of the plan IAW guidance from the geographic combatant commander and the theater SOC commander. Once employed, planning at the group level is a continuous process that occurs concurrently with group operations. The process of maintaining a running estimate of the situation keeps the commander armed with viable options.

2-174. When operating as a JSOTF, the JSOTF staff follows the planning process outlined in JP 3-05.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations. When not operating as a JSOTF, the SFG staff plans using the MDMP. Likewise, SFODs use MDMP and TLP in developing estimates and plans.

2-175. The SF unit S-5 participates in all planning and war-gaming events undertaken by the unit staff. CA considerations in planning are found throughout this manual. Additional information on SO operational planning procedures, MDMP, and TLP may be found in Appendix E or appropriate publications.
CA PLANNING TEAM PARTICIPATION IN THE PLANNING PROCESS

2-176. The SFG and SFOB will receive CA augmentation from the CAT-A (Regional) of the CA battalion (Active Army), the CAT-C of the CA battalion (SO), and/or the functional specialty company of the CA battalion (SO). The functional specialty company will provide general support to the direct support CAT-B and CAT-A of the CA battalion (SO).

2-177. SF battalions accomplish missions as part of group and SFOB operations. The SF battalion normally establishes and operates from an FOB, which can be collocated with an SFOB, or can be thousands of miles from the higher HQ. The SF battalion deploys on short notice to conduct SF missions or collateral activities in any operational environment—permissive, uncertain, or hostile. SF battalions isolate, deploy, control, sustain, recover, and reconstitute SFOBs and Special Forces operational detachments A (SFODAs).

2-178. The battalion and FOB will receive CA augmentation from one of the CAT-Bs of the CA battalion (SO), as well as the Civic Action Team of the CA Direct Support Company.

2-179. SFGs contain three SF battalions, each consisting of three SF companies (Special Forces operational detachments B [SFODBs]). Each SF company contains six SFODAs, for a total of eighteen SFODAs within the battalion. The SFODAs are the building block tactical force of the SF battalion, and are normally tasked to perform one of the specific SF missions or collateral activities. All other SF organizations are designed to command, control, and support the SFODA.

2-180. SFODAs will receive CA augmentation from one of the CAT-As allocated to the FOB from which the SFODAs are operating. CAT-A mission support and augmentation to SFODA is based upon the SF mission or collateral activities that the SFODA is tasked to perform. Based upon METT-TC, however, CAT-A augmentation may not be required or may be limited to CA/CMO orientation training before or during isolation.

2-181. To effectively participate in the planning process, the CA planning team must be familiar with SF operations as described in FM 3-05.20. It must be capable of deploying by various means of infiltration and operating in austere and less-than-permissible environments. The CA planning team must also perform the following tasks (which are not all-inclusive or necessarily in sequential order):

- Review the campaign plans, OPLANS, and CONPLANs, as appropriate, of commands two levels up.
- Review UN, unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral treaties and agreements pertaining to the group's specified JSOA to which the United States is signatory.
- Review the NSS and NMS as they apply to the operation in which the group is participating.
- Review the pol-mil plan.
- Review any additional higher-level command guidance.
- Understand the intent and tactical focus of the group commander.
Obtain the group CCIR.

Read the primary planning document (OPLAN, OPORD, or supporting plan).

Read all supporting annexes and appendixes to the primary planning document for CA/CMO-related assumptions and activities; validate the accuracy of these assumptions and activities.

Establish and maintain a CMOC for coordination with nonmilitary organizations.

Analyze the group’s JSOA defined in the primary planning document according to METT-TC, focusing on the tactical-level civil considerations (Chapter 3). This analysis includes, but is not limited to, knowing and understanding past and ongoing local events and activities; international organization and NGO personnel, resources, and capabilities already in place in the region; the condition of the existing infrastructure; types, status, and potential uses of civil structures in the JSOA; and the intentions and potential actions of the local populace in response to military operations in the JSOA.

Obtain the group commander’s intent for CMO. It should include orientation on the civil operational centers of gravity, protection of friendly operational centers of gravity, phases of operations (such as prehostilities, lodgment, decisive combat and stabilization, follow-through, and posthostilities), and end state. Be prepared to offer specific recommendations to assist the commander in defining his intent for CMO.

Identify specified, implied, and essential CMO tasks for military forces.

Identify specified, implied, and essential CA tasks for CA forces.

Apportion CA forces against CA task requirements and ensure the forces are included in the TPFDD. Ensure commanders at all subordinate levels have a CA representative on their staff.

Determine the tactical mission, configuration, and location of the CMOC.

Write the CA annex to the OPLAN, OPORD, or supporting plan.

Incorporate CMO considerations into the primary planning document and supporting annexes and appendixes, as appropriate (for example, ROE, indirect fires, IO, logistics, interagency operations, and civil engineering support).

Analyze and archive reports from the field.

Provide input to the group’s IO cell.

Catalog resources and POCs that will be useful in updating future plans and conducting future operations.

CA PLANNING TEAM LOCATION WITHIN THE SUPPORTED STAFF’S OPERATIONAL CONFIGURATION

2-182. The SFG commander designs, executes, and sustains sequential and cumulative SF operations to support the theater campaign plan. He also synchronizes the decentralized activities of the subordinate battalions and
FOBs. The commander exercises this control with the assistance of a battle staff operating from the SFOB operations center (OPCEN), as well as a support center (SPTCEN) and a signal center (SIGCEN).

2-183. The CA/CMO planning function on the group and battalion staff resides with the S-5. When deployed, this section locates in the OPCEN, where it integrates with the OPS cell and intelligence cell. The S-5’s role includes overseeing, advising, and coordinating group CMO activities; recommending group command policy for CMO; ensuring compliance with the policy; analyzing civilian impact on military operations and the impact of military operations on civilians; and supporting other USG agencies in the JSOA.

2-184. The CA planning team must also consider where to establish and maintain the CMOC for coordination with nonmilitary organizations. Techniques for establishing and maintaining a CMOC are in Chapters 4 and 5.

**CA PLANNING TEAM EQUIPMENT AND RESOURCES**

2-185. CA team members should refer to paragraphs 2-51 through 2-53, page 2-24. The team also must have transportation and tactical communications capabilities commensurate with those of the supported unit and nonmilitary agencies in the JSOA to meet SO mission requirements.
Chapter 3

CA Methodology: Assess

Participants [at the Conference on Information Sharing in Complex Humanitarian Emergencies] noted that good preparation should include more than just knowing about the host country and its people. There should be information about past and ongoing local and international activities; personnel, resources, and capacities already in place on the ground; as well as the condition of existing infrastructure, such as telephone lines or potable water sources. Participants further agreed that responsibility for knowing and sharing this information begins during predeployment planning and continues through mission implementation and into postconflict reconstruction. Gathering this information should be part of each organization's preparation, participants said.

United States Institute Of Peace Report,
Taking It to the Next Level: Civilian-Military Cooperation in Complex Emergencies,
31 August 2000

OVERVIEW

3-1. One of the hallmarks of a CA soldier is his ability to conduct an assessment. CA teams and individuals conduct assessments upon receipt of a mission, upon arrival in a designated operational area, continuously during operations, and as directed for special or emergency cases. The purpose of each assessment is to determine current conditions; compare them to a defined norm, established standards, or MOEs; and identify needs or requirements that can be addressed by CA activities or CMO. This includes the needs and requirements of the supported commander or organization, other civilian agencies associated with the mission, and the local populace.

3-2. As the entry step into the CA methodology, assess normally begins with the receipt of a mission. The preliminary assessment and the mission analysis process characterize this step. CA soldiers take an initial look at the nonmilitary factors—CASCOPE—that shape the operational environment. They do this for each of the 16 functional specialties, as well as the general aspects of the AO. At the end of this step, CA soldiers produce an initial estimate and a restated mission statement for CA or task-organized forces. They also determine who (NGOs, government organizations, or other military and civilian agencies) needs to be involved in the next step—the decision-making process.

3-3. This chapter will focus on the activities that support and occur during the assess phase. It relates CA planning and assessment tasks to each of the problem-solving and decision-making processes. A more detailed discussion of the CA role in these processes is in Appendix E.
ASSESSMENTS

3-4. CA soldiers perform two basic types of assessments: the preliminary assessment and the deliberate assessment. The objectives of the preliminary assessment are—

- To analyze known information about the situation or conditions in the AO.
- To relate U.S. policy, goals, and objectives to the current situation.
- To determine the best use of assigned assets to meet the known challenges of the assigned mission.

The objectives of the deliberate assessment are—

- To validate the preliminary assessment.
- To finalize or modify operations that were planned prior to deployment into the AO.

PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT

3-5. The preliminary assessment is conducted upon receipt of every CA mission or tasking. It is an automatic first step of mission analysis and feeds into the civil IPB process. This assessment is characterized by an analysis of all information known about the area or situation up to the moment of receipt of the mission or tasking. Much of this information may be old, secondhand, or incomplete requiring planners to make assumptions until information shortfalls can be answered by a more detailed, deliberate assessment made upon entry into the AO. The CMO estimate includes information from the preliminary assessment.

3-6. During the preliminary assessment, the CA/CMO planner consults previously prepared area studies for the region that encompasses the AO. The CA/CMO planner also researches current data and statistics pertaining to the designated area, using the CA area assessment format in FM 41-10 and the principles of METT-TC for analyzing a situation, which are described later in this chapter. Sources of current information include intelligence summaries, special operations debrief and retrieval system (SODARS) reports, magazine and newspaper articles, and the Internet. When using the Internet, the CA/CMO planner seeks links to government organizations and NGOs on the ground, such as USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) or NGOs’ ties to the UN Relief Web. The CA/CMO planner considers accuracy, reliability, and timeliness of the sources during analysis, to include—

- Understanding the combatant commander’s strategic intent and operational focus.
- Reading the primary planning document (campaign plan, OPLAN, CONPLAN, functional plan, or supporting plan).
- Reading all supporting annexes and appendixes to the primary planning document for CA/CMO-related assumptions and activities, and validating the accuracy of these assumptions and activities.
- Establishing and maintaining a CMOC for coordination with nonmilitary organizations.
• Analyzing the geographic AO defined in the primary planning document according to METT-TC, focusing on the strategic-level civil considerations.
• Analyzing and archiving reports from the field.
• Cataloging resources and POCs that will be useful in updating future plans and conducting future operations.

3-7. The CA/CMO planner also relates U.S. policy, goals, and objectives to the current situation, to include—
• Reviewing the NSS and NMS.
• Reviewing the pol-mil plan.
• Reviewing the theater security cooperation plan.
• Reviewing UN, unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral treaties and agreements to which the United States is signatory.
• Reviewing any additional guidance from the JCS.
• Reviewing alliance and coalition plans.

3-8. The CA/CMO planner determines the best use of assigned assets to meet the known challenges of the assigned mission, to include—
• Identifying specified, implied, and essential CMO tasks for military forces.
• Identifying specified, implied, and essential CA tasks for CA forces.
• Apportioning CA forces against CA task requirements and ensuring the forces are included in TPFDD.
• Incorporating CMO considerations into the primary planning document and supporting annexes and appendixes, as appropriate (for example, ROE, indirect fires, IO, logistics, interagency operations, and civil engineering support).

DELIBERATE ASSESSMENT

3-9. The deliberate assessment is conducted during the develop and detect phase—normally upon entry into the AO, continually throughout an operation, and as directed for special or emergency cases. The deliberate assessment is characterized by firsthand observation, interviews, surveys, and other tools used to make more knowledgeable decisions. Further discussion of deliberate assessments is in Chapter 5.

ANALYZING THE CIVILIAN COMPONENT OF METT-TC

3-10. Commanders and staffs analyze every situation and potential COAs using the factors of METT-TC. One of the most basic tasks of CA soldiers is to analyze and assess the civil considerations. Initial analysis is continuously updated by assessment based on firsthand observation of events, personal reconnaissance of the AO, interaction with civilians, and research of applicable data sources.

3-11. Civil considerations are a factor in every offensive, defensive, stability, and support operation. At both the operational and tactical levels, civil considerations generally focus on the immediate impact of civilians on the
operation being considered. An appreciation of civil considerations enhances the commander's selection of objectives; location, movement, and control of forces; use of weapons; and force protection measures. It also helps him avoid, or at least minimize, "mission creep" into civil areas that are beyond his mission parameters or resource capabilities. Mission creep occurs when commanders choose to use, or are forced to use, their resources to address (allegedly) unforeseen factors after they have begun an operation.

This deepening involvement of U.S. forces in combat operations during UNOSOM II has been criticized as “mission creep,” despite the fact that these changes in both mission and direction clearly resulted from specific decisions reached by the National Command Authorities. However, the important lesson for future planners that can be derived from this experience is that the best way to avoid mission creep is to analyze what the mission really calls for; this means constantly measuring the mission against milestones that best indicate its success or failure. The choice of milestones is especially important. In peace operations, these measures should not normally be expressed in terms of enemy killed and wounded or kilometers of ground taken; if they are, this is itself an indicator that the peace operation has changed in ways that should call into question both the mission and the mandate. In fact, the best measures of success may well be those that signal reductions in the level of violence. Other important indicators may be expressed in terms of the numbers of children being fed, gallons of potable water being pumped, or weapons being turned in. While specific criteria will depend upon the mission, all must be capable of answering one basic question: "How will we know when we have won?"

Institute for National Strategic Studies,
_Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned_,
By Kenneth Allard,
January 1995

3-12. Civil considerations also affect larger, long-term diplomatic, economic, and informational issues. Discounting these issues can tax military or government resources and can hinder the transition of operations to follow-on elements. If the military mission is to support civil authorities, civil considerations define the mission.

3-13. A simple technique for analyzing civil considerations, used by untrained analysts or when time is too short for in-depth research, is for the commander or planner to ask the following questions:

- Who are the civilians we might encounter in our AO?
- Where, why, and when might we encounter them?
- What activities are those civilians engaged in that might affect our operations?
- How might our operations affect civilian activities?

The following paragraphs describe a more appropriate and enlightened technique used by professional CA soldiers.
3-14. The mnemonic OAKOC is used by military leaders when analyzing an AO for terrain and weather considerations. OAKOC stands for observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, and cover and concealment.

3-15. Similarly, civil considerations are analyzed using the mnemonic CASCOPE. The six characteristics are—

- Civil Areas.
- Structures.
- Capabilities.
- Organizations.
- People.
- Events.

CIVIL AREAS

3-16. In tactical operations, key terrain is any locality or area whose seizure or retention affords a marked advantage to either combatant. The leader considers key terrain in his selection of objectives, support positions, and routes in the offense, and on the positioning of his unit in the defense.

3-17. Civil areas are key localities or aspects of the terrain within a commander’s battlespace that are not normally thought of as militarily significant. Failure to consider key civil areas, however, can seriously affect the success of any military mission.

3-18. The commander must analyze key civil areas from two perspectives: how do these areas affect the military mission and how do military operations impact on civilian activities in these areas? At times, the answers to these questions may dramatically influence major portions of the COAs being considered.

3-19. The following are examples of key civil areas that a commander should closely analyze:

- Locations of government centers. These areas are often richer, more populated, better educated, and contain greater and more advanced infrastructure than outlying areas. They are also often the center of influence over the populace in outlying areas. Depending on mission priorities, commanders may consider aggressively engaging these areas rather than bypassing them.

- Areas defined by political boundaries (districts within a city or municipalities within a region). Political boundaries are often well defined and respected not just by political leaders but also by the population of the areas. Commanders might consider overlaying unit boundaries on political boundaries for long-term operations for practical control purposes.

- Social, political, religious, or criminal enclaves. These are sources of potential problems and may pose a threat to U.S. forces.

- Agricultural and mining regions and trade routes. Routine economic activities may hinder the movement or staging of military resources. Likewise, interfering with operations related to the economy of an area
may bring an unnecessary burden on military units or logistical resources in the area.

- Possible sites for the temporary settlement of DCs or other civil functions. Often, the same considerations that make a site ideal for positioning a military unit will also make it ideal for a DC camp or other such settlement. Commanders must consider the long-term practical and environmental consequences of occupying certain civil areas.

**STRUCTURES**

3-20. Existing civil structures take on many significant roles. Some, such as bridges, communications towers, power plants, and dams, are traditional high-payoff targets. Others, such as churches, mosques, national libraries, and hospitals, are cultural sites that are generally protected by international law or other agreements. Still others are facilities with practical applications, such as jails, warehouses, schools, television stations, radio stations, and print plants, that may be useful for military purposes.

3-21. Analyzing structures involves determining the location, functions, capabilities, and application in support of military operations. It also involves weighing the consequences of removing them from civilian use in terms of political, economic, religious, social, and informational implications; the reaction of the populace; and replacement costs.

**CAPABILITIES**

3-22. Civil capabilities can be viewed from several perspectives. The term capabilities may refer to—

- Existing capabilities of the populace to sustain itself, such as through public administration, public safety, emergency services, and food and agriculture systems.
- Capabilities with which the populace needs assistance, such as public works and utilities, public health, economics, and commerce.
- Resources and services that can be contracted to support the military mission, such as interpreters, laundry services, construction materials, and equipment. Local vendors, the HN, or other nations may provide these resources and services. In hostile territory, civil capabilities include resources that may be taken and used by military forces consistent with international law.

3-23. CA soldiers use the 16 CA specialties to identify existing capabilities of the HN to address various issues. They also identify the capabilities of partner countries and organizations involved in the operation. In doing so, CA soldiers consider how to address shortfalls, as well as how to capitalize on strengths in capabilities.

**ORGANIZATIONS**

3-24. Civil organizations are organized groups that may or may not be affiliated with government agencies. They can be church groups, fraternal organizations, patriotic or service organizations, and community watch groups. They might be international organizations of the NGO community.
3-25. Organizations can assist the commander in keeping the populace informed of ongoing and future activities in an AO and influencing the actions of civilians. They can also form the nucleus of self-help programs, interim-governing bodies, civil defense efforts, and other activities.

PEOPLE

3-26. People, both individually and collectively, can have a positive, negative, or no impact on military operations. In the context of CASCOPE, the term people includes all the civilians or nonmilitary personnel one can expect to encounter in an AO. The term may also extend to those outside the AO whose actions, opinions, or political influence can affect the military mission. In all military operations, U.S. forces must be prepared to encounter and work closely with civilians of all types.

Civilians Encountered in the AO

3-27. Who These Civilians May Be. Regardless of the nature of the operation, military forces will usually encounter civilians of various kinds living and operating in and around the military AO. To facilitate determining who they might be, it is useful to separate civilians into distinct categories. In foreign operations, these categories might include—

- Local nationals.
- HN civil authorities.
- Expatriates.
- Foreign employees of multinational corporations (MNCs) or IROs.
- USG and third-nation government agency representatives.
- UN representatives.
- Contractors.
- Morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) personnel.
- DOD civilians.
- The media.

3-28. In domestic support operations (DSO), these categories might include—

- Local disaster victims.
- Local, regional, or national domestic civil authorities.
- Emergency service agencies.
- NGOs.
- Industry.
- The media.

3-29. It may also be useful to assess whether and to what extent these categories consist of males; females; and the young, elderly, healthy, ill, educated, or uneducated people. These factors may influence how military forces deal with them, as well as how they might respond to military forces.

3-30. Where, Why, and When These Civilians May Be Encountered. Civilians may be encountered in the AO at almost any time or place and for a
variety of reasons. Analysts must often use historical precedents, informed judgment, as well as their imaginations to determine the most likely reasons civilians may be encountered. For example—

- During Operation EAGLE CLAW (the failed hostage rescue attempt in Iran), a busload of Iranian civilians, a fuel truck, and a pickup truck unexpectedly drove into the remote Desert One refuel site shortly after 10:00 p.m. and had to be detained by SO soldiers.

- During Operation DESERT STORM, SF soldiers, while occupying a hide site that was dug into the open desert floor during the hours of darkness, were compromised at daybreak by a Bedouin child tending goats.

- During Operation RESTORE HOPE, despite the presence of hundreds of NGOs and IROs, local elders consistently approached the compounds and strong point positions of U.S. and international security forces throughout Somalia with requests for direct assistance in the areas of food, water, security, health care, and education.

- During intense fighting against the militia of the Somali National Alliance in Mogadishu, Somalia on 3–4 October 1993, members of Task Force Ranger routinely encountered innocent civilian bystanders, as well as civilian women and children actively engaged in combat and combat support roles against the Task Force.

Activities of Civilians That Might Affect Operations

3-31. Civilian activities are dictated primarily by the type of environment in which they occur. Each category of civilian should be considered separately, as their activities will impact differently, both positively and negatively, on all BOSs. Examples of the types of questions CA soldiers and supported unit staff planners must carefully consider for the BOS activities in foreign operations are outlined below:

- Local nationals. These include town and city dwellers, farmers and other rural dwellers, and nomads in the AO.
  - Are the local nationals peacefully going about their daily life activities, or have their daily lives been disrupted to the point that they require outside assistance?
  - Are they evacuating their homes for safer rear areas, clogging the main supply routes, and placing a burden on CA units' limited resources to sustain them?
  - Are they staying put in basements and other temporary shelters?
  - Are they supportive or nonsupportive of CA soldiers’ presence?
  - What resources do they have that CA personnel can purchase or obtain by contract to augment logistics needs?

- HN civil authorities. These include elected and traditional leaders at all levels of government.
  - How much influence do the leaders have over their constituents?
  - Are they supportive of CA soldiers’ presence or are they inciting the local nationals against CA?
- Do they have viable civil defense plans and the capabilities to put them in effect?
- Are they seeking CA personnel’s direct assistance to alleviate their plight?
- Can they provide useful information about CA personnel’s AO?

- Employees of MNCs and IROs.
  - Are foreign employees conducting business as usual, or are they seeking to be evacuated?
  - What kind of security forces, if any, do they employ?
  - Will their own logistics operations compete with CA for resources, such as port facilities; storage facilities; and air, rail, or ground transportation?
  - Are they supportive of CA soldiers’ presence?
  - What are their capabilities, and how effective might they be in supporting the local populace during relief operations?
  - Do they have any contractible resources or historical information that may be useful to CA personnel?

- UN representatives. These include high-level UN representatives and lower-level employees.
  - What UN agencies are present and what are their charters?
  - What is the relationship between CA’s operations and UN operations?
  - Can CA personnel expect very important persons (VIPs) in their AO?

- USG and third-nation government representatives. These include members of the Country Team, USAID, and similar agencies of foreign nations involved in the operation.
  - What U.S. and third-nation government agencies are in the AO and how do their operations relate to CA?
  - What useful information might they have?
  - Do CA units need to furnish LNOs?

- Contractors. These include U.S. citizens, local nationals, and third-nation citizens providing contract services to CA’s operation.
  - What contractors are present and what support activities are they providing?
  - Do they need resources from CA, such as security, subsistence, or real estate?

- DOD civilians. These are not contractors; they are members of TOE and TDA units. DOD civilians are playing an increasingly greater role in combat support and CSS. They will be there even in the absence of the categories of civilians listed thus far.
  - How many DOD civilians are in the AO?
  - What roles do they play in the organization?
• The media. This includes journalists from print, radio, and visual media.
  ▪ Are they self-sufficient or do they require support, such as transportation and security?
  ▪ Can CA personnel expect their coverage of military activities to help or hinder the overall mission?
  ▪ What aspects of the area are the media focused on?

3-32. Similar questions apply in DSO. The answers should, at a minimum, provide awareness of what units can expect to encounter in their AO.

Operations That Affect Civilian Activities

3-33. Military operations affect civilian activities in various ways throughout the spectrum of conflict. In war, conflict, or stability operations and support operations, commanders should consider the political, economic, psychological, environmental, and legal impact of their operations on the categories of civilians they have identified in their AO. The following are examples of the types of questions CA soldiers and staff planners must carefully consider for the BOS activities in foreign operations.

• Political. This can be at the local, regional, national, or international levels.
  ▪ Do CA operations support the overall political objective of the military mission?
  ▪ Do CA actions tend to improperly or inappropriately favor one group, faction, or leader over another?
  ▪ Can CA actions be exploited by opposing political groups, factions, or leaders?

• Economic. This pertains to local economic activities, as well as the activities of MNCs and IROs.
  ▪ Is military seaport, airport, or highway traffic interfering with commercial or developmental traffic in the AO?
  ▪ Are military operations attracting large numbers of vendors to CA’s AO?
  ▪ Who are the economic beneficiaries of CA personnel’s presence: legitimate local community members or local criminal elements?
  ▪ Are military payments to local individuals or groups for goods and services contributing to shifts in the local economic or political power structure?

• Psychological. Military operations can have a tremendous psychological impact on noncombatants. What CA personnel do or fail to do to mitigate hardship will often influence the amount of cooperation they receive from the populace.
  ▪ Are CA personnel doing everything possible to care for the innocent victims of collateral damage, or are CA personnel ignoring them?
  ▪ Are CA personnel respecting the social, cultural, or religious norms and practices in the AO?
NOTE: Negative public sentiment directed toward military forces often creates force protection issues from asymmetric threats. CA personnel must consider this in their operations security plans.

- Environmental. Military operations impact the civilian environment in various ways. At some point, CA personnel must begin to consider what their role will be to help civilians recover from the effects of CA operations.
  - What effect are CA operations having on shelters, infrastructure, and subsistence mechanisms in the AO?
  - With respect to contractors and DOD civilians, how are CA operations affecting their ability to support CA?
  - Do CA personnel allow them freedom of movement throughout the AO for them to be effective?

- Legal. The commander is responsible for everything that happens within his defined geographic AOR. The commander's primary responsibilities are to the mission and to the soldiers under his command. The commander is also bound by international law (the Geneva-Hague Conventions) to safeguard noncombatant life and property. In this respect, the commander must ensure that noncombatants have the resources and capabilities to take care of themselves. If noncombatants cannot support themselves, the commander must consider if, how, and when to provide the basics of life—food, water, shelter, and security—until this responsibility can be passed on to higher HQ, local civil authorities, or IROs.

3-34. Similar questions apply in DSO. Again, the answers should, at a minimum, provide awareness of what units can expect to happen in their AO as a result of their operations.

3-35. One important factor CA soldiers must consider and advise unit commanders about, especially in posthostility operations, is the tendency for lower-level military units and individuals to want to use military resources to alleviate the suffering they observe. Doing so may jeopardize the military mission, as well as interfere with the ongoing or planned projects of HN authorities or IROs. Military support to the civil sector must be tied to a centralized relief plan. This support must not become a factor that makes civilians dependent on military forces or that pulls them toward or in the way of the military force. Soldiers and unit leaders must consult with the appropriate civilian agencies before embarking on self-imposed relief efforts.

3-36. If unit-level relief efforts are not interfering with any other organization or agency, then soldiers and unit leaders must consider the long-term impact of the assistance. Is the purpose of the assistance merely to make soldiers feel good, or will there really be some long-term benefit to the community? Is the program something that can be sustained by the local populace, or will the benefit end when the unit leaves?

EVENTS

3-37. As there are many different categories of civilians, there are many categories of civilian events that may affect the military mission. Some
examples are planting and harvest seasons, elections, riots, and evacuations (both voluntary and involuntary). Likewise, there are military events that impact on the lives of civilians in an AO. Some examples are combat operations, including indirect fires, deployments and redeployments, and payday. Once the analyst determines what events are occurring, it is useful to analyze the events for their political, economic, psychological, environmental, and legal implications. An example of the types of seasonal events that should be considered during METT-TC analysis is in Table 3-1.

Table 3-1. Seasonal Civilian Events From KFOR 2 OPLAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Months</th>
<th>Season</th>
<th>Civilian Events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>December–February</td>
<td>Winter</td>
<td>Period of establishing policies and pre-positioning stocks for spring (period of reconstruction). Winter holidays.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March–April</td>
<td>Spring (Transition Period)</td>
<td>Harvesting of winter wheat; planting. Continuing to pre-position stocks; initiation of reconstruction. Seasonal floods. Large number of births from summer weddings. Period of planning for children out of school in summer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>Fall</td>
<td>Children and young adults back in school.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September–November</td>
<td>Fall (Transition Period)</td>
<td>Harvest; winter wheat planting. Preparation for winter and establishment of contingency plans. Elections and installation of government. First frosts (follows elevation).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CA SPECIALTY TEAM AND TACTICAL TEAM CONSIDERATIONS

3-38. One of the implied tasks of the assess phase is to be thoroughly familiar with the capabilities and limitations of assigned assets. The following discussion is designed to give CA/CMO planners a better understanding of both specialty and tactical team operations.

SPECIALTY TEAM OPERATIONS

3-39. CA specialty teams have their roots in the military governments of World War II. In Africa, Europe, Japan, Korea, the Philippines, and elsewhere, CA specialists followed closely behind liberating forces or arrived with occupying forces. Operating at the national level, as well as at the provincial and local levels, skilled individuals and teams oversaw the recovery of infrastructure from the destructive effects of years of foreign occupation and combat operations.

3-40. Today, CA specialty teams retain skills and expertise to perform similar missions, known collectively as support to civil administration. These skills, found and developed only in the civil sector, enable military commanders to effectively support civil authorities in the event of emergencies, support weakened governments of friendly nations, and assume the functions of defeated or nonexistent governments, as directed by the SECDEF.

3-41. CA specialty teams are retained for reasons other than for their performance in postconflict operations. Their knowledge and expertise are pertinent to all phases of military and interagency operations across the spectrum of operations. As part of the collaborative planning process in the CMOC, they are particularly valuable in the areas of analyzing and tracking current conditions, identifying MOEs, and coordinating the actions required to return an area to normal as quickly as possible once hostilities cease or recovery operations begin.

3-42. CA specialty teams must be integrated early into strategic and operational plans and plan review processes, focused particularly on the portions of plans that address end state. Since they must remain familiar with current conditions in their associated AO, they should also be integrated into reachback operations. As a reachback asset, they would serve as an information resource, as well as a sounding board for collaborative planning efforts.

3-43. There are 16 functional specialties. They reside in four broad categories that reflect the basic elements of modern societies. These include the functions of government, economics and commerce, public facilities, and five special functions. Figure 3-1, page 3-14, depicts these categories and the 16 functional specialties.
3-44. CA functional specialists are found in every CA unit. CA specialty teams vary in composition according to the CA command level to which they are assigned. The composition of each team is found in FM 41-10.

3-45. When employed, the specialty teams operate at various levels of supported command, generally based on the planning associations of their parent CA units. The operational focus of the CA specialty team is at the same level of operation as the supported unit or organization, as shown in Figure 3-2, page 3-15.

3-46. CA specialty teams also orient their plans and activities toward specific levels of government in an AO. For practical purposes, the levels of operation generally correspond to the levels of government depicted in Figure 3-2. There is sufficient overlap, however, that requires CA specialists to be prepared to operate at any level.

3-47. The 16 CA specialties are organized into government, economics and commerce, public facilities, or special functions. The specialty teams of the CACOM and CA brigade comprise the technical expertise of all 16 functional specialties. The specialty team of the CA battalion (USAR) and the civic action team of the CA battalion (SO) provide expertise in several, but not all, of the 16 functional specialty skills.

3-48. All CA specialists are required to perform the tasks of their functional specialty. They must also perform the common CA operational skills—those skills common to both CA generalists and CA specialists—discussed in Chapter 4. The remainder of this chapter provides techniques and procedures associated with each functional specialty. Individual specialists and specialty teams must adapt these techniques and procedures to meet the requirements of their particular mission, based on METT-TC.
Figure 3-2. Example of Specialty Teams Related to Supported Commands and Levels of Operation

**Government Function**

3-49. The government function includes the specialties of international law, public administration, public education, public health, and public safety. Table 3-2, page 3-16, lists the CA specialists who participate in the government function. The primary goals of the government function are to ensure—

- Legal systems conform to accepted international law principles.
- Governmental processes are viable and supported by the local populace.
- An education system is established, functioning, and sustainable.
- Public health systems are in place, viable, and available to all.
- Public safety organizations exist that meet the needs of the populace and operate in a nondiscriminatory manner.

Table 3-2. CA Teams That Perform Government Functions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CACOM Government Team</th>
<th>Sanitary Engineer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Team Chief</td>
<td>Team Sergeant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Administration Officer</td>
<td>Civil Affairs NCO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Education Officer</td>
<td>Civil Affairs Specialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Safety Officer</td>
<td>Tactical CA Battalion Public Administration Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Health Officer</td>
<td>Team Chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veterinary Preventive Medicine Officer</td>
<td>International Law Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Public Administration Officer</td>
<td>Public Administration Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Public Education Officer</td>
<td>Team Sergeant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Public Safety Officer</td>
<td>Civil Affairs Specialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Law Officer</td>
<td>CA Battalion (SO) Civic Action Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Science Officer</td>
<td>Dentist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanitary Engineer</td>
<td>Physician Assistant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Team Sergeant</td>
<td>Veterinary Service Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Affairs Specialist</td>
<td>Preventive Medicine NCO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CA Brigade Government Team</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Team Chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Administration Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Education Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Safety Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public Health Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veterinary Preventive Medicine Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Public Administration Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assistant Public Education Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Public Safety Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Law Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clinical Nurse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Science Officer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3-50. International law specialists are attorneys-at-law (Judge Advocate 27A) who provide expertise in the organization and functions of HN or foreign national judicial systems; the interpretation of local, national, and international laws; and review and analysis of treaties and agreements. The primary mission of international law specialists is to assist and ensure that foreign legal systems are modeled to conform to accepted international standards. International law specialists advise commanders at all levels on how these areas affect plan development and strategic, operational, and tactical operations. As Judge Advocate attorneys, when required, they may also perform duties as—

- Assistant to the SJA as advisor to the local commander during missions of civil assistance.
- Liaison or advisor to the judicial system of a foreign government during missions of civil administration in friendly territory.
- An official in the judicial system of a military government during missions of civil administration in occupied territory.

3-51. International law specialists do not normally function as judge advocate general corps officers in the discipline and practice of international law for U.S. forces. As qualified Judge Advocate officers, they may assist the SJA in educating and training U.S. personnel in the foreign national legal
system, obligations, and consequences. They may also advise and assist the SJA in international law issues affecting U.S. forces. Whenever they are directed to assist and advise U.S. forces, they should always coordinate that support through the appropriate unit SJA.

3-52. Public administration specialists provide expertise in the organization and functions of government services, agencies, systems, and processes. This expertise includes an understanding of the political systems and military forces of an AO. Public administration specialists advise commanders at all levels on how these areas affect plan development and strategic, operational, and tactical operations. When required, they may also perform duties as—

- Advisor to the local commander during missions of civil assistance.
- Liaison or advisor to various public administration agencies of a foreign government during missions of civil administration in friendly territory.
- An official in the public administration system of a military government during missions of civil administration in occupied territory.

3-53. Public education specialists provide expertise in the organization, structure, and facilities of primary (elementary), secondary, and post-secondary school systems. Public education specialists advise commanders at all levels on how these areas affect plan development and strategic, operational, and tactical operations. When required, they may also perform duties as—

- Advisor to the local commander during missions of civil assistance.
- Liaison or advisor to the education system of a foreign government during missions of civil administration in friendly territory.
- An official in the education system of a military government during missions of civil administration in occupied territory.

3-54. Public health specialists provide expertise in public health issues and the organization and functions of public health and sanitation systems, agencies, and programs. Public health specialists advise commanders at all levels on how these areas affect plan development and strategic, operational, and tactical operations. When required, they may also perform duties as—

- Advisor to the local commander during missions of civil assistance.
- Liaison or advisor to the public health and sanitation systems of a foreign government during missions of civil administration in friendly territory.
- An official in the public health or sanitation system of a military government during missions of civil administration in occupied territory.

3-55. Public safety specialists provide expertise in the organization, functions, capabilities, and facilities of public safety systems. Areas covered include police and law enforcement administration, fire protection, emergency rescue, and penal institutions. Public safety specialists advise commanders at all levels on how these areas affect plan development and strategic, operational, and tactical operations. When required, they may also perform duties as—

- Advisor to the local commander during missions of civil assistance.
- Liaison or advisor to the public safety systems of a foreign government during missions of civil administration in friendly territory.
• An official in the public safety systems of a military government during missions of civil administration in occupied territory.

**Economics and Commerce Functions**

There is an acute need for such a body [of civilian experts] because the success of future operations from this base will depend very largely upon the speed with which the economy of this country [Tunisia] is rehabilitated, at least to the point of sustaining a majority of the population above the starvation level.


3-56. The economics and commerce functions include the specialties of civilian supply, economic development, and food and agriculture. Table 3-3, page 3-19, lists the CA specialists who participate in the economics and commerce functions. The primary goals of the economic and commerce functions are to ensure—

• Civilian resources used in support of military operations are obtained and accounted for according to international law and U.S. policy while maintaining adequate civilian resources to support the essential needs of the populace.

• Systems and incentives exist to stimulate economic development.

• Resources, facilities, and systems exist that support the production, processing, storage, and distribution of food, fiber, and wood products.

3-57. Civilian supply specialists provide expertise in the organization, functions, services, and facilities of government and commercial supply systems. Areas covered include transportation, storage, and distribution systems. Civilian supply specialists also are instrumental in the identification and acquisition of resources essential for military operations and civilian requirements. Civilian supply specialists advise commanders at all levels on how these areas affect plan development and strategic, operational, and tactical operations. When required, they may also perform duties as—

• Advisor to the local commander during missions of civil assistance.

• Liaison or advisor to the civilian supply agencies of a foreign government during missions of civil administration in friendly territory.

• An official in the civil supply administration of a military government during missions of civil administration in occupied territory.
### Table 3-3. CA Teams That Perform Economics and Commerce Functions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CACOM Economics and Commerce Team</th>
<th>Assistant Economics Development Officer (Labor)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Team Chief</td>
<td>Assistant Economics Development Officer (Finance)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food and Agriculture Officer</td>
<td>Assistant Economics Development Officer (Projects)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economics Development Officer (Commerce)</td>
<td>Assistant Civilian Supply Officer (Property Control)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economics Development Officer (Labor)</td>
<td>Assistant Civilian Supply Officer (FNS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economics Development Officer (Finance)</td>
<td>Team Sergeant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Supply Officer (Price Control)</td>
<td>Civil Affairs NCO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Supply Officer (Property Control)</td>
<td>Civil Affairs Specialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Food and Agriculture Officer</td>
<td>CA Battalion (SO) Civic Action Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Economics Officer</td>
<td>Veterinary Service Officer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CA Brigade Economics and Commerce Team</th>
<th>Preventive Medicine NCO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Team Chief</td>
<td>CA Battalion (Active Army) Civic Action Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food and Agriculture Officer</td>
<td>Battalion Veterinarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economics Development Officer (Commerce)</td>
<td>Public Health Advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economics Development Officer (Labor)</td>
<td>Team Medic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economics Development Officer (Finance)</td>
<td>Tactical CA Battalion Civilian Supply Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economics Development Officer (Projects)</td>
<td>Team Chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Supply Officer (Price Control)</td>
<td>Civilian Supply Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Supply Officer (Property Control)</td>
<td>Team Sergeant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Supply Officer (FNS)</td>
<td>Civil Affairs NCO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Food and Agriculture Officer</td>
<td>Civil Affairs Specialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Economics Development Officer (Commerce)</td>
<td>Material Contracting/Accounting Specialist (2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3-58. Economic development specialists provide expertise in the structure, functions, services, agencies, facilities, and resources of economic systems. Areas covered include treasury, banking, and market systems; fiscal policy and controls; budgetary procedures; foreign trade; industrial and commercial activities; labor issues; and black market activities. Economic development specialists advise commanders at all levels on how these areas affect plan development and strategic, operational, and tactical operations. When required, they may also perform duties as—

- Advisor to the local commander during missions of civil assistance.
- Liaison or advisor to the economic development agencies of a foreign government during missions of civil administration in friendly territory.
- An official in the economic development administration of a military government during missions of civil administration in occupied territory.

3-59. Food and agriculture specialists provide expertise in the organization, functions, services, and facilities of government and commercial food and agriculture systems. Areas covered include the production, processing, storing, transporting, distributing, marketing, and rationing of food and agricultural products, and the equipment and supplies associated with these activities. Food and agriculture specialists advise commanders at all levels on how these areas affect plan development and strategic, operational, and tactical operations. When required, they may also perform duties as—

- Advisor to the local commander during missions of civil assistance.
- Liaison or advisor to the food and agriculture agencies of a foreign government during missions of civil administration in friendly territory.
- An official in the food and agriculture administration of a military government during missions of civil administration in occupied territory.
Food and agricultural resources include the following:

- Livestock.
- Poultry.
- Grain.
- Vegetables.
- Fruit.
- Fish.
- Fiber.
- Forestry.

### Public Facilities Function

3-60. The public facilities function includes the specialties of public communications, transportation, and public works and utilities. Table 3-4 lists the CA specialists who participate in the public facilities function. The primary goals of the public facilities function are to ensure—

- Adequate communications services exist to support public services and private enterprise.
- Adequate transportation systems are in place to allow the mobility of people and goods.
- Facilities that support power generation, public water, sewage treatment, sanitation, flood control, port operations, public housing, and other public works and utilities are built, operating, and properly maintained.

**Table 3-4. CA Teams That Perform Public Facilities Functions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CACOM Public Facilities Team</th>
<th>Assistant Public Transportation Officer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Team Chief</td>
<td>Assistant Public Works Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Transportation Officer</td>
<td>Team Sergeant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Works Officer (Utilities)</td>
<td>Civil Affairs NCO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Works Officer (Facilities)</td>
<td>Tactical CA Battalion Public Works and Utilities Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Communications Officer</td>
<td>Team Chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Public Transportation Officer</td>
<td>Public Works Officer (Utilities)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Public Works Officer</td>
<td>Public Works Officer (Facilities)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Team Sergeant</td>
<td>Team Sergeant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Affairs Specialist</td>
<td>Power Plant Operator</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CA Brigade Public Facilities Team</th>
<th>Civil Affairs NCO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Team Chief</td>
<td>Civil Affairs Specialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Transportation Officer</td>
<td>CA Battalion (SO) Civic Action Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Works Officer (Utilities)</td>
<td>Construction Engineer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Works Officer (Facilities)</td>
<td>CA Battalion (Active Army) Civic Action Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Communications Officer</td>
<td>Team Engineer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3-61. Public communications specialists provide expertise in the organization, functions, services, and facilities of government and commercial communications systems. Areas covered include postal services, telephone, telegraph, radio, television, computer systems, and print media. Public communications specialists advise commanders at all levels on how these
areas affect plan development and strategic, operational, and tactical operations. When required, they may also perform duties as—

- Advisor to the local commander during missions of civil assistance.
- Liaison or advisor to the public communications agencies of a foreign government during missions of civil administration in friendly territory.
- An official in the public communications administration of a military government during missions of civil administration in occupied territory.

3-62. Transportation specialists provide expertise in the organization, functions, services, and facilities of government and commercial transportation systems. These systems include motor vehicles, roads, trains, railways, boats, waterways, aircraft, airports, and pipelines. Transportation specialists advise commanders at all levels on how these areas affect plan development and strategic, operational, and tactical operations. When required, they may also perform duties as—

- Advisor to the local commander during missions of civil assistance.
- Liaison or advisor to the public transportation agencies of a foreign government during missions of civil administration in friendly territory.
- An official in the transportation administration of a military government during missions of civil administration in occupied territory.

3-63. Public works and utilities specialists provide expertise in the organization, functions, services, facilities, and maintenance of government and commercial public works and utilities systems. These systems include electric power; natural gas; water production and distribution; sewage collection, treatment, and disposal; flood control facilities; sanitation services and facilities; port facilities; public housing; and other public buildings and facilities. Public works and utilities specialists advise commanders at all levels on how these areas affect plan development and strategic, operational, and tactical operations. When required, they may also perform duties as—

- Advisor to the local commander during missions of civil assistance.
- Liaison or advisor to the public works and utilities agencies of a foreign government during missions of civil administration in friendly territory.
- An official in the public works and utilities administration of a military government during missions of civil administration in occupied territory.

Special Functions

3-64. The special functions include the specialties of civil information, cultural relations, DCs, emergency services, and environmental management. Table 3-5, page 3-22, lists the CA specialists who participate in these functions. The primary goals of the special functions are to ensure—

- Resources, organizations, plans, and agreements exist that support the dissemination of civil information through various media while retaining a “single voice” message.
- Friendly forces understand, preserve, and protect the social and cultural aspects of an AO, including traditions, language, and significant cultural property and facilities.
Resources, organizations, plans, and agreements exist that minimize civilian interference with military operations and protect civilians from combat operations.

Resources, organizations, plans, and agreements exist that support mitigation of, preparedness for, response to, and recovery from natural, man-made, and technological disasters.

Adequate systems, agencies, services, personnel, resources, and facilities exist to support environmental and pollution control.

Table 3-5. CA Teams That Perform Special Functions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CACOM Special Functions Team</th>
<th>Civil Affairs NCO (3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Team Chief</td>
<td>Civil Affairs Specialist (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Services Officer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Management Officer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Relations Officer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dislocated Civilians Officer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Emergency Services Officer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Civil Information Officer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Dislocated Civilians Officer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Cultural Relations Officer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CA Battalion (SO) Civic Action Team**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Team Chief</th>
<th>Team Sergeant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Diaz</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Relations Officer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Management Officer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dislocated Civil Affairs NCO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Civil Information Officer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Dislocated Civilians Officer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Cultural Relations Officer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Team Sergeant</td>
<td>Team Engineer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CA Battalion (Active Army) Civic Action Team**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Team Chief</th>
<th>Team Sergeant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Diaz</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Management Officer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Relations Officer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dislocated Civil Affairs NCO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Civil Information Officer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Dislocated Civilians Officer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Team Sergeant</td>
<td>Team Medic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Affairs NCO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CA Brigade Special Functions Team**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Team Chief</th>
<th>Team Sergeant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Diaz</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Services Officer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Management Officer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Relations Officer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dislocated Civil Affairs NCO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Civil Information Officer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Dislocated Civilians Officer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Cultural Relations Officer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Team Sergeant</td>
<td>Team Engineer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Tactical CA Battalion Dislocated Civilians Team**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Team Chief</th>
<th>Team Sergeant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Diaz</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dislocated Civil Affairs NCO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Team Sergeant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3-65. Civil information specialists provide expertise in the organization, functions, services, and facilities of government and commercial civil information (mass media) systems. These systems include radio, television, print, and newspaper. Also included are the development and dissemination of proclamations, ordinances, and notices, and information control and censorship policies. Civil information specialists advise commanders at all levels on how these areas affect plan development and strategic, operational, and tactical operations. When required, they may also perform duties as—

- Advisor to the local commander during missions of civil assistance.
- Liaison or advisor to the civil information agencies of a foreign government during missions of civil administration in friendly territory.
- An official in the civil information administration of a military government during missions of civil administration in occupied territory.

3-66. Cultural relations specialists provide expertise in the cultural and social aspects of the operational area to include historical background, religious and ethnic characteristics, codes of behavior, customs, traditions,
and language. Also included are the identification, preservation, and restoration of significant historical, cultural, social, and religious sites, facilities, artifacts, organizations, and systems. Cultural relations specialists advise commanders at all levels on how these areas affect plan development and strategic, operational, and tactical operations. When required, they may also perform duties as—

- Advisor to the local commander during missions of civil assistance.
- Liaison or advisor to the historical, cultural, social, and religious agencies of a foreign government during missions of civil administration in friendly territory.
- An official in the cultural relations administration of a military government during missions of civil administration in occupied territory.

3-67. DC specialists provide expertise in the organization, functions, services, and facilities of government and private agencies associated with the care, control, and assistance of dislocated populations. Areas covered include addressing legal and quality of life issues of displaced persons, refugees, evacuees, stateless persons, and war victims before, during, and after natural or man-made (including combat) emergencies. Also included is minimizing the interference of such persons with military operations. DC specialists advise commanders at all levels on how these areas affect plan development and strategic, operational, and tactical operations. When required, they may also perform duties as—

- Advisor to the local commander during missions of civil assistance.
- Liaison or advisor to the public assistance, immigration, and naturalization agencies of a foreign government during missions of civil administration in friendly territory.
- An official in the public assistance, immigration, and naturalization administration of a military government during missions of civil administration in occupied territory.

3-68. Emergency services specialists provide expertise in the organization, functions, services, facilities, and maintenance of government, nongovernment, and private emergency services systems. Areas covered include all agencies, capabilities, and processes associated with the mitigation of, preparedness for, response to, and recovery from natural, man-made, and technological emergencies. Emergency services specialists advise commanders at all levels on how these areas affect plan development and strategic, operational, and tactical operations. When required, they may also perform duties as—

- Advisor to the local commander during missions of civil assistance.
- Liaison or advisor to the emergency services agencies of a foreign government during missions of civil administration in friendly territory.
- An official in the emergency services administration of a military government during missions of civil administration in occupied territory.

3-69. Environmental management specialists provide expertise in the organization, functions, services, facilities, and maintenance of government and commercial environmental management systems. Areas covered include
agencies, capabilities, and processes associated with water quality, air quality, hazardous materials, pollution control, and wildlife management. Environmental management specialists advise commanders at all levels on how these areas affect plan development and strategic, operational, and tactical operations. When required, they may also perform duties as—

- Advisor to the local commander during missions of civil assistance.
- Liaison or advisor to the environmental management agencies of a foreign government during missions of civil administration in friendly territory.
- An official in the environmental management administration of a military government during missions of civil administration in occupied territory.

**TACTICAL TEAM OPERATIONS**

3-70. All CA soldiers, whether they are members of general staffs, planning teams, specialty teams, functional specialty teams, civic action teams, or CA teams, must master certain skills that can be categorized as CA generalist skills. Generalist skills revolve around the ability to analyze and monitor the civilian component of the AO and to incorporate CA specialists and the six CA activities—FNS, PRC, HA, MCA, emergency services, and support to civil administration—into the military operation.

3-71. With these generalist skills, the CA soldier has a keener sensitivity to the political, economic, social, environmental, humanitarian, and other implications of military operations than do soldiers who are not trained in CA. Successful application of these skills enhance the commander’s situational awareness and contribute to overall mission success at all levels across the spectrum of operations.

3-72. This section discusses the functions and capabilities of CA generalists found in the CA teams A, B, and C (CAT-A, CAT-B, CAT-C). Each fully resourced and trained CA team has the capability to—

- Deploy rapidly, within 24 to 48 hours.
- Provide CMO staff augmentation and CA planning and assessment support to maneuver commanders.
- Maintain direct data and voice communications (reachback) with conventional, SOF (especially CA specialists), and interagency elements using both classified and unclassified connectivity.
- Provide linguistic, regional, and cultural expertise to supported commanders.
- Provide general and limited technical assessments (engineering, medical, and intelligence).
- Plan and support CMO conducted by military forces.
- Identify and facilitate FNS.
- Conduct liaison with civilian authorities.
- Minimize civilian interference with military operations.
• Conduct area studies and area assessments. (NOTE: CA team CMO assessments are general in nature and limited in the technical application of the 16 functional specialties. RC functional specialists provide more detailed deliberate assessments, as required.)

• Establish and operate a CMOC.

• Operate independently in austere environments, within the constraints of force protection, with minimal support.

Civil Affairs Team A

3-73. The CAT-A is the basic tactical-level CA team. It provides for a rapidly deployable CA asset to division, brigade, or battalion (Figure 2-1, page 2-3). There are four types of CAT-As, each of which provide the same general type of support and capabilities to the units to which they are attached (based on METT-TC):

- CAT-A in a CA company, CA battalion (USAR): normally attached to the conventional maneuver battalion.
- CAT-A in a CA company, CA battalion (SO): normally attached to the SFODB or Special Forces operational detachment C (SFODC).
- CAT-A (Regional) in a CA company, CA battalion (Active Army): normally attached to the SOC or SFG.
- CAT-A (Tactical) in a CA company, CA battalion (Active Army): normally attached to joint rapid deployment forces, initial entry forces, or the conventional maneuver battalion, brigade, or division.

Civil Affairs Team B

3-74. The CAT-B is task-organized from a CA company HQ and operates at corps, JTF, TSC, division, or brigade levels (Figure 2-1, page 2-3). There are three types of CAT-Bs, each of which provide the same general type of support and capabilities to the units to which they are attached (based on METT-TC):

- CAT-B in a CA company, CA battalion (USAR): normally attached to the conventional maneuver brigade.
- CAT-B in a CA company, CA battalion (SO): normally attached to the SFODC or SFG.
- CAT-B in a CA company, CA battalion (Active Army): normally attached to the corps, JTF, division, or SFG.

Civil Affairs Team C

3-75. The CAT-C is task-organized from a CA battalion HQ and operates at division, COSCOM, and ASG (Figure 2-1, page 2-3). There are three types of CAT-Cs, each of which provide the same general type of support and capabilities to the units to which they are attached (based on METT-TC):

- CAT-C in a CA Battalion (USAR): normally attached to the division, COSCOM, or ASG.
- CAT-C in a CA battalion (SO): normally attached to the J SOTF.
• CAT-C in a CA battalion (Active Army): normally attached to the SOC or SFG.

PRODUCTS OF THE ASSESS PHASE

3-76. The assess phase is characterized by preliminary assessments and their role in the mission analysis process. The products of this phase include a CASCOPE analysis of the AO, an area assessment (FM 41-10, Appendix G), the CMO estimate, and a general idea of basic CA mission requirements. The CMO estimate feeds directly into the decide phase in which CA/CMO planners determine how the needs and requirements identified by preliminary assessments will be addressed by CA activities and CMO. Appendix C provides an example of a CMO estimate.
Chapter 4

CA Methodology: Decide

Lingering doubts about the crucial role of Civil Affairs were settled in the North African Campaign. On November 30, 1942, General Eisenhower wrote to General Marshall, “The sooner I can get rid of all these questions that are outside the military scope, the happier I will be! Sometimes I think I live ten years each week, of which at least nine are absorbed in political and economic matters.”

United States Army in World War II Special Studies, Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1964

OVERVIEW

4-1. During the first step of the CA methodology—assess—the CA soldier gains a thorough understanding of the background and current conditions of an area, identifies the needs or requirements (supported commander, organization, or populace) to be addressed by CA activities or CMO, and formulates a restated mission statement for CA or task-organized forces. During this step—decide—the CA soldier determines who, what, when, where, why, and how to focus CA and other assets and activities to address the needs and requirements identified in the first step. The ultimate goal of decide is to ensure all participating organizations, both military and civilian, are focused and synchronized toward a desired outcome or COE. This chapter will focus on the activities that occur during the decide phase.

4-2. This step is characterized by the processes that develop and analyze COAs and create plans or orders. It includes initiation of the interagency process through the establishment of the CMOC. With consideration for the nonmilitary factors of CASCOPE, CA soldiers, together with the supported staff and participating civilian agencies, determine the tasks and task organizations required to manage the civil component challenges of the operation. They do this not only for the phases of develop and detect, and deliver, but also for the transition phase and, if applicable, redeployment, as well.

4-3. During these processes, CA/CMO planners assign responsibilities and procedures (civil-military objectives) for the identified tasks and task-organized elements along civil lines of operation. For the develop and detect phase, these tasks are normally related to creating or observing those conditions or events (civil decisive points) that would either mitigate or trigger a specific response (civil decisive point outcomes). For the deliver phase, these tasks include the general and specialized tasks that support the CA activities of PRC, FNS, HA, MCA, emergency services, and support to civil administration. For the evaluate phase, these tasks include identifying
MOEs and how the various MOEs will be measured. For the transition phase, those tasks required to be completed before, during, and after a relief-in-place or transition of authority are included.

4-4. CA/CMO planners also war-game possible variations of the operation and formulate contingency plans that address potential branches and sequels to the operation. At the end of this step, they will have produced the commander’s intent for CMO, defined CA priorities of effort, defined MOEs, and produced the CA annex, OPLAN, CONPLAN, or OPORD.

**RELATING THE PLANNING PROCESSES TO CA EMPLOYMENT**

Identification of supporting RC units early in the planning process would prevent unnecessary coordination problems and assist in timely, efficient support once the units link up in-country. Had the CA unit commander been involved in the mission analysis process in conjunction with the supported Division G5, designing the CA task force could have been accomplished more smoothly. The CA unit commander could have accompanied the G5 on a leader reconnaissance and thus have been better able to prepare his soldiers for deployment to the target country. Greater Active-Reserve coordination early in the planning stages could alleviate these problems in the future.

CALL Report on Haiti Initial Impressions, October 1996

4-5. The concept of CA employment is addressed in JP 3-57 and FM 41-10. Figure 4-1, page 4-3, demonstrates how Active Army and RC CA forces work together to assist a supported commander. CA employment can apply to routine operations, to operations requiring rapid deployment, or to long-term operations requiring systematic rotations of CA units, teams, and individuals.

4-6. Upon validation of a mission requirement for CA forces, USACAPOC assigns a mission to subordinate CA units using SO operational planning procedures. If the mission requires the participation of more than one subordinate unit, a single CA unit is tasked as the mission planning agent (MPA) while others are assigned supporting roles. These units may further delegate mission requirements to subordinate CA units or teams.

4-7. Whether tasked as the MPA or to provide mission support, subordinate CA units and teams follow similar problem-solving procedures. Upon receipt of a mission tasking from a higher CA HQ, the commanders and staffs of the subordinate CA units (CACOMs, CA brigades, and CA battalions) analyze the mission using MDMP. Commanders and leaders of subordinate CA companies and teams analyze the mission using TLP. Each tasked unit or team reports the results of its mission planning to the tasking HQ using SO operational planning procedures. All units and teams involved in mission planning continue to use SO operational planning procedures until deployed.
4-8. Once deployed in support of an operation, CA/CMO planners participate in the planning processes of the supported unit. At geographic combatant command and JTF levels, that process is JOPES. At Army commands from corps to battalion, that process is MDMP. At the CA company and team levels, CA leaders continue to use TLP to solve problems and make plans.

4-9. Figure 4-2, pages 4-4 and 4-5, illustrates how each of the planning processes are used by CA forces during a typical operation. NOTE: Some processes occur simultaneously.
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**Legend:**

- **CONUS**: Continental United States
- **EMPRS**: En Route Mission Planning and Rehearsal System
- **JEMPRS**: Joint En Route Mission Planning and Rehearsal System
- **MSR**: Mission Support Request
- **OCONUS**: Outside the Continental United States
- **SITREP**: Situation Report
- **SOOP**: Special Operations Operational Planning
INTERAGENCY CA/CMO PLANNING: COORDINATING WITH NONMILITARY ORGANIZATIONS

4-10. The history of U.S. military operations contains many examples of U.S. military planners focusing narrowly on the military aspects of the operation and ignoring the nonmilitary organizations in their AO. Failure to incorporate or even consider the operations of these organizations into military plans has often led to frustration, wasted resources, and mission-stopping incidents.

4-11. DODD 2000.13 provides the authorization for CA forces to conduct interagency planning and coordination. It states, “The activities conducted by CA forces shall include, but are not limited to...coordinating military operations with other agencies of the U.S. Government, international organizations, agencies and military components of foreign governments, nongovernmental and non-profit organizations, and the private sector.”

4-12. Chapter 2 describes the interagency process at the national level through the NSC and its subordinate committees. DOD representation in this process is through the CJCS; Vice Chairman, JCS; joint staff representatives; and combatant command representatives. The combatant commander translates policies and decisions from this process into combatant command campaign plans and peacetime TEPs.

4-13. To differentiate the interagency process at the national level from interagency activities conducted in conjunction with CA/CMO planning, the remainder of this publication will refer to interagency activities at the combatant command HQ and below as coordinating with nonmilitary organizations.

4-14. There are many challenges to sharing information between military and nonmilitary organizations. In addition to the obvious challenges posed by language barriers, terminology differences, personal backgrounds, and personalities, some challenges are more complicated. Planners and operators must understand—

- The difference between sharing information with USG agencies versus other organizations.
- Early classification of a plan often prohibits integration of the international organization and NGO community in the planning process. CA/CMO planners need to evaluate how they can best integrate civilian planners into the process without compromising operations security (OPSEC).
- International organization and NGO representatives who participate in information sharing might be considered as participating in intelligence activities by third parties.
- The way information is packaged for military organizations may not be practical or useful to nonmilitary organizations, and vice versa.
- Military organizations often do not know that some of the information they have may be of great interest or value to a nonmilitary organization, and vice versa.
The challenges to coordination with nonmilitary organizations, from geographic combatant command HQ to the battalion, are minimized at the CMOC.

**CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS CENTER**

A CMOC is the JFC's nerve center for CMO and coordination with other non-DOD agencies. CMOC members are primarily civil affairs personnel augmented by other DOD and non-DOD (i.e., Department of State, United States Agency for International Development, Federal Emergency Management Agency) liaison personnel. A CMOC is flexible in size and composition to effectively coordinate military support to humanitarian assistance or associated contingency or crisis response operations in a given area or country. It may be the primary coordinating agency for all international organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), USG agencies during war or peace operations where DOD has complete control of the theater. A CMOC may be organized to help integrate US military forces into both multinational forces and military-civil partnership efforts. It may comprise or be augmented by either or both military and civilian personnel representatives of any organization the commander, joint task force considers necessary to effectively coordinate CMO.

*Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia*, 16 July 1997

**GENERAL**

4-15. FM 41-10 describes the capabilities, activities, organization, and setup of the CMOC. The purpose of this section is to build on that description and to set the minimum requirements for establishing and operating a CMOC. The following paragraphs describe techniques and procedures for structure, communications systems, location options, security, and reachback requirements of the CMOC.

4-16. The purpose of the CMOC is to analyze, monitor, plan, coordinate, synchronize, and influence the civil component of the commander's battlespace across the range of full-spectrum operations. In the context of a related activity, the CMOC contributes to IO. Before military operations, it serves as the conduit for integrating nonmilitary organizations into the collaborative planning process.

4-17. During offensive and defensive combat operations, the CMOC serves as the commander's filter to control the many nonmilitary “distractors” to C2 of military operations. The CMOC also captures a record of infrastructure needs in the immediate wake of combat operations to facilitate emergency relief to the populace, as well as long-term reconstruction requirements.

4-18. During stability operations and support operations, the CMOC serves as the primary center for synchronizing military operations with the operations of nonmilitary organizations. During transition from military to civilian control, the CMOC serves as a source of operational continuity and a facilitator to the transition process.
The whole idea of facilitating, of creating an environment where people can interact, is crucial. That environment was the CMOC or the On-Site Operations Coordination Center (OSOCC), the Swedish-funded communication center that became a core around which we could develop a humanitarian space. People came to us because we had something to offer, and there was a good bit of interaction. Facilitating communications means transparency, ensuring that there is free interaction and that misunderstandings are not allowed to develop.


Additionally, the CMOC is—

- Based on a clearly defined core structure comprising command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR)-enhancing assets.
- An analysis center for the civil component of the battlespace.
- A collaborative planning cell for CMO.
- A meeting place for interagency coordination, mediation, and consensus building.
- A link to the nonmilitary partners and participants of an operation, both locally and through reachback capability to intertheater and extratheater locations.
- An organization with the ability to synchronize and influence military and nonmilitary activities within authority granted by the supported commander (subject to limitations established in the supported unit OPORD).
- Employed with a task and purpose.
- A clearinghouse for requests for military support from nonmilitary organizations.
- A key node for achieving information superiority and a clearinghouse for CMO information.
- An archives-and-research facility.

The CMOC is not—

- A passive participant in the commander’s civil engagement plan.
- A maneuver element.
- An operations center that competes with the operations center of the supported unit.
- An organization with tasking authority over unassigned resources.
- An intelligence collection element or intelligence fusion cell.
- The IO cell.

4-19. In both domestic and foreign operations, there are examples of organizations that perform functions inherent to the CMOC. These examples are discussed in the following paragraphs.
Domestic Operations

4-20. The incident command system (ICS) is the model tool for command, control, and coordination of an incident response. The ICS provides a means to coordinate the efforts of individual agencies as they work toward the common goal of stabilizing an incident and protecting life, property, and the environment. The ICS was developed in the 1970s in response to a series of major wildfires in southern California. At that time, municipal, county, state, and federal fire authorities collaborated to form the Firefighting Resources of California Organized for Potential Emergencies (FIRESCOPE). FIRESCOPE identified several recurring problems involving multiagency responses, such as—

- Nonstandard terminology among responding agencies.
- Lack of capability to expand and contract as required by the situation.
- Nonstandard and nonintegrated communications.
- Lack of consolidated action plans.
- Lack of designated facilities.

4-21. Federal law requires the use of the ICS for response to hazardous material (HAZMAT) incidents. Many states have adopted the ICS as their standard for emergency management at the incident site and in their emergency operations centers (EOCs). The ICS is also part of the National Interagency Incident Management System (NIIMS), which consists of 16 teams across the United States that respond to a wide range of emergencies, including fires, floods, earthquakes, hurricanes, tornadoes, tidal waves, riots, HAZMAT release, and other natural or man-made incidents.

Foreign Operations

4-22. Like FIRESCOPE, the HA community, as a result of experience gained working with military organizations during humanitarian crises in the 1990s, has recognized the utility of a centralized coordination center to promote unity of effort in complex humanitarian emergencies. For example—

- During the Rwandan refugee crisis in 1994, the United Nations Rwanda Emergency Office (UNREO) created the OSOCC in Kigali, Rwanda, to coordinate the international response. It evolved into the focal point for UN-led operations in Rwanda and Zaire. Personnel from CMOC Kigali (which consisted of two CA officers and one OFDA/disaster assistance response team [DART] representative) attended all OSOCC meetings and supported the OSOCC by preparing contingency plans to support anticipated refugee movements.

- During operations in Bosnia and Kosovo (1995–present), allied militaries created robust CA capabilities and operated CIMIC centers.

- The Kosovo Humanitarian Community Information Center was established in Pristina in 1999 by the UNHCR, OCHA, USAID, and various NGOs.

- Other organizations, such as the Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC) and the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC),
as well as the NGO Consortium or the NGO Forum, have become commonplace fixtures in relief operations around the world.

- During Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, British and American CJCMOTF assets and elements of the 96th CA Bn (A) renamed their CMOCs Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Centers, or CHLCs (pronounced “chicklicks”) to describe its role and function and facilitate operations with participating NGOs.

4-23. In all military operations across the spectrum of operations, both foreign and domestic, the CMOC remains the commander’s vital center of activity for CMO. No matter what it may be called during the operation, when the CMOC encounters an existing civilian organization, it may augment the organization’s efforts as described later in this section.

CMOC STRUCTURE

A CMOC can be tailored to the specific tasks associated with the collective national or international mission. In establishing the CMOC, the JFC should build it from a nucleus of organic assets and CA, logistic, legal, and communications elements.

Chapter IV: Interagency Coordination, JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations, 8 February 2001

4-24. To tailor an organization, a basic structure or model must exist. The basic structure of the CMOC is shown in Figure 4-3, page 4-11. This basic structure applies equally to CMOCs established at strategic, operational, or tactical levels of operation.

4-25. The establishing entity organizes the CMOC into five main functions: directorate, plans section, operations section, logistics section, and administration section. Small CMOC organizations may need to consolidate two or more of these functions under a single entity (operations and plans section or administration and logistics section). Larger CMOC organizations may subdivide the functions into additional organizational units to facilitate operations and minimize span of control problems. In multinational operations, the CMOC may be modified to accommodate coalition assets.

4-26. Although CA soldiers may form the nucleus of the CMOC, filling positions within and throughout the CMOC, not every position must be filled by a CA soldier. The CMOC can be manned by any combination of U.S. military personnel, foreign soldiers, USG agency civilians, foreign government agency or UN civilians, or NGO representatives. The most habitual augmentation comes from the engineer, legal, public affairs, logistics, medical, chaplain and public affairs sections. The security considerations for such an organization are discussed later in this section.
4-27. The directorate has responsibility for overall management of the CMOC (and any mobile or satellite CMOCs) and provides direction and oversight of CMOC activities. The senior CA officer usually assumes the function of CMOC director, but this is not a requirement. Depending on METT-TC, the director might be a senior officer of the Army or other service component, a senior civilian, or a foreign military officer or civilian. Regardless of nationality or affiliation, the director must be fully qualified to manage the activities of the CMOC.

4-28. As the needs arise, the director may delegate authority for performing certain activities to others. For instance, he may designate—

- An information branch to handle media inquiries, to coordinate the release of information to the media with the PAO at the supported unit HQ, and to synchronize CMOC information with the supported unit’s IO cell.
- A security branch to manage the various aspects of security—physical, information, operations, personnel, communications, and computer—herent to CMOC operations.
- Liaison officers or representatives to be on-scene CMOC contacts for both military and civilian agencies and organizations in the AO, as required by the operation.

4-29. The director will also receive liaison officers or representatives from military and civilian agencies and organizations participating in the operation. These include representatives from—

- U.S. military units.
- Allied or coalition military units.
• USG and contracted agencies.
• Foreign nation government and contracted agencies.
• Local government agencies.
• NGOs.
• Local business and industry.
• Multinational corporations.

4-30. The plans section performs the following functions:
• Links to USG agencies for guidance on U.S. policy changes, long-range stability and support programs, and transition plans.
• Collects and evaluates CMO-related information about the AO from sources that include, but are not limited to—
  ▪ Reports from subordinate CMOCs and CA teams.
  ▪ Preliminary, hasty, and detailed assessments.
  ▪ Nonmilitary organization representatives.
  ▪ Nonmilitary organization publications and web sites.
• Participates in the development of long-range plans (greater than 96 hours out) that engage civil centers of gravity in the AO.
• Participates in the development of CMO policy and guidance in coordination with functional specialists.
• Develops public information campaigns.
• Maintains the unit’s archives and lessons learned.
• Eliminates redundancies in activities performed by military organizations and nonmilitary organizations.
• Develops calendars of significant upcoming CA/CMO events.

4-31. The operations section performs the following functions:
• Plans operations out to 96 hours.
• Manages the daily activities of the CMOC.
• Prepares and staffs CMO-related FRAG orders.
• Conducts daily meetings.
• Maintains communications with all participants in CMO.
• Prepares and submits reports, as appropriate, including, but not limited to—
  ▪ Security situation reports.
  ▪ Upcoming significant event reports.
  ▪ Daily significant event rollups.
• Maintains the status of all operations conducted or supported by CA soldiers and all CMO conducted by non-CA units, teams, and individuals on situation maps, in a CMO database, and in ABCS.
Collects, evaluates, tracks, and disseminates CMO-related information about, and requests from, nonmilitary organizations, including, but not limited to—

- Reports from subordinate CMOCs and CA teams.
- Names, programs, and capabilities of all NGOs.
- Status of ongoing projects.
- Requests for assistance and information.

4-32. The logistics section performs the following functions:

- Maintains a database of all POCs and HN resources that can be used for military or humanitarian purposes (facilities, transportation assets, goods, and services).
- Coordinates and tracks logistics activities in support of CMO.
- Maintains adequate levels of supplies for use in CMOC operations (for example, office supplies, fuel, batteries, and light bulbs).
- Manages operator-level maintenance on vehicles, communications, and generator equipment.
- Maintains current status of routes used in CMO.
- Produces records and reports, as required.

4-33. The administration section performs the following functions:

- Focuses on internal CMOC activities and personnel issues:
  - Maintains access roster and identification system for the CMOC.
  - Responsible for the conduct of CMOC meetings, minutes, and scheduling.
  - Maintains the duty roster.
  - Processes required reports.
- Tracks costs incurred by military forces and other agencies participating in CMO activities.
- Provides for reimbursement accounting, as necessary.
- Creates recognition documents and certificates.
- Produces and archives records and reports.

CMOC COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS REQUIREMENTS

4-34. The nature of CMOC operations presents communications requirements that are more extensive than the average TOC. Figure 4-4, page 4-14, depicts the military tactical communications environment in which the CMOC must operate.
4-35. The CMOC must be able to enter secure tactical digital networks, as well as nonsecure civilian networks via the Internet. The CMOC must be able to communicate over secure and nonsecure military radio and telephone systems, as well as nonsecure NGO radios and nonsecure commercial telephone systems for voice and data transmission. If the local telephone infrastructure is inoperable, the CMOC may require cellular or satellite communications capability. The CMOC must be able to monitor other open sources of information, such as commercial television and radio. Additionally, the CMOC must have redundant systems to enable it to operate in split operations.

4-36. The following paragraphs provide a list of the capabilities and examples of systems CMOCs should have to fully perform routine CMOC operations. Systems should be upgraded coincidentally with the fielding of follow-on Army command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) architecture systems (Figure 4-5, page 4-15) to supported unit HQ according to CA planning associations.
Figure 4-5. Army C4I Architecture

4-37. Secure digital capability with the supported military units is necessary to provide input into the common tactical picture (CTP) and common relevant operational picture (CROP) through the ABCS:

- Global Command and Control System-Army (GCCS-A) (strategic, theater, and EAC). Provides force tracking, HN and CA support,
theater air defense, targeting, PSYOP, C2, logistics, and medical and personnel status. Deployed from theater (EAC) elements down to the corps JTF and joint contingency force.

- Army Tactical Command and Control System (ATCCS) (corps to battalion) consisting of—
  - Maneuver Control System (MCS). Provides corps- through battalion-level commanders and staffs the ability to collect, coordinate, and act on near-real-time battlefield information and to graphically visualize the battlefield.
  - All-Source Analysis System-Remote Work Station (ASAS-RWS). Provides battle commanders with analyzed intelligence and unanalyzed combat information.
  - Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS). Provides command, control, and communications (C3) for the U.S. Army and Marine Corps cannon, rockets, missiles, mortars, close air support, and naval surface weapon systems. AFATDS will provide fire support coordination measures, weapon and counter-battery radar range fans, and target data. Target data will include active, inactive, planned, on-call and suspect targets, and support identification of protected targets, no-fire areas, and restricted-fire areas.
  - Combat Service Support Control System (CSSCS). Battlefield decision support and situation awareness for planning and controlling the logistics support of combat operations. CSSCS provides materiel and personnel status of units. It identifies logistical capability to resupply units for subsequent combat operations.
  - Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2). Provides situational awareness through a seamless battle command capability to leaders at brigade and below. Provides horizontal and vertical integration of the information generating and processing capabilities of individual weapons, sensors, and platforms.
  - Enhanced Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS). An integrated C3 system that provides near-real-time data communications, position and location, navigation, identification, and reporting information.

4-38. Another system is the Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T), the Army XXI communications network that will replace the Tri-Service Tactical Communications Program (TRI-TAC) and mobile subscriber equipment (MSE) (from theater to battalion CP/TOC) and provide command and control on the move (C2OTM) to the warfighter. WIN-T is based on commercial products and technology; provides wired and wireless communications to support voice, data, and video information exchange requirements; provides seamless connectivity among ABCS and weapons platforms within the battlespace; supports multiple security levels; and integrates terrestrial, airborne, and satellite-based transport systems.
4-39. Secure and nonsecure radio and telephone capabilities with military organizations consist of the following:

- **Single-Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS)**. The primary combat net radio (CNR) for the U.S. Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and combat Air Force designed primarily for voice C2.

- **AN/PSC-3 Tactical Satellite (TACSAT) Radio Set**. A battery operated, highly portable, manpack TACSAT terminal that provides the range extension required to conduct effective operations. Single-channel TACSAT is specifically suited for the conduct of critical contingency operations. The set uses an AS-3567/PSC-3 medium-gain antenna for at-halt satellite communications. In the secure voice mode, the AN/PSC-3 uses the advanced narrowband digital voice terminal (ANDVT) or a communications security (COMSEC) interface device such as the VINSON KY-57.

- **Antenna Group OE-254/GRC** or a similar antenna system.

- **DRS MDA-31 Digital Voice Terminal With Data Adapter (DVT/DA)**. A communications terminal for an individual soldier with access to MSE or TRI-TAC networks. The DVT/DA is an MSE data adapter (MDA) and digital nonsecure voice terminal (DNVT) built into a single, lightweight, ruggedized unit suitable for field operation. For voice communications, the DRS DVT/DA operates like any DNVT. For data communications, the DVT/DA contains a multifunction RS-232 data port capable of interoperating with most standard data devices, such as personal computers (PCs), FAX machines, and message terminals.

- **Telephone Set TA-312/PT**.

4-40. Secure and nonsecure radio and telephone capabilities with nonmilitary organizations consist of the following:

- **AN/PRC-148 Multi-Band Inter/Intra Team Radio (MBITR) or commercial equivalent**. A very capable handheld radio, used by SOF, which can operate in the frequency band mostly used in civilian applications.

- **FAX machines**.

- **Local commercial telephones**.

- **Cellular or satellite telephones**.

4-41. Nodes that can access unrestricted, unclassified Internet lines as well as restricted systems include the following:

- **World Wide Web (WWW)**. Access to web sites of participating organizations and agencies for research and contact information.

- **Electronic Mail (E-mail)**. Ability to request information from and pass information to participating organizations and agencies. Systems must support all media formats: text, audio, video, and graphics. Systems should include the ability to integrate commercially available secure systems that may be adopted by key organizations.

- **Refugee Management Tracking System (RMATS)**. Hardware and software that provide the user (for example, UNHCR) the capability to automatically and interactively collect, store, analyze, prepare, and disseminate individual refugee registration reports; identification
products based on digital processes, such as digital imagery, digital fingerprinting, digital voice printing, retinal scanning, or other digitally-based identification system; biographical data reports; and statistical reports.

- Open-Source Information System (OSIS) (software). An unclassified confederation of systems serving the intelligence community with open-source intelligence.

- Civil Affairs Database (software).

- Geographic Information System (GIS). Compatible database and mapping must be compatible with standard GIS protocols to ensure a seamless exchange of information between collaborating organizations.

- Plug-ins for interagency and multinational augmentation.

- Modeling tools to facilitate decision making in complex contingency situations involving limited resources and time-critical operations.

4-42. CMOCs should have the ability to plug into the local indigenous government architecture and, as required, the UN and ad hoc organizations, such as interim administrations. CMOCs must also have input into the EMPRS, which provides updated, real-time information to deploying forces. Additionally, CMOCs should have access to the global information grid (GIG). GIG is the globally interconnected, end-to-end set of information capabilities, associated processes, and personnel for collecting, processing, storing, disseminating, and managing information on demand to warfighters, policy makers, and support personnel.

ESTABLISHING THE CMOC

4-43. While the CMOC has a set structure, it retains the capability to expand, conduct split and mobile operations, and contract to meet the demands of the operation. It must be able to accommodate the various agencies that join or depart an operation during its different phases. The following paragraphs describe techniques for establishing the CMOC. Maintaining and expanding the CMOC are covered in Chapters 5 and 6. Contracting the CMOC is covered in Chapter 8.

4-44. A commander at any echelon may establish a CMOC, and more than one CMOC may be established in an AO. The supported commander establishes the CMOC early in an operation—routinely as early as the initial planning phase—for two primary reasons:

- To account for the nonmilitary threats, distractions, and interference that can adversely affect the military mission.

- To foster successful interagency coordination inherent in all operations.

JTF Support Hope (1994) deployed from USEUCOM to Entebbe, Uganda, with an ad hoc team of logistics and foreign area officers to run the JTF’s CMOC at Entebbe—the focal point of logistics operations. Elements of the JTF were spread out across five geographic areas in Uganda, Zaire, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Kenya to establish water purification and distribution systems, airfield services, and logistics management support. Not trained in CA, CMO,
or techniques for analyzing the civil considerations of a situation, JTF planners and the soldiers of CMOC Entebbe failed to identify the civil center of gravity of the relief operation. Consequently, the JTF experienced an initial lack of understanding the magnitude of the humanitarian situation and an inability to effectively interact with NGOs working in the same sector or geographical area. CA soldiers from the 353d CACOM, delayed by poorly programmed TPFDD priorities, arrived 10 days into the operation to establish CMOCs at Goma, Zaire, and Kigali, Rwanda—the focal points of the humanitarian crisis.

G-5, JTF Support Hope, 1994

4-45. A CMOC should be given a specific task and purpose, such as in a TASKORD. A METT-TC analysis of this task and purpose will determine the exact structure, equipment, manning, location, and operational requirements to accomplish the CMOC’s mission.

4-46. As discussed in Chapter 2, CA teams and CA planning teams at all command levels are tasked with establishing CMOCs to support CMO at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of operation. The diagrams in Figures 4-6 through 4-10, pages 4-20 through 4-24, depict the minimum organizational and equipment requirements necessary to establish CMOCs at each command level. **NOTE**: Equipment listing in each figure is not final.

4-47. Those teams establishing a CMOC for rapid decisive operations may be required to deploy without certain items of equipment, such as vehicles, trailers, generators, or tents, to conserve limited transportation space. These teams must be prepared to palletize mission-essential items of equipment, based on METT-TC (laptops, radios, video cameras, and other team equipment), and coordinate the rest of their equipment for follow-on transportation by air, rail, or surface ship. The team must plan and coordinate to rent or requisition transportation and billeting in the AO while its own vehicles and tents are in transit.

4-48. At every level, the CMOC must be flexible enough to expand and contract as requirements change; for example, incorporating members of military and nonmilitary organizations to meet short- or long-term projects. It must also be appropriately located, staffed, and equipped to perform the vital functions of research, planning, recording, coordinating, monitoring, and influencing CMO in a secure, and sometimes less-than-secure, austere environment.

4-49. The CMOC must be prepared to conduct echelon- and split-based operations. Doing so means operating within the security perimeter of the supported military HQ, as well as outside the security perimeter of the supported military HQ, and on the road (mobile)—often simultaneously. The parent CA unit must be manned, organized, and equipped with redundancy to do this in support of all units with which it has a planning association.
Maneuver Brigade CMOC
Established by CA Tactical Detachment From CA Company

Director

OPS/Plans Section

Administration (ADMIN)/Logistics (LOG) Section

Detachment Leader

CA NCO

Detachment NCOIC

CA Sergeant (SGT)

Armored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) With Trailer

Modular Command Post System Tent, 2 each Work Area/Personal Area

Armored HMMWV With Winch and Trailer

Modular Command Post System Tent, 2 each Work Area/Personal Area

Communications Equipment Requirements:
- MCS Light (Laptop, 2 each) (OPS - 1; Plans - 1)
- SATCOM
- SINCgars
- MBITR
- OE-254
- MSE
- Satellite Cell Phone
- Specialized Application Software for CA OPS
- FBBC2 With EPLRS and Global Positioning Satellite (GPS)
- Additional Laptop for Unclassified WWW Access
- Color Laser Printer
- Scanner

Communications Equipment Requirements:
- CSSCS
- SINCgars
- MBITR
- OE-254
- MSE
- Satellite Cell Phone
- Laptop, 2 each (ADMIN - 1; LOG - 1)
- Specialized Application Software for CA OPS
- FBBC2 With EPLRS and GPS
- Additional Laptop for Unclassified WWW Access
- Color Laser Printer
- Scanner
Division/COSCOM/ASG CMOC
Established by CAT-C (CA Bn HQ) From CA Battalion
[NOTE: The CAT-C task-organizes a CAPT-B or CAPT-A to establish the CMOC]

Director
Team Chief

OPS/Plans Section
Operations Officer
CA Specialist

ADMIN/LOG Section
Plans Officer
Team SGT

Armored HMMWV
With Trailer
Modular Command Post
System Tent, 2 each
Work Area/Personal Area

Secure Capability
for Internal Operations

Communications Equipment Requirements:
- MCS Light (Laptop, 2 each) (OPS - 1; Plans - 1)
- SATCOM
- SINCGARS
- MBITR
- OE-254
- MSE Node
- TA-312
- FAX
- Satellite Cell Phone
- Specialized Application Software for CA
- FBCB2 With EPLRS and GPS
- Additional Laptop for Unclassified WWW Access
- Tactical Local Area Network (TACLAN) With WWW Access
- Color Laser Printer
- Scanner

Armored HMMWV
With Winch and Trailer
Modular Command Post
System Tent, 2 each
Work Area/Personal Area

Nonsecure Capability
for External Operations

Communications Equipment Requirements:
- CSSCS
- SINCGARS
- MBITR
- OE-254
- DRS MDA-31 DVT/DA
- TA-312
- Satellite Cell Phone
- Laptop, 2 each (ADMIN - 1; LOG - 1)
- Specialized Application Software for CA OPS
- FBCB2 With EPLRS and GPS
- Additional Laptop for Unclassified WWW Access
- TACLAN With WWW Access
- Color Laser Printer
- Scanner
Corps/JTF/TSC CMOC
Established by CAPT-A From CA Brigade

Director
Team Chief

OPS/Plans Section
Operations Officer
CA Specialist

Communications Equipment Requirements:
- MCS Light (Laptop, 2 each) (OPS - 1; Plans - 1)
- SATCOM
- SINCGARS
- MBITR
- OE-254
- MSE Node
- TA-312
- FAX
- Satellite Cell Phone
- Specialized Application Software for CA OPS
- FBCB2 With EPLRS and GPS
- TACLAN With WWW Access
- Color Laser Printer
- Scanner

Secure Capability for Internal Operations

ADMIN/LOG Section
Plans Officer
Team SGT

Communications Equipment Requirements:
- CSSCS
- SINCGARS
- MBITR
- OE-254
- DRS MDA-31 DVT/DA
- TA-312
- Satellite Cell Phone
- Laptop, 2 each (ADMIN - 1; LOG - 1)
- Specialized Application Software for CA OPS
- FBCB2 With EPLRS and GPS
- Additional Laptop for Unclassified WWW Access
- TACLAN With WWW Access
- Color Laser Printer
- Scanner

Nonsecure Capability for External Operations
Figure 4-9. Minimum Organizational and Equipment Requirements Necessary to Establish a CMOC at EAC by a CAPT-B

EAC CMOC
Established by CAPT-B From CA Brigade or CACOM

Director
OPS/Plans Section
ADMIN/LOG Section

Team Chief
Operations Officer
CA Specialist
Plans Officer
Team SGT

Armored HMMWV With Trailer
Modular Command Post System Tent, 2 each Work Area/Personal Area

Communications Equipment Requirements:
- MCS Light (Laptop, 2 each) (OPS - 1; Plans - 1)
- SATCOM
- SINCGARS
- MBITR
- OE-254
- MSE Node
- TA-312
- FAX
- Satellite Cell Phone
- Specialized Application Software for CA OPS
- FBCB2 With EPLRS and GPS
- Additional Laptop for Unclassified WWW Access
- TACLAN With WWW Access
- Color Laser Printer
- Scanner

Secure Capability for Internal Operations

Armored HMMWV With Winch and Trailer
Modular Command Post System Tent, 2 each Work Area/Personal Area

Communications Equipment Requirements:
- CSSCS
- SINCGARS
- MBITR
- OE-254
- DRS MDA-31 DVT/DA
- TA-312
- Satellite Cell Phone
- Laptop, 2 each (ADMIN - 1; LOG - 1)
- Specialized Application Software for CA OPS
- FBCB2 With EPLRS and GPS
- Additional Laptop for Unclassified WWW Access
- TACLAN With WWW Access
- Color Laser Printer
- Scanner

Nonsecure Capability for External Operations
Figure 4-10. Minimum Organizational and Equipment Requirements Necessary to Establish a CMOC at EAC by a CAP3T
4-50. When operating in support of an operational or tactical unit, the CMOC, at a minimum, must establish its relationship with the CMO staff officer (G-5/S-5), operations officer (G-3/S-3), and IO cell. The CMOC’s normal relationship with the—

- CMO staff officer is similar to that of a direct support field artillery unit with the fire support coordinator. The staff officer monitors the daily operations of the supported unit and advises the supported commander on CMO and the employment of CA assets. The CMOC provides the CMO staff officer with current status of CMO and CA activities and assists in planning and posturing CMO and CA activities to support future operations of the supported commander.

- Operations officer is that of a satellite office specializing in a specific aspect of the overall military operation. The CMOC keeps the G-3/S-3 advised of how CMO and CA activities are providing the desired effects in support of the military operation. The CMOC routes requests for assistance through the G-3/S-3 for approval and ultimate tasking.

- IO officer is that of a related activity specializing in CMO. As the commander’s nerve center for civil-military engagement, the CMOC ensures that the IO cell is aware of the CMO situation and is in a position to best synchronize IO.

4-51. One important consideration when establishing a CMOC is whether local, national, or international coordination mechanisms for civil-military interface already exist. If the UN, HN, or some other organization or agency already operates a facility to coordinate CMO in the AO (for example, a city or county EOC during DSO), it may be best to establish a liaison or augmentation cell within that facility. Such a COA legitimizes the efforts of the lead organization and facilitates the disengagement of U.S. forces during transition and redeployment from the operation.

In Operation STRONG SUPPORT (post-Hurricane Mitch relief operations in Central America in 1999), a regional- or national-level “CMOC” was avoided. This was in deference to stated HN concerns about sovereignty and aversion to the CMOC concept as putting a foreign military in charge of what should be a national coordinating function. The concept for conducting civil-military interface was to work through HN emergency management centers and HN authorities as much as possible. However, mini-CMOCs (called mini-HOCs in that operation) were established at the local level to deconflict relief operations where JTFs were operating.

Notes of a U.S. CA Officer on Operations During Operation STRONG SUPPORT, 1999

4-52. Another important item to consider early while establishing a CMOC is the creation of continuity books. A continuity book facilitates continuity of operations during periods of potential disruption; for example, routine or emergency personnel turnover, extending and contracting the CMOC, and
transition operations. Although there is no particular format for a continuity book, there are some techniques to make the book useful, as follows:

- Arrange the book chronologically with daily, weekly, and monthly calendars that show essential tasks.
- Provide enough detail (who, what, where, why, when, and how) to each task to eliminate guesswork by the replacement.
- Include a journal to record actions taken and POCs for major ongoing projects.
- Take photographs of projects, POCs, meeting facilities, and other items pertinent to conducting CMO, and include them where appropriate in the continuity book.

CMOC LOCATION OPTIONS

4-53. The location of the CMOC depends on METT-TC. The basic options for locating a CMOC are—

- Within the security perimeter of the supported military HQ.
- Outside the security perimeter of the supported military HQ.
- On the road (mobile).
- Combination of two or all three (echelon- and split-based operations).

4-54. Each option has merit based on the situation and mission requirements. During the course of operations, the CMOC must be flexible and ready to move from one option to another based on changes in the security situation and mission requirements.

4-55. Figure 4-11, page 4-27, demonstrates a possible arrangement for the CMOC inside the security perimeter of the supported HQ. Locating the CMOC here should be considered when—

- Planning and coordinating CMO at the strategic (geographic combatant command) level.
- The security environment at the operational (J TF, corps) level permits nonmilitary individuals to enter freely or with limited inconvenience.
- The primary mission of the military force is CMO, such as during HA or disaster relief operations.
- Resources are limited and must be shared with other military units.

4-56. Because of its role as a clearinghouse for all CMO-related issues and a meeting place for nonmilitary partners and participants in an operation, this facility will receive much traffic. The CMOC and its associated parking area should be in a location that offers convenient access to visitors and that will not interfere with the internal operations of the supported HQ. The facility should be large enough to accommodate the many functions performed by the CMOC. If possible, the facility should include space for supported organizations to conduct business.
Figure 4-11. Possible Arrangement for a CMOC Inside the Security Perimeter of the Supported Headquarters

4-57. Figure 4-12, page 4-28, demonstrates a possible arrangement for the CMOC outside the security perimeter of the supported HQ. Locating the CMOC here should be considered when—

- The security environment at the supported military HQ restricts access to nonmilitary individuals, and access procedures offer major inconvenience to those individuals.
- Planning and coordinating CMO at the tactical (corps and below) level.
- The primary customers are the NGOs, international organizations, government officials, and the local populace.
- The CMOC is tasked to form the nucleus of a HOC or HACC.

4-58. This CMOC location option normally results in split-based operations. Split-based operations occur when a CMOC must operate a less-secure facility outside the security perimeter of the supported military HQ while retaining a secure facility inside the security perimeter of the supported military HQ. Split-based operations often occur when the nature of the military operation absolutely prohibits or severely limits civilian access to the supported military HQ site.
4-59. The less-secure, external CMOC may be active 24 hours daily or during set business hours. If the external CMOC is active for 24-hour operations, it must be equipped to operate as an extension of the internal CMOC. (This arrangement requires some redundancy in communications and ADP equipment.) If the CMOC is active only during set business hours, the internal CMOC may be required to answer the phone when the external CMOC is not operational.

4-60. Because of its role as a clearinghouse for all CMO-related issues and a meeting place for nonmilitary partners and participants in an operation, this facility will receive much traffic by those participants, as well as visibility from local officials and the media. The CMOC should be in a location that offers convenient access to those partners and participants. The facility should be large enough to accommodate the many functions performed by the CMOC. The interagency work and meeting areas should also be cleared of classified and unclassified but sensitive materials.
4-61. There are instances when nonmilitary organizations cannot participate in the activities of the CMOCs mentioned above. Such instances may occur during fluid combat operations, in nonpermissive environments, or because of political or cultural considerations. A mobile CMOC (Figure 4-13) may be required to interface with those organizations.

Figure 4-13. A Mobile CMOC
4-62. A mobile CMOC might be a CAT-A operating on foot (dismounted) or from a team HMMWV under the control of a CAT-B. These CMOCs generally conduct hasty assessments and pass assessment results to the higher-level CMOC for incorporation into posthostilities plans. A mobile CMOC may also be a task-organized team of CA specialists that travels on a set schedule (“circuit-rider” arrangement) to visit civilian organizations or agencies throughout a specified region. When detached from the main CMOC to perform such activities, the CMOC is conducting echelon-based operations.

CMOC FACILITY CONSIDERATIONS

4-63. The CMOC cannot fully depend on its supported unit HQ to provide the facilities it requires to operate efficiently and effectively. A CMOC should be self-deployable and operational using organic vehicles and equipment. The organic vehicles and equipment must be compatible with those of the unit with which the parent CA unit has a planning association, to include containers express (CONEXes) or trailers, generators, tents, and so on.

4-64. CA units should consider placing their CMOCs in two large CONEXes or trailers—one containing the secure equipment that will remain within the security perimeter of the supported unit HQ, and one containing the nonsecure equipment for split operations outside the security perimeter of the supported unit HQ. In addition, the units should employ several HMMWVs with trailers to transport CMOC soldiers and their personal equipment, as well as to perform as mobile CMOCs.

4-65. Depending on the environment, situation, and available existing structures, a CMOC can be established in civilian trailers or vehicles, a suite in an office building, a municipal EOC, or a separate building, such as a storefront or “CIMIC house.”

4-66. Whether operating from organic facilities or civilian structures, the CMOC must contain sufficient space for work areas, meeting areas, parking areas, living quarters, break areas, and so on. It must provide a healthy and safe environment for the CMOC personnel (for example, proper ventilation, fire protection, weather protection, and sanitation).

4-67. Wherever and whenever the CMOC is established, it is important to identify and publicize its location to the CMOC “customers” in terms understandable to them. For example, providing a street address, building name, facility markings, commonly known landmark, or strip map is better than providing a universal transverse mercator (UTM) grid location to people who do not use military maps.

CMOC SECURITY AND FORCE PROTECTION CONSIDERATIONS

4-68. Because of the nature of activities that occur at the CMOC, there are many physical, personnel, computer security, and continuity of operations issues to consider. Before initiating operations, the CMOC security officer conducts a site and situation threat and vulnerability assessment to determine CMOC security requirements. He considers and advises the CMOC director on security and force protection issues, such as—

- Defensibility (for example, fighting positions, “safe rooms,” multiple exits, or shelter).
• Communications with a quick reaction force (QRF).
• 24-hour access control systems and procedures (restricted areas, restricted hours, parking areas, barriers, and security in depth).
• Business hour access control systems and procedures (passes, metal detectors, or escorts).
• Security of vehicles and equipment during meetings.
• Guidance for security and force protection of visitors and civilian members of the team.
• Coordination with local law enforcement for—
  ▪ Patrols.
  ▪ Full-time on-site security presence (gate security).
  ▪ Periodic threat updates.
• Background checks of full-time staff members, especially local hires.
• Alternate power supply or uninterrupted power supply for computers and communications equipment.
• Emergency destruction procedures for classified materials and equipment.

4-69. The security manager may extend this assessment to areas and locations supported or frequented by the CMOC, such as HN and NGO facilities. The section on force protection in Chapter 5 includes specific techniques.

CA MISSION PLANNING PROCESSES

4-70. Chapter 2 illustrated the fact that CA/CMO planners perform at various levels of command and must be familiar with at least two different planning processes. At the joint level, planners must be familiar with JOPES. At all Army levels down to battalion, planners must be familiar with the MDMP.

4-71. Three additional processes are critical in planning and conducting CA missions. These processes are discussed below.

4-72. SO operational planning, outlined in JP 3-05.2, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning, provides guidance for operational-level joint and Service HQ conducting and supporting joint special operations. CA units, teams, and individuals use message formats to communicate CA mission taskings, CONOPS, concept approval, MSRs, and operation summaries (OPSUMs) between the various levels of CA HQ. Use of SO operational planning ensures all aspects of the mission are properly analyzed and fully supported.

4-73. EMPRS is a communications-based system that provides commanders the capability to receive operations and intelligence updates in-flight, conduct collaborative planning with HQ and forward elements, and disseminate and rehearse mission changes among the combat forces en route to the objective area. CA teams may be in the position of providing information from the objective area or supporting the forces deploying on contingency operations.

4-74. The TLP support problem solving at the tactical level. TLP are used at company level and below.
4-75. Appendix E covers the five planning processes in the most logical order of employment by CA soldiers: JOPES, SO operational planning, EMPRS, MDMP, and TLP. The techniques and procedures described in the appendix apply equally to CA units, teams, and individuals. They also apply across the four types of military action—offense, defense, stability operations, and support operations—in joint, multinational, and interagency environments.

COMMANDER’S INTENT FOR CMO
4-76. The commander’s intent for CMO is a clear, concise statement of what the force must do to achieve the desired CMO end state. The statement normally consists of four to five sentences focusing on the purpose, key tasks, and CMO end state:

- **Purpose** is not the mission statement purpose. It is a broader purpose that looks beyond the immediate mission in the context of the overall operation.
- **Key tasks** refer to those tasks that must be performed to achieve the stated purpose of the operation. They are not tied to any specific COA, but are fundamental to the success of the force. They provide the basis for subordinates to exercise initiative when unanticipated opportunities arise or when the original CONOPS no longer applies.
- **End state of CMO** refers to effects that must be achieved or conditions that must be met to achieve the stated purpose of the operation. Ultimately, the end state consists of successful transition of CMO to an indigenous civilian solution that is durable and sustainable.

DETERMINING CA PRIORITIES OF EFFORT
4-77. The focus of CA operations has its foundation in U.S. national policies and objectives. The interagency process at the NSC and its subordinate committees refines the CA mission focus for specific operations. CA mission focus is further articulated through the efforts of the CA planning team at the combatant command HQ and transmitted through the CA representatives of each subsequent commander. At the lower levels of command, changing priorities or changing conditions often muddle the CA mission focus, which tends to result in the phenomenon known as mission creep (discussed in Chapter 3).

4-78. As operations progress, CA/CMO planners often reach a point at which there are conflicting requirements for CA assets or there are more requirements for CA assets than the number or type of CA assets available. At this point, in consultation with the supported commander, CA/CMO planners must designate the CA priority of effort (POE). Designating a CA POE enables CA/CMO planners to recommend COAs that support national policies and objectives more effectively and efficiently at the operational and tactical levels. The CA POE focuses CA activities and dictates task organization and allocation of resources. For most CA operations, there are three priorities:

- Facilitate maneuver operations.
- Provide HA.
- Promote legitimacy (of the U.S. or the HN).
For other operations, such as MOOTW, CA activities may be prioritized as—

- Life-saving.
- Life-sustaining.
- Life-enhancing.

Within prioritized operations, preference should be given to projects that offer a combination of low cost, short duration, and high impact.

4-79. It is important for CA/CMO planners to consider the capabilities and usefulness of particular CA assets. Facilitating maneuver operations primarily requires the support of CA generalists on planning and tactical teams. Providing HA requires a combination of CA generalists and CA specialists on planning teams, tactical teams, and specialty teams. Promoting legitimacy of the U.S. or the HN primarily requires the expertise found on CA specialty teams.

4-80. CA POEs will often differ from one operation to another. For example, beginning in 1993, the POE for CA support to JTF Bravo was to promote the legitimacy of the United States and various HNs. The POE for CA supporting JTF 180, the forced entry option of Operation RESTORE DEMOCRACY (in 1994), was to facilitate maneuver operations. The POE for CA in Operation SUPPORT HOPE in Zaire and Uganda, also in 1994, was to provide HA to the massive numbers of DCs from Rwanda.

4-81. CA POEs may also shift during different phases of the same operation. For example, the initial CA priority in Haiti during Operation RESTORE DEMOCRACY was to facilitate maneuver operations during the entry phase. (This goal was to be accomplished primarily by members of the 96th CA Battalion [A] and the 450th CA Battalion [A] supporting the planned forced entry of JTF 180. It was accomplished by other members of the 96th CA Battalion [A], the 450th CA Battalion [A], and 360th CA Brigade [A] during the permissive entry of JTF 190.) Once the forces were successfully lodged, the priority shifted to providing HA. (This goal was accomplished initially by the members of the 96th CA Battalion [A], the 450th CA Battalion [A], and 360th CA Brigade [A] until the effort transitioned to follow-on CA forces from the 352d CACOM.) When the immediate humanitarian needs were met, the CA focus shifted to promoting the legitimacy of the HN Aristide government.

4-82. Examining DC planning may further illustrate POE shifts. The CA planning team develops and implements a plan for dealing with expected refugee flow. A clearly stated CA POE would assist the team in selecting a mission-appropriate COA, as follows:

- If the CA POE were to facilitate friendly maneuver operations, the team might recommend a “stay put policy” and develop civilian collection points which were well clear of maneuver axes and main supply routes.

- If the CA POE were to provide HA, the team might recommend employing U.S. military or other immediately available transportation to move HA supplies or international organization and NGO support to the affected group.
• If the CA POE were to promote HN legitimacy, the team might recommend waiting for HN authorities and vehicles to address refugee flow issues, even if maneuver forces might be hindered by the additional traffic.

DETERMINING CMO MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS

4-83. MOEs refer to observable, usually quantifiable, subjective indicators that an activity is proceeding along a desired path. A commander uses MOEs to determine how well or how poorly an operation is proceeding in achieving the goals of the operation according to his mission statement. He also uses MOEs to identify effective strategies and tactics and to determine points at which to shift resources, transition to different phases, or alter or terminate the mission.

4-84. MOEs are a product of mission analysis. They differ for every mission and for different phases of a mission. As the commander and his staff identify specified, implied, and critical tasks, they define what constitutes successful completion of each task. The commander and his staff decide how the MOE will be identified, reported, and validated. They determine what action will be taken when the MOE is achieved, as well as contingency plans in case MOEs are not achieved according to the original plan. MOEs are not necessarily fixed, however. They are often adjusted as the situation changes and higher-level guidance develops.

4-85. CA/CMO planners begin the process of determining CMO MOEs when they develop the civil-military lines of operation. These lines of operation normally follow the six CA activities: FNS, PRC, HA, MCA, emergency services, and support to civil administration. Along each line of operation, the planners identify civil-military objectives, civil decisive points, and desired outcomes of the civil decisive points. They then determine CMO MOEs to evaluate the effectiveness of those outcomes. Figure 4-14 depicts an example of MOEs.

During Operation SUPPORT HOPE, the joint force tracked several specific MOEs to ascertain when it had accomplished its assigned mission.

These MOEs included—

(1) The refugee population in Goma dropped from 1,200,000 on 26 July 1994 to 575,000 on 26 August 1994. (Numbers of refugees were estimates only.)

(2) The estimated 7 percent mortality rate in Goma camps, based on bodies buried per day, dropped from 6,500 per day on 27 July 1994 to less than 500 per day on 1 August 1994.

(3) Cargo capacity at Kigali airfield increased from virtually zero on 30 July 1994 to 300–600 tons per day on 26 August 1994.

(4) The number of UN agencies and NGOs represented in Kigali grew from 6 on 22 July 1994 to over 60 on 26 August 1994. This increase represented adequate nonmilitary capability to provide foreign humanitarian assistance.

Figure 4-14. Sample Measures of Effectiveness
4-86. In HA missions, the UN High Commissioner on Refugees has established five basic categories of data, which are used as MOEs:

- Mortality rate (crude and those under five years of age).
- Morbidity or disease rate.
- Nutritional status measured by height-weight standards and mid-upper arm circumference.
- Public health activities as measured by immunizations, hospital attendance, and feeding center attendance.
- Vital sectors, as measured by sanitation facilities, food distribution, and shelter availability. Standards have been prepared for each of these categories, which serve as a baseline for assessing the current situation in a given emergency and to gauge improvements.

4-87. MOEs to assess the success of the CA/CMO missions should be designed with the same considerations in mind as for any other types of missions. CA/CMO planners should ensure that MOEs are—

- Appropriate. MOEs should correlate to the audience objectives. If the objective is to present information to those outside the command, MOEs should be general and few in number; if the objective is to assist on-scene commanders, then MOEs should be more specific and detailed.
- Mission-related. MOEs must correlate to the mission. If the mission is relief, MOEs should help the commander evaluate improvements in living standards, mortality rates, and other related areas. If the mission expands, so should MOEs. Planners should tailor MOEs to address strategic, operational, and tactical levels.
- Measurable. Quantitative MOEs reflect reality more accurately than qualitative or subjective MOEs, and hence, are generally the measure of choice when the situation permits their use. When using qualitative or subjective MOEs, clear measurement criteria should be established and disseminated to prevent mismeasurement or misinterpretation.
- Numerically reasonable. MOEs should be limited to the minimum required to effectively portray the relief environment. Planners should avoid establishing excessive MOEs; they become unmanageable or collection efforts outweigh the value.
- Sensitive. MOEs should be sensitive to force performance and accurately reflect changes related to joint force actions. Extraneous factors should not greatly affect established MOEs.
- Useful. MOEs should detect situation changes quickly enough to enable the commander to immediately and effectively respond.

4-88. In multinational or multiagency operations, CA/CMO planners should coordinate MOEs with those of participating nations and agencies. In some cases, they may also collaborate on how the MOEs will be measured and reported. For example, emergency indicators commonly used by the NGO community can be used as a baseline for developing MOEs. The chart in Table 4-1, page 4-36, is extracted from UNHCR’s Handbook for Emergencies, Second Edition.
### Table 4-1. Key Emergency Indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Crude Mortality Rate (CMR)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normal rate among a settled population</td>
<td>0.3 to 0.5/10,000/day.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency program under control</td>
<td>&lt;1/10,000/day.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency program in serious trouble</td>
<td>&gt;1/10,000/day.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency out of control</td>
<td>&gt;2/10,000/day.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major catastrophe</td>
<td>&gt;5/10,000/day.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mortality Rate Among Children Under 5 Years Old (U5MR)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normal rate among a settled population</td>
<td>1.0/10,000/day.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency program under control</td>
<td>&lt;2/10,000/day.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency program in serious trouble</td>
<td>&gt;2/10,000/day.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency out of control</td>
<td>&gt;4/10,000/day.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Clean Water</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum survival allocation</td>
<td>7 liters/person/day.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum maintenance allocation</td>
<td>15-20 liters/person/day.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Food</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum food requirement for a population totally dependent on food aid</td>
<td>2,100 kcal/person/day.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nutrition</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency level</td>
<td>&gt;15% of the population under five years old below 80% weight for height. or &gt;10% of the population under five years old below 80% weight for height together with aggravating factors; for example, epidemic of measles, crude mortality rate &gt; 1/10,000/day.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Measles</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any reported cases. 10% or more not immunized in the 6 months-to-5 years age group.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Respiratory Infections</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any pattern of severe cases.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Diarrhea</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any pattern of severe cases.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Appropriate Shelter</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection from wind, rain, freezing temperatures, and direct sunlight are minimum requirements.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum shelter area</td>
<td>3.5 sq. m/person.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum total site area</td>
<td>30.0 sq. m/person.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sanitation</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of organized disposal of excreta and waste. Less than 1 latrine cubicle per 100 persons.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4-89. Using this chart, planners can create measurable MOEs, such as—

- Mortality rates in the affected population drop below one per 1,000 per day.
- The amount of clean water available to each disaster victim exceeds 7 liters per person per day.
- The amount of food actually consumed by the affected populace exceeds 2,100 kilocalories (kcal) per person per day.
- The shelter area available to the inhabitants of DC camps does not fall below 3.5 square meters per person.
- Incidence of disease in the area drops below 5 percent of the affected population.

4-90. Other useful sources of potential MOEs are—

- The Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response created by the Sphere Project with input from over 650 individuals from 228 organizations, including NGOs, the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, academic institutions, the UN, and government agencies. It is available at http://www.sphereproject.org.
- The collective brainstormed ideas of specialists in the 16 functional specialties; for example—
  - Judicial systems staffed and operating at precrisis levels. (International Law.)
  - Sustainable, legitimate governmental processes are in place according to the provisions of (named) agreement. (Public Administration.)
  - Enrollment of students in primary and secondary schools exceeds 98 percent of school-age population. (Public Education.)
  - The ratio of general practice medical doctors to the local populace exceeds one per 1,000 individuals. (Public Health.)
  - The number of incidents of capital crimes falls below five per week. (Public Safety.)
  - At least 80 percent of public services and private enterprise have access to adequate communications services. (Public Communications.)
  - The capacities of indigenous transportation systems allow for the mobility of people and goods at a level that reduces reliance on military assets to zero. (Transportation.)
  - The indigenous workforce of the (named facility) demonstrates the ability to correct system failures within 24 hours. (Public Works and Utilities.)
  - Indigenous capabilities in (named areas) provide at least 75 percent of the resources required to support the essential needs of the populace. (Civilian Supply.)
  - Unemployment in (named area) is reduced to 4 to 8 percent or better. (Economic Development.)
NGO-supported system of food production, processing, storage, and distribution in the (named area) reaches a level that no longer requires the augmentation of U.S. military resources. (Food and Agriculture.)

At least 90 percent of the populace has access to accurate and timely civil information through various (indigenous and foreign) media platforms. (Civil Information.)

80 percent of significant cultural property and facilities are restored to prehostilities conditions NLT (date). (Cultural Relations.)

HN authorities and local law enforcement are organized, rehearsed, and ready to assume control of DC assembly areas in (named area) NLT (date) according to negotiated plans and agreements. (Dislocated Civilians.)

The emergency services agencies of (named areas) demonstrate the ability to effectively plan, resource, and conduct a tabletop exercise designed to train first responders and emergency management personnel in the execution of selected portions of the (named area) Emergency Management Plan. (Emergency Services.)

The major industries in (named area) adopt regulations and guidelines designed to reduce identified environmental degradation in the area. (Environmental Management.)

4-91. In addition to deciding what the MOEs are, CA/CMO planners must decide certain aspects about each one, such as—

- Who will observe the MOE? (For example, task a specific individual or team.)
- When will the MOE be observed? (Is the MOE event-driven or time-driven? How often will the MOE be tested?)
- How will the MOE be observed? (What method will be used to detect indicators? Direct observation or all-source analysis?)
- Where will the observations be made? (For example, ground level, the CMOC, an all-source analysis center, or some other location.)
- Who will approve and validate achievement of the MOE?
- What actions will be taken when the MOE is satisfactorily achieved? By whom?

4-92. The tasks derived from the questions listed above must be put into the CA annex of the OPORD. Additionally, CA/CMO planners should consider depicting MOEs in a flowchart, an activity network diagram (AND), or both, to facilitate tracking MOEs during the evaluate phase.

UNIFORM AND PERSONAL EQUIPMENT CONSIDERATIONS

4-93. Army Regulation (AR) 670-1, Wear and Appearance of Army Uniforms and Insignia, prescribes DA policy for proper wear and appearance of Army utility, field, training, or combat uniforms and insignia and civilian clothing, as worn by officers and enlisted personnel of the Active Army and RC. In operations short of international armed conflict, the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1,
has the authority to approve exceptions to the regulation that are consistent with controlling law and regulations. The proponent may delegate this authority in writing to an individual within the proponent agency who holds the grade of colonel or above.

4-94. CA soldiers operate worldwide across the range of military operations. The uniform worn and personal items of equipment carried by CA soldiers are influenced by environmental, operational, and practical factors:

- Environmental factors include terrain, weather, and climate in the AO. The operational environment can also be characterized as permissive, semipermissive, and nonpermissive. The degree of permissiveness may vary within the theater or AO.

- Operational factors range from full-scale combat operations to low-density security cooperation missions. Operational tasks vary from staff integration to hands-on deliberate assessments to project coordination and management.

- Practical factors include force protection issues, civil-military relationship management, and credibility management. These factors do not always support one another and are often mutually exclusive.

4-95. Uniform and equipment variations range from seasonal uniform with full combat gear to local civilian clothing without a personal weapon. Sometimes the class A, B, or formal military uniforms may be appropriate while, at other times, civilian business attire may be required. Actual uniform and equipment requirements are normally directed by the mission-tasking agent. When authorized to vary from normal standards, CA soldiers use the factors of METT-TC to determine uniform and equipment requirements appropriate to the mission. Table 4-2, page 4-40, provides a sample of typical considerations when evaluating uniform and equipment combinations.

**PRODUCTS OF THE DECIDE PHASE**

4-96. The decide phase is characterized by the processes that develop and analyze COAs and create plans and orders. CA soldiers develop products throughout the decide phase to facilitate the planning process, including requests for information (RFIs), MSRs, the supported commander’s intent for CMO, civilian named areas of interest (NAIs) and targeted areas of interest (TAIs), CCIR, the CA unit mission statement, and risk assessments. The final products of the decide phase include CA/CMO MOEs (including who, what, when, where, and how MOEs will be observed), TPFDD worksheets, synchronization matrixes, and the CA annex to a campaign plan, OPLAN, CONPLAN, functional plan, supporting plan, or OPORD. These products help orient the force to creating a COE, which will begin in the develop and detect phase. Examples of these products are in Appendix C.
Table 4-2. Uniform and Equipment Combinations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Uniform</th>
<th>Pros</th>
<th>Cons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Battle dress uniform (BDU) complete with combat equipment, to include Kevlar, load-bearing vest, individual weapons, and basic load.</td>
<td>• Professional military appearance.</td>
<td>• Can make it difficult to work with NGOs, international organizations, and some civilian agencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• High level of combat readiness.</td>
<td>• In some environments, can present a more visible target.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• High level of force protection.</td>
<td>• Makes it difficult to present the local environment as “safe and secure” to the local populace.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Greatly reduces the possibility of fratricide.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Aids in dealing with supported unit.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Aids in dealing with foreign militaries.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BDU complete without combat equipment, with or without concealed weapon.</td>
<td>• Professional military appearance.</td>
<td>• Reduced level of combat readiness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Greatly reduces the possibility of fratricide.</td>
<td>• Reduced level of force protection.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Aids in dealing with supported unit.</td>
<td>• Can make it difficult to work with NGOs, international organizations, and some civilian agencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Aids in dealing with foreign militaries.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BDU complete without specified badges and insignia, without combat equipment, and with or without concealed weapon.</td>
<td>• Aids in dealing with HN military and civilian population by addressing local stereotypes and taboos.</td>
<td>• Reduced level of combat readiness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Professional military appearance.</td>
<td>• Reduced level of force protection.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Greatly reduces the possibility of fratricide.</td>
<td>• Can make it difficult to work with NGOs, international organizations, and some civilian agencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• In some environments, can present a more visible target.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian clothes with or without concealed weapon. Modified grooming standards.</td>
<td>• In some environments, can increase level of force protection.</td>
<td>• Greatly increases the possibility of fratricide.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Creates a lower profile.</td>
<td>• May present decreased professional military appearance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Can make it easier to deal with NGOs, international organizations, and some civilian agencies.</td>
<td>• Greatly reduced level of combat readiness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Can make it difficult to deal with supported unit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Can make it difficult to deal with foreign militaries.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: All options listed in this table are available only in operations short of international armed conflict. CA personnel are required to wear the BDU or other uniform in an active theater of operations in international armed conflict.
Chapter 5

CA Methodology: Develop and Detect

The success of the Torch operation is critically dependent upon the reactions of the authorities, inhabitants, and troops of North Africa. With this in mind, General Eisenhower has on this staff a Civil Administrative Section to coordinate the civil and political matters in immediate relation to the operation. He urgently requests that men from the State Department be released to serve on this body.

Memo, GEN George C. Marshall for President Roosevelt, 3 September 1942,
Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors 1964

OVERVIEW

5-1. Execution of the CA plan is initiated during the develop and detect phase. This phase begins when CA elements enter into the AO to establish relationships, develop rapport, and conduct deliberate assessments to confirm or deny the plan. This phase is characterized by numerous activities, such as expanding the CMOC to facilitate increased interagency operations; conducting interviews, surveys, and local meetings; supporting DC control points; monitoring indigenous public information programs; making contact with key communicators; submitting periodic CA/CMO reports; and managing a database of operation-specific information.

5-2. CA activities and CMO develop the civilian component of the COP and assist commanders in finalizing their COR to the actual situation (as opposed to the situation as it was understood during preliminary assessments and mission planning). They detect (confirm or deny) the conditions, standards of care, and attitudes, which serve to either cancel or trigger planned and on-call CA activities and CMO branches and sequels to the operation. The execution of these planned contingencies is the subject of the deliver phase.

5-3. The products of this step include continuous assessments, revised or updated plans, formalized CMOC terms of reference, and FRAG orders. This chapter will focus on the activities that support and occur during the develop and detect phase.

CMOC (INTERAGENCY) OPERATIONS

5-4. The CMOC is normally established early in the planning of an operation, typically during the decide phase. The CMOC’s purpose is to support the commander by providing a forum in which trained soldiers and civilian planners analyze the civilian component of an operation, decide how to conduct initial CA activities and CMO during the develop and detect phase, and begin to synchronize a COR in the deliver phase.
5-5. As the operation matures, the CMOC continues to monitor the civil component of the AO and expands, as necessary, to meet the needs of the commander. Depending on the situation and the operational level at which the CMOC is operating, the CMOC may remain in place or it may deploy forward into the AO. If it deploys or relocates within the AO, CA soldiers follow procedures to establish the CMOC as discussed in Chapter 4.

MAINTAINING THE CMOC

5-6. As a coordination center, the CMOC should be able to execute certain tasks, as necessary. These tasks include the following:

- Develop CA annexes, CMO estimates, and area studies and assessments.
- Act as a clearinghouse for all civilian requests for support from the U.S. military.
- Act as a clearinghouse for all international organizations, NGOs, U.S. and other government agencies operating with and requesting support from the U.S. military.
- Request FNS from civilian organizations.
- Organize outside agency support to reduce or eliminate redundancy and to synchronize and prioritize relief efforts.
- Act as the lead for CA activities and CMO transition to posthostility operations.
- Record, archive, and duplicate documentation.

5-7. To accomplish these tasks, the CMOC maintains maps and charts that depict current and future CA activities and CMO. Map overlays contain graphics depicting the current enemy and friendly situations; current and planned DC operations; the status of arts, monuments, and archives; and other details, as required. CA/CMO graphics are discussed later in this chapter. Charts should depict important ongoing requirements such as work requests, logistic requirements, DC statistics, and SITREP information. (Appendix D provides examples of CMOC status boards and report formats.) Additional items that may be useful in maintaining a CMOC include—

- Digital video cameras.
- Digital cameras.
- Digital voice recorders.
- Digital (high-definition) satellite television.
- Videocassette player/recorder.
- Document scanners.
- Copy machines.
- OE-254 antenna.
- Light set.
- Telephone answering machine.
- Alternate power supply.
• Voltage converters.
• Handheld metal detector (wand).
• 1D card/pass-making equipment (camera, cards, lamination).
• Typewriter.
• Megaphones.
• Butcher block easels.
• Dry-erase boards.
• Standard office supplies.
• Conference table.
• Field desks.
• Field safes.
• Footlockers.
• Prepaid telephone cards.
• Local purchase authority.
• Mailbox system.

REACHBACK REQUIREMENTS

5-8. Preliminary assessments are only as good as the date of the last database entry or the last known data before deployment from home station. Information on the ground changes. Information in the rear (CONUS) also changes (follow-on unit status, national-level policies, and decisions).

5-9. The effectiveness of the CMOC depends significantly on its ability to exploit nonorganic capabilities located within and outside the theater. As the situation matures and assessments yield updated information, there are times when deployed CA teams need to gain access to existing databases, products, and analytic expertise resident in national, joint, and Service resources. This requirement entails a reachback capability.

In late January and February of 1993, during Operation RESTORE HOPE, CADST 32 of Company C, 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (Airborne), had met various groups of elders throughout the city of Mogadishu to determine city district boundaries, district demographics, and concerns. Noting there were some conflicting claims to control over several of the districts, CADST 32 met with a political officer at the U.S. Liaison Office (USLO) in an attempt to confirm the validity of the elders' claims to district leadership. The political officer informed the CA team that the DOS database for the city was only current up to 1989, when the U.S. Embassy pulled out of Somalia. That database was not in Mogadishu, but in Washington, D.C. CADST 32 had no way to query the database from Somalia. The DOS, however, was using CADST 32's Periodic CA Reports to build a new database.

Notes of Team Leader, CADST 32, 1993
5-10. CMOC personnel may need to deconflict communications with external agencies through the information management officer (IMO) or the IO cell of the supported unit HQ.

5-11. The IMO of the supported unit HQ is usually responsible for managing the flow of information throughout the force HQ. As the RFI manager, the IMO is responsible for receiving and routing requests coming into the force HQ and sending all official RFIs generated with the collaborative networks of the force HQ to the appropriate external agencies for resolution.

5-12. IO planners and operators at the supported unit HQ theater employ reachback to IO planners and operators at the Joint Information Operations Center (JIOC), Joint Warfare Analysis Center (JWAC), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), National Security Agency (NSA), and others.

EXPANDING THE CMOC

5-13. As a vehicle for coordinating interagency operations, the CMOC should be adaptable and capable of expanding its support to participating foreign military organizations and U.S. and foreign civilian organizations. Representatives from nonmilitary organizations that can participate in CMOC operations come from such agencies as the U.S. Country Team, UN, USAID, local officials, HN agencies, and NGOs. Regardless of manning and organization, the CMOC should have sufficient personnel to conduct 24-hour operations.

5-14. As new members join the CMOC, the director ensures certain principles of the organization are maintained. These include—

- Common terminology. When agencies have slightly different meanings for terms, confusion and inefficiency result. The director of the CMOC establishes terminology that is understood by all members of the CMOC.
- Unity of command. Each person in the CMOC reports to only one designated person. All involved agencies contribute to CMOC operations by—
  - Determining overall objectives.
  - Planning jointly for operational activities while conducting integrated operations.
  - Maximizing the use of all available resources.
- A manageable span of control. Related to unity of command is span of control. A manageable span of control is the number of individuals one supervisor can manage effectively. The span of control for any supervisor falls within the range of three to seven, with five being the optimum.
- Consolidated plans. Consolidated plans describe goals, operational objectives, and support activities required to meet the common objectives of the various agencies. Whenever possible, these plans should be written.
A CMOC may sponsor various types of meetings, such as—

- Information meetings in which CMOC representatives provide information to the attendees on the security environment (tailored to nonmilitary operations), status of requests for assistance, and so on.
- Coordination meetings in which participants have decision-making authority to coordinate operations and resources for their particular agency.
- Negotiation meetings in which CMOC representatives mediate discussions and agreements between opposing parties.
- Information-sharing meetings in which participants merely gather in an unstructured atmosphere to discuss issues of their own interest with their counterparts and contemporaries. (NOTE: These are often the most productive of all and may occur after more structured meetings.)

5-15. Figure 5-1, pages 5-5 through 5-9, outlines the typical meetings sponsored or attended by CA soldiers of the Task Force 2-327 (KFOR 2B) S-5 in Kosovo. More information on conducting meetings and reaching agreements is found later in this chapter.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Daily Activities</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0900</td>
<td>Daily Scrimmage with Tactical Support Team-7 (TST-7): Conducted every morning at the Vitina CMOC, inside the UN Building. The purpose of this meeting is to discuss issues and concerns with daily CA operations. This meeting is sometimes conducted at close of business (COB) of the day prior, if time permits.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1030</td>
<td>Targeting Meeting: Held in the Task Force (TF) Planning Room. The TF Executive Officer (XO) runs this daily Targeting Meeting. The purpose of the meeting is to identify future targets and identify assets against those targets through tasking or future operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Commander’s Update: Held in the TF TOC. The purpose of this meeting is for the TF CDR to receive a daily staff update by all staff and special staff. S-5 follows the engineer and precedes the signal officer (S-6). Issues briefed are—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Significant events of the past 24 hours.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Planned events for the next 24 hours.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Other concerns (cancellation of meetings, future holidays, and cultural significant activities).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Feedback on issues or concerns from previous update.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weekly Activities</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sunday</td>
<td>Vitina AOR Information Operations Meeting: Held every Sunday at 1200 hours in the TF Plans Room. The purpose of this meeting is to discuss IO inside the Vitina AOR. Respective IO operators present issues or concerns to the TF CDR for review and approval.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5-1. Typical Meetings Sponsored or Attended by CA Soldiers of the Task Force 2-327 (KFOR 2B) S-5 in Kosovo
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Day</th>
<th>Meeting Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monday</td>
<td><strong>Vitina Town Hall Meeting</strong>: Held every Monday at 1400 hours (1500 hours in the summer during daylight savings) at the Vitina Orthodox Church. The company commander for Vitina Town conducts this meeting for the K-Serbs; this includes all Serb enclaves in Vitina and can include Binac. This is a company-level meeting, and the company can resolve most of the issues brought up at this meeting. Some special appearances by the S-5 or TST may be necessary for special issues; Company CMO officer may request their presence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Radio Iliria Weekly Meeting</strong>: Conducted at any convenient time, based on Monday’s morning scrimmage with the TST at the Radio Iliria Studio. This is an informal meeting conducted by the S-5 with the director of the radio station in Vitina. This meeting is to coordinate with the radio station staff and ensure the host of the radio show and the TF CDR are prepared for the possible issues that may be raised.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuesday</td>
<td><strong>Joint Security Council (JSC) Meeting</strong>: Held every Tuesday at 1000 hours in the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) Police Station Conference Room. The purpose of this meeting is for the key organizations, along with representatives from the community, to have an opportunity to specifically address security concerns to the TF CDR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>UNMIK Infrastructure Meeting</strong>: Held every Tuesday at 1000 hours at the UNMIK Municipality Building in Vitina. The purpose of this meeting is to gather all infrastructure-related companies in one room and to coordinate their efforts to promote efficiency. In addition, these companies can inform KFOR and UNMIK of any issues that can be resolved early to prevent potential emergency situations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>KFOR Radio Hour</strong>: This radio show begins at 1700 hours and lasts until 1800 hours every Tuesday evening at the radio station studio in Vitina. This show is the primary means of conveying Task Force Falcon’s (TFF) IO Talking Points or other issues raised from the radio station meeting conducted by the S-5 and the director, normally done on Mondays. Here, the TF CDR has the opportunity to talk and address the people of Vitina Municipality.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wednesday</td>
<td><strong>Serb Mayor’s Meeting</strong>: Held every Wednesday at 1100 hours in the UN Local Community Office in Vrbovac, across from the Vrbovac School. The purpose of this meeting is to gather all six K-Serb mayors in one room to discuss and resolve their issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>IO Working Group (IOWG) Meeting</strong>: Held every Wednesday at 1130 hours in the Battle Update Briefing (BUB) Conference Room in the TFF TOC. The purpose of this meeting is to gather all IO officers from every maneuver unit and supporting units and discuss the IO Execution Matrix and the IO Targeting Synchronization Matrix (TSM).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 5-1. Typical Meetings Sponsored or Attended by CA Soldiers of the Task Force 2-327 (KFOR 2B) S-5 in Kosovo (Continued)*
| **Klokot Town Hall Meeting:** Held at 1830 hours every Wednesday, or at the CDR’s discretion, at the Klokot School in the middle of town. The purpose of this meeting is to promote discussion among the people of Klokot and provide KFOR security assistance as needed. This meeting is similar to the Vitina Town Hall meeting on Mondays, although it is a different company AOR. This is a company-level meeting; the company CMO can request S-5 presence. |
| **Thursday** |
| **Slatina Town Hall Meeting:** Held at 1830 hours every Thursday at the Slatina School. The purpose of this meeting is to promote discussion with the people of Donja Slatina and Gornja Slatina and identify security or other-than-security needs. The liaison/coordination elements (LCEs) for the United Arab Emirates (UAE) run this meeting and it occurs at their discretion. The agenda and participants are similar to all other town hall meetings except that this meeting is in the UAE AOR. The TST normally always attends this meeting because it is the main means of maintaining contact with the people of Slatina. This is a company-level meeting and UAE can request S-5 participation. |
| **Friday** |
| **Four Pillars Meeting:** Held every Friday at 1200 hours, beginning in the “No Slack” dining facility (DFAC) in Vitina and then moving into the TF Conference Room at 1245–1300 hours after everyone has eaten lunch. The purpose of this meeting is to gather representatives from each of the Four Pillars to discuss and resolve issues. The Four Pillars are— |
| • Pillar One—UNHCR. |
| • Pillar Two—UNMIK Municipal Assembly (MA). |
| • Pillar Three—Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). |
| • Pillar Four—Kosovo Development Group (KDG). |
| **Pozaranje Town Hall Meeting:** Held at 1830 every Friday at the Pozaranje Primary School off of Route Stag. The purpose of this meeting is to promote discussion with the people of Pozaranje and to identify security or other-than-security needs. The LCEs for the UAE run this meeting and it occurs at their discretion. The agenda and participants are similar to all other town hall meetings except that this meeting is in the UAE AOR. The TST normally always attends this meeting because it is the main means of maintaining contact with the people of Pozaranje. This is a company-level meeting and UAE can request S-5 participation. |
| **Radivojce/Devaje Town Hall Meeting:** Held at 1830 every Friday at the Radivojce Primary School. The purpose of this meeting is to promote discussion with the people of Radivojce/Devaje and to identify security or other-than-security needs. The Mortar Platoon Leader (PL) attached to B Battery runs this meeting, and it occurs at his discretion. The agenda and participants are similar to all other town hall meetings. This is a company-level meeting and the Mortar PL can request S-5 or TST participation. |

Figure 5-1. Typical Meetings Sponsored or Attended by CA Soldiers of the Task Force 2-327 (KFOR 2B) S-5 in Kosovo (Continued)
Saturday

**Lidhja Demokratike e Kosoves (LDK) (Democratic League of Kosovo) Mayors Meeting**: Held every Saturday at 1000 hours at the Political Party Headquarters in Vitina across from the UN Municipality Building. The purpose of this meeting is for political leaders of LDK throughout the municipality to discuss issues and concerns relating to their respective villages. UNMIK does not acknowledge or sanction this meeting. KFOR is regularly invited to address HA concerns.

**Company CMO Officers Meeting**: Held every Saturday at 1100 hours at Camp Bondsteel (CBS). The purpose of this meeting is to gather all company CMO officers and inform, disseminate, and report information back and forth with the S-5 and TST. The TST normally coordinates a room on CBS for all company CMO officers to meet. This meeting is flexible and may be held at the TF Conference Room when a room at CBS is not available.

Biweekly Activities

**NGO Meeting**: Held every other Wednesday at 1000 hours at the UNMIK Police Station Conference Room. The purpose of this meeting is to gather all NGOs that are operating in the Vitina Municipality and attempt to coordinate their efforts.

**Command and Staff (C&S) Meeting**: Held every other Saturday at 1800 hours in the TF Conference Room. C&S meeting is run IAW Bn SOP. The C&S meeting is a PowerPoint presentation and the slides are normally due to the S-1 by close of business Friday prior to the C&S. Normally, the issues raised to the company CDRs are—

- Overall HA activities.
- Company CMO activities as they are reported to the S-5 in the weekly CMO meeting on Saturdays.
- Talking point issues developed by the Bitina AOR IO meeting and the IOWG.

**Municipal Assembly Meetings**: Normally occur bimonthly. In December 2000, three assembly meetings were scheduled and executed. They are scheduled as needed, with a minimum of 10 meetings during the year. OSCE has produced guidelines and procedures and is actively observing municipality progress. Currently, the assembly meetings have been unorganized, unproductive, and verbose.

Monthly Activities

**Political Leaders Meeting with the TF CDR**: Held as needed, at the discretion of the TF CDR, and coordinated by the S-5. This meeting is essential to the relationships between the TF CDR and the political leadership. This meeting is very effective in passing pertinent information to the leadership, gathering information on substantial issues in the municipality, and to overall better the working relationship of KFOR with the local populace.

Figure 5-1. Typical Meetings Sponsored or Attended by CA Soldiers of the Task Force 2-327 (KFOR 2B) S-5 in Kosovo (Continued)
Humanitarian Assistance Review Board (HARB): Planned and executed by TFF, the purpose of the board is to process the HA nominations prepared by the units of TFF. The HARB is chaired by the TFF CDR. It is normally conducted monthly.


Figure 5-1. Typical Meetings Sponsored or Attended by CA Soldiers of the Task Force 2-327 (KFOR 2B) S-5 in Kosovo (Continued)

DELIBERATE ASSESSMENTS

5-16. Assessments are part of the continuous IPB process and provide the commander with critical information required for making decisions regarding mission tasks, task organization, and allocation of resources. As noted in Chapter 3, CA soldiers conduct two types of assessments: the preliminary assessment (conducted during the assess phase) and the deliberate assessment (conducted during the develop and detect phase).

5-17. Deliberate assessments are normally tasked during the decide phase to appropriate elements that will be in a position to satisfy information shortfalls. Deliberate assessments can also be directed for emergencies, single issues, or special situations, such as a damage assessment incident to a claim. Elements may be task-organized for each deliberate assessment mission.

5-18. The deliberate assessment consists of two phases: the initial assessment, conducted upon entry into the designated AO, and the survey, which is more detailed.

5-19. While conducting initial assessments and surveys, CA soldiers obtain information by conducting direct observation, using checklists, and interviewing civilians in various settings. Gathering information should not be a haphazard process. As with all military missions, this task requires a well-formed, practical plan. The basic steps of this plan include the following:

- Determine what information to gather.
- Determine the most likely source (person, place, event, reference) from which to obtain the information.
- Prepare a list of questions for the source that supports the information requirements.
- Engage the source (research references, observe activities, and interview individuals).
- Compile the results obtained in step above.
- Report the results according to unit SOP.

5-20. Every assessment must contain well-defined geographical boundaries and timeframes within which the assessment is valid. As mere “snapshots in time,” assessments and surveys must be updated as often as necessary to remain current.
INITIAL ASSESSMENT

5-21. The initial assessment is conducted upon entry into the designated AO. The objectives or focus of the initial assessment should be broad yet manageable; for example, assess general conditions of the AO in the areas of public health, public safety, public works and utilities, civil information, and emergency services. CA teams conducting initial assessments must be aware of the security situation at all times.

5-22. During the initial assessment, the CA team takes a cursory look at the conditions of the area as directed by the mission statement. Using the CA area assessment format found in FM 41-10 and the principles of METT-TC for analyzing a situation, the CA team visits locations that will most likely provide the information it has been directed to find. Sources of pertinent information include municipal government and public safety offices, hospitals, medical clinics, feed centers, and HN, UN, and NGO relief sites.

5-23. Products of the initial assessment include SITREPs, spot reports, and requests for assistance. The findings of an initial assessment may lead to refined mission statements or reallocation of forces and resources. The Hasty Village Assessment sheet in Figure 5-2, page 5-11, shows the type of information that can be obtained during an initial assessment.

SURVEY

5-24. The survey is conducted as time and circumstances permit. The survey can be considered a detailed assessment in which the object of the assessment is examined carefully, as during an inspection or investigation. The objectives or focus of the survey should be well-defined; for example, assess the ability of all municipalities in the AO to perform government functions effectively, or, assess the needs of Town X to sustain the populace for the next 72 hours. CA teams conducting surveys must be aware of the security situation at all times.

5-25. During the survey, the CA team uses detailed checklists to ensure all aspects of the area are scrutinized appropriately, as directed by the mission statement. Using the CA Area Assessment Format, the principles of METT-TC, and objective-specific questions prepared by the assessment team, the CA team visits locations that will most likely provide the information it has been directed to find. Sources of pertinent information include clergy, major private industry, foreign embassies, and multinational corporations.

5-26. Products of the survey include updated SITREPs that portray actual conditions, project nominations, and interim or final reports validating the status of projects. The findings of a survey may lead to refined mission statements or reallocation of forces and resources.
# IMMEDIATE VILLAGE ASSESSMENT – HQ, JTF

## 1. Report Header

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Originating Unit</th>
<th>Date-Time Group</th>
<th>Name of Locality</th>
<th>Grid Reference (UTM)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

## 2. Shelter Survey:

- **Occupancy of shelter and houses.**
  - Most houses occupied.
  - Approximately half of the houses occupied.
  - Most houses empty.

## 3. Shelter Survey:

- **Condition of shelter and houses occupied by population.**
  - **Category 1**: No action required.
  - **Category 2**: Long-term action by locals/externals required.
  - **Category 3**: Immediate action by locals/externals required.

### Category 1
- Not damaged.

### Category 2
- Broken windows, door locks and hinges, roof tiles; cut off from electricity and water; can be repaired.

### Category 3
- Up to 30% roof damage, light shelling or bullet impact on walls, partial fire damage.

### Category 4
- Over 30% roof damage, severe fire damage, doors and windows destroyed, all piping and wiring destroyed.

### Category 5
- Destroyed, cannot be repaired, reconstruction required.

## 4. Basic needs of the population.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Food Stores/Market Open</th>
<th>Water Supply Available</th>
<th>Electricity Available</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>Inadequate</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## 5. Local authorities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local Police Seen</th>
<th>Paramilitary Seen</th>
<th>Signs of Local Authorities Seen (Town Hall)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

Figure 5-2. Hasty Village Assessment Sheet
CIVILIAN INTERVIEW TECHNIQUES

5-27. CA soldiers conduct interviews to gather information in support of hasty or detailed assessments. In some cases, the interviewer knows the interviewee in advance. In other cases, the interviewer must seek out interviewees based on the position they hold in the community or the knowledge they may have on a subject area. This section describes techniques for planning and conducting interviews in both cases.

5-28. The interview process consists of three distinct phases: the preparatory phase, the interview phase, and the postinterview phase. These phases are discussed in the following paragraphs.

PREPARATORY PHASE

5-29. A successful interview begins with proper preparation. During the preparatory phase, the interviewer follows a process designed to maximize his knowledge of the subject matter, facilitate actions during the interview phase, and foster a relationship with the interviewee that will allow future contact with the interviewee, if required. Specifically, the CA soldier will—

• Identify CCIR. CCIR are information required by the commander that directly affects his decisions and dictates the successful execution of operational or tactical operations. CCIR result in the generation of three types of information requirements:
  ▪ Priority intelligence requirements (PIR): Those intelligence requirements for which a commander has an anticipated and stated priority in his task of planning and decision making.
  ▪ Essential elements of friendly information (EEFI): Critical aspects of a friendly operation that, if known by the enemy, would subsequently compromise, lead to failure, or limit success of the operation, and therefore must be protected from enemy detection.
  ▪ Friendly force information requirements (FFIR): Information the commander and staff need about the forces available for the operation. FFIR include personnel, maintenance, supply, ammunition, POL status, and experience and leadership capabilities.

NOTE: CA assessments are normally oriented on the CA/CMO PIR and FFIR.

• Identify potential sources and interviewees who can answer the CA/CMO PIR, EEFI, and FFIR. A thorough METT-TC analysis will yield a list of the various categories of civilians a CA team may encounter in the AO. Some categories of civilians lend themselves to answering certain PIR or FFIR better than others. The interviewer should recognize that there may be different and conflicting points of view among interviewees. Accordingly, validation through multiple sources, people, history, and records is critical. Table 5-1, page 5-13, provides examples of PIR, EEFI, and FFIR.
Table 5-1. Examples of CA/CMO PIR, EEFI, and FFIR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PIR</th>
<th>Potential Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Who are the key personnel in the AO, to include political officials, business leaders, and criminal figures?</td>
<td>Municipal Leaders, Chamber of Commerce, Police and Prison Officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. What capabilities does the local populace have to sustain and protect itself in the areas of public health, public safety, public works and utilities, civil information, and emergency services?</td>
<td>Public Health Officials, Public Safety Officials, Emergency Management Director, Public Information Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. How many civilians intend to evacuate and how many intend to stay put in the event hostilities get close to populated areas?</td>
<td>Local Community Leaders, Religious Leaders, Emergency Management Director, Public Safety Officials</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EEFI</th>
<th>Potential Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. What are the shortcomings of the force in terms of HNS requirements, medical supplies, and other logistics issues?</td>
<td>U.S. Forces, CSS Units of Allied/Coalition Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. What force protection measures are currently in place? (This should include security measures employed by participating civilian agencies.)</td>
<td>Commander, G/S-3, NGO Representatives, UN Representatives</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FFIR</th>
<th>Potential Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. What military resources are available for CMO, and what are their priorities?</td>
<td>CSS Units of U.S. Forces, CSS Units of Allied/Coalition Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. What NGOs are in the area, and what are their capabilities, mandates, and priorities?</td>
<td>NGO Representatives, UN Representatives, Local Community Leaders</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Conduct background research. This research is accomplished through a review of area studies, current area assessments, and maps of the area. The interviewer reviews these documents to identify where to find potential sources (for example, names and addresses), understand previous conditions, and identify the potential for conflicting points of view. He also reviews cultural items, such as customs, traditions, and local idioms to minimize the chance of offending interviewees.
• Prepare questions for each interviewee that support the CA/CMO PIR and FFIR. Preparing questions in advance mitigates the need to think of questions on the spot, which is extremely helpful when time is short or when the interviewer encounters a potential source in an unexpected manner. Doing so also demonstrates to the interviewee that the interviewer is professional and prepared. The interviewer should consider the following:
  ▪ While some questions may be asked of all interviewees, other questions should be reserved for specific categories of interviewees based on their specialty, expertise, or knowledge.
  ▪ The interviewer should include the following two questions on every list: (1) Is there anything else you can tell me about the subject that I may have failed to ask? and (2) Whom else should I contact to obtain additional information?

• Contact the interviewee. The interviewer should arrange to meet the interviewee at a mutually convenient time and location. Depending on conditions in the area, this contact may be made by telephone, mail, E-mail, or runner. (NOTE: In most cultures, initial interviewing by any means other than face-to-face is considered discourteous. Therefore, if the interview must be by telephone or E-mail, an apology is required.) The unannounced visit is less desirable under some conditions but may be the only means of contacting individuals under other conditions. In extreme cases, the CA soldier may contact potential interviewees by seeking the most likely place a source would be located (a church, hospital, or municipal building) and asking to see the individual who best fits the desired category (religious leader, public health official, or political leader).

• Arrange for interpreter support, if needed. Interpreters are a necessity in CA operations, especially when operating in an environment of obscure languages. Appendix F discusses the use of interpreters.

• Consider a separate notetaker. A useful technique is to employ a separate individual to take notes during the interview. This individual should be someone other than the interviewer and the interpreter, as these individuals must focus on the answers, tone of voice, and body language of the interviewee.

• Gather supporting materials and equipment. Whether conducting interviews in a comfortable setting or “on the street,” the following items may be useful:
  ▪ Pen and paper.
  ▪ Recording devices (optional), such as audiotape, video camera, still camera with extra batteries, film, and cassettes.
  ▪ Question list.
  ▪ Supporting maps, photos, and charts, as appropriate.

• Arrange for security. The security team maintains watch for threats to the interviewer or interview team and serves as additional observers of the behavior of interviewees and passersby.
• Rehearse. Rehearsals accomplish several goals. By rehearsing the interview, the interviewer tests content and delivery of the questions, ensures that the interpreter, notetaker, and security personnel know and understand their roles, and ensures that the equipment functions properly. A well-conducted rehearsal increases the likelihood of a professionally conducted interview.

INTERVIEW PHASE

5-30. An interview may take place under varying conditions or environments. The interviewer should strive to conduct the interview in the best conditions possible, but he must remain flexible and focused enough to obtain information in any situation. He must also act in a manner that facilitates approaching the interviewee as a source of additional information at some future time. The following techniques apply to every interview. The interviewer should—

• Set the proper atmosphere by doing the following:
  ▪ Schedule the interview meeting at a mutually convenient time to avoid distractions or interruptions.
  ▪ Allocate sufficient time—whole morning or afternoon sessions versus several shorter periods, if possible.
  ▪ Coordinate for a quiet location, if recording—a quiet office or room or under a tree away from big crowds.
  ▪ Relax and put the interviewee at ease—ground field gear if security conditions allow, provide refreshments if possible, or accept refreshments if offered.
  ▪ Explain the overall purpose of the interview and how the session will be conducted; explain that questions and follow-up questions will be asked.
  ▪ Explain the role of each team member, if employing an interview team consisting of two or more individuals (for example, interviewer, interpreter, notetaker), to avoid the impression that the team will “gang up” on the interviewee.
  ▪ Remind the interviewee that there is no rush to answer just because the recorder is running; ensure the recorder is properly set up and is functional by testing it in advance.

• Conduct the interview as follows:
  ▪ Be confident. Through preparation and background research, the material to be covered should be familiar.
  ▪ Maintain control of the interview. The interviewer should try to pace the session so that sufficient time is given to ask all of the questions and get the information wanted from the interview.
  ▪ Avoid asking leading questions, but phrase queries to elicit detailed responses. An example of a leading question is: Is it true that your family or village is suffering from a lack of access to food, water, security, and health care? A better phrasing of the question might be: What immediate concerns do you have for your family or
village? This facilitates follow-up questions like: To what do you attribute this lack of access to food, water, security, and health care? This method should provide a wealth of detailed information.

- Ask direct questions to avoid ambiguity. Direct questions give the interviewee a starting point around which to organize a response.
- Ask follow-up questions. The interviewer should be careful not to confront the interviewee in a manner that challenges his integrity. A frequently successful approach is to acknowledge some confusion before asking additional questions.
- Take notes. Interview notes are useful for indicating when follow-up questions are needed, for organizing one's thoughts, and for preparing a preliminary list of items requiring verification. The interviewer should try not to be distracted or distracting when taking notes; it is often helpful if someone other than the interviewer takes notes.
- Have the interviewee explain the meaning of any unfamiliar terms, as well as provide additional information on unfamiliar subjects or individuals mentioned during the interview. The interviewer should ask the interviewee to provide proper spellings and draw diagrams, if possible.
- Do not interrupt the interviewee in the middle of an answer. The interviewer must be respectful, courteous, and attentive.
- Do not be afraid of silence. A pause may signify that the interviewee is thinking of additional information that could be lost if the interviewer is too quick with the next question.
- If the discussion digresses from the subject, return to the interview plan by tactfully asking a question from the list.
- Limit sessions to no more than 2 hours and take short breaks. Otherwise, both the interviewee and interviewer will become fatigued. If the interview is being recorded, a good time to take breaks is when it is time to change tapes.
- Show appreciation. The interviewer should thank the interviewee for his time, in the interviewee's language, if possible, and render the appropriate parting gesture, such as shaking hands with or bowing to the individual.

- Take into account the following additional considerations:
  - Remember the customs and courtesies of the community. Seemingly little things like rendering the appropriate greetings or accepting food and drink from the hosts, for example, often win the respect of the interviewee, gain his cooperation, and help dispel the ugly American myth.
  - Use local phrases appropriately or not at all. The interviewer should not risk offending the interviewee. If using local phrases, the interviewer should practice the correct pronunciation and usage in advance.
  - Know how to use interpreters (Appendix F).
• Don’t mislead an interviewee while soliciting information. The interviewer loses credibility and the ability to approach the interviewee, as well as others in the community, for information in the future.

• Don’t make promises. This is the number one rule when interacting with foreign nationals. CA soldiers are usually not in a position to commit U.S. resources to anything. If a CA soldier promises something and fails to produce, he has just reduced his credibility and provided propaganda material for his adversaries.

• Protect EEFI. The interviewer must ensure that he does not inadvertently release critical aspects of a friendly operation to the interviewee.

POSTINTERVIEW PHASE

5-31. Actions taken after the interview are as critical as gathering the information. The interviewer should, at a minimum, take the following actions:

• Debrief all participants of the interview team—interviewer, notetaker, interpreter, and security personnel. Compare notes and observations of all team members to obtain a more accurate understanding of the reliability, attitude, and intentions of the interviewee as well as any other individuals encountered during the interview process.

• Package all notes, recordings, and report of findings according to unit SOP. The SOP should consider the classification and disposition of transcripts, diagrams, maps, and photos as well as courier requirements for the interview products.

• If the situation permits, or as appropriate, send a brief letter thanking the interviewee for participating in the session.

TECHNIQUES IN REACHING AGREEMENTS

5-32. The very nature of CA activities often puts CA soldiers in contact with people who have differences of opinion over what they can or cannot and should or should not do in specific situations. The CA soldier must be able to influence the actions of people to meet both the objectives of a commander and the national policies and objectives of the United States. He must be able to do this in any scenario.

5-33. When resolving disagreements between parties, CA soldiers must display a combination of patience, tenacity, creativity, and focus to succeed. They must—

• Be tolerant. Build upon successes to instill trust and cooperation.

• Be patient. The process of reestablishing stability and peace is slow and methodical.

• Take charge. Initiate the process quickly but be thorough when executing an agreement.

• Be prepared. Know the situation from all aspects.

• Expect change. No two situations are the same.

• Be innovative. Exploit unexpected advantages.
• Be flexible. There are no hard-and-fast rules, just guidelines.
• Be resourceful. Use what is available.
• See the mission through. Vigilance is critical to long-term success.

Examples of the range of challenges CA soldiers may encounter include—
• Getting the leaders of a local populace to support and implement a stay-put policy to prevent DC movement during combat operations.
• Appeasing competing vendors who disagree with HNS contracts let by logistics representatives in rear areas.
• Assisting representatives of formerly warring factions to work out movement agreements during posthostilities operations.
• Deconflicting HA activities of NGOs and international military forces during HA operations.

5-34. Each of these examples represents a significant CMO event that requires the full knowledge and support of the commander responsible for the AO. Each example also demonstrates that the CA soldier must be properly trained and prepared to meet many similar, yet different, challenges.

5-35. Before entering an agreement process, the CA soldier must know what a good agreement looks like. A successfully negotiated agreement meets four standard criteria:
• Fairness implies that all or both sides are treated alike, without reference to the feelings or interests of the negotiator.
• Efficiency refers to producing a desired outcome with a minimum of effort, expense, or waste.
• Wisdom pertains to judging rightly and following the soundest COA.
• Durability refers to the stability of the agreement or the ability of the agreement to last. Durability generally follows from success in the first three criteria.

5-36. The following discussion provides techniques to assist the CA soldier in bringing a successful conclusion to situations that require two or more parties to come to a mutual agreement. Knowledge of these techniques does not qualify a CA soldier to act as a hostage negotiator or a trade negotiator for international, national, or regional trade agreements. These types of agreements require specific expertise and legal status that are beyond the normal scope of CA activities.

5-37. There are three basic methods one can use to bring opposing sides together to reach an agreement: negotiation, arbitration, and mediation. Each method has its place in CA operations, as explained below. Negotiation and arbitration are likely to place the CA soldier in a position of opposition to one or more of the local parties. As the most effective and least divisive of the three, mediation is the preferred method of reaching agreements.

NEGOTIATION

5-38. Negotiation is conferring, discussing, or bargaining to reach an agreement. Negotiation is a central technique in conflict resolution. Although
they will rarely be called on to negotiate a major agreement in a postconflict environment, CA soldiers at all levels must be competent and knowledgeable in the art of negotiation. Under normal circumstances, the DOS conducts international negotiations on behalf of the United States. Typically, exceptions to this rule occur when details of a status-of-forces agreement (SOFA) need clarification or when the U.S. military requires goods or services from a local provider.

5-39. When a U.S. military representative is a party to a negotiation, he is then injected into the problem and is seen as a competitor and not as a disinterested party. Once any of the local representatives regard the United States as an interested party, the United States surrenders the cloak of neutrality, and all actions become suspect. It is very difficult to shake the ensuing suspicion and mistrust, even by subsequent U.S. actions or representatives.

5-40. To be effective, CA soldiers must develop competencies in conflict style management, the dynamics of conflict, verbal communications skills, and cultural awareness.

Conflict Style Management

5-41. Negotiators must appraise and evaluate personality traits and profiles in relation to conflict. These appraisals give insight into how individuals and groups react to, and interact in, a conflict situation. Since all individuals are different, the negotiator must be flexible but assertive. Learning to recognize his styles of communication and the styles of others and to adapt his processes can lead to more sustainable agreements.

Dynamics of Conflict

5-42. CA soldiers will be called upon to resolve conflict when not all parties are willing to engage in negotiation or mediation processes. Moreover, CA soldiers will have to negotiate fair outcomes when there is an uneven power dynamic between the parties. Many issues will involve intractable conflicts that are considered nonnegotiable when the communication channels have broken down. Parties frequently attempt to use force to prevail in these situations. Although force can sometimes work quickly and effectively, it has many dangers.

Verbal Communication Skills

5-43. The success or failure of a negotiation is directly related to the depth of communication achieved by the parties involved. Problems often arise because intentions are miscommunicated. The assumptions and perceptions about a person, group, or situation affect the outcome of communication; listening skills and questioning techniques are important.

Cultural Awareness

5-44. Cross-cultural training increases the awareness and understanding of other cultures. This ability enables the CA participants to interact successfully with the population in the host country, and provides a
framework in which to work. An understanding of one’s own culture allows him to see cultural differences and similarities with other cultures.

**Negotiation Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures**

5-45. As it becomes necessary to act as a negotiator, the CA soldier must do the following:

- Establish the objectives of the negotiation session, which involves understanding the needs of the participants (physiological, safety, social, self-esteem, and self-actualization).
- Establish the schedule and location, which involves coordinating participants’ schedules, determining optimum timing, and considering neutral sites.
- Plan and prepare the facility, which involves determining the size and shape of the negotiating table, determining seating arrangements and room decor, providing audiovisual aids, and setting the lighting and noise conditions. It also involves considering accessibility and satisfying the basic needs of the participants.
- Establish the rules, which involves determining who will attend, setting an agenda, sequencing presentations, and sticking to the issues.

Additionally, the CA soldier will find the following tactics or ploys useful during the negotiation process:

- **Crossroads:**
  - Provide options and alternatives.
  - Be flexible.
  - Satisfy needs (the CA soldier’s and theirs).
- **Surprise:**
  - Shift methods and approach suddenly (overcome preconceived attitudes and notions).
  - Introduce new information.
  - Put the ball in their court.
- **Fait Accompli:**
  - Take action in advance.
  - Present as accomplished fact.
  - Is irreversible.
- **Association:**
  - Present issue in the best light.
  - Use positive images.
  - Cite examples of success.
- **Salami:**
  - Resist the temptation to go for broke.
  - Break large requests into more manageable pieces.
  - Prevent perception of overload.
• Participation:
  ▪ Lay the groundwork first.
  ▪ Appeal to self-interest of others.
  ▪ Enlist aid of influential others.

• Changing Levels:
  ▪ Change viewpoint.
  ▪ Change physical attitude.
  ▪ Be prepared to show benefits at every level.

ARBITRATION

5-46. Arbitration is a conflict settlement with the decision made by a neutral party. There are two forms of arbitration: binding and nonbinding. Binding arbitration refers to situations where local representatives agree to comply with the arbitrator’s decision. Nonbinding arbitration refers to situations where parties are not compelled to comply with the arbitrator’s decision. In CA operations, either form of arbitration is ineffective because the arbitrator acts as judge, and as such will make a decision that will adversely affect one or more parties. Since this is virtually always a decision on a subject where contention is so rampant that the participants could not bring themselves to agree, the arbitrator’s decision will in all likelihood anger everyone involved and decrease the chances of future cooperation with U.S. policy goals.

5-47. For the CA soldier, the only tangible advantage in acting as an arbitrator is that a quick and decisive decision can be made. Without local support, however, implementing the decision can be extremely difficult or impossible. Without local support for the arbitrator’s decision, the local commander, and, for that matter, the U.S. military as a diplomatic player, must be prepared to lose prestige and influence. Unless the United States is willing to commit sufficient resources to enforce compliance, it will appear weak and ineffective. In those situations where the U.S. military is willing to commit resources to enforce compliance, the U.S. military commander must be advised that a potential long-term negative effect may be lasting resistance to future U.S.-led efforts designed to enhance stability.

MEDIATION

5-48. Mediation is a conflict settlement with the decision made by the opponents with the assistance of a neutral third party. During mediation, the role of the CA soldier is to act as a facilitator whose aim is to guide the local parties toward an agreement that supports the policy goals of the U.S. government. The mediator is not representing the aspirations of any of the opposing sides, but acts solely to further the altruistic goals of lasting peace, stability, and cooperation within the framework of the military commander’s intent and the international agreements that authorized U.S. involvement.

5-49. Although the goals are altruistic, the mediator should not assume there would be little or no resistance from the indigenous population or institutions. There are numerous groups and individuals that will actively or passively hamper attempts to establish peace. In mediation, the United States is not in a position to support the aims or goals of one of the opposing
parties, and therefore the likelihood of persistent animosity and aggression
directed at the United States or U.S. representatives is reduced.

5-50. During the mediation cycle, the mediator may find that he may have
to enforce a decision that has a disproportionate benefit to one participant
over another. The mediator will have to prepare for that situation by
ensuring that throughout the mediation cycle he has remained impartial,
clearly outlined what behavior was expected from the participants, and what
rewards or punishments would be apportioned. Mediation includes the risk of
upsetting a participant. However, the mediator can prevent long-term friction
through effective communication and by eliminating the possibility that the
mediator’s actions appear arbitrary.

5-51. The CA soldier must remember that mediation, if at all possible, is the
preferred method when pursuing an agreement between two opposing
parties. Appendix G contains additional guidelines on how to successfully
reach an agreement.

CONDUCTING MEETINGS

5-52. A meeting is a gathering of people who come together to discuss or
decide on matters. CA soldiers often find themselves responsible for setting
up meetings for various reasons or occasions. Some examples include
the following:

- The CA team needs to coordinate with local leaders or facility
  managers to facilitate access to areas, structures, and people in support
  of a detailed assessment or survey.
- Local NGO representatives desire to voice their concerns to the
  commander regarding the nature of military operations in the area and
  to resolve conflicting priorities.
- The ranking military officer in the theater, region, or local area would
  like to introduce himself to prominent political leaders and discuss
  issues of significance to all parties.
- A serious incident occurred in which coalition or U.S. forces are
  implicated and military investigators must work with local authorities
  to investigate the incident.

5-53. It may be necessary to conduct periodic meetings with certain groups
for specific recurring or sequential topics. Weekly meetings may be
appropriate for planning operations, tracking progress, and managing
projects. Monthly meetings provide a better chance to look at certain long-
range or developmental subjects in greater depth.

5-54. Every meeting ought to be assigned to a single meeting coordinator.
The meeting coordinator is responsible for the planning, coordination, and
execution of the meeting. Depending on the circumstances and level of the
meeting, the meeting coordinator may or may not also serve as the moderator
of the meeting.

5-55. Successful meetings require detailed planning regardless of the
location, circumstances, timing, or frequency. Successful planning requires
the meeting coordinator to approach the task professionally and
systematically. He must understand the purpose, expected outcome, and implications of the meeting. He must be aware of the agendas of attendees and satisfy their need to perceive benefit from attending this and future meetings. The more care taken in preparing and structuring the meeting, the more likely the outcome of the meeting will be favorable. When planning the meeting, the meeting coordinator should—

- Determine the purpose of the meeting, the desired results of the meeting, and implications of the meeting on ongoing operations and initiatives.
- Make a list of the desired attendees, and identify individual ranks, status, and protocol requirements. He should also identify potential agenda items among the attendees that may surface before, during, or after the meeting.
- Select an appropriate location and consider security of the site, clearance of routes, and travel passes, if needed. He should consider the neutrality of the location and the possible message it may send to participants, as well as nonparticipants, and ensure that the location implies no favoritism.
- Invite the attendees and, when appropriate, confirm their attendance.
- Determine appropriate seating arrangements. He should consider the number of participants, the rank and status of the participants, the size and shape of the room, and local culture and customs. (Local culture and customs may dictate, for instance, that participants sit in a circle on the ground.)
- Consider local ceremonial customs and ensure the members of the U.S. or coalition party are aware of what will be expected of them in such ceremonies. Ceremony may be an important part of some types of meetings. What some might consider eyewash may be the gauge by which others determine commitment to subsequent or preceding terms of the meeting.
- Be familiar with other cultural idiosyncrasies, such as the exchanging of gifts before or after a meeting, or how much small talk is acceptable before “jumping in to business.” Such cultural awareness is invaluable to defusing cultural barriers that can derail or hinder the purpose of the meeting.

During the meeting, the meeting moderator should—

- Welcome all participants and allow for introductions.
- Orient the participants to the layout of the meeting area, including locations of break areas, rest rooms, telephones, FAX machines, and other administrative support.
- Provide an overview of the meeting’s purpose and objectives, relevant background information and assumptions, the time allotted for the meeting, and the expected outcome at the meeting’s conclusion.
- Publish clear and concise ground rules for behavior. For example, participants must arrive on time, there should be no interruptions to take phone calls, topics not on the agenda will be tabled for a follow-up meeting, and meetings should always strive to finish on time. Other
rules might include guidelines on sending proxies or on the need for confidentiality. In a volatile environment, full constructive challenge, as opposed to destructive confrontation, should be encouraged.

- Propose and formalize an agenda that is agreeable to all parties. Designate an individual to enforce the agenda by keeping time or reminding participants when they are straying from the approved topics.
- Pay particular attention to satisfying the needs of all participants; for example, stay away from “one-way” meetings in which it appears military participants are pulling information from civilian participants and giving little information in return.
- Designate an individual to perform as the official recorder and notetaker. It is almost impossible to effectively run a meeting and take thorough notes at the same time. Legal clerks from the Judge Advocate General (JAG) section, if available, may be helpful.
- Monitor the composition and skills of the attendees to confirm that the right people are attending.
- Provide the opportunity for people to be creative and spontaneous. Encouraging participation fosters a sense of common purpose and accomplishment. In some meetings, participants might not be vocal with their ideas. To obtain the feedback necessary to resolve issues, the meeting coordinator may have to extract the information by asking direct questions.
- Break large groups into smaller working groups (no more than 10) to facilitate communication and participation, if necessary.
- Use the last few minutes of a meeting to review the group’s decisions and define the required next steps, if appropriate. If follow-up action is necessary, it is important to be specific so that it is clearly understood which individual will handle each outstanding task. Assign due dates for each assignment, as well.

After the meeting, the meeting coordinator or moderator should—

- Produce a complete report consisting of, at a minimum, the following:
  - List of attendees.
  - Copy of the agenda.
  - A synopsis of all issues and discussions covered during the meeting, decisions made, agreements drafted, topics tabled for future meetings, and further actions to be taken.
  - The dates and subjects of future meetings.
- Provide copies of the report to each attendee.
- Follow up on outstanding issues or actions to be taken, as appropriate.

5-56. Although the processes of planning and conducting meetings should be approached as any other military operation, the meeting coordinator must be careful not to overconstrain the meeting agenda or participation. If the atmosphere is too tense or rigid, nonmilitary participants may be intimidated or alienated and, therefore, may resist attending future meetings. On the other hand, the meeting moderator must be aware of
certain skills or tactics that he or meeting participants may try to employ to turn the meeting in his favor. The use of the following skills or tactics is situational-dependent.

AGGRESSION

5-57. Psychologists differentiate between angry aggression and instrumental aggression (aggression designed to achieve a specific goal). There is no place for angry aggression in meetings. Instrumental aggression should be employed sparingly but forcefully. Tone of voice and body language will often suffice. If an individual sounds furious, people will believe he is furious. He who loses his rage completely will usually regret it.

CONCILIATION

5-58. Conciliation is usually the best way to defuse aggression. An aggressive opponent can be temporarily pacified with appeasement signals and submissive gestures. As with aggression, conciliation must be used sparingly. Admitting one is wrong about something can be a mark of strength, not weakness. Often, a well-timed apology can put even the most abusive attacker off guard and bring a situation back under control.

ENTHUSIASM

5-59. Unlike aggression and conciliation, enthusiasm is encouraged. Enthusiasm fosters participation by reinforcing the feeling that each participant’s idea counts. The meeting moderator should be wary, however, of giving the impression of false enthusiasm.

INTERROGATION

5-60. Interrogation in the context of meetings means making interrogative statements rather than making speeches. Asking pointed and relevant questions is often a more effective means of promoting communication.

PATIENCE

5-61. Patience allows the listener to hear the arguments advanced by all sides with an open mind. It enables the listener to assess the general trends of discussion, formulate arguments, and identify moments when it is most appropriate to act.

SULKING

5-62. Sulking is a way of eliciting sympathy from other meeting attendees to get one’s way against seemingly insurmountable odds. As with aggression and conciliation, sulking should be used sparingly.

WITHDRAWAL

5-63. Withdrawing from a meeting is a tactic of last resort and should be used most sparingly of all. The purpose of withdrawal is to shock the remaining participants into confusion and disarray and cause them to reconsider the position that prompted the withdrawal. It is an extremely
risky tactic, as the withdrawing party no longer has control over what transpires in the meeting once he has left.

ATTENDING MEETINGS

5-64. CA soldiers will often attend meetings run by NGOs, IROs, or local civilians. These meetings are an excellent opportunity to share information, network with influential individuals, and build relationships beneficial to the military mission. CA soldiers must understand their role in such meetings and how to maximize the value of the opportunity. Their effectiveness in future collaborative efforts will often be influenced by their military rank, where they sit, how they behave, and what they say or do not say during these meetings.

5-65. Nonmilitary participants of a meeting will often relate the military rank of the attendee to the level of importance the commander places on the meeting participants or subject matter. Lower-ranking soldiers may consider carrying an official letter of introduction from the commander, especially to initial meetings with nonmilitary groups.

5-66. At times, CA soldiers may intend to be passive observers at a particular meeting or series of meetings. Depending on the status of the military in certain environments, however, the mere presence of military representatives at a meeting is a statement in its own right. CA soldiers must display competence, reliability, and professionalism at all times.

5-67. Often, the most productive coordination is made between individuals during breaks and after adjournment of a meeting. CA soldiers must prudently observe meeting protocols. They must understand what information is appropriate for presentation to the group, when to present it, and when to keep information for appropriately timed “sidebars.” Additional meeting attendance guidelines for the CA soldier include the following:

- Understand and respect local customs, especially during interaction with community and government leaders.
- Pick seating location carefully. Sitting next to or behind someone could be interpreted as implicit support by the military of that person or organization.
- Understand your level of authority; don’t agree to conditions or make commitments beyond that authority.
- Ask questions to clarify points, keep a meeting focused, and address issues of importance to the military, but avoid the appearance of taking over the meeting.
- Speak up to counter incorrect or misleading statements. For example, if a meeting participant states that the military can or will perform certain services, or that the military did or did not do something, the CA soldier’s silence may be interpreted as concurrence. Organizations or individuals with antimilitary agendas will attempt to bait the CA soldier into making explicit or implicit statements.
MANAGING AND CLASSIFYING CA AND CMO INFORMATION

Information provided by friendly, adversary, and neutral parties has a significant effect on CMO planners' ability to establish and maintain relations between joint forces and the civil authorities and general population, resources, and institutions in friendly, neutral, or hostile areas.

JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations, 8 February 2001

5-68. During the initial planning stages of CA operations and CMO, much of the information used by CA/CMO planners is characterized by the completed area study based on the format found in FM 41-10. This information, kept current through routine and continuous study and research, is obtained using a combination of open-source and restricted source materials. Open-source materials include political, economic, military, cultural, and informational journals, the CIA source book, and numerous public web sites. Restricted source materials include the CA database and the OSIS.

5-69. As operations mature and CA soldiers begin conducting hasty and detailed surveys, the information used by CA/CMO planners becomes more sensitive in terms of how it was obtained and to what uses it will be put. Characterized by personal contact and direct observation, this information has associated costs in terms of soldiers' time, effort, and resources, as well as the potential requirement to protect information sources.

5-70. While conducting assessments, CA soldiers may uncover information that is politically sensitive, proprietary in nature, or potentially harmful to the source if the information is obtained by the source's adversaries or competitors. In the first case, dissemination of politically sensitive information may hurt reputations, cost lives, or hinder the attainment of U.S. goals and objectives. In the second case, release of proprietary information may diminish the CA soldiers' ability to obtain useful or important information in the future. In the latter case, information obtained in confidentiality must be protected according to the desires of the confidant.

5-71. Whether compiled from open-source materials, restricted source materials, personal contacts, or direct observation, the information gathered by CA soldiers must be carefully managed to ensure—

- It gets to the right end users according to a well-coordinated plan.
- It retains its integrity.
- Sources are protected, as applicable.
- Sensitive information is not released to unauthorized groups or individuals.
- Proper and adequate documentation of CA operations is maintained according to federal law (Title 18, United States Code [USC], Section 2071) and AR 25-400-2, The Army Records Information Management System (ARIMS).

DATABASE REQUIREMENTS

5-72. Information pertaining to CA operations and CMO must be carefully catalogued and managed during all phases of operations. This requirement is
especially important during long-term operations when continuity is paramount to success, and knowledge of previous actions must be passed to succeeding CA teams and interagency participants. The CMOC, as the repository for all CA and CMO information, must establish a system that achieves this objective. The system must be initiated early in the operation, simple to maintain, and easily shared with other agencies, as applicable, to facilitate planning and operations.

5-73. A paper-based system that achieves the purpose of cataloguing and managing CA/CMO information uses the daily staff journal (DA Form 1594), the CA (G-5) Workbook, CMO situation maps and overlays, and a resource card file, as discussed below:

- The daily staff journal is the official chronological record of CA and CMO events that includes summaries of all messages received by the CMO staff officer or CMOC.
- The CA Workbook is organized by each of the 16 functional specialties, contains detailed and current information about the AO, and is used to prepare CA periodic reports and CMO estimates.
- CMO situation maps depict current and future dispositions of pertinent friendly, enemy, and civilian organizations, resources, plans, and events. CMO overlays show how the situation changes over time, and provide a historical record of events. Separate overlays can be prepared that show demographics of an area, locations of civil supply support, locations and status of public utilities or health service facilities, routes and disposition of DCs, locations of protected targets, and many others. GIS products from NIMA can be used for this purpose.
- A resource card file helps keep the various overlays from becoming too cluttered. It also provides a record of resources and services used or provided by military organizations for accounting purposes.

Examples of each of the items listed above can be found in Appendix D.

5-74. An automated system that achieves the purpose of cataloguing and managing CA/CMO information might be preferable in some environments. An automated system maintains the same data as the paper-based system yet offers the advantage of being more versatile and more easily shared with other participants for collaborative planning. If compatible with ABCS, this automated system expands the COP, provides greater visibility of CMO and CA operations to the supported commander and his subordinates, and reduces the potential for misinterpreting information transmitted between units.

The lack of a uniform standard for tracking of DC movement throughout the corps led to double counting at both division and corps levels and false reporting of numbers of DCs that had a cascading effect as the exercise lengthened. Armed with bad data, poor tracking of DCs resulted in faulty planning by CSS BOSs at both division and corps levels causing them to energize CSS assets that were not necessary and could have been used elsewhere.

Urgent Victory 01 AAR,
V Corps G-5
5-75. The automated CA/CMO information system should incorporate several features. These features include—

- A database and information management system that contains records of events (both past and future-planned), assessments (including video and audio files), facilities, services, and resources, and a powerful search engine that allows users to find information instantly.
- A mapping application that allows users to “see” data (roads, facilities, schools, and military, HN, and NGO assets), display this information on computer maps, and print the information on area maps.
- A modeling application that allows users to predict potential results of hazardous conditions or military COAs on civil populations and areas.

OPERATIONAL SECURITY ASSESSMENT AND MEASURES

5-76. OPSEC is an operations function and a command responsibility. The OPSEC assessment is mission-specific. Its purpose is to protect sensitive and critical CA/CMO information from unauthorized disclosure. The unit collecting the information must take the time, before and during an operation, to determine—

- What information needs to be protected (critical information components or categories of critical information)?
- What adversaries might want to obtain that information?
- What methods might those adversaries use to obtain the information?
- How vulnerable is the unit to collection and exploitation by an adversary?
- What countermeasures should the unit take to prevent adversaries from obtaining the information?

Common measures used to protect information include the following:

- Verify clearances; confirm and strictly enforce “need-to-know” as defined in paragraph 5-92, page 5-34.
- Conduct OPSEC awareness training for all individuals, including nonmilitary participants in the CMOC.
- Implement appropriate physical, communications, computer, and personnel security measures.
- Conduct classified or sensitive conversations only in designated areas; be cautious of surroundings and the possibility that conversations, including telephone discussions, may be overheard; and use secure radios and telephones for both classified and sensitive unclassified communications.
- Ensure proper markings are applied, and cover sheets are attached to classified or sensitive documents, diskettes, and other media.
- Exercise positive control over all classified and sensitive materials at all times.
- Keep unauthorized personnel out of sensitive activities restricted areas.
- Examine trash receptacles for all waste paper, scratch (unclassified) notes, envelopes, Post-it notes, carbon paper, personal papers, and similar materials; determine if they should go into a burn bag and be
destroyed as classified material; and as a minimum, tear all paper into at least four pieces.

- Degauss all diskettes and tapes before destruction; destroy in the same manner as classified material.
- Take no measures. This is acceptable only after using the OPSEC process and the commander determines that no critical information requires protection or that the costs outweigh the risk.

5-77. Additional information on OPSEC can be found in USASOC Directive 530-1, Plans and Operations: Operations Security. NATO security procedures are contained in the International Programs Security Handbook.

CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION

5-78. AR 380-5, Information Security, governs the DOD Information Security Program and takes precedence over all DOD component regulations that implement that program. It establishes, for the DOD, uniform policies, standards, criteria, and procedures for the security classification, downgrading, declassification, and safeguarding of information that is owned by, produced for or by, or under the control of the DOD or its components. Accordingly, information is considered for classification if it concerns—

- Military plans, weapons, or operations.
- Vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, projects, or plans relating to the national security.
- Foreign government information (explained below).
- Intelligence activities, including special activities or intelligence sources or methods.
- Foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States.
- Scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to the national security.
- USG programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities.
- Cryptology.
- Confidential sources.
- Other categories of information that are related to national security and that require protection against unauthorized disclosure as determined by the SECDEF or Secretaries of the Military Departments.

ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY

CA soldiers must work closely with the classification authority and chain of command concerning the nature, source, and use of the information they produce. Unclassified material gathered during CA assessments is sometimes incorporated into classified reports, making sharing information with uncleared sources—even those sources who originally provided the information—problematic. For example, the C] 9 CIMIC [staff section] at KFOR produced an unclassified CIMIC update, which encompassed all the [four UN] pillars [of humanitarian activities, civil administration, institution-building, and reconstruction] and was the only consolidated report of its kind. The document
was provided to local representatives of the international community, who highly valued the information. When this same material was later incorporated into a classified KFOR update, the practice of sharing information with the international community was halted. This quickly degraded the ability of CJ9 CIMIC soldiers to work freely with their contacts.

Notes of a CJ9 CIMIC Officer,
February 1999

5-79. Information can only be classified by an original classification authority or an individual who has delegated original classification authority according to the provisions of AR 380-5. Delegated original classification authority limits the number of individuals with such authority and the classification levels delegated to those individuals.

5-80. The classification levels denote the degree of damage to national defense or foreign relations of the United States in the event of unauthorized disclosure of the information. They also denote the degree of protection such information requires. Classification may not be used to conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative error; to prevent embarrassment to a person, organization or agency; or to restrain competition.

5-81. The three classification levels are—

- **Confidential (C).** Applied to information or material for which the unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause damage to the national security. Examples of Confidential information include the compromise of unit status reports, movement plans, and system vulnerabilities.

- **Secret (S).** Applied to information or material for which the unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause serious damage to the national security. Examples of Secret information include OPSEC measures, subversion and espionage directed against the Army (SAEDA) incidents, and military training to foreign governments.

- **Top Secret (TS).** Applied to information or material for which the unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security. Examples of Top Secret information include the location of remote communications sites, special operations research and development projects, deception plans, national defense plans or complex cryptology and communications intelligence systems, and sensitive intelligence operations.

5-82. A fourth category—Unclassified (U)—is applied to a wide range of unclassified types of official information, which, although not requiring protection as national security information, is limited to official use and is not publicly releasable. Markings such as For Official Use Only (FOUO) and Limited Official Use are not used to identify classified information.
5-83. Classifiers of information produce classification guides. Classification guides—

- Identify the information elements to be protected, using categorization to the extent necessary to ensure that the information involved can be identified readily and uniformly.
- State which of the classification designations (Top Secret, Secret, or Confidential) applies to each element or category of information.
- State declassification instructions for each element or category of information in terms of a period of time, the occurrence of an event, or a notation that the information shall not be declassified automatically without approval of the originating agency (normally, events identified for declassification will be finite; statements such as “Declassify 6 years from the date of generation of document” are prohibited).
- State any special public release procedures and foreign disclosure considerations.

5-84. The classification guide is approved personally and in writing by an official who is authorized to classify information originally at the highest level of classification prescribed in the guide. This official will also approve personally and in writing all changes, errata sheets, and revisions to basic guides that affect a classification.

5-85. CA soldiers must be familiar with the contents of the classification guide, its application to CA/CMO information, and what to do if CA/CMO information is not addressed properly. The best way to influence changes to the guide is to coordinate with the G-2 or S-2 of the supported unit.

5-86. If a CA soldier originates or develops information that he believes should be safeguarded, he should take the following measures (according to AR 380-5):

- Safeguard the information in the manner prescribed for the intended classification.
- Mark the information (or cover sheet) with the intended classification designation.
- Transmit the information under appropriate safeguards to an appropriate classification authority for evaluation. The transmittal shall state that the information is tentatively marked to protect it in transit. If such authority is not readily identifiable, the information should be forwarded to a HQ activity of a DOD component, to the HQ office having overall classification management responsibilities for a DOD component. A determination whether to classify the information shall be made within 30 days of receipt and the originator will be notified promptly.
- Upon decision by the classifying authority, the tentative marking shall be removed. If a classification is assigned, appropriate markings shall be applied.
- In an emergency requiring immediate communication of the information, after taking the action prescribed by the first two bullets above, transmit the information and then proceed IAW the third bullet above.
Additionally, CA soldiers must treat the following as sensitive or close-hold:

- Information discovered during assessments or operations that may be embarrassing to the facility or individuals involved.
- Vulnerabilities of a security, economic, or political nature.
- Criminal activities.

**FOREIGN GOVERNMENT INFORMATION**

5-87. Foreign government information is defined by Executive Order 12356 as—

- Information provided to the United States by a foreign government or international organization of foreign governments, or an element thereof, with the expectation, expressed or implied, that the information, its source, or both, are to be held in confidence.
- Information produced by the United States under an arrangement with a foreign government or international organization of foreign governments, or any of their elements, requiring that the information, the arrangement, or both, be held in confidence.

5-88. Executive Order 12356 states that there is a presumption of damage to national security in the event of unauthorized disclosure of foreign government information. For this reason, foreign government unclassified information that is provided in confidence is to be classified at least Confidential. It should be classified higher whenever the damage criteria for Secret or Top Secret are met. Unclassified foreign government information provided in confidence must be classified by an original classification authority. If there is uncertainty concerning whether the information is to be handled “in confidence,” the providing government or international organization should be consulted to reach agreement on controls to be applied.

5-89. Foreign government information must retain its original classification or be assigned a U.S. classification designation that will provide protection equivalent to that provided by the furnishing government or organization. When unclassified foreign government “in confidence” information is involved in an international program, program documentation (the memorandum of understanding [MOU]) should include procedures on handling the information.

5-90. U.S. documents that contain foreign government information must be marked with a notation that states “THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS FOREIGN GOVERNMENT INFORMATION.” In addition, the portions containing foreign government information must be marked to identify the country of origin and classification level (for example, UK-C or UK-R). The foreign government document or authority on which the classification is based, in addition to the identification of any U.S. classification authority, must be identified on the “Classified by” line. A continuation sheet should be used for multiple sources, if necessary.

5-91. Foreign government information cannot be disclosed to nationals of third countries, including intending citizens, or to any other third party, or used for other than the purpose for which the foreign government provided it without the written consent of the originating government. Government
agencies must submit requests for other uses or further disclosure to the originating government.

ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

5-92. No person may have access to classified information unless that person has been determined to be trustworthy and unless access is essential to the accomplishment of lawful and authorized Government purposes. That is, the person must have the appropriate security clearance and a need-to-know. Further, cleared individuals may not have access until they have been given an initial security briefing.

5-93. Units at every level must establish procedures to prevent unnecessary access to classified information. In the end, every individual who has authorized possession, knowledge, or control of classified or sensitive information has the final responsibility for determining that a prospective recipient's official duties require possession of, or access to, any element or item of classified information and whether the individual has been granted the appropriate security clearance by proper authority.

TRANSMISSION OF CA/CMO INFORMATION

5-94. CA/CMO information can be transmitted by various methods, including oral, hard copy, and electronic. The method chosen must conform to published policies and procedures put in place to protect loss or accidental disclosure of that information to unauthorized individuals. In the absence of published policies and procedures, CA soldiers should use common sense to ensure OPSEC.

5-95. Oral transmission includes formal and informal briefings, personal conversations in public or private places, and telephone or radio conversations. Before transmitting CA/CMO information orally, CA soldiers must take precautions to protect the information commensurate with its classification. Examples of protective measures include—

- Discussing classified information only in areas cleared to the highest level of material to be discussed.
- Controlling access to areas where classified information will be discussed.
- Announcing the security classification of information and materials before and after discussion.
- Ensuring all individuals within earshot are properly cleared to receive the information.
- Ensuring all individuals within earshot have a need to know the information.
- Using radios and telephones that have communications security devices that are approved, authorized, functioning properly, and appropriate to the classification of the information.

5-96. Hard-copy transmission includes handcarrying, sending by authorized courier, and mailing. AR 380-5 governs the marking, transmission, and safeguarding of hard-copy classified information. CA soldiers should also consult with their local S-2 or G-2 section for the existence of any additional
command guidelines regarding handling classified materials. Electronic transmission includes FAXs, E-mail, and posting on web sites and common network drives. Examples of protective measures for electronic media include—

- Ensuring FAX machines and computers are accredited for the classification of information being transmitted.

- Separating classified machines from unclassified machines (both physically and electronically) to prevent inadvertent transmission of classified materials over unclassified systems.

- Following published policies and procedures for the use of computers, E-mails, common drives, and web sites.

OPERATING WITH THE MEDIA

5-97. DOD and major news organizations reached agreement on guidelines that apply to media coverage of U.S. military forces engaged in armed conflict. The rules listed below have been endorsed by DOD and most major news organizations, and will govern media coverage of future U.S. armed conflicts:

- Open and independent reporting will be the principal means of coverage of U.S. military operations.

- Press pools are not to serve as the standard means of covering U.S. military operations. Pools may sometimes provide the only feasible means of early access to a military operation. Pools should be as large as possible and disbanded at the earliest opportunity (within 24 to 36 hours when possible). The arrival of early access pools will not cancel the principle of independent coverage for journalists already in the area.

- Even under conditions of open coverage, pools may be appropriate for specific events, such as those at extremely remote locations or where space is limited.

- Journalists in a combat zone will be credentialed by the U.S. military and will be required to abide by a clear set of military security ground rules that protect U.S. forces and their operations. Violation of the ground rules can result in suspension of credentials and expulsion of the journalist involved from the combat zone. News organizations will make their best efforts to assign experienced journalists to combat operations and to make them familiar with U.S. military operations.

- Journalists will be provided access to all major military units. Special operations restrictions may limit access in some cases.

- Military PAOs should act as liaisons but should not interfere with the reporting process.

- Under conditions of open coverage, field commanders should be instructed to permit journalists to ride on military vehicles and aircraft whenever feasible. The military will be responsible for the transportation of pools.

- Consistent with its capabilities, the military will supply PAOs with facilities to enable timely, secure, compatible transmission of pool material and will make these facilities available whenever possible for filing independent coverage. In cases when government facilities are unavailable, journalists will, as always, file by any other means
available. The military will not ban communications systems operated by news organizations, but electromagnetic operational security in battlespace situations may require limited restrictions on the use of such systems.

These principles will apply as well to the operations of the standing DOD National Media Pool system.

NOTE: CA soldiers must always work through the PAO, as well as notify and get approval from their chain of command before talking to the press.

5-98. What CA soldiers do before they meet the media is as important as what they do when they actually meet them. Often, it is the preparatory activities that will determine the success or failure of a media interview. By being prepared, CA soldiers will not only be more confident and comfortable, but will also be able to get their story across to the audience.

5-99. CA commanders should always ensure that their unit members are fully prepared to meet and speak with media personnel. The following suggestions are for the soldier who is preparing for an interview. He should—

- Find out who the reporter is.
- Find out why he was asked for the interview.
- Establish ground rules on what will be covered.
- Set how much time will be allowed for the interview.
- Anticipate questions and think through his responses.
- Do his homework. He should make certain he is familiar with the facts supporting his position and that they are up-to-date. Even if he is the expert, a quick brush-up will help.
- Know the key points he wants to make. He might want to type them up on a card and put the card in a prominent place on his desk. Before the interview, he should review them often. Are they honest, meaningful, and to the point?
- Not memorize a statement—he will look stilted or pompous.
- Question his own position and have his PAO or other staff experts play devil’s advocate. If possible, he should practice his responses before a television camera and view the playback with members of his staff to conduct a critique. He should not be thin-skinned—it is better to correct errors before friends than commit them before millions of viewers.
- Read the morning paper and listen to the radio or TV before his interview in case a late-breaking news story affects his command.

FORCE PROTECTION

5-100. Force protection refers to measures designed to protect personnel, facilities, and equipment that conduct or support national defense missions. JP 1-02 defines force protection as “Security program(s) designed to protect Service members, civilian employees, family members, facilities, and equipment, in all locations and situations, accomplished through planned and integrated application of combatting terrorism, physical security, operations
security, and personal protective services, and supported by intelligence, counterintelligence, and other security programs.”

5-101. Force protection is a concern for all commanders and soldiers in military operations across the spectrum of conflict, both CONUS and OCONUS. The Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia states—

In peacetime, geographic combatant commanders establish measures and procedures that preserve the combat power of their forces. In wartime, geographic combatant commanders carry out assigned and implied missions in pursuit of theater strategic objectives derived from national and alliance or coalition strategic goals. Force protection responsibilities are modified as necessary in order to ensure security of assigned forces and to protect US interests in their areas of responsibility.

Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia,
16 July 1997

5-102. DODD 2000.12, DOD Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) Program, directs regional and functional combatant commanders to establish command policies and AT/FP programs for the protection of all assigned forces. The responsibility of geographic combatant commanders extends to all forces in the AOR, as well as forces conducting operations, training, or exercises in countries not assigned to a geographic combatant commander for whom the combatant commander has operational control. These programs include family members (dependents), resources, and facilities. These programs generally require prescribed levels of awareness and training for every applicable individual, as well as coordination with the officials of indigenous (and domestic, in the case of DSOs) populations and institutions on matters involving AT/FP policies and measures.

5-103. When the threat of terrorism exists, commanders implement and enforce measures according to the force protection condition (FPCON) procedures outlined in JP 3-07.2, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism, and Appendix BB of DOD Handbook O-2000.12-H, Protection of DOD Personnel and Activities Against Acts of Terrorism and Political Turbulence. These FPCON levels are discussed below:

- **FPCON NORMAL** exists when a general threat of possible terrorist activity exists but warrants only a routine security posture.
- **FPCON ALPHA** applies when there is a general threat of possible terrorist activity against personnel and facilities, the nature and extent of which are unpredictable, and circumstances do not justify full implementation of FPCON BRAVO measures. However, it may be necessary to implement certain measures from higher FPCONs resulting from intelligence received or as a deterrent. The measures in this FPCON must be capable of being maintained indefinitely.
- **FPCON BRAVO** applies when an increased and more predictable threat of terrorist activity exists. The measures in this FPCON must be capable of being maintained for weeks without causing undue hardship, affecting operational capability, and aggravating relations with local authorities.
• **FPCON CHARLIE** applies when an incident occurs or intelligence is received indicating some form of terrorist action against personnel and facilities is imminent. Implementation of measures in this FPCON for more than a short period probably will create hardship and affect the peacetime activities of the unit and its personnel.

• **FPCON DELTA** applies in the immediate area where a terrorist attack has occurred or when intelligence has been received that terrorist action against a specific location or person is likely. Normally, this FPCON is declared as a localized condition.

5-104. Force protection initiatives at all levels must be coordinated closely with the appropriate security, intelligence, and investigative forces, given their knowledge of threat possibilities and appropriate responses. Effective force protection planning includes input, guidance, and decisions from other interested agencies and personnel. These may include civil government and law enforcement officials and, in some cases, private security firms (as in the proprietary security offices of multinational corporations in the AO which may be more organized or better informed than local authorities). Ultimate responsibility for force protection rests with the force commander, and any actions taken must be consistent with the commander’s decisions. More information is contained in DOD Handbook O-2000.12-H.

**CA ROLE IN FORCE PROTECTION**

5-105. CA soldiers focus on force protection at two distinct levels: the individual or team level and the supported force level. These levels are discussed below:

• At the individual or team level, CA soldiers employ measures to counter threats to individual or team members from all sources while conducting CA activities. Threats to CA soldiers include enemy direct and indirect fires; nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) attack; ambush; landmines; enraged or disaffected civilians, thugs, and criminals; and theft of equipment. CA soldiers follow command guidance and unit force protection SOPs.

• At the supported force level, conducting routine CA activities can enhance protection of the supported force from threats from the civil component of the AO. Threats to the supported force include disaffected or dislocated civilian populations, unfriendly political organizations, seasonal cycles, disease, hazardous material sites, terrorist incidents, and theft of equipment.

The case of the Bon Repos [Haiti] marketplace emphasizes the critical role that civil affairs assets played in [TF Castle’s] ability to secure [its] area of operations. Since the site of the existing town market would be directly outside the main gate of the proposed base camp, vendors expressed concerns to the civil affairs team about the impact of troops operating in the town. Through constant dialogue and negotiations with the merchants and the town’s leaders, the TF commander decided to build a larger market down the road from the existing site. The engineers constructed a new access road from Route 100 to the new marketplace. The relocated market opened with a
formal ceremony involving the TF Castle commander, local landowners, clergy, and police. In fact, the new market attracted approximately 150 more vendors than the original marketplace and increased the commerce of the town. By meeting the terms of the agreement to move the marketplace, the engineers established credibility with a population not accustomed to trusting uniformed personnel. This step proved crucial to ensuring the security of the engineer forces.

Force Protection: Integrating Civil Affairs and Intelligence, by CPT Lynda Snyder and CPT David P. Warshaw, Military Intelligence, Oct-Dec 1995

5-106. CA soldiers enhance force protection in any operation by doing their normal duties. This means they must—

- Circulate among the populace.
- Establish rapport with ordinary citizens, key leaders, and representatives of international organizations and NGOs.
- Establish and maintain an accessible CMOC.
- Conduct continuous deliberate assessments.
- Conduct CA activities.
- Provide input to all-source analysis centers on conditions, attitudes, and intentions of the populace.

5-107. As stated in the Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia, “Force protection can be significantly improved with the proper mix of intelligence and information gathering...In some military operations other than war (such as peacekeeping), the term ‘information gathering’ is used rather than the term ‘intelligence’ because of the sensitivity of the operation.” Since information gathering is an inherent part of CA operations, CA soldiers must be sure to share their observations with the intelligence community. It is critical, however, that CA soldiers be careful not to misrepresent themselves as gatherers of intelligence.

PLANNING FORCE PROTECTION OPERATIONS

5-108. Commanders plan force protection operations using trained organic or attached force protection specialists. CA/CMO planners support the force protection plan by integrating CA operations into the plan and sharing information contained in routine CA reports. While subordinate units and teams comply with the senior commander’s force protection plan, they also augment the plan by planning at their own level to account for nuances specific to their AO and operations. For example, a CMOC operating outside the security perimeter of a supported unit may require additional force protection considerations than the CMOC inside the perimeter.

5-109. CA soldiers planning force protection operations follow basic security planning steps and principles. The following steps and principles apply whether planning at the individual or team level or the supported force level:

- Conduct a threat assessment.
- Conduct a vulnerability assessment.
• Determine appropriate countermeasures.
• Implement countermeasures.
• Evaluate effectiveness of the countermeasures.

These steps and principles also apply to CA teams conducting mobile operations or operating from a fixed site. The CA teams are focused not only on terrorist threats, but on all threats.

**Threat Assessment**

5-110. The first step in developing a force protection program is to identify and characterize the potential threats to the force. Understanding the threat enables CA soldiers to assess their vulnerability to attack and to develop effective protective and response measures. The following is an overview of the elements within a threat assessment.

5-111. **Threat Identification.** CA soldiers identify threats from the civil component during preliminary and deliberate assessments. Their analysis of the situation using CASCOPE yields potential threats to the force from CASCOPE. Examples of threats for each of the CASCOPE factors are as follows:

- **Areas:**
  - Social, political, religious, or criminal enclaves.
  - Rubbled or contaminated towns, villages, or cities.
- **Structures:**
  - Nuclear power plants.
  - Facilities that employ chemicals in production processes.
  - Structurally unsound buildings.
- **Capabilities:**
  - Indigenous communications networks.
  - Propaganda mechanisms.
  - Ability to organize and mobilize.
  - Existence of legal or illegal arms among the populace.
  - Martial arts and other warrior skills found among the populace.
- **Organizations:**
  - Radical social, political, religious, or criminal organizations.
  - Terrorist organizations.
- **People:**
  - Enemy sympathizers.
  - Organized criminals.
  - Common thieves.
- **Events:**
  - Internal feuding between competing factions.
  - Political or anti-U.S. and coalition force rallies.
- Accidental release of hazardous materials.
- Rainy, windy, or drought seasons.
- Outbreak of disease among the populace.

5-112. When considering terrorists or other human threats, threat identification focuses on three components: aggressors; tools, weapons, and explosives; and tactics.

- Aggressors generally perform hostile acts against people, facilities, and equipment. Their objectives include—
  - Inflicting injury or death on people.
  - Destroying or damaging facilities, property, equipment, or resources.
  - Stealing equipment, material, or information.
  - Creating publicity for their cause.

Aggressors may use the first three objectives to accomplish the fourth.

- Tools, weapons, and explosives, as described below, are used by aggressors to achieve their objectives:
  - Tools, such as forced entry tools, vehicles, and surveillance tools.
  - Weapons, such as incendiary devices, small arms, antitank weapons and mortars, and NBC agents (also called weapons of mass destruction [WMD]).
  - Explosives, such as homemade bombs, hand grenades, and vehicle bombs.

- Tactics refer to the offensive strategies employed by aggressors, reflecting their capabilities and objectives. Some of the more common tactics include—
  - Moving vehicle bomb. The moving vehicle bomb is a suicide attack where an explosive-laden air, ground, or waterborne vehicle is flown or driven into a site and detonated.
  - Stationary vehicle bomb. This type of bomb may be detonated by time delay or remote control.
  - Exterior attack. This attack is at close range of a facility or exposed asset. Using clubs, rocks, improvised incendiary devices, hand grenades, or hand-placed bombs, the aggressor attempts to inflict destruction and death.
  - Standoff weapons attack. These attacks are executed using military or improvised direct- and indirect-fire weapons, such as antitank weapons and mortars.
  - Ballistic attack. Using small arms at varying distances, the aggressor attempts to inflict death.
  - Covert entry. The aggressor attempts to enter the facility covertly using false credentials. The aggressor may attempt to carry weapons or explosives into the site or facility or attempt to remove items or information from the site.
Mail bombs. Small bombs or incendiary devices are incorporated into envelopes or packages that are delivered to the targeted individual.

Supplies bombs. Bombs or incendiary devices, generally larger than those found in mail bombs, are incorporated into various containers and delivered to facilities or installations.

Airborne contamination. The aggressor uses chemical or biological agents to contaminate the air supply of a facility or installation.

Waterborne contamination. The aggressor uses chemical, biological, or radiological agents to contaminate the water supply of a facility or installation.

5-113. Threat Definition. Once the threat is identified, the CA soldier determines the negative effects of the threat on the force. For example—

- Rubbled or contaminated areas pose a safety risk to soldiers passing through those areas.
- The capability to organize and mobilize great numbers of civilians, armed with firearms, pitchforks, clubs, or stones, can overwhelm a force operating among or near the mobilized population.
- Nuclear power plants or facilities that employ chemicals in production processes are vulnerable to accidents that can harm soldiers operating nearby.
- Criminals can steal equipment or information that can be used to inflict casualties against the force.
- Political or antiforce rallies can quickly deteriorate and pose a safety risk to soldiers in the area.

5-114. Terrorists operate in a clandestine mode, so the information needed to define and analyze a terrorist threat is often more difficult to acquire than information dealing with less esoteric military threats. To build a composite picture of threat conditions, police and intelligence personnel gather information from numerous sources, such as newspapers, criminal records, government records, local organizations and people, and other intelligence organizations. As outlined in DOD Handbook O-2000.12-H, DOD has identified six factors to be used in the collection and analysis of information from all sources bearing a terrorist threat:

- Existence. A terrorist group is present, assessed to be present, or able to gain access to a given country or locale. The analysis of information regarding the existence of a terrorist group addresses the question: Who is hostile to existing organizations and social structure?
- Capability. The acquired, assessed, or demonstrated level of capability to conduct terrorist attacks. An analysis of terrorist group capabilities addresses the questions: What weapons have been used by terrorist groups in carrying out past attacks? What infrastructure is necessary to train, equip, target, and execute attacks?
- History. Demonstrated terrorist activity over time. The analysis of terrorist group history addresses the questions: What have the terrorists done in the past? What is the terrorist group's method of operations?
How did they acquire the capacity they demonstrated? Where did they obtain support? What additional attacks did they mount?

- **Intentions.** Recently demonstrated anti-U.S. terrorist activity, or stated or assessed intent to conduct such activity. An analysis of terrorist group intentions addresses the questions: Why do groups engage in terrorist acts? What do they hope to achieve?

- **Targeting.** Current credible information on activity, indicative of preparations for specific terrorist operations. Targeting addresses the questions: Who is likely to be attacked, why are they likely to be attacked, and what is the basis for accepting reports that such attacks are planned?

- **Security environment.** The internal political and security considerations that impact terrorist element capability to carry out their intentions. The parameters examined within the security environment of a country include training of national law enforcement, paramilitary, and military institutions to deal with terrorist incidents and to maintain social order; quality of equipment available for law enforcement and internal security forces; and distribution of internal security forces throughout a country.

5-115. Each of the Services maintains its own terrorist threat analysis capability. Differences in perspective among DIA, Services, or combatant command threat analysis may lead to divergent conclusions about specific terrorist threats. While the threat to all DOD assets in a country may be at one level, the local commander may decide it faces no threat or a greater threat of terrorism in the country or locale in question.

5-116. **Threat Level.** Force protection planning responds to the threat level. The threat level for an area is determined after information on the threat factors is gathered and analyzed. The greater the presence of threat factors, the higher the threat level. Five of the six factors are used together to define the threat level; the sixth, security considerations, is used separately as a modifying factor. Table 5-2 depicts the relationships of the threat factors and threat levels. (Additional information is in DOD Handbook O-2000.12-H, Chapter 5.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threat Level</th>
<th>Threat Analysis Factors</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Existence</td>
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<tr>
<td>Critical</td>
<td>a</td>
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<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>a</td>
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<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>a</td>
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<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>a</td>
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<tr>
<td>Negligible</td>
<td>b</td>
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</table>

- Factor must be present
- Factor may or may not be present
5-117. Unit commanders rely on local intelligence and counterintelligence personnel to provide warnings and indicators about specific and general threats to the installations, resources, and personnel. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) determines threat levels in CONUS, and DIA determines threat levels OCONUS for DOD installations. Commanders at all levels establish the FPCONs mentioned above based on the FBI or DIA threat level and locally developed information. This information, coupled with the vulnerability assessment discussed in the following section, will influence decisions as to which force protection measures are applied to installation assets.

VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT

5-118. A vulnerability assessment addresses the susceptibility of the force to the threats identified during the threat assessment. A vulnerability assessment applies to fixed sites as well as to mobile operations. It is an ongoing process that includes all three components of threat assessment. This very essential step helps to identify and prioritize the resources required to defeat the threat, providing a basis for determining antiterrorism measures that can protect personnel and assets from terrorist attacks.

5-119. A vulnerability assessment looks at several aspects of security related to the force and its operations. These aspects include—

- **OPSEC.** According to JP 1-02, OPSEC is “a process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to: a. Identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems; b. Determine indicators hostile intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries; and c. Select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation.” An assessment tool for OPSEC is the OPSEC survey.

- **Physical Security (PHYSEC).** PHYSEC is that part of security concerned with physical measures designed to safeguard personnel; to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations, material, and documents; and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft. An assessment tool for PHYSEC is the physical security survey.

- **Personnel Security (PERSEC).** PERSEC is the application of standards and criteria to determine whether or not an individual is eligible for access to classified information, qualified for assignment to or retention in sensitive duties, and suitable for acceptance and retention in the total Army consistent with national security interests. For CMO, when dealing with individuals who are not in the U.S. Armed Forces and who do not have access to classified materials (civilians working in and around a CMOC), PERSEC refers to the assurance that individuals are trained, trustworthy, and reliable when dealing with information, equipment, and other mission-related items. Assessment tools for PERSEC include the single-scope background investigation (SSBI), the periodic reinvestigation (PRI), the national agency checks with local agency and credit checks (NACLC), civilian employment history and reference checking, and drug screening.
• Information Assurance (IA). IA provides the means to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information processed by the Army's information-based systems. IA includes security of information and related systems (information systems security [ISS]), C2, physical, software, hardware, procedural, personnel, network, communications, operational, and intelligence. IA seeks to maintain effective C2 of friendly forces by protecting critical information infrastructures from unauthorized users, detecting attempts to obtain or alter the information, and reacting to unauthorized attempts to obtain access to or change information. These measures focus on the integrity, confidentiality, availability, authentication, verification, protection, nonrepudiation of the infrastructures, and the information contained within. Assessment tools for IA include security surveys and virus screening software.

5-120. During the vulnerability assessment, CA soldiers identify any shortcomings in each of these areas as they apply to team or site operations. DOD Handbook O-2000.12-H contains guidelines and sample survey checklists that can be applied to a CA/CMO vulnerability assessment.

5-121. The results of the vulnerability assessment are evaluated against the type of threat and identified threat level to determine the appropriate level of protection. Figure 5-3 shows the steps to conduct a vulnerability assessment.

![Figure 5-3. Steps to Conduct a Vulnerability Assessment](image)

**DETERMINE APPROPRIATE COUNTERMEASURES**

5-122. Countermeasures are those measures taken by a unit or individual to counter a specific threat at a specific time and place. Countermeasures take many forms. They include specialized procedures, personal equipment, unit or team equipment, facilities, and training. They may require reorganization of land use, reorientation of roadways, security improvements to installation entries, and improvements to existing structures and the surrounding site area. They may also require the creation of specialized elements that are task-organized to mitigate threats, respond to threats, and recover from the aftermath of threats.
5-123. Some threats may require the identification of multiple scenarios, or alternatives, for achieving the desired goal. All alternatives should undergo a suitability analysis, which takes into account factors that may limit the feasibility of an action or project. Limiting factors consist of physical, resource, and political constraints, such as land area restrictions, limited availability of construction materials, and HN or civilian sensitivities.

5-124. Examples of threat-specific countermeasures for CA/CMO are in Table 5-3, pages 5-46 through 5-48.

Table 5-3. Examples of Threat-Specific Countermeasures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threat ID</th>
<th>Threat Definition</th>
<th>Threat Level</th>
<th>Countermeasure</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Civil Areas</strong></td>
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</table>
| Criminal enclave. | History of criminal violence against passers-through. | High | **Mitigation**—Travel according to supported unit force protection guidelines (2-man rule, 2-vehicle rule). Maintain situational awareness, weapons security, and radio contact with base unit. Identify patterns and methods of operation.

**Response**—Follow mission ROE. Notify base unit. Identify characteristics, personalities, and methods used by hostiles.

**Recovery**—Return to base. Report any compromised information or equipment. Debrief. Refine policies, as necessary.

| **Structures** | | | |
| Chemical processes on adjacent property. | Hazardous chemicals may spill, explode, or pollute the air. | Low–Medium | **Mitigation**—Identify HAZMAT areas and pertinent safety precautions. Monitor HAZMAT situation. Coordinate with local and military HAZMAT managers to identify response plans and agency capabilities.

**Response**—Follow approved response plans. Report all information to base unit.

**Recovery**—Coordinate for cooperation and assistance between organizations involved. Review response plans. Refine response plans, as necessary. Assist in upgrading response capabilities.
Table 5-3. Examples of Threat-Specific Countermeasures (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threat ID</th>
<th>Threat Definition</th>
<th>Threat Level</th>
<th>Countermeasure</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Capabilities</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Local militia or hostile community.</td>
<td>Capability to organize and mobilize rapidly when provoked.</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Mitigation—Identify what provokes the community to become hostile or to mobilize the militia. Train the force in how not to provoke the community. Establish positive relationship with militia, political, law enforcement, and other leaders. Engage the populace with normal CA activities. Establish a plan that includes assistance from local authorities.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Response—Follow approved response plans. Perform as liaison between supported unit and local authorities to help diffuse the situation. Maintain awareness of personal security situation. Report all information to base unit.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Recovery—Conduct projects or other activities to reestablish or enhance a positive relationship between the force and the community. Refine response plans, as necessary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organizations</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorist organization.</td>
<td>History of truck/boat bombings against U.S. targets in region.</td>
<td>Critical</td>
<td>Mitigation—Engage the populace with normal CA activities. Travel according to supported unit force protection guidelines (2 man rule, 2 vehicle rule). Maintain situational awareness, weapons security, and radio contact with base unit. Observe indicators among populace, such as excessive interest in military activities, unexplained or suspicious cancellation of civilian activities, and unusual movement of vehicles, materials, or people. Report observations to appropriate channels.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Response—Take a protective posture according to unit SOP. Notify base unit. Identify characteristics, personalities, and methods used by aggressors.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Recovery—Assist investigators as liaison between supported unit and local authorities. Refine SOP, as necessary.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>People</strong></td>
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</table>
Table 5-3. Examples of Threat-Specific Countermeasures (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threat ID</th>
<th>Threat Definition</th>
<th>Threat Level</th>
<th>Countermeasure</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>People (Continued)</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Recovery</strong>—Prosecute thieves according to appropriate law. Publicize incident through PSYOP and public information assets. Hold meeting with local authorities or public forum to discuss the implications of stealing equipment or information from military forces. Get commitment from local authorities to prevent future incidents.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Events</strong></td>
<td>Sickness caused by poor sanitary conditions among populace.</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td><strong>Mitigation</strong>—Conduct early assessments of local conditions in coordination with preventive medical assets, if available. Conduct training programs for locals, possibly as MCA projects, to correct deficiencies. Coordinate with local health officials, NGOs, and international organizations.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>Response</strong>—Notify base unit. Coordinate with military and local medical agencies. Implement containment, treatment, and clean-up plans.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Recovery</strong>—Assess results of containment, treatment, and clean-up plans. Continue and modify, as necessary. Train the populace in sanitation procedures.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5-125. CA soldiers must keep in mind that countermeasures are most effective when endorsed by the commander, understood by all participants, war-gamed, written into operations and contingency plans, resourced, and exercised or rehearsed. Failure to achieve any of these reduces the chance a countermeasure will succeed.

**IMPLEMENT COUNTERMEASURES**

5-126. Countermeasures must be implemented as soon as possible after a threat has been identified. The least costly and often the most effective protection measures are those incorporated during the planning phase. Implementing appropriate force protection measures at the planning stage can preclude the need for piecemeal and costly security enhancements later on.

**EVALUATE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE COUNTERMEASURES**

5-127. Over time, threats change as situations change. Countermeasures that may have been effective one day may no longer be effective today. As CA soldiers conduct continuous assessments, they reevaluate the threat and the countermeasures arrayed against the threat. They develop new countermeasures as old ones are determined to be no longer effective. As before, they ensure the new countermeasures are endorsed by the
commander, understood by all participants, war-gamed, written into operations and contingency plans, resourced, and exercised or rehearsed.

**PRODUCTS OF THE DEVELOP AND DETECT PHASE**

5-128. The products of this phase are both tangible and intangible. They include working relationships and rapport with nonmilitary participants in an operation; detailed deliberate assessments; and CA/CMO briefings and reports.

5-129. The duration of the develop and detect phase will vary based on the factors of METT-TC. The briefings and reports produced during this phase influence the timing of, and activities implemented during, the execute phase.

5-130. Commanders and senior civilian leaders make decisions based on the information provided to them by their subordinate commanders and staff members. This information is presented formally in the form of briefings and reports. Briefings are presented orally and may include an orientation to maps, diagrams, charts, photos, or other documents that improve the commander’s understanding of the information. Reports are presented in written form and usually follow an approved format. They are stand-alone documents that serve as historical records. As such, reports contain as much detail as possible of the events about which they are written.

5-131. CA officers and senior NCOs are adept at conducting briefings and writing reports. Formats for briefings and reports are found in Appendixes C and D. The following are examples of the types of briefings and reports CA personnel use to present CA/CMO information:

- **Briefings:**
  - Capabilities briefing to supported commander.
  - Course of analysis briefing in support of MDMP.
  - CA/CMO portion of supported unit operations order briefing.
  - BUB.
  - TOC shift-change briefing.
  - Operations briefing to CA unit or team.

- **Reports:**
  - Predeployment area assessment.
  - Results of CA initial/hasty assessment.
  - Periodic CA report.
  - CA/CMO spot report.
  - OPSUM.
  - Trip report.
  - AAR.
CA/CMO BRIEFINGS

5-132. The capabilities briefing to the supported commander or senior civilian leader is tailored to the situation. A thorough briefing would generally contain the following information:

- Mission of the CA unit, team, or individual.
- Task organization and equipment of the CA unit or team.
- Assignment of CA assets within the supported organization and two levels up.
- General capabilities, such as staff analysis and planning focused on the civilian component of the AO, enhancing the commander's awareness of the situation by monitoring and interacting with civilians in the AO, providing advice and training to military organizations in support of the commander's CMO responsibilities, and setting the conditions for successful transition of military operations to follow-on civilian control.
- Specific capabilities, such as functional specialist skills organic to the unit or team.

5-133. A current CA/CMO briefing, such as that given during the BUB or TOC shift-change, provides a “snapshot” of CA activities and CMO conducted during a specified period of time. Using the principles of CASCOPE, a typical briefing might be organized as follows:

- Orientation to civil component of the AO:
  - Names, locations, and size of population centers and other key civil areas pertinent to military operations.
  - Civilian structures and resources available for military use.
  - Nature of the local, regional, and national governments and the capability of each government level to sustain and control the populace.
  - HN and international organizations, NGOs, and their capabilities pertinent to military operations.
  - Key communicators among the civilian populace, including elected officials, as well as nonelected formal and informal leaders.
  - Civil events that may affect military operations.
  - Military events that may affect civilian activities.
  - Attitude of the local populace toward current operations and events.
  - Effects of enemy PSYOP, disinformation, or terrorism campaigns.
- Location, mission, and objectives of all CA elements in the AO.
- Additional issues, conclusions, and recommendations.

5-134. An effective briefing technique is to use overlays, sector sketches, and execution matrices that demonstrate how CA activities and CMO are integrated into the supported organization's scheme of maneuver or action plan. These can be depicted on a CA support matrix. An example of this technique is contained in Appendix C.
CA/CMO REPORTS

5-135. Reports contain information that is essential to the military decision-making process at all levels of command. Detailed, accurate, and timely reports help planners create appropriate and realistic COAs that, in turn, help commanders make informed decisions.

5-136. Reports vary in their submission requirements. Some reports are periodic (daily, weekly, and monthly situation updates), some are routine (upon completion of an action such as an area assessment, a site visit, or a coordination meeting), and some are time-sensitive (serious incident reports).

5-137. All reports must be handled in a manner appropriate to their classification (Top Secret, Secret, Confidential, or Unclassified). They are disseminated according to unit SOP, usually to all parties that have an interest in and are granted a need-to-know status on the reported information. The following list provides examples of the various means by which reports may be transmitted:

- Face-to-face.
- Courier.
- Routine distribution.
- National postal service.
- FAX.
- Secure E-mail.
- Unsecure E-mail.
- Posting to a web page on an intranet or Internet.
- Posting to a common drive on a local area network (LAN) or WAN.

5-138. Figure 5-4, page 5-52, shows a typical dissemination of CA reports that contain information pertinent to multiple organizations and agencies. This figure also describes the routing of requests for information or assistance. The diagram assumes operations in a digital environment.
Figure 5-4. Typical Dissemination of CA Reports and Requests for Information or Assistance
Chapter 6

CA Methodology: Deliver

One of CFLCC’s missions is to command the Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force, which has a forward headquarters in Kabul. The JCMOTF has elements throughout Afghanistan that are coordinating civil-military operations to support various nongovernmental organizations providing humanitarian assistance. Another mission is to oversee the International Security Assistance Force, or ISAF, which is an independent force for which the United Kingdom has stepped up to act as the lead nation... The ISAF’s goal is to establish a safe and secure environment in Kabul to allow the new interim administration to function as a fully representative government. The long-term goals of the CFLCC are to continue the current operations in Afghanistan to destroy terrorist cells and to support the international humanitarian effort there. In addition, CFLCC officials said they will work with the interim government to ensure that Afghanistan becomes and remains a stable country, and to ensure it does not once again become a safe haven for terrorism.

*Land Command Leads Fight Against Terrorists,*
by PFC Gustavo Bahena,
CFLCC Public Affairs Office,
2002

OVERVIEW

6-1. During the develop and detect phase, CA elements initiated execution of the CA plan. They entered into the AO to establish relationships, develop rapport, and conduct deliberate assessments. They provided current, pertinent information that allowed commanders to cancel or execute the planned branches and sequels of the operation. Execution of these branches and sequels encompasses the deliver phase.

6-2. During the deliver phase, CA generalists and specialists engage the civil component with planned or on-call CA activities—PRC, FNS, HA, MCA, emergency services, and support to civil administration. Executed in support of a commander’s CMO according to a well-planned, coordinated, and synchronized campaign, the activities of this phase represent a COR by CA soldiers, non-CA soldiers, other government agencies, international organizations, NGOs, and assets of indigenous populations and institutions. These activities may occur individually and selectively across the AO or simultaneously at various levels of operations and government.

6-3. At the strategic and operational levels of operation, application of some CA activities can mitigate or facilitate application of others. For example, engaging the civil sector with CA activities during the execution of combatant command TEPs may reduce the need for rapid decisive operations. Should rapid operations occur, relationships and programs put in place during the TEP can facilitate certain operational aspects. As an illustration, systems,
facilities, programs, and knowledge developed during emergency services, developmental MCA, or HCA projects conducted during peacetime can ward off potential crises caused by natural, man-made, or technological factors. In the event of a crisis, those same systems, facilities, programs, and knowledge can be useful in conducting HA, PRC, FNS, mitigating MCA, emergency services, and support to civil administration.

6-4. The CA activities apply equally to special and conventional operations. Chapter 6 in FM 41-10 and the FM 3-05.20 series of manuals contain information on the various SF operations. Other related doctrinal references include more information on how the CA activities support each of the SO missions and collateral activities.

6-5. The products of the deliver phase include CA/CMO briefings and reports. The final outcome of this phase is an executed mission. This chapter will focus on the activities that support and occur during the deliver phase. Figure 6-1 depicts these activities, as well as the military operations that support CMO objectives.

Figure 6-1. Military Operations and CA Activities That Support CMO Objectives

CA ACTIVITIES

6-6. CA activities are defined as activities performed or supported by civil affairs that (1) enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in areas where military forces are present; and (2) involve application of CA functional specialty skills, in areas normally the responsibility of civil government, to enhance conduct of CMO. The six CA activities are—

- FNS.
- PRC.
• HA.
• MCA.
• Emergency services.
• Support to civil administration.

6-7. The activities of FNS, PRC, HA, and MCA clearly fall under part (1) of the definition. Support to civil administration falls under part (2). The emergency services activity crosses both definitions.

6-8. In general, the CA activities are the primary realm of the CA specialty teams. CA specialists are task-organized to meet the various strategic, operational, and tactical requirements of the CA activity. CA generalists participate in the CA activities as staff action officers and, when required, low-level executors of nonspecialized CA activity tasks. When called upon to perform specialized CA activity tasks in the absence of CA specialists, CA generalists seek clarification, support, and guidance in their tasks from CA specialists via reachback. The following sections define these activities in detail and discuss the CA roles at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels for each activity.

FOREIGN NATION SUPPORT

6-9. The preferred means of fulfilling certain CSS requirements of military operations is to obtain appropriate goods and services locally through FNS. FNS refers to civil or military assistance rendered to the United States or its allies by an HN or other member of the international community during peacetime, emergencies, or war. Such assistance is normally based on agreements mutually concluded between the nations, but FNS may also include support from countries that have no mutual agreements.

BASIC TERMS AND CONCEPTS

6-10. According to JP 1-02, a host nation is a “nation that receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations, coalition partners, and/or NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory.”

6-11. An FNS agreement is a basic agreement normally concluded at government-to-government or government-to-combatant commander level. FNS agreements exist with numerous countries, and new agreements may be negotiated for a specific operation. These agreements may include general agreements, umbrella agreements, and MOUs. Depending on the theater and the circumstances of the agreements, FNS may be referred to by other terms, such as HNS, wartime host-nation support (WHNS), friendly or allied nation support (FANS), or CIMIC.


6-13. The FNS activity consists of the identification, coordination, and acquisition of FN resources—such as supplies, materiel, and labor—to support U.S. forces and operations.
6-14. There are many sources of FNS, including various government agencies and private citizens in the theater of operations. The following is a list of some of these sources:

- **Government agencies.** Local government agencies build, operate, and maintain facilities and systems that can support U.S. requirements. Examples of such systems include utilities and telephone networks. Police, emergency services, and border patrols may also be available to support U.S. forces.

- **Civilian contractors.** Local, national, third-country, or U.S. contractors employing indigenous or third-country personnel may provide supplies and services. These could include laundry, bath, transportation, labor, and construction.

- **Local civilians.** The need for manpower ranges from laborers, stevedores, truck drivers, and supply handlers to more highly skilled equipment operators, mechanics, computer operators, and managers. The foreign national labor pool may provide personnel with those skills.

- **Special U.S. units.** These units consist of HN military personnel and may be assigned to help perform FNS-type functions. These units are configured to conserve U.S. manpower by substituting non-U.S. personnel in specified positions of selected units. An example of this configuration is the Korean Augmentation to the United States Army (KATUSA) program in Korea, which is part of an FNS agreement.

- **Indigenous military units.** During war, indigenous military or paramilitary units may support all types of U.S. needs. Areas that are covered include traffic control, convoy escort, installation security, cargo and troop transport, and logistics AO.

- **Local facilities.** U.S. forces may use local buildings, airports, seaports, or other facilities to serve as hospitals, HQ buildings, billets, maintenance shops, or supply facilities. These facilities may be nationalized, come under local government control, or be provided by contractual agreement.

- **Area support.** A nation performs specific functions in a designated area or for a particular organization within its boundaries. Some examples are rail operations, convoy scheduling, air traffic control, decontamination, NBC reconnaissance, and harbor pilot services. These services normally operate under government control by authority of national power acts.

**COMMANDER’S POWERS OVER ENEMY PROPERTY**

6-15. Property control (a specific CA function) serves to protect property within established limits and to preserve negotiable assets and resources. It is based on a uniform and orderly system for the custody and control of property.

6-16. There are four basic categories of property subject to property control: public movable, public immovable, private movable, and private immovable. Public property refers to government-owned property versus that owned by private individuals. Immovable property consists of real estate and land and
6-17. The powers a military commander may exercise over property in enemy territory may be broadly classified as destruction, confiscation, seizure, requisition, and control. Each of these powers is discussed below.

**Destruction**

6-18. Destruction is the partial or total damage of property. With the exception of medical equipment and stores, property of any type or ownership may be destroyed if the destruction is necessary to or results from military operations either during or preparatory to combat. No payment is required. Destruction is forbidden except where there is some reasonable connection between the destruction of the property and overcoming enemy forces.

**Confiscation**

6-19. Confiscation is the taking of enemy public movable property without obligation to compensate the state to which it belongs. The term applies only to public property because the Hague Rules (Article 46) specifically forbid the confiscation of private property and Article 55 only permits the occupant to act as a usufructuary for public immovable property. Private property taken on the field of battle that was used by the troops to further the fighting is also subject to confiscation on the theory that it has forfeited its right to be treated as private property. Otherwise, the confiscation of public movable property is generally limited to that property with direct or indirect military use.

**Seizure**

6-20. Seizure is the taking of certain types of enemy private movable property for use by the capturing state. Title does not pass to the occupying power. Such use is limited to the needs of the occupying force, but may be employed outside as well as within the occupied territory. Payment or compensation is normally made at the time a peace treaty is signed or hostilities end.

**Requisition**

6-21. A requisition is the act of taking private enemy movable or immovable property for the needs of the army of occupation. It differs from seizure in three basic respects:

- The items taken may be used only in occupied territory.
- Private immovable and private movable property may be seized.
- The owners are to be compensated as soon as possible, without having to wait for the occupation to end or for the restoration of peace.

**Control**

6-22. Property within occupied territory may be controlled by the occupant to the degree necessary to prevent its use by (or for the benefit of) hostile forces or in any manner harmful to the occupant. As a general principle of international law, the occupation commander is required to maintain public order. Included within this general mandate is the requirement for the
occupation force to take control of and protect abandoned property, to safeguard banks, and ensure looting, black marketing, and so on do not get out of hand.

6-23. FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, paragraph 394c, states that property whose ownership is in question should be treated as public property until its ownership is ascertained. Religious buildings and shrines are to be respected and treated as private property. Similarly, hospitals enjoy a protected status under international law, but may be used in a manner consistent with their humanitarian purposes. The property of municipalities is afforded the same treatment as private property. Table 6-1 provides a summary of the commander’s powers over enemy property.

Table 6-1. Summary of the Commander’s Powers Over Enemy Property

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Basis For Power</th>
<th>Will It Be Used</th>
<th>Limits On Location</th>
<th>Category Of Power</th>
<th>Limits On Type (Movable/Immovable)</th>
<th>Limits On Type (Public/Private)</th>
<th>Payment/Timing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military Necessity</td>
<td>Not Used</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Destruction</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Public + Private on Battlefield</td>
<td>No Payment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Used</td>
<td>Use Anywhere</td>
<td>Confiscation (Usufructuary)</td>
<td>Movable (Public Immovable)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Use Anywhere</td>
<td>Seizure</td>
<td>Movable Only</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>Payment at End or Return</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Use Only In-Country</td>
<td>Requisition</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Pay ASAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Used</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Control</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Either</td>
<td></td>
<td>No Payment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CA ROLE

6-24. The CA role in FNS is one of support to the commander’s logistics function. General CA soldier tasks include—

- Identifying or validating sources of FNS.
- Consulting, enforcing, or monitoring existing FNS agreements.
- Assisting in the agreement process where no FNS agreements currently exist or modification is needed.
- Tracking costs associated with use of FNS assets.
- Performing quality-control assessments of FNS products, services, and associated costs.
- Assisting in the arbitration of problems arising from the use or misuse of FNS.

6-25. CA specialties that participate in FNS include international law, public administration, public health, transportation, civilian supply, economic development, food and agriculture, environmental services, and others
according to METT-TC. Appendix H provides a more detailed look at CA strategic, operational, and tactical considerations in FNS. The following examples describe coordination at the tactical level for various services.

**Example Coordination at the Tactical Level for Utilization of Local Supplies and Resources**

**S-5**: Based on the requirements of the military force, in conjunction with S-3 (tactical needs), S-4 (logistical needs), and economy, makes provisions for local procurement of the required supplies and resources. Provides S-3 with information pertaining to the local resources, dumps, or depots that, because of distance, may justify the assignment of tactical troops to effect their capture.

**S-2**: Provides supplementary information of economy concerning supplies and resources, particularly food and oil products. Reports location of dumps and depots.

**S-3**: Receives from S-5 requests for “special missions” to seize local resources, dumps, and depots. When approved, assigns missions to tactical units.

**S-4**: Provides S-5 with military logistical requirements. Receives from S-5 report of availability. Recommends procurement policy. Establishes procedures for procurement. Selects purchasing and contracting officers. Continuously coordinates with S-5 on availability, impact on local economy, and location of local offices for procurements.

Special staff officers:

**All**: Within established policies, submit to S-5 requests for assistance in locating supplies.

**SJA**: Provides legal supervision of purchasing and contracts.

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**Example Coordination at the Tactical Level for Procurement and Use of Labor**

**S-5**: Based on the requirements for civil labor as determined by S-1, determines the availability, establishes channels for procurement, and furnishes information on the recompense and treatment of local civilian labor to S-1.

**S-1**: Within policy established by higher HQ, coordinates with S-5 and recommends wages, hours of employment, and individual space allocations of civilian support labor for CSS and tactical units. Receives report of availability from S-5.

**S-2**: Screens labor employed as established by PIR or IRs.

**S-4**: Receives requirements for labor from CSS units. Determines priorities and allocations for CSS units.

Special staff officers:

**SJA**: Examines command policies and labor contracts to ensure compliance with legal requirements.
POPULACE AND RESOURCES CONTROL

6-26. Military operations are rarely conducted in a vacuum that is free of civilian presence or influence. No matter the operational environment, combat operations can be disrupted by—

- Uncontrolled and uncoordinated movement of frightened civilians about the battlespace.
- Uncontrolled and uncoordinated movement of civilians conducting legitimate activities.
- Illegal or illegitimate activities such as insurgent operations or black-market activities.

BASIC TERMS AND CONCEPTS

6-27. The PRC activity consists of two distinct, yet linked, components: populace control and resources control. These controls are normally a responsibility of indigenous civil governments. They are defined and enforced during times of civil or military emergency. For practical and security reasons, military forces employ populace control measures and resources control measures of some type and to varying degrees in military operations across the spectrum of operations. PRC operations are executed in conjunction with, and as an integral part of, military operations.

Populace Controls

6-28. These provide security for the populace, mobilize human resources, deny personnel to the enemy, and detect and reduce the effectiveness of enemy agents. Populace control measures include curfews, movement restrictions, travel permits, registration cards, and resettlement of villagers. DC operations and NEOs are two special categories of populace control that require extensive planning and coordination among various military and nonmilitary organizations.

On Aug. 13 [2001], a curfew was set in place by MNB(E) [Multi-national Brigade (East)] in the town of Cernica, following three acts of violence. No one will be allowed to enter or leave the village without the authority of KFOR [Kosovo Force], officials said.

“We hope that we can, on the one hand determine who has committed these crimes, and on the other hand deter further acts of violence,” said Maj. Jim Blackburn, 3-69th Armor Battalion executive officer.

3-69th Armor reported that an elderly Kosovo Serb woman’s window had been broken by a rock at 1:30 a.m. that day. A patrol immediately responded and two Kosovo Albanian males, ages 14 and 18, were detained. The 18-year-old was transported to the Camp Bondsteel Detention Facility.

“Youth are being recklessly encouraged to perpetuate violent acts,” said Col. Vincent Brooks, deputy commander of MNB(E). “The adults who teach or accept such behavior are irresponsible and negligent,” said Brooks.
At 3 a.m. four Kosovo Albanians approached a traffic control point and reported that one man had been shot and killed in the village of Brasaljce. A KFOR patrol entered the house in the village and discovered the body. U.N. Mission in Kosovo Police (UNMIK-P) are investigating, officials said.

3-69th Armor again responded to an explosion inside a house in Cernica at 4:30 p.m. No one was killed or injured.

3-69th Armor, UNMIK-P, and the Multinational Support Unit have begun a joint investigation. Five Kosovo Albanian men are being questioned. “Acts of violence like these have no place in a society that dreams of prosperity,” said Blackburn.

“It is quite clear that some individuals have no regard for property or lawful behavior,” said Brooks. “We deem them a direct threat to a safe and secure environment, and we will use all of our authority to put an end to such behavior,” said Brooks.

Army News Service, 15 August 2001

Resources Controls

6-29. These regulate the movement or consumption of materiel resources, mobilize materiel resources, and deny materiel to the enemy. Resources control measures include licensing, regulations or guidelines, checkpoints (for example, roadblocks), ration controls, amnesty programs, and inspection of facilities.

CA ROLE

6-30. The CA role in PRC is one of support to the commander’s operations function. General CA soldier tasks include—

- Identifying or evaluating existing HN PRC measures.
- Advising on PRC measures that would effectively support the commander’s objectives.
- Recommending command guidance on how to implement PRC measures.
- Publicizing the control measures among indigenous populations and institutions.
- Assessing the effectiveness of the measures.
- Participating in the execution of selected PRC operations and activities, as needed or directed.
- Assisting in the arbitration of problems arising from the implementation of PRC measures.

6-31. CA specialties that participate in PRC include international law, public administration, public safety, transportation, public works and utilities, civilian supply, economic development, food and agriculture, civil information, cultural relations, DCs, emergency management, environmental
services, and others according to METT-TC. Appendix H provides a more detailed look at CA strategic, operational, and tactical considerations in PRC.

**DISLOCATED CIVILIAN OPERATIONS**

6-32. DC operations pertain to those actions required to move civilians out of harm’s way or to safeguard them in the aftermath of a disaster. The disaster may be natural, as in a flood or an earthquake, or man-made, as in combat operations, social or political strife, or technological hazard emergency.

6-33. DC operations include the planning and management of DC routes, assembly areas, and camps. They also include the HA support to the affected populace. Appendix I discusses techniques in DC operations.

6-34. DC operations may occur in conjunction with military (combat) operations. They may also occur as a separate CMO mission supporting civil administration operations.

6-35. In all DC operations, controlling agencies must care for the basic needs of the DCs—food, water, shelter, sanitation, and security. Controlling agencies also must be prepared to prevent or arrest the outbreak of disease among the DCs. This last point is important for the health of the populace, as well as the health of military forces.

**Categories of Civilians**

6-36. During military operations, U.S. forces must consider two distinct categories of civilians—those who remained in place and those who are dislocated. The first category includes the civilians who are indigenous to the area and the local populace, including civilians from other countries. The civilians within this category may or may not need help. If they can take care of themselves, they should continue to remain in place.

6-37. DCs are civilians who left their homes for various reasons. Their movement and physical presence can hinder military operations. They most likely require some degree of aid, such as medicine, food, shelter, clothing, and similar items. DCs may not be native to the area or to the country in which they reside. DC is a generic term that is further subdivided into five categories. These subcategories are defined by legal and political considerations as follows:

- **Displaced person**: A civilian who is involuntarily outside the national boundary of his country in time of war.
- **Refugee**: A civilian who has left home to seek safety because of real or imagined danger.
- **Evacuee**: A civilian removed from his place of residence by local or national military order.
- **Stateless person**: A civilian who has been denationalized or whose country of origin cannot be determined or who cannot establish his right to the nationality claimed.
- **War victim**: A classification created during the Vietnam era to describe civilians suffering injuries, loss of a family member, or damage to or destruction of their homes as a result of war. War victims may be eligible for a claim against the United States under the Foreign Claims Act.
6-38. The status of individual DCs is not always clear, even to those in the international community or the UN who routinely address DC problems, as the following examples illustrate:

In some situations, the link between refugee problems and internal displacement is direct and clear.

- When refugees and displaced persons are generated by the same causes and straddle the border, not only are the humanitarian needs similar, a solution to the refugee problem cannot usually be found without at the same time resolving the issue of internal displacement. UNHCR’s involvement in northern Iraq during the Kurdish crisis was one such example.

- In many situations, effective reintegration of returnees requires assistance to be extended also to the internally displaced in the same locality or community. In Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, and Guatemala, it has been operationally and conceptually difficult for UNHCR to differentiate between returnees and internally displaced. In Sri Lanka, refugees returned home only to become internally displaced, prompting UNHCR to refocus its programme [sic] on internal displacement. In Ethiopia, UNHCR participated in a cross-mandate operation with other agencies to promote reintegration of returnees and also stabilise [sic] other kinds of population movements.

- Sometimes refugees have sought asylum across the border in areas where there are also internally displaced. For instance, refugees from Sierra Leone and the internally displaced in Liberia were found, not only living together, but also affected in the same manner by instability in the country of asylum. Not only is it operationally difficult and morally unacceptable to distinguish between people in such a situation, assistance targeting only refugees may aggravate their insecurity.

In other situations, the relationship between refugees and the internally displaced is more complex.

- Refugees may be a minor component of massive internal displacement. Colombia and Chechnya are two such operations in which UNHCR is involved. Tajikistan was another instance of such involvement when geography and history dictated the flight of some 600,000 persons to other parts of the country and only a tenth of that number to neighbouring [sic] Afghanistan. In such cases, it makes little sense to base international assistance on location alone.

- Internal conflicts of a secessionist nature have uprooted people within national boundaries, which have then become international borders. For instance in the former Yugoslavia and Timor, UNHCR decided to provide protection and assistance to the uprooted on the basis of humanitarian needs, rather than refugee status. Borders, which shift even as people move, cannot be the sole factor determining the legitimacy of international concern.
Sometimes it has been difficult to predict whether territorial disputes or ethnic violence will lead to a break-up of a state and exodus of refugees, but it has been felt that early action to protect and assist internal displacement might check the proliferation and prolongation of human suffering and promote regional stability. This was the basis of UNHCR’s response, for instance, in the Caucasus.

*Internally Displaced Persons: The Role of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,*
*UNHCR, 6 March 2000*

**CA Role**

6-39. The CA role in DC operations is one of support to the commander’s operational function and to the administration of DC control measures. General CA soldier tasks include—

- Identifying or evaluating existing HN and international community DC plans and operations.
- Advising on DC control measures that would effectively support the military operation.
- Advising on how to implement DC control measures.
- Publicizing the control measures among indigenous populations and institutions.
- Assessing the effectiveness of the measures.
- Participating in the execution of selected DC operations and activities, as needed or directed.
- Assisting in the arbitration of problems arising from the implementation of DC control measures.

6-40. CA specialties that participate in DC operations include international law, public administration, public health, public safety, public communications, transportation, public works and utilities, civilian supply, food and agriculture, civil information, cultural relations, DCs, emergency management, environmental services, and others according to METT-TC. Appendix H provides a more detailed look at CA strategic, operational, and tactical considerations in DC operations. Appendix B of FM 41-10 and Appendix I of this FM provide additional information on conducting DC operations. The following examples describe tactical-level coordination for DC operations and control of DC traffic.
### Example of Tactical-Level Coordination for DC Operations

**S-5**: Working alongside the S-2 to develop an estimate of expected DC flow in the area under the command’s control, determines the amount and type of facilities required to handle DCs. Additionally, after determining amount and type of available local resources, recommends to the commander the amount and type of military assistance required to discharge the commander’s responsibility in the CA field.

**S-1**: Advises impact of DCs on the health and morale of the military personnel. Recommends policy concerning relations between DCs and military personnel.

**S-2**: Works with S-5 to develop an estimate of number of DCs to be uncovered. Reports to S-5 location of large camps to be uncovered. Establishes procedures for screening.

**S-3**: Provides S-5 with area of future operations and the type of action expected. Recommends routes to be used for evacuation of personnel. Tasks military units to control large, unruly groups.

**S-4**: Coordinates logistical support requirements when requested and releases CA supplies for DCs. Provides military supplies as authorized. Submits recommendations concerning use of military transportation for movement of DCs.

Special Staff Officers:

**ALO**: Reports to S-5 the location of DCs located by air reconnaissance.

**Assistant division signal officer (ADSO)**: Provides signal communications along route of evacuation.

**PM**: Plans for enforcement of evacuation routes. Recommends allocation of military police (MP) resources to control of civilian traffic to ensure minimum interference with current and planned military operations.
Example of Tactical-Level Coordination for Planning Control of DC Traffic

S-5: In coordination with S-3, S-4, and PM through use of civil officials and organizations, plans for control of civilian traffic to ensure minimum interference with current and planned military operations.

S-1: Reviews plan to ensure proper allocation of MP efforts between civilian and military requirements.

S-2: Establishes procedures for screening civilian traffic to uncover agents and saboteurs.

S-3: Provides S-5 with tactical requirements for control of civilian traffic.

S-4: Provides S-5 the routes of traffic that must be reserved for logistical reasons; ensures that plan for control of traffic is coordinated with traffic control plan.

Special staff officers:

Division transportation office (DTO): Coordinates civilian traffic control plan with overall traffic regulation plan.

PM: Assists in developing civilian traffic control plan; estimates MP requirements; plans location of signs, roadblocks, patrols, and checkpoints; and enforces civilian traffic control as required.

6-41. Table 6-2, page 6-15, is an example of an operational aid used by tactical unit leaders to quickly determine the disposition of individuals encountered in their AO. It provides mission-specific guidance that supports the force commander’s DC plan. CA/CMO planners produce a matrix such as this based on extensive METT-TC analysis of the situation in collaboration with operational, legal, interagency, HN, and international community planners and participants of the operation.

NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS

6-42. NEOs refer to the authorized and orderly departure of noncombatants from a specific area by the DOS, DOD, or other appropriate authority. Although normally considered in connection with combat operations, evacuation may also be conducted in anticipation of, or in response to, any natural or man-made disaster in a foreign country, including civil unrest when evacuation to safe havens or to the United States is warranted.
### Table 6-2. Operational Aid for DC Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Potential Threat</th>
<th>Captured/ Surrendering Enemy Combatant</th>
<th>Known or Suspected Criminal</th>
<th>Civilian in Settlement</th>
<th>Civilian Not in Settlement</th>
<th>Indigenous Civilian Inhabitants, Expatriates</th>
<th>International Organization/ NGO Worker</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Resistance, Resumption of Fighting</td>
<td>Security Risk, Criminal Conduct</td>
<td>Hunger, Disease, Sleeper Combatants</td>
<td>Hunger, Disease, Sleeper Combatants</td>
<td>Sleeper Combatants</td>
<td>Unfriendly (No Threat if Friendly)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal or Doctrinal Status</td>
<td>Treat as Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW)</td>
<td>Civilian Internee</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person (IDP) or Refugee (See DC Plan for More Info)</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person (IDP) or Refugee (See DC Plan for More Info)</td>
<td>Local Resident</td>
<td>UN Recognized/ Supported International Organization/ NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task Force’s Obligation</td>
<td>Fair Treatment, Urgent Medical Care, Detention, Accountability</td>
<td>Fair Treatment, Urgent Medical Care, Detention, Accountability</td>
<td>Assessment, Emergency Subsistence, Urgent Medical Care, Accountability</td>
<td>Assessment, Emergency Subsistence, Urgent Medical Care, Accountability</td>
<td>Local Resident</td>
<td>UN Recognized/ Supported International Organization/ NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actions to Take</td>
<td>Detain as EPWs, Segregate</td>
<td>Detain as Civilian Internees, Segregate</td>
<td>Report and Bypass (Unless directed otherwise)</td>
<td>Search, Direct to DC Route or DC Collection Points</td>
<td>Search, Direct Home (Stayput Policy) or to HN Authorities</td>
<td>Direct to CMOC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Report Encounter To</td>
<td>Military Police</td>
<td>Military Police</td>
<td>CMOC</td>
<td>CMOC</td>
<td>CMOC</td>
<td>CMOC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6-43. DOD defines noncombatant evacuees in two primary categories:

- U.S. citizens who may be ordered to evacuate by competent authority, including—
  - Civilian employees of all agencies of the USG and their dependents.
  - Military personnel of the U.S. Armed Forces specifically designated for evacuation as noncombatants.
  - Dependents of members of the U.S. Armed Forces.

- U.S. (and non-U.S.) citizens who may be authorized or assisted (but not necessarily ordered to evacuate) by competent authority, including—
  - Civilian employees of USG agencies and their dependents, who are residents in the country concerned on their own volition, but express the willingness to be evacuated.
  - Private U.S. citizens and their dependents.
  - Military personnel and dependents of members of the U.S. Armed Forces outlined above, short of an ordered evacuation.
  - Designated aliens, including dependents of civilian employees of the USG and military personnel of the U.S. Armed Forces, as prescribed by the DOS.

6-44. NEOs remove threatened civilians from locations in an FN or an HN to safe areas or to the United States. Such operations are conducted under the direction of the DOS. The United States employs military assets in an evacuation only when civilian resources are inadequate. The DOS may request help in conducting evacuations to—

- Protect U.S. citizens abroad.
- Reduce to a minimum the number of U.S. citizens at risk.
- Reduce to a minimum the number of U.S. citizens in combat areas to avoid impairing the combat effectiveness of military forces.

Types of Environments

6-45. NEOs may be ordered for implementation in any of the following environments:

- Permissive. NEOs are conducted with the full help and cooperation of the affected nation. Evacuation of noncombatants is mutually beneficial to friends and allies. The political stability of nations granting authority to evacuate noncombatants is secure. An example of a permissive NEO was the evacuation of Subic Bay and Clark Air Base in the Philippines after the eruption of Pinatubo Volcano.

- Uncertain. NEOs are conducted where overt or covert opposition to the evacuation exists. The opposition may come from the “host” government, from opposition forces, from outside forces, or from all three. Usually, a military show of force is sufficient to maintain control of the situation.

- Hostile. Operations to prevent or destroy the NEO are occurring or can be expected to occur. Forced entry by military forces into the AO may be required, and as a minimum, combat operations to secure some evacuees can be anticipated. A good example of a hostile evacuation is the evacuation of the U.S. Embassy in Saigon, Republic of Vietnam, in 1975.

6-46. The DOS is the lead agency for planning and conducting NEOs. The Chief of Mission, normally the U.S. Ambassador or other principal DOS officer-in-charge, has the primary responsibility for conducting evacuation operations. Every U.S. Embassy must maintain a NEO plan. DOS in Washington, DC, maintains a copy of these plans. The Washington Liaison Group coordinates evacuation planning between DOS, DOD, and other affected agencies.

6-47. NEOs are a political last step because they send a signal to the world that the United States has lost faith in the ability of the foreign government to protect U.S. personnel. The U.S. military plays only a supporting role in the implementation of a NEO. Military commanders have primary responsibility for the military involvement of the operation. This involvement could include support during all phases of a NEO. Military planners must consider the terrain, weather, hydrography, designation and number of evacuees, and other factors of the area, including dissidents.
CA Role

6-48. The CA role in a NEO is one of support to the commander's operational function and to the administration of certain aspects of the NEO. General CA soldier tasks include—

- Participating in the writing and coordination of NEO plans.
- Identifying, validating, or evaluating HN and international community resources designated for use in the NEO.
- Participating in the execution of selected NEO activities, as needed or directed.
- Assisting in the arbitration of problems arising from the implementation of NEO plans.

6-49. CA specialties that participate in NEOs include international law, public administration, public health, public safety, public communications, transportation, civilian supply, civil information, cultural relations, DCs, emergency management, and others according to METT-TC.

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

6-50. HA encompasses programs conducted to relieve or reduce conditions that present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. These conditions may be the results of natural or man-made disasters, including combat operations, or they may be endemic to an area. Examples of disasters include hurricanes, earthquakes, floods, oil spills, famine, disease, civil conflicts, terrorist incidents, and incidents involving WMD.

6-51. HA programs are normally the responsibility of the HN civil authorities. In addition to, or sometimes in lieu of, HN HA efforts, literally hundreds of NGOs from around the world respond to disasters to provide HA in various forms and for varied duration.

BASIC TERMS AND CONCEPTS

6-52. The HA activity refers to the assistance provided by U.S. military forces. HA can occur as part of DSO in CONUS and U.S. territories and possessions. HA in DSO normally involve Army National Guard (ARNG) and Air National Guard (ANG) units operating in their state role. They may also involve Active Army and RC units, including ARNG and ANG units in a federal status, when authorized and directed by the SecDef.

6-53. To differentiate foreign from domestic HA operations, JP 3-57 and JP 3-07.6, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, refer to those operations conducted outside the United States, its territories, and possessions, as foreign humanitarian assistance. This discussion will use the term HA for both domestic and foreign operations.

6-54. HA provided by U.S. forces is limited in scope and duration and is intended to supplement or complement the efforts of the agencies that have the primary responsibility for providing HA. U.S. military participation in HA operations can range from providing security (allowing civilian agencies to operate safely and uninhibited) to providing specific military capabilities.
applied in direct disaster relief roles (providing food and medical care, constructing basic sanitation facilities, repairing public facilities, and constructing shelters and temporary camps).

6-55. HA operations are inherently complex operations that require a significant amount of interagency coordination. HA is directed from the strategic level, coordinated and managed at the operational level, and conducted at a tactical level. HA operations require centralized coordination and control. Two organizations that aid in coordination and control are the HACC and the HOC.

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE COORDINATION CENTER

6-56. The HACC is a temporary center established by a geographic combatant commander to assist with interagency coordination and planning. Much like a CMOC with an HA focus, a HACC operates during the early planning and coordination stages of HA operations by providing the link between the geographic combatant commander and other USG agencies, NGOs, and international and regional organizations at the operational level.

HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS CENTER

6-57. The HOC is an interagency policymaking body that coordinates the overall relief strategy and unity of effort among all participants in a large HA operation. The HOC is normally established under the direction of the government of the affected country, the UN, or a USG agency during a U.S. unilateral operation. The HOC should consist of representatives from the affected country, the U.S. Embassy or Consulate, the joint force, the UN, NGOs and international organizations, and other major players in the operation.

HUMANITARIAN AND CIVIC ASSISTANCE

6-58. A special form of HA is HCA. HCA is assistance provided to the local populace by predominantly U.S. forces in conjunction with military operations and exercises supporting TEPs. This assistance is specifically authorized by Title 10, USC, Section 401, and is funded under separate authorities. Assistance provided under these provisions is limited to—

- Medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas of a country.
- Construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems.
- Well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities.
- Rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities.

6-59. A special condition of HCA operations is that they must fulfill valid unit training requirements. The fact that HCA operations incidentally create humanitarian benefit to the local populace is secondary. These operations are distinctly different from MCA projects, which are discussed later in this chapter.
CA ROLE

6-60. The CA role in HA is one of support to the commander’s operational function and to the administration of certain aspects of the HA operation. General CA soldier tasks include—

- Participating in interagency assessment, planning, and synchronizing of HA operations.
- Identifying, validating, or evaluating HN and international community resources designated for use in the HA operation.
- Participating in the execution of selected HA activities, as needed or directed.
- Tracking costs associated with execution of HA.
- Performing quality control assessments of HA activities and costs.
- Assisting in the arbitration of problems arising from the execution of HA operations.

6-61. All CA specialties may participate in HA according to METT-TC. FM 41-10 includes a discussion of the HA environment and the various USG programs under which HA is administered. JP 3-07.6 contains additional information. Appendix H of this FM provides a more detailed look at CA strategic, operational, and tactical considerations in HA. The following examples describe tactical-level coordination for HA operations.

Example of Tactical-Level Coordination for Public Health and Sanitation Support

**S-5:** Determines the minimum requirements for the health and sanitation of designated or selected civilian areas. Determines requirements and recommends to the commander the amount and type of health and sanitation supplies, and construction of military medical assistance needed for the area under consideration.

**S-1:** Coordinates with S-5, surgeon, and engineer in determining areas and establishments to be placed off limits to personnel under unit control.

**S-2:** Provides intelligence on health and sanitation conditions.

**S-3:** Provides S-5 with information on future operations, particularly use of NBC weapons. Receives recommendations from S-5 and surgeon for use of military force for mass sanitation efforts, submits recommendations, and when these are approved, provides military units. Receives from S-5 and surgeon the location of dangerous health and sanitation areas for consideration in tactical plans.

**S-4:** When requested by S-5, releases CA supplies. Determines availability of military supplies and recommends emergency allocations.
Example of Tactical-Level Coordination for Public Health and Sanitation Support (Continued)

Special staff officers:

**Surgeon**: Provides S-5 with technical assistance and advice for medical surveys, inoculations, spraying, dusting, and inspections. Determines supply and equipment requirements. Advises on impact of conditions on military personnel and recommends actions.

**Chemical Officer**: Advises S-5 on contaminated areas, on methods of decontamination, and on personnel and material requirements. May supervise decontamination.

Example Coordination at the Tactical Level for Provisions of Emergency Food, Clothing, Fuel, and Shelter

**S-5**: Based on the tactical situation and the relative standard of living of the civil population, recommends to the commander the amount and type of food, clothing, fuel, and shelter materials required to discharge the commander's responsibilities under current agreements and national policy.

**S-1**: Includes in the personnel estimate the impact of civilians on the morale of military personnel.

**S-2**: Provides S-5 with information of the area concerning conditions and requirements. Provides commander and staff an estimate of the influence on military operations if assistance is not provided.

**S-3**: Provides S-5 with area of future operations and type of action expected. Recommends priorities and allocation of supplies and equipment for civilian assistance when tactical operations are affected.

**S-4**: Receives S-5 requirements for supplies from CA stocks. Plans for movement of supplies while in military channels. Provides data on availability of military supplies. Recommends priorities and allocations to S-5.

Special staff officers:

**All**: Provide S-5 with technical assistance for determination of need for assistance measures to relieve conditions and priorities and allocation of appropriate supplies on military efforts. DISCOM coordinates distribution of CA supplies or military supplies directly with S-5.

**MILITARY CIVIC ACTION**

6-62. MCA is the use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population. These projects occur at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others that contribute to economic and social development of the area. An essential feature of MCA is that the
projects also serve to improve the standing of the indigenous military forces and the indigenous government with the population.

**BASIC TERMS AND CONCEPTS**

6-63. The MCA activity consists of employing U.S. military forces in a military-to-military role of advising or training foreign military forces in MCA projects in overseas areas. These projects are arranged by international agreement and may be supported by USG programs for HA, as discussed in FM 41-10.

6-64. MCA projects are divided into two general categories. These categories are explained below:

- **Mitigating MCA projects** are immediate-response, short-term projects designed to provide emergency assistance to a populace in the wake of a disaster and to reduce further damage or suffering, as in HA. The disaster could be from natural causes, such as earthquake, hurricane, famine, or flood, or from man-made causes, such as civil disturbance, accident, terrorism, or war. Some examples of mitigating MCA projects are—
  - Operating an emergency medical clinic.
  - Distributing food.
  - Building temporary shelter and sanitation facilities.
  - Conducting damage clean-up operations, including decontamination of HAZMAT spills or release of WMD.

- **Developmental MCA projects** are long-term projects designed to enhance the infrastructure of a local area. They are often preventive in nature and include any activities that actually eliminate or reduce the probability of occurrence of a disaster. Developmental MCA projects require interagency cooperation and continuous support from government sources to be effective. Some examples of developmental MCA projects are—
  - Building or redesigning facilities to reflect better land-use management.
  - Building or reinforcing structures to withstand the destructive elements predominant to the area.
  - Building or rehabilitating water sources and sanitation facilities to eliminate or prevent the spread of disease.
  - Operating a long-term public health campaign to educate the populace on preventive health measures (a medical readiness training exercise [MEDRETE]).
  - Conducting some HMA programs.

**CA ROLE**

6-65. The CA role in MCA is one of support to the commander’s operational function. General CA soldier tasks include—

- Identifying, validating, or evaluating MCA project nominations.
• Synchronizing MCA projects with other programs, both military and civilian.
• Participating in the execution of selected MCA activities, as needed or directed.
• Tracking costs associated with execution of MCA projects.
• Performing quality-control assessments of MCA activities and costs.
• Assisting in the arbitration of problems arising from the execution of MCA operations.

6-66. All CA specialties may participate in MCA according to METT-TC. Appendix H provides a more detailed look at CA strategic, operational, and tactical considerations in MCA.

EMERGENCY SERVICES

6-67. The emergency services activity, formerly known as civil defense, encompasses the combined emergency management authorities and policies, procedures, and resources of local, state, and national-level governments to mitigate, prepare for, respond to, and recover from disasters of all kinds. In the aftermath of a disaster, this effort includes incorporating voluntary disaster relief organizations, the private sector, and international sources into a national response network.

BASIC TERMS AND CONCEPTS

6-68. One of the basic responsibilities of civil government is to support its citizens in times of disaster. This responsibility means addressing the complex and constantly changing requirements associated with natural, man-made, and technological disasters: saving lives, protecting property, meeting basic human needs, restoring the disaster-affected area, and reducing vulnerability to future disasters. This responsibility normally begins at the local level and elevates incrementally to the national level. Figure 6-2, page 6-23, depicts a national disaster response network, as described in the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) national response plan. Natural disasters include the following:

• Hurricanes.
• Tornadoes.
• Floods.
• Earthquakes.
• Volcanoes.
• Forest fires.
• Droughts.
• Severe winter storms.

Man-made disasters include the following:

• Wars.
• Terrorist attacks.
• WMD use.
• Civil disturbances.
- Major transportation (air/rail/sea) accidents.

Technological disasters include the following:
- Nuclear accidents.
- Industrial fires and explosions.
- HAZMAT spill or release.
- Power outages.
- Communications failures.

Figure 6-2. A National Disaster Response Network

6-69. Emergency services resources include—
- State and local emergency planners and personnel.
- Law enforcement agencies.
- Fire departments.
- Search-and-rescue units.
- Emergency medical technicians and other health and medical services.
- Public works and utilities companies.
- Transportation agencies.
- Public communications systems and facilities.
- Mass care and feeding organizations.
- National Guard and selected Active Army and RC units.
- Other resources based on METT-TC.
6-70. Comprehensive emergency management (CEM) involves coordinating the proper mix of government, private, voluntary, and international resources in an organized effort to meet the needs of a populace before, during, and after an emergency. CEM consists of four phases:

- **Mitigation** refers to activities that actually eliminate or reduce the chance of occurrence or the effects of a disaster.
- **Preparedness** means planning how to respond in case an emergency or disaster occurs and working to increase resources available to respond effectively.
- **Response** refers to those activities that occur during and immediately following a disaster to provide emergency assistance to victims of the event and reduce the likelihood of secondary damage.
- **Recovery** refers to returning all systems and operations to normal or near-normal. Short-term recovery returns vital life-support systems to minimum operating standards. Long-term recovery may continue for years until the entire disaster area is completely redeveloped, either as it was in the past or for entirely new purposes that are less disaster-prone.

6-71. U.S. forces involvement in emergency services, both in CONUS and OCONUS, is often most visible in the response phase, normally in the form of HA operations. U.S. forces may also participate in mitigation, preparedness, and recovery operations through MCA and HCA projects. For operations OCONUS, these projects are initiated at the request of a foreign nation, through the U.S. Embassy. Within CONUS, they are initiated at the request of the executive office of a U.S. state, possession, or territory to the President of the United States.

6-72. U.S. military support to emergency services differs between combat, theater engagement programs, and response to national, regional, or international disasters. It also differs between CONUS and OCONUS operations.

6-73. In any emergency, however, strong emergency services plans, programs, policies, and organizations reduce the need for military forces to support civil emergency services efforts. Emergency services plans are especially important during combat operations when tactical and operational forces may be unable to divert military assets from combat, combat support, or CSS missions. Military forces may be required, however, when the situation is beyond the capabilities of emergency services officials or when civil government authorities cannot or will not take appropriate action. Laws and regulations closely regulate the use of U.S. military forces in support of CONUS or OCONUS emergency services operations.

6-74. The terms crisis management and consequence management are used when emergency services operations involve a terrorist event and the potential or actual employment of WMD. The following are definitions:

- **Crisis management**: Measures to identify, acquire, and plan the use of resources needed to anticipate, prevent, and/or resolve a threat or act of terrorism. (FBI definition cited in the Federal Response Plan.)
or

- Crisis management: Measures to resolve a hostile situation and investigate and prepare a criminal case for prosecution under federal law. Crisis management will include a response to an incident involving a weapon of mass destruction, special improvised explosive device, or a hostage crisis that is beyond the capability of the lead federal agency. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02, according to JP 3-07.6.)

- Consequence management: Measures to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of terrorism. (FEMA definition cited in the Federal Response Plan.)

or

- Consequence management: Measures taken to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of a chemical, biological, nuclear, and/or high-yield explosive situation. For domestic consequence management, the primary authority rests with the States to respond and the Federal Government to provide assistance as required. (This term and its definition are provided for information in JP 3-07.6 and proposed for inclusion in JP 1.02 and JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations.)

6-75. These terms apply to both domestic and foreign terrorist incidents. According to presidential directives and the Federal Response Plan, the LFA in domestic crisis management is the FBI while the LFA for domestic consequence management is the FEMA. During foreign crisis management or consequence management, the LFA for U.S. support to a foreign government is DOS.

6-76. The fundamentals of emergency services mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery apply to both crisis management and consequence management. These operations require increased awareness and emphasis on operating in an NBC environment. They will also normally include teams or units specializing in NBC detection, containment, and decontamination.

CA ROLE

6-77. The CA role in emergency services is one of support to the commander’s operational function. General CA soldier tasks include—

- Identifying, validating, or evaluating HN and international community emergency services plans and resources designated for use in emergency services operations.

- Participating in interagency assessment, planning, and synchronizing of emergency services operations.

- Participating in the execution of selected emergency services activities, as needed or directed.

- Tracking costs associated with execution of emergency services.
• Performing quality-control assessments of emergency services activities and costs.

• Assisting in the arbitration of problems arising from the execution of emergency services operations.

6-78. All CA specialties may participate in emergency services according to METT-TC. FM 41-10 contains a discussion of emergency services in CONUS and OCONUS. Additional information on the role of U.S. forces in DSO is in FM 3-07, Stability Operations and Support Operations, and the Federal Response Plan, http://www.fema.gov/r-n-r/frp/. CJCSI 3214.01, Military Support to Foreign Consequence Management Operations, has additional information and guidance on foreign consequence management. Appendix H of this FM provides a more detailed look at CA strategic, operational, and tactical considerations in emergency services.

SUPPORT TO CIVIL ADMINISTRATION

6-79. Military operations that help to stabilize or continue the operations of the governing body or civil structure of a foreign country, whether by assisting an established government or by establishing military authority over an occupied population, are known as support to civil administration. Support to civil administration occurs most often in stability operations and support operations. Some support to civil administration is manifested in other CA activities, such as PRC, HA, MCA, and emergency services.

BASIC TERMS AND CONCEPTS

6-80. The support to civil administration activity consists of three distinct mission activities—

• Civil assistance Short-term military support to an established government or populace, in advance of or in the aftermath of natural or man-made calamities or disasters, that does not incur a long-term U.S. commitment. Examples of support include maintaining order, providing life-sustaining services, and controlling distribution of goods and services.

• Civil administration in friendly territory: Geographic combatant commander’s support to governments of friendly territories during peacetime, disasters, or war. Examples of support include advising friendly authorities or performing specific functions within limits of the authority and liability established by international treaties and agreements.

• Civil administration in occupied territory: The establishment of a temporary government, as directed by the SecDef, to exercise executive, legislative, and judicial authority over the populace of a territory which U.S. forces have taken from an enemy by force of arms until an indigenous civil government can be established.

IFOR (Implementation Force)...faced a situation somewhat reminiscent of World War II but without a mandate to govern or restore essential services. The peace agreement and other accords assigned nation building to civil agencies. For instance, OHR (Office of the High Representative) would reactivate the civil infrastructure and
joint civilian commissions dealt with communications, transport, and economic development. Elections, however, were relegated to the warring parties, international agencies, and OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe).

Stabilizing the situation; separating and disarming the various parties; and providing limited assistance, adequate security, and freedom of movement for all civilians as well as NGOs charged with effecting the peace was left to the military. That mission would develop into one of the most extensive civil-military operations in U.S. and NATO history. Furthermore, despite the concern over excessive IFOR involvement ('mission creep') and the effort to limit the military role to the letter of the agreement, the civilian implementation of the peace mandate could not be accomplished without active participation by the military in civilian support organizations.

An unforeseen and lesser-known concern was the judicial system. After 4 years of war and the physical separation of the factions, it was in dire need of rejuvenation.

Over two-thirds of the judicial positions were vacant, statutes were difficult if not impossible to locate, and legal texts were nearly nonexistent. Despite this state of affairs, neither the agreement nor the various NGOs envisioned helping this critical institution. CA personnel were the first to identify this problem and immediately render assistance using their civilian expertise.

If the judicial system was sick, the electoral process was comatose. The last countrywide election had been held in 1991. There were no election laws to which all parties could agree and no voter registration lists. OSCE was overwhelmed by the task of registering 3.5 million voters in Bosnia and 20 other countries. Virtually every phase of the process required support. Again, CA personnel proved valuable for this NGO, which is not to say that the military provided unusual services or that individuals in uniform drove the judicial and electoral systems.

The Challenge of Civil-Military Operations,
by John J. Tuozzolo,
Joint Forces Quarterly,
Summer 1997 (No. 16)

6-81. During civil administration in occupied territory, the following terms apply:

- **Military governor:** The military commander or other designated person who, in an occupied territory, exercises supreme authority over the civil population subject to the laws and usages of war and to any directive received from the commander's government or superior. (JP 1-02. Term approved for DOD and NATO use.)

- **Military government ordinance:** An enactment on the authority of a military governor promulgating laws or rules regulating the occupied territory under such control. (JP 1-02.)
CA ROLE

6-82. The CA role in support to civil administration varies between civil assistance, civil administration in friendly territory, and civil administration in occupied territory. In either case, however, the CA role is one of support to the commander’s operational and support function with respect to the continuity of government in a foreign nation. General CA soldier tasks include—

- Identifying, validating, or evaluating HN infrastructure.
- Understanding the needs of the indigenous populations and institutions in terms of the 16 functional specialties.
- Monitoring and anticipating future requirements of the indigenous populations and institutions in terms of the 16 functional specialties.
- Performing liaison functions between military and civilian agencies.
- Coordinating and synchronizing collaborative interagency or multinational support to civil administration activities.
- Participating in the execution of selected support to civil administration activities, as needed or directed.
- Performing quality-control assessments of support to civil administration activities and costs.
- Assisting in the arbitration of problems arising from the execution of support to civil administration operations.
- Coordinating and synchronizing transition of support to civil administration operations from military to indigenous government or international community control.

6-83. All CA specialties may participate in support to civil administration according to METT-TC. Appendix H provides a more detailed look at CA strategic, operational, and tactical considerations in support to civil administration. The following three examples describe tactical-level coordination in support to civil administration operations.
Example of Coordination at the Tactical Level for Restoration and Use of Public Service

S-5: Based on the tactical situation and economic situation affecting the area, recommends to the command those public services, in priority, which should be restored and estimates the amount of public utilities required to discharge the civil activities essential to the physical and moral well being of the area.

S-1: Advises on the influence poor service will have on morale of military personnel. Recommends allocation of public morale services (radio and TV) for military use.

S-2: Provides information of the AO and an estimate of the influence of conditions on military operations. If public communications are reestablished, recommends security measures. Recommends consistent policy for communications media.

S-3: Coordinates with S-5 on use of signal, chemical, and aviation efforts for civil assistance when tactical operations are affected. Recommends priority and allocation of military capabilities for civil assistance when tactical operations are affected. Recommends use of public communications and transportation by military. Receives location of vital elements to be saved from destruction if tactical situation permits.

Special staff officers:

All: Provide S-5 with technical advice and assistance in determination of need for assistance, measures to restore, and recommendations for restoration of public services of value to particular staff officer’s activities.

FSCOORD: Receives from S-3 location of vital elements to be saved from destruction by fire support means, if possible.

Example of Tactical-Level Coordination for Protection of Arts, Monuments, and Archives

S-5: In conjunction with S-2, determines the location of archives, monuments, and objects of art considered to be of value to the United States, allies, or the civil government. As appropriate, recommends to S-3 those items which, because of political, cultural, or economic value, justify the use of combat elements for their seizure and security. As appropriate, recommends to the commander the disposition of such items.

S-1: Publishes appropriate instructions for military personnel concerning treatment of arts, monuments, and archives.

S-2: Coordinates with S-5 in locating and searching archives. May provide archives team for intelligence search. Returns archives to S-5 after intelligence processing. Recommends to S-5 the safeguarding of archives.

S-3: Prepares recommendation for adjustment of tactical plans to prevent destruction of arts, monuments, or archives. Assigns special missions to tactical units to secure and safeguard.

Special staff officers:

PM: Provides security guards or may support local civil police in such operations.

FSCOORD: Receives location from S-3 for prevention of destruction by fire support.
Example of Tactical-Level Coordination for Prisoners of War and Recovered U.S. Prisoners of War

S-5: Furnishes data on availability of local suppliers for food and clothing and availability of facilities and/or material for use in construction of cages or camps.

S-1: Plans for and supervises custody, administration, utilization, and treatment of prisoners of war (PWs) from capture or taking custody to evacuation repatriation or parole. Coordinates and supervises initial steps (furnishing food, clothing, and medical attention) for the rehabilitation and processing of U.S. or allied personnel recovered from enemy control. Arranges for prompt notification to higher HQ, prompt evacuation from the combat zone, private use of Army communication means, and intelligence debriefing.

S-2: Estimates the number and capture rate of PWs, ensures continued interrogation of selected PWs, and ensures screening and debriefing of recovered personnel.

S-3: Considers requirements for additional troop units as guards.

S-4: Provides housing, food, transportation, and evacuation for PWs. Plans uses for labor.

Special staff officers:

PM: Supervises and administers collection, evacuation, processing, interment care, treatment, discipline, safeguarding, utilization, education, and repatriation of PWs.


Engineer: Plans and supervises construction, maintenance, and repair of camps and facilities for PWs under control of the command.

DISCOM: Provides food and clothing, as required.

Surgeon: Coordinates PW medical operations and provides medical support augmentation.

Transportation: Provides transportation, as required.

PAO: Provides news and press releases.

PRODUCTS OF THE DELIVER PHASE

6-84. The deliver phase is characterized by the execution of CA activities by CA soldiers, non-CA soldiers, international organizations, NGOs, and HN assets as part of a COR to the civil component of a situation. The duration of the deliver phase will vary based on the factors of METT-TC. While executing these activities, CA soldiers generate routine CA/CMO briefings and reports according to unit SOP. These briefings and reports feed directly into the evaluate phase in which soldiers monitoring CA operations determine when the deliver phase is over and transition phase may begin. Some examples of CA/CMO briefings and reports are in Appendixes C and D.
Chapter 7

CA Methodology: Evaluate

Commanders, assisted by the staff, continuously assess the situation and the progress of the operation, and compare it with the initial vision. Assessment is the continuous monitoring—throughout planning, preparation, and execution—of the current situation and progress of an operation, and the evaluation of it against criteria of success to make decisions and adjustments. Commanders direct adjustments to ensure that operations remain aligned with the commander's intent. Subordinates assess their unit's progress by comparing it with the senior commander's intent and adjusting their actions to achieve the envisioned end state, particularly in the absence of orders.

Assessment precedes and guides every activity within the operations process and concludes each operation or phase of an operation. Assessment entails two distinct tasks: continuously monitoring the situation and the progress of the operation, and evaluating the operation against measures of effectiveness. Together, the two tasks compare reality to expectations.

FM 3-0, Operations, June 2001

OVERVIEW

7-1. The evaluate phase is a vital part of the CA methodology. The term evaluate is used to distinguish this phase from the assess phase of the methodology. This phase actually begins during the develop and detect phase and continues through the deliver phase.

7-2. Once execution of the CA plan begins, every task performed or mission executed requires a critical evaluation to determine the results of the action. This evaluation is akin to conducting a CA battle damage assessment (BDA). The evaluation validates the CA/CMO concept of operations and determines whether the established MOEs have been met. It also helps commanders decide when and how to adjust the plan, when to develop new plans to address unforeseen consequences of operations, and when to terminate or transition an operation.

7-3. During the evaluate phase, evaluators focus on the MOEs established for the operation during the decide phase. They determine the sustainability of any projects or programs initiated during the deliver phase. Evaluators look at each of the 16 functional specialties to determine if the operation caused any unintended effects in other areas of the civil component, and they recommend follow-on actions.

7-4. The products of this phase include CA/CMO briefings and reports, AARs, additional project nominations, new mission requirements (FRAG
orders), a finalized transition plan, and termination or transition timelines. This chapter will focus on the activities that support and occur during the evaluate phase.

EVALUATING MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS

7-5. One of the products during the decide phase was CMO MOEs. CA/CMO planners developed CMO MOEs to determine how well or poorly an operation is proceeding in achieving the CMO goals of the operation according to the commander’s mission statement and intent. CMO MOEs were also developed to identify effective strategies and tactics and to determine points at which to shift resources, transition to different phases, or alter or terminate the mission.

7-6. For the purpose of discussion in this chapter, the following examples of CMO MOEs will be used:

• DC camp mortality rates reduced to below X per day.
• Public services and utilities restored to predisaster levels (defined by historical data).
• NGO operations sustainable without U.S. military support.

7-7. In addition to deciding what the MOEs were, CA/CMO planners developed plans to observe and validate each MOE. As discussed in Chapter 4, these plans determined—

• Who will observe the MOE?
• When will the MOE be observed?
• How will the MOE be observed?
• Where will the observations be made?
• Who will approve and validate achievement of the MOE?
• What actions will be taken when the MOE is satisfactorily achieved? By whom?

OBSERVATION OF THE MOE

7-8. MOEs can be assigned to individuals, CA teams, or an all-source analysis center, such as the CMOC.

7-9. Using the sample MOEs above, observation of DC mortality rates may be assigned to an individual, such as the camp administrator. Observation of public services and utilities levels of output may be assigned to a task-organized team of public facilities functional specialists. Observation of the sustainability of NGO operations can be assigned to the CMOC.

WHEN THE MOE IS OBSERVED

7-10. Observation of MOEs may be event-driven or time-driven. Some MOEs can be observed and measured immediately after an event, such as the percentage of a population inoculated during a MEDRETE or the level of output of a utility after repairs. Other MOEs can only be observed after a cycle of time has passed, such as harvest season, if measuring agricultural output, or a school year, if measuring academic achievement. Observation of
MOEs may be required on a routine or periodic basis to establish baselines or trends, as in crime rates or mortality rates.

**HOW THE MOE IS OBSERVED**

7-11. MOEs may be observed in a variety of ways. The deliberate assessment, described in Chapter 5, is the most effective method for observing MOEs, such as the mortality rates in DC camps or the output of public utilities. Using a combination of surveys, interviews, and direct observation, the observers of an MOE obtain detailed, current information at the source of the issue.

7-12. Some MOEs may be observed in the course of routine CMOC, or interagency, operations. As reports from CA teams and various civilian agencies are analyzed and statistics are recorded, the CMOC provides input to the COP. In this way, MOEs, such as the sustainability of NGO or HN operations, can readily be identified.

7-13. In the latter case, CA soldiers must differentiate between results, indicators, and performance measures:

- **Result (or outcome):** A result is a bottom-line condition caused by the execution of an event or implementation of a program. Results are not “owned” by any single agency or system. They cross over agency and program lines, and public and private sectors.

- **Indicator (or benchmark):** An indicator is a measure for which data exists that helps quantify the achievement of a desired result. Indicators help answer the question: “How would we know a result if we achieved it?” Examples of indicators include rates of preventable disease, death rates among a distressed population, rates of pregnancy and drug use, and crime rates. There is a difference in the way in which the term benchmark is used in public- and private-sector applications. The public sector often uses the term benchmarks to mean an indicator or performance measure. The private sector uses the term to mean a particular level of desired and achievable performance.

- **Performance measure:** A performance measure is a measure of how well agencies and programs are working. Typical performance measures address matters of timeliness, cost effectiveness, and compliance with standards. Examples of performance measures include percentage of investigations initiated within 24 hours of an incident report, percentage of military resources (versus civilian resources) expended to satisfy needs of the populace, and police or fire response time.

**WHERE OBSERVATIONS ARE MADE**

7-14. Some MOEs, such as DC camp mortality rates, can be observed at single locations. Other MOEs, such as public utility output and NGO operations, must be observed at several locations.

7-15. Certain MOEs dictate that observations must be made over a wide area to gauge the effectiveness of an event or program. The restoration of a water treatment facility or pumping station, for example, means nothing if the system that carried the water to local or remote villages is damaged or inoperable.
VALIDATION AND APPROVAL OF MOE ACHIEVEMENT

7-16. MOEs must be validated and approved before final disposition of an event or program can be made. The approval authority must be identified during the decide phase. The approval authority may be a commander, HN authorities, organized representatives of the international community, or some other entity.

ACTIONS TAKEN WHEN THE MOE IS SATISFACTORYLY ACHIEVED

7-17. Achievement of MOEs must be tied to a disposition action. This action may be the termination of an activity or task; the transfer of an activity or task to follow-on CA forces, other military forces, or the international community; or the transition of an activity or task to the indigenous population or institutions.

7-18. As the evaluation phase progresses and satisfaction of MOEs indicates an operation is nearing completion, CA soldiers finalize transition plans and begin executing termination or transition timelines. These actions are covered in Chapter 8.

7-19. Execution of an event or program may result in unexpected outcomes. As new problems present themselves, CA soldiers must begin the CA methodology over. They assess the new situation; decide what, if any, action to take; develop the new situation and detect conditions through deliberate assessments; deliver the appropriate CA activity; and evaluate the results using MOEs. When MOEs are satisfactorily achieved, they move on to the transition phase.

ACTIONS FOR UNSUCCESSFUL MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS

7-20. If success is not achieved, CA soldiers must determine why. The evaluated results of an event or program may be unsuccessful because levels were set too high, the wrong activity is being measured, or some other reason. CA soldiers must be careful not to redefine success to what has been achieved.

7-21. At this point, a decision must be made regarding what to do next. Some options include—

- Continue the operation as currently planned and reevaluate at a future date.
- Accept the results and proceed with transition of the operation as planned.
- Redefine the mission, using the CA methodology, and develop a new plan with new MOEs.
- The cause and effect diagram: a useful technique to identify, explore, and graphically display all of the possible causes related to a problem or condition.

PRODUCTS OF THE EVALUATE PHASE

7-22. The evaluate phase is characterized by comparing results of CA operations and CMO to MOEs established during the decide phase. The
evaluate phase actually begins during the develop and detect phase and continues through the deliver phase. During the evaluate phase, CA soldiers generate routine CA/CMO briefings and reports according to unit SOP. These briefings and reports help those soldiers monitoring CA operations determine when the transition phase may begin.

7-23. Products of this phase include CA/CMO briefings and reports, AARs, additional project nominations, new mission requirements (FRAG orders), a finalized transition plan, and termination or transition timelines. Examples of some of these products are in Appendixes C and D.
Chapter 8

CA Methodology: Transition

It is DoD policy that...civil affairs activities shall be undertaken to achieve an orderly and prompt transition of civilian sector responsibilities from the DoD components to non-DoD authorities.

DODD 2000.13, *Civil Affairs*,
June 27, 1994

OVERVIEW

8-1. The transition phase is every bit as critical to an operation as is the deliver phase. Planning and preparation for the transition begin during the decide phase and continue throughout the develop and detect, deliver, and evaluate phases. Successful execution of transition is the CA community’s direct contribution to a sustainable solution and the commander’s ability to secure the victory.

8-2. CA soldiers experience several types of transition throughout combat operations, from combat to posthostilities operations, and in conjunction with redeployment. Depending on the situation, CA activities and CMO in transition operations may be terminated, transferred to follow-on forces, or passed to the indigenous population or institutions. If terminated, CA soldiers take the appropriate steps to cease operations. If transferred to some other military or civilian organization, CA soldiers take steps to orient the incoming organization to the activity or task, supervise the incoming organization in performing the activity or task, transfer the task, and redeploy as directed.

8-3. Transitions may occur randomly, sequentially, or simultaneously across the AO or within a theater. Ideally, each type of transition is executed according to synchronized transition plans. These transition plans are normally a product of transition working groups established early in the planning process of an operation. Transition working groups usually require close ties with an area’s CMOC to obtain updates on the current situation and the status of MOEs. They meet periodically to review, refine, and coordinate specific details of the transition plan.

8-4. The products of this phase include CA/CMO briefings, reports, and AARs. The outcome of this step includes a successful transition of authority or relief-in-place, and programs that are durable and sustainable by the follow-on force or organization. This chapter will focus on the activities that support and occur during the transition phase.
TRANSITION OPERATIONS

8-5. Transitions occur routinely in military operations across the spectrum of operations. These transition operations include the following:

- Offensive operations become defensive operations when the force achieves the purpose of the operation, reaches a limit of advance, or approaches culmination.
- Defensive operations become offensive operations to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to defeat the enemy decisively.
- Units in combat conduct passage of lines operations in which a force moves forward or rearward through another force's combat positions with the intention of moving into or out of contact with the enemy.
- As combat operations move forward, or at cessation of hostilities, combat operations in designated areas become security operations. Some units redeploy while others arrive or remain in place to begin stability operations and/or support operations.
- Units in defensive, stability, and support operations, conduct, at the direction of higher authority, relief-in-place operations in which all or part of a unit are replaced in an area by the incoming unit. The responsibilities of the replaced elements for the mission and the assigned zone of operations are transferred to the incoming unit. The incoming unit continues the operation as ordered. (In NATO operations, this relief-in-place is sometimes called a transfer of authority.)

8-6. Transition of CMO across the spectrum of operations falls into three categories:

- Termination of an activity or task.
- Transfer of an activity or task to follow-on CA forces, other military forces, or the international community.
- Transition of an activity or task to the indigenous population or institutions.

TERMINATION OF AN ACTIVITY OR TASK

8-7. An activity or task may be terminated for a variety of reasons. Some of these include—

- The time specified for the task has elapsed.
- Milestones or overall objectives have been reached.
- The political or security situation has deteriorated below an acceptable level.
- A loss of support or funding by project benefactor.
- A change of mission.
- Command directive.

8-8. When terminating an activity or task, whether completed as planned or not, CA soldiers must execute certain close-out procedures. These include:

- Closing out all open administrative actions;
- Giving or returning equipment and facilities, in good condition, to the appropriate authorities;
- Conducting an
after-action review and writing an AAR; and thanking both military and civilian participants and supporters, if appropriate.

8-9. Depending on METT-TC, the command climate, and other factors, CA soldiers may consider conducting a termination ceremony. This action helps maintain good rapport with the indigenous population, as well as the international community, and facilitates future operations in the area.


TRANSFER OF AN ACTIVITY OR TASK TO FOLLOW-ON CA FORCES, OTHER MILITARY FORCES, OR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

Brig. Gen. Stephen Ferrell, assistant division commander of Multinational Division (North), followed with an address to the troops. “To the soldiers of NORDPOL, General Sharp passes on his congratulations to the soldiers of NORDPOL. This ceremony is a time to reflect on past experiences and to look ahead.”

“I know that over 200,000 people in this region are appreciative of your efforts and service in the Balkans,” said Brig. Gen. Ferrell. Then Brig. Gen. Ferrell welcomed the new commander and new soldiers to NORDPOL. “You are now part of our team.”

“Distinguished guests and soldiers of NORDPOL, I am proud to take over command. I will continue taking care of soldiers and treat with dignity and respect the local inhabitants,” said Col. Kochanowski.

The new commander will continue the work of the outgoing Team 10 and is interested in improving the role of Civil-Military Cooperation centers in local communities, according to Capt. Sylwester Michalski, Press Information Officer, NORDPOL.

Talon Magazine Online, Vol. 7, No. 7, NORDPOL Transfer of Authority, February 17, 2001

8-11. An activity or task may be transferred to a variety of military or nonmilitary organizations for an equally varied number of reasons. Some of these reasons include the following:

- Supported unit is conducting a relief-in-place during offensive, defensive, stability, or support operations and the incoming unit is continuing the military mission, including CMO and CA activities initiated or carried on by the unit being replaced (for example, relief of Regimental Combat Team 7/1st Marine Division in Humanitarian Relief Sector Baidoa by Australian Infantry Battalion during Operation RESTORE HOPE).

- Change of operation or mission resulting in exchange of forces (for example, Operation RESTORE HOPE to Operation CONTINUE HOPE in which U.S.-led JTF Somalia transferred operations to U.N.-led UNOSOM II; transition of authority according to Dayton Peace Plan in which ad hoc U.N. forces assisting relief agencies in Bosnia transferred authority to NATO forces conducting peace enforcement mission).
• Normal rotation of CA units or individuals conducting a long-term project or operation (for example, Bosnia and Kosovo rotations, JTF Guantanamo Bay, and some combatant command theater engagement programs).

• Administration and support of a DC camp in a rear area transferred from a CSS unit to an NGO or the UNHCR.

• Command directive.

8-12. Transferring an activity or task to other forces or organizations requires detailed, coordinated, and synchronized planning. Some items for the CA soldier to consider include—

• Define the end state; for example, continuity of current operations or modification of current operations to some other format.

• Identify the organizational structure required to perform the activity or task.

• Identify and match components within the incoming organization that are the same or similar in nature to components within the unit being replaced.

• Identify equipment and facilities required to perform the activity or task, and who will provide them. Prepare the appropriate property-control paperwork if transferring equipment or facilities between organizations.

• Create timelines that provide sufficient overlap between the outgoing and incoming organizations.

• Determine the criteria that will dictate when the incoming organization will assume control of the activity or task; for example, a target date, task standard, or level of understanding.

• Orient the incoming organization to the area, including an introduction to all the essential players of both military and civilian organizations remaining in the area.

• Orient the incoming organization to the activity or task. This orientation includes exchanging procedures, routine and recurring events, and other information critical to the conduct of the activity or task. Demonstrate the activity or task, if possible.

• Supervise the incoming organization in performing the activity or task. The outgoing organization retains control of the activity or task during this process, providing critiques and guidance as needed.

• Transfer the task according to the plan.

• Redeploy.

• Conduct an after-action review and write an AAR.

Chapter III of JP 3-57 contains a Sample Checklist for Transition Planning.
TRANSITION OF AN ACTIVITY OR TASK TO THE INDIGENOUS POPULATION
OR INSTITUTIONS

8-13. Ultimately, especially during support to civil administration operations, an activity or task may be turned over to HN government or private sector agencies. The following are examples:

- Transfer of civil authority from military to civil government (for example, replacement of U.S. military governors by German civilian high commissioners with the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949).
- Establishment of indigenous police or security forces (for example, establishment of the first truly multiethnic police force in Brcko by the International Police Task Force of the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina).
- Privatization or return of facilities, such as public works and utilities, airports, and seaports, to civilian control (for example, Kuwait City International Airport).
- Privatization of HMA programs.

8-14. The considerations for transferring an activity or task to indigenous populations or institutions is similar, in many respects, to transferring to follow-on forces or organizations. Items for the CA soldier to consider include the following:

- Know the capabilities and limitations of the elements of the on-the-ground infrastructure, such as—
  - Host governments.
  - Bilateral donors.
  - UN agencies.
  - International organizations, especially the International Crisis Group (ICG) and the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC).
  - NGOs by type (assistance or advocacy).
  - Indigenous organizations.
- Define the end state; for example, continuity of current operations or modification of current operations to some other format.
- Identify the organizational structure required to perform the activity or task.
- If within the control of the relieved organization, identify competent, trustworthy individuals to fill positions within the relieving organizational structure.
- Determine, if necessary, how to conduct demilitarization of indigenous forces and incorporation of former belligerents into the private sector.
- Identify equipment and facilities required to perform the activity or task, and who will provide them. Prepare the appropriate property-control paperwork if transferring equipment or facilities to the relieving organization.
- Create timelines that provide sufficient overlap between the departing and relieving organizations.
- Determine the criteria that will dictate when the relieving organization will assume control of the activity or task; for example, a target date, task standard, or level of understanding.
- Orient the relieving organization to the activity or task. This orientation includes providing procedures, routine and recurring events, and other information critical to the conduct of the activity or task. Demonstrate the activity or task, if possible.
- Supervise the relieving organization in performing the activity or task. The departing organization retains control of the activity or task during this process, providing critiques and guidance as needed.
- Transfer the task according to the plan.
- Redeploy.
- Conduct an after-action review and write an AAR.

CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS

8-15. The goal of transition to follow-on organizations or indigenous population or institutions is a sustainable, durable structure or system. Throughout all operations, CA/CMO planners, functional specialists, and team members maintain continuity books that will orient new personnel to their routine tasks. Ideally, there will be an overlap period when mission handoff occurs between individuals and units.

8-16. A continuity book facilitates a turnover of operations between outgoing and incoming personnel that is transparent to the supported organization, agency, or populace. The book should be chronologically arranged with daily, weekly, and monthly calendars that show essential tasks with enough detail to take out any guessing by a newly assigned soldier (including details, such as who, what, where, why, when, and how). A daily journal is an excellent tool that can be used to build a useful continuity book. Additional items for the CA soldier to consider to ensure continuity of operations are—

- Operational resource requirements (funding, equipment, personnel, and facilities).
- Sources of resources required to maintain operations.
- Identification of interdependency and interoperability between organizations.
- Contingency plans that address threats to continuity of operations, countermeasures to mitigate those threats, as well as preparedness for, response to, and recovery from those threats that succeed in disrupting operations.
- Postdeployment oversight and support mechanisms for the operation (reachback POCs, periodic visits, combatant command theater engagement programs).
CONTRACTING THE CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS CENTER

8-17. The CMOC should remain a center of CMO activity during transition operations. In fact, the operations' transition working group may be located at the CMOC. As operations wind down, units and agencies begin to withdraw from the AO or to modify their operations. As they leave, tasks are consolidated and reapportioned to those individuals who remain.

8-18. Depending on the type of transition, the CMOC may hand over its operations to another military unit or civilian agency, or it may terminate operations and redeploy. A transfer of operations to a follow-on organization should be progressive, reflecting the increasing capabilities of the incoming organization or civil institution.

8-19. The director ensures the CMOC draws down in an orderly fashion. Ideally, he will require departing individuals and teams to provide lessons learned from the experience to help increase the effectiveness of follow-on or future CMOCs.

PRODUCTS OF THE TRANSITION PHASE

8-20. The transition phase is characterized by the termination of operations or the transfer of operations to follow-on organizations or HN authorities. The duration of the transition phase will vary based on the factors of METT-TC. While executing these activities, CA soldiers generate routine CA/CMO briefings, reports, and AARs according to unit SOP. The briefings and reports allow monitors of CA operations to confirm or validate transition timelines. They also indicate how well the transition is progressing toward durable and sustainable programs run by the follow-on force or organization. Examples of CA/CMO briefings, reports, and AARs are in Appendixes C and D.
Appendix A

CA/CMO Symbology and Graphics

This appendix describes symbols for use in the force domain (maneuver command and control). FM 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Graphics, provides the military standards for symbols and graphics but does not adequately address the needs of CA operations or CMO. This appendix provides recommended symbology and graphics that can be used to more accurately describe the actions and activities related to CA/CMO (Figure A-1, page A-2).

BASIC RULES FOR BUILDING SYMBOLS

A-1. There are seven basic rules when building symbols. These rules include the following:

- Existing symbols or modifiers should be used whenever possible as building blocks for new symbols.
- Symbols must be usable in both hand-drawn and computer-generated automated modes.
- Symbols must be easily distinguishable so as not to be confused with other symbols.
- Friendly symbols must not use attributes that could be confused with enemy symbols.
- Symbols must be distinguishable without color. (Monochrome display.)
- Composite symbols will generally have the primary symbol centered on or below the modifying symbols.
- All symbols will be drawn or portrayed with the top of the symbol facing the top of the overlay (normally North is at the top). Orientation of the symbol will be accomplished by using the “Q” field for moving symbols or another graphic, such as a battle position or support by fire position.
### USE OF GRAPHICS

A-2. FM 101-5-1 describes how to label various graphic control measures. Some boundary labeling can be abbreviated when the abbreviation will not cause confusion. All text labeling should be drawn so that it can be read when the bottom of the overlay is closest to the reader. Labeling written on an angle should be readable when the overlay is turned a quarter of a turn (90 degrees) clockwise (to the left).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Control Measures</th>
<th>Graphic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CA Point: Marks locations of significance to CA/CMO forces as designated in the plan; for example, civilian collection point or checkpoint along a DC route.</td>
<td>![CA Point Graphic]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA Decision Point: Marks locations that, when engaged by designated civil or military agency(ies), trigger a planned response by designated civil or military forces.</td>
<td>![CA Decision Point Graphic]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA Reference Point: Depicts the location of a key civil area, structure, capability, organization, people, or event that may help, hinder, or be affected by the military operation. This control measure normally requires the application of CA forces in such tasks as assessing, monitoring, protecting, reinforcing, establishing, or transitioning. Numbers are assigned by unit and need to reference corresponding file or database.</td>
<td>![CA Reference Point Graphic]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA Objective: Depicts an area of significance to CA forces. The objective normally contains CA reference points that depict separate or sequential tasks for CA teams.</td>
<td>![CA Objective Graphic]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure A-1. Example of CA/CMO Symbology and Graphics
GRAPHIC OVERLAYS

A-3. Overlays are graphics drawn on top of a map, sketch, or photograph. To ensure accurate alignment, the overlay must have at least two reference marks at opposite locations. On automated displays, overlays are graphic information that is joined electronically so that it can be “turned on or off” over or in front of the primary digital display, such as a map, sketch, or photograph.

A-4. Additional guidance for creating overlays follows:

- All obstacles—friendly, enemy, neutral, or factional—will be drawn using the color green. These graphics are shown in the mobility and survivability section of FM 101-5-1.
- All friendly graphic control measures will be shown in black when drawn manually or on a color display.
- Enemy graphic control measures will be shown in red. If red is not available, they will be drawn in black with a double line or the abbreviation “ENY” placed on the graphic in at least two places to avoid confusion.
- If other colors are used to show friendly or enemy (hostile) factions, then the colors used will be shown in a legend on the overlay describing what each color means.
Appendix B

Affiliations and Professional Organizations Associated With the Functional Specialties

While CA specialists are assigned based on their civilian background and expertise, they may not necessarily routinely perform the tasks they will perform when deployed. CA specialty teams are expected and must be prepared to accomplish their wartime missions on short notice. They will not have lengthy “train up” periods before deployments. Affiliations with local groups, membership in professional organizations, and subscriptions to professional publications and journals associated with the functional specialty are viable, often overlooked, tools to keep CA specialists current or certified in their operational role.

The following list provides examples of some of the affiliations and professional organizations CA specialists should consider.

GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS

INTERNATIONAL LAW

- The American Society of International Law
  www.asil.org
- The International Law Commission
  www.un.org/law/ilc
- Public Int’l Law by Associate Professor Francis Auburn
  www.law.uwa.edu.au/intlaw

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

- The American Society for Public Administration
  www.aspanet.org
- Public Administration and Management: An Interactive Journal
  www.pamij.com

PUBLIC EDUCATION

- Public Education Network
  www.publiceducation.org
- The Center for Commercial-Free Public Education
  www.commercialfree.org
- Public Education & Business Coalition
  www.pebc.org
- Public Education Center
  www.publicedcenter.org
PUBLIC HEALTH
- American Public Health Association
  www.apha.org
- UNC School of Public Health
  www.sph.unc.edu

PUBLIC SAFETY
- Tennessee Department of Safety
  www.state.tn.us/safety
- The Public Safety Executive Association, Inc.
  www.policechief.com
- U.S. Department of the Interior Office of Managing Risk and Public Safety
  www.mrps.doi.gov
- American Society for Industrial Security
  www.asisonline.org

PUBLIC FACILITIES FUNCTIONS

PUBLIC COMMUNICATIONS
- Kwantlen Public Safety Communications
  www.kwantlen.bc.ca/pscm/pscm.htm
- CIA Public Affairs - Public Communications
- Association of Public-Safety Communications Officials International
  www.apcointl.org

TRANSPORTATION
- Transitnet Home
  www.ncdot.org/transit/transitnet
- City of High Point, NC
  www.high-point.net/hitran

PUBLIC WORKS AND UTILITIES
- American Society of Civil Engineers
  www.asce.org
- City of Newton, North Carolina Public Works and Utilities
  www.ci.newton.nc.us/PW/index.htm
- Electrical Generating Systems Association
  www.egsa.org
- Public Works and Utilities
  www.comfortsystem.ws
- Public Works/Utilities Discipline Instructors
  www.fema.gov/emi/publicdiscipline.htm
• National Public Works Organizations
• U.S. Army Corps of Engineers monthly newspaper

ECONOMICS AND COMMERCE FUNCTIONS

CIVILIAN SUPPLY
• Defense Supply Center Columbus
  www.dscc.dla.mil
• National Contract Management Association
  www.ncmahq.org

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
• Local Economic Development Board
• National Congress for Community Economic Development (NCCED)
  www.ncced.org
• Central Carolina Economic Development Alliance
  www.cceda.org

FOOD AND AGRICULTURE
• International Forum on Globalization
  www.ifg.org
• National Policy Association
  www.npal.org

SPECIAL FUNCTIONS

CIVIL INFORMATION
• U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases
  www.usamriid.army.mil
• U.S. Army Research Institute of Environmental Medicine
  www.usariem.army.mil
• Media Resource Service, 99 Alexander Drive, Research Triangle
  Park, NC 27709; 919/547-5259; Fax: 919/549-0090
  E-mail: mediaresource@sigmaxi.org

CULTURAL RELATIONS
• Racial, Ethnic, and Cultural Relations
  www.uwci.org/council/index.htm
• The Society for the Preservation of Natural History Collections
  http://www.spnhc.org

DISLOCATED CIVILIANS
• Local American Red Cross Chapter
  www.redcross.org
EMERGENCY SERVICES

- National Emergency Management Association
  www.nemaweb.org/index.cfm
- International Association of Emergency Managers
  www.iaem.com
- Association of Contingency Planners (ACP)
  www.acp-international.com
- The Disaster Preparedness and Emergency Response Association, International
  www.disasters.org
- The Online Emergency Services Resource
  www.jems.com
- Rowan County (NC) Emergency Services
  www.co.rowan.nc.us/es
- Federal Emergency Management Agency
  www.fema.gov

ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT

- U.S. Department of Energy Office of Environmental Management
  www.em.doe.gov
- Urban Environmental Management
  www.gdrc.org/uem
- INEM - International Network for Environmental Management
  www.inem.org
Appendix C

Products of CA/CMO Planning and Operations

This appendix provides formats and examples of the various products that result from the various planning processes and from conducting CA operations and CMO. Figures C-1 through C-10, pages C-1 through C-18, provide examples of the products resulting from the SO operational planning process. Figures C-11 through C-13, pages C-19 through C-22, provide examples of products resulting from the JOPES planning process. Figures C-14 through C-20, pages C-22 through C-32, provide examples of products resulting from the MDMP planning process. Figures C-21 through C-24, pages C-33 through C-38, provide examples of products resulting from the TLP planning process.

NOTE: Procedures for EMPRS are still being developed by the Army.

Figure C-1. Warning Order Format Example
Timeline.
Guidance on orders and rehearsals.
Orders group meeting (attendees, location, and time).
Earliest movement time and degree of notice.

GENTEXT/SERVICE AND SUPPORT/. (Optional) Include any known logistics preparation for the operation.
  a. Special equipment. Identifying requirements and coordinating transfer to using units.
  b. Transportation. Identifying requirements and coordinating for pre-position of assets.

GENTEXT/COMMAND AND SIGNAL/ (Optional)
  a. Command. State the chain of command if different from unit SOP.
  b. Signal. Identify current SOI edition, and pre-position signal assets to support operation.

GENTEXT/AUTHENTICATION/
AKNLDG/Y/
DECL/OADR/

Figure C-1. Warning Order Format Example (Continued)

032300Z AUG00
FM CDR 411 CAB/OPCEN/
TO CDR C COMPANY, 411 CAB/
OPERATION/AGILE PROVIDER/
MSGID/DEPLOYMENT ORDER 003/411 CAB/
REF/TASKING ORDER 003/411 CAB/
AMPN/
ORDTYP/APPROVAL/MISSION JRTC5SFG-CAT-A 23-US60015/
TIMEZONE/Z/
TASK ORGANIZATION/
GENTEXT/SITUATION/
  A. GENERAL.
  B. ENEMY.
  C. FRIENDLY.
  D. ATTACHMENTS AND DETACHMENTS.
GENTEXT/MISSION/
GENTEXT/EXECUTION/
  A. COMMANDER’S INTENT.
  B. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS.
  C. SUBORDINATE TASKS.
  D. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.
GENTEXT/SERVICE AND SUPPORT/
GENTEXT/COMMAND AND SIGNAL/
GENTEXT/AUTHENTICATION/
AKNLDG/Y/
DECL/OADR/

Figure C-2. Tasking Order Format Example
REQUEST FOR INFORMATION (RFI) FORM

DATE - ______________________
WHO - Requesting Team/Company: ___________________________________
POC: ______________________ Phone: __________________

WHAT - Subject/Topic: ______________________________________________
- Exact Type of Information Needed (such as map, document, photo):

- How many copies do you need?: _________________________________

WHEN - DTG Requesting Information For: _____________________________
(Note: Expect minimum 72-hour response time)
- Drop Dead Date (I need this info NLT): ____________________________

WHERE - Grids or locations (if applicable): ___________________________

WHY - What specifically do you need to learn from the information? Knowing what
you need to learn from the information helps us to find the product / answer
that will be of the greatest help to you (for example, maps for locations vs. imagery
for conditions): ______________________________________________________

What resources have you already checked? If the info is available through
your own sources, we may refer you back to those sources. Also, it helps
us to know what you have already looked at so we do not waste time
rechecking the same sources.: __________________________________________

CLASSIFICATION - Max classification level (circle): U/CONFIDENTIAL /SECRET
BN S-2 Only: LOGGED IN____________________________________________
ASSIGNED___________________________________________________________
RETURNED___________________________________________________________
ATTACHMENTS: ______________________________________________________

Figure C-3. Request for Information Format Example

032300Z AUG00
FM CDR CAT-A 23, 411 CAB/
TO CDR 411 CAB/
OPERATION/AGILE PROVIDER/
MSGID/CONOP 003/ CAT-A 23/
REF/TASKING ORDER 003/411 CAB/
AMPN/
ORDTYP/INFO/MISSION JRTO5SFG-CATST36-US60015/
TIMEZONE/Z/
TASK ORGANIZATION// (available CA forces)
GENTEXT/SITUATION// (include IPB update; mission and intent 2 levels up; initial guidance
from higher CA headquarters; constraints; risk)
GENTEXT/MISSION// (restate mission based on mission analysis)

Figure C-4. Concept of Operations Format Example
GENTEXT/EXECUTION/
   A. COMMANDER’S INTENT.
   B. CONCEPT OF THE OPERATION.
   C. SPECIFIED/IMPLIED TASKS.
   D. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS. (timeline)
GENTEXT/SERVICE AND SUPPORT/
GENTEXT/ COMMAND AND SIGNAL/
GENTEXT/AUTHENTICATION/
AKNLDG/Y/
DECL/OADR/

Figure C-4. Concept of Operations Format Example (Continued)

032300Z AUG00
FM CDR 411 CAB //
TO CDR CAT-A 23, 411 CAB //
OPERATION/AGILE PROVIDER//
MSGID/CONOP APPROVAL 003/ CAT-A 23//
REF/TASKING ORDER 003/411 CAB//
AMPN//
ORDTYP/INFO/MISSION JRTC5SFG-CATST36-US60015//
TIMEZONE/Z//
   1. ( ) REMARKS:
   AKNLDG/Y//
  DECL/OADR//

Figure C-5. Concept of Operations Approval Format Example

032300Z AUG00
FM CDR CAT-A 23, 411 CAB//
TO CDR 411 CAB//
OPERATION/AGILE PROVIDER//
MSGID/MSR 003/ CAT-A 23//
REF/TASKING ORDER 003/411 CAB//
AMPN//
ORDTYP/INFO/MISSION JRTC5SFG-CATST36-US60015//
TIMEZONE/Z//
   1. ( ) PERSONNEL:
   2. ( ) OPERATIONS:
   3. ( ) TRAINING:
   3. ( ) ADMINISTRATION/LOGISTICS:
   AKNLDG/Y//
   DECL/OADR//

Figure C-6. Mission Support Request Format Example
SUBJECT: Trip Report for ________________

1. Summary. Purpose of the trip and overview of the trip agenda.

2. General. An overview of the meetings attended, contacts made, coordination conducted.

3. Issues. Any issues, resolved or unresolved, that impact on further planning for the mission.
   a. Issue # 1:
      (1) Discussion.
      (2) Recommendation.
   b. Issue # 2:
      (1) Discussion.
      (2) Recommendation.
   c. Issue # 3:
      (1) Discussion.
      (2) Recommendation.

4. Conclusion. Include the degree of success in meeting the requirements of the trip and an assessment of the need for future trips.

   [Signature Block]

Enclosures:
- Copies of documentation related to the mission; for example, briefing slides, OPORD of supported unit.
- List of POCs, including name, rank, unit, duty position, dates met.
- Other pertinent items, such as photos, maps, diagrams.

Figure C-7. Trip Report Format Example

BRIEFBACK - Operation PACIFIC HAVEN
Oct 1996

Purpose of Brief: Conduct briefing for the transition of 96th CA BN to the RC CA Team and demonstrate CA continuity of mission to the Commander of JTF-PH.

Mission as Stated in the MICON: Soldiers from the 351st and 353rd CA CMD will provide support to plans, policy, and programs development and populace and resources control support to the JTF-PH to assist in maintaining a safe, stable community of limited evacuee self-determination in preparation for their possible onward movement to the United States.

Figure C-8. Briefback Format Example
On order, provide support to MARFOR for the operation of Tiyan for the reception/processing, sustainment, and onward movement of an additional 1700 evacuees to the United States.

**Politico-Military Implications of Mission:** Evacuee perception of United States is being formed throughout their processing and movement to United States.

**Strategic Implications:**
Tying up resources and an intermediate staging base for NEOs out of Korea.
Possibility for Iraq to embarrass United States by causing problems in camp.
U.S. perception of mission will be dependent upon duration, expense, and immigration policy.

**Higher (JTF-PH) Commander’s Intent:** Evacuees are to be treated as guests, not prisoners.
Foster self-sustainment and self-government within the camp. Balance respect for privacy with force protection. Provide adequate housing and a safe environment. Conduct processing in a timely manner, minimizing time spent on Guam. End State: All evacuees have been processed through camp and flown to final destination; base is returned to preoperational status and all equipment accounted for.

**Restated Mission:** Soldiers from the 351st and 353rd CA CMD will provide support to plans, policy, and programs development and populace and resources control support to the JTF-PH to assist in maintaining a safe, stable community of limited evacuee self-determination in preparation for their possible onward movement to the United States.

On order, provide support to MARFOR for the operation of Tiyan for the reception/processing, sustainment, and onward movement of an additional 1700 evacuees to the United States.

**Task Organization:**
JTF HQ CA Element - Provides Population and Resources Control support and Plans, Policy, and Programs support to the JTF-PH staff.
LTC S: Senior CA Officer for JTF-PH.
MAJ L: Current OPS, HAC Coordinator, CA LNO to 36th Air Base Wing (ABW).
MAJ M: Future Plans and Policy.
MAJ S: CA Intelligence Officer, Action Officer.
MSG D: CA Element NCOIC.
SPC M: Admin NCO and Supply NCO.
Anderson South CA Personnel - 13 personnel deployed to assist in civil administration, distribution, cultural assimilation, language training, and INS processing.

**Other Assets:**
Department of State: Ms. L
Immigration and Naturalization Services: Mr. J, Mr. K
Federal Bureau of Investigation Command Center
Central Intelligence Agency Liaison Team
Department of Treasury: Mr. T
Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance: Mr. D
Government of Guam: Ms. C
Office of Refugee Resettlement: Mr. M
Joint Volunteer Agency: Mr. H
Public Health Services: Ms. F

Figure C-8. Briefback Format Example (Continued)
Command Relationship: OPCON to Commander, JTF-PACIFIC HAVEN

Specified Tasks:
1. Develop food distribution and evacuee accountability system.
2. Provide safe environment for evacuees and JTF personnel.
3. Develop self-sufficiency among population.
4. Facilitate processing for onward movement.
5. Provide support to MARFOR for additional evacuees.

Implied Tasks:
1. Establish accurate evacuee count and develop SOR.
2. Develop collection plan.
3. Facilitate evacuee leadership election; allow evacuees to cook for themselves.
4. Provide LNO to INS, FBI.
5. Conduct mission analysis and prepare decision brief for JTF CDR.

Facts:
Evacuees are defined as parolees (no legal U.S. residence but protected by rights and laws of U.S. citizens).
Cannot collect intelligence on evacuees due to status.
Security is weak at Turkish border.
Nature of additional 1700 evacuees is unknown.
Anderson South capacity is 5000.
Tiyan site is available but there are political considerations.
Onward movement process is a lengthy process.

Assumptions:
Parolee status will be revoked under certain conditions.
Collection effort must be passive reporting of information.
There will be those in the population who should not have crossed border.
“Undesirables” within population.
Open other camp or compress current population.
Develop CA Estimate of COAs reference Tiyan.
Population will become frustrated over time.

Operational Area Evaluation
Government Functions
INS: Control inspection process and asylum process.
FBI: Background investigations and liaison with intelligence agencies.
Customs: Inspection for contraband.
Department of State: Control outflow from Turkey.
International Organization for Migration: Coordinate transportation of evacuees.
ORR: Sponsorship coordination.
JVA: Initial evacuee in-processing.
36th Air Wing: Control all resources in camp and camp administration.

Figure C-8. Briefback Format Example (Continued)
International Law:
Guam Police Department (PD) has jurisdiction outside base.
Security Police are initial response on base.
OSI conducts criminal investigations.
Public Administration: CA serves as military contact for Governor’s Office and District Representatives in areas of Andersen and Tiyan.

Public Education: Assist in obtaining local volunteers from local schools and universities.

Public Health: No known public health threat to base or community by evacuees. Potential for tuberculosis (TB) or drug users in population.

Public Safety:
5 miles per hour (mph) speed limit in camp. Need to educate evacuees on dangers of living in modern day American city.
Security police are responsible for following up on all violations.

Economic Functions
Civilian Supply: Donations are being received from community. Naval hospital is collection point. Air Force collects, sorts, and distributes to evacuee representatives and down to families.

Economic Development: Camp has no negative impact on community. Latest estimate is $2.1 million going into community.

Food and Agriculture: Defense Commissary Agency providing food to camp; CA advisor is reviewing food ordering and forecasting procedures to prevent shortages.

Public Facilities
Public Communications:
GTA handles local phone service; IT&E handles international service.
J-6 has approval for evacuee phone policy in camp. CA must review security concerns with other agencies.

Public Transportation:
Rental vans for CA personnel.
Air Force operates buses for evacuees.

Public Works and Utilities: Water and waste management provided by Air Force. Electricity and power provided by Guam.

Special Functions
Civil Information: Pacific Daily News and Stars and Stripes are distributed daily. Radios are sold in evacuee store.

Cultural Relations:
Air Force constructed Muslim Mosque in camp; Navy Chaplain provides services.
Muslim burial plot located at Lady of Peace Memorial Park.

Dislocated Civilians: Long-range calendar of events for evacuees is under review by 36th ABW Commander.

Figure C-8. Briefback Format Example (Continued)
Emergency Services:
- Assist in storage and distribution of typhoon kits.
- Ensure information from JTF weather officer is passed to camp in timely manner.

Environmental Management: Take environmental protection measures as per 36th ABW SOP.

Physical Analysis

Terrain Analysis
- Camp is flat with paved streets and sidewalks.
- Streetlights along roads.
- Outside of camp is highway and jungle.
- Potential for easy access to local population.

Implications:
- Area is very different than type of land that evacuees are accustomed to.
- Need to ensure controls are in place to prevent evacuees from communicating with people outside camp perimeter.

Population Analysis

Local population: Chamorrows, small Muslim community, and evacuees.
- Relocate 80-150 evacuees per day to United States.
- Will receive approximately 5000+ new arrivals 18–24 November.
- Group 1 evacuees: Identified and cleared for relocation to United States.
- Group 2 evacuees: Not cleared by INS. May take up to 120 days. Potential for inter-faction rivalry due to various ethnic groups.
- Group 3 evacuees: Not much known at this time.

Implications:
- Evacuees are being forced to live with ethnic groups that they normally do not live with.
- Being exposed to American practice of having to live alongside people different in culture and background.
- Camp experience should aid in transition to American lifestyle.

Climate Analysis

- Heat and humidity pose potential for dehydration.
- Typhoon season until December.

Implications:
- Evacuees have been instructed to drink more water.
- Being exposed to environmental threats not characteristic of their native land.
- Soldiers are at risk to dehydration: must increase water consumption.
Threat Evaluation

Group 1: No physical threat as they are cooperative and eager to move to United States. Group comprised of evacuees who worked for OFDA, Movement Control Center, and the Embassy.

Group 2: Some INC members and many single males; mix of Arabs and Kurds.

Group 3: Intelligence reports that there may be attempt to infiltrate agents for purpose of collecting information on evacuees.

No clear collection plan in place: Security forces not receiving adequate intelligence on potential threat.

Implications:

We are more suspicious of newer arrivals. Valid assumption that evacuees will pick up on those suspicions.

Need to scrutinize evacuee use of radios and phones and plans for evacuee tours.

Need to request CI assets from United States Army, Pacific Command to assist in collection plan.

Indicators - CA team measures degree of stability and safety of camp (and success of CA mission) by 7 indicators. These feed into overall level of security or risk for JTF personnel and form basis of PIR:

- Communication
- Subsistence
- Public Order
- Leadership
- Public Safety/Health
- Internal Security
- External Security

**INDICATOR: COMMUNICATIONS**

1a. Effective communication. 1a. Mayor and U.S. authorities communicate policies effectively. Details/work groups properly instructed.

b. Constructive suggestions. b. Suggestions are made by evacuees in a positive manner (council, conversation, and so on).

c. Rumors, graffiti, gestures, and postings. c. Observe bulletin boards for unauthorized postings, monitor graffiti, determine nature and source of rumors. Derogatory gestures or signs used.

**INDICATOR: SUBSISTENCE**

2a. Economic disruption as a result of food shortage, housing conditions (too crowded). 2a. Monitor all apparent food shortages, determine cause; assess housing availability.

b. Hoarding of supplies, food, and so on. b. Determine reason for hoarding, types of items, trends.

c. Existence of black market. c. Type of items involved, currently involved. Follow up on complaints of unavailability of certain items. Evidence of evacuees possessing restricted items. Overt or covert commerce activity.

Figure C-8. Briefback Format Example (Continued)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDICATOR: PUBLIC ORDER</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3a. Dissatisfaction with housing assignment.</td>
<td>3a. Attempts to relocate within camp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Dissatisfaction with public policy.</td>
<td>b. Evacuees are argumentative, militant, belligerent, or hostile. Ill-tempered compliance, reluctance to accept responsibility, lack of volunteers, drawing comparisons of camp to native region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Indifference.</td>
<td>c. Meetings absent of representatives; unresponsive representatives. Actions that indicate apathy, suspicion, doubt, or indifference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Unexplained actions/events.</td>
<td>d. Type of events observed (children watching babies, loud arguments, congregation of evacuees).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Civil obedience/disobedience.</td>
<td>e. Common courtesy applied, order maintained on distribution/phone lines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Pleasant or friendly attitudes.</td>
<td>f. People appear comfortable or calm.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Greetings.</td>
<td>g. Evacuees acknowledge/do not acknowledge each other and U.S. personnel. Types of greetings used.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h. Fraternization/attempt to fraternize with JTF personnel.</td>
<td>h. Trends and impressions of fraternization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. Behavior or conduct indicating confidence/trust through compliance with camp rules, laws, and so on.</td>
<td>i. Specific actions that indicate confidence.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PIR:**

Are there any perceived attitude shifts of the evacuees as a result of incoming or outgoing evacuees, implemented programs, or changes of CA personnel?  
Relevance: Their attitudes provide indicators relevant for force protection concerns, security of evacuees, and how well we are meeting their needs.  
As processing slows, evacuees will become more frustrated and possibly more aggressive.  
Rumors regarding movement to United States will create problems.  
Need to ensure JTF personnel or interpreters do not compromise departure information.  
Are there indications that evacuees have unauthorized access to non-JTF-PH personnel?  
Relevance: Such activity will reveal holes in our security procedures and leave us susceptible to black market or physical threat.  
Train JTF personnel to be aware of surroundings and learn to identify indicators of this activity (items being sold on street, money exchange, vehicles parked near unguarded areas of camp, monitor local police blotter for theft of items that evacuees may want).  
Are there indications of a rise in interfaction conflict or a decrease in tolerance to certain groups or individuals?  
Relevance: May pose a need to evaluate our security posture and take appropriate measures.  
Due to military background of certain evacuees there is the potential for militia groups to form.

Figure C-8. Briefback Format Example (Continued)
Problems with evacuees trying to enforce Islamic law, particularly in event of theft or adultery. Some evacuees may have paid their way through Turkey or use falsified identification documents. Federal Marshals are establishing plan for arresting and detaining evacuees if need should arise. Problems with INS “screen-outs.”

**Additional Requests for Intelligence**

Demographics of incoming groups, similarities to Group 1, manifests, criminal backgrounds, and languages spoken. Physical and mental condition of evacuees, cases of TB, and dietary requirements.

**Concept of the Operation:**

*Alert, readiness, and marshalling:* Mobilized mix of personnel from 351st and 353rd CA Commands and 322nd CA BDE.

*Deployment:* Personnel arrived on Guam 23 Oct 96 and received by 96th CA BN personnel. Transition plan agreed upon by LTC R and LTC S. RC team immediately began train-up and conducting briefback to LTC R on 31 Oct 96.

*Employment:* Priority of Effort: Review all JTF-PH policies and procedures that have impact on CA functional areas. Advise JTF staff on what functional areas need policy review as mission moves forward. Refine internal policies for CA operations as needed. Assess JTF-PH intelligence cycle and integrate our own observations without violating the integrity of our legal obligations to evacuees. Establish plan to receive new CA personnel without losing continuity of the mission.

LTC S: Senior CA advisor to JTF Commander and oversee all activity of CA personnel in JTF. Retain OPCON over CA personnel in camp. Attend briefings to JTF Commander and other key personnel as needed.

MAJ M: Plans CA operations beyond 3 weeks out.

MAJ L: Plans CA operations up to 3 weeks. Liaison to J-3 and 36th ABW.

MAJ S: Monitors indicators, interfaces with J-2 and OSI. Ensures plans and programs are properly coordinated and monitored.

MSG D: Serves as 1SG for CA personnel, implements physical training program, assists in day-to-day operations.

SPC M: Serves as supply and admin NCO for element.

*Concept of Team Employment:* All team members will perform their jobs while interfacing with J-3/J-5 personnel, various agencies on JTF, and Base Commander where applicable. Attend all meetings involving the J-3 and J-5, HAC, or JTF Commander. Provide CA update to JTF Commander on morning basis.

*Redeployment:* Upon completion of mission, team will complete all JTF-required AARs and Lessons Learned and deploy all personnel to home station without injury, damage, or loss of accountability. Turn in all hand-receipted equipment to JTF-PH and 36th ABW. Ensure J-1 has our projected redeployment schedule. Personnel will tentatively demobilize at Ft. Lewis before moving to home station.

**Figure C-8. Briefback Format Example (Continued)**
Tentative redeployment schedule:
LTC S: 15 DEC 96.
All others: 11 FEB 97.
All personnel have round-trip tickets in hand. JTF will bus personnel to airport.

Recovery: Turn in equipment. Submit AARs and Lessons Learned.

Actions on the Objective

Populace and Resources Control: Support CA personnel at Andersen South and Tiyan with policy and program development.

Humanitarian Assistance Plans: Obtain volunteers from University of Guam for education programs:
   ESL Program.
   Cultural Assimilation.
   Quality Control of Programs.

Military Civic Action: Not applicable (NA) at this point.

Civil Defense Plans: Facilitate information flow to evacuees and camp personnel regarding weather conditions.

METL: NA.

Force Protection: Risk to Force: LOW.

Force Protection Measures:
   Awareness of surroundings.
   Buddy system off base.
   Report all indicator-related activity to MAJ Sele.

Emergency Plan of Action:
   SEAL Team 1 platoon is military response for hostage crisis in camp.
   Guam PD is civilian emergency response for activities outside camp.

Communications Plan:

Figure C-8. Briefback Format Example (Continued)
Signal Equipment and Supplies:
JTF CA Cell: 1 x cell phone, 3 x commercial phone, 1 x FAX, E-Mail, 2 x Motorola radio, access to secure telephone unit III (STU-III), secure FAX, and copiers at JTF HQ.
CA personnel in camp: 1 x cell phone, 2 x commercial phone, 4 x Motorola radio, access to STU-III and secure FAX at FBI cell. Access to copier in Mayor’s office.

Information Management:
JTF CA Cell: 3 x desktop computers and 2 x printers.
CA personnel in camp: 1 x desktop computer and printer.
Required Reports:
CA SITREP due to J-3 NLT 2100 daily (covers 1700-1700).
Weekly update to commanding general every Monday at 1500.
CA update (face-to-face) to JTF Commander at 0700.
Weekly SITREP to 351 CA CMD due Tuesday NLT 2100.

Emergency Communications:
Higher command will contact LTC S or MSG D; information passed to soldier.
CA teams maintain internal alert roster.
JTF HQ CA cell has room and phone numbers for personnel.
No personnel will contact own unit regarding operation without permission of OIC.

Administrative Status:
Assigned Strength: 19 (6 at JTF HQ and 13 at camp). (Includes 4 personnel from 96th CA Battalion.)
Certification: All personnel are 38A qualified; no flags; current on SOF certification; team will be validated for mission upon successful completion of briefback.
Soldier Readiness Program: See enclosure.
Medical Status: All personnel are medically qualified to perform mission; 2 permanent physical profiles.
OPTEMPO: CPT S returned from Bosnia in June 96. No other deployments for team members this year.
Mailing address: All soldiers have mailing address; units have mailing address.
NCOER/OER status: Evaluations will be completed before demobilization.
Orders status: Annual training orders extended up to 29 days at which time active duty for training or temporary tour of active duty orders will be issued.
Legal Status: Court Martial and Article 15 authority retained by 351 CA CMD.

Rules of Engagement: Ensure CA personnel understand ROE dated 17 SEP 96 para 5(D)(5)c of the Executive Order dated 16 SEP 96. Security force will follow graduated response. Adhere to General Order #1, regarding treatment of evacuees. Follow camp SOP for entering camp.

Medical Estimate:
Health Hazards in AO: No known public health threat at this time. Heat injuries are greatest threat.
Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC) Procedures:

Troop Medical Clinic: Soldiers have strip map to clinic. Sick call at 0600-0800.

Emergency: Soldier will be taken to Naval Hospital if necessary. If evacuation is required he will be taken to Tripler. MSG Dunne will track soldier’s care throughout process.

Medical Status of Evacuees: Generally good. Some complaints of dehydration, diarrhea, skin problems, and viruses. Acute care on flight line and more detailed screening during in-processing.

Logistics:

Specialty Items: IDENT system available at INS processing for developing ID cards for evacuees.

Transportation: Vans and sedans.

Weapons: None.

Billets: Andersen Lodge. 351st is being billed for rooms.

Meals/Rations: Magellan mess hall. Soldiers sign in.

Budget Requirements: JTF-PH will screen and validate all requests IAW their operational budget. No constraints on soldiers’ orders at unit level.

Additional Points of Interest:

Briefing Requirements: CA representative at morning JTF HQ briefing. Be prepared to answer any questions. CA update to JTF Commander at 0700. Be prepared to provide mission brief to VIPs.

Active Army/RC Integration: Team conducted transition training; 96th will depart AO on order.

Risk Assessment: See enclosure. All soldiers viewed water safety video and have been briefed on driving, typhoon, plants, and animals.

Issues:

Request 12 personnel for Tiyan camp before its opening.

Will see reduction of volunteers during holiday season: may have impact on camp operations.

Can wastewater treatment facility handle capacity of 5500 evacuees?

INS has not developed procedures for detaining evacuees not suitable for relocation in United States.

Need better communication between 36th ABW, Mayor, civilian agencies, JTF, and CA cell.
NOTIONAL OPSUM. MANDATORY DATA SETS ARE SHOWN IN BOLD.
061700ZAPR96
FM CDR CATST-XX, 96TH CA BN FT BRAGG NC//OPCEN//
TO CDR 353 CA CMD NEW YORK NY//G3//
INFO JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J3-SOD//
ZEN CDR USACAPOC FT BRAGG NC//G3//
BT UNCLAS
OPER/COASTAL WATCH//
MSGID/OPSUM/96TH CA BN/061200Z/APR/RSW//
REF/DEPLORD/USASOC/960113//
AMPN/USASOC DEPLOYMENT ORDER DIRECTING ONE CATST (-) TO THE REPUBLIC OF SAN SEBASTIAN TO SUPPORT JTF COASTAL WATCH.///
1. ( ) PERIOD/020300Z DEC/TO:050600Z APR//
2. ( ) GENTEXT/GROUND OPSUM/ (MANDATORY A, B, C, D, I, AND L)
A. ( ) TARGET IDENTIFICATION AND LOCATION. AMEMB SAN SEBASTIAN.
B. ( ) TEAM MISSION. CA/CMO DIRECT SUPPORT TO COMMANDER, JTF COASTAL WATCH FOR PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN SAN SEBASTIAN.
C. ( ) TEAM COMPOSITION. CATST XX (-) CONSISTED OF TEAM LEADER (CPT SMITH) AND TEAM SERGEANT (SFC JONES).
D. ( ) EVALUATION OF RESULTS: CATST-XX (-) CONDUCTED CMO AND CA MISSIONS IN DIRECT SUPPORT TO THE COMMANDER JTF COASTAL WATCH AND HIS SUBORDINATE REINFORCED COMBAT TEAM (RCT) COMMANDER. THE TF HAD THE MISSION OF OBSERVING AND REPORTING ACTIVITIES AT KEY BORDER CROSSINGS BETWEEN SAN SEBASTIAN AND SAN MARCOS. THE TEAM CONDUCTED LIAISON WITH HN MILITARY AND CIVIL AUTHORITIES AND ALL INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS OPERATING IN SAN SEBASTIAN. THE CATST CONDUCTED ONGOING LIAISON WITH LOCAL CIVILIANS IN THE US SECTOR, GATHERING INFORMATION WHICH ASSISTED CAC, SAN SEBASTIAN IN DEVELOPING HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE PLANS. THE TEAM WAS INSTRUMENTAL IN ESTABLISHING A COMMITTEE FOR HUMANITARIAN COOPERATION AMONG THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, AND DEVELOPED INITIAL STAFF STUDIES AND PLANS FOR REFUGEE AND NEO CONTINGENCIES. CATST XX (-) CONDUCTED TROOP EDUCATION IN BOTH CULTURE AND LANGUAGE FOR 280 SOLDIERS OF THE TF. TEAM MISSION EVALUATIONS LED TO THE SELECTION OF A FULL CATST FOR THE SECOND ITERATION OF COASTAL WATCH.
E. ( ) ORIGINAL PLAN FOLLOWED. (OPTIONAL)
F. ( ) MISSION SUCCESSFUL. (OPTIONAL)
G. ( ) FRIENDLY LOSSES. (OPTIONAL)
H. ( ) ENEMY LOSSES. (OPTIONAL)
I. ( ) SIGNIFICANT OBSERVATIONS. PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS IS A NEW ARENA FOR US ARMY CIVIL AFFAIRS THAT STRESSES THE NEED FOR A REEVALUATION OF DOCTRINE FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF CA TACTICAL SUPPORT TEAMS.

Figure C-9. Operation Summary Format Example
J. ( ) EEI. NONE.
K. ( ) OTHER SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION. NONE
L. ( ) RECOMMENDATIONS. OPERATIONS IN SAN SEBASTIAN PROVIDED AN IDEAL ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH US ARMY CIVIL AFFAIRS COULD LEARN ABOUT UN OPERATIONS AND METHODS FOR SMOOTHLY INTEGRATING INTO THOSE OPERATIONS. SAN SEBASTIAN CIVILIAN PERSONNEL FORM THEIR CIVIL AFFAIRS ORGANIZATION, BUT THEY ARE ESSENTIALLY POLITICAL LIAISONS FOR THE GENERAL COMMANDING. THESE PERSONNEL WERE EXTREMELY EAGER TO LEARN ABOUT CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS FROM THE CATST AND EAGER TO INTEGRATE SOME OF THE US CA CONCEPTS OF HUMANITARIAN AND REFUGEE OPERATIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, THE HUMANITARIAN COOPERATION COMMITTEE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS RESULTED FROM THE CATST’S DISCUSSION OF LESSONS LEARNED FROM PROVIDE COMFORT WITH THE SAN SEBASTIAN CAC. IT IS INCREASINGLY LIKELY THAT US CIVIL AFFAIRS WILL SUPPORT UNITS INVOLVED IN PEACEKEEPING. FOR THE CA COMMUNITY TO EFFECTIVELY SUPPORT THIS TYPE OF OPERATION WE MUST FIRST LEARN THE UN SYSTEM, THEN EDUCATE HIGHER UN HQ IN THE THEATER ON CA CAPABILITIES. RECOMMEND THAT SELECTED OFFICERS AND SENIOR NCOS ATTEND THE UN STAFF OFFICER COURSE AND UN LOGISTICS COURSE.
UNCLAS
BT
DECL/OADR//

Figure C-9. Operation Summary Format Example (Continued)

[Office Symbol]       [Date]
SUBJECT: After-Action Report for Operation ________________
1. References. List the pertinent documents, such as OPORDs and TASKORDs, which established the operation and the CA participation in the operation. Attach copies if possible.
2. General. An overview of the overall mission, the CA mission, and the role CA units, teams, and individuals played in the operation.
3. Chronology of Events. Provide a chronological summary of major activities; for example, notification, mobilization, predeployment preparation, deployment, employment activities, transition of authority to follow-on elements, redeployment, and demobilization.
4. Significant Accomplishments. Include how the CA unit, team, or individuals accomplished specified and implied CA/CMO tasks and any other significant contributions to the overall mission.
5. Lessons Learned. Include significant lessons in the areas of funding, coordination, and doctrine, training, leader development, organizational design, material, and soldier systems (DTLOMS).
   a. Issue # 1: (Doctrine)
      (1) Discussion.
      (2) Recommendation.

Figure C-10. After-Action Report Format Example
b. Issue # 2: (Training)  
(1) Discussion.  
(2) Recommendation.

c. Issue # 3: (Leader Development)  
(1) Discussion.  
(2) Recommendation.

d. Issue # 4: (Organizational Design)  
(1) Discussion.  
(2) Recommendation.

e. Issue # 5: (Materiel) Organic Communications Equipment.  
(1) Discussion. While executing humanitarian assistance missions in the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch, the team was required to coordinate aerial resupply of food and water for the local populace with NGOs using civilian aircraft. The communications systems used by these aircraft were not compatible with the team’s organic FM radios. The team was forced to borrow, on a limited basis, a civilian high-frequency (HF) radio from the U.S. Embassy. The absence of an organic team HF radio hindered its ability to properly execute its assigned mission.  
(2) Recommendation. Add an HF radio (PRC 12 or similar) to the TOE for the CAT-A.

f. Issue # 6: (Soldier Systems)  
(1) Discussion.  
(2) Recommendation.

6. Conclusion. Include the degree of success enjoyed by CA unit, teams, or individuals, the significance of CA contribution to the overall mission, and how the lessons can be applied to enhance future operations.

[Signature Block]

Enclosures:  
- Copies of documentation referenced in paragraph 1.  
- List of participants, including name, rank, unit, duty position, dates.  
- Command structure diagram which depicts location of CA assets.  
- Other pertinent items, such as CONOPS, OPSUMs, input to CALL, JULLS, SODARS, and so on.
ANNEX G TO APPENDIX B

JOPES IO (CIVIL AFFAIRS) GUIDANCE

The guidance in this annex relates to the development of Annex G (Civil Affairs) of the OPLAN/CONPLAN/OPORD/ campaign plan-functional plan format found in CJCSM 3122.03A, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Volume II, (Planning Formats and Guidance).

1. Situation
   a. General
      (1) What is the legal basis for CA activities in this operation?
      (2) What is the expected scope of CA activities in this operation? Include the identification of pertinent international and civil-military agreements.
      (3) What is the purpose of this annex?
         Normally, the purpose is to provide instructions for guiding all relationships between the military force and civil authorities and inhabitants in the AO.
   b. Enemy
      (1) What is the impact of enemy capabilities and probable COAs on the CA situation? Include particular emphasis on identifying requirements for CA functions and activities.
      (2) What is the expected CA situation?
         Include government institutions, customs and attitudes of the population, and availability of indigenous resources.
   c. Friendly
      (1) What are the CA functions to be performed by civilian authorities of the United States and friendly governments in the AO?
      (2) What local indigenous assets are available to support and assist in CA activities?
   d. Assumptions
      (1) What are the basic assumptions on which CA planning is based?
         Include attention to enemy COAs, availability of indigenous resources, and conclusion of necessary agreements with foreign governments on forces.

2. Mission
   What is the mission to be accomplished by CA activities in support of the operations envisaged in the basic plan?

3. Execution
   a. Concept of Operations
      (1) Operations not involving the establishment of a military government.
         (a) What are the operational variations due to alternate COAs in the basic plan?
         (b) What will be CA support of flexible deterrent options?
         (c) Do CA activities support time phasing of the operation?
         (d) What will be the deployment and employment of forces to support CA operations?
         (e) What will be the scope and duration of CA operations? Include postconflict CA operations.
         (f) What are the desired end states in CA activities? These should be clear, concise, and subdivided as necessary to describe the successful completion of each phase and COA.
         (g) What is the planned allocation and use of military units and resources for the performance of CA functions?
         (h) What are the principal CA functions to be performed within the command area? Include any significant variations by country, state, or region.
         (i) What will be the function and operation of CMOCs, if they are established?

Figure C-11. CA Annex Format Example
Figure C-11. CA Annex Format Example (Continued)
Figure C-12. TPFDD Level II Work Sheet Example
### Level IV Detail

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<tr>
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**STONs Per Item**

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**STONs Per Item**

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**Unit**

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<tr>
<th>Verified Correct By</th>
<th>MSC</th>
<th>Loaded Into JOPES by:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Signature</td>
<td>Printed Name</td>
<td>Date Loaded:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Phone Number</td>
<td>Date Copy Back to MSC:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**Figure C-13. TPFDD Level IV Work Sheet Example**

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**(CLASSIFICATION)**

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS ESTIMATE FORMAT

Copy No. ___ of ___ Copies
Issuing Headquarters
Place of Issue
Date/Time Group

References: Maps, charts, or other documents; verbal orders of commanding officer guidance.

1. MISSION. The restated mission as determined by the commander.

**Figure C-14. CMO Estimate Format Example**
2. SITUATION AND CONSIDERATIONS
   a. Intelligence Situation. Include information obtained from the intelligence officer. When the details make it appropriate and the estimate is written, a brief summary and reference to the intelligence document or annex of the estimate may be used.
      (1) Characteristics of the Area of Operations. Physical features, climate, and basic political, economic, and psychological factors.
         (a) Attitudes of the population (cooperative or uncooperative).
         (b) Availability of basic necessities (food, clothing, water, shelter, and medical care). Include civilian capabilities of self-support.
         (c) Availability of local material and personnel to support military operations.
         (d) Number of dislocated civilians in the area.
         (e) Amount and type of war damage suffered by the economy (particularly in the transportation, public utility, and communications fields).
         (f) Status and character of civil government.
         (g) State of health of the civilian populace.
      (2) Enemy strength and dispositions.
      (3) Enemy capabilities. Consider sabotage, espionage, subversion, terrorism, and movement of dislocated civilians:
         (a) Affecting the mission.
         (b) Affecting CMO activities.
   b. Tactical Situation. Include information obtained from the commander's planning guidance and from the operations officer.
      (1) Present dispositions of major tactical elements.
      (2) Possible COAs to accomplish the mission. These COAs are carried forward through the remainder of the estimate.
      (3) Projected operations and other planning factors required for coordination and integration of staff estimates.
         (a) Personnel Situation. Include information obtained from the personnel officer.
            1. Present dispositions of personnel and administration units and installations that have an effect on the CMO situation.
            2. Projected developments within the personnel field likely to influence CMO.
         (b) Logistics Situation. Include information obtained from the logistics officer.
            1. Present dispositions of logistics units and installations that have an effect on the CMO situation.
            2. Projected developments within the logistics field likely to influence CMO.
         (c) CMO Situation. In this subparagraph, the status is shown under appropriate subheadings. In the case of detailed information at higher levels of command, a summary may appear under the subheading with reference to an annex to the estimate.
            1. Disposition and status of CA elements and related significant military and nonmilitary elements.
            2. Current problems faced by the command. Estimate the impact of future plans of the supported unit operation pertinent to the CMO mission.
            3. Projected impact of civilian interference with military operations.
            4. Government Functions:
               a. Public Administration.
               b. Public Safety.
c. Public Health.
d. Legal.
e. Public Education.

5. Economic Functions:
a. Economics Development.
b. Food and Agriculture.
c. Civilian Supply.

6. Public Facilities Functions:
a. Public Works and Utilities.
b. Public Communications.
c. Public Transportation.

7. Special Functions:
a. Dislocated Civilians.
b. Emergency Services.
c. Cultural Relations.
d. Civil Information.
e. Environmental Management.

(d) Assumptions. Until specific planning guidance becomes available, assumptions may be required for initiating planning or preparing the estimate. These assumptions are then modified, as factual data becomes available.

3. ANALYSIS OF COURSES OF ACTION. Under separate paragraphs for each COA (from para. 2.b.[2]), analyze all factors indicating problems and deficiencies.

4. COMPARISON OF COURSES OF ACTION.
   a. Evaluate CMO deficiencies and list the advantages and disadvantages of each proposed COA.
   b. Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of each tactical COA under consideration from the CMO standpoint. Those that are common to all COAs or which are considered minor should be eliminated from the list. Includes methods of overcoming deficiencies or modifications required in each COA. Priority will be given to one major CA activity that most directly relates to the mission, such as preventing civilian interference with tactical and logistical operations.

5. CONCLUSIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS.
   a. Indicate whether the mission set forth in para 1 can be supported from the CMO standpoint.
   b. Indicate which COA can best be supported from the CMO standpoint.
   c. List primary reasons why other COAs are not favored.
   d. List the major CMO problems that must be brought to the commander’s attention. Include specific recommendations concerning the methods of eliminating or reducing the effect of these deficiencies.

Designation of
Staff Officer or
Originator

Annexes as Required

(CIFICATION)
Example 1: **CMO in Stability Operations**:

Commander’s Intent. In order to facilitate the stabilization of security in our patrol areas, it is essential that we continue to interact with the people, maintain their trust, and help them to help themselves in rebuilding their country. Towards this end, we will meet with local leaders on a regular basis, assess their needs, and encourage all available NGOs to address those needs within their capabilities. We will use coalition assets available to us only if an NGO capability does not exist, our military requirements for those assets have been met, and use of those assets will help promote security and enhance the military effort. Any activity we undertake that is or should be the responsibility of a civilian organization or government agency will be transferred to that organization or agency according to well-defined measures of effectiveness and synchronized timelines.

Example 2: **CMO in Combat Operations**:

Commander's Intent. We must attack rapidly in order to defeat the enemy on Objectives Virginia and Texas and cause the enemy commander to see us as the main effort. The current intelligence estimates lead me to believe that the enemy commander’s reinforcement of these objectives further indicates that he already feels that we are the main effort for the Corps. Rapid penetration will reinforce that perception and should put us inside the enemy commander’s decision cycle, which will further facilitate the Corps’ main effort. Because of the civilian population center located west of Objective Virginia, I want every commander to utilize available assets to protect civilian lives and property IAW accepted treaties and laws. It is imperative that we quickly seize both objectives, minimize civilian casualties, and preserve our combat power for future offensive operations.

---

**Figure C-15. Commander’s Intent for CMO Format Examples**

**Example 1: **CA Brigade in HA Operation**:

MISSION. 322nd CA Brigade establishes a CMOC in vicinity of UN CIMIC HQ at Dili City to conduct liaison between the command, NGOs, and local East Timoran nationals to assist in stabilizing security and promoting the normalization process in the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) area NLT 25 Sep 1999.

**Example 2: **CA Battalion in Combat Operations**:

MISSION. 420th CA Battalion provides PRC in support of the 8th Division attack to seize Objectives Virginia and Texas in order to ensure compliance with applicable laws and treaties, minimize civilian casualties and losses, and allow the division freedom of movement NLT 040008082001.

---

**Figure C-16. CA Mission Statement Format Examples**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORGANIZATION</th>
<th>DATE: Co A, 8th CAB(A)</th>
<th>PREPARED 22 Jul 01</th>
<th>PAGE: SFC</th>
<th>MISSION: Donals 1 of 1</th>
<th>MISSION: 8th CAB(A)</th>
<th>DATE OF MISSION: 24 Aug–17 Sep 01</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HAZARDS</td>
<td>PROBABILITY OF MISHAP</td>
<td>EFFECT OF MISHAP</td>
<td>RISK LEVEL</td>
<td>CONTROLS IMPLEMENTED</td>
<td>RESIDUAL PROBABILITY</td>
<td>RESIDUAL EFFECT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial/Mil Air Accident</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>1. Compliance with safety instructions. 2. Briefing on airport/airline security.</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle Accident</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>CR (Dependent on Accident Type)</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>1. Avoid rush hour/habitually congested areas. 2. No driving during low visibility hours. 3. No impaired driving. 4. Limit driving during afternoon hours.</td>
<td>Appendix CS</td>
<td>M (Dependent on Accident Type)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Threats</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>1. Physical conditioning. 2. Awareness training. 3. Proper fluid intake. 4. Proper acclimatization/avoid extremes.</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorist Incident</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>C (Dependent on type of incident)</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>1. Awareness and antiterrorism activities. 2. In-country threat brief. 3. Adhere to combatant command force protection policies and use protective gear.</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>CR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime/Theft</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>EH</td>
<td>1. Use two-man rule. 2. Maintain control of sensitive items. 3. Avoid high-risk areas.</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OVERALL RISK LEVEL AFTER CONTROLS ARE IMPLEMENTED: LOW RISK ACCEPTANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hazard Probability Key</th>
<th>Effect Key</th>
<th>Risk Level Key</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F=Frequent</td>
<td>C=Catastrophic</td>
<td>L-Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O=Occasional</td>
<td>M=Moderate</td>
<td>M-Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U=Unlikely</td>
<td>N=Negligible</td>
<td>H-High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure C-17. Risk Assessment Format Example
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>CA/CMO PIR</strong></th>
<th><strong>POTENTIAL SOURCES</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Who are the key personnel in the AO, to include business leaders, criminal figures?</td>
<td>Municipal Political Officials, Leaders, Chamber of Commerce, Police/Prison Officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. What capabilities does the local populace have to sustain and protect itself in the areas of public health, public safety, public works and utilities, civil information, and emergency services?</td>
<td>Public Health Officials, Public Safety Officials, Emergency Management Director, Public Information Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. How many civilians intend to evacuate and how many intend to stay put in the event hostilities get close to populated areas?</td>
<td>Local Leaders, Community Religious Leaders, Emergency Management Director, Public Safety Officials</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>CA/CMO EEFI</strong></th>
<th><strong>POTENTIAL SOURCES</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. What are the shortcomings of the force in terms of HNS requirements, medical supplies, and other logistics issues?</td>
<td>U.S. Forces, CSS Units of Allied/Coalition Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. What force protection measures are currently in place? (This should include security measures employed by participating civilian agencies.)</td>
<td>Commander, G/S-3, NGO Representatives, UN Representatives</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>CA/CMO FFIR</strong></th>
<th><strong>POTENTIAL SOURCES</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. What military resources are available for CMO and what are their priorities?</td>
<td>CSS Units of U.S. Forces, CSS Units of Allied/Coalition Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. What NGOs are in the area and what are their capabilities, mandates, priorities, and so on?</td>
<td>NGO Representatives, UN Representatives, Local Community Leaders</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure C-18. CCIR Format Example**

C-1. The synchronization matrix (Figure C-19, pages C-28 and C-29) is a collaborative product of staff planning. The CMO staff officer ensures that the matrix includes civilian actions and activities and CA/CMO tasks along the timeline.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>Ila</th>
<th>Ila</th>
<th>Ila</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>D-1</td>
<td>D-Day</td>
<td>D to D+3</td>
<td>D+4 to D+5</td>
<td>D+5 to D+6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat Action</td>
<td>Can'tobs U.S., Sniper and Mort @AF</td>
<td>Harass U.S. Forces Pris, Sniper, Car Bomb</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>Same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Action (CASCOPE)</td>
<td>C: Institutions/ Public Works/ Misc Facilities Opnl</td>
<td>A/S: Sustaining damage</td>
<td>O/C: Beginning to erode</td>
<td>O/C: Further erosion P: Breaking stayput policy</td>
<td>E: Traditional Orthodox religious observance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trigger</td>
<td>1 Inf Co = Intf3 C2 on Obj Boston</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>INTEL</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus</td>
<td>SPF Mort S of AF</td>
<td>Mort on H Cmd vic AF</td>
<td>Pris</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>NAs</td>
<td>1-5, 12, 9-10, 13, 18</td>
<td>9-10, 13, 18, 11, 17, 14-19</td>
<td>9-10, 13, 18, 15, 19, 11, 17</td>
<td>14, 15, 17, 8, 19</td>
<td>14, 15, 17, 7-8, 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tals</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSTA</td>
<td>NAI 9, 10, 13, 18; Ctd R/S PL Ford-KS</td>
<td>Overwatch AF, Mv N PL KS into Pris and N in zone, NAI 11, 17</td>
<td>Same; NAI 14, 15, 19</td>
<td>Fwd PL Ford in zone; NAI 7,8,19; Relv of Grji by 10de</td>
<td>Same</td>
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<td>Reserve Airavltn TF</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pri of Fires</td>
<td>RSTA, Intf1, then Intf2</td>
<td>RSTA, O/O Intf3, O/O Intf1</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>RSTA, O/O Intf3;</td>
<td>RSTA, Intf 1 2 3;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restrictions/ROE</td>
<td>No CFL: FSCl=PL KS; NFA 1-20</td>
<td>FSCl is intl border; NFA 1-20</td>
<td>FSCL intl border</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Artillery TOC</td>
<td>TAA Skop; PA Arty;</td>
<td>vic Pris (PA2);</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q36 (2)</td>
<td>1 w RSTA, 1 w Intf1</td>
<td>Mve w Intf3</td>
<td>1 w RSTA; 1 w Intf3; 1 w Intf3 Pris AF; 1 w FA Bn (P);</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q47</td>
<td>Mve w CP</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>vic AF w HIMARS (PA HIMARS);</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIMARS Btry</td>
<td>Erroute - D+4</td>
<td>vic AF w 155</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155 Bn</td>
<td>Mve w CP; Occupy PA Arty</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>Mve 2 btrys vic Obj Pris omr AA 2k3; PA 2,3,4 vic Pris</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAS</td>
<td>PSYOP</td>
<td>15 Sorties</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>15 Sorties</td>
<td>Pris AF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pri Eff</td>
<td>Intf1 Urosi</td>
<td>Intf2 to Pris;</td>
<td>Intf10 Pod</td>
<td>Intf3 Obj KM;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pri Spg</td>
<td>Intf1 Urosi</td>
<td>Intf3 for Q36 Q37;</td>
<td>Intf2 Pris</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure C-19. Sample of Synchronization Matrix
### Figure C-19. Sample of Synchronization Matrix (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>IIIa</th>
<th>IIIa</th>
<th>IIIa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>D-1</td>
<td>D-Day</td>
<td>D to D+3</td>
<td>D+4 to D+5</td>
<td>D+5 to D+6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADA</td>
<td>Pri Eff</td>
<td>1 Sntl mv vic Pod; 1 Sntl mv vic Pris, ornt AA3</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pri Spt</td>
<td>1 Avenger Sec; TOC, Inf1.3; NAI 7,8</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Warning/Ctrl</td>
<td>Same</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHEM</td>
<td>Threat</td>
<td>Decon assts @ BSB</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Smk Decon Arr Pris; 1 Plt/bn; 2 Sqds to Engr co; 2 Sqds to BSB; CBRODS Pt lands Skop; Plt(-) lands Pris</td>
<td>Same; Engr assts to Inf1 NAI 16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td></td>
<td>HVA’s add ADA, Avn, UAV</td>
<td>1 Plt arr; Assume EPW col pt;</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA/CMO</td>
<td>Tactical</td>
<td>Scrub protected tgt list; Townhall Mtg vic LOD; CMOC Mtg with ID’s/NGOs</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Specialist</td>
<td>Radio call-in program; monitor TAI C5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Monitor damage to infrastructure; reassure key communications/institutions</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Initial assessments; monitor damage to infrastructure; process RFAs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Facilitate life-saving relief; monitor NAIs C5, C9-11; assist HN auth w/ mil traffic (TAls C6, C7)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>o/o, est. CCP 3; reinforce PSYOP themes 5 and 6; assist forward passage of HN Org’s</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Coord developmental MCA (NAI C5); finalize transition plans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INFO</td>
<td>EW/SIO</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>Nothing</td>
<td>D-3+4 EW</td>
<td>Same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public Affairs</td>
<td>Nothing</td>
<td>Cbt Camera crew Inf1 Urosi</td>
<td>O/O disrupt SPF Cell Phones;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OPSEC</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>Cbt Camera crew Inf1 Urosi</td>
<td>Media Event Brief</td>
<td>Cbt Camera crew Inf1 Urosi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C&amp;C</td>
<td>Cdr. TAC</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>Urosi</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>Same</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cmd Post</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>Mv vic Pris EM1022</td>
<td>Mv vic Pris EM0821</td>
<td>Same; Same</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Retrans (3)</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>Same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSS</td>
<td>BSA</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>Mv vic Pris EM0821</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>Same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FLE (-) I III Med</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>Mv vic Pris EM0821</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Civilian NAI/TAI Legend:**
- C1-C4 - DC Camps
- C5 - Community agricultural area
- C6 - Bridge
- C7 - Major road intersection in commercial center
- C9-11 - Potable water sites
- C25 - Hospital
- C26 - Mosque
- C27 - Prison
- C28 - Telecommunications Center
- C29 - Radio Station

**PSYOP Themes:**
- 5 - Stayput Policy
- 6 - Legitimacy of Mission
ANNEX (CIVIL AFFAIRS) TO ___ (CORPS/DIVISION/BRIGADE) OPLAN (OPORD)
NO____

References: (List those documents used to prepare this annex.)
1 - CA Annex of higher headquarters.
2 - Relevant plans of participating civilian organizations.
3 - Relevant civilian agency operations guides and standards documents.
4 - Coordinated transition plans.
5 - International treaties and agreements.
6 - Operational CA database.
7 - Others, as applicable.

Task Organization. (The CA task organization for this mission. Identify CA elements and the
units or organizations they support.)

Interagency Task Organization. (Include elements such as liaison officers and the units or
organizations they support.)

1. SITUATION. (The general operational/tactical situation will be discussed in the base plan
and in other annexes. Describe here the general civil situation, in terms of CASCOPE, as
analyzed in the CMO estimate.)
   a. CIVIL. (The major strengths and vulnerabilities of civil components of the AO and how
   they relate to the overall mission.)
      (1) Areas: Include those key aspects of the commander’s battlespace, such as political
      boundaries, centers of government, open areas for possible temporary settlement,
      agricultural and mining regions, and other significant geographic and economic features.
      (2) Structures: Include traditional high-payoff targets and structures such as cultural
      sites, facilities with practical applications—jails, warehouses, schools—power plants,
      water purification plants, and radio and TV antennas.
      (3) Capabilities: An ally’s or aggressor’s ability to provide services; for example, policing,
      emergency routine medical services, temporary shelters, public administration, and
      reestablishing industrial and agricultural capability.
      (4) Organizations: Locations and meeting cycles of key international organizations and
      NGOs (for example, UNHCR, World Food Programme, OFDA), governing bodies, health
      services, legal and law enforcement, religious groups, fraternal groups, multinational
      corporations, and community watch organizations.
      (5) People: Include key personnel and linkage to the population, all the civilians in and
      outside the AO, leaders, figureheads, clerics, SMEs (for example, computer and
      communications specialists, sewage plant operator), and demobilized soldiers.
      (6) Events: Cycles and seasons (harvest and planting seasons), significant weather
      events (floods), elections, school year, fiscal year, holidays (religious periods, traditional
      vacation time).
      (7) Civil center(s) of gravity: The one or two elements of the civil component that, when
      engaged, will result in a change that has a cascading impact on the entire civil system,
      resulting in furthering the achievement of stated objectives.

Figure C-20. CA Annex Format Example
b. THREAT. (The actual/potential nonmilitary threats to the force and to mission accomplishment; for example, natural, manmade, and technological hazards; disease; dislocated civilians; criminals; and time).

c. FRIENDLY FORCES.
   (1) Outline CA plans of higher headquarters.
   (2) Outline CA plans of higher and adjacent units.
   (3) Identify CA or civil-military capable units in the AO and their missions.

d. ATTACHMENTS/DETACHMENTS. (If not covered in task organization, all military and nonmilitary organizations participating in CMOC operations and CA activities; for example, in support of reconnaissance and surveillance [R&S] plans, or CA assets detached for liaison duties.)

e. ASSUMPTIONS. (OPLAN only) (Critical planning considerations and unknown conditions that must be confirmed by deliberate assessments. Include a statement describing the operational risks associated with not engaging the civil component of the AO through CMO.)

2. MISSION. (A short, understandable, and descriptive statement of CA activities required to support the basic plan; for example, “[CA unit] conducts [host nation support/populace and resources control/humanitarian assistance/military-civic action/emergency services/support to civil administration] operations NLT [date-time group] vicinity objective ________ [or in AO ________] to [purpose of the CA activity(ies)].”)

3. EXECUTION.
   a. COMMANDER’S INTENT. (Commander’s intent for CMO as found in the CMO estimate. This should include the relationship between the military force, civilian participants in the operation, and the indigenous populace as well as a statement of the commander’s desired effects before and after transition of CA activities and CMO to civil responsibility.)
   b. CONCEPT OF THE OPERATION. (A brief overview of the CA activities, described in terms of lines of operations, by phase. This should include a discussion of civil-military objectives, civil decisive points, measures of effectiveness and transition for each line of operation, and a general timeline for the operation. Each line of operation will be discussed in greater detail in the appendixes.)
      (1) Phase I.
         (a) Line of operation 1 (for example, PRC).
         (b) Line of operation 2 (for example, FNS).
         (c) Line of operation 3 (for example, HA).
         (d) Line of operation 4 (other CA activities, as needed).
      (2) Phase II.
         (a) Line of operation 1 (for example, PRC).
         (b) Line of operation 2 (for example, FNS).
         (c) Line of operation 3 (for example, HA).
         (d) Line of operation 4 (other CA activities, as needed).
      (3) Phase III (additional phases, as per supported OPORD).
   c. TASKS TO SUBORDINATE UNITS. (Specific tasks to the elements listed in the task organization and attachments/detachments subparagraphs of paragraph 1. This may include tasks to conduct deliberate assessments, report civil decisive points according to the R&S plans, evaluate measures of effectiveness, and others.)

(CLASSIFICATION)
d. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS. (Instructions and details of coordination that apply to two or more subordinate units not covered by SOP. This includes civil CCIR, policy statements, special reporting procedures, force protection guidance, effective time of attachments or detachments, references to annexes not mentioned elsewhere in the annex, and coordinating authority.)

4. SERVICE SUPPORT. (Instructions and details concerning the service support relationship between the CA elements and their supported units as well as any special operations support elements in the AO.)
   a. Administrative.
   b. Medical.
   c. Logistics.
   d. Maintenance.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.
   a. COMMAND. (Command relationships, the location of the CA command post and/or CMOC[s], alternate locations of the CA command post and/or CMOC[s], and a succession of command within the CA unit structure. This may also include the location of the CA command post and/or CMOC[s] of the next-higher headquarters.)
   b. SIGNAL. (All pertinent communication information, including primary and alternate means of communicating with and among military organizations as well as with and among participating civilian organizations.)

APPENDIXES: (Include diagrams, synchronization matrixes, or civil overlays.)
   1 - Cultural Briefing.
   2 - Populace and Resources Control Plan.
      A - Dislocated Civilian Plan.
      B - Noncombatant Evacuation Plan.
   3 - Humanitarian Assistance Plan.
   4 - Emergency Services Plan.
   5 - Military-Civic Action Plan.
   6 - Support to Civil Administration Plan.
   7 - Foreign Nation Support Plan.
   8 - Transfer of Authority Plan.
   9 - Others, as required.
WARNING ORDER ______

References: Refer to higher headquarters OPLAN/OPORD, and identify map sheet for operation.

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order:

Task Organization:

1. **SITUATION**
   a. **Enemy forces.** Include significant changes in enemy composition, dispositions, and courses of action. Information not available for inclusion in the initial warning order can be included in subsequent warning orders.
   b. **Friendly forces.** (Optional) Only address if essential to the warning order.
      1. Higher commander’s mission.
      2. Higher commander’s intent.
   c. **Attachments and detachments.** Initial task organization; only address major unit changes.

2. **MISSION.** Issuing headquarters’ mission at the time of the warning order. This is nothing more than higher headquarters’ restated mission or commander’s decisions during MDMP.

3. **EXECUTION**
   Intent:
   a. **Concept of operations.** Provide as much information as available; this may be none during the initial warning order.
   b. **Tasks to maneuver units.** Any information on tasks to units for execution, movement to initiate, reconnaissance to initiate, or security to emplace.
   c. **Tasks to combat support units.** See paragraph 3b.
   d. **Coordinating instructions.** Include any information available at the time of the issuance of the warning order. It may include the following:
      • CCIR.
      • Risk guidance.
      • Deception guidance.
      • Specific priorities, in order of completion.
      • Timeline.
      • Guidance on orders and rehearsals.
Orders group meeting (attendees, location, and time).
• Earliest movement time and degree of notice.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT. (Optional) Include any known logistics preparation for the operation.
   a. Special equipment. Identifying requirements and coordinating transfer to using units.
   b. Transportation. Identifying requirements and coordinating for pre-position of assets.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL. (Optional)
   a. Command. State the chain of command if different from unit SOP.
   b. Signal. Identify current SOI edition, and pre-position signal assets to support operation.

ACKNOWLEDGE: (Mandatory)

NAME (Commander’s last name)
RANK (Commander’s rank)

OFFICIAL: (Optional)

Figure C-21. Warning Order Format Example (Continued)

C-2. Just as the G-3 or S-3 prepare COA sketches during MDMP, CA team leaders can portray CA COAs in a sketch or “cartoon.” Figures C-22a. through C-22c., pages C-34 and C-35, provide examples of how three COAs for a commander’s meeting with community elders can be sketched for COA analysis.

Figure C-22a. COA Sketch for COA Analysis (COA 1: Meet at Camp Masco)
Figure C-22b. COA Sketch for COA Analysis (COA 2: Meet at CMOC)

Figure C-22c. COA Sketch for COA Analysis (COA 3: Meet at Village Elder’s House)
C-3. During comparison of each COA, the team leader identifies criteria against which to measure the feasibility of each COA. He analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of each COA using these criteria. A decision matrix may be useful in making this comparison (Figure C-23).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COA</th>
<th>Advantages</th>
<th>Disadvantages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1   | • Village Elder sees might and resources of United States.  
     • Cultural hospitality concerns for locals:  
       ▪ Villagers are not giving up all they have to be hospitable to United States.  
       ▪ Low amount of resources needed to provide security for meeting.  
     | • Travel of Elder from village to U.S. base camp:  
       ▪ Distance and mode of travel for Elder (undo hardship).  
       ▪ Security concerns for him to travel to a U.S. base camp.  
       ▪ Disruption of daily activities for U.S. base camp:  
       ▪ OPSEC.  
       ▪ Security measures (access roster).  
       ▪ Heightened security posture.  
       • Acquiring and setup of meeting room creating a sterile environment.  |
| 2   | • Centralized location for all parties:  
     ▪ Less distance of travel for Elder (undo hardship).  
     • An established known location:  
       ▪ Elder feels comfortable; may have already been there before.  
     • Neutral ground for meeting place.  
     • Cultural hospitality concerns for locals:  
       ▪ Villagers are not giving up all they have to be hospitable to United States.  
     | • Located in a civilian town:  
       ▪ What are local attitudes toward United States and Village Elder?  
       • Increased security posture:  
       ▪ Force protection issues.  
       • Acquiring and setup of meeting room:  
       ▪ Creating a sterile environment, large enough for all participants.  
       ▪ Interruptions of normal daily operations of CMOC.  |
| 3   | • Travel of Elder:  
     ▪ Less distance for Elder.  
     • Less security concerns for him.  
     • Operations at U.S. base camp and CMOC not interrupted.  
     • Review of area assessment:  
       ▪ Update assessment as information is changed.  
     • Cultural interaction between U.S. and locals:  
       ▪ Increased awareness of local culture.  
     | • Cultural hospitality concerns:  
       ▪ Elder gives up most of his supplies to be hospitable to guests.  
       • Extremely heightened security concerns:  
       ▪ Force protection issues.  
       • Distraction of meeting by villagers implied political favoritism toward one group.  |

Figure C-23. COA Decision Matrix Example
C-4. The CA support matrix (Figure C-24, pages C-37 and C-38) is normally used at the CA company or team level to illustrate the company or team OPORD in a single-page, easy-to-use format.

**Figure C-24. Sample of CA Support Matrix (OPORD)**
## Execution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phases</th>
<th>Sunday</th>
<th>Monday</th>
<th>Tuesday</th>
<th>Wednesday</th>
<th>Thursday</th>
<th>Friday</th>
<th>Saturday</th>
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<tbody>
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<td><strong>SEC</strong></td>
<td>HA Amt</td>
<td>HA Amt</td>
<td>HA Amt</td>
<td>Visit Ongoing EN Project</td>
<td>TM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Detarm Capacity of HA</td>
<td>Get Agent to HA</td>
<td>Report on Capacity</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SEC</strong></td>
<td>HA Amt</td>
<td>HA Amt</td>
<td>HA Amt</td>
<td>Visit Ongoing Agriculture Project</td>
<td>RA</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Report on Capacity</td>
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<td><strong>TM</strong></td>
<td>Coord Influx of TR Fren</td>
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<td>Project Priority List</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>NG</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>See Project Priority List</td>
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<td>Assist EN Effort</td>
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<td>See Project Priority List</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**UNCLASSIFIED**

![Figure C-24. Sample of CA Support Matrix (OPORD) (Continued)](image)
Appendix D

CMOC Operational Techniques

CA RESOURCE REPORT

D-1. A CA resource report provides a summary of the civilian resources found in the AO (normally division-level, but situation-dependent) available for military and civil-military use. The report can be sent electronically or by messenger to the appropriate HQ and staff sections at specified intervals. The report is normally unclassified, but its precedence should never be lower than the current priority.

D-2. The CA resource report is filled out as follows:

- The classification should be filled in if it has been previously or if classified information has been newly inserted.
- The FROM is the unit represented.
- The TO is the element to which the report is being sent.
- LINE 1 is where levels of civilian supplies are listed.
  - 1a is for petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL).
  - 1b is for foodstuffs.

**NOTE:** Both should list the type, location, and quantity of the sources.

- LINE 2 is for transportation assets. It should list type (trucks, rail, and so on).
- LINE 3 is for construction equipment or materials to include barrier equipment. List type, quantity, and location.
- LINE 4 is where medical equipment, supplies, and facilities should be listed.
  - 4a is a breakdown of the hospital’s capacity, quality, and level of stock.
  - 4b is a listing of the number of doctors, nurses, and technicians, and where they are located.
- LINE 5 is where public utilities are listed.
  - 5a lists sources and locations of local power utilities.
  - 5b lists sources and locations of underground and aboveground water supplies, potable water, and water that can be purified.
  - 5c lists sewage facilities and system description.
  - 5d lists warehouses and their location, contents, square footage, and cold storage.
  - 5e lists maintenance facilities and location of vehicular, aircraft, and electronic facilities, and descriptions of their capabilities.
LINE 6 lists the number and location of all skilled and unskilled labor along with wage rates and payment system.

D-3. Figure D-1 provides the format of the CA resource report. Figure D-2, page D-3, provides an example.

**CLASSIFICATION**

CIVIL AFFAIRS RESOURCE REPORT

FROM: Your unit.

TO: Next-higher CA command or as directed.

DATE-TIME GROUP:

LINE 1. CIVILIAN SUPPLIES/SERVICES.
   a. POL: Type, location*, and quantity.
   b. FOOD: Type, location*, and quantity.

LINE 2. TRANSPORTATION: Type (truck, rail), location*, and quantity.

LINE 3. CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT/MATERIALS: Type, location, and quantity.

LINE 4. MEDICAL EQUIPMENT/SUPPLIES/FACILITIES:
   a. Hospitals: Number of beds, number of beds available, level of care available, and level of supplies on hand.

LINE 5. PUBLIC UTILITY:
   a. Source and location* of local power utility.
   b. Source and location* of underground and aboveground water supplies, of potable water, and of water that can be purified.
   c. Sewage facilities and system description.
   d. Warehouses: Location*, contents, square footage, and cold storage.
   e. Maintenance facilities: Location* of vehicular, aircraft, and electronic facilities, and descriptions of their capabilities.

LINE 6. LABOR: Number and location* of professional, skilled, and unskilled workers, plus prevailing wage rates and the system of payments.

LINE 7. MISCELLANEOUS: As required.

* Location should include name of the company, owner or POC, complete name of town and street address if applicable, phone number if applicable, and 6-digit grid.

**CLASSIFICATION**

Figure D-1. CA Resource Report Format
CLASSIFICATION

CIVIL AFFAIRS RESOURCE REPORT
Omit paragraphs and subparagraphs not applicable.

FROM: CATA 83
TO: S-5, 3D BDE, 54th ID (M)

DATE-TIME GROUP: 131000RDEC02

LINE 1.

a. POL
   (1) Fuel
   Baldwin’s Fuel Supply
   1243 West Pine St
   MAXTON, PINELAND
   (910) 844-3339
   17SPJ226435
   15,000 gal diesel
   10,000 gal gasoline
   30,000 gal heating oil

b. Food:
   (2) Poultry
   M&M Farms
   20 North End
   MAXTON, PINELAND
   (910) 844-5201
   17SPJ5044
   80,000 chickens
   10,000 turkeys

LINE 5.  c. PEMBROKE 17SPJ64343735
    Sewage facility is functioning. Mayor describes it as a passive filter system.

d. PEMBROKE 17SPJ6538
    Pembroke public schools bus barn. Large vehicle, diesel, repair facility.
    Can hold 15 vehicles in maintenance bays.

CLASSIFICATION

Figure D-2. Example of CA Resource Report

CA SPOT REPORT

D-4. A spot report is used to present timely information as it is collected that
    will impact on the situation. This report does not have a specific format, but
    there are different types of spot reports used by maneuver units governed by
    their doctrine and SOP. The type of information will dictate the type of
    report. All will answer the basic who, what, when, where, and why questions,
    and should include a report on actions taken. Upon completion, distribute
    this information through the chain of command via the fastest route possible
    (usually radio or telephone).
D-5. The CA spot report includes the following:

- The TO line will be the call sign or code name of the unit’s TOC that is being supported.
- The FROM line is the call sign or code name.
- Declare the type of report. Unit SOP may dictate a code word for the report.
- LINE 1 lists the DTG of the occurrence.
- LINE 2 lists the subject of the report or the specialty the report applies to.
- LINE 3 lists the location of the occurrence or subject.
- LINE 4 lists all supporting information or actions taken.

D-6. Figure D-3 provides the spot report format. Figure D-4, page D-5, provides an example.
CA SPOT REPORT (VERBAL/RADIO)

CA SPOT REPORT
LINE 1: 141430RDEC02
LINE 2: Civilian Supply
LINE 3: 17SPJ64343735
Request preventive med team to survey site.

CA SPOT REPORT (WRITTEN)

TO: G-5, 3 BDE, 54 IN (M)
FROM: CATA 83

CA SPOT REPORT
LINE 1: 141430RDEC02
LINE 2: Civilian Supply
LINE 3: 17SPJ64343735
LINE 4: Fresh water supply located. Condition/Quality unknown.
Request preventive med team to survey site.

Joseph Snuffy
SGT, USAR
Team Sergeant

Figure D-4. CA Spot Report Examples

CA PERIODIC REPORT

D-7. The CA periodic report is submitted to the higher CA HQ. The time period between reports is posted by the command. The report covers all CA unit activities for the period prescribed and will cover all of the functional specialties. However, if there is no new information in the reporting period, the sections can be omitted. The CA periodic report paragraphs coincide with the sections of the CA workbook.

D-8. The CA periodic report is prepared as follows:

- The classification is entered by the person preparing the report.
- The period covered block lists the DTG of the start of the period to the DTG of the actual report.
- References section lists all the materials used to prepare the report.
- Paragraph 1 is a general overview of all CA unit activity in the AO.
- Paragraph 2 contains information pertaining to the specialties within the Government Functions section.
- Paragraph 3 contains information pertaining to the specialties within the Economic and Commerce section.
• Paragraph 4 contains information pertaining to the specialties within the Public Facilities section.
• Paragraph 5 contains information pertaining to the specialties within the Special Functions section.
• Paragraph 6 contains any miscellaneous information that the author wishes to pass along.
• After all the new information is listed, the signature block of the person preparing the report is entered.
• Lastly, the distribution is listed (the personnel who will get copies of the report).

D-9. Figure D-5, page D-7, provides the report format. Figure D-6, page D-8, provides an example.
PERIODIC CIVIL AFFAIRS REPORT NO._______
Period Covered: Date-time group to date-time group.
References: Maps (series number, sheet(s), edition, scale) or charts.

1. CIVIL AFFAIRS SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD
   Location of civil affairs units and major activities of each; any important changes in civil
   affairs operational zones or areas; principle incidents and events since last report. Indicate
   on map or overlay annex, where possible.

2. GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS
   a. Legal.
   b. Public Administration.
   c. Public Education.
   d. Public Health.
   e. Public Safety.

3. ECONOMIC/COMMERCE
   a. Economic Development.
   b. Civilian Supply.
   c. Food and Agriculture.

4. PUBLIC FACILITIES
   a. Public Communications.
   b. Public Transportation.
   c. Public Works and Utilities.

5. SPECIAL FUNCTIONS
   a. Cultural Relations.
   b. Civil Information.
   c. Dislocated Civilians.
   d. Emergency Services.
   e. Environmental Management.

6. MISCELLANEOUS
   Indicate any special recommendations and requests, such as existing civil affairs personnel
   problems, requisitions for additional units, recommendations for lifting of controls and
   restrictions, recommendations for troop indoctrination, and other matters not properly
   covered in paragraphs above.

____________________
Position
Unit

Authentication.
Annexes:
Distribution:

CLASSIFICATION

Figure D-5. CA Periodic Report Format
CLASSIFICATION

CIVIL AFFAIRS PERIODIC REPORT
Omit paragraphs and subparagraphs not applicable.

Copy no. 1 of 1
TO: S-5, HQ 3BDE, 54 ID (M)
FROM: CATA 83, Pineland
171600RNOV02

PERIODIC CIVIL AFFAIRS REPORT NO. 1
Period Covered: 170900RNOV02 to 171600RNOV02
References: 1:50000 SCALE, SERIES V742, HAMLET (5053)i

1. CA assets located at PU823325, south of Lumberton. In the process of coordinating with
engineering team to assist CA water specialist in repairing the water purification plants.
Also currently coordinating the engineering team and the G-3 to procure mobile water
purification systems, but problem is still unresolved. Team has produced a report to clarify
the differences between DCs and internees. Team has made plans to handle DCs
moving out of the St. Pauls area. Team has coordinated with Pembroke and received
permission to use all trailer parks in the area to house DCs. Team has coordinated with
3d BDE to meet at coordination point 2, PU 793330, at the border to take our DCs to the
Pembroke trailer park. Team has procured enough rations for the projected amount of
dislocated civilians.

3b. Civilian Supply. Information listed in resource report.

4c. Public Works and Utilities. Organizing a repair crew for local water purification plants.

5c. Dislocated Civilians. Currently several hundred DCs in AO. Coordinated with 3d BDE for
handoff at CP2.

______________________
Team Leader
CATA 83

Distribution:
3 BDE, S-5
TF 1-80, S-3
CATA 83

CLASSIFICATION

Figure D-6. Example of CA Periodic Report

CA PERSONNEL STATUS REPORT

D-10. The CA personnel status report is submitted to the higher CA HQ. The
time period between reports is posted by the command. The report covers all
CA unit activities for the period prescribed, and will cover all of the
functional specialties. However, if there is no new information in the
reporting period, the sections can be omitted. Figure D-7, page D-9, provides
an example.
**PERSONNEL STATUS REPORT**

**DTG:** 171300RDEC02

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>RANK</th>
<th>STATUS</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Snuffy, Joe</td>
<td>SGT</td>
<td>Green</td>
<td>PDY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bailey, Beetle</td>
<td>PVT</td>
<td>Green</td>
<td>PDY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen, John Q.</td>
<td>PFC</td>
<td>Amber</td>
<td>PDY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doe, Jane</td>
<td>PV2</td>
<td>Black</td>
<td>DIV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lindbergh, Charles</td>
<td>SGT</td>
<td>Black</td>
<td>DIV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McGraw, Graham</td>
<td>SPC</td>
<td>Green</td>
<td>PDY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murray, Jennifer</td>
<td>PFC</td>
<td>Amber</td>
<td>PDY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith, Quinton</td>
<td>PVT</td>
<td>Green</td>
<td>PDY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milton, Brian</td>
<td>CPL</td>
<td>Green</td>
<td>PDY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cole, David</td>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>Red</td>
<td>BDE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**STATUS KEY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Color</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Green</td>
<td>Mission Capable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amber</td>
<td>On Profile/Injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red</td>
<td>Wounded/Non-Mission Capable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>Dead</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**LOCATION KEY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Description</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>Present for duty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIS</td>
<td>Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIV</td>
<td>Division area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BDE</td>
<td>Brigade area</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Others as needed

Joseph Snuffy
CATA 83
Team Sergeant

**CLASSIFICATION**

Figure D-7. Example of CA Personnel Status Report

D-11. This report is used to track all the durable equipment that the CMOC is responsible for by name, description, and status. It is also posted daily on the status side of the map board and updated prior to each staff change. Figure D-8, page D-10, provides an example.
### EQUIPMENT STATUS REPORT

**DTG: 171300RDEC02**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>SERIAL #</th>
<th>STATUS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M998 HMMWV</td>
<td>1ZT389BF4333</td>
<td>Green</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M998 HMMWV</td>
<td>1QE345BF5899</td>
<td>Green</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laptop</td>
<td>BF1762</td>
<td>Green</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laptop</td>
<td>BF3888</td>
<td>Green</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laptop</td>
<td>BF5469</td>
<td>Green</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laptop</td>
<td>BF7852</td>
<td>Amber</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Printer</td>
<td>HP459986</td>
<td>Red</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OE-254</td>
<td>CA24</td>
<td>Green</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M48 Generator</td>
<td>GE5562</td>
<td>Green</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M4A1 Rifle</td>
<td>8471765</td>
<td>Green</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M4A1 Rifle</td>
<td>8521596</td>
<td>Green</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M4A1 Rifle</td>
<td>8965485</td>
<td>Green</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M4A1 Rifle</td>
<td>8759562</td>
<td>Green</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AN/PVS-7</td>
<td>D4875</td>
<td>Red</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AN/PVS-7</td>
<td>D4581</td>
<td>Red</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOI</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Green</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**STATUS KEY**
- Green: Mission Capable
- Amber: Damaged but Functional
- Red: Inoperative

---

### SENSITIVE ITEMS REPORT

D-12. This report lists all sensitive items assigned to the section or CMOC. It will list the description of each item, the serial number, the status of the item, and an explanation if the item is missing. (A sensitive item is any material that requires a high degree of protection due to its characteristics, such as fragile, delicate, or hazardous material; special weapons except ammunition; or equipment that is highly technical in nature.) Figure D-9, page D-11, provides an example.
## SENSITIVE ITEM STATUS REPORT

**DTG:** 171300RDEC02

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>SERIAL #</th>
<th>STATUS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M4A1 RIFLE</td>
<td>8471765</td>
<td>Green</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M4A1 RIFLE</td>
<td>8521596</td>
<td>Green</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M4A1 RIFLE</td>
<td>8965485</td>
<td>Green</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M4A1 RIFLE</td>
<td>8759562</td>
<td>Green</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AN/PVS-7</td>
<td>D4875</td>
<td>Red</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AN/PVS-7</td>
<td>D4581</td>
<td>Red</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOI</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Green</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laptop</td>
<td>BF1762</td>
<td>Green</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laptop</td>
<td>BF3888</td>
<td>Green</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laptop</td>
<td>BF5469</td>
<td>Green</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laptop</td>
<td>BF7852</td>
<td>Amber</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**STATUS KEY**

- **Green** Mission Capable
- **Amber** Damaged but Functional
- **Red** Inoperative

---

**PROTECTED TARGET LIST**

D-13. The CA protected target list (PTL) is a tool used to assist the commander in meeting his moral and legal obligations by reducing collateral damage to the civilian populace and economy. The PTL will help minimize collateral damage to cultural, religious, historical, economic, political, and high-density civilian population centers. It establishes a control measure to reduce civilian interaction and interference. The PTL will cover all four functional areas (government, economics and commerce, public facilities, and
special functions) and have an overlay key to identify the listed items on the protected target overlay. The CA PTL is only a recommendation. It must be submitted through the supported unit to the FSCOORD who will make the determination on which items will be integrated into the overall PTL. CA personnel must be able to support their selection of protected targets for the PTL to the FSCOORD and the commander.

D-14. Figure D-10, page D-13, provides an example of the PTL. Protected targets are listed by description, grid coordinate, and the designation on the protected target overlay.

D-15. The diagram in Figure D-11, page D-14, shows what a protected target overlay will look like. The overlay will normally be written on a piece of clear acetate. This example depicts eight protected sites—two from each functional area. It also includes two grid reference points and the classification on both the top and bottom. Further guidance on how to properly prepare an overlay is in Chapter 7, FM 3-25.26, Map Reading and Land Navigation.
### CLASSIFICATION

**PROTECTED TARGET LIST**

1. **Government**
   - **Legal**
     - Sears International Law Building PU61318460 GO004
   - **Public Administration**
     - Johnston Courthouse PU61318460 GO001
   - **Public Education**
     - Southview High School PU61319168 GO002
   - **Public Health**
     - Fayetteville General Hospital PU61317320 GO005
   - **Public Safety**
     - Boon Fire Department PU61321150 GO003

2. **Economics/Commerce**
   - **Economic Development**
     - Labor Department PU61345678 EC002
   - **Civilian Supply**
     - Al's Farm Machinery PU13678232 EC003
   - **Food and Agriculture**
     - Jones's Fishery PU61321150 EC001

3. **Public Facilities**
   - **Public Communications**
     - WDAK FM 1690 – Radio Station PU61345654 PF003
   - **Public Transportation**
     - Greyhound Bus Terminal PU61345689 PE001
   - **Public Works and Utilities**
     - Redmond Power and Lights PU61348603 PF002

4. **Special Functions**
   - **Cultural Relations**
     - Church of Korean Bethel Presbyterian PU13633284 SF003
   - **Civil Information**
     - Fayetteville Observer Times PU13674268 SF004
   - **Dislocated Civilians**
     - Olympic Stadium PU13679866 SF005
   - **Emergency Services**
     - Rescue (Hoffman Co.) PU13634531 SF001
   - **Environmental Management**
     - Groundwater Management Assistant PU13678981 SF002

#### OVERLAY KEY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>DESIGNATION</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Green</td>
<td>GO</td>
<td>Government Functional Specialty Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue</td>
<td>PF</td>
<td>Public Facilities Functional Specialty Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>Economics/Commerce Functional Specialty Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red</td>
<td>SF</td>
<td>Special Functions Specialty Area</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

*Figure D-10. Example of Protected Target List*
CMOC SOP

D-16. The CMOC SOP is a simply written record of the daily procedures followed within the CMOC. It should be started before or on the first day of operations. It should include the who, what, where, when, and how of conducting daily operations within the CMOC and should be constantly updated. If maintained properly, the SOP will aid in the training of additional personnel as well as allowing for a smooth transition between changing shifts within the center or cell. The SOP also serves as a tool for outgoing personnel when transitioning and turning operations over to follow-on personnel.

RESOURCE CARD FILE

D-17. The resource card file is used to provide a quick reference format for information that would cause clutter on a map overlay. The file consists of 3 x 5 cards arranged in alphabetical order. A number in the top right-hand corner of the card will correspond with a reference point on the resource overlay. Hard copy or electronic versions are equally functional. Figure D-12, page D-15, provides an example of the resource card.
D-18. Fill out a resource card as follows:
   • Write the coinciding message number from the DA 1594 and the date it was logged in the top left corner of the card.
   • List the resource in the top center of the card.
   • List the reference point on the situation map in the top right corner of the card.
   • List the description, quantity, time, and location of the resource in the body of the card. Once the resource is committed or used, annotate the using unit, quantity, and DTG information.

24 25A

LUMBER

- One hundred 2 x 4 boards (length varies) located at corner of 4th and Howard Streets. Relocated to warehouse 25A.
- 2d Brigade requests 2 x 4s. 150930 Oct 02 issued 50.
- Fifty 2 x 4 boards on hand.

Figure D-12. Example of Resource Card

MAP BOARD

D-19. The map board in the CMOC is used to track ongoing operations and provide a status of critical items of information. When properly maintained, the map board can become the focal point for unexpected briefings and media visits. The contents and organization of the board will be dependent on the unit’s SOP and the amount of space available.

D-20. The map board includes the following information:
   • DAY CODE: Displays the day of the operations. The D stands for D-day, the unnamed day on which a particular operation begins or is to begin. An operation may be the beginning of hostilities. The code consists of “D+” what day into the operation it is, then the date in DDMMYY format (for example, D+7/20DEC02).
   • MISSION: The mission of the supported unit. The civil-military mission may also be displayed beneath the unit mission.
   • INTENT: The intent of the supported unit commander.
   • PERSONNEL STATUS: The duty status of all personnel, military or civilian, whose primary place of duty is in the CMOC, using the status form shown in Figure D-7.
   • EQUIPMENT STATUS: The status of all durable equipment in the CMOC using the status form shown in Figure D-8.
- **INFORMATION STATUS**: The status of key CA essential elements of information requests.
- **REPORTS**: Status of CA reports. Lists all reports: when the last required report was submitted and when the next report is due.
- **PROJECTS**: Status on projects the CMOC is tracking.
- **CURRENT**: Key events planned for the day.
- **LAST 24 HOURS**: Key events that occurred during the last 24 hours.
- **NEXT 24 HOURS**: Key events planned for the next 24 hours.
- **SITUATION MAP AND OVERLAYS**: The situation map will serve as a focal point for all CA data collected. It will have all the information regarding the supported unit, the AO boundaries, MSRs, as well as unit locations. The types of overlays used to depict this information are dependent upon the operation and situation, informational needs, and the classification of the information posted. Typical CA overlays will include resources, DCs, protected targets, political boundaries, PSYOP product distribution areas, and critical infrastructure.

D-21. Figure D-13 provides the format of the map board. Figure D-14, page D-17, provides an example.

![Figure D-13. Map Board Format](image-url)
DAILY STAFF JOURNAL, DA 1594

D-22. This form is used by CA operators to record CMO activities chronologically. It is used to recount situations and establish details of actions taken. The form should be closed at 2400 hours daily and filed. Figure D-15, page D-18, provides a sample.
**Figure D-15. Sample of Daily Staff Journal**

| ITEM NO. | TIME | INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC. | ACTION TAKEN | INL.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0030</td>
<td>Received 1 CORPS OPLAN 15, CPY No. 31</td>
<td>F</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0045</td>
<td>SJA submitted report on court-martial cases tried during the past week.</td>
<td>S, F</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0115</td>
<td>G-4 approved request to employ 100 civilians in CSS units in DIV area.</td>
<td>S</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0138</td>
<td>AG reports 100 replacements received yesterday. 200 replacements expected today.</td>
<td>G-3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>0145</td>
<td>PMO submitted report on DC stragglers redirected during past week.</td>
<td>S, F</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>0215</td>
<td>54th IN DIV (M) commander announced that all officers commissioned through commission will be assigned to their present BN; will be assigned to present company when vacancy exists.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>0300</td>
<td>AG reports a large number of 100 replacements arrived with equipment.</td>
<td>G-4, G-1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>0315</td>
<td>PMO reports soldiers involved in black-market operations.</td>
<td>F, F-2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>0330</td>
<td>CORPS SJA will visit DIV area and perform on black market, and UCMJ.</td>
<td>G-3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CA WORKBOOK

D-23. This is an informal, indexed collection of CA data obtained from all sources. It is indexed by subject area or functional specialty. It is used to detect patterns in civilian activity, prepare CA periodic reports and estimates, and used as a current operation management tool. Figure D-16, pages D-19 through D-41, provides the format.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>LEGAL</td>
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<td>PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION</td>
<td>2B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUBLIC EDUCATION</td>
<td>2C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUBLIC HEALTH</td>
<td>2D</td>
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<tr>
<td>PUBLIC SAFETY</td>
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<td>ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIVILIAN SUPPLY</td>
<td>3B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOOD AND AGRICULTURE</td>
<td>3C</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<td>PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION</td>
<td>4B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUBLIC WORKS AND UTILITIES</td>
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<th>SPECIAL FUNCTIONS</th>
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<td>CULTURAL RELATIONS</td>
<td>5A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIVIL INFORMATION</td>
<td>5B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISLOCATED CIVILIANS</td>
<td>5C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMERGENCY SERVICES</td>
<td>5D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT</td>
<td>5E</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| MISCELLANEOUS         | 6       |

Figure D-16. CA Workbook Format
2

GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS

AS OF: ____________________
## 2A

### LEGAL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DTG WHEN ORIGINAL MESSAGE WAS LOGGED / ITEM # FROM DA 1594</th>
<th>OCCURRENCE, INCIDENT, OR MESSAGE</th>
<th>DTG, PERIODIC REPORT NUMBER, AND INITIALS WHEN INFORMATION IS EXTRACTED FROM REPORT</th>
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Figure D-16. CA Workbook Format (Continued)
## 2B

### PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

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*Figure D-16. CA Workbook Format (Continued)*
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Figure D-16. CA Workbook Format (Continued)
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Figure D-16. CA Workbook Format (Continued)
3

ECONOMIC/COMMERCE

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Figure D-16. CA Workbook Format (Continued)
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Figure D-16. CA Workbook Format (Continued)
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Figure D-16. CA Workbook Format (Continued)
PUBLIC FACILITIES

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Figure D-16. CA Workbook Format (Continued)
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Figure D-16. CA Workbook Format (Continued)
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*Figure D-16. CA Workbook Format (Continued)*
5

SPECIAL FUNCTIONS

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Figure D-16. CA Workbook Format (Continued)
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### CULTURAL RELATIONS

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Figure D-16. CA Workbook Format (Continued)
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## MISCELLANEOUS

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Figure D-16. CA Workbook Format (Continued)
PROBLEM-SOLVING STEPS

E-1. Before discussing CA mission planning using each of the various planning processes, it is useful to review the basic steps to solving problems that leaders at all levels follow. The next several paragraphs, paraphrased from FM 22-100, explain those steps.

IDENTIFY THE PROBLEM AND GOAL

E-2. Leaders should not be distracted by the symptoms of the problem; they must get at its root cause. There may be more than one thing contributing to a problem, and leaders may run into a case where there are lots of contributing factors but no real "smoking gun." The issue the leader chooses to address as the root cause becomes the mission (or restated mission for tactical problems). The mission must include a simple statement of who, what, when, where, and why. In addition, it should include the end state—how the leader wants things to look when the mission is complete.

IDENTIFY FACTS AND ASSUMPTIONS

E-3. Leaders should get whatever facts they can in the time they have. Facts are statements of what is known about the situation. Assumptions are statements of what is believed about the situation but facts are not available to support. Leaders make only assumptions that are likely to be true and essential to generate alternatives. Some of the many sources of facts include regulations, policies, and doctrinal publications. The organization’s mission, goals, and objectives may also be a source. Sources of assumptions can be personal experiences, members of the organization, subject matter experts, or written observations. Leaders analyze the facts and assumptions they identify to determine the scope of the problem. (FM 101-5 contains more information on facts and assumptions.)

GENERATE ALTERNATIVES

E-4. Alternatives are ways to solve the problem. Leaders should develop more than one possible alternative and not be satisfied with the first thing that comes into mind—the third or fourth or twentieth alternative the leader comes up with might be the best one. If the leader has time and experienced subordinates, they should be included in this step.

ANALYZE THE ALTERNATIVES

E-5. Leaders identify intended and unintended consequences, resource or other constraints, and the advantages and disadvantages of each alternative.
All alternatives should be considered. Leaders should not prejudge the situation by favoring any one alternative over the others.

**COMPARE THE ALTERNATIVES**

E-6. Leaders evaluate each alternative for its probability of success and its cost. They think past the immediate future. How will this decision change things tomorrow? Next week? Next year?

**MAKE AND EXECUTE THE DECISION**

E-7. Leaders prepare a leader’s plan of action, if necessary, and put it in motion. (Planning, an operating action, is covered later in this appendix.)

**ASSESS THE RESULTS**

E-8. Leaders check constantly to see how the execution of their plan of action is going. They keep track of what happens and adjust their plan, if necessary. Leaders should learn from the experience so they will be better equipped next time. Leaders then follow up on results and make further adjustments, as required.

**CA PLANNING USING THE JOINT OPERATION PLANNING AND EXECUTION SYSTEM**

E-9. An integral part of DOD’s ability to deploy forces, the JOPES has been used for over 25 years to support the development of OPLANs and TPFDD. Despite this fact, there is still a common misconception among soldiers that JOPES is only an ADP system.

E-10. The following overview, adapted from the User’s Guide for JOPES, is intended to clarify what JOPES is and how CA planners participate in JOPES processes. More detailed information is in the following publications, found at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/index.htm:

- JP 5-0.
- CJ CSM 3122.01, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Volume I, (Planning Policies and Procedures): Defines the process for both deliberate planning and crisis-action planning.
- CJ CSM 3150.16B, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Reporting Structure (JOPESREP), Volume I.
- CSCSM 3122.03A: Provides the administrative instructions and formats for developing joint operation plans.
- CJ CSI 3020.01, Managing, Integrating, and Using Joint Deployment Information Systems.

E-11. Figure E-1, page E-3, depicts the various parts of JOPES. JOPES is the principal system within the DOD to translate SECDEF policy decisions into the joint combatant commander’s air, land, and sea operations. It governs all
aspects of conventional joint military operations planning and execution and is the tool used by all echelons of planners and operators to speak a commonly understood language. It does this by precisely defining DOD war planning and execution policies, designating specific procedures and formats, and providing ADP support to convert SECDEF decisions into joint operation plans. Joint operation plans are the blueprints for joint operations.

E-12. The standardized policies, procedures, and formats of JOPES furnish joint commanders and war planners the ability to produce and execute a variety of required tasks to include—

- Planning: Writing OPLANs, CONPLANs, functional plans, campaign plans, and OPORDs.
- Execution and deployment (TPFDD) management: Defining requirements for, and gaining visibility of, the movement of forces into the combatant commander's AOR.

E-13. The ADP portion of JOPES provides both hardware (computers) and software (programs) to facilitate joint operation planning and execution. JOPES ADP resides in the computer network of the GCCS. The JOPES software applications support a variety of planning and execution functions.
Together, the computer hardware and software systems assist the planners to—

- Develop detailed deployment requirements.
- Estimate logistics and transportation requirements and assess OPLAN transportation feasibility.
- Prioritize, replan, and track deployment status during execution.
- Refine deployment requirements and monitor the deployment.

E-14. The players in the joint planning process, as illustrated in Figure E-2, page E-5, include the President and the SECDEF, as well as the joint planning and execution community (JPEC). The President and the SECDEF sit atop the pyramid. They provide the ultimate decision on national policy and overall strategic direction of the U.S. Armed Forces. They are supported by the executive departments and organizations within the Office of the President, primarily the NSC.

E-15. The NSC is the principal forum to deliberate national security policy issues. The NSC provides the framework to establish national security strategy and policy decisions for implementation by the President in his role as commander-in-chief. The President either issues orders directly to the military to implement his national security strategy or he mandates military action by using directives. These directives can take the form of the national security strategy document, national security presidential directives, or executive orders.

E-16. As depicted in the lower portion of the pyramid, the JPEC consists of those HQ, commands, and agencies involved in the training, preparation, movement, reception, employment, support, and sustainment of military forces assigned to a theater of operations. The JPEC principals are the CJCS and the joint staff, who publish the task-assigning documents, review the products, and approve the final version of peacetime plans. The supported commands and their subordinates are responsible for developing and executing OPLANs and OPORDs.

E-17. CA planners participate in the JOPES process at all levels, but in varying degrees. As participants, it is important that CA planners at all levels are familiar with the NSS, NMS, presidential directives, and many other related documents generated by the President, the SECDEF, and the NSC as part of the planning process.
Figure E-2. The Joint Planning and Execution Community
JOINT OPERATION PLANNING

E-18. Plans are developed under different processes depending on the focus of the specific plan (Figure E-3). These plans are campaign, deliberate, and crisis-action planning. These processes are interrelated; campaign planning principles contribute to both deliberate and crisis-action planning.

![Figure E-3. Joint Operation Planning](image)

Campaign Planning

E-19. Campaign planning allows combatant commanders to translate national strategy and objectives into unified plans for military action by specifying how operations and logistics will be used to achieve success within a given space and time. It embodies the combatant commander's strategic vision of the related operations necessary to attain theater strategic objectives.

E-20. If the scope of contemplated operations requires it, campaign planning begins with deliberate planning. It continues through crisis-action planning, thus unifying both planning processes. The degree to which the deliberate plan may serve as the core for a campaign plan is dependent on the plan assumptions, commander's intent, and available resources. Campaign planning and its relation to joint operation planning are discussed in detail in JP 5-0.

E-21. CA planners at the geographic combatant command HQ keep abreast of the national security issues in the combatant commander’s AOR. During campaign planning, they advise the combatant commander and his staff on the political, economic, social, and cultural implications of contemplated military operations. This includes the effects of military operations on the
populace and infrastructure in the immediate AO, as well as repercussions within the regional and global community. CA planners formulate CMO themes and policies into a centralized CMO plan that can be executed in a decentralized manner while supporting campaign objectives. CA planners also look beyond the end state of military operations by identifying MOEs for CMO and planning for the eventual transition of control from military forces to civilian authorities. Finally, CA planners write the CMO annex (normally Annex G) to the campaign plan.

**Deliberate Planning**

E-22. The deliberate planning process develops joint operation plans for contingencies identified in joint strategic planning documents. These planning documents include the SECDEF’s annual Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG), which provides written policy guidance for contingency planning, and the Chairman’s JSCP, which provides guidance to the combatant commanders and Service chiefs for accomplishing military tasks and missions based on current military capabilities.

E-23. Deliberate planning is completed in five phases based on JOPES guidance:

- **Phase I, Initiation:** This phase specifies strategic objectives and planning assumptions, specifies the type of plan for each task, and apportions major combat and strategic forces to the combatant commanders for planning. This information is provided to the combatant commanders in the JSCP.
- **Phase II, Concept Development:** In response to the JSCP-assigned task, the combatant commanders conduct mission analysis, identify friendly and enemy centers of gravity, determine the commander’s overall intent for the operation, and develop the staff estimates. The final result of Phase II is a combatant commander’s strategic concept, which is submitted to the Chairman, as required, for review and approval.
- **Phase III, Plan Development:** This phase occurs after the combatant commander’s strategic concept is approved. It begins with full plan development and documentation. This process produces force, support, and transportation planning documents to support the combatant commander’s CONOPS. This process will be discussed in detail later during discussions on TPFDD development.
- **Phase IV, Plan Review:** The plan is reviewed for adequacy, feasibility, acceptability, and compliance with joint doctrine. Those plans requiring approval by the Chairman will be reviewed by the Joint Staff, Services, and combat support agencies (DIA, Defense Information Systems Agency [DISA], Defense Logistics Agency [DLA], NIMA, and NSA).
- **Phase V, Supporting Plans Development:** Emphasis shifts to subordinate and supporting commanders as they complete their plans to augment the combatant commander’s plan.

**Crisis-Action Planning**

E-24. Crisis-action planning, like deliberate planning, involves a structured process following the guidance established in JOPES publications. This
planning process results in the time-sensitive development of campaign plans and OPORDs for execution. The planning process includes the following phases:

- Phase I, Situation Development: Initiated with the perception or recognition of a crisis and results in the development of the combatant commander’s assessment.
- Phase II, Crisis Assessment: The SECDEF and Chairman evaluate the combatant commander’s assessment and determine whether a crisis is imminent.
- Phase III, Course of Action Development: The SECDEF or the combatant commander develops one or more COAs. The combatant commander submits the commander’s estimate and recommendation to the Chairman.
- Phase IV, Course of Action Selection: The SECDEF decides on a COA.
- Phase V, Execution Planning: The combatant commander develops a campaign plan or OPORD, and TPFDD.
- Phase VI, Execution: The SECDEF decides to execute the campaign plan or OPORD. OPORDs are prepared in prescribed JOPES formats during crisis-action planning. They are in the form of a directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders to effect the coordinated execution of an operation.

JOINT OPERATION PLANNING PRODUCTS

E-25. Based on the Chairman’s J SCP planning requirements, the combatant commanders prepare four types of deliberate plans: OPLANs, CONPLANs (with and without TPFDD), and functional plans. These plans facilitate the rapid transition to crisis response. Each plan has different JOPES procedural and format requirements. However, all follow the basic format of a five-paragraph order:

- Situation.
- Mission.
- Execution.
- Administration and logistics.
- Command and control.

Operation Plan

E-26. OPLANs are prepared when—

- The contingency has a compelling national interest and is critical to national security.
- The nature (large scale) of the contingency requires detailed prior planning for complex issues.
- Detailed planning contributes to deterrence.
- Detailed planning is required to support multinational planning.
- Detailed planning is necessary to determine specific force and sustainment requirements.
E-27. An OPLAN includes a full description of the CONOPS using all documentation applicable to a JOPES-structured plan. It identifies the specific forces, functional support, and resources necessary to implement the plan and provides closure estimates for their movement into the theater. OPLANs can be quickly converted to OPORDs. They may include as many as twenty JOPES-prescribed annexes with associated appendixes, and they always include TPFDD.

E-28. Because of the detailed nature of an OPLAN, JOPES guidance requires a thorough presentation of the commander’s operational concept. JOPES requires all annexes and appendixes to contain detailed information on the combatant command’s CONOPS, CS, and CSS activities.

E-29. CA planners are responsible for JOPES Annex G, Civil-Military Operations. A sample Annex G is in Appendix C.

Operation Plan in Concept Format

E-30. A joint OPLAN in an abbreviated, “concept” format is called a CONPLAN. A CONPLAN requires considerable expansion or alteration to convert into an OPLAN, campaign plan, or OPORD. In a CONPLAN, all the elements of the basic OPLAN are included in summary form except mission, situation, assumptions, and CONOPS. These elements are fully developed. The full complement of annexes and appendixes are not required in a CONPLAN. CONPLANs contain a summary of logistics requirements and major constraints regarding forces, movement, or logistic support that significantly affect implementation of the plan.

E-31. A CONPLAN (without a TPFDD) is normally required when—

- The contingency has a less compelling interest but is important to national security.
- Binational alliance or treaty arrangement requires contingency planning by the signatory countries.
- The contingency is smaller in scale, requires less detailed planning, and can be handled in the near term with more general capabilities-based concepts.
- No specific threat has been identified.

E-32. A CONPLAN with a TPFDD is a CONPLAN that requires more detailed planning for the phased deployment of forces. Like an OPLAN, it is prepared when the contingency has a compelling national interest and is critical to national security—however, it is not as likely to occur in the near term. The larger scale of the possible contingency requires more detailed planning than would normally be conducted for a CONPLAN. Preparing a CONPLAN with TPFDD follows the same JOPES procedures as developing an OPLAN.

Functional Plans

E-33. Functional plans may also be developed by combatant commanders to address “functional peacetime operations” such as disaster relief, HA, or peace operations. They may be developed in response to JSCP tasks, as a
combatant command initiative, or as tasked by a Service or defense agency acting as an executive agent for the SECDEF (for example, military support to civil authorities). Functional plans are structured as CONPLANs (without TPFDD), following published JOPES formats. Annexes and appendixes are developed as required.

CA PLANNING USING SPECIAL OPERATIONS OPERATIONAL PLANNING PROCEDURES

E-34. JP 3-05.2 is the doctrinal manual that applies to the planning, conduct, and support of joint SO across the range of military operations. It provides guidance for joint SO targeting and mission planning and builds on the foundation of joint SO, targeting, and planning doctrine. It discusses SO operational mission criteria with regard to joint planning and targeting, and describes the methodology for integrating SO into the supported commander's targeting and planning processes. A major part of this publication discusses the SO deliberate and crisis-action planning processes. It also includes discussions on delineation of authority and responsibilities, SO target criteria and considerations, SO integration at the theater and JTF levels, and mission analysis procedures. USACAPOC uses the procedures outlined in JP 3-05.2 to effectively monitor subordinate unit, team, and individual preparation for, and participation in, CA operations. CA planners use SO operational planning procedures for all CA missions. These missions range from providing individual liaison to military and nonmilitary agencies, to providing training or assessment teams to foreign military and nonmilitary organizations, to conducting tactical and operational CA unit operations in support of conventional and special operations forces.

E-35. SO operational planning supports deliberate and crisis-action planning under the JOPES. Since CA forces are more apt to be involved in crisis action versus deliberate planning, this section addresses CA participation in crisis-action planning, including SOF execution phase planning.

E-36. SO operational planning also supports planning PME and theater security cooperation activities, such as CA support to HMA operations, combatant commander-directed mil-to-mil programs, and disaster preparedness planning surveys. Interagency coordination becomes increasingly important when planning these activities.

E-37. CJ CSM 3113.01A provides some guidance on planning PME. CA planners must be flexible and innovative when integrating peacetime CA operations with other agencies' activities. Funding sources and procedures may constrain peacetime military operations.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS OPERATIONAL PLANNING IN CRISIS-ACTION PLANNING

E-38. During a crisis situation, the CA force (for example, a single CA soldier, a CA team, or a CA unit) conducts both operational planning and execution phase planning as part of crisis-action planning. These planning phases are depicted in Figure E-4, page E-11. As a JTF is working through the six phases of crisis-action planning, the CA force also is conducting its planning process.
that results in various products, such as OPORDs or FRAG orders. Each of these phases is explained in the following paragraphs.

Special Operations Operational Planning During Crisis-Action Planning Phases I–V

E-39. During phases I through V of crisis-action planning, the CA force’s planning efforts are directed toward two types of products. These products are inputs to the JTF’s OPORD (with its organic TPFDD) and development of the CA force’s own OPORD. The processes used to develop these two products usually are conducted concurrently.

**Figure E-4. CA Force Support to Crisis-Action Planning**

E-40. **Providing Input to the JTF’s OPORD.** The focus of the CA force’s planning efforts in this phase of operational planning is development of input to the JTF’s OPORD (Figure E-5, page E-12). The CA force staff should provide information for all aspects of the JTF’s order (base order, all annexes, and appendixes). This should be done as a collaborative planning effort between the JTF and CA force planners. Although all aspects of the JTF order will impact the CA force, it is especially important that the CA force provide input to the CMO appendix to the Operations annex of the JTF OPORD. Major operational issues that also should be discussed in developing input to the JTF’s OPORD include the following:

- Operational capabilities required.
- Forces required.
- Command relationships.
- Civil targeting priorities.
- Force allocation.
- Task organization.
- Deployment and basing options.
- Mission approval procedures.
- TPFDD input.

Figure E-5. CA Force Support to Crisis-Action Planning: Input to JFC’s Orders

E-41. The process that allows the CA force to contribute to the JTF’s OPORD is depicted in Figure E-6, page E-13, and includes the following:

- Contribute to JTF’s overall mission analysis, as follows:
  - Determine known facts using CA methodology techniques outlined in Chapter 3, Assess. This includes, but is not limited to—
    - Analyze the higher commander’s mission and intent from a CA/CMO perspective.
    - Describe the friendly situation of the JTF, CA force, components, and other commands.
    - Describe the civil situation using CASCOPE.
    - Determine the status or conditions of CA/CMO already implemented by the higher commander.
- Describe how possible CA/CMO missions relate to the JTF’s plans.
- Describe other facts that may affect the possible missions.
Develop assumptions to replace missing or unknown facts. This includes, but is not limited to—
- SOFAs at probable execution.
- Availability and support requirements of indigenous populations and institutions, multinational forces, and/or international organizations and NGOs.
- Support from other government agencies.
- ROE changes, if required.
- CASCOPE considerations that may affect the mission.

- Review CA/CMO constraints and limitations.
- Identify tasks to be performed by CA/CMO forces. These include—
  - Specified tasks.
  - Implied tasks.
  - Essential tasks.
- Conduct initial CA/CMO force structure analysis; tentatively identify required and available CA/CMO assets and required capabilities.
- Conduct an initial risk assessment.
- Determine end state (or success criteria) for CA/CMO.
- Identify CA/CMO intelligence requirements.
- Assist in developing the JTF’s mission statement.
- Assist in developing a mission analysis briefing for the JFC.

- Assist mission analysis briefing and receive JFC planning guidance. The JFC should provide guidance at this point. Planning guidance should be disseminated to the CA force and other JTF components.

- Develop CA/CMO options for the JFC’s COA. The JTF staff should develop multiple friendly COAs. The CA force should perform the following:
  - Develop options for initial CA/CMO COAs.
  - Review mission analysis and JFC’s guidance.
  - Develop or refine a comparison of civil capabilities (for example, indigenous populations and institutions, international organizations, and NGOs) and CA/CMO capabilities.
  - Review options for engaging the civil centers of gravity and accomplishing the JTF’s mission or tasks.
  - Provide options for CA/CMO operational movement. These options include, but are not limited to—
    - Strategic deployment of CA/CMO forces into the joint operations area (JOA), including developing and integrating the deployment concept consistent with the JFC’s supporting campaign scheme and sequence of operations for initial combat and noncombat operations, force reception and buildup, and timing of follow-on operations.
    - Intratheater deployment of CA/CMO forces within the JOA.
Logistic support for the movement of CA/CMO forces from ports of debarkation to initial positions.

- Transportation, existing transportation infrastructure, and required improvements, available bases and airfields to support movement, intermediate staging bases (ISBs), and FOBs, as applicable.

- Provide options for CA/CMO operational maneuver. Develop options for the concentration of CA/CMO forces in the JOA, keeping in mind operations in depth (such as local, provincial, and national levels).

- Provide options for CA/CMO operational mobility. Consider effective use of existing facilities or infrastructure, the capture or isolation of facilities or infrastructure, and the establishment of CMOCs.

- Provide options for CA/CMO force protection, including OPSEC, PHYSEC, information security (INFOSEC), CA/CMO project management, and the establishment of relationships with indigenous populations and institutions, international organizations, and NGOs to enhance force protection of the joint force.

- Provide options for CA/CMO C2:
  - Plan to incorporate CA/CMO forces into the JTF information architecture.
  - Develop options to task-assigned and attached CA/CMO forces.
  - Consider the formation of JCMOTFs for specific, complex CMO missions.

- Test each COA input for validity.

- Provide input to the JFC COA statement and sketches.

- Participate in COA analysis (war gaming). Contribute to the process of war gaming by mentally “fighting the battle” in time and space. The process may use the structure of “action-reaction-counteraction” sequences for critical events. Key elements the staff should determine include details about—
  - Required CA/CMO operational capabilities (specific tasks to capabilities).
  - Required CA/CMO assets.
  - Task organization of the JCMOTF throughout the operation, if applicable.
  - Command relationships.
  - CA/CMO POEs.
  - Civil decisive points and intelligence requirements related to major civil events.
  - Operational support needed from the joint force and/or from indigenous populations and institutions, international organizations, and NGOs.
  - Identification of branches (what if) and sequels (what then).
• Participate in COA comparison, as follows:
  ▪ Participate in determining the criteria to be used for comparing COAs. Criteria for comparison of CA/CMO options could come from the commander’s intent, METT-TC factors, or other.
  ▪ Ensure recommendations for CA/CMO have been coordinated with the CA/CMO components of the JTF.
• Receive the JFC’s decision on COAs. The JFC may select or modify the recommended COA. Based on that decision, the JFC’s “Commander’s Estimate” document (or slides) normally will be sent or briefed to the higher commander for approval.
• Provide CA/CMO perspective in the JTF order. After the COA is selected, the order is developed. Most of the information needed for this task already should have been developed through the estimate process (mission analysis through COA selection). As discussed in Chapter 4, Decide, CMO input can be in many sections of the order, but the primary area for CA should be the CA Appendix to Annex C (Operations) of the order.

E-42. Development of the CA Force’s OPORD. The CA force’s input to the JTF’s OPORD and development of the CA force’s OPORD are conducted almost simultaneously. The processes used to develop the OPORD follow the same process used for input to the JTF’s order, but are refined and tailored to provide guidance to the CA force’s components. These processes include—
  • Conduct mission analysis. Information obtained while developing input for the JTF’s order should be updated and applied to the CA force level of planning. Topic areas include—
    ▪ Review known facts:
      ♦ Describe the friendly situation: JTF, CA force, components, and other forces, as per METT-TC.
      ♦ Describe the civil situation: indigenous populations and institutions, other government agencies, international organizations and NGOs, and others, as per METT-TC.
      ♦ Describe how possible missions relate to the JTF’s plans.
      ♦ Describe other facts that may impact on the possible missions.
    ▪ Review assumptions. Assumptions replace necessary, but unknown, facts. Assumptions must be valid and necessary for planning to continue. The CA force should take into account support from other government agencies, ROE changes, and CASCOPE considerations that may affect the mission.
    ▪ Review CA/CMO constraints and limitations.
    ▪ Review specified, implied, and essential tasks to be performed by CA/CMO forces.
    ▪ Review required and available assets and capabilities, including CA/CMO assets that are required to accomplish possible JTF-directed missions.
- Review civil IPB products and deliberate assessment plans associated with the CA/CMO mission. As early as possible, include support required beyond that of the capability of the CA force and identify PIR.

- Review the risks to CA/CMO forces:
  - Identify and assess risks that the JFC is willing to take to accomplish the mission.
  - Address CA/CMO force protection issues.
  - Assess time available as determined by JFC-imposed limitations.
  - Assess the risk of failure due to possible inadequate preparation time and time to obtain support from non-CA/CMO assets.

- Review mission success criteria for CA/CMO and state the CMO MOEs.

- Develop, analyze, compare, and recommend CA/CMO COAs. This step is dependent on time available. COAs can be as simple as force options, or more complex and detailed. Specifically, the CA force should develop COAs to support the JTF as a whole. These COAs identify or confirm—
  - Who (type of CA/CMO asset) will execute the task.
  - What type of CA/CMO mission, action, or task is contemplated.
  - Where the mission will occur.
  - Why each element of the force will conduct its part of the operation.
  - How the CA/CMO force will employ available components.

COAs are analyzed to identify strengths and weaknesses and further identify many of the elements of execution planning for each COA. Friendly COAs are then compared to reveal which COA has the highest probability of success. The end product of this step is a recommendation to the CA force commander on a COA for the various types of missions the JTF has assigned to the CA force.

**Special Operations Execution Phase Mission Planning**

E-43. The process for SO execution phase mission planning is a dynamic, interactive process (Figure E-7, page E-18). It requires continual coordination and communications among the JTF, CA force, other components of the joint force and civilian organizations, if applicable. Collaborative planning can be of immense value during crisis-action planning.

E-44. **Requests for Support.** Requests for support (which may include the application of CA generalist and/or specialist skills) can come from a variety of sources. Among these are the Joint Forces Group HQ (elements such as the Joint Information Operations Cell and Joint Planning Group), the JTF components, JSOTF components, and multinational forces. These requests, depending on command relationships and mission approval levels already established, may come from a supported command direct to the CA force or may go through the JTF to the CA force.
E-45. **Feasibility Assessment.** The CA force conducts a feasibility assessment to provide an initial determination of the viability of a proposed mission or project for CA/CMO. It is an abbreviated version of mission analysis and COA development, analysis, and selection. It essentially answers the following SO criteria questions found in FM 41-10 (and in JP 3-05.2, Appendix E, “Special Operations Feasibility Assessment”):

- Is it an appropriate SOF mission?
- Does it support the JFC’s mission and intent?
- Is it operationally feasible?
- Are required resources available?
- Does the expected outcome justify the risk?

E-46. **Feasibility Assessment Submission to JTF.** Submission of the feasibility assessment to the JTF provides the JFC with an assessment of the CA force’s ability to accomplish specific requests for support.
E-47. **Warning Order Provided to Subordinates.** The components should be informed early on if a mission is likely to be tasked. Critical intelligence and assessment products should be pushed to the MPA at this point. Doing so provides the components with more time to begin their mission planning. This step is not necessary if the feasibility assessment determines that the “SOF mission criteria” are not sufficiently satisfied for execution by CA forces.

E-48. **Input for Developing the JTF FRAG Order.** The CA force planning section should be coordinating with the JTF Joint Forces Group (through the JTF CMO staff officer or other means) to provide input to the JTF FRAG order that tasks the CA force for the mission.

E-49. **Development of the CA Force’s FRAG Order.** Once the JTF FRAG order has been sent to the CA force, the CA force planners review it to confirm or update the information that was developed during the feasibility assessment. In some instances, a verbal warning order or FRAG order may be the CA force’s first indication of a mission. In this case, the CA force planners will have to conduct a rapid and abbreviated mission analysis and COA selection process, to include—

- Confirm or conduct mission analysis. This is the same process as discussed in the feasibility analysis, but the CA force commander must now select the most feasible COA.
- Confirm and conduct COA selection. This is also the same process as discussed in the feasibility assessment.
- Confirm and identify the MPA. Ideally, the MPA has been identified and given a warning order during the feasibility assessment phase. If this was not possible, this step formally designates the MPA. At this point, intelligence and assessment products are pushed to the MPA for production of the SOMPF.
- Allocate resources. If necessary, the CA force commander provides direction and assistance on the identification and coordination for additional resources that may be necessary for the MPA to conduct the mission. The CA force commander must identify to the JFC those specific support requirements.
- Confirm and identify intelligence requirements.
- Confirm and identify ROE requirements.
- Identify supporting plans. In most instances, the CA force MPA will be the supporting command. The plans of the supported unit must be identified and reviewed in their entirety, as described in Chapter 4, Decide. This may also occur when the CA force is conducting a transition to or from another organization.
- Identify supporting components. In some missions, the MPA will require assistance from supporting commands and components. The type of support (direct, mutual, general, or close) should be specified. In addition, the CA force (as the directing HQ for the support arrangement) should provide the following information when establishing support command relationships:
  - Desired end state effects and scope.
  - Forces and resources allocated to the supporting effort.
- Time, place, level, and duration of the supporting effort.
- Priority of the supporting mission relative to the other missions of the supporting force.
- Authority, if any, of the supporting commander to modify the supporting effort in the event of exceptional opportunity or emergency.
- Degree of authority granted to the supported commander (the MPA) over the supporting effort.

- Identify mission approval authority. Clearly identify mission approval authorities for each mission.
- Write and transmit the FRAG order. The FRAG order designates the MPA and supporting agencies; identifies specific taskings, planning timelines, and CONOPS requirements; grants DIRLAUTH; and sometimes establishes the earliest anticipated departure time. Acknowledgment of the FRAG order is required.

E-50. **MPA Development of CONOPS and MSRs.** Requirements for submission of CONOPS and MSRs include the following:

- CONOPS requirements. The CA force commander should clearly specify the requirements for the MPA in submitting the CONOPS for approval IAW CA force SOP or as in the FRAG order. Among those items that should be included in the CONOPS are—
  - Situation.
  - Mission (restated MPA mission).
  - Execution (CONOPS, subordinate unit tasks, coordination, and operational limitations).

- Mission support requests. MSRs consist of the following types of requests:
  - Support requests. For initial support, the MPA submits a SPTREQ to the supporting component HQ and provides an information copy to the CA force requesting resources needed to accomplish the tasked mission. It should be sent at the same time that the MPA sends the CONOPS message. For support from sources outside of the CA force (such as Class X supplies), the SPTREQ is sent only to the CA force for action. The CA force may grant DIRLAUTH between CA components and components of the JTF. The SPTREQ should list all MPA support requirements and identify any preference for a particular supporting agency. The MPA may submit additional SPTREQs as planning continues. For follow-on support, the MPA submits a SPTREQ to the supporting component HQ for action and provides an information copy to the CA force requesting follow-on support for a CA element already on a mission. The SPTREQ should be submitted as soon as possible.
  - Air support request. For initial support, the AIRSUPREQ is used to request preplanned and immediate close air support interdiction, reconnaissance, surveillance, escort, helicopter airlift, humanitarian supply delivery, and other aircraft missions. The MPA
submits an AIRSUPREQ to the supporting component HQ and provides an information copy to the CA force requesting resources needed to accomplish the tasked mission. It should be sent at the same time the MPA sends the CONOPS. The CA force may grant DIrlAUTH between CA components and components of the JTF. The AIRSUPREQ should list all MPA air support requirements and identify any preference for a particular supporting agency. The MPA may submit additional AIRSUPREQs as planning continues. SOF LNOs and coordination elements should be aware of mission coordination in progress.

- Airspace control means request. This is used to request that a defined block of airspace be designated as having special significance for air operations within an AOR. These areas include drop zones (DZs), ground free-fire zones, landing zones (LZs), pickup points, restrictive fire plans, selected areas for evasion (SAFEs), and potential evasion locale. These zones may be defined as a circle around a central point, a corridor centered on a line, an area bounded by line segments, or airspace bounded by attitude. This request is submitted to the joint special operations air component commander who will enter them into the air control order (ACO).

- MSR confirmations. Prior to mission execution, the supporting SOF components send support confirmation in response to the support requests, or request confirmations in response to the AIRSUPREQs to the MPA with information copies provided to the CA force.

E-51. **CONOPS Approval.** The approval process varies depending upon whether or not the CA force commander has mission approval authority, as follows:

- CA force commander has mission approval authority. If the CA force commander has approval authority for execution of the mission, a CA force CONOPS is not submitted to the JTF. Once the CA force commander is satisfied with the MPA’s CONOPS, the CA force sends a CONOPS approval to the MPA and supporting components. Approval is sent as soon as possible after receipt of the MPA’s CONOPS.

- CA force commander does not have mission approval authority. If the CA force commander does not have approval authority for the mission, a CA force CONOPS is sent to the JFC for approval.

E-52. **Monitoring of Other Support Plans.** For most CA operations, other commands or agencies, both within and outside the JTF, could provide support or follow-on actions to the CA force. The CA force should monitor the planning activities and coordinate actions to ensure unity of effort. Coordination with nonmilitary agencies is usually accomplished in a CMOC. Chapters 4, Decide, and 5, Develop and Detect, include additional information.

E-53. **Mission Briefbacks.** Mission briefbacks are briefings by subordinate commanders to the mission approving authority (the CA force commander or the JFC) explaining how the CA element intends to accomplish the assigned
mission. Representatives from the CA force planning section and the JOC should attend the briefback, if possible. At this point, planning has not ended and changes can still be made to the plan. The major benefits of briefbacks are that they allow the approving commander to—

- Clarify the commander’s intent.
- Identify and emphasize the CCIR.
- Understand problems that the MPA may be having in planning the mission.
- Understand the MPA’s CONOPS.
- Modify and/or approve the MPA’s CONOPS.

The approving commander should expect the following from the MPA:

- Information concerning the MPA’s assumptions, task organization, mission statement, commander’s intent, CONOPS, threat assessment, and risk.
- Discussion of any issue that needs clarification.
- Requests for support and assistance in resolving issues.

E-54. Plans Handover Procedures. At some point prior to mission execution, the CA force’s planning effort should be handed over to the JOC for execution. This handover should be a formal process in which the CA force planners ensure that the JOC personnel are thoroughly familiar with the plan. The plans handover briefing should include the following:

- Situation: The general situation, the civil situation, CA/CMO objective and mission description, and threat assessment.
- Mission: Specified and implied tasks and expected results of action taken in as specific terms as possible.
- Task organization: CA/CMO operational elements, including support, security, and logistic elements, as required.
- CONOPS: Infiltration plan, actions on the objective, exfiltration plan, and emergency action plan.
- Other: Limitations, ROE, support plans, status of support requests, and command and signal.

E-55. Requests for Execution and Execute Order. The MPA requests authority for mission execution (verbal or via message or E-mail). If the CA force commander has mission execution authority, approval is granted through an EXORD. If the JFC (or higher level of command) has execution authority, the CA force commander prepares a request for execution and submits it to the JFC. The higher authority provides an EXORD and the CA force commander subsequently issues an EXORD to the MPA and supporting units.

E-56. Operation Summary. Once the mission is complete, the MPA submits an OPSUM to the CA force commander.
BASIC SPECIAL OPERATIONS OPERATIONAL PLANNING STEPS IN DETAIL

E-57. There are thirteen basic steps for planning CA missions using the SO operational planning process. CA units, teams, and individuals follow these steps for deliberate, time-sensitive, and peacetime planning whether planning at home station or at a forward-deployed location. This section will discuss each of the steps, less deploy, execute mission, and redeploy, in detail. For the purpose of simplicity, this discussion will begin with a validated mission tasked by USACAPOC to a regional CACOM or Active Army CA battalion to provide support to a geographic combatant command. Tasks attributed to the CA unit commander and staff officers in this discussion are performed at the CA team level by the team leader and team members.

Receipt of Mission

E-58. A CA unit will receive notification of a mission by means of a warning order, TASKORD, or FRAG order. This order could be issued verbally, but it is more often received in electronic or hard copy form. It is normally transmitted in message text format through secure means via a message center or over a classified network. It may also be hand delivered by courier.

E-59. The mission notification order provides as much information as necessary for the subordinate unit to begin mission planning. It follows the 5-paragraph field order format. At a minimum, the order designates the MPA and supporting agencies, provides pertinent references and POCs, gives instructions regarding DIRLAUTH, key mission planning events, and suspense dates for required reports, and earliest anticipated launch time (EALT).

E-60. Mission notification is normally handled through the CA unit operations section. Upon receipt of the mission, the G-3 or S-3 informs the unit commander via the most expedient and secure means possible. The commander provides initial guidance regarding the mission planning process, such as the date, time, and required attendees for the mission analysis conference.

Initiation of the Special Operations Mission Planning Folder

E-61. The SOMPF is an integral part of the planning process and is described in JP 3-05.5, Joint Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning Procedures. The SOMPF is a key, single-source, reference document that contains all historical details of a mission from initial notification through mission completion. It is classified according to its contents and is handled appropriately according to its classification. It is designed to retain continuity for planners over time.

E-62. The G-3 or S-3 initiates the SOMPF by assigning a mission designation and an MPA. The MPA creates the folder according to unit SOP. The SOMPF is normally contained in a compartmented binder or folder that keeps all information in an orderly, logical format. A typical SOMPF consists of the following items:

- Mission designation.
- Mission TASKORD.
- Mission planning checklist (Figure E-8, page E-24).
- DA Form 1594, Daily Staff Journal or Duty Officer’s Log.
• Commander’s Statement of Intent.
• CONOPS.
• MSR.
• CONOPS approval by higher HQ.
• Planning conference trip reports.
• Predeployment site survey (PDSS) results.
• Deployment data.
• OPSUM.
• AAR.

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**Figure E-8. Sample Mission Planning Checklist**

**Mission Analysis**

E-63. The commander and all essential personnel involved in the CA mission participate in the mission analysis process. This process is best performed in a location that gives the participants a secure, nondisruptive atmosphere yet provides access to equipment, people, and information required for proper mission analysis. The following paragraphs discuss the mission analysis process.
E-64. **Gather Facts.** The following documents are useful in gathering facts pertaining to the mission:

- All documents referenced in the TASKORD (these usually include theater OPLANs or OPORDs, supported unit OPLANs or OPORDs, and other documents that are directive in nature or provide guidance for mission planners).
- Area studies for the specified AO.
- Recent surveys or assessments of the AO.
- SODARS data for the specified AO.
- Trip reports and AARs of conferences or CA operations in the AO.
- Current SITREPs of deployed CA units, teams, and individuals in the AO.

E-65. Other sources of information include national and theater threat assessments, ambassadors’ annual statements of goals and objectives, country team and HN government plans, annual integrated assessments of security assistance, theater joint mission analysis, basic PSYOP studies, and the plans and programs of other USG agencies. Many of these sources are available through theater-level planners and are highly classified.

E-66. **Make Assumptions.** Any required information not readily available through these resources should be requested from the higher CA HQ using specific RFIs. In order for the mission analysis process to continue, the missing information is replaced by assumptions that are based on the knowledge and experience of the analysts. These assumptions will be confirmed or refuted upon receipt of answers to the RFIs.

E-67. **Restate the Mission Statement.** The tasked CA commander restates the mission statement to reflect what he sees as his actual mission. Using the TASKORD as the primary document and the resources listed above as supporting documents, the CA commander and his staff determine the specified and implied tasks for CA forces. Specified tasks are those tasks specifically assigned to CA forces in plans, orders, and other directives. Implied tasks include those supporting tasks that must be accomplished in order to achieve a specified task. Implied tasks also include those tasks identified in supporting documents that must be accomplished to achieve the overall mission.

E-68. After listing all specified and implied tasks, the commander and his staff determine which are the critical, or essential, tasks. The essential tasks are those that absolutely must be accomplished in order to successfully complete the mission. These essential tasks will be listed in the restated mission statement for the unit conducting the mission analysis.

E-69. **Determine Commander’s Intent and Guidance.** In addition to the restated mission statement, the commander constructs his intent for the mission, defining what he sees as the end state of the operation and what the CA force must do to achieve that end state. He also provides guidance for continued mission analysis by the staff. His guidance should include—

- Specific COAs to develop.
- Risk guidance.
- Security measures to be implemented.
• Specific priorities for CSS.
• The time plan.
• The type of order or product to result from the process.
• Any other information the commander wants the staff to consider.

E-70. At this point, the commander should take the opportunity to give a warning order to all subordinate units, teams, or individuals that will be participating in the operation. The warning order provides all details necessary for the subordinate CA element to begin planning and, if applicable, tells the subordinate element when the OPORD will be issued.

E-71. Develop and Analyze COAs. When the commander and staff have completed the steps mentioned above, the staff conducts a COA analysis. FM 101-5 presents a detailed discussion of the process of developing and analyzing COAs. The staff will follow this process to determine options that will achieve the restated mission.

E-72. For some CA missions, only one COA exists to satisfy a mission. The commander of the higher CA HQ may direct this COA or it may be the only viable solution based on mission requirements and the availability of CA functional specialists. When only one COA is developed, the purpose of the COA analysis is to verify, refine, synchronize, and integrate the commander’s COA and recommend modifications, as necessary.

E-73. Approve COA. The staff will present each of the options to the CA unit commander in a decision briefing. At the end of the briefing, the unit commander chooses the COA which best satisfies the mission according to his guidance.

E-74. If the commander has observed and participated in the planning process, the decision may be rapidly apparent and the commander can make an on-the-spot decision. If only one COA was developed, no decision is required unless the developed COA becomes unsuitable, infeasible, or unacceptable.

Response to Higher Headquarters via CONOPS and MSR

E-75. The approved COA becomes the basis for the unit’s initial CONOPS. The CONOPS indicates to the tasking CA commander that the tasked unit has conducted a detailed mission analysis. The initial CONOPS will contain as much detail as possible in each of its paragraphs, but leaves room for further coordination. It is sent to the higher CA HQ according to the suspense date given in the mission notification order; for example, within 90 days of the DTG of the TASKORD for deliberate planning and NLT 24 hours after receipt of the TASKORD for time-sensitive operations.

E-76. The CONOPS is not a directive—it is merely a mechanism used to advise the tasking commander how the unit intends to accomplish its assigned mission.

E-77. Normally, the CA element tasked as the MPA will consolidate the CONOPS of subordinate or supporting CA elements into one CONOPS. This CONOPS is passed to the higher CA HQ where it may be further consolidated before submission to the tasking commander.
E-78. Any resources required for the mission that are not organic to the unit or available to the unit through routine CSS channels are listed in an MSR. The MSR is forwarded to the next-higher CA HQ, usually along with the CONOPS. This HQ will attempt to fill the request using internal sources. It will consolidate all subordinate and supporting unit MSRs and forward unfilled requirements to the next-higher CA HQ for resolution.

**Receipt of CONOPS Approval From Higher CA Headquarters**

E-79. Upon review of the CONOPS, the tasking commander will issue a message indicating approval or disapproval of the CONOPS. He will also provide additional guidance, as necessary, regarding further planning and coordination for the mission.

**Mission Conferences and Orders Briefs and Conduct of PDSS**

E-80. Depending on the timeline given in the mission notification order, this step may occur during the facts-gathering phase of mission analysis and before CONOPS submission.

E-81. The tasked CA unit commander sends his primary mission planners to mission conferences and orders briefs sponsored by the supported unit. The CA planners actively participate in these meetings by providing capabilities briefings, meeting key POCs, coordinating logistics requirements, and gathering additional information for CA mission planning.

E-82. If time, circumstances, and force protection measures permit, the CA planners visit the location at which the unit, team, or individual will conduct the CA mission. During this PDSS, CA planners visit or obtain information on all mission-related CASCOPE. They meet key POCs and conduct as much coordination as possible to ensure a smooth transition to full operations upon deployment. A technique is to take still photos or video during the PDSS to orient deploying CA soldiers to the area.

E-83. Upon return from mission conferences, orders briefs, and PDSSs, CA planners write trip reports. Trip reports serve to document coordination made during the trip and to identify unresolved issues that must be addressed before execution of the CA mission. They are submitted to the MPA according to time requirements specified in the unit SOP. A typical trip report format is found in Appendix C.

**Refinement of CONOPS into OPLAN, CONPLAN, Supporting Plan, or OPORD**

E-84. The final product of the SO operational planning process is an OPLAN, CONPLAN, supporting plan, or OPORD that details how the CA unit, team, or individual will accomplish the CA mission. All plans and orders and their supporting annexes and appendixes use the five-paragraph field order format found in FM 101-5.

E-85. The OPLAN, a product of deliberate planning, is a complete and detailed plan containing a full description of the CONOPS and all required annexes with associated appendixes. The OPLAN identifies the specific CA forces, functional support, deployment sequence, and resources required to execute the plan and provides closure estimates for their movement into the
theater. The OPLAN becomes an OPORD when the conditions of execution occur and an execution time is determined.

E-86. The CONPLAN, also a product of deliberate planning, is an OPLAN in an abbreviated concept format that would require considerable expansion or alteration to convert it into an OPLAN or OPORD. A CONPLAN contains the commander’s employment concept and key annexes and appendixes required to complete planning. CONPLANs are generally developed to meet common-type missions that may develop rapidly and require implementation of like action but under markedly different circumstances; for example, NEO.

E-87. The supporting plan complements the OPLAN or CONPLAN of a supported unit. Some examples of supporting plans are CMO annexes, CA appendixes, and NEO plans.

E-88. The OPLAN, CONPLAN, and supporting plan are merely proposals for executing a future or anticipated operation. Upon completion, these plans are stored according to their classification until required. Because plans make assumptions about the nature of the situation at the anticipated time of execution, they cannot remain static. They must be reviewed periodically and updated to reflect the current analysis of the situation.

E-89. The OPORD, a product of both time-sensitive planning and peacetime planning, is a directive issued by the commander to subordinate commanders or team leaders for effecting coordinated execution of an operation. Based on plans or the receipt of a new mission, the OPORD is a written or an oral communication directing actions at a specified execution time and date.

E-90. The execution paragraph of CA plans and orders typically covers five distinct phases:

- **Phase I, Predeployment**: Addresses all actions necessary to prepare the unit, team, or individual to deploy, including administrative, training, and logistics requirements and mobilization issues.
- **Phase II, Deployment**: Addresses movement through mobilization station or point of embarkation to the AO according to the TPFDD or TPFDL.
- **Phase III, Employment**: Addresses how the CA unit, team, or individual will accomplish its specified, implied, and critical tasks in the AO along civil lines of operation (such as the six CA activities). This section may be further divided into major milestones or phases of the operation, if known.
- **Phase IV, Redeployment**: Addresses movement through point of embarkation through demobilization station to home station according to TPFDD or TPFDL.
- **Phase V, Recovery**: Addresses all actions necessary to prepare the unit, team, or individual for future missions.

**Briefback**

E-91. The briefback is the MPA’s opportunity to demonstrate to the tasking CA commander or the supported mission commander that all assigned tasks from the mission notification order and all subsequent guidance requirements
issued during the planning process have been met. For deliberate planning, the briefback allows the tasking CA commander the opportunity to review OPLANs, CONPLANs, and supporting plans before they are placed in the CA unit files or forwarded to the commander of the supported unit. For time-sensitive and peacetime planning, the briefback allows the tasking CA commander to ensure the deploying unit, team, or individual clearly understands the mission, and all requirements have been planned and coordinated prior to mission execution.

E-92. The tasking CA commander dictates the venue and format of the briefback. The briefback can take the form of a formal staff briefing or an informal desk-side briefing. At a minimum, the briefback should cover each of the five paragraphs in enough detail to demonstrate the extent and effectiveness of the planning process.

E-93. If circumstances do not afford a tasked CA unit, team, or individual the opportunity to present an oral briefback to the tasking commander, a final CONOPS that details the same information may serve the same purpose.

**NOTE:** This is the last step in the SO operational planning process for deliberate planning.

**Deploy/Execute Mission/Redeploy**

E-94. These steps of the planning process are the result of CA mission planning. They will not be addressed in this appendix.

**Results of Mission Documented in OPSUM, AAR, J ULLS, SODARS, and CA Database**

E-95. This step in the planning process occurs after mission completion and is not technically a step in mission planning. It is addressed at this time, however, because the products of this step assist CA planners plan follow-on CA missions or CA missions of a similar nature.

E-96. **Operations Summary.** The OPSUM is a snapshot of what occurred during the mission. It outlines details about the operational mission only. It is normally submitted within 96 hours of mission completion with the understanding that a more detailed AAR will follow. A sample OPSUM is in Appendix C.

E-97. **After-Action Report.** The AAR is a historical record of a CA activity or CA participation in a civil-military operation. Participants in the activity or operation generate the AAR shortly after the mission is completed. The AAR is forwarded through the chain of command to the highest command level so that commanders, staff officers, and other analysts can develop trends, lessons, and justification for changes to structure and equipment authorizations.

E-98. A good, comprehensive AAR contains copies of pertinent documentation and information about the important events that initiated the operation. It provides diagrams depicting force structure and command relationships for the operation. It details the CA activities conducted during the operation and discusses challenges and issues that enhanced or impeded those activities. Finally, the AAR analyzes the operation for DTLOMS.
E-99. **Joint Universal Lessons Learned System.** JULLS is a subcomponent of the joint exercise management package (JEMP). The JULLS program is used widely throughout all branches of the military and provides a mechanism for collecting lessons that are learned from a military exercise or operation. Each lesson learned is stored in a central database to facilitate later reference. This database is distributed semiannually to the combatant commanders of all unified commands, the Services, and the combat support agencies. JULLS improves combatant commanders’ warfighting capabilities by taking advantage of lessons from real-world operations and exercises. The JULLS database is classified SECRET and below.

E-100. Information is input to the JULLS database in the following format:
- Identifying information.
- Title.
- Observation.
- Discussion.
- Lesson learned.
- Recommended action.
- Comments.

E-101. **Special Operations Debrief and Retrieval System.** Some OCONUS missions require a SODARS report. The purpose of the SODARS report is to capture current conditions, attitudes, contacts, and other information items in the visited area for reference by SOF personnel deploying there on future missions. The unit G-2 or S-2 is responsible for maintaining and transmitting the SODARS report through higher CA HQ to USASOC.

**JOINT OPERATION EXECUTION AND DEPLOYMENT MANAGEMENT**

E-102. Except for TPFDD development, JOPES deliberate and crisis-action planning is essentially a manual process. In crisis-action planning, JOPES ADP support is used to refine existing TPFDD or to develop new ones. At execution, JOPES ADP manages the deployment of forces and their equipment into the AO.

**Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data**

E-103. A TPFDD is a computer database used to identify types of forces and actual units required to support an OPLAN or OPORD. In addition, the TPFDD contains estimates of logistics support and designates ports for loading (embarkation) and unloading (debarkation). Finally, the TPFDD, based on planner input, establishes the sequence for moving the forces and their support (time phasing) into the AO. The time-phased forces, and their associated cargo and passenger movement requirements, are used as the basis for actual transportation scheduling. JOPES ADP depends on Service planning systems for these force and support requirements. The JOPES database is distributed worldwide and provides a single information source for movement status.
E-104. Developing TPFDD involves four main processes. These are discussed in the following paragraphs.

E-105. **Force Planning.** JOPES ADP helps planners build the force list during force planning. Force planning begins when the combatant commander identifies the major apportioned forces needed to support his CONOPS, and continues with the identification of CS and CSS force requirements. Initially, for gross planning estimates, notional (generic) units may be designated. As the process continues, however, actual units must be identified.

E-106. **Support Planning.** TPFDD development then shifts to support planning. Various software programs use the force list to estimate time-phased lift requirements for supplies, equipment, and replacement personnel needed to sustain the forces specified during force planning. The quantities are determined using planning models to derive gross quantities (weight and volume). Unique computer programs provide support for specialized planning models, such as civil engineering and medical support.

E-107. **Transportation Planning.** During transportation planning, all of the forces are time-phased into the AO. JOPES software compares apportioned transportation assets to the forces to be moved, factors in their sustainment requirements and time-phasing, and determines if the planned forces can be moved to the AO to meet the combatant command’s needs. The product of this process is a capabilities-based, transportation-feasible database containing all the forces, materiel, and personnel needed to execute the combatant commander’s CONOPS. This transportation-feasible database is the TPFDD.

E-108. **Deployment or Redeployment Execution.** At execution, the TPFDD developed during deliberate planning (or a new one developed during crisis-action planning) is refined and movement requirements are validated. This validated TPFDD becomes the basis for actual transportation scheduling for force deployment and subsequent redeployment. Supply and replacement personnel estimates developed during planning are used as a source for establishing transportation channels for sustainment movement. In short, the JOPES database is a single source for force deployment movement requirements and status.

E-109. The CJCS has established a time standard for TPFDD development during crisis-action planning. The objective time standard is 72 hours from notification and receipt by the supported commander to validation of the TPFDD (in level IV detail [explained below]) for the first 7 days of the deployment flow. (**NOTE:** Based on supported commander guidance, assets deploying from origin to destination on unit organic transportation may not require level IV detail.)

### Levels of Detail

E-110. Within the current joint planning and execution systems, movement characteristics are described at six distinct levels of detail. CA planners must be familiar with the levels as they must provide specific data to the supported unit during the TPFDD-building process. These levels are—

- **Level I:** Aggregated level. Expressed in total number of passengers and total short tons (STONs), total measurement tons (MTONs), total
square feet (SQFT), or total thousands of barrels by unit line number (ULN), cargo increment number (CIN), and personnel increment number (PIN).

- **Level II**: Summary level. Expressed as total number of passengers by ULN and cargo summarized as follows: bulk, oversized, outsized, and non-air-transportable STONs; vehicular, non-self-deployable aircraft and boats, and other MTONs in SQFT; and thousands of barrels of POL.

- **Level III**: Total passengers and cargo STONs, MTONs, SQFT, and thousands of barrels broken down by cargo category.

- **Level IV**: Detail expressed as number of passengers and individual dimensional data (expressed in length, width, and height in number of inches) of cargo by equipment type by ULN.

- **Level V**: Detail by priority of shipment. Expressed as total number of passengers by Service specialty code in deployment sequence by ULN individual weight (in pounds) and dimensional data (expressed in length, width, and height in number of inches) of equipment in deployment sequence by ULN.

- **Level VI**: Detail expressed for passengers by name and social security number (SSN) or for coalition forces and civilians by country national identification number; and for cargo by transportation control number (TCN). Nonunit cargo includes federal stock number (FSN) or National Stock Number (NSN) detail. Cargo can be nested. Cargo with TCNs that are nested are referred to as “secondary loads.” Level VI example: 11 level VI records would represent 11 vehicles of the same type. Those records would be summed to 1 in a level IV record.

**CA Planner Responsibilities**

E-111. ADP hardware and software applications supporting JOPES and TPFDD development are continuously upgraded as technology advances. The GCCS currently provides the hardware that supports JOPES. The JOPES ADP software is made up of hundreds of individual computer programs. The major elements of JOPES ADP are found no lower than division level.

E-112. Whatever the mechanisms may be, collaborative planning is a common goal that all commands must support. CA planners support the process by—

- Reviewing the following policy documents:
  - JOPES Volume I.
  - Joint TPFDD letter of instruction (LOI).
  - USOCOM TPFDD LOI.
  - Supported combatant command TPFDD LOI.
  - USASOC TPFDD LOI.
- Routinely assessing unit mission, readiness, and deployment requirements.
Maintaining accurate and current databases; for example, Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS), which feeds into the TPFDD-building process.

- Reporting discrepancies to the appropriate staff or command element.
- Providing copies of cargo detail reports and personnel detail reports to designated command element, logistics staff, and movement planners.
- Reviewing and updating cargo detail reports and personnel detail reports upon notification of deployment or receiving access to operation plan from operations staff.
- Keeping abreast of changes in supported unit requirements that ensure the effective deployment and redeployment of any assigned mission or requirement.

TPFDD PROCESS FOR CA UNIT DEPLOYMENT OR REDEPLOYMENT

E-113. The following paragraphs discuss the TPFDD process for CA units deploying or redeploying in support of CMO.

E-114. The supported combatant command—
- Determines force requirements.
- Normally develops force module.
- Develops notional TPFDD (type unit, locations, dates).
- Informs USSOCOM of force requirements.
- Obtains geographic combatant commander approval for force deployments.
- Validates force requirements to USTRANSCOM for lift scheduling.
- Except for validation of lift, usually exercises authority through theater Army or SOC.

E-115. USASOC—
- Coordinates with USSOCOM, SOCs, and MSCs in building and sourcing the TPFDD.
- Monitors the size of unit deployment packages to ensure that only the minimum essential equipment and personnel are sourced in the TPFDD.
- Loads cargo detail into JOPES.
- Validates TPFDD to USSOCOM IAW TPFDD milestones outlined in the USSOCOM and supported combatant command TPFDD LOI.

E-116. USASOC TPFDD procedures (Figure E-9, page E-34) include the following:
- ARSOF TPFDD for crisis and contingency operations will be loaded into JOPES at USASOC Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS), once validated by the chain of command.
- Exercise data will be entered at USASOC DCSOPS or at the theater exercise planning conference if a USASOC representative is present, IAW the supported combatant command’s TPFDD LOI or USSOCOM tasking.
- Deliberate planning data will be entered at USASOC DCSOPS prior to planning conferences or at the USTRANSCOM planning conference if a
USASOC representative is present, IAW the supported combatant command’s TPFDD LOI or USSOCOM tasking.

- ARSOF units will be listed separately from conventional forces. They will not be absorbed into conventional ULNs.

**Figure E-9. TPFDD Data Entry**

E-117. General rules for TPFDD and ULN development include the following:

- An air movement ULN will not exceed four C-141B equivalents (80 STONs).
- One unit identification code (UIC) per ULN.
- ULNs will be based on company-sized and smaller units with appropriate UIC.
- Standard pallet planning weight is 3.2 STONs or less unless shipping paper, water, ammunition, or barrier material.
- Derivative UICs are vigorously used and tracked.
- USASOC Level II or Level IV Worksheet (Appendix C) will be used to submit TPFDD.
E-118. Earliest arrival date (EAD) and latest arrival date (LAD) window procedures are as follows:

- Theater planners specify the EAD and LAD window.
- C-days are used for real-world TPFDD.
- Julian dates are used for most exercise TPFDD.
- Air movement ULNs require a minimum of 3 days.
- Sea movement ULNs require a minimum of 10 days.

E-119. Airlift allocation procedures (Figure E-10) are as follows:

- Supported commander provides for real-world and exercise planning.
- Real world: Expressed as the total number of STONs of cargo (per day) that can be transported by air or sea into the theater of operations.
- Exercise: The total number of aircraft authorized by the joint staff for a specific exercise.
- Theater SOC will suballocate airlift to SOC components.
- Theater Army will suballocate airlift to CA and PSYOP.
- ULNs must be sized and phased to remain within respective suballocations.

Figure E-10. TPFDD Airlift Scheduling
E-120. TPFDD validation procedures include the following:
   - “Force receiving commands” and “force providing commands” have reached agreement on the forces in the TPFDD.
   - Theater SOCs and combatant commands ensure that sourced forces in the TPFDD satisfy force requirements and are prioritized for movement. USASOC and USSOCOM ensure—
     - Units are ready to deploy by dates in the TPFDD.
     - Unit readiness status will allow them to accomplish the mission.
     - TPFDD is accurate and error-free.
     - Identification of hazardous cargo during the validation.
     - Unit’s requested lift requirement is within the theater-defined lift allocation.

E-121. TPFDD milestones (air movement) include the following:
   - T-110: TPFDD to MSC G-3.
   - T-105: TPFDD to USASOC DCSOPS.
   - T-95: USASOC submits validation to USSOCOM.
   - T-90: USSOCOM submits validation to supported combatant command.
   - T-85: Theater SOC or Army validates to supported combatant command.
   - T-70: Supported combatant command validates to USTRANSCOM.

E-122. TPFDD milestones (sea movement) include the following:
   - T-135: TPFDD to MSC G-3.
   - T-130: TPFDD to USASOC DCSOPS.
   - T-125: USASOC submits validation to USSOCOM.
   - T-120: USSOCOM submits validation to supported combatant command.
   - T-115: Theater SOC or Army validates to supported combatant command.
   - T-100: Supported combatant command validates to USTRANSCOM.

CA PLANNING USING THE EN ROUTE MISSION PLANNING AND REHEARSAL SYSTEM

E-123. EMPRS was developed to meet the challenges of force projection and rapid deployment to contingency operations. Forces deploying to an operational area, by air, land, or sea, are expected to execute their mission immediately upon arrival. Those forces may or may not have the benefit of time and intelligence to adequately prepare and rehearse an operation before departure.

E-124. EMPRS provides the ability to support en route collaborative planning and mission rehearsal with early entry and forced entry forces that are typically disadvantaged while moving to the target area for tactical deployment. It provides C2 to deploying forces by enabling HQ to plan and replan operations collaboratively based on changes to ongoing operations.
"When you put an airborne force or a light force... on an airplane, you essentially put them in an isolation booth, so all they know is what they knew when they got on that airplane," said Lieutenant General Randall L. Rigby, exercise director for the experiment.

During one test of the system, paratroopers from the 3d Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, were tasked to take the airfield on the fictitious island of "Aragon." They learned 15 minutes after takeoff that a cache of SA-18 antiaircraft missiles north of the drop zone had to be seized as well.

With the help of EMPRS, Lieutenant Colonel Michael Garrett, 3d Battalion commander, drafted a new plan of attack, briefed the joint task force headquarters at Fort Bragg, and informed his men of the additional mission before they reached the drop zone. He was able to section off a detachment to seize the missiles well before the paratroopers hit the ground.

Based on such performance, some officials believe the EMPRS could play a key part in the success of Army Chief of Staff General Eric K. Shinseki's plan to create brigade combat teams that can deploy anywhere in the world within 96 hours. "If you can't plan to rehearse while you are in the air, then we won't be able to make the 96-hour timeline."

Experimental System Provides Real-Time In-Flight Data,
Army Logistician,
Volume 33, Issue 1,
January-February 2001

E-125. As a capability of the ABCS, EMPRS is a platform for three-way communications between mission command HQ, a task force en route, and an operations site. The system's hardware and software components enable the development, processing, and display of mission-related information including maps, photographs, and other planning tools. The system provides data connectivity between ground and airborne computers using various communication links, and connections with remotely located stations. In addition to voice communications, the system enables participants to simultaneously exchange and edit overlays, imagery, presentations, and other documents.

E-126. Using ABCS- and EMPRS-unique equipment, deploying forces are able to—

- Receive a new or modify an existing mission tasking while en route to an area of combat operations.
- Replan mission implementation based upon new information or tasking in near-real time.
- Coordinate the new plan among all applicable combat elements (including joint and multiservice elements).
- Rehearse the new plan with all applicable combat elements.
- Execute the new plan.
E-127. During the alert and predeployment phase, the system operates from fixed facilities. EMPRS can also be configured for mobile platforms, including USAF C-130, C-141, C-5 and C-17 aircraft, as well as surface ships.

E-128. While communication between tactical military users is normally secure, the system also interfaces with NGOs supporting contingency operations using commercial, off-the-shelf, industry-standard hardware and software packages.

E-129. When used aboard aircraft, EMPRS is a palletized system. The deploying force commander and staff must create seating plans and bump plans that cross-level soldiers based on their operational functions and mission requirements in the objective area. The CA team leader ensures that the commander conducts an appropriate METT-TC analysis when creating these plans.

CA PLANNING USING THE MILITARY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

E-130. This discussion of the MDMP, adapted from FM 101-5, supports CA planners in their role as members of a conventional military staff below the joint level. It covers basic procedures without the benefit of the ABCS.

E-131. Deliberate decision making is characterized by full implementation of the MDMP. Commanders below the joint level use the MDMP when time is available for the staff to explore a full range of options. It is used by both experienced and inexperienced staffs. CA planners, as essential members of the staff, are intricately involved in the MDMP.

E-132. The commander is personally responsible for planning, preparing for, and executing operations. From start to finish, the commander’s personal role is central; his participation in the process provides focus and guidance to the staff. The commander uses his staff during the MDMP to explore the full range of probable and likely enemy, friendly, and civilian COAs, and to analyze and compare his own organization’s capabilities with those of the enemy and other organizations in the AO. This staff effort has one objective: to collectively integrate information with sound doctrine and technical competence to assist the commander in visualizing the battlespace and in making sound decisions. The MDMP is an adaptation of the Army’s analytical approach to problem solving, mentioned previously in this appendix. The MDMP—

- Provides a tool to assist in developing a plan.
- Is detailed, deliberate, and sequential.
- Minimizes the risk of overlooking a critical aspect of the operation.
- When used properly, results in the production of a sound order.
- Is time-consuming.
- Forms the foundation for planning in a time-constrained environment.

E-133. Throughout the MDMP, the commander and each staff section maintain estimates. The estimate contains significant facts and events of an AO, interprets their significance to current and future operations, and, based on the analyzed data, provides conclusions on future possibilities and
prospective results of the various actions that might be taken by all sides of an operation—friendly, enemy, and civilian. The estimate also recommends how to best use available resources.

E-134. The estimate is revised when important new information is received or the situation changes significantly. It is maintained not only to support the planning process but also for mission execution. The CMO estimate format is found in FM 41-10.

E-135. Figure E-11 provides a detailed graphic representation of the MDMP. FM 101-5 identifies seven steps to the MDMP. Each of these steps will be discussed in more detail below.

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**Figure E-11. The Military Decision-Making Process**

**RECEIPT OF MISSION**

E-136. A unit may receive a mission in a variety of ways; for example, via warning order, FRAG order, OPORD, or verbal order. As soon as a new mission is received, the unit’s operations section issues a warning order to the
staff alerting them of the pending planning process. Unit SOPs identify who is to attend, who the alternates are, and where they should assemble.

E-137. Before the MDMP, staff officers must know the status of subordinate units, limitations, and capabilities of supporting assets, threat situation and capabilities in the AO, and time available. The CA planning team prepares for the mission analysis immediately upon receipt of the warning order by gathering the tools needed to do mission analysis. These include—

- Copy of the order or plan of the higher HQ, with graphics.
- Maps of the AO.
- SOPs of the supported unit, the higher HQ, and the supporting CA unit.
- Appropriate FMs.
- Any existing CMO estimates and area assessments. At a minimum, the CA planners should have conducted an analysis of CASCOPE for the AO.
- Additional tools determined to be useful based on team experience and CA unit SOP for the particular type of mission.

E-138. At the initial mission analysis meeting, the commander and staff conduct a quick initial assessment designed to optimize the commander’s use of time while preserving time for subordinate commanders to plan and complete operational preparations. This assessment—

- Determines the time available from mission receipt to mission execution.
- Determines the time needed for the unit and its subordinates to plan, prepare for, and execute the mission.
- Determines the IPB.
- Determines the staff estimates already available to assist planning.
- Considers ambient light requirements for planning, rehearsals, and movement.
- Considers the staff’s experience, cohesiveness, and level of rest or stress.

E-139. Additionally, the commander issues his staff initial guidance. This guidance normally includes—

- How to abbreviate the MDMP, if required. The commander can do this by giving the staff specific COAs to develop.
- Initial time allocation for planning. The commander establishes a timeline that allocates one-third of the available time to his staff planning process and two-thirds to subordinate units. The time may vary from hours to days, weeks, or months.
- Liaison officers to dispatch. Liaison officers facilitate support for any coordination that may be required. Their dispatch is an informal notification that a plan of action is pending.
- Initial reconnaissance to begin. A collection plan is established early to gather and provide information to the staff during the planning process. Depending on the staff level and assets available, the reconnaissance may range from a foot soldier to satellite imagery to researching and monitoring Internet sites to a host of other sources.
Authorized movement. It may be necessary to move units into positions that facilitate implementation upon completing and disseminating the plan.

Additional tasks to accomplish. This refers to any other identified activities that can be done before the mission or to aid in mission accomplishment.

E-140. The last step in the mission receipt phase is to issue a warning order to subordinate and supporting units. This order must include, as a minimum, the type of operation, the general location of the operation, the initial timeline, and any movement or reconnaissance operations to initiate. It is issued so that several echelons can work on their MDMP concurrently.

E-141. Parallel planning is a routine procedure for MDMP. Parallel planning relies on accurate and timely warning orders and a full sharing of information between echelons as it becomes available. Parallel planning is facilitated by digitization using ABCS. CA planners ensure unit SOPs address when and how to share relevant CA and CMO information in support of parallel planning between staff elements and between echelons.

MISSION ANALYSIS

E-142. The mission analysis process is crucial to the MDMP and ensures that the commander and all staff members completely understand what tasks the unit is directed to accomplish and why. The result of mission analysis is defining the tactical problem and beginning the process of determining feasible solutions.

E-143. The staff normally conducts mission analysis and briefs the results to the commander for his approval. The commander conducts his own mission analysis to develop a framework from which to evaluate the staff's work.

E-144. This process contains seventeen steps, as described in detail below. The order in which these steps are followed is not as important as ensuring that all areas are addressed.

I do not propose to lay down for you a plan of campaign; but simply to lay down the work it is desirable to have done and leave you free to execute it in your own way.

LTG Ulysses S. Grant to MG William Tecumseh Sherman, 4 April 1864

Step 1. Analyze the Order of the Higher Headquarters

E-145. The commander and his staff thoroughly analyze the order of the higher HQ to make sure they completely understand—

- The higher HQ commander's intent, mission (including tasks, constraints, risk, available assets, and AO), concept of the operation (including the deception plan), and timeline for mission execution.
- The missions of adjacent (to include front and rear) units and their relation to the plan of higher HQ.
- The assigned AO.
E-146. Embedded in the mission order of the higher HQ are the campaign objectives and end state objectives from which the supported unit mission is derived. CA planners must review all appendixes and annexes for relevant CA and CMO information. CA and CMO tasks may not be specifically stated, but CA planners can readily identify how CA forces and activities and CMO support the mission and intent of higher-level commanders. If any of the order is unclear, CA planners must seek clarification from the higher HQ immediately.

Step 2. Conduct Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace

E-147. According to FM 101-5, the IPB is a systematic, continuous process of analyzing the threat and the effects of the environment on the unit. It identifies facts and assumptions that determine likely threat COAs. The IPB supports the commander and staff and is essential to estimates and decision making.

E-148. Traditional IPB seeks to define the conditions in an AO in terms of the enemy, environment, and terrain and how these factors affect potential military operations. This is the function of the G-2 or S-2, assisted by the commander and all staff members.

E-149. CA planners conduct civil IPB by factoring in the nonmilitary threats to unit operations. They analyze the conditions in an AO in terms of CASCOPE. They determine the effect of nonmilitary threats from these civil aspects of the battlespace to potential military operations, as well as the effect of military operations on each of these factors.

E-150. From this analysis, CA planners develop situational templates (SITTEMPs) that depict likely civilian COAs. These SITTEMPs support the war-gaming process used later during COA analysis.

Step 3. Determine Specified, Implied, and Essential Tasks

E-151. Determining the tasks to be performed is the heart of mission analysis. A mission is narrowly defined as a task that, together with the purpose, clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason for taking it. Three types of tasks that planners must identify before narrowing down a unit's mission statement are specified, implied, and essential tasks.

E-152. Specified Tasks. These tasks are expressly stated in the mission order and its annexes. CA tasks may be found in paragraph 2, Mission, but are more likely found in Tasks to Subordinate Units under paragraph 3 or in the Civil Affairs annex. CA tasks, as well as CMO tasks, can be found throughout the mission order in almost any paragraph, annex, or overlay. CA planners must review the entire mission order document to identify specified CA and CMO tasks.

E-153. Implied Tasks. These tasks are not specifically stated in the mission order, but must be accomplished to satisfy the overall mission or to satisfy any of the specified tasks. Implied tasks come from a detailed analysis of the order (reading between the lines) and from an understanding of the environment through the civil IPB process. Implied CA tasks may include the following:

- Establish liaison with international organizations and NGOs in-theater.
- Establish liaison with HN governmental officials in the AO.
• Identify and report MOEs that affect or establish the commander's desired end state.

E-154. **Essential Tasks.** These tasks are derived from the list of specified and implied tasks. They are the tasks that must be executed to accomplish the overall mission. The restated mission will be formed around the essential tasks.

**Step 4. Review Available Assets**

E-155. The commander and staff examine additions to and deletions from the current task organization, support relationships, and status (current capabilities and limitations) of all units. They determine if they have the assets to perform all specified and implied tasks. If there are shortages, they identify additional resources needed for mission success, such as CA specialty teams of the parent or higher CA HQ, additional CAT-As, and so on. The staff needs to pay particular attention to deviations from what the commander considers his normal task organization.

**Step 5. Determine Constraints**

E-156. A higher commander normally places some constraints on his subordinate commanders that restrict their freedom of action. These limitations are normally found in the scheme of maneuver, the CONOPS, and coordinating instructions.

E-157. Constraints are those things imposed by a higher HQ or by factors such as the enemy, terrain, and weather, that an organization either must do or cannot do. Constraints limit options available to a commander or prohibit the commander from doing something specific. Examples of **must do** constraints include—

- Movement in sector at night requires permission by HN military authorities.
- CMOC will be fully functional within 48 hours of arrival in sector. (Affects load plans and sequencing of units into sector.)

Examples of **cannot do** constraints include—

- Direct liaison with civilian agencies authorized no earlier than (DTG).
- Conduct no follow-on missions without prior coordination with the higher HQ.

E-158. The commander must be informed if those constraints are found to severely limit a unit. The staff should try to adjust or remove such constraints, if possible.

**Step 6. Identify Critical Facts and Assumptions**

E-159. The staff prepares for mission analysis by collecting pertinent information and sorting it into facts and assumptions. Facts are statements of known data concerning the situation, including enemy and friendly unit dispositions, available troops, material readiness, and conditions in the civil arena. Assumptions are suppositions about the current or future situation that are assumed to be true in the absence of facts. They take the place of necessary, but unavailable, facts and fill the gaps in what the commander
and staff know about a situation. Assumptions are replaced by facts as soon as the facts are known.

E-160. An assumption is appropriate if it meets the tests of validity and necessity. Validity means the assumption is likely to be true. “Assuming away” potential problems, such as weather, likely enemy options, or likely civilian responses to friendly or enemy military operations, would result in an invalid assumption. Necessity is whether or not the assumption is essential for planning. If planning can continue without the assumption, it is not necessary and should be discarded. When possible, assumptions are cleared with higher HQ to ensure they are consistent with the plan of the higher HQ.

E-161. To provide a basis for compiling facts and assumptions, staff officers constantly update staff estimates and other critical information databases pertaining to the AO. It may be helpful to organize critical facts and assumptions into three categories: friendly, enemy, and civilian.

E-162. The CA staff planner gathers facts and assumptions according to CASCOPE. He maintains pertinent CA and CMO information in a CA database, and keeps the CMO estimate current. He is also familiar with the AO, establishes and maintains contacts within the civilian community, and knows where to obtain critical information related to CMO.

E-163. While gathering facts and assumptions, the CA planner follows OPSEC procedures and guidelines in effect for the given mission.

**Step 7. Conduct a Risk Assessment**

E-164. There are many potential threats or hazards associated with military operations—natural, man-made, and technological. The commander and staff identify threats and hazards and make an initial assessment of the risk level associated with each threat and hazard. The commander may also specify a risk he is willing to accept to accomplish the mission.

E-165. A risk assessment serves not to stifle or eliminate dangerous missions but to provide for safer and more effective missions. A risk assessment—

- Fosters an awareness of the potential threats to the force and hazards inherent to a particular operation. Awareness is the first step toward reducing or mitigating threats and hazards or the effects of threats and hazards.
- Identifies equipment and procedures that will be beneficial or that may improve on the conduct and safety of the operation.
- Identifies coordination that may be required to better execute the intended operation.
- Outlines training that can be conducted during rehearsals for the operation to improve the overall effectiveness of the operation and mitigate the possibility of problems occurring during the operation.

E-166. There are five steps to risk assessment:

- Identify threats and hazards.
- Assess threats and hazards.
- Develop controls, determine residual risk, and make risk decision.
• Implement controls.
• Supervise and evaluate.

An example Risk Assessment Matrix is in Appendix C.

**Step 8. Determine Initial Commander’s Critical Information Requirements**

E-167. The commander identifies information requirements that support his visualization of the battlespace and are critical to decision making and analyzing COAs. He decides what information is critical based on his experience, the mission, the higher commander’s intent, and input from the staff.

E-168. CCIR are situationally dependent and are specified by the commander for each operation. The commander continually reviews CCIR during planning and adjusts them as the situation changes and CCIR are answered.

E-169. During the MDMP, CCIR most often arise from IPB and war gaming. CCIR define what is important to mission accomplishment. They also help focus the efforts of subordinates and staff, assist in the allocation of resources, and assist staff officers in making recommendations. The CCIR consist of—

- **PIR:** Information the commander needs to know about the enemy.
- **FFIR:** Information the commander needs to know about adjacent units.
- **EEFI:** Information about friendly forces that must be protected from discovery by the enemy.

E-170. Application of CA and CMO into CCIR is further discussed in Chapter 5 under Civilian Interview Techniques.

**Step 9. Determine the Initial Reconnaissance Annex**

E-171. Based on CCIR and IPB, the staff identifies gaps in intelligence and determines the R&S plan to acquire that information. The G-3 or S-3 turns this plan into an initial reconnaissance annex to launch reconnaissance assets as soon as possible to begin their collection effort.

E-172. CA/CMO-related R&S activities may include visiting and assessing key infrastructure facilities or monitoring web sites pertaining to CASCOPE in the AO. This step allocates resources to gather the information to support the MDMP. As these assets and activities collect information and help fill in the intelligence gaps, the taskings to reconnaissance assets are updated to reflect new CCIR.

**Step 10. Plan Use of Available Time**

E-173. The commander and staff refine the initial plan for the use of available time. They compare the time needed to accomplish essential tasks to the timeline of the higher HQ to ensure mission accomplishment is possible in the allotted time. Additionally, the staff must consider the enemy and civilian timelines, developed during the IPB and civil engagement processes, to determine windows of opportunity or times when the unit will be vulnerable to enemy or civilian activity.
Step 11. Write the Restated Mission

E-174. The final product of the mission analysis is the restated mission statement. The restated mission must contain all elements of a mission statement:

- Who (what types of forces) will execute the action?
- What type of action (for example, attack, defend, or support) is contemplated?
- When will the action begin?
- Where will the action occur (AO and objectives)?
- How will the commander employ available assets?
- Why (for what purpose) will each force conduct its part of the operation?

E-175. The element of what states the essential tasks. On-order missions are included in the mission statement while be-prepared and follow-on missions will be addressed in the concept of operation. CA planners ensure CA unit missions and maneuver unit CMO responsibilities are included in these two paragraphs.

Step 12. Conduct Mission Analysis Briefing

E-176. The staff briefs the commander on the results of its mission analysis. The briefing focuses on the relevant conclusions reached by the staff and helps develop a shared vision of the requirements of the upcoming mission. It normally follows the following outline:

- Mission and commander’s intent of the HQ two levels up.
- Mission, commander’s intent, concept of the operation, and deception plan or objective of the HQ one level up.
- Review of commander’s initial guidance.
- Initial IPB products.
- Specified, implied, and essential tasks.
- Constraints and restraints on the operation.
- Forces available.
- Hazards and their risk.
- Recommended initial CCIR.
- Recommended timelines.
- Recommended restated mission.

E-177. This is not a unit readiness briefing. The CA/CMO staff officer must know the status of supporting CA units and teams and brief relevant information as it applies to the situation. CA planners should develop standardized charts, according to the supported staff’s SOP, to monitor and consolidate this type of data to assist the commander in obtaining a quick snapshot of his capabilities.
E-178. The mission analysis briefing is a critical event for CA planners. It is often the only time the commander and his entire staff is present and the only opportunity to ensure that all staff members are starting from a common reference point. The focus of the briefing is on relevant conclusions reached during mission analysis so that the commander and staff can develop a shared vision of the requirements for the upcoming operation. Failure to promote CA/CMO themes in this briefing may result in poorly crafted or coordinated plans later.

Step 13. Approve the Restated Mission

E-179. Immediately after the mission analysis briefing, the commander approves a restated mission. Once approved, the restated mission statement becomes the unit's mission, which is placed in paragraph 2 of the unit OPLAN or OPORD.

Step 14. Develop the Initial Commander's Intent

E-180. The commander's intent is a clear, concise statement of what the force must do to succeed with respect to the enemy, the terrain, and the desired end state. It provides the link between the mission and the CONOPS by stating the key tasks that, along with the mission, are the basis for subordinates to exercise initiative when unanticipated opportunities arise or when the original CONOPS no longer applies. If the commander wishes to explain a broader purpose beyond that of the mission statement, he may do so. Intent is normally expressed in four or five sentences and is mandatory for all orders. The mission and the commander's intent must be understood two echelons down.

E-181. Key tasks are those that must be performed by the force, or conditions that must be met, to achieve the stated purpose of the operation (paragraph 2 of the OPORD or OPLAN). Key tasks are not tied to a specific COA; rather they identify that which is fundamental to the force’s success. When circumstances change and planned COAs no longer apply, subordinates use these tasks to keep their efforts supporting the commander’s intent.

E-182. Examples of key tasks that commanders include in their intent are the tempo and duration of the operation, the intended effect on the enemy, terrain that must be controlled, the degree of acceptable collateral damage, and the treatment or disposition of noncombatant civilians encountered during the operation.

E-183. Commanders from company level up prepare an intent statement for each OPORD or OPLAN. There is only one commander’s intent statement and it is found at the beginning of paragraph 3, Operations, in the basic order or plan document. The commander personally prepares his intent statement. To ensure the commander considers his CMO responsibilities, CA planners may recommend CMO themes or tasks to include in his intent statement.

E-184. Annexes (and their subordinate appendixes, tabs, and enclosures) to the OPORD or OPLAN do not contain an intent statement; they contain a concept of support. For example, the CA annex to an OPORD will contain a concept of support but not an intent statement. However, if a CA unit is
deployed intact in support of a maneuver unit, the OPORD issued to the CA unit will contain the intent statement of the CA unit commander.

**Step 15. Issue the Commander’s Guidance**

E-185. After the commander approves the restated mission and states his intent, he provides the staff with enough guidance (preliminary decisions) to focus staff activities in planning the operation. This guidance is essential for timely COA development and analysis. His guidance allows staff members to concentrate on developing COAs that meet the commander’s intent.

E-186. The commander’s guidance must focus on the essential tasks supporting mission accomplishment. The guidance emphasizes in broad terms when, where, and how he intends to mass his combat power to accomplish the mission according to his higher commander’s intent. Commander’s guidance should include priorities for all combat, CS, and CSS elements and how he envisions their support of his concept. At a minimum, the commander’s guidance should address—

- Specific COAs to consider or not to consider—friendly, enemy, and civilian—and the priority for addressing them.
- The CCIR.
- The reconnaissance guidance.
- Risk guidance.
- Deception guidance.
- Fire support guidance.
- Mobility and countermobility guidance.
- Security measures to be implemented.
- Additional specific priorities for CS and CSS.
- Any other information the commander wants the staff to consider.
- The time plan.
- The type of order to issue.
- The type of rehearsal to conduct.

E-187. Some of the specific guidance listed (for example, fire support, mobility and countermobility, and security measures) has CA/CMO-related repercussions or consequences. If the commander’s guidance is unclear on CA/CMO tasks or related issues, CA planners should seek specific CA/CMO guidance from the commander.

**Step 16. Issue a Warning Order**

E-188. Immediately after the commander gives his guidance, the staff sends subordinate and supporting units a warning order that contains, as a minimum—

- The restated mission.
- The commander’s intent.
- The unit’s AO (a sketch, an overlay, or some other description).
- The CCIR.
- Risk guidance.
- Reconnaissance to be initiated by subordinate units.
- Security measures.
- Deception guidance.
- Mobility and countermobility guidance.
- Specific priorities.
- The time plan.
- Guidance on rehearsals.

**Step 17. Review Facts and Assumptions**

E-189. As mentioned previously, CA planners maintain and update the CMO estimate continuously. Current information is important as the commander and staff periodically review all available facts and assumptions throughout the rest of the decision-making process to confirm their currency and validity. New facts may alter requirements and analysis of the mission. Assumptions may have become facts or may have become invalid. Whenever the facts or assumptions change, the commander and staff must assess the impact of these changes on the plan and make the necessary adjustments.

**COA DEVELOPMENT**

E-190. After receiving the commander’s guidance, the staff develops COAs for analysis and comparison. COA development is a deliberate attempt to design unpredictable COAs (difficult for threat elements to deduce). CA planners are intricately involved in this process.

E-191. A good COA positions the force for future operations and provides flexibility to meet unforeseen events during execution. It also provides the maximum latitude for initiative by subordinates. During COA development, the commander and staff continue the risk management process, focusing on identifying and assessing threats and hazards, developing controls, determining residual risk, and making risk decisions.

E-192. There are normally six steps in COA development. FM 101-5 covers each of these steps in detail. While CA planners should be familiar with the entire process, they usually participate as follows.

**Step 1. Analyze Relative Combat Power**

E-193. The commander and staff compare the relative strengths and weaknesses of opposing forces. The goal is to generate overwhelming combat power to accomplish the mission at minimal cost.

E-194. While this analysis generally focuses on military forces, a transparent factor of relative combat power lies in the civilian component of an AO. The CA planners’ IPB and CASCOPE analysis should have identified the general attitudes and capabilities that exist among the people and organizations of the AO. Sometimes the populace may provide overwhelming support to the enemy, sometimes it may overwhelmingly support friendly forces, and other times it may be neutral or split evenly both ways. These often-ignored issues...
can influence the relative combat power by causing friendly or enemy forces to deploy critical assets in nondoctrinal ways.

E-195. Whatever the operational environment, civil considerations must be weighed during this step to determine its effect on relative combat power. These considerations eventually affect the commander’s selection of objectives; the location, movement, and control of forces; the use of weapons; and force protection measures. CA planners provide the insight that allows the staff to manage these issues in later steps.

E-196. During this analysis, the commander and staff also discuss how to allocate existing resources and what additional resources may be required to execute the mission. Sometimes, shortfalls in resources may readily be made up through FNS. CA planners who conduct detailed CMO estimates will have identified sources of FNS that can be used in support of military operations. Availability of resources through FNS should be carried as an assumption until coordination and acquisition make it fact.

Step 2. Generate Options

E-197. Based on the commander’s guidance and the results of Step 1, the staff generates options for COA development. The commander usually limits the number of options with his commander’s guidance. The options should focus on enemy and civilian COAs arranged in order of probable adoption.

E-198. The preferred technique for generating options is brainstorming. All staff members must participate for this to be effective. The staff must be unbiased and open-minded in evaluating proposed options. If a CA planner identifies information that might affect another staff member’s analysis, he must share it immediately.

E-199. CA planners can quickly identify COAs that are obviously not feasible for civil considerations. They must be able to make recommendations regarding how a COA can be modified to accomplish requirements or if the COA needs to be eliminated completely.

E-200. In developing COAs, staff members must determine the doctrinal requirements for each type of operation they are considering, to include doctrinal tasks to be assigned to subordinate units. For example, DC operations require control and assembly points, rest areas, and campsites that must be organized and manned by personnel. In the absence of HN or NGO support, these requirements fall to military organizations.

Step 3. Array Initial Forces

E-201. In this step, staff planners determine the forces necessary to accomplish the mission and provide a basis for the scheme of maneuver. They determine the ratio of friendly to enemy units required for each task starting with the main effort and continuing through all supporting efforts. They also determine battlefield geometry and control measures; for example, a proposed forward edge of battle area (FEBA) for a defense or a line of departure/line of contact (LD/LC) for an offense.

E-202. During this step, planners consider the deception story. Because aspects of the story may influence unit positioning, planners must consider
the story's major elements before developing any COAs. CA planners must factor in the civil considerations of CASCOPE before the staff finalizes the deception story.

E-203. Staff planners next make the initial array of friendly forces using generic unit configurations, starting with the main effort at the decisive point in the operation and continuing through supporting efforts. During this step, staff planners do not assign missions to arrayed units; they merely consider what forces they must allocate to accomplish the mission. CA planners ensure the arrayed forces contain appropriate CA attachments required to accomplish specified and implied CA/CMO tasks.

E-204. The initial array identifies the total number of units and attachments needed, develops a base of knowledge to make decisions, and identifies possible methods of dealing with the enemy and civilians during scheme-of-maneuver development. If the number of units and attachments arrayed is less than the number available, the additional assets are placed in a pool for use during scheme-of-maneuver development. If the number arrayed is greater than the number available, the shortfall is identified as a possible requirement for additional resources. For CA planners with limited access to CA resources, this may mean seeking non-CA resources to fill the gap. This option, however, inherently carries a measure of risk-taking as well as a need for comprehensive training of tasked personnel.

Step 4. Develop the Scheme of Maneuver

E-205. The scheme of maneuver describes how arrayed forces will accomplish the commander's intent. It is the central expression of the commander's CONOPS and governs the design of supporting plans or annexes. Planners develop a scheme of maneuver by refining the initial array of forces and using graphic control measures to coordinate the operation and to show the relationship of friendly forces to one another, the enemy, the civilians, and the terrain.

E-206. FM 101-5 contains a list of items that are included in the scheme of maneuver. One item not mentioned, which the CA planner must add during this step, is the consideration of the effects of civilian activities on military operations and military operations on civilians.

E-207. At this point during MDMP, it may also be necessary for CA planners to articulate the value of CA teams and CMO in enhancing the effectiveness of military operations. A useful technique is to determine the operational risks or costs associated with not engaging the civilian component of the operational environment through CMO. Examples of the types of operational risks to consider include—

- Missed opportunities.
- Decrease in ability to manage civilian behavior.
- Deteriorated force protection.
- Increase in degree or length of dependency of civilians on the military (in terms of food, health, public security, and safety).
• Undesirable or inappropriate allocation or reallocation of resources (soldiers, equipment, materiel) to “fix” a preventable situation.
• Unnecessary collateral damage.
• Loss of mission legitimacy.
• Reduction in support or cooperation for future operations from coalition partners, indigenous population, or international community.
• Failure to meet U.S. goals and objectives.
• Damage to reputation or embarrassment to command, combatant command, ambassador, or SECDEF.

E-208. During this step, staff planners select control measures (graphics) to control subordinate units during the operation. The planners base control measures on the array of forces and the scheme of maneuver to defeat probable enemy and civilian COAs.

E-209. Maneuver and graphic control measures often have serious repercussions on CA operations and CMO. CA planners must be thoroughly familiar with the scheme of maneuver and monitor the placement of maneuver and graphic control measures. They must be cognizant of areas that should be designated for limited use or off-limits to certain military activities. They should also ask questions regarding considerations and responsibilities for bypassed areas that contain civilian populations. In some operations, primarily during stability and support missions, CA planners must address the placement of unit boundaries with respect to political boundaries versus the traditional placement on terrain features.

Step 5. Assign Headquarters

E-210. Staff planners next assign HQ to groupings of forces, creating a task organization. CA planners must ensure that each HQ contains a CA representative on the primary staff to plan, coordinate, and monitor CA activities and CMO for that organization.

Step 6. Prepare COA Statements and Sketches

E-211. The G-3 or S-3 prepares a COA statement and supporting sketch for each COA developed. The COA statement must clearly portray how the unit will accomplish the mission and explain the scheme of maneuver, including the end state. The sketch should include the array of generic forces and control measures discussed above.

E-212. CA planners review the sketches to ensure they adequately portray the civil considerations discussed throughout this process. They ensure that known or templated locations of populated areas are shown. If possible, the affiliations and sympathies of these populations are included. CA planners also ensure that restrictive fire control measures (restricted-fire areas and no-fire areas) and restricted targets are included among the fire support coordination measures.
COA ANALYSIS

E-213. The COA analysis identifies which COA accomplishes the mission with minimum casualties while best positioning the force to retain the initiative for future operations. COA analysis helps the commander and his staff to—

- Determine how to maximize combat power against the threat while protecting friendly forces and minimizing collateral damage.
- Have as near an identical vision of the operation as possible.
- Anticipate battlefield events.
- Determine conditions and resources required for success.
- Determine when and where to apply the force’s capabilities.
- Focus IPB on enemy strengths, weaknesses, centers of gravity, desired end state, and decisive points.
- Focus civil IPB on civilian strengths, weaknesses, centers of gravity, desired end state, and decisive points.
- Identify the coordination or engagement requirements among friendly forces and civilian agencies (for example, government or NGOs) to produce synchronized results.
- Determine the most flexible COA.

E-214. Commanders use the war-gaming process to visualize the flow of an operation and to analyze various COAs. The war-gaming process generates branches and sequels that are essential for rapid response to changing operational conditions and situations. The war-gaming process helps to identify decision points and critical information requirements, which, in turn, drive the unit’s intelligence and reconnaissance efforts.

E-215. The war-gaming process has a set of rules and steps, and each staff officer has particular responsibilities. The following discussion highlights some of the responsibilities and steps as they apply to the CA planner. FM 101-5 contains a detailed discussion of the war-gaming process.

E-216. The CA staff officer’s responsibility in the war-gaming process is similar to that of the G-2 or S-2 in that he must role-play civilian leaders and individual groups of civilians that will be encountered in the AO. He develops critical civilian decision points in relation to the friendly and enemy COAs, projects civilian reactions to both friendly and enemy actions, and projects civilian losses due to expected collateral damage. He war-games and finalizes the MOEs (Chapter 4) that will be used to monitor the objectives established for the civilian situation in this particular operation.

E-217. The CA staff officer captures the projected results of each COA on the civilian situation using the factors of CASCOPE. By doing so, he ensures that the staff fully understands the civil considerations inherent in every offensive, defensive, stability, and support operation. He ensures that the commander and staff fully address the commander’s legal responsibilities in CMO. He also assists staff members such as the G-1 or S-1 and G-4 or S-4 in projecting HNS requirements to augment CSS shortfalls.
E-218. A very important byproduct of the war-gaming process is that CMO-related tasks and responsibilities are often identified that are beyond the scope or capabilities of attached CA forces. These tasks and responsibilities must be assigned to some element of the force. War gaming allows the staff to look at available resources and determine the most economic and efficient way to assign those tasks and responsibilities or request additional resources from the higher HQ before getting too deep into the operation.

E-219. One of the steps followed during the war-gaming process is gathering the necessary tools, materials, and data to be used during the war game. Tools the CA staff officer should bring to the war game process include, but are not limited to—

- Current CMO estimate.
- Map of AO.
- Event template.
- Synchronization matrix.
- Projected civilian COAs, DC routes, and FNS asset availability and acquisition requirements.
- Civilian icons and symbols to post on the war-gaming medium (for example, map, sand table, or other terrain model).

E-220. Another step in the war-gaming process consists of determining evaluation criteria to measure the effectiveness and efficiency of one COA relative to other COAs following the war game. The staff normally determines this criteria as a group. Evaluation criteria may change from mission to mission. Evaluation criteria may include anything the commander desires. The criteria should look not only at what will create success, but also at what will cause mission failure. Examples include—

- The principles of war.
- Doctrinal fundamentals for the kind of operations being conducted.
- The commander’s guidance and intent.
- The level of residual risk for accident hazards in the COA.

E-221. During this step, it is important that the CA staff officer advocates including civil considerations into the evaluation criteria, if not already included. Ignoring the civil considerations of an operation can make the COA comparison invalid.

E-222. Yet another step in the war-gaming process is selecting a method to record and display results of the war game. Again, the staff normally decides this as a group. Two methods used to portray COA actions are the synchronization matrix and the sketch note. The synchronization matrix is the method most preferred by staff officers because it can be readily translated into a graphic decision-making product, such as a decision support template, at the war game’s conclusion. The synchronization matrix allows the staff to synchronize COAs across time and space in relation to the enemy and civilian COAs. CA planners must make sure that civilian actions and activities have a separate and distinct row on the matrix and that valid civilian actions and activities are entered along the timeline. An example of a
A synchronization matrix that shows civilian actions and activities and CA/CMO tasks along the timeline is in Appendix C.

E-223. By the conclusion of the war-gaming process, the commander and staff will have analyzed all COAs individually and completely. They will better understand the nuances of each COA and may have found that certain details regarding the friendly, enemy, and civilian situations needed to be refined or modified completely. They also have a better understanding about the conditions of the entire battlespace and the tasks and task organization required to successfully complete all mission requirements.

COA COMPARISON

E-224. The COA comparison starts with each staff officer analyzing and evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of each COA from his perspective. Each staff member presents his findings for the others’ consideration. Using the evaluation criteria developed earlier, the staff then outlines each COA, highlighting its advantages and disadvantages. Comparing the strengths and weaknesses of the COAs as they apply to the civil situation helps the CA planner identify their strengths and weaknesses with respect to each other. Table E-1, pages E-56 and E-57, outlines the COA planning factors.

E-225. The actual comparison of COAs is critical. The staff may use any technique that facilitates the staff reaching the best recommendation and the commander making the best decision. The most common technique is the decision matrix, explained in FM 101-5, which uses evaluation criteria developed earlier in the war-gaming process, to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of each COA. The criticality of this comparison highlights why the CA staff officer must strive to put civil considerations into the evaluation criteria.

COA APPROVAL

E-226. After completing its analysis and comparison, the staff identifies its preferred COA and makes a recommendation in a decision briefing to the commander. The commander may reject the recommendation and direct the staff to begin the process over again. He may also accept the recommendation completely, accept it with modification, or give the staff an entirely new COA. If the commander modifies a proposed COA or gives the staff a new one, the staff must war-game the revised or new COA to derive the products that result from the war-game process.

E-227. Once the commander has selected a COA, he may refine his intent statement and CCIR to support the selected COA. Having already identified the risks associated with the selected COA, the commander decides what level of risk he will accept to accomplish the mission and approves control measures that will reduce the risks.

E-228. The commander issues any additional guidance on priorities for CS or CSS activities, orders preparation, rehearsal, and preparation for mission execution. Upon receipt of this guidance, the staff immediately issues a warning order with essential information so that subordinate units can refine their plans.
E-229. CA staff officers take time at this point to ensure the COA and the commander’s risk decisions support both short- and long-term CMO objectives for the AO. Any shortfalls in support to CMO objectives must be passed on to the CA/CMO planners at the next-higher HQ for consideration in achieving the objectives by some other means.

Table E-1. COA Planning Factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FACTORS FOR CONSIDERATION</th>
<th>COA-A</th>
<th>COA-B</th>
<th>COA-C</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Desirability</strong></td>
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<td>Will the population support it?</td>
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<td>Will the military support it?</td>
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<td>Will other agencies support it?</td>
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<td>Will the government support it?</td>
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<td>Can it start immediately?</td>
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<td>Will it have immediate impact?</td>
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<td>Will it benefit a majority of the people?</td>
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<td>Will it have a favorable psychological effect?</td>
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<td>Is it amenable to public exploitation?</td>
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<td>Will it improve the government image?</td>
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<td>Will it improve civil-military relations?</td>
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<td>Will it lend itself to self-help?</td>
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<td>Will it contribute to the stabilization of society?</td>
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<td>Does it jeopardize primary mission accomplishment?</td>
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<td>Does it have full approval and support of the civilian leadership in the community?</td>
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<td>Will the civilians in the community work along with the military?</td>
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<td>Does it infringe upon private enterprise?</td>
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<td>Will it require future Army maintenance?</td>
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<td>Will it benefit a wide spectrum of the community?</td>
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<td>Is it discriminatory?</td>
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<td>Will it be fully coordinated with all appropriate levels of authority?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Is it in consonance with the country’s national objectives and interests?</td>
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<td>Is it in support of the commander’s politico-military mission?</td>
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<td>Will the project serve to gain civilian cooperation with populace and resources control and tactical operations?</td>
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</table>
Table E-1. COA Planning Factors (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FACTORS FOR CONSIDERATION</th>
<th>COA-A</th>
<th>COA-B</th>
<th>COA-C</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Desirability (Continued)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Will participation by the military avoid wasteful or needless duplication of functions and services of other agencies?</td>
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<td>Does it compromise civilian authority and responsibility?</td>
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<td>Is it an important need, locally wanted, and beyond unaided local capabilities?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Can military participation be so managed that it does not compromise civilian authority and responsibility?</td>
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<td>Will the project stimulate the flow of needed information from the people of the area?</td>
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<td><strong>Feasibility</strong></td>
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<td>Does it conform to local customs?</td>
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<td>Are all necessary skills available?</td>
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<td>Are labor materials and equipment available?</td>
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<td>Can it be supported by current programmed funds?</td>
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<td><strong>Justification</strong></td>
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<td>Will it provide maximum return on investment and effort?</td>
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<td>Does it avoid duplication with efforts of other agencies?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Will the operation raise the expectations of the populace and then result in disappointment when U.S. assistance is withdrawn?</td>
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</table>

**ORDERS PRODUCTION**

E-230. The staff prepares the order or plan to implement the selected COA by turning it into a clear, concise CONOPS, a scheme of maneuver, and the required fire support. Orders and plans provide all the necessary information subordinates require for execution.

E-231. The CA staff officer writes the CA annex to the OPORD or OPLAN. This annex directs subordinate CA assets to conduct CA missions in support of the overall supported unit mission. An example of a CA annex is in FM 41-10.

E-232. During orders production, CA staff officers continuously coordinate with fellow staff officers to ensure that those CMO-related tasks and responsibilities that were identified for non-CA units during the war-gaming process are incorporated in the appropriate paragraphs (particularly the Concept of the Operation, Tasks to Subordinate Units, and Coordinating Instructions paragraphs), graphics, appendixes, and annexes. Later, when the staff briefs the order to subordinate commanders and staffs, the CA staff officer
participates in the briefing and ensures all subordinates understand the civil considerations they must include in their own decision-making process.

E-233. Table E-2, pages E-58 and E-59, depicts the typical participants and responsibilities, actions, and products required during the MDMP.

**Table E-2. Typical Participants and Responsibilities, Actions, and Products Required During the MDMP**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planning Process</th>
<th>CDR</th>
<th>Staff Officers</th>
<th>Staff NCOs</th>
<th>CA Specialist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mission Analysis:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Prepare charts for mission analysis.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Prepare terrain sketches.</td>
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<td>- Update and post unit reports or status.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Prepare TOC for planning process.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Conduct mission analysis.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Serve as a recorder during process.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Brief commander and staff.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Commander’s Guidance:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Assist CDR in developing guidance.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Issue guidance.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Record and post CDR’s guidance.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>COA Development:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Prepare charts.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Sketch COAs.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Develop COAs.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>COA Analysis:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Collect and prepare tools and charts.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Serve as recorders during war game.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Conduct war-game session.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td><strong>Decision:</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Make recommendation to CDR.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Decide.</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Record and post CDR’s guidance.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Order Preparation:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Write annexes.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Consolidate annexes.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Type order.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Reproduce order and graphics.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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Table E-2. Typical Participants and Responsibilities, Actions, and Products Required During the MDMP (Continued)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planning Process</th>
<th>CDR</th>
<th>Staff Officers</th>
<th>Staff NCOs</th>
<th>CA Specialist</th>
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<td>Review order.</td>
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<td>Approve order.</td>
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<td>Set up briefing area.</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distribute order and graphics.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brief the order.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>Receive briefbacks.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rehearsal:</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Set up rehearsal area.</td>
<td></td>
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<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distribute new or changed products.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct rehearsal.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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</table>

CA PLANNING USING THE TROOP-LEADING PROCEDURES

E-234. Eventually, execution of a CA or CMO mission is the responsibility of a designated team. Depending on mission requirements, the team may be unified (a singular branch, unit, or function), such as a CAT-B, CAT-A, or CA specialty team performing strictly CA tasks. It is quite likely, however, that the team will consist of elements from various BOSs (for example, maneuver, mobility and survivability, and CSS) and specific operational functions (for example, PSYOP, chaplain, MP, and CA) performing CMO. Whatever the composition of the team, the team will have a team leader. This leader must prepare his team to accomplish the assigned mission.

E-235. Troop leading is the process a leader goes through to prepare his organization to accomplish an assigned mission. TLP consist of eight steps, which are highlighted below. CA soldiers participate in TLP whether they are team leaders or team members. The following discussion assumes the CA team is deployed and attached to a supported unit. The team is tasked to conduct CA operations in support of CMO in offense, defense, stability, or support operations.

E-236. The TLP begin when the team leader is alerted for a mission. TLP continue until the mission is completed or the leader receives a change of mission or a new mission. For CAT-B and CAT-A leaders who have CA staff planning functions, as well as requirements to conduct CA activities in support of CMO, TLP may begin during MDMP or immediately after the orders briefing. It may be useful for these team leaders to delegate the initial steps of the TLP to a subordinate leader until they can focus entirely on preparation for the CA mission.

E-237. The TLP are similar to the MDMP in that the TLP support problem solving and deliberate decision making at the team level. There are eight steps to the TLP as explained below.
STEP 1: RECEIVE THE MISSION

E-238. The team leader may receive the mission verbally or in writing in the form of a warning order, an OPORD (or more specifically, the CA annex to an OPORD), or a FRAG order. Upon receipt of the mission, he initiates a mission planning folder (MPF) similar to the one described in the discussion on SO operational planning earlier in this appendix. He gathers the appropriate materials—maps, overlays, SOPs, FMps, CMO estimates, or area assessments—needed for a mission analysis. He then begins a preliminary mission analysis using the factors of METT-TC:

- What is the CA team mission and what are the CMO requirements of the supported unit mission?
- What is known about the enemy that could hinder CA operations and CMO?
- How will terrain and weather affect CA operations and CMO?
- What troops and support are available within the CA team to conduct CA operations or from the supported unit to conduct CMO?
- How much time is available to plan and rehearse before mission execution?
- What are the known civil considerations for this operation?

E-239. If there is insufficient information to answer these questions, the team leader determines what additional facts he needs to conduct a more detailed mission analysis during Step 3. He makes assumptions until the facts are known. He can immediately request additional information from the issuing HQ or he can wait until Step 2 to designate a subordinate to obtain the necessary details.

STEP 2: ISSUE A WARNING ORDER

E-240. The team leader provides initial instructions to the team in a warning order. The warning order has no particular format, but the five-paragraph OPORD format is often used. The warning order contains enough information for team members to begin preparation as soon as possible. At a minimum, the team leader provides—

- The mission or nature of the operation.
- Information on who is participating in the operation.
- Time of the operation.
- Tasks to team members in support of mission planning and preparation.
- Time and place for issuance of the team OPORD.
- Information on who will attend the OPORD.

E-241. The team SOP should prescribe the routine actions team members take upon receipt of a warning order. Examples include drawing ammunition, rations, and water; checking vehicles, communications equipment, other team equipment, and personal gear; and gathering or packing mission-specific materials. The team leader provides updates and refined guidance to team members as often as necessary until he issues the OPORD.
STEP 3: MAKE A TENTATIVE PLAN

E-242. The team leader develops a comprehensive estimate of the situation to use as the basis for his tentative plan. Using all available information, the team leader conducts a modified MDMP consisting of five steps:

- Detailed mission analysis.
- Situation or risk analysis and COA development.
- Analysis of each COA.
- Comparison of each COA.
- Decision.

E-243. During detailed mission analysis, the team leader builds on the METT-TC analysis of Step 1:

- What is the mission?
  - Determine specified and implied CA tasks by analyzing the mission, intent, and concept of the operation of the supported commander and the commander two levels up.
  - Determine the essential CA tasks required to accomplish the overall mission and support or set the conditions for the end state.
  - Determine CMO-related tasks to non-CA elements of the supported unit by analyzing the supporting annexes to the OPORD; for example, the fire support annex, the engineer annex, the service support annex, the provost marshal annex, and the rear operations annex.
- What is known about the enemy?
  - Determine known and suspected enemy positions, obstacles, targets (especially NBC targets), and tactics (such as ambush, sniping, or sabotage) that could hinder CA operations and CMO.
  - Determine any nonlethal security threats to the mission, such as political propaganda, criminal activities, activist activities (demonstrations or sabotage), IO, DC movement,HN or international community restrictions, and disease or other medical conditions.
- How will terrain and weather affect the operation?
  - Determine the locations of urban, rural, and agricultural areas in the AO. (This is explored further in civil considerations.)
  - Determine the prevalent weather patterns of the season and forecasted weather conditions and how they might affect movement through urban, rural, and agricultural areas.
- What troops and support are available?
  - Confirm the composition of the team and determine any additional troop resources that may be available from higher CA HQ and the supported unit.
  - Determine shortfalls that must be filled to accomplish the specified and implied CA tasks.
• How much time is available?
  - Use no more than one-third of the available time for planning and for issuing the team OPORD. The remaining two-thirds is for subordinates to plan and prepare for the operation.
  - Consider available daylight and travel time to and from orders and rehearsals.
  - Use reverse planning from the time of execution to the present to allow enough time for the completion of each task.

• What are the civil considerations for this operation?
  - Using CASCOPE, determine the civil areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events that affect the operation or can be exploited in support of the operation.
  - Analyze the situation for CASCOPE.

NOTE: Chapter 4 contains more detail on analyzing the situation for CASCOPE.

E-244. During situation or risk analysis and COA development, the team leader identifies potential threats to and vulnerabilities of his team. He determines countermeasures to those threats and vulnerabilities (also known as force protection measures) and incorporates them into his COA development.

E-245. The team leader develops COAs that satisfy the essential tasks according to the conditions identified in the mission analysis. It may be useful to identify essential CA tasks (for example, meetings, interviews, assessments, inspections, or negotiations) as CA objectives. The COAs, then, evolve around different methods of approaching and engaging those objectives with assigned team members while maintaining the security of the team.

E-246. During COA analysis, the team leader war-games each COA. The war-gaming process at the team level consists of talking through each phase of the mission, beginning with departure from current location to actions on the objective to return to current location. The team can war-game the COAs in a tabletop exercise using COA sketches, maps and overlays, sand models, or other similar methods. (Figures C-22a through C-22c, pages C-34 and C-35, contain samples of COA sketches.) The purpose of the war game is to analyze the viability of each COA and to identify details that may need to be modified or refined.

E-247. During comparison of each COA, the team leader identifies criteria against which to measure the feasibility of each COA. He analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of each COA using this criteria. A decision matrix may be useful in making this comparison.

E-248. Based on the results of the comparison step, the team leader decides which COA is the best course to follow. His decision represents the tentative plan. Before going much further, the team leader must brief his plan to the tasking agent for approval. Having the understanding and support of the tasking agent facilitates continued mission planning and coordination conducted by the CA team.
E-249. The team leader uses the approved plan as the start point for coordination, reconnaissance or assessment, task organization (if required), and movement instructions. He works through the problem-solving sequence in as much detail as time allows. The team leader updates the estimate continuously and refines his plan accordingly.

**STEP 4: START NECESSARY MOVEMENT**

E-250. The team may have to move itself or any attached elements into a staging area, rehearsal area, or some other position before execution of the team mission. This step can occur at any time. It is important that the team checks the current security situation and conducts a precombat inspection (PCI) of all equipment before movement.

**STEP 5: CONDUCT A PRELIMINARY OR INITIAL ASSESSMENT**

E-251. An assessment provides the team leader with critical information that is essential in making decisions regarding mission tasks, task organization, and allocation of resources. It identifies potential threats and area characteristics that must be considered in the plan.

E-252. The need to conduct a preliminary or initial assessment depends on the team's familiarity with the CA objective and the objective area, as well as time available and the security conditions in the AO. Team leaders should not discount this step for the sake of expediency. In fluid environments where the situation constantly changes, this assessment can define the success or failure of the mission.

E-253. At the very least, the team leader conducts a map or photo reconnaissance of the objective area. If possible, he conducts a leader's reconnaissance to verify his situation analysis, adjust his plan, confirm the usability of routes or facilities, and time any critical movements. Chapters 3 and 5 contain more information on assessments.

**STEP 6: COMPLETE THE PLAN**

E-254. The team leader completes his plan based on the assessment and any changes in the situation. He should review his mission, as he received it from the tasking agent, to ensure his plan meets the requirements of the mission and stays within the framework of the commander’s intent.

E-255. He organizes the plan using the five-paragraph OPORD format. He includes as much detail as time permits. The successful team leader will have delegated as much of the plan as possible to subordinate leaders to maximize the time and talent available to him for the orders process.

**STEP 7: ISSUE THE COMPLETE ORDER**

E-256. The team leader issues the order to his subordinates. This order is normally issued orally and to all mission participants. To aid subordinates in understanding the concept of the operation, the team leader should issue the order within sight of the objective, if possible. When this is not possible, the leader should use a terrain model or sketch.
E-257. The CA team leader must ensure that all mission participants understand the mission, the commander’s intent, the concept of the operation, and their assigned tasks. The leader may require subordinates to repeat all or part of the order, demonstrate on the model, or sketch their understanding of the operation. They should also quiz the participants to ensure that all participants understand the mission.

STEP 8: SUPERVISE

E-258. The team leader supervises the team’s preparation for the mission by conducting rehearsals and inspections.

Rehearsals

E-259. The team leader uses rehearsals to—

- Practice essential tasks (improve performance).
- Reveal weaknesses or problems in the plan.
- Coordinate the actions of participating elements; for example, CA team, infantry squad, military police, or PSYOP team.
- Improve soldier understanding of the concept of the operation (foster confidence in soldiers).

E-260. If possible, the team rehearses under similar conditions as those expected to be encountered in the objective area. Rehearsals should include all team members and focus on the following tasks:

- Force protection measures en route to and from the objective area; for example, convoy procedures, react to ambush, react to indirect fire, and react to air attack.
- Force protection measures at the objective; for example, surveillance and reconnaissance of objective, establishment of security zones around the objective, personal security measures, methods of guarding vehicles and team equipment in an urban environment, and actions on unexpected enemy contact.
- Actions on the objective; for example, survey a facility, direct a meeting, conduct an interview, resolve disputes between parties, or observe civilian activities while maintaining site security.
- Other tasks, including operating in buddy teams, crowd control measures, ID checks, treating and evacuating casualties, using local phrases, searching detainees, ROE, and reacting to NBC attack.

Inspections

E-261. Before moving to the objective, team leaders conduct a final PCI to reassure the team’s readiness. The PCI consists of checking—

- Weapons and ammunition.
- Uniforms and equipment.
- Mission-essential equipment.
- Communications equipment.
- Team members’ understanding of the mission and their specific tasks.
- Rations and water.
- Deficiencies noted during earlier inspections.

E-262. The following sample Mission Planning Execution Checklist (Table E-3, pages E-65 through E-67) illustrates the types of coordination and team activities required to successfully prepare for and recover from a routine CA mission. The team leader reviews and modifies the checklist at the beginning of every mission planning requirement. This checklist should be posted at the front of the SOMPF.

**Table E-3. Sample Mission Planning Execution Checklist**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Days Out</th>
<th>Point of Contact</th>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>DTG Action Started</th>
<th>Suspension Date</th>
<th>DTG Action Completed</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>360</td>
<td>BN OPS OFF</td>
<td>S-3</td>
<td>Contacts CA for JRTC</td>
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<td>Tasking Order</td>
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<td>Start MPF</td>
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<td>270</td>
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<td>240-270</td>
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<td>Review Battalion METL</td>
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<td>270-240</td>
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<td>Conference Briefing</td>
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<td>JA/ATT Request Deploy/Redeploy</td>
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<td>PDSS Passport/Visas</td>
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<td>OPFUND Request</td>
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Table E-3. Sample Mission Planning Execution Checklist (Continued)
### Table E-3. Sample Mission Planning Execution Checklist (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Days Out</th>
<th>Point of Contact</th>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>DTG Action Started</th>
<th>DTG Action Completed</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
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<td>Commercial Air/Lodging</td>
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<td>Threat Brief</td>
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Appendix F

Use of Interpreters

Most U.S. military operations are conducted on foreign soil. Consequently, there are occasions when CA soldiers will lack the linguistic ability to communicate effectively with the local populace in the AO. The use of interpreters is often the best or only option, but must be considered a less satisfactory substitute for direct communication. Therefore, the proper use and supervision of interpreters can play a decisive role in the mission.

CA LINGUIST TEAMS

F-1. Since the majority of CA operations occur in foreign countries, theater-oriented linguistic capabilities enhance the effectiveness of CA personnel. CA organizations attempt to achieve limited basic language skills aligned with their geographic combatant commander’s priorities. Ideally, CA units will recruit individuals with a combination of civilian technical expertise, military education, and appropriate language skills. In practice, however, adequate language skills are difficult to attain and maintain. Thus, during most operations, language requirements are met by locally contracted interpreters-translators.

F-2. To help meet the military’s theater language requirements, the CA linguist team provides expertise to supported commands and language training management for the CA command.

F-3. The capabilities of the linguist team are to manage the command language program, provide limited translation capability, manage interpreter support, and coordinate production of language handbooks. Although the linguist team may provide some operational interpreter support, more often they provide a management and quality control function with locally obtained interpreters.

INTERPRETER SELECTION

F-4. Whenever possible, the interpreters used should be U.S. military personnel or at least U.S. citizens. In some operational or training settings abroad, the CA soldiers will not be faced with the problem of selecting an interpreter; they will simply be assigned one by the chain of command or host government. In other cases, interpreters are chosen from a pool provided by the host government. Finally, in many operational situations interpreters will be hired from the general HN population. Whatever the case, the following guidelines will be critical to the success of mission accomplishment. This is an opportunity for the CA soldier to truly influence the outcome of the mission.
F-5. Interpreters should be selected based on the following criteria:

- **Native speaker.** Interpreters should be native speakers of the socially or geographically determined dialect. Their speech, background, and mannerisms should be completely acceptable to the target audience so that no attention is given to the way they talk, only to what they say.

- **Social status.** In some situations and cultures, interpreters may be limited in their effectiveness with a target audience if their social standing is considerably lower than that of the audience. This may include significant differences in military rank or membership in an ethnic or religious group. Regardless of the CA soldier’s personal feelings on social status, he should remember the job is to accomplish the mission, not to act as an agent for social reform in a faraway land. Local prejudices should be accepted as a fact of life.

- **English fluency.** An often-overlooked consideration is how well the interpreter speaks English. As a rule, if the interpreter understands the CA soldier and the CA soldier understands the interpreter, then the interpreter’s command of English should be satisfactory. The CA soldier can check that “understanding” by asking the interpreter to paraphrase, in English, something the CA soldier said; the CA soldier then restates the interpreter’s comments to ensure that both persons are in sync. Also, interpreting goes both ways. The interpreter must be able to convey the information expressed by the interviewee or target audience.

- **Intellectual intelligence.** The interpreter should be quick, alert, and responsive to changing conditions and situations. He must be able to grasp complex concepts and discuss them without confusion in a reasonably logical sequence. Although education does not equate to intelligence, generally speaking, the better educated the interpreter, the better he will perform due to increased exposure to diverse concepts.

- **Technical ability.** In certain situations, the CA soldier may need an interpreter with technical training or experience in special subject areas to translate the “meaning” as well as the “words.” For instance, if the subject is very technical or specialized, with terms such as nuclear physics, background knowledge will be useful.

- **Reliability.** The CA soldier should beware of the potential interpreter who arrives late for the interview. Throughout the world, the concept of time varies widely. In many less developed countries, time is relatively unimportant. The CA soldier should make sure that the interpreter understands the military’s preoccupation with punctuality.

- **Loyalty.** If the interpreter used is a local national, it is safe to assume that his first loyalty is to the HN or subgroup, and not to the U.S. military. The security implications are clear. The CA soldier must be very cautious in how he explains concepts to give interpreters a greater depth of understanding. Additionally, some interpreters, for political or personal reasons, may have ulterior motives or a hidden agenda when they apply for the interpreting job. If the CA soldier detects or suspects such motives, he should tell his commander, S-2, or security manager.
The CA soldier should be aware of and monitor these motives with all interpreters.

- Gender, age, and race. Gender, age, and race have the potential to seriously affect the mission. One example is the status of females in Muslim society. In predominantly Muslim countries, cultural prohibitions may render a female interpreter ineffective under certain circumstances. Another example would be the Balkans, where the ethnic divisions may limit the effectiveness of an interpreter from outside the target audience’s group. Since traditions, values, and biases vary from country to country, it is important to check with the in-country assets or area studies for specific taboos or favorable characteristics.

- Compatibility. The CA soldier and the interpreter will work as a team. For the interpreter to be most effective, he should become a psychic extension of the CA soldier. The target audience will be quick to recognize personality conflicts between the CA soldier and the interpreter, which can undermine the effectiveness of the communication effort. If possible, when selecting an interpreter, the CA soldier should look for compatible traits and strive for a harmonious working relationship.

F-6. If several qualified interpreters are available, the CA soldier should select at least two. This practice is of particular importance if the interpreter will be used during long conferences or courses of instruction. The exhausting nature of these type jobs makes approximately four hours of active interpreting about the maximum for peak efficiency. Whatever the mission, with two or more interpreters, one can provide quality control and assistance to the active interpreter. Additionally, this technique can be useful when conducting coordination or negotiation meetings as one interpreter is used in an active role and the other can pay attention to the body language and side conversations of the others present. Many times, the CA soldier will gain important side information that assists in negotiations from listening to what others are saying among themselves outside of the main discussion.

TARGET ANALYSIS

F-7. Implied throughout the preceding points is the need for a careful analysis of the target population. This type of analysis goes beyond the scope of this lesson. Mature judgment, thoughtful consideration of the audience as individual human beings, and a genuine concern for their receiving accurate information will go a long way toward accomplishing the mission. The CA soldier must remember that the individual from a farm or small village is going to have markedly different expectations than the jet-setting polo player.
Evaluation Criteria

F-8. As mentioned, it is safe to assume that if the interpreter is not U.S. military or at least a U.S. citizen, his first loyalty will be to his country or subgroup and not to the United States.

F-9. The security implications of using local nationals are clear. The CA soldier must be cautious about what information he gives his interpreter. The CA soldier must always keep in mind possible security issues.

F-10. Certain tactical situations may require the use of uncleared indigenous personnel as “field expedient” interpreters. Commanders should be aware of the increased security risk involved in using such personnel and carefully weigh the risk versus the potential gain. If uncleared interpreters are used, any sensitive information should be kept to a minimum.

F-11. The interpreters must be honest and free from unfavorable notoriety among the local inhabitants. Their reputation or standing in the community should be such that persons of higher rank and standing will not intimidate them.

Rapport Establishment

F-12. The interpreter is a vital link to the target audience. Without a cooperative, supportive interpreter, the mission could be in serious jeopardy. Mutual respect and understanding is essential to effective teamwork. The CA soldier must establish rapport early in the relationship and maintain rapport throughout the joint effort. The difficulty of establishing rapport stems most of the time from lack of personal contact.

F-13. The CA soldier begins the process of establishing rapport before he meets the interpreter for the first time. The soldier should do his homework. Most foreigners are reasonably knowledgeable about the United States. The CA soldier should obtain some basic facts about the HN. Useful information may include population, geography, ethnic groups, political system, prominent political figures, monetary system, business, agriculture, and exports. A good general outline can be obtained from a recent almanac or encyclopedia. More detailed information is available in the Area Handbook for the country, and current newspapers and magazines, such as New York Times, Washington Post, Newsweek, and U.S. News and World Report.

F-14. The CA soldier should find out about the interpreter’s background. The soldier should show a genuine concern for the interpreter’s family, aspirations, career, education, and so on. Many cultures place a greater emphasis on family than career, so the soldier should start with understanding the interpreter’s home life. The CA soldier should also research cultural traditions to find out more about the interpreter and the nation in which the soldier will be working. Though the soldier should gain as much information on culture as possible before entering an HN, his interpreter can be a valuable source to fill gaps. Showing interest is also a good way to build rapport.

F-15. The CA soldier should gain the interpreter’s trust and confidence before embarking on sensitive issues, such as religion, likes, dislikes, and prejudices. The soldier should approach these areas carefully and tactfully. Although deeply personal beliefs may be very revealing and useful in the
professional relationship, the CA soldier must gently and tactfully draw these out of his interpreter.

**Orientation**

F-16. Early in the relationship with interpreters, the CA soldiers should ensure that interpreters are briefed on their duties and responsibilities. The soldiers should orient the interpreters as to the nature of their duties, standards of conduct expected, techniques of interview to be used, and any other requirements necessary. The orientation may include the following:

- Current tactical situation.
- Background information obtained on the source, interviewee, or target audience.
- Specific objectives for interview, meeting, or interrogation.
- Method of interpretation to be used—simultaneous or alternate:
  - Simultaneous—when the interpreter listens and translates at the same time.
  - Alternate—when the interpreter listens to an entire phrase, sentence, or paragraph, then translates during natural pauses.
- Conduct of the interview, lesson, or interrogation.
- Need for interpreters to avoid injecting their own personality, ideas, or questions into the interview.
- Need for interpreter to inform interviewer (CA soldier) of inconsistencies in language used by interviewee. An example would be someone who claims to be a college professor, yet speaks like an uneducated person. During interrogations or interviews, this information will be used as part of the assessment of the information obtained from the individual.
- Physical arrangements of site, if applicable.
- Possible need for interpreter to assist in AARs or assessments.

**INTERPRETER TRAINING**

F-17. As part of the initial training with the interpreter, the CA soldier should tactfully convey that the instructor, interviewer, or interrogator (CA soldier) must always direct the interview or lesson. The soldier should put the interpreter’s role in proper perspective and stress the interpreter’s importance as a vital communication link between the soldier and the target audience. The CA soldier should appeal to the interpreter’s professional pride by clearly describing how the quality and quantity of the information sent and received is directly dependent upon the interpreter’s skills. Also, the CA soldier should mention how the interpreter functions solely as a conduit between the soldier and the subject.

F-18. The CA soldier must be aware that some interpreters, because of cultural differences, may attempt to “save face” by purposely concealing their lack of understanding. They may attempt to translate what they think the CA soldier said or meant without asking for a clarification or vice versa. Because this can result in misinformation and confusion and impact on credibility, the
CA soldier should let the interpreter know that when in doubt he should always ask for clarification. The soldier should create a safe environment for this as early in the relationship as possible.

F-19. Other points for the CA soldier to cover while orienting and training the interpreter are—

- Importance of the training, interview, or interrogation.
- Specific objectives of the training, interview, or interrogation, if any.
- Outline of lesson or interview questions, if applicable.
- Background information on the interviewee or target audience.
- Briefing, training, or interview schedules. It may take double or triple the amount of time needed when using an interpreter to convey the same information. For that reason, the interpreter may be helpful in scheduling enough time.
- Copy of the briefing, questions, or lesson plan, if applicable. Special attention should be given to develop language proficiency in the technical fields in which the interpreters are expected to be employed. In general, this will give the interpreter time to look up unfamiliar words or ask questions to clarify anything confusing.
- Copies of handout material, if applicable.
- General background information on subject.
- Glossary of terms, if applicable.

INTERVIEW PREPARATION

F-20. The CA soldier selects an appropriate site for the interview. He positions and arranges physical setup of the area. When conducting interviews with VIPs or individuals from different cultures, this arrangement can be significant.

F-21. The CA soldier instructs the interpreters to mirror the soldier’s tone and personality of speech. The soldier instructs the interpreters not to interject their own questions or personality. He also instructs the interpreters to inform him if they notice any inconsistencies or peculiarities from sources.

Interview Conduct

F-22. Whether conducting an interview or presenting a lesson, the CA soldier should avoid simultaneous translations; that is, both the soldier and the interpreter talking at the same time. The soldier should speak for a minute or less in a neutral, relaxed manner, directly to the individual or audience. The interpreter should watch the soldier carefully and, during the translation, mimic the soldier’s body language as well as interpret his verbal meaning. The CA soldier should observe the interpreter closely to detect any inconsistencies between the interpreter’s and CA soldier’s manners. The soldier must be aware not to force the interpreter into literal translation by being too brief. The soldier should present one major thought in its entirety and allow the interpreter to reconstruct it in his language and culture.

F-23. Although the interpreter will be doing some editing as a function of the interpreting process, it is imperative that he transmit the exact meaning
without additions or deletions. As previously mentioned, the CA soldier should insist that the interpreter always ask for clarification, prior to interpreting, whenever not absolutely certain of the soldier’s meaning. However, the soldier should be aware that a good interpreter, especially if he is local, can be invaluable in translating subtleties and hidden meanings.

F-24. During an interview or lesson, if questions are asked, the interpreter should immediately relay them to the CA soldier for an answer. The interpreter should never attempt to answer a question, even though he may know the correct answer. Additionally, neither the soldier nor interpreter should correct the other in front of an interviewee or class; all differences should be settled away from the subject or audience.

F-25. Just as establishing rapport with the interpreter is vitally important, establishing rapport with interview subjects or the target audience is equally important. The CA soldier and the interpreter should concentrate on rapport. To establish critical rapport, the subjects or audiences should be treated as mature, important human beings that are capable and worthy.

Communication Techniques

F-26. An important first step for the CA soldier in communicating in a foreign language is to polish his English language skills. This is true even if no attempt is made to learn the indigenous language. The clearer the soldier speaks in English, including diction, the easier it is for the interpreter to translate. Other factors to consider include use of profanity, slang, and colloquialisms. In many cases, such expressions cannot be translated. Even those that can be translated do not always retain the desired meaning. Military jargon and terms such as “gee whiz” or “golly” are hard to translate. In addition, if a technical term or expression must be used, the CA soldier must be sure the interpreter conveys the proper meaning in the target language. The soldier should speak in low context, simple sentences. For instance, he may want to add words usually left off such as “airplane.” This ensures the meaning will be obvious and he is not talking about the Great Plains or a wood plane.

F-27. When the soldier is speaking extemporaneously, he must think about what he wants to say. He should break it down into logical bits, and give it out a small piece at a time using short, simple words and sentences and low context, which can be translated quickly and easily. As a rule of thumb, the CA soldier should never say more in one sentence than he can easily repeat word for word immediately after saying it. Each sentence should contain a complete thought without verbiage.

Transitional Phrases and Qualifiers

F-28. These tend to confuse and waste valuable time. Examples are “for example,” “in most cases,” “maybe,” and “perhaps.” The soldier should be cautious of using American humor. Cultural and language differences can lead to misinterpretations by foreigners. The soldier should determine early on what the interpreter finds easiest to understand and translate meaningfully. In summary, the CA soldier should—

- Keep the entire presentation as simple as possible.
• Use short sentences and simple words (low context).
• Avoid idiomatic English.
• Avoid tendency toward flowery language.
• Avoid slang and colloquial expressions.

F-29. Whenever possible, the soldier should identify any cultural restrictions before interviewing, instructing, or conferring with particular foreign nationals. For instance, when is it proper to stand, sit, or cross one’s legs? Gestures, being learned behavior, vary from culture to culture. The interpreter should be able to relate a number of these cultural restrictions, which, whenever possible, should be observed in working with the particular group or individual.

Do’s and Don’ts

F-30. The following are some do’s and don’ts for the CA soldier to consider while working with an interpreter. The CA soldier should—

• Position the interpreter by his side (or even a step back). This method will keep the subject or audience from shifting their attention, or fixating on the interpreter and not on the soldier.
• Always look at and talk directly to the subject or audience; guard against the tendency to talk to the interpreter.
• Speak slowly and clearly; repeat as often as necessary.
• Speak to the individual or group as if they understand English. The soldier should be enthusiastic and employ the gestures, movements, and voice intonations and inflections that would normally be used before an English-speaking group. Considerable nonverbal meaning can be conveyed through voice and body movements. The soldier should encourage the interpreter to mimic the same delivery.
• Periodically check the interpreter’s accuracy, consistency, and clarity. Another American, fluent enough in the language, should sit in on a lesson or interview. This should assure that the translation is not distorted, intentionally or unintentionally. Another way to be sure is for the soldier to learn the target language so that the interpreter’s loyalty and honesty can be personally checked.
• Check with the audience whenever misunderstandings are suspected and clarify immediately. Using the interpreter, the soldier should ask questions to elicit answers that will tell whether the point is clear. If not clear, he should rephrase the instruction differently and illustrate the point again. The soldier should use repetition and examples whenever necessary to facilitate learning. If the class asks few questions, it may mean the instruction is “over the heads” of the audience, or the message is not clear to the audience.
• Make the interpreter feel like a valuable member of the team; give the interpreter recognition commensurate with the importance of his contribution.
The CA soldier **should not**—

- Address the subject or audience in the third person through the interpreter. The soldier should avoid saying “tell them I’m glad to be their instructor,” but rather should say, “I’m glad to be your instructor.”
  He should address the subject or audience directly.

- Make side comments to the interpreter that are not expected to be translated. This tends to create the wrong atmosphere for communication.

- Be a distraction while the interpreter is translating and the subject or audience is listening. The soldier should not pace the floor, write on the blackboard, teeter on the lectern, drink beverages, or carry on any other distracting activity while the interpreter is actually translating.
Appendix G

Guidelines to Successfully Reach an Agreement

This appendix discusses mediation from the perspective of mediating between former belligerents in a postconflict environment. The following guidelines are not all-inclusive or exclusive. Since mediation is the preferred method for conducting bilateral or multilateral talks, these guidelines were written mainly to facilitate mediation. However, the principles contained below should also apply in those cases where the CA soldier is serving as a negotiator or arbitrator.

The mediation process, like the interview process, consists of three distinct phases: the preparatory phase, the meeting phase, and the postmeeting phase. Unlike the interview process, which is normally a one-time event, the three phases are repeated before each mediation event.

PREPARATORY PHASE

G-1. This phase includes determining where the mediation should take place, as well as doing research to understand what factors are involved so that a successful outcome of the mediation process will result. The following paragraphs discuss these actions.

ENVIRONMENT

G-2. When setting the environment, the mediator considers both the physical meeting place and the individual or group requirements of the parties present at the mediation. Preferences among the representatives for a specific time or location should be considered, but a safe, quick route equidistant for as many of the involved parties as possible should be the priority. All parties must feel secure and comfortable while at the mediation site. Shelter, water, food, light, telephone and communications assets, restrooms, paper and pens, chairs and tables, along with any other requisite supplies should be readily available.

SITUATION RESEARCH

G-3. Preparation, as in any military operation, is the key to a successful mediation. The mediator must know the factual situation as well as the nuances that the local representatives will apply to the facts. The condition of local factories, level of education, age of the populace, amount of farming versus manufacturing, lines of communications (roads, telephones, water, and so on) are but a part of the overall situation. Political inclination before and after the conflict, economic ties outside the country, and the ideologies of internal and external pressure groups seeking cooperation or disharmony are also critical.
G-4. The mediator must be fully aware of the resources that can be exploited to reach an agreement. He must know about all possible resources, not only from the organization that he represents but also from other international, nongovernmental, or private groups operating in the theater.

G-5. The mediator should also know which requirements of the local populace could be leveraged to increase pressure on the local representatives to comply with efforts to enhance stability and peace. For example, there may exist in the AO factories that are missing an easily procured part or farmland that could productively grow an alternate crop. While this knowledge does not directly lead to an agreement, an effort by the mediator to obtain the missing part or an alternate crop source can be used to nudge a party toward cooperation.

G-6. The local slant on the facts will vary by person, village, county, and nation. Mediators must know what each party can and will concede and ensure that a balance is achieved.

G-7. The mediator must know as much as possible about the parties that are directly and indirectly involved in the mediation. There will be personalities and pressures from behind the scenes that can affect the willingness of the local representative to support an agreement. Mediators must know the ability of the people present at the table to effectively comply with any agreement that they sign. Frustration and distrust are hard to overcome when an unseen person derails an agreement made in good faith.

G-8. The mediator must also know if the local representative can sign an agreement and expect the support of the populace. If popular support is not forthcoming, any momentum towards stability will be lost. Finally, the mediator must know which international parties have an influence on, as well as an interest in, the topics of the mediation and ensure that the goals of the mediation are not at odds with those of a member of the international community (IC).

G-9. When using translators, the mediator must also be mindful of the translator's personal bias filter. Translators should be vetted and routinely checked to ensure their integrity and accuracy. Before key meetings, the mediator should brief the translators to ensure that new or difficult ideas are clearly understood and uncommon words and their definitions are explained.

G-10. When hiring translators, many factors must be considered. Local translators tend to be the most fluent and have a better command of dialects but will be more likely to have more pronounced biases, depending upon their personal experiences and loyalties to particular ethnic or religious groups. American translators have a lower tendency to have personal biases, either for or against a party, but their command of local dialects may not equal that of a native speaker. If possible, mediators should use translators in tandem to ensure both accuracy and reliability and to reduce the effects of personal bias.

G-11. One of the most difficult challenges facing a mediator is ensuring that all parties are represented. In some cases, portions of the populace will be either underrepresented or not represented at all. The mediator must know the demographics of the region to integrate all potential interested parties into the process. Failure to do so will lessen overall support for stability and
may actually lay the foundation for future controversy where the United States is cited as a biased entity.

**MEETING PHASE**

G-12. Effective communication is essential to maintain successful negotiations. This will often take place within meetings. Meetings may be informal and spontaneous or may be routine, but all must be well thought out and carefully planned, if possible.

**BEFORE THE MEETING**

G-13. Before any meeting, the CA soldier conducting the meeting should accomplish the following:

- Identify the reason for members meeting face to face.
- Ensure members have been invited well in advance.
- Establish the objectives for the meeting.
- Ensure all participants understand the objectives.
- Circulate reports and other documentation pertinent to the discussion before the meeting so information can be read and digested.
- Prepare the physical environment beforehand (check for warmth, fresh air, light, seating arrangements, security, communications support, accessibility of the meeting location, and solitude). The CA soldier should also—
  - Ensure appropriate visual aids (whiteboards, markers, sheets of paper, recording equipment, and overhead projectors) are in place.
  - Arrange members so they can face each other, if possible; for larger groups, try U-shaped rows. A leader has better control when he is centrally located.
  - Choose a location suitable to group size. Small rooms with too many people get stuffy and create tension. A larger room is more comfortable and encourages individual expression.
  - Vary meeting places, if possible, to accommodate different members.
- Collect any other resources needed for the meeting.
- Assemble static displays, if used.
- Establish and publish an agenda.
- Identify and prepare a facilitator.
- Identify and prepare a recorder.

**AT THE MEETING**

G-14. The facilitator will—

- Make sure the meeting starts on time.
- Be knowledgeable on appropriate social customs and requirements.
• Be aware that people of different cultures may follow different time scales; if there are latecomers, welcome them, give them a moment to settle, then tell them what the group is doing.
• Welcome members and organizations and conduct introductions.
• Articulate ground rules that have been developed by the members:
  ▪ Respect for other people: There will be no interrupting, no long monologues, no personal abuse, and time is allowed for everybody to express their views.
  ▪ Confidentiality: Agreement needs to be reached on whether meeting content shall be discussed outside the meeting.
  ▪ Responsibility: Everybody agrees to take responsibility for timekeeping, keeping to the agenda, and voicing their opinions in the meeting rather than afterwards.
  ▪ Physical comfort: Agreement needs to be reached on whether smoking is permissible or whether breaks can be negotiated.
  ▪ Decision making: Agreement needs to be reached on how decisions are to be made: by consensus or voting. If consensus cannot be achieved, at what point will alternative decision-making methods be used and who will decide?
• Read and call for apologies.
• Establish the time frame for the meeting.
• Keep the group focused on the agenda.
• Thank everyone for attending the meeting and set the time and place, if appropriate, for the next meeting.
• Conduct a documents security check of the room or area after the meeting.

AFTER THE MEETING
G-15. Problems are discussed during the meeting with officers so improvements can be made. The facilitator will—
• Follow up on delegation decisions; see that all members understand and carry out their responsibilities.
• Give recognition and appreciation to excellent and timely progress.
• Put unfinished business on the agenda for the next meeting.
• Conduct a periodic evaluation of the meetings. Weak areas can be analyzed and improved for meetings that are more productive.
• Ensure—
  ▪ Action plans and follow-ups are confirmed.
  ▪ Minutes are checked by the facilitator and the recorder.
  ▪ The time frame for publication and distribution of minutes, reports, and the next agenda is arranged, as required.

GOAL EXPLANATION
G-16. The methods and operational aspects of an operation may be classified, but there is nothing classified about the goals of U.S. policy. Upon meeting
the parties to the mediation, the mediator must be forthright and direct with what is expected between parties as it pertains to the establishment of stability and lasting peace. The U.S. goals should be presented to all parties to the mediation in written form and in the local language. After the local representatives have read the goals, the mediator should ask questions of them to ensure that the goals are understood and that there is no mistaken conception that the mediator is trying to further the particular interests of either the United States or a local entity.

G-17. Neither the goal of stability nor of peace should have negative connotations. When applicable, the mediation effort should be placed in the context of a larger framework of international or regional agreements, or a treaty that a higher level of the local government has signed and with which it is complying.

Establishment of a Professional Interpersonal Relationship With the Parties

G-18. It is a challenge to balance the interpersonal relationship between the mediator and the local parties. Mediators must be accessible and open without appearing to favor one side over another. Any social meeting should be brief and based upon the professional relationship. Any appearance of being overly cordial with a party to the negotiation will erode trust. Mediators should treat all meetings as if they were in a business environment to preclude the taint of impropriety.

Fairness and Impartiality

G-19. In conjunction with interpersonal relationships, mediators must show fairness and impartiality. When a mediator suggests a program or offers to assist in providing funding or support for a cooperative project that adheres to U.S. policy goals, he must equitably divide the resources to ensure that neither side profits at the expense of the other.

G-20. Similarly, the mediator must know when to mete out rewards and punishments. If one party consistently cooperates while another party constantly resists or refuses to cooperate, the mediator must simultaneously reward and punish the respective participants. In this situation, an effective way to influence behavior is to seek an increase in funding or support for programs that benefit those who cooperate, and decrease funding or support for programs that aid the uncooperative.

G-21. Mediators should exercise discretion as to how previously noncooperative parties are treated once they begin to cooperate. The mediator may recommend either restoring lost funding or support or simply recommend that funding or support be permanently lost.

Perception Equals Reality

G-22. An essential tenet in all mediation efforts in a postconflict environment is that perception is the same as reality. The basis for reality is how a person perceives recent events and not how actual facts prove the perception right or wrong. Therefore, if a party to mediation perceives he was wronged, then he was wronged. Alternatively, if the United States were perceived as taking a side, the United States has, de facto, taken a side.
G-23. It is not the impartial mediator's place to correct false perception. In any event, he will be unable to do so in the limited amount of time he has to affect the situation. The mediator must be aware of local misperceptions and find a way to circumvent them. In a postconflict environment, an effective way to correct misperceptions is by long-term revisions made with small steps.

**Something Tangible to Offer**

G-24. While remaining impartial, the mediator must have something tangible to offer the parties for cooperation and, therefore, something tangible to take away for failing to cooperate. Otherwise, the mediator is only an observer and cannot lead the mediation effort toward cooperation, stability, and peace. There are instances, however, where a mediator has nothing traditionally tangible to offer. Funding may be slow in coming or nonexistent. In those cases, the mediator will have to improvise and seek either nontraditional support or methods that allow military resources to assist. The mediator can always leverage the prestige of cooperating with the United States. There are few local politicians who do not want to appear as being able to hold their own in a U.S.-led arena.

**Money Equals Influence**

G-25. Along with having something tangible to offer is the fact that money equals immediate influence. While this is true, it can be a problem if not monitored. Mediators must not appear to be using funding for projects to force local officials into cooperating in agreements that run counter to the interests of the local populace.

G-26. The United States funds foreign aid projects expressly to influence the decisions of local officials, but the perception that an official is a puppet of the United States will both lessen his effectiveness in the community and quell popular support for U.S. policy.

**Refocus of the Mediation Effort**

G-27. There are situations when the mediator may have to totally refocus the mediation effort. If the participants are actively opposing U.S. policy and the mediator's concerted efforts fail to alter that behavior, the mediator should redirect his effort. This is a very delicate and complex task. If the uncooperative representatives are able to quickly or easily replace, by domestic or international means, the same support or funding withdrawn by the U.S. representative, then the prestige and influence of the United States is adversely affected. The mediator should display his determination to seek stability and leverage his ability to curtail support for the uncooperative officials. Coordination with the various members of the international organizations operating in the area is critical.

G-28. If the mediator must redirect the mediation, he should consider different communication methods. The mediator can alter the meeting location, change which entities participate, reassess what subjects will be addressed, find a different international organization to host, allow for surrogates, or lower the level of representatives from the local communities. To succeed, the mediator must be flexible.
G-29. The mediator must consistently demonstrate that U.S. determination to achieve stability and peace is greater than the local dedication to continued conflict. He must constantly reiterate the goal of cooperation over the protests of the locals to confirm that U.S. staying power will overcome any attempt to stall progress toward peace.

Mediator Control

G-30. Mediators must always be in control of themselves and the members of their team and not become personally involved. This is very difficult when the mediator has knowledge of a particular participant’s inhumane acts or when a party to the mediation exhibits an aggressive attitude. No matter the circumstances, the mediator and his subordinates must maintain their composure.

G-31. Mediators must also control the outbursts of the participants. Belligerent acts or threats cannot be tolerated. When unacceptable behavior occurs, the mediator must stop the talks immediately to prevent escalation. The mediator should then schedule separate and private meetings with each participant to reiterate what is expected of each party.

G-32. The mediator, however, should not be emotionless. There are times when the mediator should show his disapproval, both verbally and through body language. Although the mediator should not yell or aggressively approach any participant, he should schedule a private meeting to clarify the reason for his disapproval.

Option to Retreat

G-33. Parties to mediation should always have an option to retreat. The goal of mediation is not to defeat a party but to instill cooperation toward stability and peace. There may be times when a participant cannot support a position and the mediator should tactfully allow the party a face-saving route of escape. Should an agreement be made with a party that felt trapped, it is very unlikely that that party will honor the agreement. It is more effective to reschedule and meet when actual progress can be made than to reach an agreement that will be discarded. All parties should be able to retreat honorably or with some form of victory.

Private Meetings

G-34. Private meetings have an important role in mediation efforts. They allow the mediator and each participant to know one another on a personal level, and both the mediator and the individual party can explain their particular goals. In addition, issues a party would not discuss in front of an adversary can be discussed while details and differences of opinion can be ironed out.

G-35. The mediator should be aware that too many private meetings with one party or another may give the appearance of favoritism. Private meetings should be focused on the main issues of the mediation.

G-36. On the other hand, mediation that is conducted in seclusion and without outside witnesses can be an effective use of the private meeting format. Because the parties do not have the opportunity or feel the pressure
to bluster or outmaneuver their adversary for the benefit of the public, these meetings can be very constructive. Once cooperation and trust are established, private meetings can quickly lead to progress.

Public Meetings

G-37. Public meetings are the most effective vehicle for widely demonstrating progress and support for increased trust, cooperation, stability, and peace between former warring parties. Public meetings also help establish the air of permanence and, thereby, add to the legitimacy of the effort.

G-38. While public meetings are preferable to private meetings, the costs and inherent inefficiencies may outweigh the benefits. Coordinating public meetings can be extremely difficult. As local and international spectators attend the mediation, the physical requirements increase drastically. Security and safety issues also become more acute. The mediator must weigh concerns for security against the public display for stability and peace. Mediators must also ensure that the desire to cooperate and pursue stability and peace is genuine, and that a public meeting will not be intentionally used to disrupt cooperation or U.S. policy.

POSTMEETING PHASE

G-39. The postmeeting phase is the implementation and follow-through required for a successful mediation. The following paragraphs discuss the necessary actions that mediators must take.

REPRESENTATIVE ACCOUNTABILITY

G-40. Once a local representative commits to and signs an agreement, he must be held accountable to the terms of the agreement. Support and funding for projects that benefit the signatories’ communities should always be directly linked to continued adherence to any and all agreements.

G-41. The mediator must establish a system that ensures every party will adhere to all agreements. Should a signatory begin to veer away from the intent or the letter of an agreement, the mediator must be prepared to apportion punishment and clearly and directly explain why the punishment is being meted out.

G-42. The mediator should use all forms of local, national, and international press, as well as international organizations that monitor the area, as watchdogs. As often as possible, agreements should be publicized to make them a matter of public record, which will compel the parties to comply.

Accurate Information Delivery to all Interested Parties

G-43. The press can be both a tremendous asset and a tremendous burden for mediators. There are particular guidelines for interacting with the media, and the PAO within each command is tasked with announcing official press releases. The PAO is also the primary source for information on contacting members of the press.
G-44. Certain parameters must be observed when the media is integrated. An analysis of the target audience and the method of information delivery have to be conducted. The significance of the event must be balanced with the amount of press coverage. The size and the literacy rate of the audience are also factors. In addition, the geographic area (local, regional, national, or international audiences) has a significant impact on which media will be effective.

G-45. The CA civil information officer and local PSYOP assets should also be integrated into the delivery of information. Close coordination for timing and dissemination is critical for success. Accurately informing the public about successful agreements will broaden popular support for stability and peace while reducing the negative impact of local perceptions about the behavior of their former adversaries.

G-46. Wording and translation of information releases are critical. As one who is fully knowledgeable of the subject matter, the mediator should be closely involved in drafting all documents describing key points about the agreement. When writing information releases, the mediator should use short, direct sentences that read well if quoted. Speeches should be available in written form. Ratified agreements should be presented in as many applicable languages as possible. The mediator should ensure the accuracy of all translations. For the television and radio media, information should be edited into short but understandable pieces that are usable as “sound bites.” As with everything that is to be disseminated after having been translated, the mediator should ensure that appropriate personnel have vetted the translations.

G-47. Timing is critical to effectively announcing a successful mediation. When the decision is made to integrate the media, the mediator should be aware of any events that may disrupt or detract from the mediator’s announcement. The mediator should release information when it will not be diluted or edited to the point where it is ineffective. If possible, the mediator should avoid dates that involve major holidays, elections, religious holy days, historical events, or dates when a critical announcement is scheduled. The mediator should also coordinate with the other members of the IC to eliminate the possibility of conflicting announcements.

**Written Records and Agreements**

G-48. Written records of all meetings must be kept to ensure that all participants to the mediation understand important terms, conditions, and definitions within an agreement. Without written records, it is impossible to establish the veracity of an agreement. The parties to the mediation should see that notes and records are being kept, which serves two purposes. First, it reinforces the understanding that the participants will be held to the terms of the agreement and, therefore, should not make statements without intending to honor them. Second, a written record can be forwarded to the participants for their records and the professional manner in which the mediation is conducted will enhance the legitimacy of the mediation effort.

G-49. All agreements must be written and translated. A handshake to symbolize the final acceptance of an agreement is excellent for a closing but does not substitute for a written and signed agreement. If necessary, the
mediator can gather signatures on a working version of the agreement to establish documentation of an agreement. From this working version, the mediator can formalize the agreement with an official signing ceremony. The mediator should use all of these protocols to reinforce, among the local population as well as their representatives, the seriousness of the agreement and that all agreements will be monitored for compliance.

G-50. English is commonly accepted as the international language of agreements. During mediation, therefore, the English version of an agreement is the official version. If the intent or terms of an agreement are challenged, the English version must be the benchmark for all clarifications.

Mediation and Transition to the International Community

G-51. The mediator should establish a routine by scheduling mediation meetings at set intervals. As the mediation progresses, he should invite key members from the IC to observe and participate. After the members of the IC become more active, the mediator may defer to them on decisions or integrate their expertise. The members of the IC should be integrated into the process as mediators and hosts to maximize exposure and establish cooperation. If possible, a name should be established for the group of participating entities to encourage a sense of ownership and membership in an exclusive organization.

G-52. The mediator should transition the mediation effort, once firmly established, to the IC. The mediator can use the role of mediation leader, as well as the trust and prestige established over the term of the mediation effort, to prepare the participants for transition to the IC. Doing so will allow the international and nongovernmental organizations and institutions chartered to assist in these arenas to accomplish their mandates.

G-53. Effectively transitioning the IC into the lead role in the mediation effort will assist them in accomplishing their respective missions and may lead to future IC support of U.S. military-led mediation efforts. As U.S. military representatives establish a reputation as effective mediators, the IC should in turn become more accepting of the U.S. military's mediation efforts and, therefore, more enthusiastically supportive. Quicker support from the IC for U.S. military mediation efforts will then reduce the long-term requirement for U.S. force structure needed to conduct postconflict operations.

G-54. The mediator should set a timetable in coordination with the IC that will gradually transition the lead role from the CA mediator to a mediator from the IC. The CA mediator should install a member of the IC as a co-mediator, or establish a pattern for alternating the role of lead mediator from one meeting to another. Both the CA representative and the IC representative should be present at all meetings until final transition occurs. All records should be passed over to the IC organization that is providing the person who is taking the position of lead mediator.

MEDIATION PROCESS AND THE MEDIATOR'S ACTIONS

G-55. Mediation in a postconflict operation follows a general pattern. While each operation is on a different timeline and can involve additional or fewer steps, the process remains constant. In some instances, steps in the process may take place simultaneously or they may take place in a different order.
The mediator must remain flexible and open to change based on the idiosyncrasies of the local situation. Since CA mediators are often replaced at the six-month mark, the mediator must initiate the process as soon as possible after arrival. In addition, the mediator must have accurate records to ensure continuity when he transitions out.

G-56. Starting at establishing trust and ending at the first multilateral agreement, the average period for completing a mediation cycle is 4 to 6 months. Since the CA mediator is usually in the area for approximately six months, he must act quickly and decisively to develop a plan for mediation. The following paragraphs describe the general mediation process and the steps the mediator takes during the process.

**Establishment of Trust (Closed Door—No Outside Observers, Participants, or Press)**

G-57. The mediator conducts one-to-one meetings to establish a professional relationship between himself and each individual participant and to explain U.S. policy goals, expectations, and the rewards of cooperation, as well as the consequences of noncooperation.

G-58. The mediator compiles a list of the concerns and grievances of each party. He compares the lists and decides which issues show promise of cooperation. He looks for areas where infrastructure or lines of communication intersect. These areas generate many opportunities where the needs of the parties overlap.

G-59. Group meetings of increasing size and frequency are held to establish a professional relationship between the participants.

G-60. Following both one-to-one and group meetings, the mediator attempts to establish the routine of a “social hour” for small talk and to relax the participants in the company of former adversaries.

**Bilateral Mediation (Open or Closed Door—May or May Not Allow Outside Observers, Participants, or Press at the Mediator’s Discretion)**

G-61. The mediator orchestrates a simple agreement over a small issue that only involves two of the local entities or villages. He concentrates on those areas where concerns or needs overlap, and works with pairs of representatives from the local communities, one representative from each of the opposing sides. The mediator rewards the two participants with funding, support, or by coordinating assistance for their respective communities.

G-62. Throughout the entire course of the mediation, the mediator actively encourages all parties to meet outside the framework of the mediation. Details about wording or minor aspects about the terms and conditions of cooperation should take place directly between the opposing sides. The mediator should make every attempt to determine what the parties have agreed to, but the more important goal is to establish normalized communications between all local entities without the intervention of the IC or the U.S. military.

G-63. The mediator meets with the representatives of adjacent entities or villages and discusses the successful cooperative efforts that are occurring in the region and the rewards that ensued.
G-64. The mediator keeps a comparative balance in the characteristics of the participants. He attempts to pair each entity with an entity from the opposition that has a similar size, infrastructure, farming or business base, and economic condition.

G-65. The mediator repeats the above steps with issues of increasing importance to establish credibility in ever-expanding realms. He makes cooperation the norm so that it becomes expected and not a surprise.

G-66. The mediator initiates bilateral talks with as many pairs of the local entities as can be effectively managed. When possible, he works different issues with each pair to establish cooperation in various areas.

G-67. As bilateral talks advance toward a multilateral setting, the mediator exploits established cooperation between any or all of the pairs of entities. He encourages parties to a successful bilateral mediation to mentor other pairs who are facing similar problems. As the process moves forward into more formalized multilateral mediation, the mediator builds teams from the pairs to establish a personal bond between the participants.

G-68. All of the above steps lay the groundwork for meetings between multiple entities. Before moving forward in the process, the mediator should ensure that there are enough successful precedents to indicate that multilateral mediation will be fruitful.

Multilateral Mediation (Open or Closed Door—May or May Not Allow Outside Observers, Participants, or Press at the Mediator’s Discretion)

G-69. The mediator meets with the pairs of representatives developed during the bilateral phase to determine their combined concerns and issues. Also, he determines whether they are willing to talk with other pairs of representatives to discuss larger group cooperation and concessions. The mediator explains U.S. policy goals, the rewards of cooperation, and the consequences of noncooperation.

G-70. The mediator demonstrates the rewards and advantages of cooperation by citing previous cooperative ventures and the proceeds that the cooperative parties received for their communities. He explains the goals of the mediation and what each cooperative party can expect to benefit at the conclusion of an acceptable agreement. (The mediator should ensure that the IC and the military chain-of-command can and will sustain any support or funding that is proffered.)

G-71. The mediator asks the participants to propose a name for the group that is representative of the entire region. He refers to commonplace names for rivers, mountain ranges, or any major terrain feature that the local populace can readily recognize. The mediator should ensure the name does not have potential negative connotations, such as a major battle or the site of an atrocity.

G-72. The mediator begins the multilateral mediation with a statement of intent to cooperate. He works out the details ahead of time and has the participants sign the document, either as a group or during one-to-one meetings. A group setting is preferred.
G-73. The mediator has the IC and the military commander write congratulatory letters to the entire group of participants, and ensures that the wording is accurate and non-inflammatory. The mediator submits a draft of the letter to the U.S. military commander and the representatives from the IC so that they have a common reference point from which to write their respective congratulatory letters. From this point onward, any communication from the U.S. military or the IC is addressed to the group to reinforce the perception, among the participants, of membership in a larger organization.

G-74. The mediator develops the statement of intent to cooperate into a declaration to work as a cohesive group for rebuilding infrastructure that affects the entire region. Once again, he procures congratulatory letters from the major IC and military HQ. Each subsequent statement, declaration, or agreement should receive a letter from the appropriate IC and military leadership. The mediator matches the level of the local document with the level of the letter that is delivered from the IC and military community. For example, an agreement from a group whose physical boundaries are within a battalion’s AO should receive letters from the battalion commander and the leadership of the major IC organizations that conduct business in the immediate area. As the participants to the mediation outgrow the battalion or brigade AOs, the next-higher level within the command structure, as well as the IC, should write a congratulatory letter.

**Mediation by Establishing Protocol and a Schedule**

G-75. The mediator follows the rules of order for a typical board of directors meeting and begins distributing minutes from the previous meetings. He sets an agenda and keeps to it. The mediator encourages direct discussions between the participants of the mediation.

G-76. The mediator initiates a plan where the participants to the mediation rotate as the president or host for the meeting. Any equitable system of rotating this role is acceptable, be it weekly, biweekly, or monthly, as long as it allows all parties an opportunity to lead the discussion. (The mediator does not relinquish control of the mediation at this time.)

**Integration of the International Community into the Mediation (Open or Closed Door—May or May Not Allow Outside Observers, Participants, or Press at the Mediator’s Discretion)**

G-77. This period in the cycle of the mediation is critical for establishing long-term stability and peace. The mediator identifies an organization within the IC that is directly involved with the issues of the participants and will be in the theater for an extended time. The IC organization should provide a person to act as a co-mediator or alternate with the military mediator as the head mediator. The U.S. military mediator begins to phase out of the lead role.

**Agreement Resolution (Open or Closed Door—at the Mediator’s Discretion)**

G-78. This period can be the least predictable in the mediation effort. If the mediator’s preparation has been effective, no external events have disrupted the willingness of the participants to cooperate, and funding from both the
United States or the IC remains intact, then a written agreement can be rather quickly reached. If anything occurs to disturb the process, the entire procedure may have to be reinitiated.

G-79. After the basics of the agreement are verbally resolved, the mediator puts them on paper. Butcher-block paper on an easel, or a similar form of displaying the points of the agreement to the entire group, can be used to start the process of putting the ideas of the agreement on paper. The mediator formalizes the process by creating typewritten interim versions of all documents and giving everyone a copy. These documents are used as working drafts; the mediator makes changes and adds details, as required. Once the first part of an agreement is concluded, momentum toward cooperation is created and the mediator assumes the additional burden of keeping up the pressure to reach a finalized document.

Agreement Announcement to the Public (Open Door—Outside Observers, Participants, or Press Are Invited)

G-80. The mediator develops a program to announce the agreement to both the domestic and the international community. He integrates CA civil information and PSYOP assets to publicize the agreement. In concert with the PAO information is released to the local, national, and international press. The mediator ensures that the cooperating participants are the focus of all announcements. He downplays the role of the U.S. military mediation effort and enhances the role of the IC and the participants to set the stage for eventual transition to the IC.

G-81. The mediator allows access to signing events for print, radio, and television to publicly document the agreement. If possible, local, national, and international press agencies should be present and given copies of the agreement in the local language and in English.

G-82. The mediator has the local participants sign the agreement followed by the official witnesses from the IC and the military. A public display of civility, such as a group handshake, is also encouraged. The witnesses should be from the organizations tasked with monitoring the agreement.

Mediation Expansion

G-83. Efforts in one AO should be integrated into the efforts of adjacent AOs. If there is no current effort underway in an adjacent AO, the mediator coordinates for expansion of the mediation effort across internal boundaries. The mediator educates key leaders in adjacent military and IC organizations on the methods that led to success.

Agreement Monitoring

G-84. The organizations that mediated the agreement must supervise the agreement for compliance by all parties. The local participants, as well as U.S. and international organizations that pledged support or funding, must be monitored to ensure everyone is meeting the obligations outlined in the agreement.
AGREEMENT DOCUMENTS

G-85. The documents that lead up to a multilateral agreement can range from the simple to the complex. The most successful documents allow for flexibility and are direct and simple. Complex documents, especially when translated, lend themselves to multiple interpretations.

G-86. All agreements must be written and readily available to establish compliance by the parties. Documents should also be forwarded to all IC and military organizations in the affected area, as well as adjacent areas, to coordinate all efforts to establish cooperation.

G-87. Every document produced during mediation should be leveraged to increase the legitimacy and institutionalization of the cooperative group. Each document should be the foundation for subsequent documents until the goal of permanently established stability and peace is accomplished.

G-88. There is no standard format for any of these documents, and the mediator must tailor each document to the individual situation. However, consistency in format is critical to establishing understanding and legitimacy as the process expands. Some of the common documents that the mediator will either draft or contribute to are—

- Letters of intent. The most simple of the documents involving mediation, letters of intent are short statements signed by an individual or by two or more local parties declaring that the signatories will come together with the intention of discussing cooperation. The mediator should be the official witness for these documents. Letters of intent incur no other commitment than to enter into talks. There is no commitment from the United States or IC. Letters of intent are the base document the mediator uses to bring parties to the original talks.

- Statements supporting cooperation. Statements supporting cooperation are the next type of document that the mediator should pursue. These documents include more detail and should incorporate an explicit commitment from the United States or the IC to support or fund projects based upon demonstrated cooperation. These documents should quickly generate an official congratulatory letter from the U.S. military, as well as the applicable IC organizations.

- Agreement to cooperate in support of stability and peace. A written agreement, signed by all participants, is the pinnacle of the mediation effort. These documents delineate the categories in which the signatories intend to cooperate (for example, refugee return, infrastructure reconstruction, housing, education, agriculture, and so on) and what the signatories expect from the IC and the U.S. military in return for cooperation. (These documents can be politically explosive at the local level and, therefore, methods to limit negative political impact upon the signatories to the agreement should be sought.)

G-89. The mediator should ensure that the document has enough detail to hold the participants responsible to the terms of the agreement. The document should be concise and not overbearing. References to any local political group should be eliminated to preclude the perception of favoritism or the generation of negative publicity through association. Flexibility in how
an agreement is interpreted should be very limited, and each signatory’s specific concerns must be addressed in the body of the agreement.

G-90. The mediator will find that issues will emerge after the agreement is signed that will hamper cooperation. As soon as possible after an issue in contention is identified, the mediator should draft an addendum to the original agreement that eliminates the problem.

ADDITIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE DOCUMENTS

G-91. There will be circumstances when a mediator will have to draft a document to clarify a specific issue relevant to an agreement. These occasions should be minimized to preclude confusion and distraction from the intent of the original document. The mediator’s task in this situation is to create a simple addendum that is concise and directly addresses a grievance or clarifies a questionable detail.

Adoption of a Name

G-92. These documents are very simple and take the form of an official resolution. There is little contention in adopting a name as long as the research has been done to eliminate names with negative connotations.

Adoption of a Schedule

G-93. When a document is drafted to establish a schedule, the mediator must ensure that the schedule is clear and equitable to all parties. Any agreements pertaining to exceptions to a predetermined schedule should be included to prevent confusion. Examples of common exceptions to a predetermined schedule include religious holy days, elections, state holidays, and contentious historical dates. Establishment of prearranged meeting places and alternate meeting dates or locations can also be incorporated into this document and will add to the legitimacy of the mediation effort.

Establishment of a Revolving Leadership Program

G-94. Agreements about rotating the internal leadership role within the group of participants should be written to ensure equality and that no individual party benefits exceedingly from a leadership position. The participant who is in the leadership role should be precluded from establishing the group’s agenda or the power to veto or disproportionately affect issues brought to the mediation. Other administrative positions can be added such as Secretary, Deputy Leader, and so on.

Recognition of a Transition of Mediators

G-95. When the time occurs for transition to the IC from the U.S. military, the participants should be encouraged to adopt a resolution recognizing a specific IC organization as the new mediator. An official date of transition should be established, as well as the method for contacting the new mediator. (This document should not be required when the mediator transitions from one U.S. military representative to another since the organization that is leading the mediation has not changed.)
Layout of a Typical Agreement

G-96. The mediator should establish a standardized format for each type of document based upon the peculiarities of each operation. All subsequent documents in the AO should, to the extent possible, follow the format of documents written to accomplish similar goals. This leads to a formalized and predictable structure to succeeding mediation efforts. Enough copies of the agreement should be produced in the local language so that each signatory can receive an original document with original signatures. In addition, all participants and witnesses should sign an official English version of the agreement. For example, if there are six participants and two official witnesses, nine documents should be produced and each one signed to allow each participant and witness to receive an original document. Each participant and witness receive an original copy with the English version maintained as the official reference document.

G-97. The general format for an agreement is an introduction, body of the agreement, conclusion, space for signatories, and a space for witnesses.

- **Introduction:** The introduction should state the name of the group signing the agreement, the goals of the agreement, location and date of the signing, and administrative information specific to the signing.

- **Body:** The body of the agreement should include—
  - The specific areas in which the parties to the agreement will cooperate.
  - Political entities that will adhere to the agreement.
  - Specifics, as required, clarifying the terms of the agreement.
  - What the signatories to the agreement expect from the members of the IC and the USG.

- **Conclusion:** The conclusion should state that the agreement is made in an effort to support stability and peace between the communities that are parties to the agreement and reiterate the signatories' willingness to cooperate for the benefit of their communities.

- **Signatories:** The signatories should sign immediately below the body of the agreement. The signature blocks should include a typed line long enough to accommodate a signature, the typed name of the signatory (under the line for the signature), with the signatory's title along with the name of his community under his name. If the signatories habitually affix a seal to official documents, the document should facilitate a space where an official seal may be affixed that does not distort the signatures.

**NOTE:** The order of the signatures should not show favoritism. An effective technique is to arrange the signatures in the order in which the participants joined the mediation effort. Since the mediator took pains to maintain a balance, the signatories should be in a balanced and unbiased pattern.

- **Witnesses:** The witnesses should sign at the bottom of the document and their signature blocks should follow the pattern used for the participants. Again, a space for official stamps or seals should be allowed.
Maintaining the Agreement

G-98. Until the cessation of U.S. participation in an operation, the U.S. military representative who initiates the original mediation effort is responsible for monitoring that the signatories comply with any agreements stemming from mediation. In addition, the U.S. military mediator or representative is responsible for ensuring that the members of the IC, as well as the USG, comply with the obligations they made.

Checking for Compliance

G-99. Either the mediator or a representative of the U.S. military should habitually attend the meetings that the parties to the mediation have scheduled. This attendance exhibits the continued interest of the U.S. military and allows for an insight into how the efforts to support cooperation are progressing. Continuing contact with the representatives that have to comply with any mediated agreement facilitates communications and an open environment. The mediator or his representative should always seek ways to reinforce cooperation.

G-100. The mediator or his representative should perform both scheduled and unscheduled inspections into areas where the local parties have agreed to cooperate. Meetings with local leaders, who are not signatories to a mediated agreement, should include questions about support by the populace for cooperation, as well as adherence by the local community to previous agreements.

G-101. Mediators should use all available information resources, both military and civilian, to monitor adherence to the terms of the agreement. The mediator should also watch for parties that circumvent the intent of the agreement. Warnings as to possible punishment for noncompliance should be timely and direct. The mediator should have leeway for recommending curtailment of support for intentional breaches of an agreement.

G-102. Conversely, mediators should reward cooperation between former adversaries in areas not covered by the terms of a mediated agreement. If possible, additional funding or support for initiatives outside the parameters of a previous agreement should be sought.

G-103. The mediator should also advise the members of the IC of an increase or decrease in cooperation to ensure that the IC is apprised of the current situation. Doing so allows the IC to reward or punish the local entities as their behavior dictates.

Moderating the Size

G-104. When the mediator sets out to bring former warring parties together, he is always concerned with the issue of how many communities should be incorporated into the mediation. Each operation will be different since no two nations have political subdivisions of the same size.

G-105. The mediator must be careful not to include too many parties in a mediation effort. Too large of a population can overburden the funding and logistical capability of the military assets and the IC than are committed to supporting cooperation. A gradual expansion of the population involved in
mediation can generally be planned for and accommodated, but too many people too fast will overwhelm the theater’s logistical systems.

G-106. Each party will have issues specific to their community and, with a large group, the likelihood of competition for resources escalates. Additionally, the requirement to monitor agreements by a small force over expansive terrain is inefficient. The typical optimum size of a mediation effort is six to eight participants, depending upon the population and geography within each community. Mediation efforts larger than this tend to overcome the ability of the limited number of U.S. military personnel and should remain in the realm of the IC or the U.S. State Department.

G-107. Conversely, mediation that only involves a small portion of the local communities will not catch the interest of the IC and will not be an efficient use of limited U.S. military resources. Modest mediation efforts should be incorporated into adjacent efforts or expanded to include more people. Dependent upon community geography and population size, mediation efforts should include no fewer than four parties. An exception may occur if two large entities, with many small communities within their boundaries, were willing to mediate their issues so that the smaller communities could seek redress for their separate issues.

G-108. The following web sites provide additional information on mediation:

- Working Papers on Conflict Resolution. Centre for Conflict Resolution, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, UK. http://www.brad.ac.uk
- Peace and Conflict Homepage. A wide variety of sources on peace and conflict studies hosted by the University of Colorado, Boulder. Includes the Peace Studies Association, directories of peace studies and related courses, syllabi, publications, and other interesting links. http://csf.colorado.edu/peace

• WWW Virtual Library: International Affairs Resources. Over 2,000 selected, annotated links in 37 international affairs categories. http://www.etown.edu/vl
Appendix H

Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Considerations

The following figures outline the strategic, operational, and tactical considerations in each of the six CA activities:

- FNS (Figure H-1, pages H-1 through H-4).
- PRC (Figure H-2, pages H-5 through H-15).
- HA (Figure H-3, pages H-15 through H-19).
- MCA (Figure H-4, pages H-19 through H-21).
- Emergency services (Figure H-5, pages H-22 through H-27).
- Support to civil administration (Figure H-6, pages H-27 through H-38).

### Foreign Nation Support

|---------------|-------------------|---------------|------------------|---------------|--------------|--------------|---------------|-------------------|----------------|---------------|--------------|----------------|------------------|-------------|----------------|-----------|

### Strategic Considerations

- Review strategic plans for known shortfalls of supplies, material, and labor to support strategic lift and operational logistics. X X X X X
- Review existing international agreements, treaties, contracts, area studies, the CA database, and other applicable documents for information on possible FNS sources in-theater or worldwide. X X
- Review international laws, local laws, international agreements, treaties, and other data sources for any legal issues that may affect the procurement of FNS. X
- Identify requirements to update, modify, or initiate new international agreements, treaties, or contracts pertaining to FNS for the operation. X
- Establish a CMOC early to support interagency coordination of FNS plans. X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
- Participate in proceedings that generate international agreements, treaties, or contracts pertaining to FNS for the operation. X
- Provide guidance to geographic combatant commander regarding identification and procurement of FNS in theater. X X
- Monitor all FNS activities for compliance with applicable laws, agreements, treaties, and contracts. X
- Record expenditures for all FNS activities associated with the operation. X
- Determine the cost(s) of not implementing CA/CMO options. X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

Figure H-1. Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Considerations in FNS
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<td>Deploy CA personnel early to support advance party logistics elements, especially in countries where no or limited FNS plans or agreements exist.</td>
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<td>Identify sources of FNS, including various government agencies and private citizens in the theater of operations and establish contact and working relationships, as appropriate.</td>
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<td>Participate in proceedings that update, modify, or generate international agreements, treaties, or contracts pertaining to FNS for the operation.</td>
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<td>Determine the impact of the populace on FNS activities.</td>
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<td>Determine the impact of FNS activities on the populace (for example, price controls, market changes, and black-market and other criminal activities).</td>
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<td>Develop plans and strategies for immediate mitigation of political, economic, legal, social, and military issues associated with FNS activities.</td>
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<td>Develop plans and strategies for long-range mitigation of political, economic, legal, social, and military issues associated with FNS activities.</td>
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<td>Update and maintain a database of FNS sources and issues in-theater.</td>
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<td>Record expenditures for all FNS activities associated with the operation.</td>
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<td>Provide guidance to operational- and tactical-level commanders regarding identification and procurement of FNS in-theater.</td>
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Figure H-1. Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Considerations in FNS (Continued)
Ensure understanding of those functions inappropriate for FNS (for reasons of security and the need for U.S. national control), which include—

- C2 of medical supply, service, maintenance, replacements, and communications. X
- Triage of casualties for evacuation. X
- Veterinary subsistence inspection. X
- Law and order operations over U.S. forces. X
- Control and maintenance of U.S. nuclear and chemical ammunition. X
- U.S. military prisoner confinement operations. X
- Accountability for and security of EPWs retained in U.S. custody. X
- Identification and burial of U.S. dead. X
- Repair of U.S. nuclear weapons delivery sites. X
- U.S. patient administration. X

Determine the cost(s) of not implementing CA/CMO options. X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

Tactical Considerations

Review higher headquarters guidance regarding identification and procurement of FNS in the tactical area. X X
Review tactical plans for known shortfalls of supplies, materiel, and labor to support tactical logistics. X X
Review existing agreements, treaties, contracts, area studies, the CA database, and other applicable documents for information on possible FNS sources in the tactical area. X X X X
Review international laws, local laws, international agreements, treaties, and other data sources for any legal issues that may affect the procurement of FNS in the tactical area. X
Monitor activation of preplanned CIMIC agreements (in EUCOM) or requests for wartime host nation support (WHNS) (in Korea). X
Identify requirements to initiate agreements and contracts pertaining to FNS for the operation. X
Incorporate FNS requirements that have not yet been resourced into PIR; for example, where are sources of fuel? X
Deploy CA personnel early to support advance party logistics elements in locating and procuring FNS in the tactical area. X X
Identify sources of HN legal support for FNS issues in the tactical area and establish contact and working relationships, as appropriate. X
Identify sources of FNS, including government agencies and private citizens in the tactical area and establish contact and working relationships, as appropriate. X
Establish CMO/Cs to coordinate and synchronize interagency and multinational FNS efforts in the tactical area. X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Contact businesses and government agencies directly, through NGO representatives, friendly expatriates, or through the territorial force structure, to establish a working relationship for FNS. X X

Figure H-1. Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Considerations in FNS (Continued)
### Foreign Nation Support

**Tactical Considerations (Continued)**

| Provide guidance to tactical-level commanders regarding identification and proper procurement of FNS in-theater. | X | X |
| Create a set of preplanned FNS requests that conform to regional guidance and established FNS agreements. | X | X |
| Act in an intermediary role in the acquisition process by introducing units requiring FNS and sources of FNS and allowing the parties to negotiate contracts according to established standards and guidance. | X | X |
| Use interpreters, as necessary. | X | X |
| Provide information to tactical-level commanders regarding the destruction, confiscation, seizure, and requisition of property for military use. | X | X | X |
| Assess, monitor, and report the impact of the history and infrastructure of the tactical area on FNS activities. | X | X |
| Assess, monitor, and report the impact of FNS activities on the future and infrastructure of the tactical area. | X | X |
| Assess, monitor, and report the impact of the populace on FNS activities. | X | X |
| Assess, monitor, and report the impact of FNS activities on the populace. | X | X |
| Inform FNS providers of the technical requirements to process claims. | X | X |
| Identify sources of criminal or black-market activity associated with FNS activities. | X | X |
| Execute operational plans for immediate mitigation of political, economic, legal, social, and military issues associated with FNS activities. | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Execute operational plans for long-range mitigation of political, economic, legal, social, and military issues associated with FNS activities. | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Update and maintain a database of FNS sources and issues in the tactical area. | X | X |
| Record expenditures for all FNS activities associated with the operation. | X | X |
| Develop contingency plans that address what to do if FNS is unavailable. | X | X |
| Determine the cost(s) of not implementing CA/CMO options. | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X

**Figure H-1. Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Considerations in FNS (Continued)**
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<td>Review existing international agreements, treaties, area studies, the CA database, and other applicable documents for information on PRC measures routinely or historically employed in-theater.</td>
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<td>Coordinate or provide resources to support PRC operations.</td>
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<td>Provide guidance to geographic combatant commander regarding employment of PRC measures in-theater.</td>
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<td>Record expenditures for all PRC activities associated with the operation.</td>
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<td>Deploy CA personnel early to support advance party operations and logistics elements, especially in countries where no or limited PRC plans or agreements exist.</td>
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<td>Participate in proceedings that update, modify, or generate international agreements, treaties, or contracts pertaining to PRC for the operation.</td>
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<td>Identify sources of HN legal support for PRC issues and establish contact and working relationships, as appropriate.</td>
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<td>Identify sources of support to PRC operations, including various government agencies and private citizens in the theater of operations and establish contact and working relationships, as appropriate.</td>
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<td>Establish CMOC(s) to coordinate and synchronize interagency and multinational efforts in PRC operations in the AO.</td>
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<td>Tie PRC plans to public information plans.</td>
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Figure H-2. Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Considerations in PRC
### Populace and Resources Control

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<td>Determine the impact of the history and infrastructure of the AO on PRC activities.</td>
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<td>Determine the impact of PRC activities on the future and infrastructure of the AO.</td>
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<td>Determine the impact of the populace on PRC activities.</td>
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<td>Determine the impact of PRC activities on the populace.</td>
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<td>Develop plans and strategies for immediate mitigation of political, economic, legal, social, and military issues associated with PRC activities.</td>
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<td>Develop plans and strategies for long-range mitigation of political, economic, legal, social, and military issues associated with PRC activities.</td>
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<td>Update and maintain a database of PRC sources and issues in-theater.</td>
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<td>Record expenditures for all PRC activities associated with the operation.</td>
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<td>Provide guidance to operational- and tactical-level commanders regarding employment of PRC measures in-theater.</td>
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<td>Determine the cost(s) of not implementing CA/CMO options.</td>
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### Tactical Considerations

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<td>Review higher headquarters guidance regarding employment of PRC measures in the AO.</td>
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<td>Review international laws, local laws, international agreements, treaties, and other data sources for any legal issues that may affect the employment of PRC measures.</td>
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<td>Identify requirements to initiate agreements and contracts pertaining to PRC for the operation.</td>
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<td>Deploy CA personnel early to support advance party operations and logistics elements establishing PRC requirements.</td>
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<td>Establish CMOC(s) to coordinate and synchronize interagency and multinational efforts in PRC operations in the tactical area.</td>
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<td>Identify sources of HN legal support for PRC issues in the tactical area and establish contact and working relationships, as appropriate.</td>
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<td>Identify sources of PRC support (for example, barrier material, manning of checkpoints, ID and pass-making processes, and ration-card development), including government agencies and private citizens in the tactical area, and establish contact and working relationships, as appropriate.</td>
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<td>Contact businesses and government agencies directly, through NGO representatives, friendly expatriates, or through the territorial force structure, to establish a working relationship for PRC.</td>
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<td>Provide guidance to tactical-level commanders regarding employment of PRC measures in the tactical area.</td>
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<td>Act in an intermediary role in the PRC support acquisition process by introducing units requiring PRC support and sources of PRC support and allowing the parties to negotiate contracts according to established standards and guidance.</td>
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<td>Deconflict duplication of resources and activities of participants in the tactical AO.</td>
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Figure H-2. Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Considerations in PRC (Continued)
### Populace and Resources Control

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### Tactical Considerations (Continued)

- Publicize PRC plans through local public information operations and tactical PSYOP assets.
  - X X X X X X X X

- Use interpreters, as necessary.
  - X X X X X X X X

- Assess, monitor, and report the impact of the history and infrastructure of the tactical area on PRC activities.
  - X X X X X X X X X X X X

- Assess, monitor, and report the impact of PRC activities on the future and infrastructure of the tactical area.
  - X X X X X X X X X X X X

- Assess, monitor, and report the impact of the populace on PRC activities.
  - X X X X X X X X X X X X

- Assess, monitor, and report the impact of PRC activities on the populace.
  - X X X X X X X X X X X X

- Inform the populace of the technical requirements to process claims or grievances over PRC measures.
  - X

- Identify sources of criminal or black-market activity associated with PRC activities.
  - X

- Execute operational plans for immediate mitigation of political, economic, legal, social, and military issues associated with PRC activities.
  - X

- Execute operational plans for long-range mitigation of political, economic, legal, social, and military issues associated with PRC activities.
  - X

- Update and maintain a database of PRC sources and issues in the tactical area.
  - X

- Record expenditures for all PRC activities associated with the operation.
  - X

- Develop contingency plans that address what to do if PRC operations are ineffective.
  - X

- Determine the cost(s) of not implementing CA/CMO options.
  - X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

### Dislocated Civilian Operations

#### Strategic Considerations

- Review existing international agreements, treaties, plans, area studies (historical data), the CA database, and other applicable documents for information on DC issues in-theater.
  - X X X X X X X X X X

- Review international laws, local laws, international agreements, treaties, plans, and other data sources for any legal issues that may affect the employment of DC control measures.
  - X X X X X X X X X X

- Identify requirements to update, modify, or initiate new international agreements, treaties, plans, or contracts pertaining to DC control measures for the operation, especially the care of DCs in DC camps.
  - X

- Participate in proceedings that generate international agreements, treaties, plans, or contracts pertaining to DC issues for the operation.
  - X

- Identify the major participants in strategic- and operational-level DC operations for the operation.
  - X X X X X X X X

- Establish a CMOC early to support interagency coordination of DC operations.
  - X

- Provide guidance to geographic combatant commander regarding employment of DC control measures in-theater.
  - X X X X X X X X X X X X

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**Figure H-2. Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Considerations in PRC (Continued)**
### Populace and Resources Control

|---------------|-------------------|--------------|-----------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|---------------|-----------------|----------------|--------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|-------------|-------------|

### Dislocated Civilian Operations (Continued)

#### Strategic Considerations (Continued)

- Tie DC plans to public information and PSYOP campaign plans.  X X X X X X
- Monitor all DC activities for compliance with applicable laws, agreements, treaties, and contracts.  X X
- Record expenditures for all DC activities associated with the operation.  X
- Determine the cost(s) of not implementing CA/CMO options.  X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

#### Operational Considerations

- Review geographic combatant commander guidance regarding employment of DC control measures in-theater.  X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
- Review operational plans for issues related to DC control measures.  X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
- Review international laws, local laws, international agreements, treaties, and other data sources for any legal issues that may affect the employment of DC control measures.  X X
- Identify requirements to update, modify, or initiate new international agreements, treaties, plans, or contracts pertaining to DC control measures for the operation, especially the care of DCs in DC camps.  X X
- Identify the major participants in operational-level DC operations for the operation.  X
- Establish law and order, protect private property within geographic AORs, and provide a minimum standard of humane care and treatment for all civilians IAW international law.  X X
- Understand that as a general rule, the HN retains all control and legal authority over DCs. HN authorities should assume control of DC camp occupants as soon as the situation allows.  X X
- Deploy CA personnel early to support advance party operations and logistics elements, especially in countries where no or limited DC plans or agreements exist.  X X
- Participate in proceedings that update, modify, or generate international agreements, treaties, or contracts pertaining to DC issues for the operation.  X X
- Identify sources of HN legal support for DC issues and establish contact and working relationships, as appropriate.  X X X X X X X X X X X
- Identify sources of support to DC operations (for example, barrier and route-marking material, manning of checkpoints, food, water, clothing, and shelter), including government agencies and private citizens in the AO, and establish contact and working relationships, as appropriate.  X X X X X X X X X X X
- Establish CMOC(s) to coordinate and synchronize interagency and multinational efforts in DC operations in the AO.  X
- Tie DC plans to public information plans.  X
- Determine the impact of the history and infrastructure of the AO on DC activities.  X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
- Determine the impact of DC activities on the future and infrastructure of the AO.  X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
- Determine the impact of the populace on DC activities.  X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
- Determine the impact of DC activities on the populace.  X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

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**Figure H-2. Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Considerations in PRC (Continued)**
### Populace and Resources Control

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### Dislocated Civilian Operations (Continued)

#### Operational Considerations (Continued)

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<td>Develop plans and strategies for immediate mitigation of political, economic, legal, social, and military issues associated with DC activities.</td>
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<td>Develop plans and strategies for long-range mitigation of political, economic, legal, social, and military issues associated with DC activities.</td>
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<td>Update and maintain a database of DC sources and issues in-theater.</td>
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<td>Tie DC plans to public information plans.</td>
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<td>Determine the impact of the history and infrastructure of the AO on DC activities.</td>
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<td>Determine the impact of DC activities on the future and infrastructure of the AO.</td>
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<td>Determine the impact of the populace on DC activities.</td>
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<td>Determine the impact of DC activities on the populace.</td>
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<td>Develop plans and strategies for immediate mitigation of political, economic, legal, social, and military issues associated with DC activities.</td>
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<td>Develop plans and strategies for long-range mitigation of political, economic, legal, social, and military issues associated with DC activities.</td>
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<td>Provide guidance to operational-level commanders regarding disposition and care of pets and livestock.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Update and maintain a database of DC sources and issues in-theater.</td>
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<td>Record expenditures for all DC activities associated with the operation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Provide guidance to operational- and tactical-level commanders regarding employment of DC control measures in operational and tactical areas.</td>
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<td>Determine the cost(s) of not implementing CA/CMO options.</td>
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#### Tactical Considerations

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<tr>
<td>Review higher headquarters guidance regarding employment of DC control measures in the tactical area.</td>
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<td>Review international laws, local laws, international agreements, treaties, and other data sources for any legal issues that may affect the employment of DC control measures.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Identify requirements to initiate agreements and contracts pertaining to support to DCs for the operation.</td>
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<td>Recommend stay put or evacuate, based on an assessment of the situation.</td>
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<td>Identify DCs by category.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assess DC needs.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deconflict DC routes, collection points, assembly areas, and camps with MSRs and other militarily significant locations.</td>
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**Figure H-2. Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Considerations in PRC (Continued)**
### Populace and Resources Control

|---------------------------------|---------------|-------------------|--------------|-----------------|--------------|---------------|--------------|---------------|------------------|-----------------|--------------|---------------|--------------------|--------------------|-----|----------------|----------|

### Dislocated Civilian Operations (Continued)

#### Tactical Considerations (Continued)

| Provide guidance to subordinate operational and tactical commanders on the categories of civilians in the AO and what to do with them. | x |
| Deploy CA personnel early to support advance party operations and logistics elements establishing DC control measures. | x |
| Establish CMOC(s) to coordinate and synchronize interagency and multinational efforts in DC operations in the tactical area. | x x x x x x x x |
| Coordinate with the fire support officer in the development of the protected target list. | x x x x x x x x x x x x |
| Identify sources of support to DC operations (for example, barrier and route-marking material, manning of checkpoints, food, water, clothing, and shelter), including government agencies and private citizens in the AO, and establish contact and working relationships, as appropriate. | x x x x x x x x |
| Contact businesses and government agencies directly, through NGO representatives, friendly expatriates, or through the territorial force structure, to establish a working relationship for DC operations. | x x x x x x x x |
| Provide guidance to tactical-level commanders regarding employment of DC control measures in the AO: for example— | x x x x x x x x |
| - Plan collection points throughout the entire sector, front and rear. Plan them as far forward as possible to prevent or minimize civilian interference with tactical operations. | x x |
| - To the extent practicable, avoid placing collection points astride MSRs; secondary routes are preferred. | x |
| - In restrictive terrain, plan civilian collection points near traffic control points so that MP and infantrymen manning them may direct and guide DCs to the collection points efficiently and effectively (get them off the MSR as quickly and surely as possible). | x |
| - Ensure that a hasty collection point contains local security, limited processing capability, and means to maintain control of civilians. | x |
| - Ensure that a deliberate collection point contains local security, physical security within the collection point (to include vehicle and DC searches), limited DC processing and property control, limited personal services, and a resolution or disposition plan. | x |
| - Coordinate DC control measures with front, rear, and lateral units to minimize redundancy and increase efficiency of DC plans. | x |
| - Identify DC control measures with names or numbers and post them on operations graphics. | x |
| Provide guidance to tactical-level commanders regarding disposition and care of pets and livestock. | x x |
| Plan to segregate civilians from EPWs and civilian internees to protect them, as required by international law. | x x |
| Ensure civilians within the AO are not erroneously treated as EPWs. | x x |

**Figure H-2. Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Considerations in PRC (Continued)**
### Populace and Resources Control

|------------|-------------------|--------------|------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|---------------|------------------|-----------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|-----------------|-------------------|-----|----------------|-----------|

### Dislocated Civilian Operations (Continued)

#### Tactical Considerations (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Act in an intermediary role in the DC support acquisition process by introducing units requiring DC support and allowing the parties to negotiate contracts according to established standards and guidance.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deconflict duplication of resources and activities of participants in the tactical AO.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Publicize DC plans through local public information operations and tactical PSYOP assets.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Use interpreters, as necessary.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assess, monitor, and report the impact of the history and infrastructure of the AO on DC activities.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assess, monitor, and report the impact of DC activities on the future and infrastructure of the AO.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assess, monitor, and report the impact of the populace on DC activities.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assess, monitor, and report the impact of DC activities on the populace.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inform the populace of the technical requirements to process claims or grievances over DC measures.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Identify sources of criminal or black-market activity associated with DC activities.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Execute operational plans for immediate mitigation of political, economic, legal, social, and military issues associated with DC activities.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Execute operational plans for long-range mitigation of political, economic, legal, social, and military issues associated with DC activities.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Update and maintain a database of DC sources and issues in the AO.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Record expenditures for all DC activities associated with the operation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Develop contingency plans that address what to do if DC operations are ineffective.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Determine the cost(s) of not implementing CA/CMO options.</td>
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### Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

#### Strategic Considerations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conduct and maintain a threat and vulnerability analysis of designated nations or regions.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assess the ability of designated HN governments to relieve or reduce conditions that present a serious threat to U.S. citizens.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Review existing NEO plans for shortfalls in resources.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Monitor the conditions in designated nations or regions for indicators and warnings that NEO plans should be activated.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review existing international agreements, treaties, plans, area studies (historical data), the CA database, and other applicable documents for information on NEO issues in-theater.</td>
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**Figure H-2. Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Considerations in PRC (Continued)**
### Populace and Resources Control

**Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (Continued)**

#### Strategic Considerations (Continued)

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Review international laws, local laws, international agreements, treaties, plans, and other data sources for any legal issues that may affect the execution of a NEO.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Identify requirements to update, modify, or initiate new international agreements, treaties, or contracts pertaining to the NEO.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Identify the major participants in the NEO.</td>
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<td>Participate in proceedings that generate international agreements, treaties, or contracts pertaining to the NEO.</td>
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<td>Establish a CMOC early to support interagency coordination of the NEO.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Provide guidance to geographic combatant commander regarding execution of the NEO.</td>
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<td>Provide instructions and NEO packets to all potential evacuees as part of their inprocessing into the HN:</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Emphasize individual responsibility to safeguard NEO information books, even though the books are unclassified. Local instructions and other NEO documents will be kept in a secure place where children or unauthorized persons cannot easily find them. Individuals will release information on the evacuation of noncombatants only on a need-to-know basis.</td>
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<td>- Educate potential evacuees on the importance of OPSEC concerning NEO plans. Disclosing evacuation plans to unauthorized persons could jeopardize the safety of others in an emergency.</td>
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<td>- Emphasize that NEOs are not a subject for discussion with local national acquaintances, in letters to friends or family, or at social gatherings. Noncombatant family members will confine discussions of NEO to the sponsor and his chain of command, designated evacuation authorities, and other participating noncombatants.</td>
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<td>Rehearse portions or all of the NEO plan as often as possible and practical.</td>
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<td>Monitor all NEO activities for compliance with applicable laws, agreements, treaties, and contracts.</td>
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<td>Record expenditures for all activities associated with the NEO.</td>
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<td>Determine the cost(s) of not implementing CA/CMO options.</td>
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#### Operational Considerations

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<td>Review geographic combatant commander guidance regarding execution of the NEO.</td>
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<td>Review operational plans for issues related to the NEO.</td>
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<td>Identify requirements to update, modify, or initiate new international agreements, treaties, plans, or contracts pertaining to the NEO.</td>
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<td>Identify the major participants at the operational level for the NEO.</td>
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*Figure H-2. Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Considerations in PRC (Continued)*
### Populace and Resources Control

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### Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (Continued)

#### Operational Considerations (Continued)

- Deploy CA personnel early to support advance party operations and logistics elements, especially in countries where no or limited NEO plans or agreements exist. X
- Participate in proceedings that update, modify, or generate international agreements, treaties, or contracts pertaining to NEOs. X X
- Identify sources of support to NEO (for example, transportation, route-marking material, food, water, clothing, and shelter), including government agencies and private citizens in the AO, and establish contact and working relationships, as appropriate. X X X X X X X X X X X X X
- Establish CMOC(s) to coordinate and synchronize interagency and HN efforts in the NEO. X
- Determine the impact of the history and infrastructure of the AO on NEO activities. X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
- Determine the impact of NEO activities on the future and infrastructure of the AO. X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
- Determine the impact of the populace on NEO activities. X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
- Determine the impact of NEO activities on the populace. X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
- Develop plans and strategies for immediate mitigation of political, economic, legal, social, and military issues associated with NEO activities. X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
- Develop plans and strategies for long-range mitigation of political, economic, legal, social, and military issues associated with NEO activities. X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
- Update and maintain a database of NEO support resources and issues in-theater. X
- Record expenditures for all NEO activities associated with the operation. X
- Provide guidance to operational- and tactical-level commanders regarding execution of the NEO in operational and tactical areas. X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
- Create policy on when and guidance on what noncombatants can take and what are prohibited items; for example—
  - Evacuees will not carry personal firearms on their person or in luggage during NEO. Sponsors and noncombatants will keep the correct documents to allow firearms that may be imported to be shipped with household goods. Firearms may be turned in at the personnel processing center (PPC) for storage and security (AR 190-11, Physical Security of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives). X X
  - Pet owners are responsible for finding someone to care for family pets during NEO. Transportation of household pets, regardless of species, is not authorized on DOD-owned, chartered, or -controlled aircraft. Title 37, USC, does not permit moving household pets at Government expense. X
  - Pet owners will determine where and how to dispose of pets. They should make arrangements to ship pets commercially or to leave pets with local national personnel. Pet owners should coordinate with commercial shippers well in advance to ensure the proper paperwork and shipping containers are available. X

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Figure H-2. Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Considerations in PRC (Continued)
### Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (Continued)

#### Operational Considerations (Continued)

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<tr>
<td>- Transportation of pets is subject to quarantine restrictions on entry into other countries. Household pets must not be abandoned. Area support groups, base support battalions, and the United States Air Forces in Europe community personnel will not be able to care for abandoned pets.</td>
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<td>- Guide dogs may be transported without charge when accompanying a blind or hearing-impaired owner on an aircraft or ship. They must be properly trained and officially identified by a bona fide organization as qualified to lead the blind or hearing-impaired. They must be harnessed and muzzled properly to safeguard other people. Guide dogs should stay at the owner’s feet and should not create a hazard to other people.</td>
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<td>Understand that a request to commit U.S. forces to conduct a NEO is routed from the ambassador or COM to the President. The senior DOS official in-country is in charge of the evacuation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Understand that under emergency conditions, the DHHS is the LFA for the reception and onward movement of all U.S. evacuees. Under less-than-emergency conditions or by request of DOS, DHHS provides support for non-DOD evacuees.</td>
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<td>Determine how to set up reception station for evacuees.</td>
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<td>Rehearse the reception and onward movement procedures prior to arrival of evacuees.</td>
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<td>Determine the cost(s) of not implementing CA/CMO options.</td>
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#### Tactical Considerations

- Review higher headquarters guidance regarding execution of NEO plans.  
- Review international laws, local laws, international agreements, treaties, and other data sources for any legal issues that may affect the execution of the NEO.  
- Identify requirements to initiate agreements and contracts pertaining to support to NEO along the evacuation route and at the reception station(s).  
- Assess evacuee needs.  
- Deconflict evacuee routes with MSRs and other militarily significant locations.  
- Provide guidance to subordinate operational and tactical commanders on how to conduct the NEO.  
- Deploy CA personnel early to support advance party operations and logistics elements establishing reception and onward movement stations.  
- Establish CMOC(s) to coordinate and synchronize interagency and multinational NEO efforts in the tactical area.  
- Identify sources of support to NEO (for example, transportation, route-marking material, food, water, clothing, and shelter), including government agencies and private citizens in the AO, and establish contact and working relationships, as appropriate.  
- Plan to segregate authorized evacuees from unauthorized individuals.  
- Ensure evacuees are treated courteously.
## Populace and Resources Control

|---------------|-------------------|---------------|-----------------|---------------|---------------|--------------|----------------|---------------------|----------------|--------------|--------------|-----------------|------------------|-----|---------------|-----------|

## Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (Continued)

### Tactical Considerations (Continued)

- Deconflict duplication of resources and activities of participants in the tactical AO. X
- Use interpreters, as necessary. X
- Assess, monitor, and report the impact of the history and infrastructure of the AO on NEO activities. X X X X X X X X X X X X
- Assess, monitor, and report the impact of NEO activities on the future and infrastructure of the AO. X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
- Assess, monitor and report the impact of the populace on NEO activities. X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
- Assess, monitor, and report the impact of NEO activities on the populace. X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
- Inform the populace of the technical requirements to process claims or grievances over NEO measures. X X
- Identify sources of criminal or black-market activity associated with NEO activities. X
- Execute operational plans for immediate mitigation of political, economic, legal, social, and military issues associated with NEO activities. X
- Execute operational plans for long-range mitigation of political, economic, legal, social, and military issues associated with NEO activities. X
- Update and maintain a database of NEO sources and issues in the AO. X
- Record expenditures for all NEO activities associated with the operation. X
- Develop contingency plans that address what to do if NEO operations are compromised. X
- Determine the cost(s) of not implementing CA/CMO options. X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

### Humanitarian Assistance

|---------------|-------------------|---------------|-----------------|---------------|---------------|--------------|----------------|---------------------|----------------|--------------|--------------|-----------------|------------------|-----|---------------|-----------|

### Strategic Considerations

- Conduct and maintain a threat and vulnerability analysis of designated nations or regions. X
- Conduct and maintain an assessment of humanitarian issues in designated nations or regions. X
- Assess the ability and willingness of designated HN governments to relieve or reduce conditions that present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. X X X X X X X X X X

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**Figure H-2. Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Considerations in PRC (Continued)**

**Figure H-3. Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Considerations in HA**
Identify shortfalls in HN HA programs and resources. X

Monitor the conditions in designated nations or regions for indicators and warnings of impending humanitarian disasters. X  X  X  X  X  X

Review existing international agreements for stipulations providing emergency or disaster-related assistance. X  X

Review U.S. laws, international laws, local laws, international agreements, treaties, and other data sources for any legal issues that may affect the conduct of HA operations. X  X

Identify requirements to update, modify, or initiate new international agreements, treaties, or contracts pertaining to HA for the operation. X  X

Participate in proceedings that generate international agreements, treaties, or contracts pertaining to HA for the operation. X  X

Participate in preparation and review of combatant command functional plans that address assisting USG agencies, international organizations, HN agencies, and NGOs to support HA and disaster relief operations. (Tasking to combatant commands by FY 1996 JSCP and CJCSI 3214.01.) X  X

The Office of Humanitarian Assistance, under the OSD, executes a number of humanitarian and relief programs. Some forms of HA may not extend to individuals or groups engaged in military or paramilitary activities. X

Approval authority for commitment of DOD component resources or services to foreign disaster relief operations rests with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Democracy and Peacekeeping. The DOD coordinator for foreign disaster relief is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Humanitarian and Refugee Affairs (DASD[H&RA]) (Global Affairs). The joint staff POC for the DOD Foreign Disaster Relief and Humanitarian Assistance Program is the Chief of the Logistics Directorate (J-4).

DOD supplies and services are provided for disaster and humanitarian purposes only after approval by Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) (ASD[ISA]), on behalf of the SECDEF. DOD provides supplies and services from the most expedient source, which is normally the geographic command from whose theater the foreign disaster or HA request emanates.

When a foreign disaster or HA request emanates from a country not assigned to a combatant command under the Unified Command Plan, the joint staff or J-4 assumes the primary coordinating role in conjunction with DASD(H&RA). Requests for DOD assistance come from the DOS or the USAID through the OFDA.

Upon SECDEF order to execute an HA mission, establish a CMOC to support interagency coordination and deconfliction within the USG.

Understand that DOS is the LFA for OCONUS HA operations. X

Understand that FEMA is the LFA for CONUS HA operations. X

Monitor all HA activities for compliance with applicable laws, agreements, treaties, and contracts. X  X

Record expenditures for all HA activities associated with the operation. X  X

Figure H-3. Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Considerations in HA (Continued)
### Humanitarian Assistance

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<td>Provide guidance to geographic combatant commander regarding HA activities in TEPs, HA and disaster relief plans, and consequence management plans.</td>
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<td>Determine the cost(s) of not implementing CA/CMO options.</td>
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### Operational Considerations

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<tr>
<td>Review geographic combatant commander guidance regarding HA activities in TEPs, HA and disaster relief plans, and consequence management plans.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Participate in preparation and review of combatant command functional plans that address assisting USG agencies, international organizations, HN agencies, and NGOs in foreign HA and disaster relief operations. (Tasking to combatant commands by FY 1996 JSCP and CJCSI 3214.01.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Incorporate HA assessments, HA training, HCA projects, and MCA projects into TEPs.</td>
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<td>Assess the environment in which U.S. forces will conduct HA operations. The operational environment includes the political situation, physical boundaries, potential threat to forces, global visibility, and media interest climate for HA operations.</td>
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<td>Deploy CA personnel early to support advance party operations and logistics elements, especially in countries where no or limited plans or agreements for HA exist.</td>
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<td>Confirm and validate HN ability to manage HA in the AO.</td>
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<td>Establish CMOC(s) to coordinate and synchronize interagency and multinational HA efforts in the AO.</td>
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<td>Identify shortfalls in HN HA plans and resources.</td>
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<td>Identify HA resources, including various government agencies, military units, NGOs, and private citizen groups and individuals in the theater of operations and establish contact and working relationships, as appropriate.</td>
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<td>Emphasize the responsibility of the HN authorities to support their citizens in time of disaster.</td>
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<td>Incorporate HA supplies from all sources into collaborated logistics plans.</td>
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<td>Determine the impact of the history and infrastructure of the AO on HA activities.</td>
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<td>Determine the impact of HA activities on the future and infrastructure of the AO.</td>
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<td>Determine the impact of the populace on HA activities.</td>
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<td>Determine the impact of HA activities on the populace.</td>
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<td>Develop plans and strategies for long-range mitigation of political, economic, legal, social, and military issues associated with HA activities.</td>
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<td>Understand that DODD 5100.46, Foreign Disaster Relief, establishes the relationship between DOD and USAID, OFDA. The DASD(H&amp;RA) is the primary POC.</td>
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Figure H-3. Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Considerations in HA (Continued)
Humanitarian Assistance

Operational Considerations (Continued)

According to DODD 5100.46, “It is the policy that DoD Components will participate in foreign disaster relief operations only after a determination is made by the Department of State that foreign disaster relief shall be provided. The Department of State will then send a request to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) which indicates (1) the country(s), international organizations and/or individuals to be assisted; (2) the form of assistance requested; (3) the types and amounts of materiel and services requested; (4) the amount of funds allocated to the Department of Defense accompanied by symbols showing the chargeable appropriation, allotment, and obligation accounts; and (5) such other information as is needed to permit effective participation by DoD Components in a foreign disaster relief operation.”

Provide guidance to operational- and tactical-level commanders regarding support to HA activities in-theater.

Provide guidance to subordinate commanders on how to handle issues resulting from ethnic differences and resentments, social structures (family, regional), religious and symbolic systems (beliefs and behaviors), political structures (distribution of power), economic systems (sources and distribution of wealth), linkages among social, religious, political, and economic dynamics, and attitudes toward the U.S. military forces.

Record expenditures for all HA activities associated with the operation.

Understand that OFDA, USAID, often has existing operational links and grants relationships with many NGOs and international organizations that have relief programs outside the United States. These include the ICRC, International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC) and Red Crescent Societies, United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and United Nations World Food Program (UNWFP).

Be aware that OFDA, USAID, also routinely coordinates with other governments responding to disasters through donor country coordination meetings to solve operational or political problems.

Determine the cost(s) of not implementing CA/CMO options.

Tactical Considerations

Review higher headquarters guidance regarding support to HA activities in-theater.

Integrate PSYOP and civil information campaigns to inform the civilian infrastructure and encouraging popular support of humanitarian efforts.

Maintain awareness of the security environment.

Understand that even in a permissive environment, nonthreatening means, such as demonstrations, may be employed to impair credibility or to reduce the effectiveness of U.S. military activities. See FM 100-23-1, Multiservice Procedures for Humanitarian Assistance Operations, for more information.

In a hostile environment, employ sufficient combat and combat support forces to safeguard the populace, defend the perimeter, escort convoys, screen the local populace, and assist in personnel recovery operations.

Understand that HN authorities or combatants may use HA and disaster relief as a tool for political gain.

Figure H-3. Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Considerations in HA (Continued)
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#### Tactical Considerations (Continued)

- Establish CMOC(s) to coordinate and synchronize interagency and multinational HA efforts in the tactical area.
  - X

- Establish close ties with the DART from USAID’s OFDA. The DART consists of specialists trained in a variety of disaster relief skills who assist U.S. Embassies and USAID missions in managing the USG response to disasters.
  - X

- Understand that military commanders at the immediate scene of a foreign disaster are authorized to conduct prompt relief operations when time is of the essence and when humanitarian considerations make it advisable to do so. The commander should report at once the action taken and request guidance IAW the provisions of DODD 5100.46.
  - X

- Understand that measures to ensure continuity of operations, troop survival, and the rehabilitation of essential military bases take precedence over military support of local communities. Requests for support for the use of the military are normally accepted only on a mission-type basis.
  - X

- Update and maintain a database of HA sources and issues in the tactical area.
  - X

- Execute HA operations according to coordinated plans and guidance from higher headquarters.
  - X

- Assess, monitor, and report the impact of the history and infrastructure of the tactical area on HA activities.
  - X

- Assess, monitor, and report the impact of HA activities on the future and infrastructure of the tactical area.
  - X

- Assess, monitor, and report the impact of the populace on HA activities.
  - X

- Assess, monitor, and report the impact of HA activities on the populace.
  - X

- Execute operational plans for immediate mitigation of political, economic, legal, social, and military issues associated with HA activities.
  - X

- Execute operational plans for long-range mitigation of political, economic, legal, social, and military issues associated with HA activities.
  - X

- Record expenditures for all HA activities associated with the operation.
  - X

- Assess, monitor, and report the effectiveness of HA activities.
  - X

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**Figure H-3. Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Considerations in HA (Continued)**

### Military Civic Action

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#### Strategic Considerations

- Review TEPs for planned MCA projects or requirements that could be performed as MCA projects.
  - X

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**Figure H-4. Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Considerations in MCA**
## Military Civic Action

### Strategic Considerations (Continued)

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<td>Review requests for MCA projects routed through U.S. embassies by HNs.</td>
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<td>Validate proposed MCA projects from the theater.</td>
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<td>Review international laws, local laws, international agreements, treaties, and other data sources for any legal issues that may affect the execution of MCA.</td>
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<td>Identify requirements to update, modify, or initiate new international agreements, treaties, or contracts pertaining to MCA.</td>
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<td>Participate in proceedings that generate international agreements, treaties, or contracts pertaining to MCA.</td>
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<td>Provide guidance to geographic combatant commander regarding execution of MCA projects in-theater.</td>
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<td>Emphasize the HN role and minimize the U.S. role in MCA projects.</td>
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<td>Monitor all MCA activities for compliance with applicable laws, agreements, treaties, and contracts.</td>
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<td>Record expenditures for all MCA activities.</td>
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### Operational Considerations

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<td>Determine the impact of the history and infrastructure of the AO on MCA activities.</td>
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<td>Develop plans and strategies for immediate mitigation of political, economic, legal, social, and military issues associated with MCA activities.</td>
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<td>Develop plans and strategies for long-range mitigation of political, economic, legal, social, and military issues associated with MCA activities.</td>
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<td>Employ the minimum number of U.S. military forces required to advise, train, or oversee foreign military forces in execution of MCA projects.</td>
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<td>Provide guidance to U.S. military forces employed in MCA regarding execution of MCA projects in-theater.</td>
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Figure H-4. Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Considerations in MCA (Continued)
### Military Civic Action

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### Operational Considerations (Continued)

Understand that the scope of MCA projects can be expanded to include military and paramilitary forces as benefactors of U.S. support in foreign countries.

Publicize the purpose and scope of MCA projects, prior to initiation, if possible, through national or local media, emphasizing the role of the HN government and military forces.

Update and maintain a database of MCA projects and issues in-theater.

Record expenditures for all MCA activities associated with the operation.

Monitor HN military compliance with Human Rights protocols.

Determine the cost(s) of not implementing CA/CMO options.

### Tactical Considerations

Review higher headquarters guidance regarding execution of MCA projects in the tactical area.

Review international laws, local laws, international agreements, treaties, and other data sources for any legal issues that may affect the execution of MCA.

Deploy CA personnel early to support advance party operations and logistics elements in locating and procuring FNS in the tactical area.

Identify sources of HN legal support for MCA issues in the tactical area and establish contact and working relationships, as appropriate.

Use interpreters, as necessary.

Assess, monitor, and report the impact of the history and infrastructure of the tactical area on MCA activities.

Assess, monitor, and report the impact of MCA activities on the future and infrastructure of the tactical area.

Assess, monitor, and report the impact of the populace on MCA activities.

Assess, monitor, and report the impact of MCA activities on the populace.

Execute operational plans for immediate mitigation of political, economic, legal, social, and military issues associated with MCA activities.

Execute operational plans for long-range mitigation of political, economic, legal, social, and military issues associated with MCA activities.

Publicize the purpose and scope of MCA projects, prior to initiation, if possible, through local media and personal contacts, emphasizing the role of the HN government and military forces.

Update and maintain a database of MCA projects and issues in the tactical area.

Record expenditures for all MCA activities associated with the operation.

Monitor HN military compliance with Human Rights protocols.

Develop contingency plans that address what to do if MCA is ineffective.

Determine the cost(s) of not implementing CA/CMO options.

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Figure H-4. Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Considerations in MCA (Continued)
**Emergency Services**

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<td>Conduct and maintain a threat and vulnerability analysis of designated nations or regions.</td>
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<td>Assess the ability of designated HN governments to mitigate, prepare for, respond to, and recover from the identified disasters.</td>
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<td>Monitor the conditions in designated nations or regions for indicators and warnings of impending disasters.</td>
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<td>Review existing international agreements for stipulations providing emergency or disaster-related assistance.</td>
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<td>Review strategic plans for emergency services-related issues, including consequence management.</td>
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<td>Review U.S. laws, international laws, local laws, international agreements, treaties, and other data sources for any legal issues that may affect the conduct of emergency services operations.</td>
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<td>Identify requirements to update, modify, or initiate new international agreements, treaties, or contracts pertaining to emergency services for the operation.</td>
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<td>Participate in proceedings that generate international agreements, treaties, or contracts pertaining to emergency services for the operation.</td>
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<td>Conduct liaison with other Federal disaster agencies and international relief organizations to coordinate memoranda of understanding for consequence management operations. (Tasking to combatant commands by CJCS CONPLAN 0400-96 and CJCSI 3214.01.)</td>
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<td>Understand that approval authority for commitment of DOD component resources or services to foreign disaster relief operations rests with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Democracy and Peacekeeping. The DOD coordinator for foreign disaster relief is the DASD(H&amp;RA) (Global Affairs). The joint staff POC for the DOD Foreign Disaster Relief and Humanitarian Assistance Program is the Chief of the Logistics Directorate (J-4).</td>
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<td>Understand that DOD supplies and services are provided for disaster and humanitarian purposes only after approval by ASD(IS&amp;I), on behalf of the SECDEF. DOD provides supplies and services from the most expedient source, which is normally the geographic command from whose theater the foreign disaster or HA request emanates.</td>
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<tr>
<td>When a foreign disaster or HA request emanates from a country not assigned to a combatant command under the Unified Command Plan, the joint staff or J-4 assumes the primary coordinating role in conjunction with DASD(H&amp;RA). Requests for DOD assistance come from the DOS or the USAID through OFDA.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Upon SECDEF order to execute a consequence management mission, establish a CMOC to support interagency coordination and deconfliction within the USG.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Understand that DOS is the LFA for OCONUS emergency services operations.</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Understand that FEMA is the LFA for CONUS emergency services operations.</td>
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<td>Monitor all emergency services activities for compliance with applicable laws, agreements, treaties, and contracts.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Record expenditures for all emergency services activities associated with the operation.</td>
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**Figure H-5. Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Considerations in Emergency Services**
### Foreign Strategic Considerations (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task Description</th>
<th>DOD</th>
<th>DCs</th>
<th>H-23</th>
<th>JCS</th>
<th>OD</th>
<th>SECDEF</th>
<th>Joint Staff</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>NAVY</th>
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<th>MARINE</th>
<th>MC</th>
<th>CJCS</th>
<th>STRATCOM</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provide guidance to geographic combatant commander regarding emergency services activities in TEPs, HA and disaster relief plans, and consequence management plans.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Determine the cost(s) of not implementing CA/CMO options.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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### Foreign Operational Considerations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task Description</th>
<th>DOD</th>
<th>DCs</th>
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<th>SECDEF</th>
<th>Joint Staff</th>
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<th>MARINE</th>
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<th>STRATCOM</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participate in preparation and review of combatant command functional plans that address assisting USG agencies, international organizations, HN agencies, and NGOs in foreign HA and disaster relief operations. (Tasking to combatant commands by FY 1996 JSCP and CJCSI 3214.01.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Incorporate emergency services assessments, training, mitigation projects, and recovery projects into TEPs.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Participate in preparation and review of combatant command consequence management plans. (Tasking to combatant commands by CJCS CONPLAN 0400-96 and CJCSI 3214.01.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deploy CA personnel early to support advance party operations and logistics elements, especially in countries where no or limited plans or agreements for emergency services exist.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Confirm and validate HN ability to manage emergency services in the AO.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Establish CMOC(s) to coordinate and synchronize interagency and multinational efforts in emergency services in the AO.</td>
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<td>Identify shortfalls in HN emergency services plans and resources.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Identify emergency services resources, including various government agencies, military units, NGOs, and private citizen groups and individuals in the theater of operations and establish contact and working relationships, as appropriate.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Emphasize the responsibility of the HN authorities to support their citizens in time of disaster.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assist HN authorities in preparation of mitigation, response, and recovery plans.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inform the populace of emergency services plans and rehearse, as possible.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Incorporate emergency services-related supplies from all sources into collaborated logistics plans.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Determine the impact of the history and infrastructure of the AO on emergency services activities.</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Determine the impact of emergency services activities on the future and infrastructure of the AO.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Determine the impact of the populace on emergency services activities.</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Determine the impact of emergency services activities on the populace.</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Develop plans and strategies for immediate mitigation of political, economic, legal, social, and military issues associated with emergency services activities.</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Develop plans and strategies for long-range mitigation of political, economic, legal, social, and military issues associated with emergency services activities.</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Understand that DODD 5100.46 establishes the relationship between DOD and USAID, OFDA. The DASD(H&amp;RA) is the primary POC.</td>
<td>X</td>
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</table>

Figure H-5. Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Considerations in Emergency Services (Continued)
According to DODD 5100.46, “It is the policy that DoD Components will participate in foreign disaster relief operations only after a determination is made by the Department of State that foreign disaster relief shall be provided. The Department of State will then send a request to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) which indicates (1) the country(s), international organizations and/or individuals to be assisted; (2) the form of assistance requested; (3) the types and amounts of materiel and services requested; (4) the amount of funds allocated to the Department of Defense accompanied by symbols showing the chargeable appropriation, allotment, and obligation accounts; and (5) such other information as is needed to permit effective participation by DoD Components in a foreign disaster relief operation.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Foreign Operational Considerations (Continued)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provide guidance to operational- and tactical-level commanders regarding support to emergency services activities in-theater.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide guidance to subordinate commanders on how to handle issues resulting from ethnic differences and resentments, social structures (family, regional), religious and symbolic systems (beliefs and behaviors), political structures (distribution of power), economic systems (sources and distribution of wealth), linkages among social, religious, political, and economic dynamics, and attitudes toward the U.S. military forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Record expenditures for all emergency services activities associated with the operation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understand that OFDA, USAID, often has existing operational links and grants relationships with many NGOs and international organizations that have relief programs outside the United States. These include the ICRC, IFRC and Red Crescent Societies, UNICEF, and UNWFP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Be aware that OFDA, USAID, also routinely coordinates with other governments responding to disasters through donor country coordination meetings to solve operational or political problems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Determine the cost(s) of not implementing CA/CMO options.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Foreign Tactical Considerations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Establish CMOC(s) to coordinate and synchronize interagency and multinational efforts in emergency services in the tactical area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish close ties with the DART from USAID’s OFDA. The DART consists of specialists trained in a variety of disaster relief skills who assist U.S. Embassies and USAID missions in managing the USG response to disasters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understand that military commanders at the immediate scene of a foreign disaster are authorized to conduct prompt relief operations when time is of the essence and when humanitarian considerations make it advisable to do so. The commander should report at once the action taken and request guidance in accordance with the provisions of DODD 5100.46.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understand that measures to ensure continuity of operations, troop survival, and the rehabilitation of essential military bases take precedence over military support of local communities. Requests for support for the use of the military are normally accepted only on a mission-type basis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Update and maintain a database of emergency services sources and issues in the tactical area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assist local HN authorities in preparation of mitigation, response, and recovery plans.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure H-5. Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Considerations in Emergency Services (Continued)
### Emergency Services

|------------|-------------------|---------------|------------------|--------------|---------------|--------------|----------------|------------------|--------------|---------------|------------------|-------------------|-----|---------------|-----|-----------|

#### Foreign Tactical Considerations (Continued)

| | Inform the populace of emergency services plans and rehearse, as possible. |
| | Execute emergency services operations according to coordinated plans and guidance from higher headquarters. |
| | Assess, monitor, and report the impact of the history and infrastructure of the tactical area on emergency services activities. |
| | Assess, monitor, and report the impact of emergency services activities on the future and infrastructure of the tactical area. |
| | Assess, monitor, and report the impact of the populace on emergency services activities. |
| | Assess, monitor, and report the impact of emergency services activities on the populace. |
| | Execute operational plans for immediate mitigation of political, economic, legal, social, and military issues associated with emergency services activities. |
| | Execute operational plans for long-range mitigation of political, economic, legal, social, and military issues associated with emergency services activities. |
| | Record expenditures for all emergency services activities associated with the operation. |
| | Assess, monitor, and report the effectiveness of emergency services activities. |
| | Determine the cost(s) of not implementing CA/CMO options. |

#### Domestic Strategic Considerations

| | Conduct and maintain a threat and vulnerability analysis of U.S. states, territories, and possessions. |
| | Assess the ability of states and local governments to mitigate, prepare for, respond to, and recover from the identified disasters. |
| | Monitor the conditions in U.S. states, territories, and possessions for indicators and warnings of impending disasters. |
| | Review the Federal Response Plan [http://www.fema.gov/fema/fed1.htm](http://www.fema.gov/fema/fed1.htm) and other applicable documents for DOD tasks and responsibilities regarding support to domestic civil authorities in the aftermath of disasters and in consequence management. |
| | Provide guidance reference Posse Comitatus in HA and disaster relief plans, and consequence management missions. |
| | Ensure that personnel participating in U.S. domestic assistance programs are not in violation of the provisions of the Posse Comitatus Act. This act prohibits the use of federal military personnel in enforcing federal, state, or local laws unless expressly authorized by the Constitution or by an act of Congress. The act does NOT apply to state National Guard (NG) troops unless they have been federalized. |
| | Consider the following when committing USAR units or individual reservists to disaster relief operations: |

- Commitment of USAR volunteers must be consistent with Army policy for military assistance.

---

**Figure H-5. Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Considerations in Emergency Services (Continued)**
### Domestic Strategic Considerations (Continued)

| - Civil authorities have made a firm commitment to repay all ADT costs. | X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X |
| - State and local assets, including the NG, have been committed, or the assistance requested is clearly beyond state and local capabilities. | X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X |
| - Authority to commit USAR volunteers may be delegated no lower than CONUS Army. | X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X |
| - Commitment of volunteers must be coordinated with the proper Corps of Engineer district or division to avoid duplication of effort. | X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X |

Understand that USAR commanders may approve voluntary USAR participation during imminently serious conditions in a nondrill, nonpay status. USAR members taking part in such support are performing official duty; however, unit commanders will:

- Not order members of the USAR to participate. | X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X |
- Approve voluntary USAR participation only when time or conditions do not permit seeking guidance from higher headquarters. | X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X |
- Make sure reasonably available state and local assets are fully committed or the help requested is clearly beyond the ability of the state and local assets. | X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X |
- Provide support on a minimum-essential basis. NOTE: Support will end when adequate state and local assets become available. | X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X |

Determine the cost(s) of not implementing CA/CMO options. | X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X |

### Domestic Operational Considerations

Determine the cost(s) of not implementing CA/CMO options. | X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X |

### Domestic Tactical Considerations

Ensure the core operational considerations of emergency management programs for government, industry, and small businesses include the following (reference: http://www.fema.gov/library/biz2.htm):

- Direction and Control - The system for managing resources, analyzing information and making decisions in an emergency. Examples are Emergency Management Group, Incident Command System, and Emergency Operations Center. | X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X |

- Communications - Needed to report emergencies, to warn personnel of the danger, to keep families and off-duty employees informed about what is happening at a facility to coordinate response actions, and to keep in contact with customers and suppliers. Consider contingency planning, emergency communications, family communications, notification, and warning. | X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X |

- Life Safety - Protecting the health and safety of everyone in the facility is the first priority during an emergency. Consider evacuation planning, evacuation routes and exits, assembly areas and accountability, shelter, training and information, rehearsals, and family preparedness. | X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X |

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**Figure H-5. Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Considerations in Emergency Services (Continued)**
### Emergency Services

|---------------|-------------------|--------------|-----------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|---------------|------------------|----------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|-----------------|------------------|-----|----------------|-----------|

#### Domestic Tactical Considerations (Continued)

- **Property Protection** - Protecting facilities, equipment, and vital records is essential to restoring operations once an emergency has occurred. Establish procedures for fighting fires, containing material spills, closing or barricading doors and windows, shutting down equipment and facilities, covering or securing equipment and facilities, moving equipment to a safe location, and backing up vital records and processes.

- **Community Outreach** - The relationship between a government, industry, or small business facility and the community will influence their ability to protect personnel and property and return to normal operations. Ways to involve outside organizations in the emergency management plan include maintaining a dialogue with community leaders, first responders, government agencies, community organizations, and utilities; establishing mutual aid agreements with local response agencies and businesses; providing community service and public information during emergencies; and managing media relations.

- **Recovery and Restoration** - Business recovery and restoration, or business resumption, goes right to a facility’s bottom line: keeping people employed and the business running. Determine critical operations and make plans for bringing those systems back on-line; establish procedures for continuity of management; obtain adequate insurance; provide employee support; and resume operations according to a logical, coordinated, and exercised plan.

- **Administration and Logistics** - Maintain complete and accurate records at all times to ensure a more efficient emergency response and recovery.

Determine the cost(s) of not implementing CA/CMO options.

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### Support to Civil Administration

#### Civil Assistance

- **Strategic Considerations**
  - Review strategic plans for tasks that involve providing short-term military support to an established government or populace, in advance of or in the aftermath of natural or man-made calamities or disasters, that does not incur long-term U.S. commitment.
  - Review existing international agreements, treaties, contracts, area studies, the CA database, and other applicable documents that indicate the need for civil assistance, as described above.
  - Review international laws, national laws, international agreements, treaties, and other data sources for any legal issues that may affect the conduct of civil assistance at the national, provincial, and local levels.
  - Identify requirements to update, modify, or initiate new international agreements, treaties, or contracts pertaining to the conduct of civil assistance at the national, provincial, and local levels.

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Figure H-5. Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Considerations in Emergency Services (Continued)

Figure H-6. Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Considerations in Support to Civil Administration
### Support to Civil Administration

|---------------|-------------------|--------------|-----------------|---------------|--------------|-------------|---------------|-----------------|----------------|-------------|--------------|----------------|------------------|----------------|----------------|------------|

### Civil Assistance (Continued)

#### Strategic Considerations (Continued)
- Assess the capabilities and effectiveness of the existing civil administration at the national level.
- Develop plans to reinforce or restore civil administration at the national level.
- Establish a CMOC early to support interagency and international coordination of civil assistance plans.
- Identify military capabilities required to provide civil assistance, for example, maintaining order, providing life-sustaining services, controlling distribution of goods and services, and advising HN government officials and agencies in the CA specialty areas.
- Provide guidance to geographic combatant commander regarding authorized and appropriate civil assistance activities, MOEs, end state, and termination.
- Determine an end state and plan termination criteria and timelines.
- Monitor and evaluate MOEs.
- Terminate civil assistance according to termination plan.
- Determine the cost(s) of not implementing CA/CMO options.

#### Operational Considerations
- Review geographic combatant commander guidance regarding authorized and appropriate civil assistance activities, MOEs, end state, and termination.
- Review existing international agreements, treaties, contracts, area studies, the CA database, and other applicable documents that indicate the need for civil assistance, as described above.
- Review international laws, national and provincial laws, international agreements, treaties, and other data sources for any legal issues that may affect the conduct of civil assistance at the provincial and local levels.
- Identify requirements to update, modify, or initiate new international agreements, treaties, or contracts pertaining to the conduct of civil assistance at the provincial and local levels.
- Deploy CA personnel early to conduct deliberate assessments and to support advance party operations and logistics elements.
- Assess the capabilities and effectiveness of the existing civil administration at the provincial level.
- Assess the AO for shortfalls and capabilities in each of the 16 functional specialties.
- Develop plans to reinforce or restore civil administration at the provincial level.
- Establish CMOC(s) to coordinate and synchronize interagency and multinational civil assistance efforts in the AO.
- Determine the impact of the history and infrastructure of the AO on civil assistance activities.
- Determine the impact of civil assistance activities on the future and infrastructure of the AO.
- Determine the impact of the populace on civil assistance activities.

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Figure H-6. Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Considerations in Support to Civil Administration (Continued)
### Support to Civil Administration

|------------|------------------|--------------|------------------|--------------|-------------|----------------|------------------|-----------------|--------------|---------------|-----------------|-------------------|----------------|-----|--------------|

### Civil Assistance (Continued)

#### Operational Considerations (Continued)

| Determine the impact of civil assistance activities on the populace. | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Develop plans and strategies for immediate mitigation of political, economic, legal, social, and military issues associated with civil assistance activities at the provincial and local levels. | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Develop plans and strategies for long-range mitigation of political, economic, legal, social, and military issues associated with civil assistance activities at the provincial and local levels. | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Update and maintain a database of civil assistance issues in theater. | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Record expenditures for all civil assistance activities associated with the operation. | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Provide guidance to operational- and tactical-level commanders regarding authorized and appropriate civil assistance activities, MOEs, end state, and transition. | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Determine an end state and plan termination criteria and timelines. | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Monitor and evaluate MOEs. | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Terminate civil assistance according to termination plan. | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Determine the cost(s) of not implementing CA/CMO options. | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |

### Tactical Considerations

| Review higher headquarters guidance regarding authorized and appropriate civil assistance activities, MOEs, end state, and termination. | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Review existing international agreements, treaties, contracts, area studies, the CA database, and other applicable documents that indicate the need for civil assistance, as described above. | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Review international laws, local laws, international agreements, treaties, and other data sources for any legal issues that may affect the conduct of civil assistance at the local level. | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Identify requirements to update, modify, or initiate new international agreements, treaties, or contracts pertaining to the conduct of civil assistance at the local level. | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Deploy CA personnel early to conduct deliberate assessments and to support advance party operations and logistics elements. | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Assess the capabilities and effectiveness of the existing civil administration at the local level. | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Assess the AO for shortfalls and capabilities in each of the 16 functional specialties. | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Develop plans to reinforce or restore civil administration at the local level. | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Establish CMOC(s) to coordinate and synchronize interagency and multinational civil assistance efforts in the tactical area. | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Monitor activation of preplanned civil assistance agreements. | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Provide guidance to tactical-level commanders regarding authorized and appropriate civil assistance activities, MOEs, end state, and termination. | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Use interpreters, as necessary. | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |

Figure H-6. Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Considerations in Support to Civil Administration (Continued)
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<td>Assess, monitor, and report the impact of the history and infrastructure of the tactical area on civil assistance activities.</td>
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<td>Assess, monitor, and report the impact of civil assistance activities on the future and infrastructure of the tactical area.</td>
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<td>Assess, monitor, and report the impact of civil assistance activities on the populace.</td>
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<td>Identify sources of criminal or black-market activity associated with civil assistance activities.</td>
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<td>Execute operational plans for immediate mitigation of political, economic, legal, social, and military issues associated with civil assistance activities.</td>
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<td>Execute operational plans for long-range mitigation of political, economic, legal, social, and military issues associated with civil assistance activities.</td>
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<td>Update and maintain a database of civil assistance issues in the tactical area.</td>
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<td>Record expenditures for all civil assistance activities associated with the operation.</td>
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<td>Determine an end state and plan termination criteria and timelines.</td>
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<td>Monitor and evaluate MOEs.</td>
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<td>Terminate civil assistance according to termination plan.</td>
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<td>Determine the cost(s) of not implementing CA/CMO options.</td>
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**Civil Administration in Friendly Territory**

**Strategic Considerations**

| Review strategic plans for tasks that involve advising friendly authorities or performing specific administration functions during peacetime, disasters, or war. | X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X |
| Review existing international requests, agreements, treaties, contracts, area studies, the CA database, and other applicable documents that outline extent, goals, and expected duration of the support mission, as described above. | X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X |
| Review international requests, laws, national laws, international agreements, treaties, and other data sources for any legal issues that may affect the conduct of civil administration in friendly territory at the national, provincial, and local levels. | X X X X X X X X X X X |
| Identify requirements to update, modify, or initiate new international agreements, treaties, or contracts pertaining to the conduct of civil administration in friendly territory at the national, provincial, and local levels. | X X |
| Assess the capabilities and effectiveness of the existing civil administration at the national level. | X X |
| Develop plans to reinforce or restore civil administration at the national level. | X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X |

Figure H-6. Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Considerations in Support to Civil Administration (Continued)
### Support to Civil Administration

|-------------|----------------|------------------|----------------|------------------|----------------|----------------|--------------|----------------|-------------------|------------------|----------------|----------------|------------------|------------------|-------|----------------|-----------|

#### Civil Administration in Friendly Territory (Continued)

### Strategic Considerations (Continued)

- Ensure the level of support rendered is tailored to meet the needs of the existing situation. In no case will the support exceed—
  - The HN’s request for help. X
  - Applicable international treaties and agreements. X X
  - Limitations imposed by the law of land warfare. X X

- Establish a CMOC early to support interagency and international coordination of plans to support civil administration at the national level. X X X X X X X X X X X X

- Identify military capabilities required to support civil administration according to the pertinent request or agreements. X X X X X X X X X X

- Provide guidance to geographic combatant commander regarding authorized and appropriate civil administration support activities, MOEs, end state, and termination or transition. X X X X X X X X X X

- Determine an end state and plan termination or transition criteria and timelines. X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

- Monitor and evaluate MOEs. X

- Terminate civil administration support according to termination or transition plan. X

- Determine the cost(s) of not implementing CA/CMO options. X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

### Operational Considerations

- Review geographic combatant commander guidance regarding authorized and appropriate civil administration support activities, MOEs, end state, and termination or transition. X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

- Review existing international requests, agreements, treaties, contracts, area studies, the CA database, and other applicable documents that outline extent, goals, and expected duration of the support mission, as described above. X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

- Review international requests, laws, national laws, international agreements, treaties, and other data sources for any legal issues that may affect the conduct of civil administration in friendly territory at the provincial and local levels. X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

- Identify requirements to update, modify, or initiate new international agreements, treaties, or contracts pertaining to the conduct of civil administration in friendly territory at the provincial and local levels. X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

- Assess the capabilities and effectiveness of the existing civil administration at the provincial level. X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

- Assess the AO for shortfalls and capabilities in each of the 16 functional specialties. X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

- Develop plans to reinforce or restore civil administration at the provincial level. X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

- Ensure the level of support rendered is tailored to meet the needs of the existing situation. In no case will the support exceed—
  - The HN’s request for help. X
  - Applicable international treaties and agreements. X X

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**Figure H-6. Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Considerations in Support to Civil Administration (Continued)**
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<td>Deploy CA personnel early to conduct deliberate assessments and to support advance party operations and logistics elements.</td>
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<td>Establish CMOC(s) to coordinate and synchronize interagency and multinational support to civil administration efforts in the AO.</td>
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<td>Determine the impact of civil administration support activities on the future and infrastructure of the AO.</td>
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<td>Develop plans and strategies for immediate mitigation of political, economic, legal, social, and military issues associated with civil administration support activities at the provincial and local levels.</td>
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<td>Update and maintain a database of civil administration support issues in-theater.</td>
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<td>Provide guidance to operational- and tactical-level commanders regarding authorized and appropriate civil administration support activities, MOEs, end state, and termination or transition.</td>
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<td>Terminate civil administration support according to termination or transition plan.</td>
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<td>Review higher headquarters guidance regarding authorized and appropriate civil administration support activities, MOEs, end state, and termination or transition.</td>
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<td>Review existing international requests, agreements, treaties, contracts, area studies, the CA database, and other applicable documents that outline extent, goals, and expected duration of the support mission, as described above.</td>
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<td>Review international requests, laws, national laws, international agreements, treaties, and other data sources for any legal issues that may affect the conduct of civil administration in friendly territory at the local level.</td>
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Figure H-6. Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Considerations in Support to Civil Administration (Continued)
### Support to Civil Administration

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**Civil Administration in Friendly Territory (Continued)**

#### Tactical Considerations (Continued)

- Identify requirements to update, modify, or initiate new international agreements, treaties, or contracts pertaining to the conduct of civil administration in friendly territory at the local level.  
  - X  
- Deploy CA personnel early to conduct deliberate assessments and to support advance party operations and logistics elements.  
  - X
- Assess the capabilities and effectiveness of the existing civil administration at the local level.  
  - X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
- Assess the tactical area for shortfalls and capabilities in each of the 16 functional specialties.  
  - X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
- Develop plans to reinforce or restore civil administration at the local level.  
  - X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
- Ensure the level of support rendered is tailored to meet the needs of the existing situation. In no case will the support exceed—
  - The HN's request for help.  
    - X
  - Applicable international treaties and agreements.  
    - X X
  - Limitations imposed by the law of land warfare.  
    - X X
- Establish CMOC(s) to coordinate and synchronize interagency and multinational support to civil administration efforts in the tactical area.  
  - X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
- Monitor activation of preplanned civil administration support agreements.  
  - X
- Provide guidance to tactical-level commanders regarding authorized and appropriate civil administration support activities, MOEs, end state, and termination or transition.  
  - X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
- Use interpreters, as necessary.  
  - X
- Assess, monitor, and report the impact of the history and infrastructure of the tactical area on civil administration support activities.  
  - X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
- Assess, monitor, and report the impact of civil administration support activities on the future and infrastructure of the tactical area.  
  - X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
- Assess, monitor, and report the impact of the populace on civil administration support activities.  
  - X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
- Assess, monitor, and report the impact of civil administration support activities on the populace.  
  - X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
- Identify sources of criminal or black-market activity associated with civil administration support activities.  
  - X X X X X X X X
- Execute operational plans for immediate mitigation of political, economic, legal, social, and military issues associated with civil administration support activities.  
  - X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
- Execute operational plans for long-range mitigation of political, economic, legal, social, and military issues associated with civil administration support activities.  
  - X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
- Update and maintain a database of civil administration support issues in the tactical area.  
  - X

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**Figure H-6. Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Considerations in Support to Civil Administration (Continued)**
### Civil Administration in Friendly Territory (Continued)

#### Tactical Considerations (Continued)

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<th>Action</th>
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<tr>
<td>Record expenditures for all civil administration support activities</td>
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<td>associated with the operation.</td>
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<td>Determine an end state and plan termination or transition criteria</td>
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<td>and timelines.</td>
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<td>Monitor and evaluate MOEs.</td>
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<td>Terminate civil assistance according to termination or transition</td>
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<td>plan.</td>
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<td>Determine the cost(s) of not implementing CA/CMO options.</td>
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### Civil Administration in Occupied Territory

#### Strategic Considerations

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<td>Review strategic plans for tasks that involve conducting civil</td>
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<td>administration in occupied territory at the direction of the SECDEF.</td>
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<td>Review existing international agreements, treaties, and other</td>
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<td>applicable documents that outline roles, goals, and expected duration</td>
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<td>of the civil administration mission, as described above.</td>
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<td>Review international agreements, treaties, and other data</td>
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<td>sources for any legal issues that may affect the conduct of civil</td>
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<td>administration in occupied territory at the national, provincial,</td>
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<td>and local levels.</td>
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<td>Identify requirements to update, modify, or initiate new international</td>
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<td>agreements, treaties, and other applicable documents pertaining to the</td>
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<td>conduct of civil administration in occupied territory at the</td>
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<td>national, provincial, and local levels.</td>
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<td>Assess the existing civil infrastructure and needs of the populace</td>
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<td>at the national level in terms of the 16 functional specialties.</td>
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<td>Develop plans to reinforce or restore civil infrastructure at the</td>
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<td>national level.</td>
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<td>Understand that the goal of U.S. civil administration of an occupied</td>
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<td>territory is to create an effective civil government. The government</td>
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<td>should not pose a threat to future peace and stability. CA support to</td>
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<td>civil administration of an occupied territory should emphasize that—</td>
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<td>- The populace receives responsive, effective government services.</td>
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<td>- The populace is able to obtain essential goods and services.</td>
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<td>- The measures taken enhance the social and economic well-being of</td>
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<td>the occupied territory.</td>
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<td>- The system of control furthers U.S. political objectives.</td>
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<td>- Law and order prevail.</td>
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<td>- Restoration, rehabilitation, and development occur in the social</td>
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<td>institutions and economic system of the occupied territory.</td>
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<td>- An orderly, efficient transition occurs from civil administration</td>
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<td>to civil government.</td>
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<td>- The country and people are as well off at the end of civil</td>
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<td>administration as at the onset of occupation.</td>
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Figure H-6. Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Considerations in Support to Civil Administration (Continued)
Support to Civil Administration

|------------|-------------------|--------------|-----------------|--------------|--------------|----------------|--------------------|-----------------|-------------|---------------|----------------|----------------------|-----|----------------|------------|

Civil Administration in Occupied Territory (Continued)

### Strategic Considerations (Continued)

- The obligations of international law and treaties are met. | X |
- Human rights abuses against collaborators, minority groups, discriminated social classes, or individuals must be prevented. | X |
- The occupying power must obey the existing laws but, in many cases, may need to change those laws. International law is specific about requirements, and the occupying power must meet these requirements when changing civil law in an occupied territory. For further information, consult international law specialists and review FM 27-10 and other texts on the law of land warfare. | X | X |

Establish a CMOC early to support interagency and international coordination of plans to support civil administration at the national level. | X |
Identify military and civil capabilities required to support civil administration according to pertinent agreements. | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
Provide guidance to geographic combatant commander regarding authorized and appropriate civil administration activities, MOEs, end state, and termination or transition. | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
Determine an end state and plan termination or transition criteria and timelines. | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
Monitor and evaluate MOEs. | X |
Terminate civil administration according to termination or transition plan. | X |
Determine the cost(s) of not implementing CA/CMO options. | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |

### Operational Considerations

Review geographic combatant commander guidance regarding authorized and appropriate civil administration support activities, MOEs, end state, and termination or transition. | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
Review existing international agreements, treaties, and other applicable documents that outline roles, goals, and expected duration of the civil administration mission, as described above. | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
Review international agreements, treaties, and other data sources for any legal issues that may affect the conduct of civil administration in occupied territory at the provincial and local levels. | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
Identify requirements to update, modify, or initiate new international agreements, treaties, and other applicable documents pertaining to the conduct of civil administration in occupied territory at the provincial and local levels. | X | X |
Assess the existing civil infrastructure and needs of the populace at the provincial level in terms of the 16 functional specialties. | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
Develop plans to reinforce or restore civil infrastructure at the provincial level. | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
Understand that the structure of the civil administration system may develop in one of several ways. The occupying power may—

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Figure H-6. Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Considerations in Support to Civil Administration (Continued)
## Support to Civil Administration

|---------------|-------------------|---------------|------------------|--------------|--------------|-------------|---------------|------------------|----------------|--------------|---------------|----------------|------------------|------|----------------|------------|

### Civil Administration in Occupied Territory (Continued)

#### Operational Considerations (Continued)

- Allow the existing government structure to continue under its control and supervision. This arrangement does not mean the occupying power approves of the existing regime or condones its past actions. The arrangement represents the easiest basis for developing a functioning government on short notice because the government is already in place.

- Retain all public officials or, for political or security reasons, replace all or selected personnel with other qualified people. As necessary, the occupying power executes programs that effect political reform, strengthen government agencies and institutions, and develop self-government. In some cases, the occupying power may reorganize, replace, or abolish selected agencies or institutions of the existing government.

- Replace the existing government and build a new structure. This measure is the most drastic COA. The occupying power should, therefore, adopt this COA only if the old regime has completely collapsed or it is so hostile that its continued existence poses an intolerable threat to peace and stability.

Understand that possession does not require the presence of troops in all areas of the occupied country. The occupying force must, however, be able to deploy quickly to any area within the territory to enforce its authority. The number of troops required to occupy a territory depends on the—

- Degree of resistance to the occupation.
- Size of the area and the nature of the terrain.
- Population density and distribution.
- Level of development in the area.

Establish CMOC(s) to support interagency and international coordination of plans to support civil administration at the operational level.

Direct or inform the populace through proclamations, ordinances, orders, instructions, and agreements.

Determine the impact of the history and infrastructure of the AO on civil administration activities.

Determine the impact of civil administration activities on the future and infrastructure of the AO.

Determine the impact of the populace on civil administration activities.

Determine the impact of civil administration activities on the populace.

Develop plans and strategies for immediate mitigation of political, economic, legal, social, and military issues associated with civil administration activities at the provincial and local levels.

Develop plans and strategies for long-range mitigation of political, economic, legal, social, and military issues associated with civil administration activities at the provincial and local levels.

Update and maintain a database of civil administration issues in-theater.

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**Figure H-6. Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Considerations in Support to Civil Administration (Continued)**
**Figure H-6. Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Considerations in Support to Civil Administration (Continued)**

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<td>Review international agreements, treaties, and other data sources for any legal issues that may affect the conduct of civil administration in occupied territory at the local level.</td>
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<td>Assess the existing civil infrastructure and needs of the populace at the local level in terms of the 16 functional specialties.</td>
<td>X X X X X</td>
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<td>Understand that the structure of the civil administration system may develop in one of several ways. The occupying power may—</td>
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<td>- Allow the existing government structure to continue under its control and supervision. This arrangement does not mean the occupying power approves of the existing regime or condones its past actions. The arrangement represents the easiest basis for developing a functioning government on short notice because the government is already in place.</td>
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<td>- Retain all public officials or, for political or security reasons, replace all or selected personnel with other qualified people. As necessary, the occupying power executes programs that effect political reform, strengthen government agencies and institutions, and develop self-government. In some cases, the occupying power may reorganize, replace, or abolish selected agencies or institutions of the existing government.</td>
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<td>- Replace the existing government and build a new structure. This measure is the most drastic COA. The occupying power should, therefore, adopt this COA only if the old regime has completely collapsed or it is so hostile that its continued existence poses an intolerable threat to peace and stability.</td>
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<td>Understand that possession does not require the presence of troops in all areas of the occupied country. The occupying force must, however, be able to deploy quickly to any area within the territory to enforce its authority. The number of troops required to occupy a territory depends on the—</td>
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### Support to Civil Administration

|---------------|-------------------|---------------|------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|----------------|------------------|-----------------|---------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|--------------|

#### Civil Administration in Occupied Territory (Continued)

### Tactical Considerations (Continued)

| - Degree of resistance to the occupation. | X |
| - Size of the area and the nature of the terrain. | X |
| - Population density and distribution. | X |
| - Level of development in the area. | X |

Establish CMOC(s) to support interagency and international coordination of plans to support civil administration at the local level. X

Provide guidance to tactical-level commanders regarding authorized and appropriate civil administration activities, MOEs, end state, and termination or transition. X

Direct or inform the populace through proclamations, ordinances, orders, instructions, and agreements. X

Use interpreters, as necessary. X

Assess, monitor, and report the impact of the history and infrastructure of the tactical area on civil administration activities. X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

Assess, monitor, and report the impact of civil administration activities on the future and infrastructure of the tactical area. X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

Assess, monitor, and report the impact of the populace on civil administration activities. X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

Assess, monitor, and report the impact of civil administration activities on the populace. X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

Identify and assess the impact of anti-U.S./anti-government propaganda on popular support of civil administration activities; for example, satisfaction or dissatisfaction and support or hindrance via subversive activity. X X X X X X X X X X X

Identify sources of criminal or black-market activity associated with civil administration activities. X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

Execute operational plans for immediate mitigation of political, economic, legal, social, and military issues associated with civil administration activities. X X X X X X X X X X X

Execute operational plans for long-range mitigation of political, economic, legal, social, and military issues associated with civil administration activities. X X X X X X X X X X X

Update and maintain a database of civil administration issues in the tactical area. X

Record expenditures for all civil administration activities associated with the operation. X

Determine an end state and plan termination or transition criteria and timelines. X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

Monitor and evaluate MOEs. X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

Terminate civil administration according to termination or transition plan. X

Determine the cost(s) of not implementing CA/CMO options. X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

Figure H-6. Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Considerations in Support to Civil Administration (Continued)
Appendix I

Techniques in Dislocated Civilian Operations

DC operations are a special category of PRC and the most basic collective task performed by CA personnel. The goals of DC operations are to minimize civilian interference with military operations and to protect civilians from combat operations. This appendix addresses techniques for meeting those goals.

INTRODUCTION

I-1. People may become dislocated from their homes or villages for a variety of reasons in both war and MOOTW. The following are some examples:

- Destructive forces (both natural and man-made) cause people from a devastated area to pursue sources of basic needs, such as food, water, shelter, security, and health care.
- Anticipation or expectancy that basic needs will not be met by the existing government or infrastructure in an impending disaster cause voluntary or forced evacuation.
- Political or ethnic persecution force portions of a population to seek a friendlier environment.
- Enemy forces deliberately use civilians as shields, countermobility barriers, or disruptions to friendly operations.

I-2. Based on national policy directives and other political efforts, the theater commander provides directives on the care, control, and disposition of DCs. The operational force commander integrates the theater commander’s guidance with the ground tactical plan. At division, COSCOM, and other subordinate command levels, the DC plan must—

- Allow for accomplishing the tasks assigned by the higher command echelon.
- Be within the restrictions imposed by the higher HQ.
- Guide the subordinate commands in the handling and routing of DCs.
- Ensure that all concerned parties (including the fire support coordination center and the S-3 or G-3 air) receive information on DC plans, routes, and areas of concentration.

I-3. DC plans support the OPLAN and require extensive coordination among operational, legal, logistics, interagency, HN, and IC planners. As a minimum, DC plans must address—

- Authorized extent of migration and evacuation.
- Minimum standards of care.
- Status and disposition of all DCs.
Designation of routes and control measures for movement control.
Cultural and dietary considerations.
Designation and delegation of responsibilities.

DC TEMPLATING

I-4. There is no doctrinal template or rule of thumb for determining how many people of a certain area will leave their homes in response to actual or perceived threats and disasters. As illustrated above, every situation is different. Some people may be able to survive the situation in relative comfort and safety, while others may choose or be forced to leave their homes for relative comfort and safety elsewhere.

I-5. In the absence of a doctrinal template, DC planners conduct comprehensive civil IPB, using all the factors of METT-TC and CASCOPE, to analyze the DC situation. They consider the civil centers of gravity, civil decisive points, and civil lines of operation in their analysis.

I-6. DC planners use this analysis to create a series of civil SITTEMPs. The first of the civil SITTEMPs describes civil dispositions under normal conditions and circumstances. The remaining civil SITTEMPs describe the possible COAs a populace, or portions of a populace, may take given certain criteria or stimuli. Ideally, the SITTEMPs will indicate the anticipated speed, direction, and flow pattern of DC movement, which are described later in this appendix.

I-7. DC templating is more of an art than a science. Planners will often need to call on knowledgeable representatives of various CA specialties to fully understand the civil environment. Appendix H contains some of the strategic, operational, and tactical considerations in planning DC operations. Examples of additional information requirements that may result from brainstorming are—

- What is the status and resiliency of the civilian support infrastructure in the area?
- What is the level of preparedness for this type of situation (for example, how effective are the area's emergency management or civil defense plans and resources)?
- Are there any political, economic, military, informational, demographic, historical, or other reasons that indicate the populace, or portions of the populace, may leave their homes?
- Are there any political, economic, military, informational, demographic, historical, or other reasons that indicate the populace, or portions of the populace, may remain in or near their homes?
- What conditions or actions might mitigate a DC problem and how can we influence the realization of those conditions or actions?

I-8. DC planning cannot occur in a vacuum. DC planners must make the DC templates available to other operational planners during problem-solving and decision-making processes. They must also coordinate with interagency, HN, and IC planners and participants as the situation and OPSEC requirements permit.
DC MOVEMENT PLANNING FACTORS

I-9. DC planners must consider several variables, or factors, when creating SITTEMPS for DC movements. These factors assume a controlled movement and apply to all DC movements regardless of type or size. Planners assume values for the variables, based on common sense, until verified by observation. For DCs moving through denied areas, planners should consider requesting unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) support to determine actual values. DC movement planning factors include the following:

- Distance factors:
  - Dislocated civilian road space (DCRS): Used in determining time length of the DC column. DCRS consists of two parts: the space occupied by one DC alone and distance between another DC, and the sum of the distance between elements of a number of DC foot columns. (Total DCRS = RS [individual DC] + DCRS column distances).
  - DC column gap: The space between two organized DC elements following each other on the same route.
  - DC traffic density: The average number of DCs that occupy 1 kilometer, expressed in DC/KM (DCs per kilometer).
  - Length of DC column: The length of roadway occupied by a column, including gaps, measured from front to rear inclusive.
  - Road gap: The distance between two DC march elements.

- Rate factors:
  - Speed: The actual rate of speed at a given moment.
  - Pace: The regulated speed of a DC column or element set by the column.
  - Rate of march: The average number of kilometers traveled in any given period of time, including short delays or periodic halts. Expressed in kilometers per hour (km/h).

- Time factors (must be adjusted for demographic of column, health, and weather conditions):
  - Arrival time: The time when the head of the DC column arrives at a designated point.
  - Clearance time: The time when the last of a DC column passes a designated point.
  - Completion time: The time when the last element of a DC column passes a designated point.
  - Extra time allowance (EXTAL): Time added, based on assessment of situation, to the pass time.
  - Pass time: Actual time required for a DC column, from the first to the last element, to pass a given point.
  - Road clearance time: The total time a DC column requires to travel over and clear a section of road.
  - Time distance (TDIS): The time required to move from one point to another at a given rate of march.
• Time gap: Time measured between rear and front of successive DC columns as they move past any given point.

• Formulas:
  - Distance = Rate x Time.
  - Distance/Time = Rate.
  - Distance/Rate = Time (or TDIS).

EXAMPLE: Determine TDIS of a DC column moving on foot traveling 20 kilometers at a rate of 4 km/h.

TDIS = 20 km/4km/h = 5 hours.

NOTE: An EXTAL of 3 hours is added based on assessment of demographic (women, children, elderly) composition of the DC column and weather conditions. It is anticipated that the head of the DC column will arrive at completion point in approximately 8 hours.

• Completion Time = SP (Start Point) + TL (Time Length) + Scheduled Halts + EXTAL.

• Time Length, Foot Column (Rate Formula):
  - 4.0 km/h TL (min) = RS (meters) x .0150.
  - 3.2 km/h TL (min) = RS (meters) x .0187.
  - 2.4 km/h TL (min) = RS (meters) x .0250.
  - 1.6 km/h TL (min) = RS (meters) x .0375.

NOTE: DC movement rate 4 km/h during day slows to 3.2 km/h at night. Cross-country DC movement rate 2.4 km/h during day slows to 1.6 km/h at night.

• Formation 2 meters per DC 5 meters per DC
• Single file 2.4 5.4
• Column of twos 1.2 2.7
• Column of fours 0.6 1.3

NOTE: Distance between DCs during day is 2 to 5 meters, 50 meters between columns. Distance between DCs during night is 1 to 3 meters, 25 meters between columns.

DC MOVEMENT GRAPH

I-10. A DC movement graph (Figure I-1, page I-5) is a time-space diagram that visually depicts a DC movement from start point to completion point. It is used during the DC movement planning phase to integrate, coordinate, prevent congestion along the route of march, and deconflict route usage with the military highway regulation and traffic circulation plan. It is also used to prepare or check the DC road movement table. It shows the relative time and location of the head and tail of each DC march column at any point along the route, arrival and clearance times of DC columns at critical points, and restrictions and congestion in the network.
I-11. DC planners transfer information derived from march formulas or obtained from DC march tables directly to the graph. To complete the DC movement graph, planners must determine time-distance, arrival time, and pass time for each identified DC column based on data collected on organized DC columns.

![DC Movement Graph](image)

**Figure I-1. DC Movement Graph**

**DC MOVEMENT TABLE**

I-12. A DC movement table is a convenient way of transmitting time schedules and other essential details of a DC move. The accompanying example (Figure I-2, page I-6) of a DC movement table is a general use blank form. The following notes assist in the use of this form:

- Only the minimum number of headings should be used. Any information common to two or more movements under general data paragraphs of the DC movement annex should be included.
- Because the table may be issued to personnel concerned with control of traffic, the security aspect must be remembered. Including dates and locations may not be desirable.
- If the table is issued by itself and not as an annex to a detailed order, the table must be signed and authenticated in the normal way.
• A critical point is a selected point along a route used for reference in giving instructions, coordinating for required support, and decon- 
liction, as required. It includes start points, completion points, and other points along a route where interference with military movement may occur or where timings are critical.

• The DC movement number (Column) identifies a DC column (or 
element of a column) during the whole movement.

• To obtain due times for DC columns, DC planners transfer directly from the road movement graph or calculate using time-distance table and strip map.

• To obtain DC column clear times, DC planners add march unit pass time to due time.

• To complete the schedules for successive DC columns, DC planners add pass time plus graph time to due time.

ANNEX _____ (DC Movement Table) to OPORD # _________

General Information:

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<tr>
<td>DC Column #</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Estimated # DCs</td>
<td>From</td>
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<td>Route</td>
<td>Route to SP</td>
<td>Route to SP</td>
<td>Speed</td>
<td>Rate of March</td>
<td>Open/Closed Column</td>
<td>Cleared From</td>
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Critical Points

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Figure I-2. DC Movement Table Format

MITIGATING THE DC PROBLEM - DC CONTROL TECHNIQUES

I-13. Once DC planners have identified the parameters of the expected DC situation, they must determine how to deal with the DC problem. Potential COAs include—

• Prevent or minimize dislocations.

• Bypass or ignore DCs.
• Control DC movement using various techniques.
• Any combination of the above.

PREVENT OR MINIMIZE DISLOCATIONS

I-14. This COA involves executing populace control measures, such as a stayput policy, curfew, and controlled evacuations. Each measure requires detailed assessment and planning, as well as coordination with and support of HN civil authorities and, at times, the IC. Public information and PSYOP assets will increase the chance of success.

STAYPUT POLICY

I-15. A stayput policy is, essentially, an order to citizens to stay within the confines of their homes, communities, or other defined boundaries. Successful execution of a stayput policy requires that the citizens be provided with sufficient necessities of life (food, water, shelter, security, and health care) (according to accepted international standards; for example, the Sphere Project), during and after the period the policy is in effect. Mitigation measures conducted during predisaster emergency services programs (building individual and community survival shelters, stockpiling food and medicines, and conducting preparedness exercises) will enhance the willingness of citizens to abide by stayput policies. Emergency response activities, such as the airlift of disaster relief into the populated area, may also be required.

I-16. The policy is designed to minimize civilian interference with military operations and, just as importantly, to minimize civil collateral damage. HN authorities should enforce a stayput policy whenever possible. When enforced by military forces, the policy requires an agreement among participating nations and the appropriate military command. This section provides guidance on what such agreements should or could contain.

General

I-17. This agreement should state that in matters concerning population movement, military commanders will always deal through and with the appropriate national commanders or authority.

I-18. “Stay put” means that civil authorities will do everything in their power to stop DCs (also known as internally displaced persons, or IDPs) in their own country—especially preventing them from passing from one country to another. Neighboring countries should cooperate closely to help in the implementation of this policy within common frontiers. If, for whatever reason, some movement does take place, the receiving country should do all in its power to hold DCs in appropriate areas and return them to the country from which they were displaced, as soon as circumstances permit. Any such movement might gravely prejudice national, multinational, or coalition operations and the possibility of civilian survival.

I-19. In crisis and wartime, indigenous national authorities retain full responsibility for their populations, institutions, and resources unless otherwise arranged for by special agreement.
I-20. Evacuations of populations in times of crisis short of war may become a necessity to ensure the population’s survivability and no less to ensure freedom of military operations.

I-21. During crisis or wartime, civilian populations may start to move of their own volition and thus become DCs. Unless such movements are fully controlled by proper authorities and agencies, they may lead to chaos. National authorities shall take all possible steps—
- To prevent unauthorized population movement.
- To control and organize DCs should such movement occur.

I-22. Should refugee movements occur, commanders must cooperate with and assist national authorities in preventing such movements from interfering with military operations. National law normally dictates whether and under what conditions commands can take control of DC movements, if that is necessary for the achievement of their operational mission and for the protection and safety of the population. If such control has been granted to commanders, it will be handed back to the proper national authorities as soon as possible.

I-23. All actions taken with respect to DCs must be in consonance with the applicable provisions of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, and other rules of the International Law of War, especially The Hague Land Warfare Conventions.

Details of the Agreement

I-24. Commanders and national authorities must consider the overall problem of population movements against the background of the circumstances likely to prevail at the time. Panic and fear among the civilian population caused by weapon effects—including WMD—may induce large numbers of civilians to flee their homes and take to the roads. Should this happen, DCs would use all means of transport available. Unless controlled, they may—
- Interfere with military operations.
- Risk their own lives.

I-25. All commanders must be aware of—
- The responsibilities of national authorities. The responsibility for all planning and implementation measures concerning population movements rests with the national authorities.
- Their own responsibilities. Commanders will—
  - Contact and assist national authorities to coordinate military planning with national planning and national implementation of measures concerning the evacuation of the civilian population and the control of refugee movements, as appropriate.
  - Assist, on request, national authorities in the implementation of the above plans, as long as they are compatible with the existing operational situation.
Assume control of population movements if so granted as described above.

Keep the appropriate national authorities advised of the development of operations.

Provide appropriate national authorities with information concerning the adverse effect of the refugee situation on the preparedness or operations of the military forces under their command.

Work with national authorities to obtain information concerning the population movement situation and associated matters, which could have adverse effects on the preparation and conduct of operations.

I-26. In the event the military assumes direct control of the population, which is the last resort to ensure the safety of the population and the conduct of operations, the military commanders will inform higher HQ of the following:

- Period of assistance.
- Composition of military forces to be provided.
- C2 of these forces.
- Powers granted to the commanders of these forces (should be the same as those held by equivalent national authorities and must in any case ensure the security of the military forces).
- Any restrictions on the employment and conduct of military forces.
- Logistic support for the assistance of military forces where special measures are necessary.

CURFEWS

I-27. Curfews and other movement restrictions discourage unauthorized civilians from moving during certain time periods or into certain areas. These restrictions should be codified in a policy that is legal, practical, enforceable, and well publicized. Exceptions to the policy may be granted using a strict identification or pass system. In addition, restrictions should be enforced by a system of measures, including patrols, checkpoints, and roadblocks, or any combination thereof.

CONTROLLED EVACUATIONS

I-28. Controlled evacuations are a way of minimizing the chaos that exists when civilians will not or should not stay where they are. Forced dislocations may be appropriate to protect civilians from combat operations, as well as impending natural disasters, such as hurricanes or volcanic eruption. They also may be appropriate to protect military operations, as in the removal of civilians from port areas or areas adjacent to main supply routes to promote the efficiency of logistics operations and minimize the possibility of sabotage.

DC AVOIDANCE

I-29. Some military operations may dictate that DCs can or must be ignored or bypassed to ensure military success. An example is rapid offensive operations in which maintaining momentum is required. Commanders should
consider the use of PSYOP leaflets or loudspeakers to instruct or bolster the morale of bypassed DCs.

I-30. The decision to bypass or ignore DCs depends on the factors of METT-TC and may require the approval of the chain of command. Bypassed or ignored DCs must eventually be controlled by some military or civilian organization in the AO. Since bypassed groups of DCs may include enemy infiltrators attempting to pass through friendly lines, the military or civilian organization must be prepared to take security and force protection measures when assuming this control.

DC MOVEMENT CONTROL

I-31. DC movement must often be controlled to minimize interference with planned or ongoing military operations. Planners may use several techniques to control the movement of DCs. These techniques require detailed assessment and planning, as well as coordination with and support of HN civil authorities and, at times, the IC. These techniques include blocking, clearing, and collecting (Table I-1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Control Measure</th>
<th>Effectiveness of Measure</th>
<th>Special Requirements</th>
<th>Personnel Resource Intensity</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Blocking</td>
<td>Medium–High</td>
<td>Conducive Terrain</td>
<td>Low–Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clearing</td>
<td>Low–Medium</td>
<td>Dedicated Vehicle(s)</td>
<td>Low–Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collecting</td>
<td>Low–High</td>
<td>Special Training</td>
<td>High–Very High</td>
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BLOCKING

I-32. Blocking uses roadblocks, which may be supported by checkpoints, to prevent DCs from flowing onto roads or into areas essential for the conduct of military operations. Blocking involves preventing DCs from entering those areas and redirecting them to some other area, such as back to their homes or along a designated DC route. Depending on the security situation and other factors, civilians and their means of transport may or may not be searched at the blocking position.

I-33. The following questions must be considered when planning DC blocking operations:

- What is the likely timing, direction, route, rate, and flow of DCs? (This is required to mass forces when and where they are most needed.)
- Where is terrain that canalizes DCs?
- Does the ability exist to reinforce a roadblock under pressure?
- Does the flexibility exist to disengage on order?

CLEARING

I-34. Clearing directs DCs from main supply routes, alternate supply routes (ASRs), and other areas of military significance to keep them from interfering with operations. Clearing is conducted at the small unit level by ordinary
soldiers or by small, specialized teams whose sole purpose is to confront DCs, remove them from their current location, and orient them toward the location to which the commander wants them to go. In some cases, this may simply be the shoulder of the road.

I-35. Clearing is intended for fast-paced, unit-level operations. It is not an effective method for large-scale DC operations. It must be deliberately planned and integrated with other control techniques. Clearing is merely intended to push or direct DCs in specified directions, away from military operations, installations, or encampments, until they can be picked up by more organized DC operations, such as collecting.

I-36. Some of the challenges of clearing operations include the following:

- Clearing is temporary in nature; units must continually sweep or chase new or returning DCs.
- External support is often required to transmit the intended message in a way that the DCs will understand.
- DCs present a continuing security concern for friendly forces (for example, potential for terrorist acts, such as car or suicide bombings).
- A unit's resources can be quickly overwhelmed if the numbers of DCs are great or the DCs need emergency assistance.

COLLECTING

I-37. Collecting provides positive control of concentrations of DCs at various holding areas to prevent them from interfering with operations and to foster care and processing. The collection plan is resource-intensive and must be coordinated and synchronized with operations, logistics, and security plans. Whenever possible, existing facilities, such as barns and warehouses, should be considered.

I-38. Collecting must also be planned and executed in collaboration with HN authorities and NGOs that specialize in public health, public safety, public communications, transportation, public works and utilities, and mass care and feeding. Its main features are collection points, DC routes, assembly areas, and DC camps.

Collection Points

I-39. These are temporary holding areas for gathering small numbers of DCs before moving onward along DC routes to assembly areas or DC camps. Units establishing DC collection points (commonly known as CIV on operational graphics) provide minimal emergency relief supplies that address only short-term (less than 1 day to 3 or 4 days) immediate needs (for example, water and trauma first aid).

DC Routes

I-40. DC routes are routes that offer protection to DCs by moving them away from the main effort of military combat and logistics operations.
Assembly Areas

I-41. Assembly areas are larger and more elaborate than collection points. They provide DCs with emergency relief, such as food, intermediate medical care, and temporary shelter. Designated personnel (military or civilians of the United States, HN, or IC) begin screening and registering DCs to identify family groups, determine points of origin and intended destinations, and other pertinent information. They also begin to segregate enemy prisoners of war (EPWs), hostile civilians, and deserters. Assembly areas are typically located in division rear areas and may host DCs for a week or longer. Authorities may decide to send DCs from assembly areas to camps, allow them to continue to their intended destination, or to return home. Assembly areas may evolve into DC camps, if required.

DC Camps

I-42. DC camps are semipermanent, carefully planned facilities where administrators prepare DCs for the return to their homes, resettlement, repatriation, or other disposition. Host country authorities, NGOs, or international organizations normally administer DC camps. U.S. forces may temporarily administer them or assist when necessary. Designated personnel continue to detect hostile civilians who should be interned. Camp administrators also begin examining and monitoring the DC population for disease. DCs should receive identification cards, records, food, clothing, and medical care in the camp. Camps are generally located in the division or corps communications zone or theater rear area. Figure I-3, page I-13, shows a typical DC collection plan.

I-43. Ideally, HN authorities handle mass DC operations by implementing planned and rehearsed evacuation plans. When a military force assumes responsibility for planning DC operations, DC planners should consider incorporating HN assets in the planning and implementation of DC plans.

DC Route Planning

I-44. Considerations with respect to the movement of civilians are as follows:

- Selection of routes. All DC movements take place on designated routes that are kept free of civilian congestion. When selecting routes for civilian movement, CA personnel must consider the types of transportation common to the area. They coordinate these routes with the traffic circulation plan proposed by the transportation officer and MP personnel.

- Identification of routes. After designating the movement routes, CA personnel mark them in languages and symbols the civilians, U.S. forces, and allied forces can understand. U.S. PSYOP units, HN military, and other allied military units can help mark the routes.

- Control and assembly points. After selecting and marking the movement routes, CA and HN authorities establish control and assembly points at selected key intersections. The G-5 or S-5 coordinates with the provost marshal, the movement control center,
and the G-4 for the locations of these points for inclusion in the traffic circulation plan.

- Emergency rest areas. CA personnel set up emergency rest areas at congested points to provide for the immediate needs of the DCs. These needs include water, food, fuel, maintenance, and medical services.

- Local and national agencies. Use of local and national agencies is essential for three reasons. First, it conserves military resources. Second, civilian authorities normally have legal status and are best equipped to handle their own people. Third, the use of local personnel reduces the need for interpreters or translators.

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**Figure I-3. Typical DC Collection Plan**

I-45. When routing DC movements, CMO planners should consider three fundamentals and four principles that govern routing. The three fundamentals that govern routing are—

- Balance: The process of matching DC column characteristics with route characteristics. Balance ensures that DC traffic never routinely exceeds the most limiting features of a route. Balancing also identifies requirements for upgrading routes or ordering cautions for certain
areas along the route. Route characteristics are identified during the planning process.

- **Separation**: The process of allocating road space for movements to ensure that movements do not conflict. The goal of separation is to reduce the potential for congestion.

- **Distribution**: The process of allocating as many routes as possible to reduce the potential for congestion. Distribution also promotes passive security by distributing and separating traffic.

The four principles that govern routing are—

- Assign highest priority traffic to routes that provide the minimum time-distance.
- Consider sustainability of route network when assigning movements.
- Separate motor movements from pedestrian movements.
- Separate civilian traffic (vehicular or pedestrian) from military movements.

I-46. Effective routing of DCs requires a detailed understanding of the military highway regulation and traffic circulation plan. Route classification and traffic control measures currently in use by military movement control agencies are applicable during the planning and execution of DC operations. These measures include—

- Open routes.
- Supervised routes.
- Dispatch routes.
- Reserved routes.
- Prohibited routes.

I-47. OPSEC considerations are important. Planned DC routes may be an indicator for the location of the main effort in the attack or defense. By attempting to minimize interference by DCs with military operations, planners may inadvertently disclose the location of the main effort. Because opposing forces seek to discover seams and boundaries to exploit them, DC planners should not consistently move DCs along seams or unit boundaries. The following example discusses DC road space usage calculations.

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**EXAMPLE OF DC ROAD SPACE USAGE CALCULATIONS**

1. **TASK.** Visualize, Describe, and Direct DC Operations.

2. **FACT.** The city of An Nasiriyah is key to the Corps’ river crossing operation. The population of An Nasiriyah is approximately 400,000.

3. **VISUALIZE DC FLOW.** Will DCs displace north as opposing forces move north; will DCs displace south into path of friendly forces moving north; will DCs displace east or west? Assess likelihood of DCs moving south into a fight or away from a fight. Assess percentage of total numbers of DCs that will move north, south, east, or west. Divide AOR into zones based on operational phase for ease of computation and assessment.
4. DESCRIBE. Apply concept of elasticity to determine approximate DCs. Concept of elasticity states that 50% of an urban area must be destroyed before 20% of a given population departs the area.

a. Application of concept of elasticity. Total population of An Nasiriyah is estimated at 400,000. If 50% of An Nasiriyah is destroyed, then we can expect 20% of the population to depart the area. Additionally, concept of elasticity states that food is less elastic than housing. A food shortage will cause people to depart an area in search of food.

b. Formula. \[400,000 \times 20\% = 80,000\] expected DCs departing the An Nasiriyah metropolitan area.

c. Subtract percentage of total estimated number of DCs that are assessed to move north, east, west, or south. Out of 80,000 expected DCs to depart An Nasiriyah, 40% are assessed to depart with opposing forces displacing north, 20% to move east due to affiliation with co-religionists, 10% west, and 30% south to search for food.

d. Calculations.

\[
\begin{align*}
80,000 \times 40\% \text{ move north} & = 32,000 \text{ DCs} \\
80,000 \times 20\% \text{ move east} & = 16,000 \text{ DCs} \\
80,000 \times 10\% \text{ move west} & = 8,000 \text{ DCs} \\
80,000 \times 30\% \text{ move south} & = 24,000 \text{ DCs}
\end{align*}
\]

e. Assessment. The 320,000 persons remaining in An Nasiriyah will be engaged with IO to support stayput objective. Concept of elasticity suggests that availability of less elastic than housing and if food is supplied in a timely manner will assist in keeping population in place. Coordination for delivery of food and medical supplies forward into vicinity of An Nasiriyah supports enforcement of stayput policy.

f. Describe DC columns. Depict what DC columns will look like and the amount of road space the columns will utilize. Apply road usage formula in DC Model.

(1) Step 1. Determine optimum size of DC column (packet) based on control and sustainability (DC road network) considerations. Divide 24,000 by number of DCs determined to be optimum size of a DC column for control and sustainability. Example: If 2,000 DCs is optimum size then \[24,000/2,000 = 12\] DC columns; if 1,000 DCs, then \[24,000/1,000 = 24\] columns; if 500, then \[24,000/500 = 48\] DC columns; if 250, then \[24,000/250 = 96\] columns.

(2) Step 2. Determine road space usage of DC columns. Measurement is based on a 2–5 meter distance between DCs during the day and 50 meters between columns and 1–3 meter distance between DCs at night and 25 meter distance between columns.

Example: To determine the road space requirement for 12 x DC columns of 2,000 (4 x 5,000 DCs) during the day, multiply:

(a) \[4 \times \text{DC columns} \times 2 \text{ meters} = 8 \text{ meters wide.}\]

(b) Divide 2,000 DCs by 4 (column of four): \[2,000/4 = 500 \text{ DCs per file} \times 2 \text{ meters separation between DCs} = 1,000 \text{ meters for one DC column.}\]
(c) DC column of 2,000 DCs is approximately 8 meters wide and 1,000 meters long.

(d) Multiply DC column length x number of columns: 1,000 meters x 12 = 12,000 meters long, divided by 1,000 meters = 12 km.

(e) Add 50 meters between columns during day moves: 12 columns x 50 meters = 600 meters.

(f) Total road space requirement of all DC columns = 12.6 km.

(3) Step 3. Determine time distance (TDIS) rates of DC columns. Example: To determine TDIS rates, divide the distance between stops by the rate of march of the DC column in kilometers per hour (km/h). DC column movement rate is 4 km/h during the day.

(a) The TDIS of a DC column moving on foot traveling 20 kilometers at a rate of 4 km/h = 20 kilometers/4 = 5 hours. Add extra time allowance (EXTAL) if assessment of demographic (women, children, elderly, medical condition) composition of DC column and weather conditions warrant.

(b) Compute DC moves for all columns for total DC operations timeline.

(c) Multiply 5 hours x 12 DC columns = 60 hours or 7.5 days if conducting DC moves 8 hours/day, 5 days if conducting DC moves 12 hours/day, or 3 days if conducting DC moves 18 hours/day.

(d) Multiply 5 hours x 24 DC columns = 120 hours or 15 days if conducting DC moves 8 hours/day, 10 days if conducting DC moves 12 hours/day, or 7 days if conducting DC moves 18 hours/day.

(e) Multiply 5 hours x 48 DC columns = 240 hours or 30 days if conducting DC moves 8 hours/day, 20 days if conducting DC moves 12 hours/day, or 13 days if conducting DC moves 18 hours/day.

(f) Multiply 5 hours x 96 DC columns = 480 hours or 60 days if conducting DC moves 8 hours/day, 40 days if conducting DC moves 12 hours/day, or 27 days if conducting DC moves 18 hours/day.

5. DIRECT. Based on the various DC operation timelines above, coordinate and direct DC movements on established DC route network IAW routing fundamentals. Apply combination of blocking, redirecting, clearing, or collecting DCs, as appropriate. Coordinate, integrate, and regulate DC operations with IO, Movement Control, MEDCOM, MP, Rear Operations Center (ROC), and G-2. Coordinate and integrate NGOs, as required.

**COMBINED DC CONTROL METHODS**

I-48. An analysis of METT-TC may indicate that several of the DC control methods may be required simultaneously or sequentially. In a port city, for example, the people in a predominantly neutral area may be ordered to stay in their neighborhoods and conform to such restrictions as curfews. Meanwhile, civilians in a hostile section of the city may be quarantined (no
one may enter or leave without permission and escort), and those in the areas closest to critical port facilities and adjoining the main inland supply routes may be selectively evacuated.

**TASK FORCE CONTROL**

I-49. One technique for controlling DCs in a tactical AO is to organize organic forces into a task force specifically tailored for this mission. Known generically as TF DC Control, this task force has four imperatives:

- Implement an integrated system of control.
- Help provide life saving and life sustaining care, such as oral rehydration therapy (ORT) and water.
- Help process civilians to determine their identity and status and to collect military and civil-military information.
- Transition control activities in an orderly manner.

Table I-2, pages I-17 and I-18, depicts a generic organization for TF DC control.

| **Table I-2. Generic Organization for TF DC Control** |
|-----------------|---------------------------------|-----------------|
| **Equipment**   | **GP Block/Collect Team**       | **GP Clear Team** |
| Vehicles        | MP vehicle and infantry or combat engineer vehicle, supplemented by vehicles obtained through foreign nation support. | MP vehicle. |
| Control Materials| Pepper spray (oleoresin capsicum – OC) with ultraviolet identification dye for marking individuals and heavy-duty foggers for mass dispersion.  
|                  | CS riot control agent (RCA) with means of mass dispersion, such as M203.  
|                  | Flash bangs, riot batons (and riot gear), and other crowd control equipment.  
|                  | Flex cuffs/cable ties.  | Pepper spray (oleoresin capsicum – OC) with ultraviolet identification dye for marking individuals and heavy-duty foggers for mass dispersion.  
|                  | CS riot control agent (RCA) with means of mass dispersion, such as M203.  
|                  | Flash bangs, riot batons (and riot gear), and other crowd control equipment.  |
| Care Materials   | Water/cups for thirst and RCA flushing.  
|                  | ORT mixes/ingredients.  
|                  | Emergency medical kits.  
|                  | Humanitarian rations (emergency only).  | Water/cups for thirst and RCA flushing.  
|                  | ORT mixes/ingredients.  |
Table I-2. Generic Organization for TF DC Control (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equipment</th>
<th>GP Block/Collect Team</th>
<th>GP Clear Team</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barrier Materials</td>
<td>Concertina/gloves.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information</td>
<td>Loudspeaker with approved tape-recorded messages.</td>
<td>Loudspeaker with approved tape-recorded messages.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I-50. Generic TF DC Control is a combined arms force revolving around general purpose (GP) teams of infantry with MP, PSYOP specialists, and CA specialists or CA-trained personnel. GP teams control civilians by the basic techniques of blocking, clearing, and collecting described earlier.

I-51. The basic action element for blocking and collecting is the same—a GP block/collect team of one infantry squad with organic armored vehicle (if mechanized), one MP team with organic vehicle, one tactical PSYOP team (TPT), and one tactical CA team or several CA-trained personnel. The basic action element for clearing is the GP clearing team, consisting of one MP team with organic vehicle and one TPT. TF DC Control may modify one or more GP teams based on the civil-military situation and/or its tasks, the terrain, and the assets available (for example, using an MP squad instead of an MP team as a basic building block of all GP teams and/or augmenting the teams with combat engineers).

I-52. Generic TF DC Control also has five special purpose teams, each designed to accomplish particular missions requiring special training and/or equipment:

- Negotiation team. The primary purpose of the negotiation team is to assist in intense negotiations that have a potential for creation or expansion of unrest or may result in highly adverse public perceptions beyond the battlefield. Negotiations include meetings with civil leaders, but not hostage incidents—hostage rescue and similar means of resolving a hostage situation are beyond the scope of generic TF DC Control. Instead, the goals of negotiation are to contain the incident or issue so that the populace is not adversely and unduly influenced by it and, if possible, to resolve it peacefully so that civilian lives are not unduly jeopardized and the incident does not become a focus of the local or international news media.

- Special reaction team (sniper). The primary purpose of the special reaction team (sniper) is to neutralize special threats effectively and safely as they arise in blocking, clearing, and collecting operations. Another purpose is to support the apprehension of troublemakers and ringleaders by a team assigned to snatch them from a crowd. However, apprehending a suspect in other circumstances is beyond the scope of generic TF DC Control.
• Special reaction team (armored vehicles). The primary purposes of the special reaction team (armored vehicles) are to conduct show-of-force operations (especially at road blocks), protect task force elements and any civilians in their charge, and assist the task force, as needed, to include the execution of snatch apprehensions in crowds.

• Medical care team. The primary purposes of the medical care team are to respond quickly to civilian mass casualties (MASCALs) to begin triage and coordinate further MASCAL response with the parent unit’s surgeon and medical operations center, or the equivalent, and to provide medical care above the level of emergency first aid, as needed by the task force.

• Counterintelligence (CI) team. The primary purpose of the CI team is to exploit the potential for military and civil-military information from civilians encountered by the task force. CI agents are often fluent in the primary language of the AO or come with a translator, and the task force always needs a few translators. Moreover, there is a synergy to be gained when CI and CA work together. CA, CI, and PSYOP form a strong triad within TF DC Control and for the parent JTF.

Table I-3, pages I-19 and I-20, depicts the basic equipment the various teams should have to perform their tasks.

Table I-3. Basic Equipment of GP Teams

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equipment</th>
<th>GP Block/Collect Team</th>
<th>GP Clear Team</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles</td>
<td>MP vehicle and infantry or combat engineer vehicle, supplemented by vehicles obtained through foreign nation support.</td>
<td>MP vehicle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control Materials</td>
<td>Pepper spray (OC) with ultraviolet identification dye for marking individuals and heavy-duty foggers for mass dispersion. CS RCA with means of mass dispersion, such as M203. Flash bangs, riot batons (and riot gear), and other crowd control equipment. Flex cuffs/cable ties.</td>
<td>Pepper spray (OC) with ultraviolet identification dye for marking individuals and heavy-duty foggers for mass dispersion. CS RCA with means of mass dispersion, such as M203. Flash bangs, riot batons (and riot gear), and other crowd control equipment.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table I-3. Basic Equipment of GP Teams (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equipment</th>
<th>GP Block/Collect Team</th>
<th>GP Clear Team</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Undercarriage inspection device.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barrier Materials</td>
<td>Concertina/gloves.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information</td>
<td>Loudspeaker with approved tape-recorded messages.</td>
<td>Loudspeaker with approved tape-recorded messages.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PLANNING DC CONTROL MEASURES**

I-53. The senior commander in the AO provides guidance pertaining to the designation of DC control measures. Typically, this guidance provides for bottom-up or top-down planning.

**BOTTOM-UP PLANNING**

I-54. In bottom-up planning, each subordinate unit commander selects routes for movement of DCs and tentative DC collection points within his designated unit boundaries. His staff sends this information up to the next level commander for consolidation into his DC plan. The senior commander’s staff deconflicts duplication and sends the approved plan back to subordinate commanders for implementation.

**TOP-DOWN PLANNING**

I-55. The senior commander may designate and assign specific routes and collection points to subordinate units for implementation based on METT-TC. This action does not preclude the subordinate commander from adding to the plan as he sees fit. The subordinate commander’s staff forwards additional control measures to the senior commander to allow the senior commander’s staff to refine his plan.

I-56. Whatever the planning method, commanders responsible for implementing DC control measures ensure the measures are known to all participants and, as applicable, are fully resourced for their intended purpose. Commanders also ensure those soldiers and civilians who man DC collection points, areas, and camps are trained and rehearsed to perform their duties. Figure I-4, pages I-21 through I-23, provides a sample DC plan format.
Reference: Map, series (number), (name), sheet (number and name), edition ________, (scale).
   a. Status of forces agreements in effect.
   b. Civil affairs agreements in effect.
   c. Other OPLANs or intelligence summaries.

Time zone used throughout the order: ______________________.

Task Organization: This paragraph should show any specially organized units or elements required for the execution of DC operations. (Example: liaison teams, contact teams.)

1. SITUATION:
   a. GENERAL: This should include an overall description of the DC situation with a brief description of primary causes of the problem.
   b. ENEMY: This should include an analysis of any enemy actions or capabilities as they affect the DC situation. Examples:
      (1) Enemy has chemical/nuclear capability and decontamination units have been seen in a certain area.
      (2) Enemy infiltrators have been discovered in adjacent areas posing as DCs.
   c. FRIENDLY: This will, hopefully, be an extensive paragraph describing the location, current activities, and capabilities of any friendly unit or civil organization that is supporting or could support DC operations. Examples:
      (1) Host Nation:
         (a) Police have control of all roads in area.
         (b) Civil defense organization is currently functioning to full capability and has total control in towns of ________.
         (c) Local hospitals include: (1) ________with 180 beds at vicinity (VIC). With 300 beds at VIC. ________, (2) ________ with 100 beds at VIC. ________. A shortage of Betadine is expected.
      (2) U.S. nonmilitary:
         (a) Peace Corps headquartered at VIC _________ has stored blankets and clothing for 5,000 personnel.
         (b) American Red Cross has capability to assist with medical supplies and food.
      (3) U.S. military:
         (a) DC camp operation is corps rear area at VIC _________. CA battalion is currently expanding to second camp at VIC _________.
         (b) CA company operating additional assembly area at VIC ________ for processing prior to transporting to civilian-run camps.
         (c) Transportation battalion providing transportation from division assembly to civilian DC camps.
   d. ASSUMPTIONS: This should include any pertinent assumptions made during the estimate of the situation. Examples:
      (1) Expected number of DCs.
      (2) Expected locations and directions of movements.
      (3) Expected problem areas.
      (4) Expected degree of military support required:
         (a) Medical.
         (b) Subsistence.
         (c) Transportation.
      (5) Will local government be viable entity?
      (6) Will CA agreements remain in effect?
      (7) Will there be a language communication gap?
      (8) What will the attitude of civilians be toward the U.S. efforts?

Figure I-4. Sample DC Plan Format
2. MISSION: This should state the objectives of the specific DC plan. Examples (one or more of the following):
   a. Reduce interference with military operations.
   b. Relieve destitute conditions of DCs encountered in battle area.
   c. Evacuate an area pursuant to military operations.
   d. Control disease or health problems.
   e. Be prepared to assume control of or establish more extensive DC operations in the absence of civilian participants, such as DC camps.

3. EXECUTION:
   a. Concept of operations. A general statement of intent of how the plan will be accomplished. A description of the DC flow should include collection points, routes (primary/alternate), assembly areas and, if necessary, DC camps. Hopefully, the involvement of military personnel will be minimal. If, however, any major subordinate units have missions that are key to the plan, they should be included.

   (Subordinate unit paragraph)
   These paragraphs should include assigned or be-prepared missions enumerated for each subordinate unit. Included below are some examples of missions that could be considered for assignment to subordinate units.

   b. 1st Bde: Establish collection points at VIC __________.
   c. 2nd Bde: Operate checkpoints at road junction (RJ) VIC ____________.
   d. 3rd Bde: Welfare action at collection points (water, food, medical aid).
   e. Medical battalion:
      (1) Provide two medical teams to collocate with CA teams at the assembly area VIC ____________.
      (2) Be prepared to provide additional medical support, on order.
   f. Supply and transportation battalion:
      (1) Be prepared to provide one truck squad to transport DCs.
      (2) Be prepared to provide 5,000 meals a day, on order, assembly area at VIC ____________.
   g. MP:
      (1) Maintain free-flow of traffic along main supply route.
      (2) Establish liaison through CA unit with civil police.
   h. Signal battalion: Provide wire from the assembly area at VIC ____________ to CMOC at VIC ____________.
   i. CA:
      (1) Supervise DC operations under G-5.
      (2) Maintain liaison with civilian DC operations.
   j. PSYOP: Assist CA units with printing, publishing, and language expertise.
   k. Engineers:
      (1) Clear obstacles on DC routes.
      (2) Water—transport, purify.
   l. Chaplain.
   m. Coordinating instructions: This should include any specific reports or procedures not covered in the various SOPs. Examples:
      (1) Displaced persons from ____________ should be routed to ____________ Military Intelligence Detachment for questioning.
      (2) Persons identified as city officials of ____________ should be treated as VIPs and provided transportation to the CMOC ASAP.
      (3) Traffic control: Coordinate all traffic along main supply route on traffic control net.

Figure I-4. Sample DC Plan Format (Continued)
(4) Cultural DO’s/DON’Ts: These can be identified from area studies concerning the specific area.
(5) PW handling instructions: (treatment).
(6) Disarming of civilians.
(7) Possessions allowed to be transported.
(8) Use of DCs as labor.
(9) Where is CA authority retained? (Division or delegated down to brigade).

4. SERVICE SUPPORT: This section should include a summary of resources that have been identified as necessary and assigned. Also, if any resources have been identified as critical or short, they should be mentioned.
   a. Supply: Distribution of captured enemy supplies (food, medical).
   b. Transportation: Required vehicles.
   c. Medical: Medical considerations for wounded DCs.

5. COMMAND and SIGNAL:
   a. Command:
      (Examples):
      (1) CMOC locations - grid ____________.
      (2) POCs for various agencies, police departments, and civilian officials.
      (3) POCs for major subordinate HQ.
   b. Signal:
      (Examples):
      (1) Route marking - primary route for DC movement is marked by red triangles; alternate, yellow circles.
      (2) Radio nets - DC control net is G-5 alternate net. Net control station is G-5 CMOC.

Figure I-4. Sample DC Plan Format (Continued)

DC COMMUNICATION

I-57. Persuading people to comply with the terms of a DC plan is often a difficult endeavor. HN public information programs and PSYOP assets may assist by providing mass media broadcasts, loudspeakers with prerecorded messages, signs (with culturally correct graphics), and leaflets.

I-58. The following messages, prerecorded in the dominant language of the AO, are useful for controlling civilians in tactical situations:

- Standard roadblock recording:
  - This is a roadblock.
  - For your safety, you will not be allowed to pass this point.
  - Return to your homes.

- Standard clearing recording:
  - Stay off the road. or Get out of this area.
  - If you do not comply, you will be detained or arrested.
  - Return to your homes.

- Standard recording for a DC collection point:
  - This is a civilian collection point.
You will not be harmed.

Everyone will be searched. Vehicles will be searched and parked. Some belongings may be taken from you temporarily for everyone's safety.

Water and emergency medical care will be provided to you after you have been searched.

If we take any of your belongings, you will receive a receipt. If any of your belongings for which you have a receipt are not returned to you, you will be compensated for them.

I-59. These words should also be printed in English and the predominant language of the AO on 3x5 cards which can be used to “point and talk” by number. A well-prepared DC control site will have the same words in the same order on a large sign.

I-60. There are 10 words or phrases that every soldier should be able to say in the dominant language of the AO. “Put down your weapon” and other phrases are also important, but “hands up” is a simpler way to express surrender, control, and related concepts. The ten words or phrases are—

- Go.
- Stop.
- Hands up.
- Right.
- Left.
- Stand.
- Sit.
- Yes.
- No.
- Water.

TECHNIQUES FOR DC COLLECTION POINTS

I-61. A technique for designating hasty sites to control noncombatants and other groups is the quadrant method. By this method, each quadrant of a crossroads may be designated for a likely group or purpose, as depicted in Figure I-5, page I-25. In this example, West is designated as a hasty collection point (CIV); Northeast is designated as a hasty EPW or detainee (DET) site; Southeast is designated as a hasty casualty collection point (CCP); and Southwest as a multipurpose quadrant for maintenance, supplies, and other purposes.
Figure I-5. Designation of Hasty Control Sites by Quadrant

I-62. Each control point is located 50 to 100 meters from the roads to keep the groups sufficiently separated. This distance improves the safety and security of each group, minimizes manpower requirements, and reduces potential for terrorism by keeping people a reasonable distance from passing troops. Prior training and rudimentary supplies, including water cans or water bottles and large quantities of chemical lights, facilitate the day and night operation of a hasty DC collection point.

I-63. Upon activation of a hasty DC collection point, designated personnel transform the site into a deliberate DC collection point. There are five key tasks that must be accomplished at a deliberate DC collection point. These tasks are illustrated in Figure I-6, page I-26, and explained in detail in the following paragraphs.

LOCAL SECURITY

I-64. The collection point should be located so that DCs will not suffer any greater exposure to the effects of combat than would exist for them away from the collection point. Local security should be established to protect the occupants, persons operating the collection point, and friendly troops adjacent to or passing by the collection point. Guards should be posted at the entrance and exit of the collection point and given special orders, as required.
PHYSICAL SECURITY WITHIN THE COLLECTION POINT, TO INCLUDE VEHICLE SEARCH AND DC SEARCH

I-65. This task requires setting up special purpose areas within the collection point and following certain procedures. CA personnel—

- Ensure that all private autos, public conveyances, and the like (including livestock and carts) are parked outside or on the fringes of the collection point in the vehicle search area until they have been searched, and make all passengers dismount.
- Direct passengers to the DC search area.
- Make the driver remain with the vehicle until it is searched. Designated personnel search the vehicle. If an undercarriage observation device is available, it is used. When the search is over, the driver and the searchers together move the vehicle, livestock, or cart to the vehicle hold area.

I-66. Many vehicles will contain household goods, suitcases, and other items. These vehicles should be searched for bombs and other dangerous items if the vehicle holding area is within 50 meters of the people holding
area. Searching for contraband is not standard procedure, but it may be mandatory under the OPORD or if given special orders. Searchers inform the driver that once the vehicle is searched, it will be secured and placed off limits so that no DC will be allowed to retrieve any of the items in the vehicle. Searchers communicate as described above. Searchers treat livestock as vehicles, and treat pets as livestock if this does not create more problems than it avoids. A searcher then escorts the driver to the DC search area. Designated personnel—

- Search DCs and their belongings for prohibited items.
- Vary search methods. A quick pat down is used for some people. A more invasive search is done for others. If a handheld metal detector is available, it should be used to expedite the searches. Any property taken under the searcher’s control should be tagged and a copy given to the owner. A Field Property Control Card should be used, as well as an Explanation Card, as necessary.
- Always use trained personnel to perform searches. If possible, females are used to search females, infants, and little boys. If a female searcher is not at the collection point but is close enough to get there in a reasonable time, these searches are deferred until she arrives. The unsearched people are set aside until then so that they do not pose a clear and present potential danger to others. If a female searcher cannot be obtained, a trained male searcher should do the search using the back of the hand technique if its use is not contrary to orders and special security concerns require a search.
- Always use a searcher (unarmed) and an over watcher (armed). They must be trained in these skills and to work together.

DC PROCESSING AND PROPERTY CONTROL

I-67. This part of operating a deliberate DC collection point may be deferred for a while, but full waiver is not advisable as a general practice. DC processing consists of two stages. All persons go through stage one. Stage two may be deferred or delayed, reserved for certain people, or not take place at all.

Stage One Processing

I-68. This is the quick screen to identify EPWs and others (civilian internees and detainees) that must be segregated immediately from everyone else. This processing may be done without a translator. Searchers should beware of irregulars and infiltrators trying to pass as civilians. Upon discovery, all EPWs, civilian internees, and detainees are placed in the short-term detainee holding area. Normally, anyone who is causing a problem at the collection point is detained. Although civilian internees and detainees should be further segregated from EPWs, rarely is the time or resources available to do this.

I-69. Consistent with orders, searchers take control of all items that may cause harm to the team, friendly forces passing the collection point, or the DCs. In addition, searchers confiscate and tag all items that noncombatants are not permitted to have according to U.S. or HN policy.

I-70. If available, a Field Property Control Card is affixed to the vehicle or animal. The Field Property Control Card contains, at a minimum, the following
information: the DC collection point number, the date, the seized item quantity, the seized item description, and a signature block for the collection point officer in charge (OIC) or NCOIC. A copy is given to the driver.

Stage Two Processing

I-71. This stage is intended to help more finely categorize DCs (for example, determining if anyone is a U.S. citizen), to reunite families within the collection point, to identify persons of influence, and to obtain information (from equipment, weapons, papers, and discussions) that may have intelligence value. This processing is done when the time and resources are available—it is not a high priority. A translator is almost always required.

LIMITED SERVICES (FOOD, WATER, SHELTER, AND SANITATION)

I-72. Services at a DC collection point may range from immediate care (attention to life-threatening conditions) to ancillary care (including food), depending on need and resources. However, only water and immediate medical care, to the extent they are emergency services provided consistent with the legal and moral obligations of the commander, are mandatory. Services are not provided to a DC until after he has undergone the quick-screen stage of processing, except for emergency care needed to prevent loss of life (death imminent). CA personnel should—

- Treat life-threatening emergencies, such as first aid for traumatic injuries and ORT for dehydrated infants.
- Provide water as a preventive measure if an adequate supply is available for this purpose.
- Allow occupants to relieve themselves. CA personnel should provide one place for males and one for females and basic equipment (such as shovels and latrine screen expedients) to permit and encourage the occupants themselves to prepare rudimentary sanitation facilities (slit trenches). Occupants must be supervised.
- Give out food only to occupants who have been at the collection point 24 hours or more. Food handed out more generously can become a “pull factor.” Also, CA personnel should be aware that certain meal, ready to eat (MRE) items may be forbidden or inappropriate by religion or culture, or too rich for malnourished people and cause immediate sickness. (Yellow-packaged international humanitarian rations are safe.)
- Provide other services consistent with the commander’s legal, moral, and mission-specific obligations and requirements.

I-73. The following historical example discusses sanitation and is taken from notes of a CA soldier who served in Operation DESERT STORM.
Lesson Learned During Operation DESERT STORM

When disposing of waste, the burning procedure used in Vietnam would not work because the Moslem population has the habit of cleaning themselves with water. Therefore, instead of waste, there was a high level of water or waste liquid. This material would not burn. Consequently, it was recommended to have a deep hole where the waste could be disposed of and allowed to dry out. This was usually followed by burning or burial.

RESOLUTION OR DISPOSITION OF EACH DC

I-74. Once a DC collection point is operational, there are four possible outcomes for the collection point operators:

- Retain control of the collection point, recognizing that moral obligations to DCs at the collection point increase with time.
- Close down the collection point by releasing the DCs from it, if warranted by the tactical situation and other factors.
- Arrange for movement of the DCs to another holding area, such as a civilian assembly area.
- Hand off collection point operations to other operators (such as a support unit or the HN), which is the mostly likely outcome for infantry units on the move.

DC COLLECTION POINT HANDBOFF

I-75. As a unit moves out of an area, it must be prepared to hand off (transition) any active DC collection point to follow-on forces. Ideally, these forces will include trained CA operators; however, they may not. In either case, the outgoing unit must be prepared to fully brief the follow-on forces on the operation of the collection point.

Briefing

I-76. The DC collection point OIC/NCOIC should personally brief the OIC/NCOIC of follow-on forces. He should note the date-time group of the handoff; the name, rank, and position of the person to whom the handoff was made; and a summary of the information provided. The transition briefing should cover—

- EPWs.
- U.S., allied, and coalition soldiers.
- Civilian internees and detainees.
- Civilians who are U.S. citizens or contractors.
- Civilians who may be useful as centers of influence.
- The tactical situation and intelligence (or unprocessed information) as they concern threats to the DC collection point.
- Medical emergencies.
- Controlled property.
- Any special, additional information peculiar to the DC collection point.
Controlled Property

I-77. Units have several disposition options for controlled property. Depending on the property category, units may retain control of it, return it to the persons from which it was taken, do a combination of all three, or hand it over to other forces or agencies (such as local law enforcement or follow-on forces taking control of the DC collection point). Unit commanders act according to their moral and legal obligations, weighing the advantages and disadvantages of each option.

I-78. Transferring Control. To transfer control of this property, units must fill out a property control register listing all the items controlled and have an official of the follow-on forces sign for the items and a copy of the register itself by using DA Form 3161, Request for Issue or Turn-In.

I-79. Retaining Control. If units take the property with them (it must be taken if no one will sign for it and return is not an option), they should give the owner an official receipt (such as DA Form 3161), explain the unit’s intention for the property, and explain the owner’s rights and procedure requirements for compensation. This reiteration of rights is intended to reassure the owners and may be needed to ensure a smooth handoff.

EVACUATION PLANNING

I-80. Evacuation creates serious problems and should only be considered as a last resort. U.S. doctrine states that only a division or higher commander can order an evacuation. When the decision is made to evacuate a community, CA planners must make detailed plans to prevent uncontrolled groups from disrupting the movement of military units and supplies. Considerations in mass evacuation planning include—

- Transportation. CA planners plan for the maximum use of civilian transportation.
- Security. CA personnel help the G-2 in security screening and documentation of evacuees. Since the civilians are being removed from the area where they can best take care of themselves, the military provides security for them after evacuation. The military also provides for the security of all civilian property left behind, including farm animals, pets, and other possessions.
- Documentation. In some circumstances, evacuees may need identification documents showing, as a minimum, the name and locality from which they were evacuated. As a control technique, CA personnel may prepare a manifest that lists evacuees for movement.
- Briefing. Before movement, the movement control officer briefs evacuees. The briefer uses leaflets, loudspeakers, posters, or other means available. This briefing explains the details of the move, such as restrictions on personal belongings, organization for movement, and movement schedules.
- Rations. For a movement lasting no more than 2 days, supply personnel issue rations to each evacuee at the time of departure or at designated points en route.
• Health care. The public health team makes maximum use of civilian medical personnel, equipment, and supplies to care for the health and physical well-being of the evacuees. Military medical personnel, equipment, and supplies can be used as supplements, if necessary. The public health team or surgeon’s staff takes proper steps before the movement to prevent the spread of infectious diseases.

• Return. Evacuation plans also provide for the evacuees’ eventual return and criteria for determining the duration of their absence.

**DC CAMP CONSIDERATIONS**

I-81. Successful camp operations depend upon many considerations that CA personnel must take into account. These considerations are discussed in the following paragraphs.

**FACILITIES**

I-82. When large groups of civilians must be quartered for a temporary period (less than 6 months) or on a semipermanent basis (more than 6 months), CA units establish camps. HN personnel usually direct the administration and operation of a camp. CA units provide technical advice, support, and assistance, depending on the requirements. They may also furnish additional detachments and functional teams or specialists to resolve public health, public welfare, or public safety problems at any particular camp. Minimum considerations include—

• Camp control, construction, administration, screening, medical care, and sanitation.

• Security.

• Supply.

• Transportation.

• Information dissemination.

• Liaison with other agencies.

**CAMP CONTROL**

I-83. Control of the people is the key to successful camp operations. To meet U.S. obligations under international law, CA personnel ensure the efficient and effective administration of camps. Camp control also includes measures to reduce waste and to avoid duplication of effort. CA personnel must quickly and fairly establish and maintain discipline when administering DC camps. They must publish and enforce rules of conduct for the camp as necessary. Camp administrators serve as the single point of contact, coordinating all camp matters within the camp and with outside organizations or agencies. Camp rules should be brief and kept to a minimum.

**DC CAMP LOCATION AND CONSTRUCTION**

I-84. The most manageable number of people in a camp is 5,000. This number helps enforce control measures. It also lets CA personnel efficiently administer the camp and its population. The location of the camp is extremely important. Engineer support and military construction materials
I-32. Camp personnel must avoid those sites near vital communication centers, large military installations, or other potential military targets. The location of the camp also depends on the availability of food, water, power, and waste disposal. Additional considerations include the susceptibility of the area to natural or man-made disasters (for example, flooding, pollution, and fire) and the use of camp personnel as a source of local labor support.

I-85. The physical layout of the camp is important. The main principle is to subdivide the camp into sections or separate compounds to ease administration and camp tension. Each section can serve as an administrative subunit for transacting camp business. The major sections normally include camp HQ, hospital, mess, and sleeping areas. The sleeping areas must be further subdivided into separate areas for unaccompanied children, unattached females, families, and unattached males. CA personnel must also consider cultural and religious practices and make every effort to keep families together.

I-86. CA personnel must also consider the type of construction. Specific types of construction necessary to satisfy the needs of the particular DC operation vary according to the—

- Local climate.
- Anticipated permanency of the camp.
- Number of camps to be constructed.
- Availability of local materials.
- Extent of available military resources and assistance.

I-87. Whenever possible, the DCs themselves or local agencies or government employees should construct the camp. Local sources provide materials whenever possible IAW legal limitations. The supporting command's logistics and transportation assets are used to acquire and transport required resources to build or modify existing facilities for DC operations. The supporting command also furnishes medical, dining, and other supporting assets to establish DC camps.

**ADMINISTRATION OF DC CAMPS**

I-88. Because of the large numbers of DCs for whom control and care must be provided, using HN civilians as cadre for the camp administration is preferred. DCs should become involved in the administration of the camp. Past military experience in DC operations shows that about 6 percent of the total number of DCs should be employed on a full-time basis. If possible, CA personnel organize and train the cadre before the camp opens. Whenever possible, civilians should come from public and private welfare organizations and be under military supervision. Other concerns are problems that might stem from the state of mind of the DCs. The difficulties they have experienced may affect their acceptance of authority. They may have little initiative or may be uncooperative because of an uncertain future. They may be angry because of their losses, or they may resort to looting and general
lawlessness because of their destitution. The camp administrator can minimize difficulties through careful administration and by—

- Maintaining different national and cultural groups in separate camps or sections of a camp.
- Keeping families together while separating unaccompanied males, females, and children under the age of 18 (or abiding by the laws of the HN as to when a child becomes an adult).
- Furnishing necessary information on the status and future of DCs.
- Allowing DCs to speak freely to camp officials.
- Involving the DCs in camp administration, work, and recreation.
- Quickly establishing contact with agencies for aid and family reunification.

SCREENING

I-89. Screening is necessary to prevent infiltration of camps by insurgents, enemy agents, or escaping members of the hostile armed forces. Although intelligence or other types of units may screen DCs at first, friendly and reliable local civilians under the supervision of CA personnel can perform this function. They must carefully apply administrative controls to prevent infiltration and preclude alienation of people who are sympathetic to U.S. objectives. The insertion or the development of reliable informants is important in all but the most temporary camps. Intelligence collection by CA personnel is under the staff supervision of the G-2. The screening process also identifies skilled technicians and professional specialists to help in camp administration—for example, policemen, schoolteachers, doctors, dentists, nurses, lawyers, mechanics, carpenters, and cooks.

MEDICAL CARE AND SANITATION

I-90. The need for medical care and sanitation intensifies in camp environments because of the temporary nature of the facilities and the lack of sanitation by the people. Enforcement and education measures are necessary to ensure that the camp population complies with basic sanitation measures.

SUPPLY

I-91. The camp supply officer or CA civilian supply specialist must coordinate in advance for food, water, clothing, fuel, portable shelter, and medical supplies. CA supply personnel must make sure U.S. medical personnel inspect all food and water, particularly civilian and captured stocks. USAID and security assistance officers (SAOs) can be helpful in U.S. efforts to provide aid to the country. International organizations and NGOs may also be useful. Support from U.S. military stocks should only be considered as a last resort, however, and CA supply personnel should not rely upon that support.

SECURITY

I-92. The camp security officer, supervised by the public safety team, provides camp security and enforces law, order, and discipline. Sources for security officers include local police forces, HN paramilitary or military
forces, and U.S. military forces. Another potential source may be the camp population itself. Police personnel within the population could supplement security teams or constitute a special camp police force, if necessary. Internal and external patrols are necessary; however, security for a DC facility should not give the impression that the facility is a prison.

TRANSPORTATION

I-93. The efficient administration of a DC camp requires adequate transportation assets. The camp movement officer or CA transportation specialist determines the types and numbers of vehicles required and makes provisions to have them on hand. He uses civilian or captured enemy vehicles whenever possible.

INFORMATION DISSEMINATION

I-94. In the administration of any type of camp, dissemination of instructions and information to the camp population is vital. Communications may be in the form of notices on bulletin boards, posters, public address systems, loudspeakers, camp meetings and assemblies, or a camp radio station. An example of barracks rules is shown in Figure I-7, page I-35. CA civil information teams and area PSYOP units may be able to help.

LIAISON

I-95. Liaison involves coordination with all interested agencies. USG and military authorities, allied liaison officers, and representatives of local governments and international agencies may help in relief and assistance operations.

DISPOSITION

I-96. The final step in DC operations involves the ultimate disposition of the DCs, although this consideration must occur early in the planning phase. The most desired disposition is to return them to their homes. Allowing DCs to return to their homes as quickly as tactical considerations permit lessens the burden for support on the military and the civilian economy. It also lessens the danger of diseases common among people in confined areas. When DCs return to their homes, they can help restore their towns and can better contribute to their own support. If DCs cannot return to their homes, they may resettle elsewhere in their country or in a country that accepts them. Guidance on the disposition of DCs must come from higher authority, under coordination with U.S. forces, national authorities, and international agencies.
## Barracks Rules

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rule</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Do not move from assigned barracks without permission. NOTE: Area teams assign individuals to the designated barracks. Only the U.S. center's administrative staff can change barracks assignments. Occupants desiring to change barracks must request permission from the area office.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Maintain the sanitary and physical condition of the barracks. NOTE: Barracks chiefs organize occupants to perform these tasks.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Empty and wash trash cans daily. NOTE: Put the trash into the trash receptacles (dumpsters) in the barracks area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Do not bring food or cooking utensils into the barracks. Do not take food from the mess halls (other than baby food and fruit).</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Do not have weapons of any kind in the barracks and in the surrounding camp.</td>
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<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Do not have pets in the camp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Observe barracks lights-out time of 2300. Barracks indoor lights will be turned out at 2300 each night. Do not play radios, record players, or tape recorders after 2300.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Do not allow children to play on the fire escape. NOTE: This practice is very dangerous.</td>
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<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Watch children carefully and do not allow them to wander out of the residence areas.</td>
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<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Do not throw diapers and sanitary napkins into the toilets. Place these items into trash cans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Do not allow children to chase or play with wild animals, as these animals may bite and carry diseases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Obtain necessary barracks supplies from the barracks chief.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Do not smoke, use electrical appliances for heating or cooking, or have open fires in the barracks.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: These barracks rules are similar to the ones used in August 1975 at Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania, in support of Operation NEW ARRIVALS. They also parallel the rules posted in support of Panama's Operations JUST CAUSE and PROMOTE LIBERTY.

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**ORAL REHYDRATION THERAPY**

I-97. Death from dehydration (extreme loss of fluids), especially of infants, the elderly, and the sick or injured, is a constant threat in war and MOOTW. People tend to experience extreme loss of fluids from diarrhea, bleeding, and hot weather. CA soldiers must be aware of this threat and be prepared to respond to it effectively, especially when operating a DC collection point.

I-98. Soldiers operating a DC collection point must be especially aware of—

- Infants.
- Nursing mothers.
- Very thin people with sallow eyes.
• Persons who are heavily bandaged.
• Persons on litters.
• The elderly.

I-99. People suffering from dehydration require more than just water. Soldiers should consider the following information when providing oral rehydration:

• World Health Organization ORT formula:
  ▪ 1 quart water.
  ▪ 3.5 grams of sodium chloride (table salt).
  ▪ 2.5 grams of sodium bicarbonate (Arm & Hammer).
  ▪ 1.5 grams of potassium chloride (Lite Salt).
  ▪ 20 grams of sugar.

• U.S. military field expedients for ORT:
  ▪ MRE salt pack = 4 grams of table salt.
  ▪ MRE beverage base pack = 32 grams of sugar.
  ▪ MRE cocoa pack = 1.4 grams of potassium.

• Water is most important, then salt, then potassium, then sugar.
  ▪ Water and salt alone are okay in a pinch.
  ▪ In extreme cases, do not “load up” the patient with fluids, especially if the water is cold; the patient could vomit and lose even more fluid. Small amounts of room temperature water should be given frequently.
  ▪ Babies will want to suck (not drink) the formula. Ice chips or a wet, porous rag should be used.
  ▪ Dehydration causes the blood pressure to be low. The patient should get in the shade with feet up, if possible.
  ▪ Pedia-Lite is a brand name ready-mix ORT formula for infants.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Abbreviation</strong></th>
<th><strong>Description</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>airborne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAR</td>
<td>after-action report</td>
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<tr>
<td>ABCS</td>
<td>Army Battle Command System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABW</td>
<td>air base wing</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACE</td>
<td>ammunition/casualties/equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACMREQ</td>
<td>airspace control means support request</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACO</td>
<td>air control order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACofS</td>
<td>Assistant Chief of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD3E</td>
<td>assess, decide, develop and detect, deliver, and evaluate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADCoord</td>
<td>air defense coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>admin</td>
<td>administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADP</td>
<td>automated data processing</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADSO</td>
<td>assistant division signal officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADSW</td>
<td>active duty for special work</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADVON</td>
<td>advanced echelon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFATDS</td>
<td>Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFFOR</td>
<td>Air Force Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFSOF</td>
<td>Air Force special operations forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AG</td>
<td>adjutant general</td>
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<tr>
<td>agri</td>
<td>agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AI</td>
<td>Amnesty International</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIRSUPREQ</td>
<td>air support request</td>
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<tr>
<td>ALCON</td>
<td>all concerned</td>
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<tr>
<td>ALO</td>
<td>air liaison officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMC</td>
<td>Air Mobility Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>ammo</td>
<td>ammunition</td>
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<tr>
<td>AND</td>
<td>activity network diagram</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANDVT</td>
<td>advanced narrowband digital voice terminal</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANG</td>
<td>Air National Guard</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANGLICO</td>
<td>Air Navy Gunfire Liaison Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>AO</td>
<td>area of operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>area of responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AR</td>
<td>Army regulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>American (National) Red Cross</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARFOR</td>
<td>Army forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARNG</td>
<td>Army National Guard</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARSOA</td>
<td>Army special operations aviation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARSOF</td>
<td>Army special operations forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASAP</td>
<td>as soon as possible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASAS-RWS</td>
<td>All-Source Analysis System–Remote Work Station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASD</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASD(ISA)</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASD(SO/LIC)</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASG</td>
<td>area support group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASR</td>
<td>alternate supply route</td>
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<td>asst</td>
<td>assistant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AST</td>
<td>administrative support team</td>
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<tr>
<td>AT</td>
<td>antiterrorism; antitank</td>
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<tr>
<td>ATCCS</td>
<td>Army Tactical Command and Control System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATF</td>
<td>Anti-Taliban Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVCOORD</td>
<td>aviation coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCOC</td>
<td>base cluster operations center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCTP</td>
<td>battle command training program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BDA</td>
<td>battle damage assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BDE</td>
<td>brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BDU</td>
<td>battle dress uniform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BN</td>
<td>battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOS</td>
<td>battlefield operating system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BP</td>
<td>battle position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUB</td>
<td>battle update briefing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Confidential; confiscation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>command and control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2OTM</td>
<td>command and control on the move</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>--------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2W</td>
<td>command and control warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3</td>
<td>command, control, and communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C4I</td>
<td>command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C4ISR</td>
<td>command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Civil Affairs—Designated Active and Reserve component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs activities and to support civil-military operations. (J P 1-02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CACOM</td>
<td>Civil Affairs Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CADST</td>
<td>Civil Affairs direct support team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CALL</td>
<td>Center for Army Lessons Learned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAP3T</td>
<td>Civil Affairs plans, programs, and policy team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPT-A</td>
<td>Civil Affairs planning team A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPT-B</td>
<td>Civil Affairs planning team B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CASCOPE</td>
<td>civil areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAT-A</td>
<td>Civil Affairs team A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAT-B</td>
<td>Civil Affairs team B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAT-C</td>
<td>Civil Affairs team C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CATHST</td>
<td>Civil Affairs headquarters support team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBS</td>
<td>Camp Bondsteel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBT</td>
<td>combat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCIR</td>
<td>commander's critical information requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCP</td>
<td>casualty collection point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-day</td>
<td>unnamed day on which a deployment operation begins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDR</td>
<td>commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CE</td>
<td>communications-electronics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEM</td>
<td>comprehensive emergency management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFLCC</td>
<td>Coalition Forces Land Component Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHLC</td>
<td>Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CI</td>
<td>counterintelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>civil-military cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIN</td>
<td>cargo increment number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIV</td>
<td>civilian; dislocated civilian collection point (on operational graphics)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJ CS</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJ CMOTF</td>
<td>Combined Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJ TF</td>
<td>combined joint task force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CL</td>
<td>control lines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMDT</td>
<td>commandant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMO</td>
<td>civil-military operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMOC</td>
<td>civil-military operations center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMR</td>
<td>crude mortality rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMTC</td>
<td>combat maneuver training center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNR</td>
<td>combat net radio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>co</td>
<td>company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COA</td>
<td>course of action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COB</td>
<td>close of business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COE</td>
<td>common operating environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CofS</td>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMJ SOTF</td>
<td>Commander, Joint Special Operations Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>comm</td>
<td>communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMSEC</td>
<td>communications security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONEX</td>
<td>container express</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONOPS</td>
<td>concept of operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONPLAN</td>
<td>concept plan; operation plan in concept format</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONUS</td>
<td>continental United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COP</td>
<td>common operational picture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COR</td>
<td>common operational response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COSCOM</td>
<td>corps support command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP</td>
<td>command post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPG</td>
<td>Contingency Planning Guidance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPO</td>
<td>civilian personnel officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>captain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CR</td>
<td>control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CROP</td>
<td>common relevant operational picture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C&amp;S</td>
<td>command and staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSM</td>
<td>command sergeant major</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSS</td>
<td>combat service support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSSCS</td>
<td>Combat Service Support Control System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTP</td>
<td>common tactical picture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>destruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Department of the Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAG</td>
<td>DPRE Action Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DART</td>
<td>disaster assistance response team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAG(H&amp;RA)</td>
<td>Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Humanitarian and Refugee Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC</td>
<td>dislocated civilian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCRS</td>
<td>dislocated civilian road space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCSOPS</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D-day</td>
<td>unnamed day on which operations commence or are scheduled to commence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>det</td>
<td>detainee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>devel</td>
<td>development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFAC</td>
<td>dining facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHHS</td>
<td>Department of Health and Human Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIA</td>
<td>Defense Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIME</td>
<td>Diplomatic Information Military and Economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIRLAUTH</td>
<td><strong>direct liaison authorized</strong>—That authority granted by a commander (any level) to a subordinate to directly consult or coordinate an action with a command or agency within or outside of the granting command. Direct liaison authorized is more applicable to planning than operations and always carries with it the requirement of keeping the commander granting direct liaison authorized informed. Direct liaison authorized is a coordination relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised. (J P 1-02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISA</td>
<td>Defense Information Systems Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISCOM</td>
<td>Division Support Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISN</td>
<td>Defense Information Systems Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>div</td>
<td>division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLA</td>
<td>Defense Logistics Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DNVT</td>
<td>digital nonsecure voice terminal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
DODD  Department of Defense Directive
DOJ  Department of Justice
DOS  Department of State
DPRE  Displaced Persons, Refugees, and Evacuees
DS  **direct support**—A mission requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to answer directly to the supported force’s request for assistance. (J P 1-02)
DSO  domestic support operations
DTG  date-time group
DTLOMS  doctrine, training, leader development, organizational design, material, and soldier systems
DTO  division transportation office
DVT/DA  digital voice terminal with data adapter
DZ  drop zone
EAC  echelons above corps
EAD  earliest arrival date
EAG  Economic Action Group
EALT  earliest anticipated launch time
EEFI  essential elements of friendly information
E-mail  electronic mail
EMPRS  En Route Mission Planning and Rehearsal System
EN  engineer
ENCOORD  engineer coordinator
envir  environmental
EOA  equal opportunity advisor
EOC  emergency operations center
EOD  explosive ordnance disposal
EPLRS  Enhanced Position Location Reporting System
EPW  enemy prisoner of war
EWO  electronic warfare officer
EXORD  execute order
EXTAL  extra time allowance
FAADC3  Forward Area Air Defense Command, Control, and Communications
FANS  friendly or allied nation support
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FAX</td>
<td>facsimile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBCB2</td>
<td>Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEBA</td>
<td>forward edge of battle area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEMA</td>
<td>Federal Emergency Management Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FFIR</td>
<td>friendly force information requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIRESCOPE</td>
<td>Firefighting Resources of California Organized for Potential Emergencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM</td>
<td>field manual; frequency modulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FNS</td>
<td>foreign nation support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOB</td>
<td>forward operational base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FORSCOM</td>
<td>United States Army Forces Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOUO</td>
<td>For Official Use Only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FP</td>
<td>force protection—Security program designed to protect Service members, civilian employees, family members, facilities, and equipment, in all locations and situations, accomplished through planned and integrated application of combatting terrorism, physical security, operations security, and personal protective services, and supported by intelligence, counterintelligence, and other security programs. (JP 1-02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPCON</td>
<td>force protection condition</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRAG</td>
<td>fragmentary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSCoord</td>
<td>fire support coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSN</td>
<td>federal stock number</td>
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<tr>
<td>G-1</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-2</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-3</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-4</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-5</td>
<td>Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-6</td>
<td>Chief Information Officer/Director, Information Systems for Command, Control, Communications, and Computers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gal</td>
<td>gallon(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCCS-A</td>
<td>Global Command and Control System - Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCSS</td>
<td>Global Combat Support System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIG</td>
<td>global information grid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIS</td>
<td>geographic information system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GP</td>
<td>general purpose</td>
</tr>
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</table>
GPS  global positioning satellite
GS  general support—That support which is given to the supported force as a whole and not to any particular subdivision thereof. (JP 1-02)
GSR  general support reinforcing
GTN  Global Transportation Network
h  hour
HA  humanitarian assistance
HACC  Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center
HARB  Humanitarian Assistance Review Board
HAZMAT  hazardous materials
HCA  humanitarian and civic assistance—Assistance to the local populace provided by predominantly US forces in conjunction with military operations and exercises. This assistance is specifically authorized by title 10, United States Code, section 401, and funded under separate authorities. Assistance provided under these provisions is limited to (1) medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas of a country; (2) construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems; (3) well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities; and (4) rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities. Assistance must fulfill unit training requirements that incidentally create humanitarian benefit to the local populace. (JP 1-02)
HF  high frequency
HHC  headquarters and headquarters company
HMA  humanitarian mine action
HMMWV  high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle
HN  host nation
HNS  host-nation support
HOC  Humanitarian Operations Center
HQ  headquarters
IA  information assurance
IAD  immediate action drill
IAW  in accordance with
IC  international community
ICG  International Crisis Group
ICRC  International Committee of the Red Cross
ICS  incident command system
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IDP</th>
<th>internally displaced person</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IFOR</td>
<td>Implementation Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFRC</td>
<td>International Federation of the Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IG</td>
<td>inspector general</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMO</td>
<td>information management officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INFOSEC</td>
<td>information security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INS</td>
<td>Immigration and Naturalization Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERFET</td>
<td>International Forces for East Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>information operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOWG</td>
<td>Information Operations Working Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPB</td>
<td>intelligence preparation of the battlespace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRC</td>
<td>International Rescue Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRO</td>
<td>international relief organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISB</td>
<td>intermediate staging base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISS</td>
<td>information systems security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-1</td>
<td>Manpower and Personnel Directorate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-2</td>
<td>Intelligence Directorate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-3</td>
<td>Operations Directorate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-4</td>
<td>Logistics Directorate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-5</td>
<td>Plans Directorate of a joint staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-6</td>
<td>Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems Directorate</td>
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<tr>
<td>J-7</td>
<td>Operational Plans and Joint Force Development Directorate, Joint Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JA/ATT</td>
<td>Joint Airborne/Air Transportability Training</td>
</tr>
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<td>JAG</td>
<td>Judge Advocate General</td>
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<tr>
<td>J CMEB</td>
<td>joint civil-military engineering board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J CMOTF</td>
<td>joint civil-military operations task force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J CS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J EMB</td>
<td>joint environmental management board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J EMP</td>
<td>joint exercise management package</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J EMPRS</td>
<td>Joint En Route Mission Planning and Rehearsal System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J FC</td>
<td>joint force commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J FLCC</td>
<td>joint force land component commander</td>
</tr>
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</table>
J FSC  Joint Forces Staff College
J FSOCC  joint force special operations component commander
J FUB  Joint Facilities Utilization Board
J IOC  Joint Information Operations Center
J OA  joint operations area
J OC  joint operations center
J OPES  Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
J P  joint publication
J PEC  joint planning and execution community
J PG  joint planning group
J RTC  joint readiness training center
J SC  Joint Security Council
J SCP  Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
J SOA  joint special operations area
J SOTF  joint special operations task force
J TCB  joint targeting coordination board
J TF  joint task force—A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an existing joint task force commander. (JP 1-02)
J ULLS  Joint Universal Lessons Learned System
J VA  Joint Voluntary Agency
J WAC  Joint Warfare Analysis Center
KATUSA  Korean Augmentation to the United States Army
Kcal  kilocalories
KDG  Kosovo Development Group
KFOR  Kosovo Force
KLA  Kosovo Liberation Army
km  kilometer(s)
KPF  Kosovo Protection Force
K-Serb  Kosovo Serbian
LAD  latest arrival date
LAN  local area network
LBE  load-bearing equipment
LC  line of contact
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LCE</td>
<td>liaison/coordination element</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDK</td>
<td>Lidhja Demokraticke e Kosoves (Democratic League of Kosovo)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LD</td>
<td>line of departure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LFA</td>
<td>lead federal agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LNO</td>
<td>liaison officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOC</td>
<td>logistics operations center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOG</td>
<td>logistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOI</td>
<td>letter of instruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRP</td>
<td>logistics release point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSCR</td>
<td>laundry, shower, and clothing repair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>lieutenant colonel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LZ</td>
<td>landing zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MA</td>
<td>Municipal Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>major</td>
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<tr>
<td>MARFOR</td>
<td>Marine Corps forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARKS</td>
<td>Modern Army Recordkeeping System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASCAL</td>
<td>mass casualty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MB</td>
<td>main body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MBITR</td>
<td>Multi-Band Inter/Intra Team Radio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCA</td>
<td>military civic action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCLLS</td>
<td>Marine Corps Lessons Learned System</td>
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<tr>
<td>MCP</td>
<td>maintenance collection point</td>
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<td>MCRP</td>
<td>Marine Corps reference publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCS</td>
<td>Maneuver Control System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDA</td>
<td>MSE data adapter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDMP</td>
<td>military decision-making process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MED</td>
<td>medical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDEVAC</td>
<td>medical evacuation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDRETE</td>
<td>medical readiness training exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>METL</td>
<td>mission-essential task list</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>METT-TC</td>
<td>mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available—time available, and civil considerations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mgt</td>
<td>management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MICON</td>
<td>mission concept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>mil</td>
<td>military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNB</td>
<td>Multinational Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNB(E)</td>
<td>Multinational Brigade (East)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNC</td>
<td>multinational corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOA</td>
<td>memorandum of agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOE</td>
<td>measure of effectiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOOTW</td>
<td>military operations other than war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOU</td>
<td>memorandum of understanding</td>
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<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>military police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPA</td>
<td>mission planning agent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPF</td>
<td>mission planning folder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mph</td>
<td>miles per hour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRE</td>
<td>meal, ready to eat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSC</td>
<td>major subordinate command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSE</td>
<td>mobile subscriber equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSG</td>
<td>master sergeant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSR</td>
<td>mission support request</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTMC</td>
<td>Military Traffic Management Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTON</td>
<td>measurement ton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTS</td>
<td>Movement Tracking System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTW</td>
<td>major theater war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MWR</td>
<td>morale, welfare, and recreation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>not applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NACLC</td>
<td>national agency checks with local agency and credit checks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAI</td>
<td>named area of interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>natl</td>
<td>national</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NAVFOR</td>
<td>Navy forces</td>
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<td>nuclear, biological, and chemical</td>
</tr>
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<td>NC</td>
<td>North Carolina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>noncommissioned officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCOER</td>
<td>noncommissioned officer evaluation report</td>
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<td>NCOIC</td>
<td>noncommissioned officer in charge</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEO</td>
<td>noncombatant evacuation operation</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>NG</td>
<td>National Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>nongovernmental organization&lt;br&gt;— Transnational organizations of private citizens that maintain a consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. Nongovernmental organizations may be professional associations, foundations, multinational businesses, or simply groups with a common interest in humanitarian assistance activities (development and relief). “Nongovernmental organizations” is a term normally used by non-United States organizations. (JP 1-02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIIMS</td>
<td>National Interagency Incident Management System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIMA</td>
<td>National Imagery and Mapping Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NLT</td>
<td>not later than</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMS</td>
<td>national military strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORDPOL</td>
<td>Nordic Polish Battle Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSA</td>
<td>National Security Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSC/DC</td>
<td>National Security Council Deputies Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSC/PC</td>
<td>National Security Council Principals Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSC/PCC</td>
<td>National Security Council Policy Coordination Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSCS</td>
<td>National Security Council System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSN</td>
<td>National Stock Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSPD</td>
<td>National Security Presidential Directive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSS</td>
<td>national security strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSW</td>
<td>naval special warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NVG</td>
<td>night vision goggle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/Y</td>
<td>no/yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAKOC</td>
<td>observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, and cover and concealment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OC</td>
<td>oleoresin capsicum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCONUS</td>
<td>outside the continental United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OER</td>
<td>officer evaluation report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFDA</td>
<td>Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFF</td>
<td>officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OHR</td>
<td>Office of the High Representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIC</td>
<td>Officer in Charge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPCEN</td>
<td>operations center</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
**OPCON**  operational control—Transferable command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Operational control may be delegated and is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commands. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. (JP 1-02)

**OPFUND**  operational fund

**OPLAN**  operation plan

**OPORD**  operation order

**OPS**  operations

**OPSEC**  operations security—A process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to: a. identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems; b. determine indicators that hostile intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries; and c. select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation. (JP 1-02)

**OPSUM**  operation summary

**OPTEMPO**  operating tempo

**ORT**  oral rehydration therapy

**OSCE**  Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

**OSD**  Office of the Secretary of Defense

**OSI**  Office of Strategic Information

**OSIS**  open-source information system

**OSOCC**  On-Site Operations Coordination Center
PACE  primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency
PAG   Project Action Group
PAO   Public Affairs Office; public affairs officer
PAX   personnel
PC    personal computer
PCI   precombat inspection
PD    police department
PDM   pursuit deterrent mine
PDSS  predeployment site survey
PERSEC personnel security
PFC   private first class
PH    phase
PHYSEC physical security
PIN   personnel increment number
PIR   priority intelligence requirements—Those intelligence requirements for which a commander has an anticipated and stated priority in the task of planning and decisionmaking. (JP 1-02)
PKF   Peacekeeping Force
PL    platoon leader
PM    Provost Marshal
PME   peacetime military engagement
POC   point of contact
POE   priority of effort
POL   petroleum, oils, and lubricants
pol-mil political-military
PRC   populace and resources control
PRI   periodic reinvestigation
PSRC  Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Up
PSYOP Psychological Operations—Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. (JP 1-02)
PTL   protected target list
PW prisoner of war
QRF quick reaction force
R reinforcing; requisition
RC Reserve Component
RCA riot control agent
REQCONF request confirmation
RF/AIT radio frequency automated information tags
RFI request for information—Any specific time-sensitive ad hoc requirement for intelligence information or products to support an ongoing crisis or operation not necessarily related to standing requirements or scheduled intelligence production. (JP 1-02)
RFO request for orders
RJ road junction
RM Resource Management
RMATS Refugee Management Tracking System
ROE rules of engagement
RON remain overnight
R&S reconnaissance and surveillance
RS road space
RTN return
S Secret; seizure
S-1 personnel officer
S-2 intelligence officer
S-3 operations and training officer
S-4 logistics officer
S-5 civil-military operations officer
S-6 signal officer
SAEDA subversion and espionage directed against the Army
SAO security assistance officer
SATCOM satellite communications
SBCT Stryker brigade combat team
sec secretary
SECDEF Secretary of Defense
SFC sergeant first class
SFG Special Forces group
SFOB  Special Forces operational base
SFOD  Special Forces operational detachment
SFODA Special Forces operational detachment A
SFODB Special Forces operational detachment B
SFODC Special Forces operational detachment C
SGT  sergeant
SIGCEN signal center
SINCGARS single-channel ground and airborne radio system
SITREP situation report
SITTEMP situational template
SJA  Staff Judge Advocate
SO  special operations
SOC  special operations command
SOCCENT Special Operations Component, United States Central Command
SOCEUR Special Operations Component, United States European Command
SOCOORD special operations coordinator
SODARS special operations debrief and retrieval system
SOF  special operations forces
SOFA status-of-forces agreement
SOI  signal of interest
SOMPF special operations mission planning folder
SOP  standing operating procedure
SOR  statement of requirement
SORTS Status of Resources and Training System
SP  start point
SPC  specialist
SPTCEN support center
SPTCONF support confirmation
SPTREQ support request
SQFT  square feet
sq m  square meter(s)
SRP  soldier readiness processing
SSBI single-scope background investigation
SSN    social security number
SSSC  self-service supply center
STANAG standardization agreement
STON   short ton
STU-III secure telephone unit III
svcs   Services
SWO    staff weather officer
SYSCON systems control
tac    tactical
TACC   tactical air command center
TACLAN tactical local area network
TACON  tactical control—Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed, and usually, local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical control may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant command. (J P 1-02)
TACSAT tactical satellite
TAI    targeted area of interest
TALO   theater airlift liaison officer
TASKORD tasking order
TB     tuberculosis
TC AIMS II Transportation Coordinator’s Automated Information for Movement System II
TCN    transportation control number
TDA    Table of Distribution and Allowance
TDIS   time distance
TDY    temporary duty
TEP    theater engagement plan
TF     task force
TFF    Task Force Falcon
TL     time length
TLP    troop leading procedures
TM     team
TNG    training
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tr>
<td>TOA</td>
<td>transfer of authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOC</td>
<td>tactical operations center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOE</td>
<td>table of organization and equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPFDD</td>
<td>time-phased force and deployment data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPFDL</td>
<td>time-phased force and deployment list</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPT</td>
<td>tactical psychological operations team</td>
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<tr>
<td>TRI-TAC</td>
<td>Tri-Service Tactical Communications Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TS</td>
<td>Top Secret</td>
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<tr>
<td>TSC</td>
<td>theater support command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSM</td>
<td>targeting synchronization matrix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TST</td>
<td>tactical support team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TTAD</td>
<td>temporary tour of active duty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TTP</td>
<td>tactics, techniques, and procedures</td>
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<tr>
<td>TV</td>
<td>television</td>
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<tr>
<td>U</td>
<td>Unclassified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U5MR</td>
<td>mortality rate among children under 5 years old</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAV</td>
<td>unmanned aerial vehicle</td>
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<tr>
<td>UCK</td>
<td>Ushtria Clirimtare E Kosoves (Kosovo Liberation Army)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCP</td>
<td>Unified Command Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UIC</td>
<td>unit identification code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ULN</td>
<td>unit line number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITAF</td>
<td>Unified Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Kosovo</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMIK-P</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Kosovo Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOSOM</td>
<td>United Nations Operation Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNREO</td>
<td>United Nations Rwanda Emergency Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAET</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNWFP</td>
<td>United Nations World Food Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USACAPOC</td>
<td>United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>United States Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAJ FKSWCS</td>
<td>United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAR</td>
<td>United States Army Reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USARPAC</td>
<td>United States Army, Pacific Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USASOC</td>
<td>United States Army Special Operations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USC</td>
<td>United States Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCENTCOM</td>
<td>United States Central Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCG</td>
<td>United States Coast Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USEUCOM</td>
<td>United States European Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USG</td>
<td>United States Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>USGET</td>
<td>United States Support Group East Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USIS</td>
<td>United States Information Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USJ FCOM</td>
<td>United States Joint Forces Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USLO</td>
<td>United States Liaison Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>United States Marine Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMTF</td>
<td>United States message text format</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USN</td>
<td>United States Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USNORTHCOM</td>
<td>United States Northern Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USPACOM</td>
<td>United States Pacific Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSOCOM</td>
<td>United States Special Operations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSOUTHCOM</td>
<td>United States Southern Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USTRANSCOM</td>
<td>United States Transportation Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>util</td>
<td>utilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UTM</td>
<td>universal transverse mercator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UW</td>
<td>unconventional warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VDD</td>
<td>visualize, describe, direct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vic</td>
<td>vicinity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIP</td>
<td>very important person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VOCO</td>
<td>verbal orders of commanding officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAN</td>
<td>wide-area network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHNS</td>
<td>wartime host-nation support</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
WIN  Warfighter Information Network
WIN-T  Warfighter Information Network-Tactical
WMD  weapons of mass destruction
WWW  World Wide Web
XO  executive officer
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