DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION. The material in this manual is under development. It is NOT approved doctrine and CANNOT be used for reference or citation. The approved FM is still current and must be used for reference, or citation, until this draft is approved and authenticated.
Stability Operations
Symposium Draft
NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION

Contents

Page
PREFACE ............................................................................................................. iv
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. vi

Chapter 1
THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT .............................................................................. 1-1
The American Experience with Stability ............................................................. 1-1
The Strategic Approach ...................................................................................... 1-2
National Strategy ................................................................................................ 1-9
National and Defense Policies ............................................................................ 1-12
Strategy for Stability Operations ....................................................................... 1-14

Chapter 2
STABILITY IN FULL SPECTRUM OPERATIONS ............................................ 2-1
Full Spectrum Operations ................................................................................... 2-1
Primary Stability Tasks ....................................................................................... 2-3
Stability Operations Framework ....................................................................... 2-10

Chapter 3
ESSENTIAL STABILITY TASKS ....................................................................... 3-1
Identifying Essential Tasks ................................................................................ 3-1
Seizing the Initiative ......................................................................................... 3-2
Primary Stability Tasks ....................................................................................... 3-2
Information Engagement ................................................................................... 3-20
The Role of Civil Affairs in Stability Operations ................................................ 3-22
Mission-Essential Tasks in Stability Operations ................................................ 3-23

Chapter 4
PLANNING FOR STABILITY OPERATIONS ................................................. 4-1
Planning Fundamentals .................................................................................... 4-1
Planning Foundations ....................................................................................... 4-4
Contents
(Symposium Draft—NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION)

Chapter 5  TRANSITIONAL MILITARY AUTHORITY ......................................................... 5-1
Designing Stability Operations............................................................................ 4-6
Definitions and Authorities.................................................................................. 5-1
Establishing Transitional Military Authority ......................................................... 5-2
Organizing for Transitional Military Authority ..................................................... 5-3
Guidelines for Transitional Military Authority ...................................................... 5-5
Courts and Claims .............................................................................................. 5-9

Chapter 6  SECURITY SECTOR REFORM ......................................................................... 6-1
Unified Action in SSR.......................................................................................... 6-2
Guiding Principles of Security Sector Reform..................................................... 6-5
Security Sector Reform Planning........................................................................ 6-6
Comprehensive Security Sector Reform ............................................................ 6-9
Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration............................................ 6-18

Appendix A  INTERAGENCY, INTERGOVERNMENTAL, AND NONGOVERNMENTAL
ORGANIZATIONS IN STABILITY OPERATIONS ........................................... A-1
Appendix B  INTERAGENCY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM...................................................... B-1
Appendix C  USG PRINCIPLES FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND STABILIZATION ........ C-1
Appendix D  TACTICAL CONFLICT ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK .................................. D-1
Appendix E  HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE PRINCIPLES ................................................... E-1
Appendix F  PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS..................................................... F-1
Appendix G  SUMMARY OF CHANGES ............................................................................... G-1

GLOSSARY ........................................................................................................... Glossary-
REFERENCES........................................................................................................ References-
INDEX .................................................................................................................. Index-

Figures

Figure 1-1. The fragile states framework ................................................................. 1-5
Figure 1-2. Strategy and policy references for stability operations ...................... 1-10
Figure 2-1. Full spectrum operations ..................................................................... 2-1
Figure 2-2. The primary stability tasks ................................................................. 2-4
Figure 2-3. Essential stability task sectors........................................................... 2-7
Figure 2-4. The spectrum of conflict ................................................................. 2-10
Figure 2-5. The failed states spectrum ................................................................. 2-11
Figure 2-6. The stability operations framework................................................. 2-11
Figure 2-7. A whole of government approach to stability operations ............... 2-13
Figure 3-1. Relating primary stability tasks to technical sectors for reconstruction and
stabilization ........................................................................................................... 3-3
Figure 3-2. Relating information engagement to the primary stability tasks ................. 3-21
Figure 4-1. Example stability lines of effort ................................................................. 4-9
Figure 4-2. The transition challenge ............................................................................. 4-11
Figure 6-1. Elements of the security sector ................................................................. 6-4
Figure A-2. Model organization of a CMOC ............................................................... A-12
Figure F-1. Example of provincial reconstruction team organization ..................... F-3

Tables

Table A-1. Country team members ................................................................................. A-2
Table A-1. Members of NATO ......................................................................................... A-8
Table A-2. Example of coordination centers ................................................................. A-11
Table E-1. The code of conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement ................................................................................................................. E-3
Table G-1. New Army terms .......................................................................................... G-3
Preface

FM 3-07 is the Army’s keystone doctrinal publication for stability operations. FM 3-07 presents overarching doctrinal guidance and direction for conducting stability operations, setting the foundation for developing other fundamentals and tactics, techniques, and procedures detailed in subordinate field manuals. It also provides operational guidance for commanders and trainers at all echelons and forms the foundation for Army Education System curricula.

The six chapters that make up this edition of Stability Operations constitute the Army’s approach to the conduct of full spectrum operations in an environment characterized primarily by stability tasks. This doctrine is consistent with, and supports the execution of, broader “whole of government” engagement as defined by the United States Government. The core of this doctrine includes the following:

- Chapter 1 describes the strategic context that frames the Army’s approach to stability operations. It includes discussion of the strategic environment, United States Government strategy and policy, and interagency efforts to define a comprehensive “whole of government” approach to stability operations.
- Chapter 2 links full spectrum operations to broader efforts aiming to achieve stability. It includes doctrine that describes the role of civil affairs forces in stability operations as the commander’s conduit for civil-military cooperation.
- Chapter 3 addresses the essential tasks that comprise stability operations. It provides a detailed discussion of each of the five primary stability tasks, and describes the subordinate tasks that comprise military stability operations.
- Chapter 4 discusses the fundamental principles of planning for stability operations in an environment of unified action. It builds on the precepts established in FMs 3-0 and 5-0, providing a systematic approach to operational design and planning focused on the stability element of full spectrum operations.
- Chapter 5 addresses transitional military authority and provides doctrine concerning command responsibility, establishment, and organization of military government in support of stability operations. It includes principles for establishing judicial structures to enable transitional military authority.
- Chapter 6 provides the doctrinal foundation for security sector reform, and introduces security force assistance as the capacity building activity that encompasses organizing, training, equipping, rebuilding, and advising host-nation security forces. It also sets disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration as a fundamental element of security sector reform.

Six appendixes complement the body of the manual.

Army doctrine is consistent and compatible with joint doctrine. FM 3-07 links stability operations doctrine to joint operations doctrine as expressed in joint doctrinal publications, specifically, JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, and JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning. FM 3-07 expands on the fundamental principles of operations expressed in FM 3-0, Operations, and links those principles to a comprehensive approach to stability operations within the framework of full spectrum operations. FM 3-07 also uses text and concepts developed in conjunction with North Atlantic Treaty Organization partners. When published, Allied Joint Publication 3.2, Doctrine for Land Operations, will contain this material.

The principle audience for FM 3-07 is the middle and senior leadership of the Army, officers in the rank of major and above who command Army forces in major operations and campaigns or serve on the staffs that support those commanders. It is also applicable to the civilian leadership of the Army. This manual is also a critical resource for the other agencies of the United States Government, agencies of other governments, intergovernmental organizations, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and private
sector companies who seek to develop a better understanding of the role of the military in broader reconstruction and stabilization efforts.

FM 3-07 uses joint terms where applicable. Most terms with joint or Army definitions are in both the glossary and the text. Glossary references: Terms for which FM 3-07 is the proponent publication (the authority) have an asterisk in the glossary. Text references: Definitions for which FM 3-07 is the proponent publication are in boldfaced text. These terms and their definitions will be in the next revision of FM 1-02. For other definitions in the text, the term is italicized and the number of the proponent publication follows the definition.

“Adversaries” refers to both enemies and adversaries when used in joint definitions.

FM 3-07 applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard of the United States, and U.S. Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.

This manual contains copyrighted material.

Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, is the proponent for this publication. The preparing agency is the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center. Send written comments and recommendations on a DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to Commander, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, ATTN: ATZL-CD (FM 3-07, LTC Steve Leonard), 201 Reynolds Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2337; by e-mail to steven.leonard@conus.army.mil; or submit an electronic DA Form 2028.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The copyright owners listed here have granted permission to reproduce material from their works. When published, other sources of quotations will be listed in the source notes.
Introduction

Today, the Nation remains engaged in an era of persistent conflict against an enemy intent on limiting American access and influence throughout the world. This is a fundamental clash of ideologies and cultures, waged across a societal abyss separating rich ethnic and religious traditions and profound differences in perspective. The Nation is embarking on a journey into an uncertain future where this precipitous divide threatens to expand as a result of increased global competition for natural resources, teeming urban populations with rising popular expectations, unrestrained technological diffusion, and a global economy struggling to meet the mounting demands from emerging markets and third world countries.

This is a conflict unlike any other in recent American history, where military forces operating among the people of world will decide the major battles and engagements. Here, the margin of victory will be measured in far different terms than the wars of our past; the allegiance, trust, and confidence of these people in the operational area is the final arbiter of success. On the battlefields of the future, the greatest enemy will be time: time to bring safety and security to an embattled populace; time to provide for the essential, immediate humanitarian needs of the people; time to restore basic public order and a semblance of normalcy to life; and time to rebuild the institutions of government and market economy that provide the foundations for enduring peace and stability. This is the essence of stability operations.

Joint doctrine provides a definition for stability operations that captures the role of military forces in support of broader governmental efforts:

Stability operations encompass various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief (JP 3-0).

This manual proceeds from that definition to establish the broad context in which military forces assume that role. In doing so, the manual focuses the efforts of military forces appropriately in a complex and uncertain future. For Army forces, those efforts are fundamental to full spectrum operations. As this manual addresses stability operations, it does so with the understanding that those operations are, in fact, full spectrum in nature with the majority of the task effort focused on the stability element of full spectrum operations.

The essential nature of stability operations in this era of persistent conflict became increasingly clear following combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Recognizing this shift in focus, the Secretary of Defense signed Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 in November 2005. The directive emphasized that stability operations were no longer secondary to combat operations, stating:

Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DOD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.

The directive further stressed that stability operations were likely more important to the lasting success of military operations than traditional combat operations. Thus, the directive elevated stability operations to a status equal to that of the offense and defense. That fundamental change in emphasis sets the foundation for this edition of the Army’s keystone stability operations doctrine.

This manual addresses military stability operations in the broader context of U.S. Government reconstruction and stabilization efforts. It describes the role of military forces in supporting those broader efforts by leveraging the coercive and constructive capabilities of the force to establish a safe and secure environment; facilitate reconciliation among local or regional adversaries; establish political, legal, social, and economic institutions; and facilitate the transition of responsibility to a legitimate civil authority. This transition is fundamental to the
shift in focus toward long-term developmental activities where military forces support broader efforts in pursuit of national and international objectives. Success in these endeavors typically requires a long-term commitment by external actors and is ultimately determined by the support and participation of the host-nation populace.

However, this manual also provides doctrine on how those capabilities are leveraged in support of a partner nation as part of peacetime military engagement. Those activities, executed in a relatively benign security environment as an element of a combatant commander’s theater security cooperation plans, share many of the same broad goals as stability operations conducted in the aftermath of conflict or disaster. They aim to build partner capacity, strengthen legitimate governance, maintain rule of law, foster economic growth, and help to forge a strong sense of national unity. Conducted within the context of peacetime military engagement, they are essential to sustaining the long-term viability of partner nations and provide the foundation for multinational alliances that help to maintain the global balance of power.

Through stability operations, military forces establish the conditions that enable the actions of the other actors to succeed. By providing security and control to stabilize the area of operations, these efforts provide a foundation for transitioning to civilian control and eventually to the host nation. Stability operations are usually conducted in support of a host government or a transitional civil or military authority when no legitimate, functioning host-nation government exists. Generally, military forces establish or restore basic civil functions and protect them until a civil authority or the host nation is capable of providing these services for the local populace. They perform specific functions as part of a broader response effort, supporting the activities of other agencies, organizations, and the private sector. When the host nation or other agency is unable to fulfill their role, military forces may be called upon to provide the basic civic functions of government.

By nature, stability operations are lengthy endeavors, and all tasks must be performed with a focus toward maintaining the delicate balance between long-term success and short-term gains. Ultimately, stability operations aim not necessarily to reduce the military presence quickly, but to achieve broader national policy goals that extend beyond the objectives of military operations. The more effective those military efforts are at setting the conditions that facilitate the efforts of the other instruments of national power, the more likely it is that the long-term commitment of military will not be required.

To that end, unified action aims to bring the efforts of military forces together with the other instruments of national power to form a whole of government approach to engagement. This approach accounts for a wider range of considerations beyond those of the military instrument, ensuring that planning accounts for broader national policy goals and interests. For the commander and staff, this may mean planning and executing operations within an environment of political ambiguity. As a result, flexible military plans that adapt to the lethal dynamics of combat operations may be frustrated by the potentially slow maturation process of government reconstruction and stabilization policy. Thus, integrating the planning efforts of all the agencies and organizations involved in a stability operation is absolutely essential to long-term success.
Chapter 1

The Strategic Context

Our nation’s cause has always been larger than our nation’s defense. We fight, as we always fight, for a just peace—a peace that favors human liberty. We will defend the peace against the threats from terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. And we will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent.

President George W. Bush
West Point, New York
1 June 2002

1-1. During the relatively short history of the United States, military forces have fought only eleven wars considered conventional in nature. From the American Revolution through Operation Iraqi Freedom, these wars represented significant or perceived threats to national security interests, where the political risk to the nation was always gravest. These were the wars for which the military traditionally prepared; these were the wars that endangered America’s very way of life. Of the hundreds of other military operations conducted in those intervening years, most are considered stability operations today. Contrary to popular belief, the military history of the United States is one characterized by stability operations, interrupted by distinct episodes of major combat.

THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE WITH STABILITY

1-2. America’s experience with stability operations began with the Royal Proclamation of 1763. King George III issued it after the British acquired French territory in North America following the French and Indian War. Intended to stabilize relations with Native Americans, the Proclamation established British foreign policy for the regulation of trade, settlement, and land purchases on the British Empire’s vast western frontier. The Proclamation also limited expansion of the thirteen colonies, essentially outlawing them from purchasing or settling territory west of the Appalachian Mountains. With the Proclamation, King George III authorized the British military to execute colonial policy in the Americas, including the ability to detain and arrest those in violation of the Proclamation.

1-3. Shortly after the signing of the Treaty of Paris on September 3, 1783, Congress appointed military commissioners to negotiate peace treaties and land purchases with native tribes. However, Congress had no means of enforcing the policy. In 1786, it passed The Ordinance for the Regulation of Indian Affairs and placed the program under Secretary of War Henry Knox. Secretary Knox directed the commanders of the frontier posts to support the Indian superintendents in settling disputes, regulating trade, adjusting land claims, and enforcing the law. Later, President Washington tasked Secretary Knox with developing and implementing a military plan to prevent hostilities against settlers on former Indian lands. Before and following the Civil War, this experience continued in the trans-Mississippi West, where military forces enforced treaty agreements while providing protection for the movement of settlers into the western United States.

1-4. During General Winfield Scott’s occupation of Central Mexico from 1846 to 1848, he quickly achieved the support of the local populace through programs focused on their immediate needs. His forces protected the goods and trade routes of local merchants, allowing markets to reopen quickly in the aftermath of operations. He instituted local programs to remove accumulated garbage and the obvious signs of war. Finally, he established civilian jobs programs that infused much needed cash into the local economies.
1-5. During the reconstruction following the Civil War, military forces maintained order and provided security. These forces also initiated comprehensive measures to establish new state governments, hold elections, ensure the well-being of freed slaves, and provide for economic and social development. Military forces assumed three roles during Reconstruction in the South:

- As an occupation force following the war, supporting a Presidential-appointed civilian government.
- As a military government under the Military Reconstruction Act of 1867
- As a supporting force to elected state governments until 1877.

1-6. In the aftermath of the Spanish-American war, the United States imposed a military government in Cuba, initiating free elections; reform of the security sector; and health, sanitation, and public works programs. A similar effort in the Philippines, however, resulted in a nationalist uprising that evolved into an insurgency lasting more than a decade. When President Wilson ordered American forces into the Mexican coastal city of Veracruz in 1914, Soldiers soon found themselves performing the same humanitarian, governmental, economic, and security tasks conducted in Cuba and the Philippines 15 years earlier. In 1915, the Marines began a series of Caribbean interventions in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua, but faced constant armed, irregular opposition from the local population and had little success establishing effective constitutional governments using the lessons of the past. (See appendix E.)

1-7. Following World War II, the occupation of Germany serves as a model for modern post-conflict stability operations as the Army reorganized and retrained its forces for a peacetime role focused on the reconstruction and development of a war-torn nation. The postwar occupation of Japan provides similar lessons. The initial 60 days of occupation focused on disarmament and demobilization, essential to the demilitarization of the Japanese military complex and the democratization of Japanese society. In 1958, following the overthrow and murder of the pro-American Iraqi royal government, President Eisenhower ordered military forces to conduct a show of force to help quell civil unrest in Lebanon, providing much-needed stability to the Beirut government.

1-8. Vietnam earned America invaluable experience with the complexity of conducting operations among the people. Military forces contended with an established insurgency while working alongside the other instruments of national power to bring peace and stability to the government of South Vietnam. Through the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program, the efforts of the Departments of State and Defense were integrated under a “single manager concept” that effectively achieved the civil-military unity of effort vital to success in Southeast Asia. While the overall war effort was ultimately unsuccessful, the CORDS program provided valuable lessons that helped shape contemporary approaches to stability operations.

1-9. Following the fall of the Berlin Wall and end of the Cold War, U.S. forces began reducing force structure while preparing to reap the benefits of a new era of peace. The benefits of this “peace dividend” were never realized. The strategic environment evolved from one characterized by the bi-polar nature of the relationship between the world’s dominant powers to one of shared responsibility across the international system. In time, events tragically revealed unfolding situations throughout the world—the collapse of established governments, the rise of international criminal and terrorist networks, a seemingly endless array of humanitarian crises, and grinding poverty. The global implications of such destabilizing forces proved staggering.

THE STRATEGIC APPROACH

1-10. In the complex, dynamic strategic environment of the 21st Century, significant challenges to sustainable peace and security persist across the spectrum of conflict. In a world of sovereign states, unequal in development and resources, tension and conflict are ubiquitous. The sources of instability that push parties toward open conflict, known as drivers of conflict, include religious fanaticism, global competition for resources, climate change, residual territorial claims, ideology, ethnic tension, elitism, greed, and desire for power. The drivers of conflict are reflected in myriad symptoms of crisis around the world. In this era of persistent conflict, rapidly evolving terrorist structures, transnational crime, and ethnic violence continue to complicate international relations, creating belts of instability that threaten to
fundamentally alter the balance of power. As the world journeys into this uncertain future, stability operations will increasingly be called upon to reduce the drivers of conflict and instability, while building local institutional capacity to forge sustainable peace, security, and economic growth.

1-11. Any integrated approach to stability operations requires a model that is applicable across the spectrum of conflict, from stable peace to general war. It must frame purposeful intervention at any point along that spectrum, reflecting the execution of a wide range of stability tasks performed under the umbrella of a variety of operational environments:

- In support of a partner nation during peacetime military engagement.
- In the aftermath of a natural or manmade disaster as part of a humanitarian-based limited intervention.
- During peace operations to enforce international peace agreements.
- In support of a legitimate host-nation government during irregular warfare.
- During major combat operations to establish conditions that facilitate post-conflict activities.
- In a post-conflict environment following the general cessation of organized hostilities.

1-12. For many agencies and organization, stability operations are considered in a post-conflict state: following the cessation of hostilities as part of broader efforts to reestablish enduring peace and stability. For military forces, however, stability tasks are executed continuously throughout all operations. Executed early enough, and in support of broader national policy goals and interests, stability operations provide an effective tool for reducing the risk of politically-motivated violence by addressing the possible drivers of conflict long before the onset of hostilities. Providing the authority and resources to conduct these stability operations as part of peacetime military engagement may be the most effective and efficient method to mitigate the risk of lengthy post-conflict interventions.

UNITY OF EFFORT

1-13. Uniting all of the diverse capabilities necessary to achieve success in stability operations requires collaborative and cooperative paradigms that focus those capabilities toward a common goal. Where military operations typically demand unity of command, the diverse array of actors involved in a stability operation strive for unity of effort. This is the essence of **unified action**: the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort (JP 1). **Unity of effort** is the coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization—is the product of successful unified action (JP 1). Unity of effort is fundamental to successfully incorporating all the instruments of national power in a collaborative approach to stability operations.

1-14. Unified action is the foundation of success for operations that require integrating the capabilities of all the instruments of national power, as well as those of other nations, nongovernmental organizations, intergovernmental organizations, and the private sector. Unified action is the cornerstone for a whole of government approach. This approach integrates and synchronizes the diverse capabilities and myriad activities of these actors toward a mutually understood and accepted end state. However, many actors, including nongovernmental organizations, participate in unified action at their own discretion. Their roles are often defined by competing interests and governed by differences in policy. In the case of nongovernmental organizations, many of their activities are funded by the public, or institutional donors with goals separate from the United States Government or the international community.

1-15. Therefore, unity of effort in such complex endeavors is often the operational norm. Unity of effort leverages the ability of various actors to achieve a cooperative environment that focuses effort toward common goal, regardless of individual command or organizational structures, underlying interests, or policy differences. The mechanisms for achieving unity of effort depend upon whether a legitimate, functioning host-nation government exists. In situations where such a government exists, military forces will coordinate their efforts through host-nation civilian agencies and the county team to sustain the host nation’s legitimacy, build capacity, and foster sustainability. However, if the state has failed through military action or other socio-economic factors, then a transitional authority must assume responsibility for
governing. This can be a transitional civil authority typically authorized by the United Nations and under international lead, or a transitional military authority. (Chapter 5 discusses transitional military authority.)

**A Whole of Government Approach**

1-16. A whole of government approach is vital to achieving the balance of resources, capabilities, and activities that reinforce progress made by one of the instruments of national power while enabling success among the others. Accomplishing this requires a willingness and ability to share resources among US government agencies and organizations while working toward a common goal. These resources—financial, military, intelligence, law enforcement, diplomatic, developmental, and strategic communications—are often limited in availability and cannot be restricted to use by a single agency, Service, or entity. To achieve the broad success envisioned in whole of government engagement, all USG actors must be integral to unified action. All are elements of the whole of government approach.

1-17. To that end, all actors involved in unified action are integrated into the operation from the onset of planning. Together, they conduct detailed analysis of the situation and operational environment, develop integrated courses of action, and continuously assess the situation throughout execution. This ensures that the various capabilities and activities all focus on achieving specific conflict transformation goals in cooperation with host-nation and international partners. A coherent whole of government approach requires early and high-level participation of both national and multinational civilian and military participants. This process necessitates active dialogue and reciprocal information sharing with intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, the host-nation government, and the private sector, when necessary.

1-18. A primary challenge for integrating civilian and military efforts into a whole of government approach is the differing capacities and cultures in civilian agencies compared to those of military forces. A successful whole of government approach requires the following:

- All participants are represented, thoroughly integrated, and actively involved in the process.
- All participants share an understanding of the situation and problem to be resolved.
- All participants strive for unity of effort toward achieving a common goal.
- All participants totally integrate and synchronize capabilities and activities.
- All participants collectively determine the resources, capabilities, and activities necessary to achieve their goal.

**A Comprehensive Approach**

1-19. A comprehensive approach is founded in the cooperative spirit of unity of effort. It is common to operations that involve actors that participate in operations at their own discretion or are present in the operational area but not acting as a member of a coalition. In such cases, integration and collaboration often elude the diverse array of actors involved; a comprehensive approach achieves unity of effort through extensive cooperation and coordination to forge a shared understanding of a common goal. A comprehensive approach is difficult to sustain, but is nonetheless critical to achieving success in an operation with a very wide representative body of actors.

1-20. Forging a comprehensive approach is necessary to leverage the capabilities of the disparate actors present to achieve broad conflict transformation goals and attain a sustainable peace. Unlike a whole of government approach, which achieves true unified action toward those ends, a comprehensive approach requires a more nuanced, cooperative effort. In a comprehensive approach, the actors are not compelled to work together toward a common goal, but do so out of a shared understanding and appreciation for what that end state represents. Achieving that end state is in the best interests of the actors participating, and recognition of that fact forges the bonds that allow them to achieve unity of effort.

1-21. A comprehensive approach is framed by four guiding principles:

- **Accommodate.** The approach accommodates the concerns and contributions of all participants; it determines appropriate priorities for resourcing and sets support relationships as required to deconflict activities.
The Strategic Context
(Symposium Draft—NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION)

- **Understand.** The approach leverages a shared understanding of the situation toward a common goal. Understanding does not imply conformity; each actor contributes a distinct set of professional, technical, and cultural disciplines, values, and perceptions that provide breadth, depth, and resilience to assessment, planning, and execution.

- **Purpose-based.** The approach focuses cooperative effort toward a common, purpose-based goal; the approach links discreet, yet interrelated, tasks and objectives to the conditions that comprise the desired end state.

- **Cooperative.** The approach is based on a cooperative effort reinforced by institutional familiarity, trust, and transparency. Communities of practice that provide forums for information sharing and concept development support cooperation among the actors involved.

**FRAGILE STATES**

1-22. The United States has a long history of assisting other nations. This assistance may come as humanitarian aid, development assistance, free trade agreements, or military assistance. Fragile states, however, pose a particularly complicated challenge. The weakness of these states, especially with respect to governance institutions, threatens the success of any development effort. Development activities within weak states require extended time commitments to build partner capacity in key institutions and to improve the lives of their citizens.

1-23. A *fragile state* is a nation that suffers from institutional weaknesses serious enough to threaten the viability of the central government. These weaknesses arise from several root causes, including ineffective governance, economic failure, external aggression, and internal strife due to disenfranchisement of large sections of the population. Fragile states frequently fail to achieve any momentum toward development. They can generate enormous human suffering, create regional security challenges, and collapse into wide ungoverned areas that can become safe havens for terrorists and criminal organizations.

1-24. The term fragile state refers to the broad spectrum of recovering, failing, and failed states. The distinction among them is rarely clear, as fragile states do not travel a predictable path to failure or recovery. The difference between a recovering and failed state may be minimal, as the underlying conditions, such as insurgency or famine, may drive a state to collapse in a relatively short period. It is far more important to understand how far and quickly a state is moving from or toward stability. The fragile states framework, developed by the United States Agency for International Development, provides the overarching framework for the conduct of stability operations while defining the intervention spectrum for these activities. (See Fig 1-1, below.)

![Figure 1-1. The fragile states framework.](image)

1-25. Fragile states can be defined as either vulnerable or in crisis. A *vulnerable state* is a nation either unable or unwilling to provide adequate security and essential services to significant portions of the population. In vulnerable states, the legitimacy of the central government is in question. This includes states that are failing or recovering from crisis. A *crisis state* is a nation in which the central government does not exert effective control over its own territory. It is unable or unwilling to assure the provision of security and essential services to significant portions of the population. In crisis states, the central government may be weak or nonexistent, or simply unable or unwilling to provide security or basic services. This includes states that are failing or have failed altogether, where violent conflict is a reality or a great risk.
Rule of Law

1-26. During stability operations, it is imperative that the local populace is confident that they will be treated fairly and justly under the law, have unrestricted access to justice, have an open and participatory government, and trust that all persons, entities and institutions – public and private – are accountable to the law. Rule of law is a principle under which all persons, institutions, and entities, public and private, including the state itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced, and independently adjudicated, and that are consistent with international human rights principles. It also requires measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in applying the law, separation of powers, participation in decisionmaking, and legal certainty. Such measures also help to avoid arbitrariness as well as procedural and legal transparency. Human rights derive from the inherent dignity of the individual; all citizens deserve rights without distinction as to race, color, sex, language, religion, national or social origin, property, birth, or other status. Human rights include fundamental freedoms of expression, association, peaceful assembly, and religion. These freedoms are set out in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. These human rights also include rights in labor conventions and provisions of national civil rights legislation. They reflect a common sense of decency, fairness, and justice; and states have a duty to respect and ensure these rights and incorporate them into the processes of government and law.

1-27. The rule of law provides the foundation for a nation’s civil agencies responsible for public safety to use coercive and lethal force. Security sector reform programs aim to create an effective and legitimate security sector firmly rooted within the rule of law. Effective rule of law establishes democratic authority, protects rights, exerts a check on other branches of government, and complements efforts to build security in post-conflict situations. The U.S. Government ascribes to the United Nations’ definition of the rule of law: The rule of law refers to a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. The primary U.S. interagency partners for rule of law and justice reform consist of the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Department of State Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, and the Department of Justice.

1-28. Effective governance is inseparable from, and inherent to, rule of law. Rule of law establishes principles that limit the power of government by setting rules and procedures that prohibit the accumulation of autocratic or oligarchic power. It dictates government conduct according to prescribed and publicly recognized regulations while protecting the rights of all members of society. It also provides a vehicle for the nonviolent resolution of disputes in a manner integral to establishing enduring peace and stability.

Strategic Considerations

1-29. Any integrated approach to stability operations requires close coordination, cooperation, and a common approach founded on fundamental considerations that guide intervention within the international community. Of these, the following are essential to any successful intervention that coordinates and integrates the efforts of a diverse array of actors in a stability operation:

- **Capacity building** is essential to reestablishing the viability of a host nation. Capacity building is the roadmap to reestablishing a stable, lasting peace.

- **Legitimacy** is central to building trust and confidence among the people. Legitimacy is a multifaceted principle that impacts every aspect of stability operations from every conceivable perspective.

- **Conflict transformation** enables actors to fundamentally transform the dynamics of conflict into processes for constructive, positive change.
Capacity Building

1-30. Capacity building is fundamental to success in stability operations. During stability operations, capacity building is the process of creating an environment, supported by appropriate policy and legal frameworks that fosters institutional development, community participation, human resources development, and the strengthening of managerial systems. It includes efforts to improve governance capacity and good governance—ethos as well as structure—as part of broader capacity building activities within a society. Capacity building is a long-term, continuing process, in which all actors contribute to enhancing the host nation’s human, technological, organizational, institutional, and resource capabilities.

1-31. Capacity building activities may support partner nation leadership or build on existing capacity; it may focus on reforming extant capacity or developing new capability and capacity altogether. To some degree, local capacity always exists; capacity building activities aim to build, nurture, empower, and mobilize that capacity. Those efforts can be facilitated through groups or individuals. They can be broad, long-term efforts or targeted to specific responsibilities or functions to achieve decisive results sooner. Initial response actions reestablish a safe, secure environment and provide for the immediate humanitarian needs of the local populace. All following efforts aim to build partner capacity across the five stability sectors defined in the Department of State publication, Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks. (See chapter 2 for a detailed description and discussion of these tasks.)

1-32. Capacity building activities develop and strengthen the skills, instincts, systems, abilities, processes, and resources that host-nation institutions and individuals need to learn, and adapt these activities to dynamic political and societal conditions within the operational environment. Most capacity building focuses on long-term technical assistance programs, but it also includes—

- **Human resource development.** The process of equipping individuals with the understanding, skills, and access to information, knowledge, and training that enables them to perform effectively.
- **Organizational development.** The elaboration of management structures, processes, and procedures, not only within organizations, but also with managing relationships among the different organizations and sectors (public, private, and community).
- **Institutional and legal framework development.** Making the legal and regulatory changes necessary to enable organizations, institutions, and individuals at all levels and in all sectors to build their capacities.

1-33. Human resource development is central to capacity building. Education and training lie at the heart of development efforts; most successful interventions require human resource development to be effective. Human resource development focuses on a series of actions directed at helping participants in the development process to increase their knowledge, skills, and understanding, and to develop the attitudes needed to bring about the desired developmental change.

Legitimacy

1-34. Within national strategy, legitimacy is a central principle for intervention: both the legitimacy of the host-nation state and the legitimacy of the mission. As a concept, state legitimacy has many facets. The legitimacy of the state is generally representative of the legitimacy of the supporting institutions and societal systems of the host-nation government. Legitimacy includes the legal framework that governs the state and the source of that authority; it reflects not only the supremacy of the law, but the democratic foundation upon which the law was developed: the collective will of the people through the consent of the governed. It measures the perceptions of several groups: the host-nation populace; individuals serving within the governance structures of the state, regional states, and the international community; and the American public. Ultimately, a legitimate state does not go to war against its population or instigate unwarranted hostilities with its neighbors. A legitimate state acts in accordance with human rights standards and laws and assures that the resources of the state are available to its citizens in a fair and equitable manner. National security strategy lists four traits that characterize a legitimate, effective democratic state in which the consent of the governed prevails:
Chapter 1
(Symposium Draft—NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION)

- **Honor and uphold basic human rights.** Respect freedom of religion, conscience, speech, assembly, association, and press.
- **Responds to their citizens.** Submit to the will of the people, especially when people vote to change their government.
- **Exercise effective sovereignty.** Maintain order within their own borders, protect independent and impartial systems of justice, punish crime, embrace the rule of law, and resist corruption.
- **Limit the reach of government.** Protect the institutions of civil society, including the family, religious communities, voluntary associations, private property, independent businesses, and a market economy.

1-35. The legitimacy of the mission is as sensitive to perceptions as it is dependent upon the support and participation of the host-nation populace in the processes that comprise the mission. *Ownership*, a central tenet of successful stability operations that capitalizes on that support and participation, is fundamental to legitimacy. (See appendix C.) The legitimacy of the mission includes four distinct factors:

- **Mandate.** The mandate or authority that establishes the intervention mission often determines the initial perceptions of legitimacy. Multilateral missions with the broad approval of the international community generally have a higher degree of legitimacy than unilateral missions. These might include missions conducted by a coalition under United Nations mandate.

- **Manner.** The credible manner in which intervening forces conduct themselves and their operations decides legitimacy as the operation progresses. Highly professional forces are well-disciplined, trained, and culturally aware. They carry with them an innate perception of legitimacy that is further strengthened by consistent performance that conforms to the standards of international law.

- **Consent.** Consent is essential to the legitimacy of the mission. Generally, no mission is perceived as legitimate without the full consent of the host nation. In addition, general consent must extend to those nations with a vested interest in the intervention as well as the international community. An exception is an intervention to depose a regime that significantly threatens national or international security or willfully creates conditions that foment humanitarian crises. However, such missions are only perceived as legitimate with the broad approval of the international community; unilateral missions to impose regime change are rarely perceived as legitimate, however well intentioned.

- **Expectations.** Expectations are the final arbiter of legitimacy. Realistic, consistent, and achievable expectations—in terms of goals, time, and resources—help to assure legitimacy during a lengthy operation. Progress is a measure of expectations and an indirect determinant of will; missions that do not achieve a degree of progress consistent with expectations inevitably sap the will of the host nation, the international community, and the American people. Without the sustained will of the people, the legitimacy of any mission gradually decreases over time.

1-36. For military forces, a clearly defined commander’s intent and mission statement are critical to establishing the initial focus that drives the long-term legitimacy of the mission. The commander’s intent succinctly defines the criteria for success for an operation, providing the broad purpose and conditions that constitute the desired end state. It links the tasks required to attain the end state with the concept of the operation and the mission statement.

**Conflict Transformation**

1-37. **Conflict transformation is the process used to change conflicts fundamentally to achieve peaceful outcomes.** It seeks to diminish the factors that cause violent conflict and instability while building the capacity of local institutions to forge and sustain effective governance, economic development, and the rule of law. Ultimately, conflict transformation aims to shift the responsibility for providing security and stability from the international community to the host nation, who can sustain these efforts with minimal support from external actors. Conflict transformation focuses on the dynamic aspects of social conflict; it recognizes that conflict is a normal and continuous social dynamic within human relationships, and seeks to transform those relationships through positive processes. It relies heavily on
knowledge and understanding to recognize conflict as a potential catalyst for growth and to leverage that potential to spur constructive change. Conflict transformation is built upon two foundations:

- The intellectual capacity to envision conflict positively, as a natural social phenomenon with inherent potential for positive change.
- The flexibility to adapt approaches to respond in ways that maximize this potential for constructive growth.

1-38. Conflict transformation is based in cultural astuteness and a broad understanding of the dynamics of conflict. Success depends on building creative solutions that improve relationships; it necessitates an innate understanding of underlying relational, social, and cultural patterns. It exploits the opportunity within conflict to achieve positive change. It aims to reduce the motivations and means for violent conflict. At the same time, conflict transformation develops more attractive, peaceful alternatives for the competitive pursuit of political and economic aspirations. It derives its success from the local population, whose active participation underpins more rapid and sound development of broader regional and national programs. This entails addressing the drivers of conflict while concurrently assisting in developing or supporting local institutions that have both legitimacy and the capacity to provide basic services, economic opportunity, public order, and security.

1-39. Conflict transformation aims to—
- Establish a safe and secure environment.
- Provide essential services until sufficient civil capacity is present.
- Provide immediate humanitarian relief and emergency infrastructure reconstruction.
- Support reestablishment of governance.
- Support public order and rule of law.
- Establish the conditions for sustained development.

1-40. Fundamentally, conflict transformation focuses on creating adaptive responses to human conflict through change processes that increase justice and reduce violence. The focused, combined military and civilian efforts support the transformation process. This process strengthens legitimate governance, rebuilds governmental infrastructure and institutions to achieve sustainable peace and security, fosters a sense of confidence and well-being, and establishes conditions for economic recovery so that local institutions can assume their civic responsibilities. Ultimately, the success of these efforts depends on the people of the host nation. Success also depends on the interrelationship and interdependence of the following four factors:
- The legitimacy of the mandate that establishes the operation as perceived by the local population and the international community, or the perceived legitimacy of any nonmandated action.
- The perceived legitimacy of the freedoms and constraints placed on the force executing the operation.
- The degree to which factions, the local population, and other actors accede to the authority of those executing the operation.
- The degree to which the activities of those executing the operation meet the expectations of factions, local population, and international community and address the drivers of conflict.

NATIONAL STRATEGY

1-41. U.S. National strategy is based on a distinctly American policy of internationalism that reflects the interests and values of the country. It clearly aims to make the world a safer, better place, where a community of democratic nations lives in relative peace. To that end, the National Security Strategy and subordinate supporting strategies focus on a path to progress that promotes political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other nations, and universal respect for human dignity.

1-42. The body of security strategy that shapes the conduct of military operations includes the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and the National Military Strategy. Related strategies include the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, the National Strategy for Homeland Security, and the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. Together with national policy, strategy
provides the broad direction necessary to conduct operations in support of national interests. See figure 1-1.

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

1-43. Fragile states tend to attract destabilizing forces, manifesting the potentially dangerous effects of rapid globalization. This poses a national security challenge unforeseen even a decade ago, yet central to today’s strategic environment. While the phenomenon of fragile states is not new, the need to provide a stabilizing influence is more critical than ever. This challenge is at the core of the current National Security Strategy. Founded on two distinct pillars, it—

- Promotes freedom, justice, and human dignity while working to end tyranny, to promote effective democracies, and to extend prosperity through free trade and wise development policies.
- Confronts challenges of the strategic environment by leading a growing community of nations to defeat the threats of pandemic disease, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, international crime, human trafficking, and natural disasters.

1-44. The National Security Strategy outlines the President’s vision for providing enduring security for the American people in a volatile, uncertain, and complex strategic environment. It serves as a waypoint for statecraft, providing the broad national strategy for applying the instruments of national power to further U.S. interests globally. At the heart of this strategy is the nation’s approach to stability operations: to help create a world of democratic, well-governed states that can meet the needs of their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system.

Figure 1-2. Strategy and policy references for stability operations
The National Security Strategy addresses stability operations within the broad engagement strategy for regional conflict. These regional conflicts pose a significant threat to national security; they rarely remain isolated and often devolve into humanitarian tragedy or anarchy. External actors exploit them to further their own ends, as Al Qaeda continues to do in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Even when a particular conflict does not directly affect national security, the long-term interests of the nation often are affected. For this reason, the national strategy identifies three levels of engagement for addressing regional conflict:

- **Conflict prevention and resolution.** The most effective long-term measure for conflict prevention and resolution is the promotion of democracy and economic development. Effective democracies generally resolve disputes through peaceful means, either bilaterally or through other regional states or international institutions. Stability tasks executed as part of a theater security cooperation plan under the operational theme of peacetime military engagement generally fall in this category.

- **Conflict intervention.** Conflicts that threaten national security, interests, or values may require direct intervention to restore peace and stability. Stability tasks executed at the higher end of the spectrum of conflict, typically under the operational themes of major combat operations or irregular warfare, fall in this category.

- **Post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization.** While military involvement may be necessary to end a conflict, peace and stability endure when follow-on efforts are successful. Such efforts aim to restore order and rebuild infrastructure, governance, and civil society institutions. Success depends on the early establishment of strong local institutions such as effective police forces and functioning justice and penal systems. This governance capacity is critical to establishing rule of law and a market economy that ensure lasting stability and prosperity. At the same time, reconstruction and stabilization efforts rely heavily on the early involvement and support of the local populace with identifying and rebuilding the critical civil service infrastructure. Such infrastructure helps societies and institutions to function effectively. In this category, stability tasks generally characterize the overall mission, regardless of the predominant operational theme.

1-46. *Reconstruction* is the process of rebuilding degraded, damaged, or destroyed political, socio-economic, and physical infrastructure of a country or territory to create the foundation for longer-term development. *Stabilization* is the process by which underlying tensions that might lead to resurgence in violence and a breakdown in law and order are managed and reduced, while efforts are made to support preconditions for successful longer-term development. Together, reconstruction and stabilization comprise the broad range of activities defined by the Department of Defense as stability operations.

**NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY**

1-47. Reinforcing the direction of the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy emphasizes the threat to national security posed by fragile states. These states often undermine regional stability, threatening broader national interests. The National Defense Strategy recognizes the need for building partner capacity in these states. It focuses on using security cooperation programs to build partnerships that strengthen the host nation’s ability to confront security challenges. Security cooperation, the principle vehicle for building security capacity, supports these states by—

- Encouraging partner nations to assume lead roles in areas that represent the common interests of the U.S. and the host nation.
- Encouraging partner nations to increase their capability and willingness to participate in coalitions with U.S. forces.
- Facilitating cooperation with partner militaries and ministries of defense.
- Spurring the military transformation of allied partner nations by developing combined command and control, training and education, concept development and experimentation, and security assessment framework.

1-48. The National Defense Strategy also recognizes the need to foster interagency coordination and integration in these efforts. Such efforts draw a vital link between the Department of Defense and
Chapter 1
(Symposium Draft—NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION)

Department of State in the conduct of stability operations. The National Defense Strategy emphasizes the need to establish conditions of enduring security in support of stability operations, necessary to the success of the other instruments of national power. Unless the security environment supports using civilian agencies and organizations, military forces must perform those nonmilitary tasks normally the responsibility of others. Thus, the National Defense Strategy clearly establishes the intent of the Secretary of Defense to focus efforts on tasks directly associated with establishing favorable long-term security conditions.

NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

1-49. Prepared by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Military Strategy is consistent with the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and Quadrennial Defense Review. It specifies the ends, ways, and means necessary to assure national security and interests, and to pursue national interests at home and abroad. It also describes and analyzes the strategic environment as it affects military operations, as well as the most significant threats in that environment.

1-50. The National Military Strategy echoes the National Defense Strategy on the necessity of interagency integration, emphasizing the role of interagency partners and nongovernmental organizations in achieving lasting success in stability operations. It establishes the requirement for the joint force to retain the capability to conduct full spectrum operations, combining offensive, defensive, and stability tasks simultaneously and to seamlessly transition between them. Finally, it highlights the need to integrate conflict termination measures with the other instruments of national power, ensuring unity of effort toward a common set of national objectives. See appendix A for a discussion of interagency, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental organizations in stability operations.

NATIONAL AND DEFENSE POLICIES

1-51. Consistent with national strategy, U.S. policy focuses on achieving unity of effort through an integrated approach to intervention. This approach, echoed throughout defense policy, is fundamental to unified action. Through this approach, the nation synchronizes, coordinates, and integrates activities of governmental and nongovernmental agencies and organizations toward a common goal. As expressed in the National Security Strategy, American foreign policy adopts this approach to help fragile, severely stressed states. It helps these governments avoid failure or recover from devastating natural disaster by reestablishing the institutions of governance and society that represent an effective, legitimate state.

1-52. Interagency cooperation and coordination has long been a goal of national policy. From the post-World War II administration of President Truman through the current administration, every president has prioritized improving the interagency integration process. When Congress passed the National Security Act of 1947, it included formal interagency consultative structures to coordinate national intelligence and policy, ensuring the presence of seasoned government experience to provide advice on presidential decisions. President Eisenhower’s experience as a military commander led him to establish interagency structures to oversee the development and implementation of policy.


1-54. Ultimately, every presidential administration in the past sixty years has implemented some form of policy directive in an attempt to spur cooperation and collaboration among the agencies of the government. Some have been more successful than others, but none has survived a change in administration. As long as this trend continues, true integration across the interagency will remain elusive.
The Strategic Context

(Symposium Draft—NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION)

NATIONAL SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE 44

1-55. In 2005, President Bush signed National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44), Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization. This policy was significant for two reasons: it was his administration’s first attempt at defining national policy for interagency integration, and it was the first time that any administration implemented interagency policy with respect to stability operations. In addition, NSPD-44 formally acknowledged that the stability of foreign states served the broader national interests of the U.S., recognizing stability operations as a necessary capability of the Federal government.

1-56. NSPD-44 assigned lead agency responsibility to the Department of State for these operations. It granted authority to the Secretary of State to coordinate and integrate activities of other U.S. Government (USG) agencies. The policy also empowered the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) to assist the Secretary of State in several areas, to include—

- Coordinating USG stability operations with the Secretary of Defense.
- Developing plans for stability operations.
- Coordinating foreign assistance and foreign economic cooperation in stability operations.
- Ensuring program coordination among the USG agencies.
- Coordinating USG stability operations with foreign governments, international and regional organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and private sector entities.
- Developing plans to build partner capacity for security.
- Leading USG development of a civilian response capability for stability operations.

1-57. In directing S/CRS to provide material assistance to the Secretary of State, NSPD-44 called on an office of the Department of State specifically created to enhance the nation’s institutional capacity to respond to crises involving fragile states. Former Secretary of State Colin Powell created S/CRS in 2004 to lead, coordinate, and institutionalize the USG civilian capacity to prevent violent conflict or prepare for post-conflict situations. This office was to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife, so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy, and a market economy. It was the first USG entity specifically created to address stability operations.

1-58. The vehicle for achieving whole of government integration in stability operations is the Interagency Management System. The Interagency Management System is an institutionalized system of interagency bodies that manage the planning, execution, and assessment of stability operations for the USG. It consists of the following (see appendix B for additional detail on the Interagency Management System.):

- **Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group.** The main interagency coordination body for comprehensive USG engagement in a post-conflict or complex contingency, consisting of a secretariat and a policy coordinating committee.
- **Integration Planning Cell.** An interagency team that deploys to the Geographic Combatant Command or to a non-US military headquarters for a multilateral military operation.
- **Advance Civilian Team.** An interagency team that deploys to the USG field headquarters, typically the Embassy, in support of the Chief of Mission.
- **Field Advance Civilian Team.** An interagency team that deploys outside of USG field headquarters.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE 3000.05

1-59. Also in 2005, the Secretary of Defense signed Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 (DODD 3000.05), Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations, providing the military force with definitive guidance for the conduct of stability operations. It outlines Department of Defense policy and assigns responsibility for planning, preparing for, and executing stability operations. It is part of a broader USG and international effort to establish or maintain order in states and regions in support of national interests. Most importantly, however, it establishes stability operations as a core military mission, on par with combat operations.
1-60. DODD 3000.05 also emphasizes that many of the tasks executed in a stability operation are best performed by host-nation, foreign, or USG civilian personnel. However, the directive clearly states that, in the event civilian personnel are not prepared to perform those tasks, military forces assume that responsibility. Finally, the directive describes the comprehensive purposes supporting these tasks:

- Rebuild host-nation institutions, including various types of security forces, correctional facilities, and judicial systems necessary to secure and stabilize the environment.
- Revive or build the private sector, including encouraging citizen-driven, bottom-up economic activity and constructing necessary infrastructure.
- Develop representative governmental institutions.

1-61. In addition, DODD 3000.05 defines the goals for stability operations. The immediate goal, consistent with initial response efforts, is to provide the local populace with security, restore essential services, and meet humanitarian needs. Long-term goals that reflect transformation and foster sustainability efforts include developing host-nation capacity for securing essential services, a viable market economy, rule of law, democratic institutions, and a robust civil society.

1-62. The directive also stresses the importance of civil-military teaming in stability operations. It lists the wide array of actors that share in the responsibility for an intervention, as well as others—often referred to as stakeholders—that have an expressed interest in the outcome of that intervention but may not participate in the operation:

- The host nation (partner, country, and nationals).
- Relevant USG departments and agencies (interagency partners).
- Foreign governments and forces (multinational partners).
- Global and regional international and intergovernmental organizations.
- International, national, and local nongovernmental organizations.
- Nongovernmental humanitarian agencies.
- Community and civil society organizations.
- Private sector individuals and for-profit companies (private sector).
- Enemies and potential adversaries opposed to intervention.

1-63. These civil-military teams are a critical USG tool in stability operations. DODD 3000.05 directs that military forces work closely with other actors and stakeholders to establish the broad conditions that represent mission success.

STRATEGY FOR STABILITY OPERATIONS

1-64. To achieve the conditions that ensure a stable and lasting peace, stability operations capitalize on coordination, cooperation, integration, and synchronization among military and nonmilitary organizations. These civil-military efforts aim to strengthen legitimate governance, restore or maintain rule of law, support economic and infrastructure development, and foster a sense of national unity. These complementary efforts also seek to reform institutions to achieve sustainable peace and security and create the conditions that enable the central government to assume civic responsibilities.

DEFINING THE STRATEGIC END STATE

1-65. Drawing on extensive operational experience and institutional knowledge of stability operations, the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) developed an overarching framework that serves as a model to guide the development of strategy in pursuit of broader national or international policy goals. This purpose-based framework is founded on five discreet conditions that represent the desired end state of a successful stability operation. In turn, each condition is supported by a broad set of objectives that link the execution of tactical tasks to the end state. Finally, the framework identifies leadership responsibilities that help to guide action toward the desired end state. Within the framework, the end state conditions include—

- Safe and secure environment.
- Rule of law.
Safe and Secure Environment

1-66. In the aftermath of conflict or natural disaster, conditions often give rise to a significant security vacuum within the state. The government institutions are either unwilling or unable to provide security. In many cases, these institutions do not operate within internationally accepted norms; they are rife with corruption, abusing the power entrusted to them by the state, or actually embody the greatest threat to the populace. These conditions only serve to ebb away at the very foundation of the stability of the host nation.

1-67. Security is the most immediate concern of the military force, a concern typically shared by the host-nation people. A safe and secure environment is one in which the local populace can live their day-to-day lives without fear of being drawn into violent conflict. Achieving this condition requires extensive collaboration with civilian authorities, the trust and confidence of the people, and strength of perseverance.

1-68. The most immediate threat to a safe and secure environment is generally a return to fighting by former warring parties. However, insurgent forces, criminal elements, or terrorists also pose a significant threat to the safety and security of the local populace. The objectives that support a safe and secure environment include—

- Prevent renewal of fighting.
- Protect civilians.
- Ensure freedom of movement.
- Protect key historical, cultural, and religious sites, as well as important buildings, property, and infrastructure.
- Protect witnesses and evidence of atrocities.
- Protect international borders, airspace, and ports of entry.
- Build effective defense forces, under civilian control.

Rule of Law

1-69. While military forces aim to establish a safe and secure environment, the rule of law requires much more: security of individuals and accountability for crimes committed against them. This typically requires a broad spectrum of civilian and military law and order capabilities, including criminal intelligence and investigation; arrest, prosecution, and defense; and sentencing and incarceration. The planning, preparation, and execution of the transfer of responsibility from military to civilian control for rule of law is often the most difficult and complex transition conducted in the course of a stability operation. Failure to ensure continuity of rule of law through transition threatens the safety and security of the local populace, erodes the legitimacy of the host nation, and serves as an obstacle to long-term development.

1-70. Establishing effective rule of law typically requires an international review of the host-nation legal code, a legal reform agenda, and general justice reform programs. Many societies emerging from conflict will also require a new constitution. The objectives that support rule of law include—

- Establish coherent, legitimate, and just legal frameworks.
- Build effective and independent courts.
- Build effective police, customs, immigration, and border control forces.
- Build effective corrections system.
- Build effective legal profession.
- Protect human rights.
- Ensure equal access to justice and equal application of the law.
- Promote public awareness and legal empowerment.
Stable Democracy

1-71. Since the end of the Cold War, all international interventions have aimed to establish democratic governments with legitimate systems of political representation at the national, regional, and local levels. A stable democracy is one in which the host-nation people regularly elect a representative legislature according to established rules and in a manner generally recognized as free and fair. Legislatures must be designed consistent with a legal framework and legitimate constitution. Officials must be trained, processes created, and rules established.

1-72. Typically, early elections in a highly polarized society empower elites, senior military leaders, and organized criminal elements. Therefore, it is often better to begin democratic reform processes at the provincial or local level, thus minimizing the likelihood of national polarization and reemergence of violent divisions in society. This allows popular leaders to emerge who are capable of delivering services and meeting the demands of their constituents.

1-73. Stable democracies also require effective executive institutions to be successful; this type of capacity building generally necessitates a long-term commitment of effort from the international community to reestablish effective ministries and a functional civil service at all levels of government. They also require free and responsible media, multiple political parties, and a robust civil society. The objectives that support a stable democracy include—

- Develop legitimate systems of political representation at national, regional, and local levels.
- Build effective and legitimate executive institutions at national, regional, and local levels.
- Promote free and responsible media.
- Promote the creation of political parties.
- Promote robust civil society and civil participation.

Sustainable Economy

1-74. Economies tend to react well following conflict or disaster; commerce – both legitimate and illicit – previously inhibited by circumstances emerges quickly to fill market voids and entrepreneurial opportunities. International aid and the requirements of intervening military forces infuse the economy with abundant monetary resources, causing rapid growth across the economic sector. However, much of this growth is temporary and serves to highlight increasing income inequalities, lagging government capacity to manage and sustain growth, and expanding opportunities for corruption.

1-75. Rather than focus efforts toward immediately achieving economic growth, intervening elements aim to build on those aspects of the economic sector that enable the economy to become self-sustaining. These include physical infrastructure, sound fiscal and economic policy, an effective and predictable regulatory and legal environment, a viable workforce, business development and increased access to capital, and effective management of natural resources. The objectives that support a sustainable economy include—

- Reconstruct infrastructure.
- Promote sound fiscal and economic policy.
- Build effective and predictable regulatory and legal environment.
- Create a viable workforce.
- Promote business development and sustainable employment.
- Promote, manage, and equitably distribute natural resources and revenues.
- Limit and contain corruption and illicit commerce.

Social Well-Being

1-76. The most immediate needs of a host-nation populace emerging from conflict or disaster are generally clear: food, water, shelter, basic sanitation, and health care. International aid typically responds quickly in most situations, often due to their presence in, or close proximity to, the affected area. Once the situation is relatively stable and secure, aid organizations are able to provide for the immediate humanitarian needs of the people, establish sustainable assistance programs, and assist with dislocated civilians.
1-77. However, attention must also be paid to longer-term requirements: developing educational systems, addressing past abuses, and promoting peaceful coexistence among the host-nation people. Resolving issues of truth and justice are paramount to this process, and systems of compensation and reconciliation are essential to long-term success. The objectives that support social well-being include—

- Ensure the population is fed.
- Ensure the population has water.
- Ensure the population has shelter.
- Meet basic sanitation needs.
- Meet basic health needs.
- Build an effective education system.
- Enable dislocated civilians to return or relocate.
- Address legacy of past abuses.
- Promote peaceful coexistence.
Chapter 2

Stability in Full Spectrum Operations

Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DOD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.

Department of Defense Directive 3000.05

FULL SPECTRUM OPERATIONS

2-1. Full spectrum operations apply to the joint force as well as Army forces. The foundations for Army operations conducted outside the United States and its territories are reflected in the elements of full spectrum operations: continuous, simultaneous combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability tasks. These combinations are manifested in operations designed to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative using the mutually supporting lethal and nonlethal capabilities of Army forces. This is the essence of full spectrum operations, representing the very core of Army doctrine. In full spectrum operations, the emphasis on the individual elements changes with echelon, time, and location. (See figure 2-1.) No single element is more important than another; simultaneous combinations of the elements, constantly adapted to the dynamic conditions of the operational environment, are the key to successful operations. (See FM 3-0 for doctrine on full spectrum operations.)

Figure 2-1. Full spectrum operations

INITIATIVE

2-2. All Army operations aim to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Through the initiative, leaders use prudent risk as a catalyst to create opportunity; once they seize the initiative, they exploit the opportunities it creates. Army forces use those opportunities to create new avenues for further exploitation. Initiative represents the spirit, if not the form, of the offense. Based on the principle of war offensive, initiative is the surest way to achieve decisive results. The offensive mindset, with its focus on initiative, is central to Army operations and is the guiding principle for all leaders in the conduct of their duties. It emphasizes opportunity created by decisive action through full spectrum operations.
Chapter 2
(Symposium Draft—NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION)

2-3. Success in stability operations depends on military forces seizing the initiative to improve the civil situation while preventing conditions from deteriorating further. Through the initiative, friendly forces dictate the terms of action and drive positive change. Initiative creates opportunities to rapidly stabilize the situation and begin the process that leads to a lasting peace. In turn, this improves the security environment, creating earlier opportunities for civilian agencies and organizations to contribute. Commanders draw on understanding to retain the initiative, remaining flexible to a dynamic environment while anticipating the needs of the host nation. By acting proactively to positively influence events, Army forces exploit the initiative to ensure steady progress toward conditions that support a stable, lasting peace.

2-4. During stability operations, effective information engagement is inseparable from initiative. Information engagement enhances the success of each primary stability task, reinforcing and complementing actions on the ground with supporting messages. Seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative often depends on how various audiences perceive it; stability operations are conducted among the people, within the lens of the media. Through effective information engagement, Army forces seize, retain, and exploit the initiative, drawing on cultural understanding and media engagement to achieve decisive results. They communicate with the local populace in an honest, consistent fashion while providing fair and open access to media representatives. As much as practical, commanders coordinate with the news media to ensure prompt and accurate reporting of facts. (See chapter 3 for a detailed discussion of information engagement.)

LETHAL AND NONLETHAL ACTIONS

2-5. In the conduct of full spectrum operations, an inherent, complementary relationship exists between lethal and nonlethal actions; each situation requires a different combination of violence and restraint. Lethal actions are critical to accomplishing offensive and defensive missions. They leverage swift, decisive force to impose friendly will on enemy forces. Nonlethal actions are vital contributors to all operations but are typically decisive only in the execution of stability tasks. Determining the appropriate combination of lethal and nonlethal actions necessary to accomplish the mission is an important consideration for every commander. Every situation is unique and requires a careful balance between lethal and nonlethal actions to achieve success.

2-6. During combat operations, nonlethal actions may include a wide range of intelligence-gathering, disruptive, and other activities. Interference with enemy command and control systems through nonlethal means can also limit the effectiveness of enemy forces, thus increasing their exposure to attack. Sometimes, just the threat of violent action is enough to compel the enemy to yield to friendly will and force a settlement. In stability operations, military forces use various nonlethal means to accomplish the mission. Stability operations emphasize nonlethal, constructive actions by military forces operating among the local populace. During stability operations, military forces work with and through host-nation institutions and other civilian agencies and organizations to enhance the legitimacy of the state and the mission.

2-7. The presence of well-trained, equipped, and led forces is a potent combination of lethal and nonlethal capabilities. In some cases, just demonstrating the potential for lethal action helps to maintain order. Maintaining order is vital to establishing a safe, secure environment. Even though stability operations emphasize nonlethal actions, the ability to engage potential enemies with decisive lethal force remains a sound deterrent and is often a key to success. Enemies and adversaries may curtail their activities to avoid being engaged by military forces they perceive to be capable and willing to use lethal force. This allows military forces to extend the scope and tempo of nonlethal actions.

2-8. Perception is also a major factor for military forces; the actions of Soldiers, both positive and negative, influence the populace’s perception of military forces. Therefore, in all actions, leaders focus on managing expectations and informing the people about friendly intentions and actions. This is accomplished through very specific nonlethal means: information engagement. Commanders use information engagement to inform, influence, and persuade the local populace within limits prescribed by international law. In this way, the legitimacy of the operation and the credibility of friendly forces are enhanced. (See chapter 3 for additional detail concerning information engagement.)
OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

2-9. Offensive and defensive operations emphasize employing the lethal effects of combat power against an enemy force. Speed, surprise, and shock are the hallmarks of combat operations; the side better able to leverage these effects defeats its opponent quickly while incurring fewer losses. Such victories create opportunities for exploitation. In some operations, the effects of speed, surprise, and shock suffice to collapse organized resistance. Such a collapse occurred in the offensive phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003.

2-10. Offensive operations compel the enemy to react, creating or revealing weaknesses that the attacking force can exploit. Successful offensive operations place tremendous pressure on defenders, creating a cycle of deterioration that can lead to their disintegration. Against a capable, adaptive enemy, the offense is the most direct and sure means of seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative. Seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative is the essence of the offense. Offensive operations seek to throw enemy forces off balance, overwhelm their capabilities, disrupt their defenses, and ensure their defeat or destruction by maneuver and fires.

2-11. Defensive operations counter enemy offensive operations. They defeat attacks, destroying as much of the attacking enemy as possible. They also preserve control over land, resources, and populations. Defensive operations retain terrain, guard populations, and protect critical capabilities. They can be used to gain time and economize forces so offensive tasks can be executed elsewhere.

STABILITY OPERATIONS

2-12. Stability operations encompass various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief (JP 3-0). They leverage the coercive and constructive capabilities of the military force to establish a safe and secure environment; facilitate reconciliation among local or regional adversaries; establish political, legal, social, and economic institutions; and facilitate the transition of responsibility to a legitimate civilian authority.

2-13. Through stability operations, military forces help to reestablish the conditions that enable the actions of the other instruments of national power to succeed in achieving the broad goals of the conflict transformation process. Providing security and control stabilizes the area of operations. These efforts then provide a foundation for transitioning to civilian control and eventually to the host-nation control. Stability operations are usually conducted in support of a host-nation government. However, stability operations may also support the efforts of a transitional civil or military authority when no legitimate government or institutions exist.

2-14. Generally, the responsibility for providing basic civil functions rests with the host-nation government or civilian authorities, agencies, and organizations. When this is not possible, military forces establish or restore basic civil functions and protect them until a civil authority or the host nation can provide these services for the local populace. They perform specific functions as part of a broader response effort, supporting the activities of other agencies, organizations, and institutions.

2-15. In certain circumstances, stability operations may involve activities associated with combating weapons of mass destruction (WMD). These activities may include actions applicable across the three strategic pillars to combat WMD – nonproliferation, counter-proliferation, and WMD consequence management. Military forces may be directed – either through interagency coordination or by the joint force commander – to conduct WMD elimination operations, CBRN passive defense, or CBRN consequence management in an effort to reduce the threat or in response to a CBRN incident.

PRIMARY STABILITY TASKS

2-16. Stability operations consist of the five primary tasks shown in figure 2-2. These tasks correspond to the five stability sectors adopted by the Department of State Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS): Security, Justice and Reconciliation, Humanitarian Assistance and Social Well-
2-17. None of these tasks is performed in isolation. When integrated within their complementary technical sectors, they represent a comprehensive effort to reestablish the institutions that provide for the democratic participation, livelihood, and well-being of the citizens and the state. At the operational level, the primary stability tasks may serve as lines of effort or simply as guideposts to ensure broader unity of effort. Each primary task and technical sector contains a number of subordinate tasks. In any operation, the primary stability tasks, and the subordinate tasks included within each area, are integrated with offensive and defensive tasks under full spectrum operations. (See FM 3-0 for more information on full spectrum operations.)

**ESTABLISH CIVIL SECURITY**

2-18. Civil security involves providing for the safety of the host nation and its population, including protection from internal and external threats. Civil security includes a diverse set of activities, ranging from enforcing peace agreements to executing disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. Until a legitimate civil government can assume responsibility for the security sector, military forces perform the tasks associated with civil security. At the same time, they help develop host-nation security and police forces. Normally, the responsibility for establishing and maintaining civil security belongs to military forces from the onset of operations through transition, when host-nation security and police forces assume this role.

2-19. Civil security is resource intense; as a primary stability task, establishing civil security requires more manpower, materiel, and monetary support than any other task. However, civil security is a necessary precursor to success in the other primary stability tasks. Civil security provides the foundation for unified action across the other technical sectors. Well-established and maintained civil security enables efforts in other areas to effect lasting results.

2-20. Establishing or reestablishing competent host-nation security forces is fundamental to providing for the enduring safety and security of the host nation and its population. These forces are developed primarily to counter external threats but may also assist in other key missions including disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, and in special cases, countering certain internal military threats. Developing host-nation security forces is integral to successful stability operations and includes organizing, training, equipping, rebuilding, and advising various components of host-nation security forces. (See chapter 6 for a detailed discussion of security force assistance; see FM 3-24 for doctrine on developing host-nation security forces.)
ESTABLISH CIVIL CONTROL

2-21. Although establishing civil security is the first responsibility of military forces in a stability operation, this can only be accomplished by also restoring civil control. To provide for the safety and security of the populace successfully, the state’s security institutions require an effective judiciary branch complemented with a functioning penal system. Together with governance and civil security, civil control is a core element of security sector reform. This reform sets the foundation for broader governmental and economic reform and successful humanitarian relief and social development. Establishing civil control protects the integrity of the security sector reform program. Civil control tasks prevent corruption that threatens security institutions when they lack the support of judges to apply the law and prisons to incarcerate the convicted.

2-22. Civil control centers on rule of law, supported by efforts to rebuild the host-nation judiciary and corrections systems. It encompasses the key institutions necessary for a functioning justice system, including police, investigative services, prosecutorial arm, and public defense. It includes assisting the state to select an appropriate body of laws to enforce; this is usually the host nation’s most recent criminal code, purged of blatantly abusive statutes. In a fragile state, the legal system typically has ceased to function altogether. Judges and legal professionals are absent, courts and prisons have been looted or destroyed, and any surviving vestiges of the legal system are stripped of essentials. If transitional military authority is instituted, intervening forces likely carry out judicial and correctional functions. (See chapter 5 for a discussion of rule of law under transitional military authority.)

2-23. Developing host-nation capacity for civil control is paramount to establishing the foundation for lasting civil order. Community-based police services that clearly separate the roles of the police and military are essential to success. As with host-nation security forces, the development of police forces proves integral to providing a safe, secure environment for the local populace. Military forces may first need to restore and then maintain civil order until formed police units trained in stability policing skills are available to perform these functions and begin training host-nation police forces.

2-24. As with other elements of the civil security and governance sectors, an appropriate authority vets the judiciary and corrections staff and oversees their activities as part of the security sector reform program. Conducted in parallel with other reform processes, near-term efforts focus on building host-nation capacity by restoring the components of the legal system. Long-term development aims to institutionalize a rule-of-law culture within the government and society. Establishing this culture often relies on the delicate balance between retribution and reconciliation in a state recovering from the effects of collapse. Successful development depends on the ability of the host nation to reconcile with its past—determining whom to punish, whom to forgive, whom to exclude, and whom to accept within the new order of the state.

RESTORE ESSENTIAL SERVICES

2-25. In the aftermath of armed conflict and major disasters, military forces support efforts to establish or restore the most basic civil services. Military forces also protect them until transferring responsibility to a transitional civilian authority or the host nation. In addition, these efforts typically include providing or supporting humanitarian assistance, providing shelter and relief for dislocated civilians, and preventing the spread of epidemic disease. The immediate humanitarian needs of the local populace are a top priority.

2-26. However, activities associated with this primary stability task extend beyond simply restoring local civil services and addressing the effects of humanitarian crises. While military forces generally center their efforts on the initial response tasks that provide for the immediate needs of the populace, other civilian agencies and organizations focus on broader humanitarian issues and social well-being. Typically, local and international aid organizations are already providing assistance, although the security situation or obstacles to free movement may limit their access to all populations. By providing a secure environment, military forces enable these organizations to expand their access to the entire populace and ease the overall burden on the force to provide this assistance in isolation.
SUPPORT GOVERNANCE

2-27. Ultimately, the objective in a stability operation is to leave a society at peace with itself and its regional neighbors. Governance is the process, systems, institutions, and actors that enable a state to function; effective, democratic governance ensures that these are transparent, accountable, and involve public participation. Democratization, while often an end state condition in planning, does not ensure these outcomes. In societies already divided along ethnic, tribal, or religious lines, elections may further polarize factions. Generally, representative institutions based on universal suffrage offer the best means of reconstituting a government acceptable to the majority of the citizens. This is the broad intent of developing host-nation governance.

2-28. Although the United States is home to a secular, representative government with a clear separation of church and state, other states have varying degrees of religious participation in their governments. Countries such as Iran and Saudi Arabia have codified versions of Shari’a (Islamic legislation) with the Quran serving as the foundation for the national constitution. Religion is often a central defining characteristic in the governance process and cannot be discounted by external actors. Ultimately, the form of government adopted must reflect the host-nation customs and culture and not those of the intervening actors.

2-29. Military support to governance focuses on restoring public administration and resuming public services while fostering long-term efforts to establish a functional, effective system of political governance. The support provided by military forces helps to shape the environment for extended unified action by other partners. Their efforts eventually enable the host nation to develop an open political process, a free press, a functioning civil society, and legitimate legal and constitutional frameworks.

SUPPORT ECONOMIC AND INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT

2-30. The economic viability of a state is among the first elements of society to exhibit stress and ultimately fracture as conflict, disaster, or internal strife overwhelms the government. Signs of economic stress include rapid increases in inflation, uncontrolled escalation of public debt, and a general decline in the state’s ability to provide for the well-being of the people. Economic problems are inextricably tied to governance and security concerns. As one institution begins to fail, the others invariably collapse.

2-31. Infrastructure development complements and reinforces efforts to stabilize the economy. It focuses on the society’s physical aspects that enable the state’s economic viability. These physical aspects of infrastructure include engineering and construction services and physical infrastructure in the following sectors:

- Transportation such as roads, railways, airports, and ports and waterways.
- Telecommunications.
- Energy such as natural resources, the electrical power sector, and energy production and distribution.
- Municipal and other public services.

2-32. Accurate, detailed assessment is a key to formulating long-term plans for infrastructure development. Military forces often possess the capability to conduct detailed reconnaissance of the state’s physical infrastructure and serve as an effective tool to inform planning efforts. Infrastructure reconnaissance focuses on gathering technical information on the status of the large-scale public systems, services, and facilities of a country or region necessary for economic activity. It is an important task that facilitates the restoration of essential services as well as spurring economic and infrastructure development. Infrastructure reconnaissance is accomplished in two stages: infrastructure assessment, which is typically associated with the restoration of essential services; and infrastructure survey, which supports economic and infrastructure development. Infrastructure reconnaissance supports the operations process by providing critical information on the quality of the local infrastructure or problems within it, and how those infrastructure issues impact military operations and the affected population. (FM 3-34.170 contains doctrine on infrastructure assessment.)
DEPARTMENT OF STATE POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION TASK FRAMEWORK

2-33. While the Department of State is empowered to lead these efforts on behalf of the Federal government, S/CRS serves as the vehicle for realizing the full potential of the USG in the conduct of stability operations. To that end, S/CRS developed a detailed list of stability-focused tasks, Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks (hereafter referred to as the essential stability task matrix). The essential stability task matrix is an evolving interagency document intended to help planners identify specific requirements to support countries in transition from armed conflict or civil strife to sustaining stability. It serves as a detailed planning tool and will continue to develop as it is implemented during operations.

2-34. The essential stability task matrix provides a menu of post-conflict stability tasks, organized into five sectors that categorize the array of activities that may be involved in an intervention (See figure 1-2). The sectors help to focus and unify reconstruction and stabilization efforts within specific functional areas of society. Depending on the scope, scale, and context of the operation, priorities are established to deconflict activities, focus limited resources, and delineate specific responsibilities. Detailed planning is necessary to integrate and synchronize activities in time and space, identify complementary and reinforcing actions, and prioritize efforts within and across the sectors.

Figure 2-3. Essential stability task sectors

2-35. These sectors form the framework for the USG approach to stability operations, representing the five key areas in which civil-military efforts focused on building host nation capacity. Individually, they reflect the distinct, yet interrelated tasks that constitute reform activities in a functional sector. Collectively, they are the pillars upon which the government frames the possible reconstruction tasks required for nations torn by conflict or disaster. Although some tasks are executed sequentially, success necessitates an approach that focuses on simultaneity—the essence of full spectrum operations. These tasks are inextricably linked; positive results in one sector depend upon the successful integration and synchronization of activities across the other sectors.

Security

2-36. Efforts within the security sector focus on establishing a stable security environment and the development of legitimate institutions and infrastructure to maintain that environment. The foundation for broader success across the other sectors, security also encompasses the provision of the individual and collective security. While securing the lives of local civilians from the violence of conflict and restoring the territorial integrity of the state, intervening forces stabilize the security environment. This stability allows for comprehensive reform efforts that are best accomplished by civilian personnel from other stakeholder agencies and organizations.

2-37. In the most pressing conditions, expeditionary military forces will assume the lead for efforts in the security sector. These efforts are typically focused under the activities reflected in the primary stability
task, *Establish Civil Security*, but also complement and reinforce parallel efforts in other sectors. Ultimately, for the results of these efforts to be lasting, host-nation forces—acting on behalf of the host nation and the people—must provide security.

### Justice and Reconciliation

2-38. The justice and reconciliation sector extends well beyond policing, civil law and order, and the court systems of a state. Efforts within the sector must provide for a fair, impartial, and accountable legal system while ensuring an equitable means to reconcile past crimes and abuse arising from conflict or disaster. Tasks most closely associated with justice focus on reestablishing a functioning police force and judiciary that ensures public safety; those tasks relating to reconciliation address grievances and crimes, past and present, in hopes of forging a more peaceful future for an integrated society.

2-39. A comprehensive approach to justice and reconciliation is central to broader reform efforts across the other sectors. The justice and reconciliation sector is supported by six key elements:

- Effective and scrupulous law enforcement institutions responsive to civilian authority and respectful of human rights and dignity.
- An impartial, open, and accountable judiciary.
- A fair, representative, and equitable body of law.
- Mechanisms for monitoring and upholding human rights.
- A humane, reform-based corrections system.
- Reconciliation mechanisms for resolving past abuses and grievances arising incident to conflict or disaster.

2-40. Successful interventions address the most critical gaps in capability and capacity as soon as possible. Initial response forces that immediately account for vital issues of justice and reconciliation typically maintain the initiative against subversive and criminal elements seeking to fill those gaps. Intervention in the justice and reconciliation sector generally encompasses four categories:

- Predeployment activities intended to facilitate a rapid and effective initial response.
- Initial response activities to institute essential interim justice measures to resolve the most urgent issues of law and order until host-nation processes and institutions are restored.
- Long-term activities that aim to rebuild host nation justice systems and infrastructure.
- The establishment of a system of reconciliation to address grievances and past atrocities.

2-41. The justice and reconciliation sector closely relates to the security and governance sectors; activities in one sector often complement or reinforce efforts in another. This relationship is further reinforced by the inseparable nature of the tasks subordinate to each sector, which reflects the dynamic interaction between security and justice. Due to the close relationships among the activities and functions that comprise the security, governance, and justice and reconciliation sectors, the failure to take quick action in one sector can lead to the loss of momentum and gains in the other sectors.

### Humanitarian Assistance and Social Well-Being

2-42. Conflict and disaster place significant stress on the ability of the state to provide for the essential, immediate humanitarian needs of the people. The institutions of security and governance that enable the effective functioning of public services are among the first to fail, often leading to widespread internal strife and humanitarian crisis. In some areas, the intense competition for limited resources may explode into full-blown conflict, possibly leaving pervasive starvation, disease, and death as the most obvious outward indications of a fragile state in crisis. (See appendix E.)

2-43. Any intervention effort is incomplete if it does not alleviate the immediate suffering of the local populace. Generally, this suffering is understood to include the immediate need for water, food, shelter, emergency health care, sanitation, and protection. However, solutions that focus on sustainability are also necessary to prevent the recurrence of systemic failures while ensuring the social well-being of the people. These solutions establish the foundation for long-term development, resolving the root causes of a conflict
that results in issues such as famine, displaced populations, refugee flows, and human trafficking, while ensuring the lasting effects of these efforts by institutionalizing positive change in society.

Governance and Participation

2-44. The governance and participation sector accounts for the need to establish effective, legitimate political and administrative institutions and infrastructure. Governance is the state’s ability to serve the citizens, including to the rules, processes, and behavior by which interests are articulated, resources are managed, and power is exercised in a society, as well as the representative participatory processes typically guaranteed under inclusive, constitutional governance. Effective governance involves establishing rules and procedures for political decisionmaking, strengthening public sector management and administrative institutions and practices, providing public services in an effective and transparent manner, and providing civil administration that supports lawful private activity and enterprise. Participation includes methods that actively, openly involve the local populace in forming their government structures and policies that, in turn, encourage public debate and the generation and exchange of new ideas.

2-45. Achieving positive, lasting change in society fosters efforts to strengthen democratic participation. Achieving this change enables the people to influence government decisionmaking and hold public leaders accountable for their actions. Activities that develop social capital help local communities influence policies and institutions at local, regional, and national levels. With this assistance, communities establish processes for problem identification, development of proposals to address critical issues, capability and capacity building, community mobilization, rebuilding social networks, and advocacy. These social capital development activities are founded on three pillars:

- **Human rights.** Promoting and protecting social, economic, cultural, political, civil, and other basic human rights.
- **Equity and equality.** Advancing equity and equality of opportunity among citizens in terms of gender, social and economic resources, political representation, ethnicity, and race.

2-46. Response efforts that seek to build local governance and participation capacity ensures host-nation responsibility for these processes. Even when the local populace is deprived of authority or the right to vote, they must be encouraged to take the lead in rebuilding their own government. This is essential to establishing successful, enduring host-nation governance institutions. Even when external actors perform certain governance functions temporarily, a process to build host-nation capacity, complemented by a comprehensive technical assistance program, is vital to long-term success.

2-47. The military may assume the powers of a sovereign governing authority when military forces intervene in the absence of a functioning government, or when the operations of military forces prevent a government from administering to the public sector and providing public of services. Military transitional authority is an interim solution. It is intended to continue only until the host-nation institutions and infrastructure can resume their functions and responsibilities. (Chapter 5 has a detailed discussion of transitional military authority during stability operations.)

Economic Stabilization and Infrastructure Development

2-48. Much of the broader success achieved in stability operations begins at the local level as intervening actors engage the populace with modest economic and governance programs. These programs set the building blocks for comprehensive macro-level, national reform efforts. These efforts aim to build the institutions and processes necessary to ensure the sustained viability of the state. To support the progress of the state from disarray to development, external actors and the host nation address five key areas:

- Establish the regulatory framework that supports basic macroeconomic development.
- Secure and protect the natural resources and energy production and distribution infrastructure of the host nation.
- Engage and involve the private sector in reconstruction.
2-49. Although, conflict and disaster cause significant economic losses and disrupt economic activity, they also create opportunities for economic reform and restructuring out of the chaos they create. In fragile states, conditions of the environment and elites who benefit from the existing economic structure can discourage the growth of trade and investment, stifle private sector development, and limit opportunities for employment and workforce growth. In fragile states, crises weaken or destroy economic structures and thus provide an opportunity to stimulate the recovery and reconstruction process by involving the international community in the comprehensive, integrated humanitarian and economic development programs required to achieve sustained success. Ultimately, such can reduce the likelihood of a return to violent conflict while restoring valuable economic and social capital to the host nation.

2-50. The economic recovery of the host nation is inextricably linked to effective governance. Sound economic policy supported by legitimate, effective governance fosters recovery, growth, and investment. Typically, this begins at the local level as markets and enterprises are reestablished, the workforce is engaged, and public and private investment restored. These events help to stabilize the host-nation currency and reduce unemployment, thus providing the tax base necessary to support the recovery of the host-nation treasury. In turn, this enables the host-nation government fund the public institutions and services that provide for the social and economic well-being of the people.

STABILITY OPERATIONS FRAMEWORK

2-51. In capstone Army doctrine, the continuum of operations sets the broad framework for full spectrum operations. Combining the spectrum of conflict with the operational themes, it provides a construct for describing the major operation underway in an area of operations. This construct links conditions of the operational environment to the appropriate combination of offensive, defensive, and stability tasks required to accomplish the mission.

THE FAILED STATES SPECTRUM

2-52. The spectrum of conflict serves as the backdrop for the continuum of operations and Army operations. It describes the prevailing conditions of the operational environment in terms of violence, spanning an ascending scale from stable peace to general war. (See figure 2-3.) In practice, the level of violence in the operational environment does not rise and fall according to a smooth, graduated scale; it may escalate with little or no warning or descend from a state of general war to stable peace in a relatively short period. Ultimately, the spectrum of conflict is a tool used to gauge the level of politically-motivated violence in an operational environment. As a tool, it can determine the appropriate role of military forces in conflict intervention. (See FM 3-0 for a discussion of the spectrum of conflict.)

![Figure 2-4. The spectrum of conflict](image)

2-53. During stability operations, engagement and intervention activities are better defined in terms of the progress toward stabilizing the operational environment. Using the broad spectrum that describes fragile states, figure 2-4 illustrates conditions that characterize an operational environment during stability operations. (See chapter 1 for a discussion of fragile states.) This spectrum also defines the environment according to two quantifiable, complimentary scales: decreasing violence and increasing normalization of the state. Although fragile states do not recover from conflict or disaster according to a smooth, graduated...
scale, this spectrum provides a means with which to gauge conditions of an operational environment, formulate an engagement methodology, and measure progress toward success.

**Figure 2-5. The failed states spectrum**

2-54. Military forces can engage at any point along this spectrum. In each case, achieving the end state requires quickly reducing the level of violence while creating conditions that support safely introducing other government agencies and intergovernmental organizations while securing critical humanitarian access for nongovernmental organizations. Military operations focus on stabilizing the environment and transforming conditions of the environment and the state toward normalization. In a failed or failing state, conditions typically require more coercive actions to eliminate threats and reduce violence. As conditions of the environment begin to improve, the constructive capabilities of military forces focus toward building host-nation capacity and encouraging sustained development.

**THE STABILITY OPERATIONS FRAMEWORK**

2-55. The stability spectrum is a critical tool for understanding and prioritizing the broad range of tasks that embody unified action in an operational environment characterized by a fragile state. These tasks—categorized in the S/CRS essential stability task matrix as initial response, transformation, and fostering sustainability—collectively represent the post-conflict actions necessary to achieve security and reestablish stable, lasting peace. Together, the stability spectrum and the essential stability task matrix task categories provide the basic framework for stability operations. This framework characterizes the operational environment, defines the types and range of tasks performed in that environment, and provides a tool with which to measure progress toward the desired end state. (See figure 2-5.)

**Figure 2-6. The stability operations framework**
This framework encompasses all of the tasks performed by military forces during stability operations. Initial response tasks range from stabilizing the operational environment in the aftermath of a violent conflict to tasks that support fostering sustainability in a recovering state. The framework serves as a guide to understanding the effort and commitment necessary to rebuild a nation torn by conflict or disaster, yet also provides a tool to shape activities during peacetime military engagement. The tasks performed during a stability operation include the following:

- **Initial response tasks** generally reflect tasks executed to stabilize the operational environment in a crisis state. Military forces typically perform initial response tasks during or directly after a conflict or disaster where the security situation does not allow for the introduction of civilian personnel. Initial response tasks aim to provide a safe, secure environment, thus allowing the force to attend to the immediate humanitarian needs of the host-nation population. They support efforts to reduce the level of violence and human suffering while creating conditions that enable other actors to participate safely in ongoing efforts.

- **Transformation tasks** represent the broad range of post-conflict stabilization, reconstruction, and capacity-building tasks performed in a relatively secure environment free from most wide-scale violence. Transformation tasks may be executed in either crisis or vulnerable states. These tasks aim to build host-nation capacity across multiple sectors. These tasks are essential to ensuring the continued stability of the environment while establishing conditions that facilitate broad unified action to rebuild the host nation and its supporting institutions.

- **Fostering sustainability tasks** encompass long-term efforts that capitalize on capacity building and reconstruction activities to establish conditions that enable sustainable development. Military forces usually perform these tasks only when the security environment is stable enough to support efforts to implement the long-term programs that commit to the viability of the institutions and economy of the host nation.

The stability operations framework helps to emphasize the training and organization of forces prior to initial deployment and later during force generation. It spurs design and planning, serving as an engagement paradigm that frames response efforts and scopes the tasks required to accomplish the mission. In the simplest terms, it is a guide to action in stability operations.

**LINKING MILITARY AND CIVILIAN EFFORTS**

The unity of effort necessary for a successful whole of government approach is attained through close, continuous coordination and cooperation among the actors involved in a stability operation. This is necessary to overcome internal discord, inadequate structures and procedures, incompatible or underdeveloped communications infrastructure, cultural differences, and bureaucratic and personnel limitations. Within the United States Government, the National Security Strategy guides the development, integration, and coordination of all the instruments of national power to accomplish national objectives.

At the national level, the Department of State leads the effort to support interagency coordination. During stability operations, the essential stability task matrix makes this coordination easier. This matrix forms the broad task framework that helps attain unity of effort across the sectors toward a common end state. The end state reestablishes a secure, lasting peace; a viable market economy; and a legitimate host-nation government capable of providing for its populations’ essential needs. When this framework is joined with the primary tasks that comprise the stability element of full spectrum operations, they constitute a single, integrated model for a whole of government approach.
2-60. Linking the basic military and civilian task frameworks creates a single model. This model serves as the underpinning for a comprehensive approach to stability operations founded on integrated, whole-of-government engagement. Thus, the conduct of full spectrum operations in support of a broader campaign contributes toward the shared end state established by the stakeholders. On a fundamental level, the execution of discreet military tasks is linked to a coordinated, comprehensive effort. This ensures that the efforts of military forces are integral to whole-of-government engagement. These efforts unite in the pursuit of a common goal and shared understanding of the desired end state. A clear delineation and understanding of the formal lines of authority enhances unity of effort. These tasks are nested within a framework of unified action and, together with the activities of the other participants, contribute to unity of effort with the diverse array of actors involved in any collaborative effort.
Chapter 3

Essential Stability Tasks

Many stability operations tasks are best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals. Nonetheless, U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so. ... The long-term goal is to help develop indigenous capacity for securing essential services, a viable market economy, rule of law, democratic institutions, and a robust civil society.

Department of Defense Directive 3000.05

3-1. Military forces are organized, trained, and equipped to be modular, versatile, and rapidly deployable. They are tailored for expeditionary operations, easily task-organized, and continuously self-sufficient. These unique expeditionary capabilities allow for prompt movement into any operational environment worldwide, even the most austere regions. Expeditionary military forces can conduct operations without delay; they can deliver decisive combat power with little advance warning.

3-2. In an operational environment with unstable security conditions in which the host-nation government has either failed or is unable to function effectively, a military force may be the only substantial stabilizing presence. In these conditions, the force must be prepared to perform all of the tasks essential to establishing and maintaining security and order while providing for the essential needs of the populace. In most situations, local and international aid organizations will be present in the joint operations area but may have limited access to the population. Military forces can significantly contribute to increasing the access, thereby reducing the substantial logistics burden while enabling the force to focus on providing a safe, secure environment.

3-3. This is the essence of full spectrum operations: Army forces combine offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations simultaneously as part of an interdependent joint force to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative, accepting prudent risk to create opportunities to achieve decisive results. Army forces employ synchronized action—lethal and nonlethal—proportionate to the mission and informed by a thorough understanding of all dimensions of the operational environment. Mission command that conveys intent and an appreciation of all aspects of the situation guides the adaptive use of Army forces (FM 3-0). Offensive and defensive tasks focus on the destructive effects of combat power; stability tasks emphasize constructive effects.

IDENTIFYING ESSENTIAL TASKS

3-4. Success in stability operations depends on the commander’s ability to identify the tasks essential to mission success. Success also depends on the commander’s ability to prioritize and sequence the execution of those tasks with available combat power, the diverse array of actors participating, and the ability of the host nation to accept change. Even more so than in the offense and defense, stability operations require commanders to demonstrate cultural astuteness and a clear understanding of the myriad stability tasks to determine which are truly essential to mission success.

3-5. The commander and staff identify essential stability tasks based on due consideration of the relevant mission variables. (See FM 3-0 for a discussion of mission variables.) Essential stability tasks are those that the force must successfully execute to accomplish the specific mission. These essential tasks include the specified and implied tasks required to establish the end state conditions that define success. They include primary and subordinate stability tasks and supporting information engagement tasks that inform and influence a wide array of audiences. In addition, they include any essential offensive and defensive tasks associated with the defeat of an enemy force. Typically, these are initial response tasks for which
military forces retain primary responsibility. Other tasks may be included that are not the primary responsibility of military forces. Some tasks are executed simultaneously and some sequentially.

3-6. For the commander and staff, stability operations require a unique combination of knowledge and understanding, the ability to achieve unity of effort, and a thorough depth of cultural astuteness. A finite amount of combat power is available to apply against the essential tasks associated with a given stability operation. Essential stability tasks lay the foundation for success of the other instruments of national power. This foundation must sustain the burdens of governance, rule of law, and economic development that represent the future viability of a state. Establishing this foundation depends on applying combat power to the essential stability tasks identified during the initial assessment of the situation and framing of the basic problem. Decisions about using combat power are more than a factor of the size of the force deployed, its relative composition, and the anticipated nature and duration of the mission. Assuring a state’s long-term stability depends on applying combat power to those tasks that are, in fact, essential.

SEIZING THE INITIATIVE

3-7. Success in stability operations also depends on military forces seizing the initiative. In fragile states, the sudden appearance of military forces typically produces a combination of shock and relief among the local populace. Resistance is unorganized and potential adversaries are unsure of what course of action to take. This malleable situation is often referred to as the “golden hour” that follows in the wake of conflict, disaster, or internal strife. In this moment, the force has the greatest opportunity to seize the initiative. By quickly dictating the terms of action and driving positive change in the environment, military forces improve the security situation and create opportunities for civilian agencies and organizations to contribute. Immediate action to stabilize the situation and provide for the immediate humanitarian needs of the people begins the processes that lead to a lasting peace.

3-8. Initiative embodies the offensive spirit of the military force; it is at the heart of seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative. This spirit is fundamental to how the force operates in any situation and serves to guide leaders in performing their duties. The force embraces risk to create opportunity. It relentlessly sets the tone and tempo of operations to ensure decisive results. Seizing the initiative within the context of a fragile state or after a disaster requires an appropriately sized expeditionary force with a broad mix of capabilities applicable to the situation. That expeditionary force may require the capability and capacity to either support or institute a transitional military authority and the support structure to provide for the well-being of the population. The tasks discussed in this chapter serve as a basis for determining the commander’s essential task list.

PRIMARY STABILITY TASKS

3-9. Stability operations aim to stabilize the environment enough so the host nation can begin to resolve the root causes of conflict and state failure. These operations establish a safe, secure environment that facilitates reconciliation among local or regional adversaries. Stability operations aim to establish conditions that support the transition to legitimate host-nation governance, a functioning civil society, and a viable market economy. See figure 3-1.
3-10. The size of the force and combination of tasks necessary to stabilize conditions depend on the situation in the operational area. When a functional, effective host-nation government exists, military forces work through and with local civil authorities. Together they restore stability and order, and may be required to reform the security institutions that foster long-term development. In this situation, the size of the force and the scope of the mission are more limited. However, in a worst-case engagement scenario, the security environment is in chaos and the state is in crisis or has failed altogether. In this situation, international law requires the military force to focus on essential tasks that establish a safe, secure environment and address the immediate humanitarian needs of the local populace. This requires a force capable of securing borders, protecting the population, regulating the behavior of individuals or groups that pose a security risk, reestablishing essential services, and providing critical humanitarian assistance.

3-11. Military forces provide support to facilitate the execution of tasks for which the host nation is normally responsible. Typically, these tasks have a security component ideally performed by military forces or a private security company. However, military forces sometimes provide logistic, medical, or administrative support to enable the success of civilian agencies and organizations. These tasks generally fall into one of three categories, representing the collective effort associated with a stability operation:

- Tasks for which military forces retain primary responsibility.
- Tasks for which civilian agencies or organizations likely retain responsibility, but military forces are prepared to execute.
- Tasks for which civilian agencies or organizations retain primary responsibility.

3-12. Only those essential tasks for which military forces retain primary responsibility or must be prepared to execute are listed in this chapter.

3-13. Stability tasks are further subdivided according to their relative execution timeframe. Execution timeframes typically fall into one of three subcategories:

- Initial response tasks that represent early efforts to stabilize the situation. The environment often lacks security, civil order, and basic services. In this environment, military forces may perform the majority of the initial response tasks, either during or in the immediate aftermath of conflict or disaster. Typically, these initial response tasks are performed in cooperation with nongovernmental organizations, which usually remain in operational areas regardless of the security situation. However, the nonpermissive nature of the security environment may limit humanitarian access, thus preventing some civilian agencies from performing the critical and immediate tasks required to stabilize the situation. As the situation is stabilized and the environment becomes more permissive, these agencies and organizations assume an increasing role in initial response tasks.
Chapter 3
(Symposium Draft—NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION)

- Transformation tasks that generally reflect post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization activities. The environment has military and civil organizations generating sufficient capability and capacity to provide basic security and basic services. The host-nation government is not yet able to attain sustainable peace on its own.
- Fostering sustainability tasks that represent long-term reconstruction and development efforts. The environment has a legitimate and capable government or transitional authority providing the key services and developing sustained relationships with other countries.

3-14. Within each technical sector, these tasks are defined in terms of the desired end state conditions for a specific execution time frame. For example, initial response tasks executed in the security sector focus on establishing a safe and secure environment. Finally, the five primary tasks are broken down into major subcategories that facilitate coordination of related activities.

**ESTABLISH CIVIL SECURITY**

3-15. Establishing a safe, secure, and stable environment for the local populace is a key to obtaining their support for the overall stability operation. Such an environment allows the introduction of the civilian agencies and organizations whose efforts ensure long-term success. When the people have confidence in the security sector providing for their safety, they offer the cooperation required to control crime and subversive behavior, defeat insurgents, and limit the effects of adversaries. For political and economic reform efforts to be successful, people, goods, and livestock must be able to circulate within the region.

3-16. Within the security sector, initial response tasks aim to establish a safe and secure environment; transformation tasks focus on developing legitimate and stable security institutions; and fostering sustainability tasks consolidate host-nation capacity building activities. These conditions define success within the sector but also reflect the end state that ensures the foundation for enduring stability and peace.

**Enforce Cessation of Hostilities, Peace Agreements, and Other Arrangements**

3-17. The tasks associated with this subcategory provide stability after a conflict while setting the preconditions for beginning disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. The tasks help military forces establish a sustained peace by focusing on processes and activities fundamental to conflict prevention. The list of essential tasks may include—

- An initial response in which military forces—
  - Enforce ceasefires.
  - Supervise disengagement of belligerent forces.
  - Identify and neutralize potential adversaries.
  - Provide security for negotiations.
- Transformation in which military forces establish and control buffers, including demilitarized zones.

**Determine Disposition and Constitution of National Armed and Intelligence Services**

3-18. The tasks within this subcategory establish the conditions for a successful security sector reform program. These tasks focus on the security and intelligence institutions that form the underpinnings of an effective security sector. They provide the broad guidance and direction for the training and advising effort central to security sector reform. The list of essential tasks may include—

- An initial response in which military forces—
  - Implement a plan for disposition of host-nation forces, intelligence services, and other national security institutions.
  - Identify future roles, missions, and structure.
  - Vet senior officers and other individuals for past abuses and criminal activity.
- Transformation in which military forces—
  - Conduct security force assistance.
Establish defense institutions.

Fostering sustainability in which military forces—

- Provide conventional security assistance programs.
- Establish military-to-military programs with host-nation forces and services.

Conduct Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration

3-19. A disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program is fundamental to most efforts to establish stability and lasting peace. It includes physically disbanding armed groups, removing the means of combat from former combatants and belligerents, and reintegrating them into society. These groups include men, women, and children. Many do not carry weapons; however, they service the fighting forces. Their communities and families perceive them as part of an armed group. Together, the tasks of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration reduce the possibility of a resurgence of armed conflict. Additionally, these tasks provide a means for these individuals and groups to reenter society as contributing members.

3-20. While the tasks that support the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program generally fall under civil security, the program itself represents one element of a comprehensive security sector reform program. (See chapter 6 for a detailed discussion of security sector reform.) The list of essential tasks may include—

- An initial response in which military forces—
  - Negotiate arrangements with belligerents.
  - Establish and enforce weapons control programs, including collection and destruction.
  - Provide reassurances and incentives for disarmed factions.
  - Establish monitoring program.
  - Establish demobilization camps.
  - Ensure adequate health, food provisions, and security for belligerents.
- Transformation in which military forces—
  - Disarm former combatants and belligerents.
  - Reduce availability of unauthorized weapons.
  - Ensure safety of quartered personnel and families.
- Fostering sustainability in which military forces—
  - Secure, store, and dispose of weapons.
  - Develop host-nation arms control capacity.
  - Reintegrate former combatants into society.

Conduct Border Control, Boundary Security, and Freedom of Movement

3-21. A central component of the security sector is the ability of the state to monitor and regulate its borders. Generally, border and coast guard forces secure national boundaries while customs officials regulate the flow of people, animals, and goods across state borders. These border controls are necessary to regulate immigration, control the movements of the local populace, collect excise taxes or duties, limit smuggling, and control the spread of disease vectors through quarantine. The list of essential tasks may include—

- An initial response in which military forces—
  - Establish border security.
  - Establish and disseminate rules relevant to movement.
  - Dismantle roadblocks and establish checkpoints.
  - Ensure freedom of movement.
- Transformation in which military forces train and equip border control and boundary security forces.
Support Identification Programs

3-22. Identification programs complement efforts to vet host-nation personnel, encourage participation in representative government, resolve property disputes, and validate professional credentials. Although vital to other programs for rebuilding a functioning civil society, identification programs are equally important to the security sector. After the collapse of an authoritarian or hostile regime, these programs ensure that potential adversaries are not inadvertently reintegrated into society. Thus, they are deprived of the ability to provide the seeds for future organized sabotage, subversion, or insurgency. The list of essential tasks may include—

- An initial response in which military forces—
  - Secure documents relating to personal identification, property ownership, court records, voter registries, professional certificates, birth records, and driving licenses.
  - Establish identification program.
  - Ensure individuals have personal forms of identification.
- Transformation in which military forces develop mechanisms for long-term dispute resolution.

Protect Reconstruction and Stabilization Personnel and Facilities

3-23. Increasingly, the operational environment includes many actors that include joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational, and other agencies, organizations, and institutions. This is the nature of unified action. The capabilities and actions of multiple partners are integrated, synchronized, and coordinated to achieve unity of effort. When required, military forces may extend protection and support to other actors and stakeholders to ensure their continued contribution to the overall stability operation; in the interest of transparency, this protection typically must be requested and negotiated. The list of essential tasks may include an initial response in which military forces—

- Protect government-sponsored civilian reconstruction and stabilization personnel.
- Protect contractor and civilian reconstruction and stabilization personnel and resources.
- Provide emergency logistic support, as required.

Clear Explosive Hazards

3-24. In a state already burdened by collapsed institutions of central government, the presence of explosive hazards (to include minefields and unexploded explosive ordnance) inflicts stress that the surviving institutions cannot bear. These explosive hazards restrict freedom of movement, hinder international trade, and detract from the ability of a fragile state to secure its borders and boundaries. Military forces may clear unexploded explosive ordnance and other explosive hazards to facilitate capacity building activities. Removing these hazards ensures the safety, security, and well-being of the local populace. (Fm 3-24.210 includes tactics, techniques, and procedures for clearing explosive hazards.) The list of essential tasks may include—

- An initial response in which military forces—
  - Conduct emergency clearing of mines, unexploded explosive ordnance, and other explosive hazards. (US military personnel may assist and train others in demining techniques and procedures, but are prohibited by federal statute from detecting, lifting, or destroying land mines unless done for the concurrent purpose of supporting a US military operation.
  - Conduct mapping and surveys of mined areas, unexploded explosive ordnance, and other explosive hazards.
  - Mark minefields, unexploded explosive ordnance, and other explosive hazards.
- Transformation in which military forces—
  - Create host-nation capacity to conduct demining.
  - Develop host nation capability to export demining expertise.
ESTABLISH CIVIL CONTROL

3-25. Military support to justice and reconciliation encompasses a broad range of activities, most of them inherent to security sector reform. Justice and reconciliation activities may include enacting interim legal codes, providing trainers and advisors for police and legal professionals, resolving property disputes, supporting human rights initiatives, restoring the corrections system, and supporting reconciliation efforts. However, the greatest contribution may come in the form of military support to governance—restoring the basic functions of the civil government after state failure.

3-26. Within the justice and reconciliation technical sector, initial civil control response tasks aim to develop interim mechanisms for establishing rule of law. Transformation tasks focus on restoring the legal system and processes for reconciliation. Fostering sustainability tasks serve to establish a legitimate, functioning legal system founded on international norms. These conditions define success within the sector while reflecting the end state necessary to ensure the foundation for enduring stability and peace.

Establish Public Order and Safety

3-27. The tasks within this category provide a broad range of activities to protect the civilian populace, provide interim policing and crowd control, and secure critical infrastructure. These tasks represent actions that must occur both during and after direct armed conflict to ensure the long-term sustainability of any reform efforts. A direct correlation exists between speed and effectiveness in performing these tasks and the length of time required to return the host nation to a normal state. Executing these tasks as soon as practical after intervening reduces the time required for related efforts and allows the mission to be accomplished far sooner. The list of essential tasks may include—

- An initial response in which military forces—
  - Protect vulnerable elements of the population (such as dislocated civilians).
  - Ensure humanitarian aid and security forces have access to endangered populations and refugee camps.
  - Perform civil police functions, including investigating crimes and making arrests.
  - Locate and safeguard key witnesses, documents, and other evidence related to key ongoing or potential investigations and prosecutions.
  - Control crowds, prevent looting, and manage civil disturbances.
  - Protect and secure places of religious worship and cultural sites.
  - Protect and secure critical infrastructure, natural resources, civil registries, and property ownership documents.
  - Protect and secure strategically important institutions (such as government buildings; medical and public health infrastructure; the central bank, national treasury, and integral commercial banks; and museums and religious sites).
  - Secure facilities, records, storage equipment, and funds related to criminal justice and security institutions.
  - Identify, secure, protect, and coordinate disposition for stockpiles of conventional materiel and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear and material, pre-cursors, facilities, and adversaries with technical expertise.
  - Secure military depots, equipment, ammunition dumps, and means of communication.
- Transformation in which military forces—
  - Build host-nation capacity to protect military infrastructure.
  - Build host-nation capacity to protect infrastructure and public institutions.
  - Build host-nation capacity for emergency response.
- Fostering sustainability in which military forces identify modernization needs and the means to achieve them.
Establish Interim Criminal Justice System

3-28. When conditions require the restoration of governance, establishing an interim justice system is a necessary prerequisite. This restoration requires a wide range of skilled professionals, including judges, prosecutors, court administrators, corrections personnel, law enforcement, and investigators. Together, these personnel—and the institutions they represent—provide a temporary respite allowing the host nation to restore its capacity. The list of essential tasks may include—

- An initial response in which military forces—
  - Deploy interim justice personnel to supplement host-nation criminal justice system.
  - Enact interim legal codes and procedures permitted by international law.
  - Assess host-nation capacity to combat organized crime.
- Transformation in which a transitional military authority dispenses justice in central or sensitive jurisdictions.

Support Law Enforcement and Police Reform

3-29. Integral to the security sector reform program is the support military forces provide to law enforcement and policing operations. Host-nation civil law enforcement agencies and organizations may provide this capability if the security environment permits. However, in a fragile state, these institutions likely become corrupt or fail altogether. In failed states, especially during and immediately after conflict, military police forces, at times augmented by civilian law enforcement personnel, are typically the only organizations with the capability and capacity to fill this void.

3-30. The preferred providers of civil law enforcement services are civilian police, augmented as required by military and paramilitary police units with stability policing capabilities. Military forces may be required to perform these services on an interim basis, until the situation permits the transition of this function to nonmilitary agencies or organizations. The list of essential tasks may include—

- An initial response in which military forces—
  - Identify, secure, and preserve evidence of war crimes, crimes against humanity, corruption, and transnational crime (terrorism, organized crime, human trafficking, and narcotics).
  - Identify and detain perpetrators of these offences.
  - Vet, credential, and account for host-nation police forces.
  - Deploy police trainers and advisors.
  - Inventory and assess police facilities and systems.
- Transformation in which military forces—
  - Train and advise host-nation police forces.
  - Establish police academies.
  - Develop community interface forums.
  - Rehabilitate or construct necessary facilities.

Support Judicial Reform

3-31. The reform of judicial bodies is integral to rule of law and provides the necessary framework for security sector reform. The support provided to judicial institutions parallels efforts with police and security forces to enhance the state’s capability in the security sector. Under most circumstances, other agencies and organizations typically support the development of the judicial branch of the government. In a failed state, however, military forces may initially perform these functions and can be a critical enabler of success over time. The list of essential tasks may include—

- An initial response in which military forces—
  - Identify host-nation legal professionals.
  - Identify actual and potential leaders to incorporate into reform process.
  - Establish vetting criteria.
  - Educate criminal justice personnel on interim legal codes.
Essential Stability Tasks
(Symposium Draft—NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION)

- Inventory and assess courts, law schools, legal libraries, and bar associations.
- Deploy judicial advisors and liaisons.
- Transformation in which military forces—
  - Rehabilitate or construct necessary facilities.
  - Vet host-nation legal professionals.

Support Property Dispute Resolution Processes

3-32. One of the most vital services provided by the judiciary branch is the resolution of property disputes. In a fragile state, long-standing disputes over ownership and control of property are common. Authorities must implement dispute resolution mechanisms. This prevents the escalation of violence that can occur in the absence of law and order as people seek resolution on their own terms. Typically, the military’s role in resolving disputes is limited to transitional military authority where these mechanisms are implemented in the absence of a functioning host-nation government. The list of essential tasks may include an initial response in which military forces—
  - Implement mechanisms to prevent unauthorized occupation or seizure of land or property.
  - Publicize dispute resolution process.
  - Coordinate dispute resolution process to deter violence and retribution.

Support Legal System Reform

3-33. Legal system reform, much like other reform processes, is integral to a comprehensive rule of law program and is necessary for successful security sector reform. Within the legal system, reform activities aim to reorganize basic structures, update legal statutes, encourage citizen participation, and ultimately achieve broad institutional reform. These activities are instrumental to establishing a legal system the local populace perceives as legitimate. The list of essential tasks may include an initial response in which military forces—
  - Develop strategy to rebuild criminal justice system.
  - Determine local due process norms and expectations.
  - Develop awareness of notice and comment forums.
  - Review current laws and resolve questions of applicability.
  - Abolish provisions incompatible with international standards of human rights.
  - Translate interim and important laws into local languages.
  - Assess court administration capability and resources.

Support Human Rights Initiatives

3-34. Often, forces that intervene after conflict or disaster encounter conditions of human suffering beyond their ability to resolve. Such situations require the dedicated support of intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations with the capacity to provide long-term solutions to complex humanitarian issues. The military contribution to these efforts generally involves preventing further abuse of vulnerable populations and establishing the conditions that enable the success of the agencies and organizations that provide for the long-term well-being of these populations. The list of essential tasks may include an initial response in which military forces monitor vulnerable groups and act preemptively to deter human rights abuses.

Support Corrections Reform

3-35. As with other reform processes, corrections reform is an integral component of security sector reform. Corrections reform tasks focus on building host-nation capacity in the penal system, restoring the institutional infrastructure, and providing oversight on the incarceration of prisoners. Tasks also include a comprehensive review of the prisoner population to help reintegrate political prisoners and others unjustly detained or held without due process. The list of essential tasks may include—
  - An initial response in which military forces—
Identify and register all detention, correction, or rehabilitative facilities.
- Preserve and secure penal administrative records and reports.
- Inventory and assess prison population and conditions.
- Implement humanitarian standards and provisions.
- Provide emergency detention facilities.
- Vet corrections personnel.
- Deploy penal trainers and advisors.
- Refurbish prison facilities at key sites.
- Coordinate jurisdiction and handover.
- Facilitate international monitoring.
- Transformation in which military forces—
  - Rebuild corrections institutions.
  - Train and advise corrections personnel to internationally accepted standards.
  - Develop reconciliation, parole, and reintegration mechanisms.

Support War Crimes Courts and Tribunals

3-36. While the military government operates military commissions and provost courts, the international community oversees the conduct of war crimes courts and tribunals. As part of the broad processes that represent legal system reform, military forces identify, secure, and preserve evidence for courts and tribunals of war crimes and crimes against humanity. However, military forces also provide support in other forms, to include helping to establish courts and tribunals, supporting the investigation and arrest of war criminals, and coordinating efforts with other agencies and organizations. The list of essential tasks may include—
- An initial response in which military forces—
  - Acquire secure facilities.
  - Establish atrocity reporting system.
  - Document and preserve evidence of mass atrocities.
  - Publish progress reports.
  - Publish indictments and statements.
- Transformation in which military forces—
  - Assist in investigation, arrest, and transfer or suspects to international courts.
  - Ensure witness protection.
  - Support media access.

Support Public Outreach and Community Rebuilding Programs

3-37. Public outreach and community rebuilding programs are central to the reconciliation process. They provide the local populace with a means to form a cohesive society. While these programs generally do not involve substantial military involvement, some activities require the force’s support to achieve success. The list of essential tasks may include an initial response in which military forces—
- Establish broad public information programs to promote reconciliation efforts.
- Develop public access to information.
- Identify customary judicial practices, religious institutions, and other leaders on local and national levels.
- Assess needs of vulnerable populations.

RESTORE ESSENTIAL SERVICES

3-38. The activities associated with this primary stability task extend beyond simply restoring local civil services and addressing the effects of humanitarian crises. While military forces generally center efforts on
the initial response tasks for immediate needs of the populace, other civilian agencies and organizations focus on broader humanitarian issues and social well-being. Transformation tasks establish the foundation for long-term development, resolving the root causes of conflict that lead to events such as famine, displaced populations, refugee flows, and human trafficking. Fostering sustainability tasks ensure the permanence of those efforts by institutionalizing positive change in society.

3-39. Normally, military forces support host-nation and civilian relief agencies with these efforts. However, when the host nation cannot perform its roles, military forces may execute these tasks directly or in support of other civilian agencies and organizations. It is imperative that these activities are properly scaled to local capacity for sustainment and to create maximum opportunity for the creation of small-scale enterprises by the local populace to provide as many of these essential services as possible through the private economy. It is almost always a mistake to construct large-scale projects that require complicated efforts to sustain.

**Restore Essential Civil Services**

3-40. Although closely related to establishing and supporting effective local governance, efforts to restore essential civil services involve developing host-nation capacity to operate, maintain, and improve those services. This broader focus involves a societal component that encompasses long-range education and training, employment programs, and economic investment and development.

3-41. At the tactical level, activities of military forces to restore essential civil services are often defined in terms of the immediate humanitarian needs of the people: providing the essential food, water, shelter, and medical support necessary to sustain the population until local civil services are restored. Once their immediate needs are satisfied, operations typically progress using lines of effort based on the memory aid, SWEAT-MSO (sewage, water, electricity, academics, trash, medical, safety, and other considerations). Lines of effort are vital to integrating efforts to reestablish local civil services with similar, related actions to establish a safe and secure environment. Military forces, specifically functional units or functional specialists, may support the effort to restore essential civil services by conducting detailed infrastructure reconnaissance. The list of essential tasks may include—

- An initial response in which military forces—
  - Provide for immediate humanitarian needs of the population (food, water, shelter, and medical support).
  - Ensure proper sanitation, purification, and distribution of drinking water.
  - Provide interim sanitation, wastewater, and waste disposal services.

- Transformation in which military forces build host-nation capacity to operate and maintain essential civil services.

**Tasks Related to Civilian Dislocation**

3-42. The following four task subcategories share similar characteristics related to the challenges associated with dislocated civilians. Intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations are best equipped and trained to manage the human crises associated with dislocated civilians. Intergovernmental organizations include the United Nations, the International Organization for Migration, and the International Committee of the Red Cross. Nongovernmental organizations include Cooperative Assistance for Relief Everywhere and others.

3-43. The presence and uncontrolled flow of dislocated civilians can threaten the success of any stability operation. Dislocated civilians are symptoms of broader issues such as conflict, insecurity, and disparities among the population. How displaced populations are treated can either foster trust and confidence—laying the foundation for stabilization and recovery among a traumatized population—or create resentment and further chaos. Local and international aid organizations are often best equipped to deal with the needs of the local populace but require a secure environment in which to operate. Through close cooperation, military forces can enable the success of these organizations in providing critical assistance to the populace.
3-44. Nearly eighty percent of all dislocated civilians are women or children. Most suffer from some form of post-traumatic stress disorder, and all require food, shelter, and medical care. Following a major disaster, humanitarian crisis, or conflict, dislocated civilians present a challenge beyond the capability of military forces. Therefore, military forces offer vital support, coordinated with the efforts of other agencies and organizations to provide humanitarian assistance to the general population. The list of essential tasks may include—

- Assist displaced persons.
- Support refugee assistance.
- Support assistance to dislocated civilians.
- Support security to dislocated civilians camp.

**Assist Dislocated Civilians**

3-45. When assisting displaced persons, military forces—

- Ensure humanitarian access to populations in need.
- Estimate food aid needs for affected populations.
- Assess the adequacy of local physical transport, distribution, and storage.

**Support Assistance to Dislocated Civilians**

3-46. When supporting dislocated civilians assistance, the list of essential tasks may include—

- An initial response in which military forces—
  - Estimate food aid needs for dislocated civilians.
  - Assess the adequacy of local physical transport, distribution, and storage.
  - Provide humanitarian assistance, including emergency food, water, sanitation, shelter, and medicine.
  - Establish camps for dislocated civilians.
- Transformation in which military forces ensure access to basic services, including education and health care.

**Support Security to Dislocated Civilians Camp**

3-47. When supporting dislocated civilians camp security, the list of essential tasks may include—

- An initial response in which military forces—
  - Ensure adequate protection and monitoring.
  - Ensure humanitarian aid and security forces access to camps.
- Transformation in which military forces establish and maintain order in camps.

**Support Famine Prevention and Emergency Food Relief Programs**

3-48. Famine-prone countries are a unique subcategory of fragile states and require special focus. Without exception, weak and failing economic, governance, health, and food systems at the national level increase famine vulnerability. The combination of shocks, failing systems, environmental change, and poor policies in these countries often results in famine. Famine may result in food insecurity, increased poverty, morbidity, malnutrition, and mortality. Government agencies—such as the United States Agency for International Development—numerous nongovernmental organizations, and the United Nations are instrumental to response efforts in famine-prone states, overseeing the major relief programs that provide emergency food aid to suffering populations.

3-49. Military support of these efforts is minimal but vital to the overall success of the operation. The list of essential tasks may include—

- An initial response in which military forces—
  - Monitor and analyze food security and market prices.
  - Predict the effects of conflict on access to food.
Estimate total food needs.
Assess the adequacy of local physical transport, distribution, and storage.
Deliver emergency food to most vulnerable populations.
Assess the effects of weather and climate on transportation networks and storage facilities.
Transformation in which military forces establish transportation and distribution networks.

Support Shelter and Nonfood Relief Programs

3-50. Military forces offer significant support capability to the broader effort to provide adequate shelter and nonfood relief during humanitarian crises. Any shelter intervention for dislocated civilians should be closely coordinated with the relevant host-nation ministry, United Nations agency, and appropriate aid organizations. Although the related tasks are minimal, they exert a great influence on the long-term success of these efforts. The list of essential tasks may include—

- An initial response in which military forces—
  - Secure emergency nonfood relief distribution networks.
  - Deliver emergency nonfood items.
  - Provide emergency shelter for immediate needs.
- Transformation in which military forces clear devastated housing and assess damage.

Support Humanitarian Demining

3-51. Humanitarian demining is related to the subordinate task clear unexploded explosive ordnance under the primary stability task establish civil security; however, this task focuses on supporting the humanitarian aspects of demining, while the task clear unexploded explosive ordnance is generally considered a protection-related task. In fragile states, the existence of vast minefields and unexploded explosive ordnance pose a significant hazard to freedom of movement. The marking and removal of these hazards is a necessary first step toward long-term recovery, especially along major transport routes and in critical public facilities. In comprehensive demining programs, much of the effort focuses on educating the local populace on how to recognize, avoid, and report the presence of mines and unexploded explosive ordnance. The list of essential tasks may include—

- An initial response in which military forces—
  - Conduct mapping and surveys of mined areas.
  - Mark minefields.
  - Treat initial injuries.
- Transformation in which military forces—
  - Educate local population to recognize and avoid mines.
  - Build host-nation capacity to conduct demining.

Support Public Health Programs

3-52. The military contribution to the public health sector, especially early in an operation, enables the complementary efforts of local and international aid organizations. The initial efforts of military forces aim to stabilize the public health sector. These efforts may include assessments of the medical and public health system such as infrastructure, medical staff, training and education, medical logistics, and public health programs. Following these initial response tasks, civilian organizations tailor their efforts to reforming the public health sector through health systems strengthening and other public health capacity-building activities. Health systems strengthening involves reducing bureaucracy by streamlining management, increasing cost-effectiveness, improving efficiency through reorganized services, decentralizing health systems, and allocating resources to better address the needs of the population. Achieving measurable progress requires early coordination and dialogue with stakeholders, thereby facilitating a successful transition from military-led efforts to civilian organizations or the host nation.
3-53. The tasks performed in support of public health programs closely relate to the tasks required to restore essential services. In many cases, they complement and reinforce those efforts. The list of essential tasks may include—

- An initial response in which military forces—
  - Assess and repair existing clinics and hospitals.
  - Evaluate need for new clinics and hospitals.
  - Prevent epidemics through immediate vaccinations.
  - Assess chronic and acute malnutrition.
  - Assess emergency physical and psychological care needs.
  - Assess existing medical infrastructure to include health care systems and medical logistics.
  - Assess and provide preventive medicine and veterinary services to local populace.
  - Assess, identify, and safeguard local populace from most dangerous public health hazards.

- Transformation in which military forces—
  - Evaluate water sources.
  - Support local waste and wastewater management capacity.
  - Promote and enhance the host-nation medical infrastructure.

Support Education Programs

3-54. Military activities in support of education programs generally focus on physical infrastructure. In some cases, trained personnel with appropriate civilian backgrounds provide additional services such as administrative or educational expertise. The efforts of civilian organizations aim to improve school-age access to education, to train teachers and administrators, to develop curricula, and to improve adult literacy. The list of essential tasks may include initial response in which military forces—

- Reopen schools as quickly as possible.
- Build and repair schools.

Support Governance

3-55. When a democratic and functional host-nation government is present, the role of military forces in support of governance is limited. However, if the host-nation government cannot adequately perform its basic civil functions—whatever the reason—some degree of military support to governance may be necessary. A state’s legitimacy among its people is in part tied to its perceived ability to provide these essential services. In extreme cases, where civil government is completely dysfunctional or absent altogether, international law requires the military force to provide the basic civil functions of the host-nation government under the auspices of a military government. (See chapter 5 for a detailed discussion of transitional military authority.)

Support Transitional Administrations

3-56. When the host-nation government has collapsed or been deposed, initial response efforts focus on immediately filling the void in governance. In either situation, the reliability and trustworthiness of local officials is suspect; due care and prudence is necessary to avoid empowering officials whose interests and loyalties are inconsistent with those of the force. The list of essential tasks may include an initial response in which military forces—

- Vet host-nation officials.
- Reconstitute leadership at multiple levels of government.
- Establish interim legislative processes.

Support Development of Local Governance

3-57. Establishing effective governance at the local level is necessary before developing governance institutions and processes throughout the state. Initially, effective local governance almost depends entirely
on the ability to provide essential civil services to the people; restoring these services is also fundamental to humanitarian relief efforts. (See paragraph 1-31 for additional discussion on the primary stability task, Restore Essential Services.) Most stability tasks require an integrated effort across all of the sectors to achieve the desired end state. The list of essential tasks may include an initial response in which military forces—

- Establish mechanisms for local-level participation.
- Identify, secure, rehabilitate, and maintain basic facilities for local government.
- Restore essential local public services.
- Provide resources to maintain essential local public services.

Support Anticorruption Initiatives

3-58. Providing legal guidance and assistance to the transitional government mitigates the near-term effects of corruption. Long-term measures ensure lasting success. Corruption and graft can impede efforts to establish governance, restore rule of law, or institute economic recovery. While some level of corruption is common to many cultures, its existence can unhinge reform efforts and put the entire mission at risk. The list of essential tasks may include an initial response in which military forces create mechanisms to curtail corruption across government institutions. The list of essential tasks may include an initial response in which military forces—

- Implement or reaffirm government employee oaths of office.
- Develop and disseminate ethical standards for civil servants.
- Ensure transparency in the dispersal of government resources.
- Implement reporting procedures for corruption and intimidation.
- Support witness protection programs.

Support Elections

3-59. The ability of the state and its local subdivisions to stage fair and secure elections is a significant milestone toward establishing legitimate, effective governance. While civilian agencies and organizations that maintain strict transparency guide the elections process, military forces provide support that enables broad participation by the local populace. The list of essential tasks may include—

- An initial response in which military forces—
  - Determine identification requirements for voter registration.
  - Establish or verify voter registry.
- Transformation in which military forces provide security to ensure free and fair elections.

SUPPORT ECONOMIC AND INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT

3-60. Sound economic stabilization policy promotes equitable, sustainable growth. It is the key to remedying underlying tensions in society. This allows the state to progress toward recovery and eventually long-term economic development. Therefore, any effort to establish economic stabilization is coordinated with similar efforts in the governance and security sectors. Linking these efforts expands the possibilities for changing the underlying social and political conditions that led to the collapse of the state. Synchronizing reform efforts among the economic, governance, and security sectors decreases the chance of continued or renewed conflict.

3-61. Building capacity within the economic sector requires an integrated approach to achieve sustainable growth. Although much of this effort is accomplished at the macro-level by appropriate civilian or host-nation organizations through development mechanisms, military forces must maintain an understanding of the economic sector and how to properly lay a stabilizing foundation that will support future sustainability and development.

3-62. The role of military forces in supporting economic stabilization and infrastructure development is significant, especially at the local level. The building blocks for broad national recovery and development are set at the local level. At the tactical (local) level, emphasis is on generating employment opportunities,
infusing monetary resources into the local economy, stimulating market activity, fostering recovery through microeconomics, and supporting the restoration of physical infrastructure. However, military forces must be mindful of unintended disruptions to the local markets through sudden stimulation of the economy. Unanticipated demand on local markets may cause prices to spike, thus making products cost prohibitive to the people. This may cause resentment among the population and undermine broader efforts, particularly if the force is only in the area for a short time and a sudden collapse in market activity occurs after its departure.

3-63. At the operational (regional or national) level, efforts focus on comprehensive infrastructure improvements, such as rebuilding a national electrical grid system, or on supporting the efforts of other agencies to strengthen the economy or foster development. Intergovernmental organizations such as the World Bank and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development cooperate to help set sound economic policy and establish conditions for long-term development and investment.

Support Economic Generation and Enterprise Creation

3-64. Economic recovery begins with an actively engaged labor force. When a military force occupies an operational area, the demand for local goods, services, and labor creates employment opportunities for the local populace. Local projects, such as restoring public services, rebuilding schools, or clearing roads of debris, offer additional opportunities for the local labor pool. Drawing on local goods, services, and labor presents the force with the first opportunity to infuse cash into the local economy, which in turn stimulates market activity.

3-65. The local level requires this stimulus to sustain economic generation and enterprise creation. It includes efforts to execute contracting duties; identify, prioritize, and manage local projects; and implement employment programs. Often, such programs reinforce efforts to establish security and civil order by providing meaningful employment and compensation for the local populace. The assessment of the economic sector must include developing knowledge and understanding of local pay scales; this is essential to the establishment of jobs programs with appropriately wages. Inflated pay scales may divert critical professionals from their chosen field in pursuit of short-term financial gain from new jobs created by the force. Establishing appropriate pay scales is also significant when the environment includes illicit actors willing to pay for actions or services in direct conflict with the aims of the force. Relatively low pay scales are easily exploited by adversaries and can quickly undermine efforts to build positive perceptions among the people.

3-66. Host-nation enterprise creation is an essential activity whereby the local people organize themselves to provide valuable goods and services. In doing so they create employment for themselves, their families, and neighbors that is inherently sustainable after the departure of other actors. Host-nation enterprises may provide a variety of goods and services, including essential services such as small-scale sewerage, water, electricity, transportation, health care, and communications.

3-67. Local jobs programs require a complementary vetting program to ensure the reliability of the workforce, especially if the labor pool draws from a population that includes former combatants. While the task support identification programs is a subordinate task under the primary task establish civil security, linking these tasks mitigates risk to the force or the people. The list of essential tasks may include—

- An initial response in which military forces—
  - Implement initiatives to provide immediate employment.
  - Create employment opportunities for young males.
  - Assess the labor force for critical skills requirements and shortfalls.
  - Assess market sector for manpower requirements and pay norms.

- Transformation in which military forces—
  - Implement public works projects.
  - Establish basic commercial code to register lawful business activity.
  - Ensure interim civil code provides for codification and enforcement of contracts and resolution of disputes.
  - Provide professionally managed capital through small scale lending.
Support Monetary Institutions and Programs

3-68. At the operational level, the military force focuses on supporting the strengthening of the national economy, including the central bank, the ministry of finance, and the civil service commission. Normally, other agencies lead this effort and the military provides support to ensure the broad success of the mission. Efforts include selecting a national currency, working through the central bank to ensure the solvency of commercial financial institutions and balancing government expenditures and revenue. Organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund provide the means and expertise to establish or reform the central bank. Also, they provide the fiscal resources to manage the currency while maintaining the national budget. The list of essential tasks may include an initial response in which military forces—

- Assess capability of central bank to conduct essential operations.
- Initiate immediate capacity in the central bank to conduct essential operations.

Support National Treasury Operations

3-69. In most nations, the national treasury is the central authority for providing payments from the government’s fiscal reserves. In fragile states, the national treasury is often among the first institutions to collapse, resulting in high unemployment and uncontrolled inflation. Restoring the payment programs of the national treasury, identifying and renewing sources of revenue, and developing the host nation’s fiscal capacity are central to reestablishing the economic viability of the state. In states suffering from economic collapse, the failure of the national treasury usually leaves essential local public services without a paid work force. Reestablishing government payment programs complements efforts to restore and maintain these vital public works. The list of essential tasks may include an initial response in which military forces—

- Reestablish government payment mechanisms to fulfill recurrent and emergency expenditures.
- Establish simple and reliable capacity to process, record, and report payments.
- Assess revenue-generating activities for the national treasury.
- Identify tax structure and sources of revenue.

Support Public Sector Investment Programs

3-70. Although organizations such as United States Agency for International Development usually manage public sector investment in a fragile state, the military force also possesses the ability to influence success in these programs. Public sector investment ensures the long-term viability of public education, health care, and mass transit while providing for development in industries such as mining, oil and natural gas, and hydroelectricity. At the local level, military forces may spur investment through grant programs or direct public investment projects. The list of essential tasks may include—

- An initial response in which military forces—
  - Prioritize public investment needs.
  - Develop plans to allocate available resources.
  - Pay civil service debts.
- Transformation in which military forces invest in critical projects neglected by the private sector.

Support Private Sector Development

3-71. Developing the private sector typically begins with employing large portions of the labor force. In addition to acquiring goods and services from the local economy, the tasks that support private sector development infuse much-needed cash into local markets and initiate additional public investment and development. Even in the most remote, austere regions of the world, local markets offer unique entrepreneurial opportunities, as well as services often considered vital to the economies of developed countries. The list of essential tasks may include—

- An initial response in which military forces—
  - Assess the depth of the private sector and enterprise creation.
Chapter 3
(Symposium Draft—NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION)

- Identify obstacles to private sector development.
  - Transformation in which military forces—
    - Strengthen private sector through contracting and out-sourcing.
    - Provide investors with protection and incentives.

Protect Natural Resources and Environment

3-72. Protecting a nation’s natural resources is an extension of the requirement to secure and protect other institutions of the state. Additionally, it preserves the long-term economic development and investment capacity of a fragile state. This capacity includes the revenues generated by the storage, distribution, and trade in natural resources. Rival factions often target these resources to finance illegitimate interests. The list of essential tasks may include—
  - An initial response in which military forces assess and secure access to valuable natural resources.
  - Transformation in which military forces—
    - Prevent the capture of revenues from natural resources.
    - Stop illicit trade in natural resources.

Support Agricultural Development Programs

3-73. The agricultural sector is a cornerstone of a viable market economy, providing crops and livestock vital to local markets and international trade. The development of this sector may be hindered by property disputes, poor irrigation, animal disease, minefields, or unexploded explosive ordnance. Therefore, development agencies prioritize and integrate projects with related tasks in other technical sectors to establish and institutionalize practical solutions to the long-term growth of the agricultural sector. The military contribution to agricultural development parallels related efforts to spur economic growth in local communities. Together they draw on local labor pools to help reestablish basic services central to the agricultural sector. The list of essential tasks may include—
  - An initial response in which military forces—
    - Secure and protect post-harvest storage facilities.
    - Rebuild small-scale irrigation systems.
    - Establish work programs to support agricultural development.
  - Transformation in which military forces—
    - Protect water sources.
    - Identify constraints to production.
    - Assess health, diversity, and numbers of animals.
    - Channel food aid to promote market activity.
    - Establish transportation and distribution networks.
    - Encourage indigenous enterprise creation to provide goods and services to the agricultural sector.

Restore Transportation Infrastructure

3-74. Restoring the transportation and distribution capability of the state is central to economic recovery. An underdeveloped or incapacitated transportation infrastructure limits freedom of movement, trade, social interaction, and development. Military forces often initiate immediate improvement to the transportation and distribution networks of the host nation. These networks enable freedom of maneuver, logistic support, and the movement of personnel and material to support ongoing operations. Transportation infrastructure improvements help to ease the transportation challenges common to relief efforts in fragile states. These improvements facilitate the vital assistance efforts of civilian agencies and organizations that follow in the wake of military forces. The list of essential tasks may include an initial response in which military forces—
Assess overall condition of national transportation infrastructure (airports, roads, bridges, railways, and coastal and inland ports, harbors, and waterways).

- Determine and prioritize essential infrastructure programs and projects.
- Conduct expedient repairs or build new facilities to support stabilization and to facilitate commercial trade.

**Restore Telecommunications Infrastructure**

3-75. The telecommunications infrastructure of the state exists to support every element of a society, from the government to the financial sector, and from the media to the local populace. The failure of this infrastructure accelerates the collapse of the state, isolates the state and the populace from the outside world, and hampers any development efforts. The military contribution to reconstruction efforts in the telecommunications infrastructure is limited; normally, few essential tasks exist in this area. The list of essential tasks may include an initial response in which military forces—

- Assess overall condition of national telecommunications infrastructure.
- Determine and prioritize essential infrastructure programs and projects.

**Support General Infrastructure Reconstruction Programs**

3-76. General infrastructure reconstruction programs focus on rehabilitating the state’s ability to produce and distribute fossil fuels, generate electrical power, exercise engineering and construction support, and provide municipal and other services to the populace. The United States Army Corps of Engineers and Field Force Engineering capabilities possess the expertise to support host-nation capacity building in many of these areas, spurring rehabilitation efforts that establish the foundation for long-term development. As with the restoration of essential services, support to general infrastructure programs requires a thorough understanding of the civil component of the area of operations. Civil affairs personnel support this information collection to inform the prioritization of programs and projects.

3-77. The forward engineer support team, part of the United States Army Corps of Engineers, provides detailed infrastructure reconnaissance in the area of operations. These efforts are central to understanding the needs of the state and prioritizing programs and projects. In a fragile state, fuels, energy, engineering, and construction industries represent the difference between a primitive tribal state and a developing country with a vibrant, functioning society. The list of essential tasks may include an initial response in which military forces—

- Assess overall condition of national energy infrastructure.
- Determine and prioritize essential infrastructure programs and projects.
- Assess condition of existing power generation and distribution facilities.
- Assess condition of existing natural resources conversion and distribution facilities.
- Assess condition of existing facilities integral for effectively executing essential tasks in other sectors.
- Assess condition of existing local, municipal facilities that provide essential services.
- Conduct expedient repairs or new facilities to support local populace (such as schools, medical clinics, and municipal buildings).

**INFORMATION ENGAGEMENT**

3-78. Accomplishing essential stability tasks also depends on influencing attitudes. Although there are more tangible objectives that mark the success of a stability operation, the final measure success or failure often rests with the perceptions of the people. Military forces must go beyond defeating the enemy. They must secure the trust and confidence of the population. This requires a mastery of information engagement: the integrated employment of public affairs to inform U.S. and friendly audiences; psychological operations, combat camera, U.S. Government strategic communication and defense support to public diplomacy, and other means necessary to influence foreign audiences; and, leader and Soldier engagements to support both efforts (FM 3-0). Since stability operations are conducted within a broader global and
regional context, success often depends on the integration of information engagement efforts among military forces and the various agencies and organizations participating in the operation. Information engagement efforts must support and complement those of higher headquarters, national strategic communications guidance, and broader United States government policy. (When published, FM 3-13 will include doctrine on information engagement.)

3-79. In stability operations, leader and Soldier engagement may be the most critical component of information engagement. It is the sustained engagement of the host-nation populace that most directly influences the attitudes and shapes the perceptions of the people. Leader and soldier engagement amplifies positive actions, counters enemy propaganda, and increases support among the host-nation populace. It begins with the direct interaction between Soldiers and the local populace, where the consistency between words and deeds is most important. It includes meetings conducted with key communicators, civilian leaders, or others whose perceptions, decisions, and actions will affect mission accomplishment. Conducted with detailed preparation and planning both activities often prove crucial in building local support for military operations, providing an opportunity for persuasion, and reducing friction and mistrust. This is essential to gaining the trust and confidence of the local populace. (See chapter 4 for a discussion of the relationship between leader and Soldier engagement and understanding.)

3-80. Information engagement is fundamental to each of the primary stability tasks. Information engagement efforts are deliberately integrated with activities in each sector to complement and reinforce the success of operations. Combined with broad efforts to build partner capacity, information engagement is essential to achieving decisive results: the recovery of the host-nation government and the attainment of a lasting, stable peace. Figure 3-2 illustrates the relationship between information engagement and each of the primary stability tasks.

![Figure 3-2. Relating information engagement to the primary stability tasks](image)

3-81. Stability operations are conducted among the people, in the spotlight of international news media, and under the umbrella of international law. The actions of Soldiers communicate American values and beliefs more effectively than words alone. Therefore, military forces ensure consistency in their actions and messages. They provide the media with prompt, factual information to quell rumors and
misinformation. They provide media representatives access to information on operations within the limits of OPSEC. Finally, they understand the culture of each audience and tailor the message appropriately.

3-82. No other military activity has as significant a human component as operations that occur among the people. With urbanization, these operations will be increasingly conducted among concentrations of people, and will have significant psychological effects on the population. Human beings capture information and form perceptions based on inputs received through all the senses. They see actions and hear words. They compare gestures and expressions with the spoken word. They weigh the messages presented to them with the conditions that surround them. When the local and national news media are unavailable or unreliable, people turn to the Internet, where information flows freely at unimaginable speeds. To the people, perception equals reality. Altering perceptions requires an understanding of the psychological motivations of the populace and shaping messages according to how people absorb and interpret information to ensure broad appeal and acceptance.

3-83. In executing stability operations, the military force focuses on people, aiming to gain the cooperation and support of the populace. Stability tasks that improve their safety, security, and livelihood help to shape their perceptions that supporting the objectives of the operation are in their best interest. Shaping perceptions that the operation is legitimate will increase support for it. To ensure the populace and the international community understand the commander’s objectives, a list of essential tasks may include an initial response in which military forces—

- Identify or establish outlets for international, national, and local news media.
- Provide factual information to the media to control rumors and disinformation.
- Issue effective press releases and prompt information in local languages.
- Assist transitional civil or military authorities with public information programs.
- Synchronize messages with operations; ensure messages are consistent with actions.
- Assess media capability and capacity of host nation; tailor information engagement strategy to ability of the local populace to receive messages.
- Integrate cultural understanding with information engagement strategy.

THE ROLE OF CIVIL AFFAIRS IN STABILITY OPERATIONS

3-84. Civil affairs forces support full spectrum operations in every environment across the spectrum of conflict, from stable peace to general war. They are an essential element of successful stability operations. Civil affairs personnel provide unique area and linguistic orientation, cultural astuteness, advisory capabilities, and civilian professional skills that generally parallel those of host-nation governments. They provide the commander with specialized expertise on the civil component of the operational environment. The commander draws on this expertise to analyze and influence the human dimension through specific processes and dedicated resources and personnel.

THE CIVIL AFFAIRS MISSION

3-85. The mission of civil affairs forces is to engage and influence the civil populace by planning, executing, and transitioning civil affairs operations in Army, joint, interagency, and multinational operations. These forces plan and execute civil affairs operations in support of and nested within a broader operation. Civil affairs forces support these operations by engaging the civil component of the area of operations to enhance the success of stability operations conducted before, during or after a conflict or disaster. Civil affairs forces help to shape the operational environment by interacting with the local populace to facilitate military operations. A supportive local populace can provide valuable resources and critical information that supports friendly operations. A hostile local populace threatens the immediate success of military operations and may undermine domestic public support for those operations. When executed properly, civil affairs operations reduce the friction between the local populace and the military force.
CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS

3-86. During full spectrum operations, civil affairs forces conduct operations nested within the overall mission and commander’s intent. Civil affairs operations improve the relationship between military forces and host-nation authorities in areas in which the military force operates. They involve applying civil affairs functional specialty skills to areas normally under the responsibility of a host-nation government. Civil affairs operations establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relationships between military forces and all levels of host-nation governments and officials. These operations are fundamental to successfully executing stability tasks.

3-87. Civil affairs organizations and personnel develop detailed assessments based on civil considerations. These include information about infrastructure, civilian institutions, and attitudes and activities of civilian leaders, the local populace, and host-nation organizations. These assessments may reveal that a viable host-nation government does not exist or is incapable of performing its basic civil functions. In such cases, Army forces may support or implement transitional military authority until a legitimate host-nation government is established. (JP 3-57 and FMs 3-05.40 and 3-05.401 contain civil affairs doctrine.)

3-88. Civil affairs operations help to ensure the sustained legitimacy of the mission, and the transparency and credibility of the military force. This is accomplished by minimizing the effects of military operations on the local populace, limiting how civilians impact those military operations, and providing sound advice to the commander on the legal and moral obligations of the force incident to operations conducted among the people. The key to successful civil affairs operations is in leveraging the relationship between the military force and every individual, group, and organization in the area of operations to achieve the desired outcome or result.

3-89. During full spectrum operations, civil affairs personnel support the commander by helping to understand and visualize the civil component of the area of operations. These personnel provide detailed analysis based on careful consideration of operational and mission variables. (See FM 3-0 for doctrine on the use of operational and mission variables). This analysis is critical to determining—

- The root causes of instability and civil strife in the area of operations.
- The requirement for civil-military operations centers to facilitate communication and coordination with nonmilitary agencies and organizations operating in the area of operations.
- The need to use liaison teams to enhance communications and coordination with nonmilitary agencies and organizations to facilitate operations at all echelons.
- What, when, where, and why civilians might be encountered in the area of operations; what ongoing or planned military operations might impact the activities of those civilians; what activities those civilians are engaged in that might affect military operations; and what actions the military force must take to mitigate the effects of those civilians.
- Measures of performance and measures of effectiveness for civil affairs operations in support of the larger military operation.

3-90. During full spectrum operations, civil affairs forces provide the resident expertise to plan for and support host-nation government reconstruction in six functional areas:

- **Rule of law.** The fair, competent, and efficient application and fair and effective enforcement of the civil and criminal laws of the host nation through impartial legal institutions and competent police and corrections systems. This functional area includes judge advocates trained in international and comparative law as well as specialists in related subjects.

- **Economic stability.** The efficient management of resources, goods, and services to ensure the viability of the host-nation economic system. This discipline includes specialists in economic development, civilian supply, and food and agriculture, and includes the provision of capital and enterprise development skills to an indigenous private sector.

- **Infrastructure.** Designing, building, and maintaining the organizations, systems, and architecture required to support transportation, sewage, water, waste collection, communications, and power. This discipline includes specialists in public transportation, public works and utilities, and public communication.
- **Governance.** Creating, resourcing, managing, and sustaining the institutions and processes through which the host nation is governed, protected, and sustained. This discipline includes specialists in public administration, environmental management, and public safety.
- **Public health and welfare.** The systems, institutions, programs, and practices that promote the physical, mental, and social well-being of a society. This discipline includes specialists in public health and cultural relations.
- **Public education and information.** Designing, resourcing, and implementing public education and public information programs and systems through media and formal education institutions. This discipline includes specialists in public education and civil information.

3-91. The civil affairs staff officer is the principal staff officer for all matters related to the civil component of the operation and maintains the running estimate that identifies additional civil affairs augmentation required to support the force. Civil affairs planning teams may provide support to the civil affairs staff officer in this effort. The civil affairs staff officer ensures that civil considerations are integrated into all elements of full spectrum operations.

**MISSION-ESSENTIAL TASKS IN STABILITY OPERATIONS**

3-92. A mission-essential task is a collective task a unit must be capable of performing successfully in order to accomplish its mission. Since organizations must be able to conduct full spectrum operations, they cannot afford to focus training exclusively on one element of full spectrum operations at the expense of the others. Yet they also cannot conceivably maintain proficiency on all tasks across the spectrum of conflict. Therefore, commanders use the mission-essential task list (METL) to focus organizational training. There are three types of METL:

- Joint METL derived from the Universal Joint Task List (known as the UJTL).
- Core METL standardized for brigades and above units by the Department of the Army.
- Directed METL developed by a commander.

3-93. Units train on only a single METL at any given time but may be required to report readiness on more than one METL.

**CORE MISSION-ESSENTIAL TASK LIST**

3-94. An organization’s core METL is a list of the tasks derived from a unit’s specific capabilities based on the organization, mission, and doctrine for that unit. Core METL consists of tasks the organization was designed to perform and general tasks applicable to all organizations, regardless of type. The core METL consists of general mission-essential tasks and core capabilities mission-essential tasks. (See FM 7-0 for a detailed discussion of general mission-essential tasks and core capabilities mission-essential tasks.)

3-95. For stability operations, the specific focus of the core METL will typically vary between echelons. However, for all echelons, it will aim for proficiency in those tasks that are most likely during or in the immediate aftermath of conflict or disaster. For division and corps headquarters, the core capabilities mission-essential task will include the following primary stability tasks:

- Establish civil security.
- Establish civil control.
- Restore essential services.

3-96. For brigade-level headquarters, the focus of the core METL will vary according to the type of brigade. In stability operations, the brigade combat team remains the principle means of executing the broad range of tasks required for success. For a brigade combat team, the core capabilities mission-essential task includes the following subcategories of primary stability tasks:

- Enforce cessation of hostilities, peace agreements, and other arrangements.
- Conduct disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration.
- Conduct border control, boundary security, and freedom of movement.
- Establish public order and safety.
Chapter 3
(Symposium Draft—NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION)

3-97. Five types of modular support brigades complement the brigade combat teams providing multifunctional capabilities to deployed forces: the battlefield surveillance brigade, fires brigade, combat aviation brigade, maneuver enhancement brigade, and sustainment brigade. (See FM 3-0 for doctrine on modular support brigades.)

3-98. For a battlefield surveillance brigade, the core capabilities mission-essential task includes the following subcategories of primary stability tasks:
- Enforce cessation of hostilities, peace agreements, and other arrangements.
- Conduct border control, boundary security, and freedom of movement.
- Support identification programs.

3-99. For a fires brigade, the core capabilities mission-essential task includes the following subcategories of primary stability tasks:
- Enforce cessation of hostilities, peace agreements, and other arrangements.
- Conduct disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration.
- Conduct border control, boundary security, and freedom of movement.
- Establish public order and safety.
- Restore essential civil services.

3-100. For a combat aviation brigade, the core capabilities mission-essential task includes the following subcategories of primary stability tasks:
- Enforce cessation of hostilities, peace agreements, and other arrangements.
- Conduct disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration.
- Conduct border control, boundary security, and freedom of movement.

3-101. For a maneuver enhancement brigade, the core capabilities mission-essential task includes the following subcategories of primary stability tasks:
- Enforce cessation of hostilities, peace agreements, and other arrangements.
- Conduct disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration.
- Conduct border control, boundary security, and freedom of movement.
- Establish public order and safety.
- Restore essential civil services.

3-102. For a sustainment brigade, the core capabilities mission-essential task includes the stability task, restore essential civil services.

3-103. Functional brigades, like the modular support brigades, have a modular subordinate structure that may vary considerably among brigades of the same type. Unlike the modular support brigades, functional brigades typically operate under theater army control and depend on theater-level elements for signal and other support. The theater army may task-organize them to corps or division headquarters. For functional brigades, the core capabilities mission-essential task reflects the most likely tasks according to its organization, mission, and doctrine.

**DIRECTED MISSION-ESSENTIAL TASK LIST**

3-104. When an organization is assigned a specific mission, the focus of organizational training shifts from core METL to directed-mission tasks and training conditions that realistically portray mission conditions. The commander will develop a list of the tasks required to accomplish that mission. This list, a unit’s directed METL, is based on a thorough mission analysis and, once established, forms the new foundation and focus for unit training until completion of the assigned mission.

3-105. The situation and conditions within the operational area determine the directed METL. The directed METL for stability operations may remain consistent with a unit’s core METL, assume a broader focus on post-conflict tasks that encompass reconstruction activities, or focus on stability tasks conducted
during peacetime military engagement. For division and corps headquarters, the directed METL may expand to include the primary stability tasks support governance and support economic and infrastructure development. (See FM 7-0 for doctrine on core METL and directed METL development.

3-106. For brigade-level organizations, the directed METL may expand to include various tasks that support the efforts of the other instruments of national power, the host nation, and other actors and stakeholders. In operations where the host-nation security forces lack the capability and capacity to provide security adequately for the state and its people, brigade combat teams may be assigned the mission of conducting security force assistance. Though not integral to the core METL of these organizations, security force assistance draws on many of the skills already resident in these organizations, as well as the developed command and control infrastructure to coordinate the broad and often dispersed efforts involved. (See chapter 6 for a discussion of security force assistance.)
Chapter 4
Planning for Stability Operations

A plan, like a tree, must have branches if it is to bear fruit. A plan with a single aim is apt to prove a barren pole.

Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart
Thoughts on War

The plan was smooth on paper, only they forgot about the ravines.

Russian Military Proverb

PLANNING FUNDAMENTALS

4-1. Planning entails visualizing a desired future and describing effective ways of bringing it about. It includes communicating guidance, intent, and direction toward a common, desired end state. Planning is an adaptive process that ebbs and flows with the situation; as understanding of the situation evolves, plans evolve branches and sequels to account for such evolution. Planning is a continuous activity, constantly adapting as the conditions of the operational environment are shaped by activities, both natural and human. Since planning is an ongoing process, the resultant plan is an interim product of deliberate thought, based on knowledge and understanding at a specific point in time and space. The truest measure of a good plan is not whether execution occurs as planned, but whether the plan fosters flexibility, initiative, and adaptability in the face of unforeseen events.

REDUCE COMPLEXITY

4-2. Conflict, by nature, is a complex endeavor; it is fundamentally human in character and, as such, is inherently unpredictable in nature. Uncertainty, chance, and friction are ubiquitous. Such is the essence of complexity. In an era of persistent conflict, human interaction, globalization, and technological diffusion characterize an increasingly complex global security environment. As such, planning provides the necessary tools to understand the environment and to minimize the adverse effects of complexity on operations.

4-3. Given the inherently uncertain nature of war, the object of planning is not to eliminate or minimize uncertainty but to foster decisive and effective action in the midst of such uncertainty. Planning does not aim to predict the future but contains an element of forecasting. Effective planning provides an informed forecast of how future events are likely to unfold based on understanding of the current situation and conditions of the operational environment. This forecast accounts for the uncertainty, chance, and friction innate to complex situations and is expressed through planning as flexibility and adaptability.

4-4. Simplicity is central to reducing complexity in planning. The most effective plans are clear, concise, and direct. This fosters a shared understanding of the situation, the problem, and the solution. Simplicity counters the effects of complexity through initiative, risk, and opportunity. A well-conceived plan encourages initiative, accounts for risk, and spurs initiative. It is flexible enough to allow for adaptation within the commander’s intent, yet sufficiently clear to ensure that all effort is directed toward a common understanding of the desired end state.

INculcate INITIATIVE, OPPORTUNITY, AND RISK

4-5. Planning is essential to the ability to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Planning helps to anticipate events and set in motion the actions that allow forces to act purposefully and effectively, shaping...
the situation as events unfold and the situation develops. Planning is inherently proactive, and effective plans instill that spirit into operations. Planning ensures that forces are postured to retain the initiative and consistently able to seek opportunities to exploit that initiative. Plans account for the interdependent relationship among initiative, opportunity, and risk; successful plans combine the three to reduce or counter the effects of complexity, using the commander’s intent as a waypoint for individual initiative and freedom of action.

4-6. Effective planning also anticipates the inherent delay between decision and action, especially between the levels of war and echelons of command. Sound plans draw on the fundamentals of mission command to overcome this effect, fostering subordinate initiative within the commander’s intent to act appropriately and decisively when orders no longer sufficient address the changing situation. This ensures commanders act promptly as they encounter opportunities or accept prudent risk to create opportunities when they lack clear direction. In such situations, prompt action requires detailed foresight and preparation.

4-7. Planning is especially important in unique situations in which experience is lacking; in such situations, creative and adaptive planning is the only viable substitute for experience. With sufficient experience in a given situation, commanders know intuitively what to expect, what goals are feasible, and what actions to take. In situations where experience is lacking, planning enables a systematic approach to problem solving that helps to formulate practical solutions to complex situations.

**ANTICIPATE FUTURE EVENTS**

4-8. Planning involves projecting thoughts forward in time and space to influence events before they occur. Rather than responding to events as they unfold, proactive planning anticipates these events. Proactive planning contemplates and evaluates potential decisions and actions in advance; it involves visualizing consequences of possible courses of action to determine whether they will contribute to achieving the desired end state. Proactive planning reduces the effects of complexity during execution.

4-9. Newton’s Third Law of Motion predicted that for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction; thus, in a fundamentally complex environment, planning is essential to anticipating the most likely reactions to friendly action. Proactive planning entails anticipating results of friendly action and resulting reactions to those activities. Planning integrates these individual actions (tasks) together into likely sequences (operations) and examines the possible implications of these sequences in time and space (results). These actions and sequences are linked through planning along lines of effort, which focus the outcomes toward objectives that help to shape the conditions of the operational environment.

**BALANCE RESOURCES, CAPABILITIES, AND ACTIVITIES**

4-10. During persistent conflict where operations will be increasingly multilateral and involve a diverse array of actors, requirements will often outpace available resources and capabilities necessary to reestablish conditions of peace and stability. Planning involves focusing efforts toward accomplishing the mission while maintaining a careful balance among resources, capabilities, and activities across multiple lines of effort.

4-11. Planning ensures that limited resources and capabilities are weighted according to priority of effort. While commanders typically focus resources on the decisive effort, they also provide sufficient resources to capitalize on unforeseen opportunities and to provide impetus for other efforts. The myriad tasks involved in a stability operation require specific capabilities that are often just as limited in availability. An effective plan judiciously applies these capabilities where and when they are most needed. Commanders synchronize the activities in time and space to achieve the greatest effect, one that achieves broad success in one line of effort while reinforcing progress in the others.

**SHAPE A POSITIVE FUTURE**

4-12. Planning is based on the principle that by intervening in events in the present, the results of friendly actions can shape a better future. If there were no way to influence the future, if U.S. forces perceived that the natural course of events would lead to a satisfactory outcome, or if U.S. forces believed they could
achieve desired results purely by reacting to the situation, there would be no reason to plan. There may be cases in which these conditions apply, but these cases are generally rare.

4-13. Planning alone does not guarantee success. It does not ensure friendly actions will quantifiably improve the situation. Planning takes on value when performed properly. Commanders must use methods appropriate to the situation, the planned operation, and the roles and capabilities of actors involved. Performed properly and focused toward a common goal, planning proves a valuable activity that greatly improves performance and prudently applies time and effort. Performed haphazardly and without proper focus and effort, planning becomes time consuming, ineffective, process-focused, and irrelevant. Proper, thoughtful, and informed planning is the only sure means to achieve lasting success and instill positive change in the operational environment.

RECOGNIZE PLANNING HORIZONS

4-14. All planning is based on imperfect knowledge and involves assumptions about the future that is fundamentally uncertain in nature. Regardless of the quality of the information available or the depth of understanding, operational limits affect the commander’s ability to plan. The more certain the future, the easier it is to plan.

4-15. The planning horizon refers to how far into the future plans attempt to shape events. Uncertainty increases with the length of the planning horizon and the rate of change in the environment. Planning attempts to anticipate and influence the future; the farther into the future that plans reach, the more time commanders have for preparation. However, the farther into the future plans reach, the wider the range of possibilities and the more uncertain the forecast. A fundamental tension thus exists between the desire to plan in detail and the lack of certainty in future events. The farther the plans reach into the future to facilitate preparation and coordination, the less certain events may be, and the less relevant detailed preparations become.

UNDERSTAND THE PITFALLS

4-16. Planning can often be a time-consuming and frustrating endeavor. Familiarity with the requisite processes and steps typically speeds the planning effort, and repetition only serves to imbue it with an inherent efficiency. Collaborative planning in a stability operation, especially among the many diverse participants, presents unique challenges and opportunities. When the various systems, cultures, and personalities involved can quickly derail effective planning, the challenges may create significant pitfalls to developing a coherent, integrated plan.

4-17. The first pitfall consists of attempting to forecast and dictate events too far into the future. This may result from the natural desire to believe a plan can control the future. People naturally tend to plan on the assumption that the future will merely be a linear continuation of present conditions. Their plans often underestimate the scope of changes in direction that may occur. Even the most effective plans cannot anticipate the unexpected. Often, events overcome plans much sooner than anticipated; effective plans include sufficient branches and sequels to account for the nonlinear nature of events.

4-18. The second pitfall consists of trying to plan in too much detail. While sound plans must include detail, planning in more detail than needed only consumes limited time and resources. This pitfall often stems from the natural desire to leave as little as possible to chance. In general, the less certain the situation, the less detail included in the plan. However, people naturally respond to uncertainty by planning in greater detail to try to account for every possibility. This attempt to plan in greater detail under conditions of uncertainty can generate even more anxiety, which in turn leads to even more detailed planning. The result may become an extremely detailed plan that does not survive the friction of the situation and that constrains effective action.

4-19. The third pitfall consists of using planning as a scripting process that tries to prescribe the course of events with precision. When planners fail to recognize the limits of foresight and control, the plan can become a coercive and overly regulatory mechanism that restricts initiative and flexibility. The focus for subordinates becomes meeting the requirements of the plan rather than deciding and acting effectively.
Chapter 4
(Symposium Draft—NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION)

4-20. The fourth pitfall is the danger of institutionalizing rigid planning methods that lead to inflexible or overly structured thinking. This tends to make planning rigidly process-focused and plans overly emphasize detailed procedures. Planning provides a disciplined framework for approaching and solving complex problems. The danger is in taking that discipline to the extreme. This especially proves dangerous in collaborative environments, where the mix of different planning cultures and processes can stymie progress. Stakeholders may want to follow a rigid, institutionalized planning method or, in some situations, not use any planning methodology whatsoever. In a collaborative environment, it is imperative to streamline the planning effort, providing economy of effort and coordination among several people working on the same problem.

PLANNING FOUNDATIONS

4-21. Planning is an essential part of command and control. It helps commanders to decide and act more effectively in an uncertain and complex environment. As such, planning is one of the principal tools commanders use to exercise command and control. Planning involves elements of both art and science, combining analysis and calculation with intuition, inspiration, and creativity. Effective planning demonstrates imagination rather than an overreliance on mechanics. Fundamentally, planning struggles to reconcile the tension between the desire for preparation with the need for flexibility in recognition of the uncertainty of war.

4-22. Effective planning is founded on the bedrock of commander’s collective wisdom, experience, intellect, and intuition. The commander drives planning, providing sound advice, definitive direction, and seasoned leadership. In setting the tone for planning, the commander provides—

- Understanding.
- The commander’s intent and planning guidance.
- A concept of operations.

UNDERSTANDING

4-23. Understanding is fundamental to planning. Without understanding, commanders cannot establish the situation’s context. Analysis of the situation and the operational variables provides the critical information necessary to develop understanding and frame complex problems. To develop a truer understanding of the operational environment, commanders circulate throughout their operational areas as often as possible, talking to Soldiers conducting operations and making observations. These commanders will better sense the local situation. Their intuition may cause them to detect trouble or opportunity long before the staff might. This deepens commanders’ understanding. It allows them to anticipate potential opportunities and threats, information gaps, and capability shortfalls. Understanding becomes the basis of the commander’s visualization.

4-24. Effective planning requires a broad understanding of the operational environment at all levels. It also requires practical creativity and the ability to visualize changes in the operational environment. Commanders need to project their visualization beyond the realm of physical combat. They must anticipate the operational environment’s evolving military and nonmilitary conditions. Therefore, planning encompasses visualizing the synchronized arrangement and use of military forces and capabilities to achieve the desired end state. This creative process requires the ability to discern the conditions required for success before committing forces to action.

4-25. Numerous factors determine the commander’s depth of understanding. These include education, intellect, experience, and perception. Maintaining understanding is a dynamic ability, and situational understanding changes as the operation unfolds. Relevant information fuels understanding and fosters initiative. Greater understanding enables commanders and staffs to make quantifiably better decisions; it allows them to focus their intuition on visualizing the current and future conditions of the environment and describe them to subordinates.

4-26. In operations conducted among the people, understanding is informed by sustained engagement of the host-nation populace. This is the essence of leader and Soldier engagement, the face-to-face interaction of military personnel with the local populace of the host nation. Such interaction not only informs
understanding, it is fundamental to shaping the perceptions of the people among whom military forces operate. (See chapter 3 for a detailed discussion of leader and Soldier engagement.)

**COMMANDER’S INTENT AND PLANNING GUIDANCE**

4-27. Commanders summarize their visualization in their initial intent statement. The initial commander’s intent aims to facilitate planning while focusing the overall operations process. Commanders personally develop this intent statement. It succinctly describes the commander’s visualization of the entire operation; it clearly states what the commander wants to accomplish. The initial commander’s intent links the operation’s purpose with the conditions that define the desired end state. The intent statement usually evolves as planning progresses and more information becomes available.

4-28. The initial commander’s intent statement focuses the staff during the operations process. The staff uses this statement to develop and refine courses of action that contribute to establishing conditions that define the end state. Planning involves developing lines of effort that link the execution of tactical tasks to end state conditions. A clear initial intent statement is essential to this effort.

4-29. Commanders also provide planning guidance with their intent statement. Planning guidance conveys the essence of the commander’s visualization. Guidance may be broad or detailed, depending on the situation. Effective planning guidance is essentially an initial concept of operations that includes priorities for each warfighting function. It reflects how the commander sees the operation unfolding. It broadly describes when, where, and how the commander intends to leverage combat power to accomplish the mission within the higher commander’s intent.

4-30. Commanders use their experience and judgment to add depth and clarity to their planning guidance. They ensure staffs understand the broad outline of their visualization while allowing the latitude necessary to explore different options. This guidance forms the basis for a detailed concept of operations without dictating specifics of the final plan. As with their intent, commanders may modify planning guidance based on staff and subordinate input and changing conditions.

**CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS**

4-31. Every operation begins with a concept of operations that guides its conduct. In almost all cases, a commander’s concept of operations includes the other instruments of national power present in the operational area working with the military toward a common end state. Commanders frame their concept by answering several fundamental questions:

- What is the force trying to accomplish (ends)?
- What conditions, when established, constitute the desired end state (ends)?
- How will the force achieve the end state (ways)?
- What sequence of actions is most likely to attain these conditions (ways)?
- What resources are required, and how can they be applied to accomplish that sequence of actions (means)?
- What risks are associated with that sequence of actions, and how can they be mitigated (risk)?

4-32. The concept of operations expands on the commander’s intent by describing how the commander visualizes the force accomplishing the mission. It details the principal tasks necessary to accomplish the mission, the subordinate units responsible for those tasks, and how the tasks complement one another. The concept of operations promotes general understanding by explicitly stating the decisive operation—the task that directly accomplishes the mission, the units that will execute it, and the shaping and sustaining operations required to ensure the success of the decisive operation. Normally, the concept of operations describes the status of the force at the end of the operation. (FM 5-0 discusses the concept of operations in detail.)

4-33. Conflict is fundamentally a human endeavor. Often, violence, uncertainty, chance, and friction characterize conflict. Land operations are inherently tied to the human dimension; they cannot be reduced to a simple formula or checklist. Planning is essential to the commander’s ability to integrate diverse capabilities, including those related to the human dimension. It also helps commanders synchronize
military actions with actions of other instruments of national power. Planning provides the conceptual framework for ordering thought when visualizing and describing operations. As a creative engine, planning drives commanders’ ability to seize, retain, and exploit initiative.

DESIGNING STABILITY OPERATIONS

4-34. The elements of operational design are essential to identifying tasks and objectives that tie tactical missions to achieving the desired end state. They help refine and focus the concept of operations that forms the basis for developing a detailed plan or order. During execution, commanders and staffs consider the design elements as they assess the situation. They adjust current and future operations and plans as the operation unfolds.

4-35. Stability operations, more so than offensive and defensive operations, present a unique challenge. Where combat typically focuses on the defeat of an enemy force, stability focuses on the people. With an extended execution horizon, people often gauge success over the course of several years. Such operations typically include significant offensive and defensive components. These components set the appropriate conditions to enable the success of concurrent stability tasks. These operations may set conditions as the campaign progresses toward reestablishing the conditions of stable, lasting peace necessary to plant the seeds of effective governance and economic development.

4-36. Planning for stability draws on all elements of operational design. However, certain elements are more relevant than others, and some in particular are essential to successful stability operations. (See FM 3-0 for a detailed discussion of the operational art.)

END STATE AND CONDITIONS

4-37. Generally, the end state is represented by the broadly expressed conditions that will exist when an operation ends. The end state is thus an image of the operational environment consistent with the commander’s visualization of the operation. In a stability operation, the end state is achieved through the integrated, collective activities of all the instruments of national power, not by any single instrument applied in isolation. Clearly describing the end state requires appreciating the nature of the operational environment and assessing its friendly, enemy, adversary, and neutral aspects. Ultimately, the end state shapes the operation’s character. Commanders include it in their planning guidance and commander’s intent. A clearly defined end state promotes unity of effort, facilitates integration and synchronization, and helps mitigate risk.

4-38. Commanders explicitly describe the end state and its defining conditions for every operation. Otherwise, the necessary integration between tactical tasks and operational conditions does not occur. Missions become vague and operations lack focus. Every operation focuses on a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable end state. The end state may evolve as a campaign progresses. Strategic and operational guidance may be refined, the operational environment’s conditions might change, and situational understanding may increase. Therefore, all commanders continuously monitor operations and assess their progress. Commanders assess progress against measures of effectiveness and the end state conditions. These conditions form the basis for decisions that ensure operations progress consistently toward the desired end state.

4-39. Military operations typically focus on attaining the military end state. However, the efforts of military forces also contribute to establishing nonmilitary conditions. Sometimes that is their focus. This is most apparent in stability operations, when integrating military and nonmilitary capabilities is essential to success. Achieving the desired end state in a stability operation requires deliberately coordinating and synchronizing military and civilian efforts. These efforts focus on a shared understanding of the conditions that support a stable, lasting peace. Due to the interrelated nature of the primary stability tasks, these efforts are fundamentally complementary and contribute toward shaping an enduring end state.

4-40. To achieve the desired end state, stability operations capitalize on coordination, cooperation, integration, and synchronization among military and nonmilitary organizations. These civil-military efforts aim to strengthen legitimate governance, restore rule of law, support economic and infrastructure
development, reform institutions to achieve sustainable peace and security, foster a sense of national unity, and create the conditions that enable the host-nation government to reassume civic responsibilities.

OPERATIONAL APPROACH

4-41. The operational approach conceptualizes the commander’s visualization of the surest method for establishing the conditions that define the desired end state. Some operations are conducted among the people, where military interaction with a host-nation populace is innate to the mission. In those operations, the most effective operational approach achieves decisive results through combinations of stability and defeat mechanisms. While the stability mechanisms leverage the constructive capabilities inherent to combat power, the defeat mechanisms allow the commander to focus the coercive capabilities of the force to provide security, public order, and safety for the local populace.

4-42. The conditions of the operational environment ultimately determine the operational approach. During planning, as commanders and staffs frame the problem, they determine the appropriate combination of stability and defeat mechanisms necessary to resolve the situation. This begins the process that ends with an integrated, synchronized plan for an operation that achieves the desired end state. At times, military forces intervene in an unstable situation where the security environment is actively violent in nature. In these cases, military forces may initially use defeat mechanisms to alter the conditions sufficiently to protect the civil populace. In a relatively benign environment where military forces exist only to assist or facilitate civil efforts, the stability mechanisms will predominate.

Stability Mechanisms

4-43. Commanders use stability mechanisms to visualize how to employ the stability element of full spectrum operations. A stability mechanism is the primary method through which friendly forces affect civilians in order to attain conditions that support establishing a lasting, stable peace (FM 3-0). Combinations of the stability mechanisms produce complementary and reinforcing effects that help to shape the human dimension of the operational environment more effectively and efficiently than a single mechanism applied in isolation. The four stability mechanisms are—

- **Compel.** Involves maintaining the threat—or actual use—of lethal force to establish control and dominance, effect behavioral change, or enforce cessation of hostilities, peace agreements, or other arrangements.
- **Control.** Involves establishing public order and safety; securing borders, routes, sensitive sites, population centers, and individuals; and physically occupying key terrain and facilities.
- **Influence.** Involves altering the opinions and attitudes of the host-nation population through information engagement, presence, and conduct; also includes the application of nonlethal capabilities to complement and reinforce the effects of the stability mechanisms compel and control.
- **Support.** Involves establishing, reinforcing, or setting the conditions necessary for the other instruments of national power to function effectively; coordinating and cooperating closely with host-nation civilian agencies; and assisting aid organizations as necessary to secure humanitarian access to vulnerable populations.

4-44. Compliance and legitimacy are interrelated concepts. While legitimacy is vital to achieving host-nation compliance, compliance itself depends on how local populace perceives the force’s ability to exercise force to accomplish the mission. The appropriate and discriminate use of force often forms a central component to success in stability operations; it closely ties to legitimacy. Depending on the circumstances, the threat or use of force can reinforce or complement efforts to stabilize a situation, gain consent, and ensure compliance with mandates and agreements. The misuse of force—or even the perceived threat of the misuse of force—can adversely affect the legitimacy of the mission or the military instrument of national power.

4-45. As a stability mechanism, control closely relates to the primary stability task, *establish civil control*. However, control is also fundamental to effective, enduring security. When combined with the stability mechanism compel, it is inherent to the activities that comprise disarmament, demobilization, and
reintegration, as well as broader security sector reform programs. (Chapter 6 discusses security sector reform in detail.) Without effective control, efforts to establish civil order—that includes efforts to establish both civil security and control over an area and its population—will not succeed. Establishing control requires time, patience, and coordinated, cooperative efforts across the operational area.

4-46. Influence aims to effect behavioral change through nonlethal means. It is more a result of public perception than a measure of operational success. It reflects the ability of the forces to operate successfully among the people of the host nation, to interact with them consistently and positively while accomplishing the mission. Here, consistency of actions and messages is vital. Influence requires legitimacy; the trust and confidence of the people is earned through the constructive capabilities of combat power, not through lethal or coercive means. Positive influence is absolutely necessary to achieve lasting control and compliance. It contributes to success across the lines of effort and engenders support among the people. Once attained, influence is best maintained by consistently exhibiting respect for, and operating within, the cultural and societal norms of the local populace.

4-47. Support is vital in a comprehensive approach founded in whole of government engagement. The military instrument of national power brings unique expeditionary and campaign capabilities to stability that allow the force to address the immediate needs of fragile states quickly. In extreme circumstances, support may require committing considerable resources for a protracted period. However, to ease the burden of support on military forces requires enabling civilian agencies and organizations to fulfill their respective roles. This is typically achieved by combining the effects of the stability mechanisms compel, control, and influence to reestablish security and control; restoring essential civil services to the local populace; and helping to secure humanitarian access necessary for aid organizations to function effectively.

Defeat Mechanisms

4-48. Defeat mechanisms primarily apply in combat operations against an active enemy force. They are defined in terms of the broad operational and tactical effects they produce—physical or psychological. Commanders translate these effects into tactical tasks, formulating the most effective method to defeat enemy aims. Physical defeat deprives enemy forces of the ability to achieve those aims; psychological defeat deprives them of the will to do so. Military forces prove most successful when applying deliberate combinations of defeat mechanisms. As with stability mechanisms, this produces complementary and reinforcing effects not attainable with a single mechanism. The four defeat mechanisms are—

- **Destroy** involves identifying the most effective way to destroy enemy capabilities; this may be attained by sequentially applying combat power over time, or with a single, decisive attack.
- **Dislocate** involves compelling the enemy to expose forces by reacting to a specific action; this requires enemy commanders to either accept neutralization of part of their force or risk its destruction while repositioning.
- **Disintegrate** involves exploiting the effects of dislocation and destruction to shatter the enemy’s coherence; this typically follows the loss of capabilities that enemy commanders use to develop and maintain situational understanding, coupled with destruction and dislocation.
- **Isolate** involves limiting the enemy’s ability to conduct operations effectively by marginalizing critical capabilities or limiting the enemy’s ability to influence events; this exposes the enemy to continued degradation through the massed effects of other defeat mechanisms.

Combining Stability and Defeat Mechanisms

4-49. Stability and defeat mechanisms complement planning by providing focus in framing the complex problems; they offer the conceptual means to solve them. By combining the mechanisms in a stability operation, commanders can effectively address the human dimension of the problem while acting to reduce the security threat. Therefore, one element of the force can focus on reestablishing security and control while another element can address the immediate humanitarian needs of the populace. This is essential in operations conducted among the people where success is often gauged by the effectiveness of long-term reconstruction and development efforts. Thus, early and deliberate combinations of the stability and defeat mechanisms are vital to success, especially in environments where actors may face active opposition.
LINES OF EFFORT

4-50. A line of effort links multiple tasks and missions to focus efforts toward establishing the conditions that define the desired end state. Lines of effort are essential in stability operations, where physical, positional references to an enemy or adversary are less relevant. In these operations, where the human dimension typically assumes the focus of the force, lines of effort often work best to link tasks, effects, conditions, and the end state. Lines of effort are essential to helping commanders visualize how military capabilities can support the other instruments of national power. They prove particularly valuable where unity of command is elusive, if not impractical, and when used to achieve unity of effort in operations involving multinational forces and civilian agencies and organizations.

4-51. Commanders use lines of effort to describe how they envision their operations creating the more intangible end state conditions inherent in stability operations. These lines of effort show how individual actions relate to one another and to achieving the desired end state. In these situations, lines of effort combine the complementary, long-term effects of stability tasks with the cyclic, short-term events typical of offensive or defensive tasks. Commanders at all levels use lines of effort to develop missions and tasks, identify complementary and reinforcing actions, and allocate resources appropriately. Commanders may designate actions on one line of effort as the decisive operation and others as shaping operations. They synchronize and sequence related actions across multiple lines of effort; recognizing these relationships helps them to assess progress toward achieving the end state.

4-52. Commanders typically visualize stability operations along lines of effort. At the corps and division level, commanders may consider linking primary stability tasks to their corresponding Department of State post-conflict stability sectors. These stability tasks link military actions with the broader interagency effort across the levels of war. Figure 4-1 provides an example. (Chapter 1 discusses the stability sectors in detail.) A full complement of lines of effort may also include lines focused on offensive and defensive activities, as well as a line that addresses the information element of combat power. Tasks along the information line of effort typically produce effects across multiple lines of effort.

![Figure 4-1. Example stability lines of effort](image-url)
4-53. The five stability sectors provide a framework for determining the tasks necessary to influence the operational environment where stability operations are the major focus. They help to identify the breadth and depth of relevant civil-military tasks and emphasize the relationships among them. The sectors form the basis for the collaborative interagency planning and dialog that leads to developing lines of effort that synthesize the effects of all instruments of national power.

4-54. However, at the brigade level and below, the primary stability tasks and corresponding stability sectors are too broad to focus effort appropriately; at lower tactical echelons, lines of effort are best designed using core or directed mission-essential tasks. (Chapter 3 includes additional detail on mission-essential stability tasks.) Lines of effort may focus on specific aspects of the local situation, such as the restoration of essential civil services. There, activities of military forces are often shaped using lines of effort based on the memory aid, SWEAT-MSO while addressing the need to provide emergency food aid and shelter. This integrates efforts to reestablish local civil services with similar, related actions to establish a safe and secure environment.

4-55. As operations progress, commanders may modify the lines of effort after assessing conditions and collaborating with other actors in the operational area. Lines of effort typically remain focused on integrating the effects of military operations with those of other instruments of national power to support broader, whole of government engagement. Each operation, however, differs. Commanders develop and modify lines of effort to keep operations focused on achieving the end state, even as the situation evolves.

**DECISIVE POINTS**

4-56. Decisive points assume a different character during stability operations. These decisive points may be less tangible and more closely associated with important events and conditions, and typically relate to the human dimension of the problem. Examples include—

- Securing national borders
- Repairing a vital water treatment facility.
- Establishing a training academy for national security forces.
- Securing a major election site.
- Quantifiably reducing crime.

4-57. None of these examples is purely physical. Nonetheless, any may be vital to establishing conditions for transitioning to civilian authority. In stability operations, commanders identify the decisive points that most directly influence the end state conditions. Decisive points that enable commanders to seize, retain, or exploit the initiative are crucial. Controlling them is essential to mission accomplishment. Ceding control of a decisive point may exhaust friendly momentum, force early culmination, or expose the force to undue risk. Decisive points shape the design of operations. They help commanders select clearly decisive, attainable objectives that directly contribute to establishing the end state.

4-58. The essential stability tasks offer an efficient means for commanders to identify those tasks most closely associated with decisive points. Success in stability operations depends on the commander’s ability to identify the tasks essential to mission success, and prioritize and sequence the performance of those tasks with available combat power. These tasks include the essential tasks required to establish the end state conditions that define success. These tasks are linked to the end state through decisive points. Therefore, identifying essential tasks and tying them directly to decisive points most effectively establishes the conditions that define the desired end state and mark the successful accomplishment of the mission. (See chapter 3 for a discussion of the essential stability tasks.)

**TRANSITIONS**

4-59. Transitions mark a change of focus between phases or between the ongoing operation and execution of a branch or sequel. The shift in relative priority between the elements of full spectrum operations—such as from offense to stability—also involves a transition. Transitions require planning and preparation well before their execution. The force is vulnerable during transitions, and commanders establish clear conditions for their execution. Transitions may create unexpected opportunities; they may also make forces vulnerable to enemy threats.
4-60. An unexpected change in conditions may require commanders to direct an abrupt transition between phases. In such cases, the overall composition of the force remains unchanged despite sudden changes in mission, task organization, and rules of engagement. Typically, task organization evolves to meet changing conditions; however, transition planning must also account for changes in mission. Commanders attuned to sudden changes can better adapt their forces to dynamic conditions. They continuously assess the situation and task-organize and cycle their forces to retain the initiative. They strive to achieve changes in emphasis without incurring an operational pause.

4-61. Stability operations include transitions of authority and control among military forces, civilian agencies and organizations, and the host nation. (See figure 4-2.) Each transition involves inherent risk. That risk is amplified when multiple transitions must be managed simultaneously or when a component must conduct a series of transitions in relatively short order. Planning anticipates these transitions, and careful preparation and diligent execution ensures they occur without incident. Transitions are identified as decisive points on lines of effort; they typically mark a significant shift in effort and signify the gradual return to civilian oversight and control of the host nation.
Chapter 5

Transitional Military Authority

The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.

Article 43, Regulations Annexed to the Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague Convention No. IV)
18 October 1907

5-1. Under extreme circumstances, where the host-nation government has failed completely or an enemy regime has been deposed, the intervening authority has a legal and moral responsibility to install a transitional military authority on the behalf of the population. In cases in which military forces have invaded and are occupying enemy territory, such an authority is established by the occupying force pursuant to international law, including the Hague and Geneva Conventions. Such authority is limited in scope by international law. In other circumstances, transitional military authority may be established pursuant to a United Nations Security Council Resolution or a similar international legal authority, which will also describe the limits of that authority. Furthermore, when occupying enemy territory, authority additional to that provided by traditional sources of international law, such as the Geneva and Hague Conventions, may be provided by United Nations Security Council Resolutions or similar authority. Commanders should only take action with regard to transitional military authority after close and careful consultation with the legal advisor.

DEFINITIONS AND AUTHORITIES

5-2. Transitional military authorities are installed to act on the behalf of the population, and in the case of occupation of enemy territory, to secure the occupying force. The United Nations Security Council Resolution or similar authority may prescribe specific or additional roles of the transitional military authority. In cases other than the occupation of enemy territory, the international community generally will lead this effort through an international organization such as the United Nations. The occupation of enemy territory may result in one nation or a coalition of nations providing the transitional military authority. A transitional military authority may draw assistance from experienced civilian agencies and organizations. These agencies and organizations have expertise to establish a system of government that fosters the gradual transition to a legitimate host-nation authority. Sometimes, however, sufficient civilian expertise is not present or conditions of the operational environment do not support introducing such civilian expertise. Military forces may then be required to lead this effort until they stabilize the security situation and can safely transition responsibility for governance to civilian authority and control.

5-3. Effective transitional military authority enhances security and facilitates ongoing operations while fulfilling the legal obligations of occupying forces under international law. This authority enhances stability by promoting the safety and security of both military forces and the local populace, reducing active or passive sabotage, and maintaining public order. It helps ongoing operations by building host-nation capability and capacity to perform government functions and relieving maneuver forces of civil administrative tasks. Until the military authority can safely transition to civilian authority and control, activities of the transitional military authority are performed with civilian personnel assistance and participation. These civilians may come from the host-nation, the United States Government, or other agencies or organizations. This cooperation facilitates the transition while ensuring that all activities complement and reinforce efforts to establish conditions necessary to achieve success.
5-4. A transitional military authority exercises functions of a civil government. These functions include providing for the safety, security, and well-being of the populace; restoring and maintaining public order; and reestablishing essential civic services. Such functions—and the tasks that support them—come from the essential tasks described in the essential stability task matrix (discussed in detail in chapter 3). Establishing transitional military authority may require military forces to execute tasks typically performed by the host-nation government. These tasks typically may be provided for under international law, including applicable treaties—such as the Hague and Geneva Conventions—and United Nations Security Council Resolutions.

**COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY FOR TRANSITIONAL MILITARY AUTHORITY**

5-5. The exercise of transitional military authority is a command responsibility, exercised in accordance with international law. To ensure that understanding and cultural awareness inform planning and the conduct of transitional military authority, commanders maintain open, continuous dialogue. They also collaborate among the echelons of command and various agencies, organizations, and institutions that share in efforts to restore legitimate governance to the host nation.

5-6. The authority to implement transitional military authority resides with the President and is exercised through the Secretary of Defense and the joint force commander. Broad policy formulation and initial planning for transitional military authority is conducted under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, the joint force commander, key staff, and subordinate Service component and allied commanders also participate to a lesser degree.

**ESTABLISHING TRANSITIONAL MILITARY AUTHORITY**

5-7. A transitional military authority exercises the functions of civil government by restoring and maintaining public order and reestablishing essential civic services. Transitional military authority is not limited to the occupation of enemy territory. During operations outside the United States and its territories, necessity may also require establishing transitional military authority in various situations, including—

- An allied or neutral territory liberated from enemy forces.
- A technically neutral or allied territory proven to be hostile.
- Ungoverned areas.

5-8. The time during which a transitional military authority exercises authority varies based on the requirements of the military operation and of international law. To establish transitional military authority, commanders may require from the host-nation population a level of obedience commensurate with military necessity. Such obedience provides security of military forces, maintenance of law and order, and proper administration of the area of operations. Commanders can reward civil obedience by reducing infringement on the individual liberties of the local populace.

5-9. The degree of control exercised by a transitional military authority varies greatly due to several factors, including—

- The legal authorities of the military commander under international law.
- The relationship that previously existed between the United States Government and the host-nation government.
- Existing attitudes and the level of cooperation of host nation’s national, regional, and local leaders, and the local populace.
- Ongoing and projected military operations.
- The presence of hostile or enemy forces.
- The level of civil obedience.

5-10. As conditions in the territory subject to transitional military authority stabilize, the degree of control exercised by a military government can decrease. Authority and control can transfer to either the legitimate sovereign or to such other civilian government such as a civilian occupation government.
ORGANIZING FOR TRANSITIONAL MILITARY AUTHORITY

5-11. The joint force commander is responsible for the detailed planning and operations of the transitional military authority under the general guidelines received from the President, Secretary of Defense, and Joint Chiefs of Staff. The structure and organization of the transitional military authority depend on—

- International law, including any applicable United Nations Security Council Resolutions or similar authorities.
- The mission of the military force.
- The organization, capabilities, and capacities of deployed forces.
- The military and political conditions of the joint operations area.
- The nature, structure, and organization of the existing or former host-nation government.
- The physical, political, economic, and cultural geography of the host nation.

EXISTING LAWS, CUSTOMS, AND BOUNDARIES

5-12. The laws of the territory subject to transitional military authority may not be changed, except to the extent permitted by international law. Commanders must consult closely and carefully with their legal advisors before attempting to change any local law.

5-13. In general, the military authority should not impose on an occupied territory the customs of another nation. Implementing changes or reforms inconsistent with local customs may foster active or passive resistance, adding friction to an already complex effort. Commanders and their legal advisors must recognize that laws and customs often vary between political divisions of a country, such as between provinces or municipalities. Commanders need to identify issues related to ethnic and minority groups so policies of the transitional military authority do not inadvertently oppress such groups.

5-14. Local boundaries and political divisions may not be redrawn except to the extent permitted by international law. The treatment of legislative bodies in the territory subject to transitional military authority will vary depending upon international law and security requirements.

5-15. Existing police jurisdictional boundaries and lines should be examined to determine if they will contribute to setting the conditions for successful stability operations. Established precincts, zones, districts, regions, counties, parish, or other mechanisms that delineate police authority can assist in command and control, decision making, and employment of military forces. Police jurisdictional boundaries may reflect dominant or sensitive cultural realities or fault lines that exist in a community. Some police boundaries may also exist to ensure that police capability is commensurate or appropriate to the criminal conditions of an area.

FORMS OF TRANSITIONAL MILITARY AUTHORITY

5-16. In general, transitional military authorities are either operational or territorial. An operational military authority expands in authority as operations continue. In the territorial form of transitional military authority, a separate organization is established under the direct command of the joint force commander or an authorized subordinate.

Operational Military Authority

5-17. An operational military government may expand in authority as operations continue. Commanders oversee civil functions of government in their respective operational areas. This includes ensuring the safety, security, and well-being of the local populace, and providing humanitarian assistance. Under the operational military government, the existing chain of command retains the responsibility for authority and is supported by the staff structure at that echelon.

5-18. Concentrating authority and responsibility in the commander helps ensure that governance activities are integrated consistently with ongoing operations. These activities include relations between the military force and civilians. By ensuring the integrity of unity of command in an operational area, commanders can mitigate much of the friction associated with operations in and among the local populace. As the situation
permits, the responsibility for government transfers to host-nation or other civilian authority to help it return to full self-governance. Using host-nation civilian advisory groups helps accelerate this transfer of authority.

5-19. The advantages of operational governance, however, are tempered by the rate of military activities. Generally, the higher the tempo in the operational area, the less able the commander can address the requirements of transitional military authority. In operations where military forces are always moving, military administration and policy may change frequently. Finally, operational headquarters are not always assigned operational areas corresponding to known political subdivisions. Even after hostilities, conformance of these areas to political boundaries may prove impossible.

Territorial Military Authority

5-20. In territorial military government, a separate organization is established. It may be under the direct command of the joint force commander or an authorized subordinate or may report directly to the Secretary of Defense or the President. The military governor may command subordinate military governors assigned to political subdivisions throughout the territory of the host nation. Generally, the territorial government represents a separate chain of command from operational forces.

5-21. A territorial military government typically makes more effective and economical use of military manpower and expertise than an operational government. Established after the operational areas is stabilized, a territorial military government may provide for better continuity of policy and personnel and better facilitate selecting and assigning specially trained military personnel. Territorial military government operates under the provisions of unity of effort, representing the fundamental principles for unified action.

5-22. However, the existence of a separate chain of command within an operational area or a political subdivision presents unique challenges to the territorial military government. Activities of the territorial military government must carefully coordinate with those of operational military forces. These activities must not interfere with ongoing operations or expose the operational force to undue risk. The territorial military government and the operational forces must maintain close communication, cooperation, and coordination to ensure unity of effort.

5-23. In practice, the exact form of authority should be adapted to suit the political and military situation in the joint operations area. A territorial military government may draw certain features from an operational form, or vice versa. As operations progress, the character of the military government may evolve according to the situation, mirroring the effort to build host-nation capacity. In certain cases, one type of military government may predominate in one region of the host nation, while another type is better suited for another region.

Local Government Officials and Departments

5-24. Successfully implementing transitional military authority often depends on how the host-nation government and its civilians participate and contribute. The transitional military authority thoroughly assesses the capability of the remaining host-nation government officials. This assessment determines if those officials can support and contribute to transitional military authority. The long-term success of the operation may depend on this assessment. If permitted by international law, offices that are unnecessary or detrimental to the transitional military authority may close temporarily, and officials who refuse to serve the best interests of the transitional military authority may be suspended. However, such officials may be retained in an advisory capacity at the discretion of the military commander. In such cases, they should continue to receive compensation for their services.

5-25. Generally, if a transitional military authority needs to be established, very high-ranking political officials of the former government will not continue to hold office. Such officials may include heads of the host-nation government and cabinet ministers. To the extent permitted by international law, the transitional military authority may be required to perform certain duties that would otherwise fall to individuals in these positions.
5-26. Typically, mere membership in unfriendly organizations or political groups is not by itself considered sufficient grounds for removal from office. However, officials who have served as active leaders of such organizations or political groups may need to leave office. Similarly, officials who prove unreliable or corrupt must leave office through legal action or through an open, transparent administrative process. The willful failure of retained officials to perform their duties satisfactorily is a serious offense against the transitional military authority.

5-27. The commander’s decisions about whether or not to retain leaders of the local government will likely vary. In some areas, full local participation may be the norm, while in other areas entire departments and bureaus of the local government may need to close. Where practical, the transitional military authority should retain subordinate officials and employees of the local government. These officials can continue to properly discharge their duties under the direction and supervision of appropriately trained military personnel. Under certain circumstances, military forces may protect officials who continue to serve in, or are appointed to, local public service. Hostile elements may pose a threat to these individuals, putting their safety at risk.

5-28. In some areas, the local populace may have had very limited participation in government due to centralized power in an authoritarian regime or a dominating foreign power. Elitist groups may also have focused regional, provincial, or municipal power under their control, negating the participation of the local populace. In such cases, civil officials of the former government may flee. Even if they remain, it may be impractical or unsafe for them to continue in office. For this reason, building new partner capability—training local nationals to assume certain government positions—must often precede long-term efforts in capacity building.

5-29. When a local official is removed or unavailable, the transitional military authority should seek a fully qualified, trained, and experienced replacement. When selecting officials, the military authority should consider their reliability, willingness to cooperate with the transitional military authority, and status in the community. The transitional military authority does not make permanent appointments, however. If a suitable candidate is not available, a representative of the transitional military authority should perform the duties of the position until an appropriate replacement can assume the duties.

5-30. Commanders at all echelons must avoid any commitments to, or negotiations with, local political elements without the approval of higher authority. Military personnel should refrain from developing or maintaining unofficial relationships with local officials and host-nation personnel. Soldiers must refuse personal favors or gifts offered by government officials or the local populace unless authorized by higher authority.

**GUIDELINES FOR TRANSITIONAL MILITARY AUTHORITY**

5-31. For military forces, the successful completion of the mission is paramount. As long as operations continue, the commander must exercise the necessary control and take appropriate measures with host-nation personnel and the local populace to ensure the success of the mission. The policies and practices adopted for transitional military authority can reduce the possibility that civilians interfere with ongoing operations.

5-32. To ensure operations continue unimpeded by civilian interference, transitional military authority focuses on ensuring the safety and security of civilians, restoring and maintaining law and order, building host-nation capability and capacity in key areas of government, and reestablishing living conditions to a normal, customary state. This effort is facilitated by thoroughly integrating civil affairs planning and capabilities into the operations process, and maintaining positive interaction between military forces and the local people.

**TREATMENT OF THE POPULATION**

5-33. Fair treatment of the local populace can help reduce the chance that it will be hostile to U.S. forces and increase the chance for obtaining cooperation from that population. The proper and just treatment of civilians helps military forces establish and maintain security; prevent lawlessness; promote order; and secure local labor, services, and supplies. It promotes a positive impression of the military force, the United
States, and other government agencies, organizations, and institutions engaged in unified action. It strengthens the legitimacy of the operation and the transitional military authority in the eyes of the populace, bordering nations, and other members of the international community.

5-34. Nonetheless, a policy of proper and just treatment does not prevent the imposition of restrictive or punitive measures necessary to secure the objectives of the transitional military authority. In particular, such measures may be needed in an area where the population is actively and aggressively hostile.

5-35. The military’s policies for treating any population vary depending on several factors. These factors include characteristics of the population, such as their attitude toward the governing forces, the degree of technical-industrial development, socio-economic conditions, the political system, and local history and culture. Another determining factor is the policies of the United States with respect to the host-nation government. The commander must become familiar with host-nation customs, institutions, and attitudes and implement transitional military authority accordingly.

5-36. When determining policies for treating the local populace, commanders consider other factors:

- Generally, less restrictive measures are appropriate for civilians of friendly or nonhostile states. More restrictive measures generally are needed with civilians of hostile states.
- Depending on the culture, the local populace may perceive certain actions as characteristic of an illegitimate or weak military government. On the other hand, certain actions, though permissible under international law, may aggravate an already complex civil situation or reduce the effectiveness of the force in imposing civil control.
- Force may be used to subdue those who resist the transitional military authority or to prevent the escape of prisoners or detainees suspected of crimes. Force is limited to what is necessary, and must be consistent with international law. Legal advisors should be consulted in formulating policies for the use of force and the treatment of prisoners, detainees, and other persons.

5-37. Military commanders are inherently empowered to take all prudent and proportional measures necessary to protect their forces. However, during stability operations, the nature of the threat can often inhibit the ability of friendly forces to differentiate between a hostile act and hostile intent among members of the civilian community. For this reason, military commanders and forces must retain the authority to detain civilians and an acceptable framework under which to confine, intern, and eventually release them back into the operational environment. This authority has the most legitimacy when sanctioned by international mandate or when it is bestowed or conveyed from the local or regional governmental power. The initial or baseline authority granted to military forces to use force and detainee civilians will ultimately determine the status of the persons they detain. The status of detained persons will further determine the manner in which they are processed, the degree of due process they are afforded, and whether their offense is military or criminal in nature.

ECONOMIC STABILIZATION AND RECOVERY

5-38. Transitional military authority generally focuses on security and the restoration and maintenance of law and order. In certain circumstances, military forces may need to act with regard to economic conditions to promote security and law and order. However, international law generally limits the authority of a transitional military authority in this area. Specific sources of international law directed at the activities of the transitional military authority, such as United Nations Security Council Resolutions, may provide additional authority. This is a complex area. Commander must consult legal advisors.

5-39. When international law permits a transitional military authority to engage in economic stabilization and recovery activities, two immediate goals generally exist for the economic sector. The first goal aims to use all available goods and services as efficiently as possible to meet the essential needs of the local populace. The second aims to revive the economy at the local level, stimulating production capability and workforce capacity, to reduce dependence on external support. Typically, the authority accomplishes this goal by quickly identifying local sources of supply and services to support military operations. This infuses critical monetary resources into the local economy to stimulate further growth, investment, and development.
5-40. When international law permits the transitional military authority to engage in economic stabilization and recovery efforts, commanders have a task. They must keep in mind that actions taken to stimulate economic recovery at the local level must be closely tied to efforts to stabilize the national economy. Therefore, the transitional military authority must immediately draw on the expertise and advice of civilian agencies (such as the Department of the Treasury) and organizations (such as the International Monetary Fund) to contend with macroeconomic challenges. Issues such as stabilizing monetary policy, controlling inflation, and reestablishing a national currency generally go beyond the expertise resident in the transitional military authority. This lack of expertise underscores the necessity of introducing appropriate civilian expertise as soon as practical or puts the success of broader economic recovery programs at risk from the outset of operations.

5-41. Stimulating the economy at the microeconomic level has proven to facilitate economic recovery, especially in areas suffering from market failure or collapse. The transitional military authority may apply microeconomics principles to influence local prices, supply and demand, or the availability of labor. For example, the transitional military authority can offer small-scale grants and low- or fixed-interest loans to encourage entrepreneurial investment and host-nation enterprise creation. These practices enable impoverished people to invest in projects that generate income and, in many cases, begin to build wealth and exit poverty. At the local level, this stimulation is essential to economic recovery; it sets the cornerstone for recovery and development on a national scale.

5-42. Economic assessments are critical to the success of recovery programs. They enable the transitional military authority with a broad understanding. The transitional authority can understand the economic conditions in the operational area, the factors that affect stabilization and growth, and the cultural nuances that influence the performance how the market sector performs. Developing a shared understanding of the economic situation spurs market integration, increases private sector participation, and improves social and economic cohesion throughout the host nation.

5-43. An equitable distribution of necessities—such as food, water, shelter, and medicine—supports economic stability. To this end, it may be necessary to establish and enforce controls temporarily over certain aspects of the local economy. These controls may be designed to affect the prices of goods and services, wage rates and labor practices, black market activity, hoarding of goods, banking practices, imports or exports, and production rates within industry. However, these controls may also have certain adverse effects, including impeding economic progress, causing corruption, conflict over limited resources, and social tension that can lead to renewed violence. Commanders must weigh the decision to implement economic controls against the abilities of the private sector. In doing so, they should seek guidance from higher echelons and from personnel and organizations with appropriate expertise. They determine how well the private sector can identify profitable lines of investment and enterprise creation quickly, stimulate market-led economic recovery, and provide reasonably priced consumable goods and services to the population. (See FM 3-05.40 for doctrine on populace and resources control.)

5-44. When permitted by international law, the transitional military authority may stimulate the economy to help the local industry develop. This may include agriculture, manufacturing, mining, forestry, and any number of service trades. The transitional military authority may support the production in a specific operational area. Industries may require some form of initial subsidization to spur productivity as well as assistance with management. In potentially hostile areas, the transitional military authority may provide or train personnel for skilled positions (to replace people who have fled or are not cooperative or dependable). Detailed infrastructure assessments help to locate useable production facilities and identify damaged or inoperable facilities for reconstruction planning.

PUBLIC HEALTH

5-45. Establishing the public health policy is a primary concern of the transitional military authority for security, public safety, and humanitarian reasons. The health of the military force is paramount to sustained operations. Without a healthy, viable force, the military cannot provide for the health and well-being of the people adequately. To protect the health of the force, the transitional military authority may need to take measures to safeguard, and if necessary, improve, the health of the local populace. Generally, the force lacks the health service support capacity to provide sustained medical care for civilians. However, with
appropriate resources and security, the transitional military authority may open and secure humanitarian access to the local population. It may also take steps such as establishing temporary clinics, training local health professionals, and augmenting existing medical facilities.

5-46. The transitional military authority should take steps to secure the public health infrastructure. Such steps can enable functioning hospitals and clinics to remain open so local medical personnel can continue to serve civilians. The transitional military authority can also repair critical transportation infrastructure to ensure continued delivery of medical supplies and accessibility for emergency patient transport. The transitional military authority should ensure the continued functioning of essential services infrastructure so that adequate power, water, and sanitation are available to support health care facilities. Public health policy should also focus on burying or cremating remains; disposing of sewage, garbage, and refuse properly; purifying local water supplies; inspecting food supplies; and controlling insects and disease. Preventive medicine specialists, working with civil affairs personnel, provide the capability to exercise public health policy.

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

5-47. **Respect for religious customs and organizations.** International law mandates that the religious convictions and practices of members of the local populace be respected. The military force should, consistent with security requirements, respect the religious celebrations and the legitimate activities of religious leaders. Places of religious worship should remain open unless they pose a specific security or health risk to the force or the local populace.

5-48. **Archives and records.** Archives and records, current and historical, of all branches of the former government should be secured and preserved. These documents are of immediate and continuing use to the military force as a source of valuable intelligence and information. They are of even greater importance to the transitional military authority by providing invaluable information in running the government. Therefore, the military force seizes, secures, and protects archives and records.

5-49. **Mail.** Large quantities of mail and other documents are often found in post offices or at other points of central communications. These also represent an important source of intelligence and information. The transitional military authority should seize and protect such materials until the forces can process and deliver them.

5-50. **Shrines and art.** Except in cases where military operations or military necessity prevents it, the force protects and preserves all historical and cultural monuments and works, religious shrines and objects of art, and any other national collections of artifacts or art.

5-51. **Atrocities.** Under certain circumstances, the transitional military authority may be required to contend with the aftermath atrocities, including war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. To the greatest extent possible, the transitional military authority should assist in establishing commissions and with identifying, processing, and memorializing remains of victims. These are especially sensitive matters, and must be carried out with appropriate sensitivity and respect for local culture and customs.

5-52. **Anticorruption.** The transitional military authority will likely contend with corruption in certain sectors of the host nation. Appropriate anticorruption measures may need to be implemented to counter the influence of corrupt officials in host-nation institutions. Dismissing these officials, however, must be weighed against their prestige and influence. Transparent, legitimate processes are fundamental to effective anticorruption programs.

5-53. **Vetting.** Successful capacity building relies on dependable vetting processes to screen potential civil servants from the host nation. These processes help commanders select qualified, competent officials while reducing the threat of security risks. Vetting processes should include the participation of local inhabitants to ensure transparency, cultural sensitivity, and legitimacy. Commanders should monitor these processes closely to prevent the exclusion of specific religious, ethnic, or tribal groups.
COURTS AND CLAIMS

5-54. The ordinary courts in areas under control of the transitional military authority generally continue to function during a military occupation. They may only be suspended if judges abstain from fulfilling their duties, the courts are corrupt or unfairly constituted, or the administration of the local jurisdiction has collapsed. In such cases, the transitional military authority may establish its own courts.

5-55. The penal laws of the occupied territory remain in force during the occupation. However, the transitional military authority may suspend them during an occupation if they constitute a threat to security or an obstacle to the application of the Geneva Conventions.

5-56. During an occupation, the transitional military authority may enact special decrees and penal provisions essential for it to—

- Fulfill its obligations under the Geneva and Hague Conventions.
- Maintain orderly government of the occupied territory.
- Ensure the security of the occupying forces.

5-57. Penal provisions enacted by the transitional military authority during an occupation may not enter into force until they are made public to the population of the occupied territory in the national language of that territory. Such penal provisions may not be retroactive and the penalty must be proportionate to the offense. Courts may only apply to those provisions of law that were applicable prior to the alleged offense and are in accordance with the general principles of law.

5-58. The transitional military authority may establish courts to hear cases on alleged violations of the special decrees and penal provisions enacted by the transitional military authority. It may also establish courts and administrative boards for other certain purposes. These might include considering the cases of detainees and reconsidering the refusals of requests by aliens to leave the occupied territory. For further information on courts, commissions, and military tribunals, see the Manual for Military Commissions.

5-59. During an occupation, the transitional military authority has certain requirements. It may not declare that the rights and actions of enemy nationals are extinguished, suspended, or unenforceable in a court of law. During an occupation, U.S. forces and the transitional military authority are not subject to local laws. Nor are they subject to the jurisdiction of the local civil or criminal courts of the occupied territory unless expressly agreed to by the transitional military authority or by the occupying power. Only U.S. military courts should try U.S. personnel subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Promptly investigating, arbitrating, and settling local damage claims—to the extent permitted by U.S. law, regulation, and policy—can help to strengthen the credibility of the transitional military authority. (See AR 27-20 for regulatory guidance on claims.)
Chapter 6

Security Sector Reform

Establishing security involved domestic security, secure borders, and relatively accommodating neighbors. Of the three factors in achieving stabilization and reconstruction, domestic security is the most important and often the most difficult to achieve.

James Stephenson
Losing the Golden Hour

6-1. National defense and internal security are the traditional cornerstones of state sovereignty. Security is essential to legitimate governance and participation, effective rule of law, and sustained economic development. For a state recovering from the effects of armed conflict, natural disaster, or other events that threaten the integrity of the central government, an effective security sector fosters international development, encourages foreign investment, and helps reduce poverty.

6-2. The security sector comprises the individuals and institutions responsible for the safety and security of the host nation and its people. Generally, this includes the military and any state-sponsored paramilitary forces; national and local police; the judiciary and corrections systems; coastal and border security forces; oversight bodies; and militia and private military and security companies employed by the state. The security sector represents the foundation of effective, legitimate governance and the potential of the state for enduring viability.

6-3. Security sector reform is the set of policies, plans, programs, and activities that a government undertakes to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice. Security sector reform aims to provide an effective and legitimate public service that is transparent, accountable to civilian authority, and responsive to the needs of the public. It may include integrated activities in support of: defense and armed forces reform; civilian management and oversight; justice, police, corrections, and intelligence reform; national security planning and strategy support; border management; disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration; and concurrent reduction of armed violence.

6-4. Security sector reform (SSR) involves the reestablishment or reform of the institutions and key ministerial positions that maintain and provide oversight for the safety and security of the host nation and its people. Through unified action, those individuals and institutions assume an effective, legitimate, and accountable role; they provide external and internal security for their citizens under the civilian control of a legitimate state authority. Effective security sector reform enables a state to build its capacity to provide security, justice, and rule of law. SSR promotes stability, fosters democratic reform processes, and enables economic development. The desired outcome of SSR programs is an effective and legitimate security sector firmly rooted within the rule of law.

6-5. SSR includes reform efforts targeting the individuals and institutions that provide a nation’s security and promote the rule of law. By recognizing the inherently interdependent aspects of the security sector and by integrating operational support with institutional reform and governance, SSR promotes effective, legitimate, transparent, and accountable security and justice. SSR captures the full range of security activities under the broad umbrella of a single, coherent framework—from military and police training to weapons destruction; from community security to disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants to security sector oversight and budgeting.
UNIFIED ACTION IN SSR

6-6. The U.S. Government and its agencies, including the Department of Defense, pursue an integrated, whole-of-government approach to SSR based on unified action. With the support of the host nation, military forces collaborate with interagency representatives and other civilian organizations to design and implement SSR strategies, plans, programs, and activities. The Department of State leads and provides oversight for these efforts through its bureaus, offices, and overseas missions. The Department of Defense provides coercive and constructive capability to support the establishment; to restructure or reform the armed forces and defense sector; and to assist and support activities of other U.S. Government agencies involved in SSR. Army forces participate in and support SSR activities as directed by the joint force commander.

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

6-7. To implement SSR programs, elements of the U.S. Country Team, in partnership with the appropriate USG departments and agencies, and consistent with the Chief of Mission’s authority in the country, cooperate to design SSR strategies, plans, programs, and activities.

- The Department of State leads U.S. diplomatic initiatives and oversees programmatic support to SSR through its bureaus, offices, and overseas missions. These efforts are coordinated closely with DOS regional and functional bureaus holding substantive or lead roles in the development and execution of SSR programs, including the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), the Bureau of International Organizations (IO), the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS), and the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), in connection with its National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-44 responsibilities.

- The primary role of the Department of Defense in SSR is the reform, restructuring, or re-establishment of the armed forces and the defense sector. The regional offices assume the lead DOD role in setting regional and country priorities for SSR. The Director of Strategic Plans and Policy on the Joint Staff is responsible for coordinating SSR guidance with the Geographic Combatant Commands, which are responsible for planning and directing SSR activities within their areas of responsibility. The Military Departments and Defense Agencies will normally conduct SSR activities and implement SSR programs for the Department.

- The primary role for USAID is to support the governance, conflict mitigation and response, and Rule of Law agenda through programs aimed at building civilian capacity to manage, oversee, and provide security and justice as well as through reintegration and reconciliation programs. USAID regional bureaus as well as a number of functional offices, including the Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM), the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), and the Office of Military Affairs (OMA), may have substantive or lead roles in the development and execution of SSR and rule of law programs.

6-8. In addition to DOS, DOD, and USAID, other USG departments and agencies provide important capabilities in the execution of SSR programs. In particular, the Department of Justice, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Energy, and Department of the Treasury may have substantive or lead roles in the development and execution of SSR and rule of law programs. This whole of government approach to SSR is a cooperative activity. This activity is conducted by U.S. Government agencies and military forces; intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, multinational partners; and civil authorities. Through unified action, SSR actors orchestrate and integrate reform activities to achieve unity of effort across all agencies, organizations, institutions, and forces contributing to the SSR program. Success requires a shared understanding of the desired end state and supporting conditions. This understanding develops as the actors collaborate and is expanded upon through open and continuous dialogue. Unified action in a collaborative environment ensures more than unity of effort; it reinforces the broader, whole of government effort to integrate SSR into the overall reconstruction and stabilization strategy for the host nation.

6-9. SSR programs nested within a whole of government approach are complex undertakings that require time and patience. Managing expectations and setting realistic goals for SSR programs are essential to
sustaining such programs. Many reforms require an adjusted frame of reference that responds to changes in the operational environment, local culture, and existing political conditions.

6-10. All SSR programs recognize that good governance—the effective, equitable, responsive, transparent, and accountable management of public affairs and resources—and the rule of law are essential to establishing an effective security sector. Effective, enduring security sector governance requires legitimate oversight and control of security policy and practices. Security sector governance expands the concept of civilian oversight and control to include administration, management, policy formulation, and service delivery. Rule of law refers to a principle of governance in which all individuals, institutions, and entities, public and private (including state itself), are accountable to laws. These laws are publicly promulgated, equally enforced, and independently adjudicated. These laws are maintained consistent with international human rights norms and standards.

ELEMENTS OF THE SECURITY SECTOR

6-11. The security sector consists of both uniformed forces — police and military — and civilian agencies and organizations operating at various levels within the operational environment. Elements of the security sector are interdependent: SSR activities within one security sector element significantly affect other elements. See figure 6-1. The three core elements of the security sector consist of —

- **Armed and public security forces and agencies.** Those bodies authorized by the state to use or support the use of force. They include the active armed forces, civilian agencies, executive protection services, formed police units, military and civilian intelligence services, coast guards, border guards, customs services, reserves or local security units (civil defense units), national guards, government militias, and other paramilitary organizations.

- **Security management and oversight bodies.** Those bodies, both formal and informal, authorized by the state to manage and oversee the activities and governance of armed and public security forces and agencies. They may include (but are not limited to) the executive branch and ministries of defense, interior, justice, and foreign affairs; national security coordination and advisory bodies; the legislative branch and its committees; traditional and customary authorities; the ministry of finance and other financial management bodies; civilian review boards and compliance commissions; and local government structures. The latter includes governors, municipal councils, auditing bodies, civilian review boards, and public complaints commissions.

- **Civil society and other nonstate actors.** The society consists of professional organizations, policy analysis organizations (think tanks and universities), advocacy organizations, human rights commissions and ombudsmen, informal and traditional justice systems, nongovernmental organizations, media, and other nonstate actors. In addition to monitoring security actor performance, civil society articulates the public demand for safety and security. In some cases, particularly where a host-nation government’s capacity may be limited, civil society and other nonstate actors fill the security void by providing security and justice to local communities or constituents.
6-12. Although normally focused on a specific state or area, SSR activities occur in a broader regional context. Within that context, cultural sensitivities, political concerns, or apprehensions within neighboring states can become obstacles to the reform process. This makes SSR inherently complex in execution. Effective SSR requires a broad understanding of the security environment and an appreciation for the time commitment required to achieve long-term success.

THE MILITARY ROLE IN SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

6-13. SSR can occur at any point along the spectrum of conflict, in conditions ranging from general peace to the aftermath of major combat operations. No matter the conditions, SSR activities focus on the stability of the host nation to ensure conditions do not foment crisis and conflict. Within full spectrum operations, SSR is an aspect of stability operations. SSR includes tasks, functions, and activities from each of the primary task areas. It concentrates on generating the necessary capacity of the state and societal institutions to support responsible governance and rule of law.

6-14. In general, military forces play a primary role in SSR activities affecting host-nation defense institutions and armed forces. Within the other elements of the security sector, military forces will typically be limited to a role supporting the efforts of other SSR actors. However, military forces may assume a more active role in SSR activities affecting the nonmilitary elements of the security sector. Ultimately, conditions of the operational environment determine the role of military forces.

6-15. When the operational environment is characterized as nonpermissive, military forces can expect to lead reform efforts. When conditions permit other SSR actors to assume primary responsibility for their components of the SSR program, military forces relinquish the lead. Initially, the presence of non-military SSR partners may be limited, requiring military forces to undertake tasks normally performed by other interagency and civilian partners. Even when nonmilitary SSR actors are present, the nature of the environment may require military forces to support extensively those actors as they undertake their respective components of the SSR program. Many nonmilitary agencies and law enforcement forces require a permissive or semipermissive environment before assuming responsibility for their respective components. In certain situations, the military establishes security and control over an area so other elements of the security sector can become active. In these situations, the military role is essential to establishing the conditions that enable subsequent SSR efforts by civilian partners.

6-16. When the operational environment is more permissive and suitable to introduce nonmilitary SSR partners, reform efforts can focus on all SSR activities, including the transition from external to host-nation responsibility for security and public safety. Under these conditions, SSR activities may also transition to new host-nation institutions, groups, and governance frameworks as part of the peace process. As the transition proceeds, military primacy recedes. Other nonmilitary agencies and organizations come to the
forefront. They apply their expertise to their respective areas of the security sector and leave the military to focus on the host-nation defense sector and forces. Often the situation requires disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating personnel associated with armed forces or belligerent groups before and as part of the SSR program. Military forces can expect to assume a primary role in the disarmament process. As the situation and conditions of the operational environment allow, military forces begin establishing and training host-nation forces within a comprehensive reform program. As the host-nation forces train and validate their capabilities, they begin to conduct operations and to assume responsibility for security. Finally, the supporting, external military forces reduce their level of operations and supervision, and civil authorities assume full responsibility for security sector functions.

6-17. During peacetime military engagement, military forces may conduct SSR activities as part of the theater security cooperation plan. The military component of SSR during peacetime military engagement helps reform established host-nation defense institutions and processes and security force assistance activities aimed at promoting SSR objectives in host-nation forces. During peacetime military engagement, the chief of mission for the Department of State carries out SSR. The U.S. military role in SSR is normally limited to helping reform host-nation defense activities and security force assistance to the host nation armed forces. These efforts may impact other, nonmilitary aspects of SSR. The military component of SSR closely coordinates with other SSR activities, consistent with a collaborative, whole of government approach.

**Security Sector Reform and Host-Nation Autonomy**

6-18. External stability operations actors deliberately enhance the legitimacy of host-nation governance while trying to reform the security sector. The host-nation institutions, laws, and processes, however developmental, should play a central role when formulating and implementing SSR programs and processes. External influences frequently shape SSR policy formulation and implementation, especially when the host-nation government functions poorly. Nonetheless, SSR planners carefully uphold the host nation’s sovereignty by integrating its government into reform planning and execution.

6-19. Comprehensive peace agreements may be helpful where a national constitution is not in place or is not practiced. National security strategies or policies, national defense acts, and national justice codes illustrate host-nation guidelines that can help to add structure to the reform effort. Also important are host-nation groups in charge of specific responsibilities, such as government reform agencies, national reconciliation commissions, and national DDR bodies.

6-20. Participants in SSR help develop the program using their own policy guidance and policy implementation mechanisms. For example, United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolutions define the mandates of UN peacekeepers and UN-integrated missions. National policy guidance, national legal systems, relevant national legislation, treaties, and agreements—both bilateral and multilateral—provide a framework for host-nation and military forces. U.S. security assistance, in particular, must proceed within the framework of legislated provisions governing the delivery of foreign assistance by U.S. agencies, both military and civilian. While the SSR program integrates these influences, ultimately, it reflects the host-nation institutions, laws, and processes.

**Guiding Principles of Security Sector Reform**

6-21. Support local ownership. The principles, policies, laws, and structures that form an SSR program are rooted in the host nation’s history, culture, legal framework, and institutions. Notably, the needs, priorities, and circumstances driving SSR differ substantially from one country to another. Assistance is designed to support local actors, processes, and priorities to ensure the sustainability of the SSR process.

6-22. Pursue integrated approaches. Holistic programs that consider connections between organizations, sectors, and actors foster the balanced development of each sector. Thereby these programs increase the chances of success, minimize unforeseen developments, and give value for the resources expended. SSR is a cooperative activity, in which military forces conduct SSR activities in tandem with other agencies of the U.S. Government, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, multinational partners, and the
host nation. Effective SSR requires unity of effort and vision across all agencies, organizations, institutions, and forces contributing to the reform process.

6-23. **Incorporate principles of good governance and respect for human rights.** Accountability, transparency, public participation, and legitimacy are integral features of security force development. Technical assistance not only aims to build operational capability, but also to strengthen adherence to democratic principles and build respect for human rights. Security forces—whether military, police, or intelligence services—carry out their core functions in accordance with these principles. This is especially important in rebuilding countries where the legacy of abuse by the military may have eroded public confidence.

6-24. **Balance operational support with institutional reform.** Incentives, processes, resources, and structures are put in place so that externally supported reforms, resources, and capacities are sustained after the assistance effort ends. Building training platforms and providing material assistance without parallel efforts to help develop the infrastructure, personnel, and administrative support systems ultimately undermines the ability of host-nation forces to perform their security functions. Equal emphasis is placed on how the recipients of security force assistance efforts are managed, monitored, deployed, sustained, and supported. Success and sustainability depend on developing the institutions and governance processes that support security sector reform as well as the human capacity to lead and manage the elements of that sector.

6-25. **Link security and justice.** Host-nation security policies and practices are nested in the rule of law. Rule of law cannot flourish in crime-ridden environments or where public order breaks down and citizens fear for their safety. Assistance efforts consider the diverse array of actors and institutions that comprise the justice system. Police assistance undertaken without accompanying efforts to reform other parts of the justice system might result in increased arrests without the means to adjudicate individual cases or to support the incarceration or rehabilitation of convicted offenders. Similarly, focusing solely on reforming and rebuilding host-nation forces, while police services and justice system institutions languish, can lead to the militarization of civil security. It also might encourage using military forces in roles inconsistent with existing frameworks for host-nation justice and rule of law.

**SECURITY SECTOR REFORM PLANNING**

6-26. Sustainable SSR totally depends on thorough planning and assessment. Working within a collaborative environment of unified action, the various stakeholders consider the unique capabilities and contributions of each participant. The ensuing plan aims for a practical pace of reform and accounts for the political and cultural context of the situation. The plan accounts for available resources and capabilities while balancing the human capacity to deliver change against a realistic timeline. The SSR plan reflects host-nation culture, sensitivities, and historical conceptions of security. It does not seek to implement a Western paradigm for the security sector, understanding that a Western model may not be appropriate. As with the broader campaign plan, the SSR plan seeks to resolve the underlying sources of conflict while preventing new or escalating future security crises.

6-27. The level of host-nation development—especially as it pertains to poverty and economic opportunity—is an important consideration in SSR planning. High levels of poverty significantly challenge the SSR effort. These levels of poverty—both at the individual and institutional levels—are typically evidenced by inadequate government revenues and a chronically under-resourced public sector. SSR programs are tailored to the unique challenges that such environments pose. These programs confront endemic corruption in the public sector and accommodate limited host-nation public administration and public management capacities. External resourcing and external fiscal management for elements of the host-nation security sector, including its military institutions, may be necessary until sufficient host-nation capacity exists to sustain SSR activities.

6-28. Ideally, the SSR plan is informed and guided by host-nation security strategy and defense policy. However, in states without established, legitimate democratic government institutions able to develop mature strategy and policy, SSR planning draws on a broad review of international security strategy and defense policy before implementing a plan. This review, which accounts for the nuances of host-nation
culture, ensures the SSR plan reflects the needs of the country. It also ensures the end state is a security apparatus appropriate for the needs of the state and its people.

FOUNDATIONS OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

6-29. In unified action, participating military forces understand that ultimate responsibility for SSR rests with the host nation and other nonmilitary participants. SSR planning extends to the long run. The military judiciously selects and uses forces to create a secure environment for an SSR program to progress unimpeded. The military may provide temporary capability and expertise, but long-term success in the reform process depends on how quickly and effectively it transitions to appropriate nonmilitary agencies and the host nation. The military participates in SSR under principles for stability operations.

6-30. The foundations of SSR are—

- **A concept of security developed by the host nation and ingrained in its culture.** The core values of a SSR program reflect the needs of the people and inculcate the principle of ownership.
- **A framework that encompasses all security sector participants and challenges.** A SSR program provides a framework to structure thinking concerning the diverse security challenges facing host nations and their populations. This inclusive framework is essential to better integrate security sector reform policies and greater civilian involvement and oversight. It is founded on a comprehensive understanding of the security sector from a host-nation perspective.
- **Cooperation with and among civil authorities.** SSR approaches are developed in cooperation with civil authorities. SSR approaches have many sectors; they are based on a broad assessment of the security and justice needs of the people and the state. Strategies reflect a comprehensive whole of government plan that encompasses all participants in the security sector.
- **Human rights and the rule of law.** An SSR program is based on democratic norms and underpinned by internationally accepted human rights principles and the rule of law. SSR creates an environment characterized by freedom from fear by measurably reducing armed violence and crime. An SSR program enhances the institutional and human capacity for security policy to function effectively and for justice to be delivered equitably.
- **Clear policies, accountability, and professionalism.** SSR programs include well-defined policies that strengthen the governance of security institutions. Programs build professional host-nation security forces that are accountable to civil authorities and capable of executing their responsibilities. The security sector and supporting SSR activities adhere to basic principles of governance and broader public sector reform programs, including transparency and accountability.

CONSIDERATIONS FOR SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

6-31. SSR planning must account for several interrelated factors that influence the reform process. Interactions among the security sector and these factors complicate the reform process. Additionally, actions taken to reform one aspect of the security sector invariably affect reform activities in another. Effective assessment of these factors will drive the process and help define success.

6-32. **Cultural awareness.** Regardless of the need to develop a host nation’s security forces quickly, SSR requires considerable tolerance, cultural awareness, and an environment of mutual respect. In particular, actors working closely with host-nation forces must respect the security culture of the host nation. This culture is shaped by history, language, religion, and customs and must be understood. Cultural awareness and sensitivity are necessary to dispel the natural tensions that arise when external actors dictate the terms and conditions of SSR for the host nation. Responsiveness, flexibility, and adaptability to local culture help limit resentment and resistance to reform while generating local solutions to local problems. Local help fosters acceptance and strengthens the confidence of the citizens in the reform process.

6-33. **Leadership capacity building.** Challenges associated with developing capable, legitimate, and accountable security forces require strong leadership in the host-nation security sector at all levels. To
establish the conditions for long-term success, SSR must help the host nation identify and begin training and advising security force leaders as early as possible. Such efforts must avoid undermining host-nation legitimacy while recognizing that assistance, advice, and education may be needed. Programs focused on developing senior leaders, such as those conducted by the Department of Defense Regional Centers for Security Studies, may prove helpful. Often the host nation can augment programs for officer training and staff college courses of participating forces and may even develop similar institutions. This participation ensures that future leaders gain the knowledge and skills to manage security forces effectively while meeting the broader responsibilities normally associated with leaders in the security sector.

6-34. **Public confidence.** In rebuilding the institutions of a failed state, commanders must engender trust and confidence between the local populace and the security forces. As SSR proceeds, these security forces carry a progressively greater burden in ensuring public safety. Frequently, they do so in an environment characterized by high levels of crime and violence. This proves true in areas recovering from violent, predatory forces. Recovery requires a community-based response that uses the unique capabilities of the security forces and police. Operating in accordance with the laws of the host nation, the success of these forces will help to gain the consent, trust, and confidence of the local populace. Furthermore, increased public confidence engenders greater desire among the people to support the efforts of the security forces.

6-35. **Improving credibility.** External participants in the SSR process must focus on enhancing the functionality of host-nation security forces while sustaining and strengthening the perception of legitimacy of civilians. Public confidence is further strengthened as host-nation forces support activities that foster democratic processes. These activities, such as providing security for elections, associate the security forces with positive processes; this improves the credibility of host-nation security forces while providing visible signs of accountability and responsibility.

6-36. **Balanced development.** All parts of the security sector must be reformed together. For military forces, for example, this requires the concurrent development of a defense ministry, joint and Service component headquarters, formations, and field units. This, in turn, requires the establishment of systems of military justice, logistics, and finance to sustain development. Sustained reform also requires an emphasis on the quality, rather than quantity, of formations and units; this necessitates patience throughout the entire reform process. The provision or acquisition of materiel must be appropriate for the host nation, accounting for identified requirements, identified threats, and projected capacity. The host nation must drive materiel acquisition programs. The host nation founds these programs on the host nation’s ability to operate and maintain those systems within the given physical, fiscal, and cultural constraints and limitations. The expectations of the host nation are vital to their acceptance of reform; failure to support those expectations may hinder the SSR process or negatively influence the perceptions of the local populace.

6-37. **Host-nation contribution.** Ultimate responsibility for security sector reform rests with the host nation. Commanders clearly need to respect the views and interpretations of the host nation regarding what it perceives the security architecture should look like. The host nation bases its perception on threats and its broader security needs. SSR programs are nested within existing host-nation social, political, and economic institutions and structures. This ensures that institutions, capabilities, and forces developed under SSR will be enduring, appropriate to the needs of the host nation, and trusted by the host-nation government and populace.

6-38. **Avoiding long-term dependency.** During reform, the risk of building a culture of dependency is mitigated by adopting a training process. This process sequentially provides training and equipment to security forces, a dedicated advising capability, and an advisory presence. After initial training efforts this reform helps host-nation security forces progress toward the transition of security responsibility. A robust transition plan supports the gradual and coherent easing of host-nation dependency, typically in the form of increased responsibility and accountability.

6-39. **Security.** Depending on the security environment, external partners in the SSR program may need to protect new host-nation security forces from many direct and immediate threats during their development. While this requirement usually applies only during initial training, security forces remain at risk throughout their development during SSR; these threats may contribute to issues with discipline, dependability, and desertion. In extreme circumstances, protecting host-nation security forces may necessitate conducting training outside the physical boundaries of the state.
6-40. **Perseverance.** SSR is a complex activity, and participants must demonstrate persistence and resilience in managing the dynamic interactions among the various factors affecting the reform program. Within the SSR processes, some failures are likely. Early identification of potential points of failure, such as corruption within police services, allows for mitigating action.

6-41. **End state.** In stability operations, the external assistance force cannot impose success on the host nation. The host nation must emerge as the host nation’s only legitimate authority. Within SSR, security forces are developed to enhance the legitimacy of the host-nation government. The resulting security forces must be competent, capable, committed, and confident:

- **Competent** from the ministerial level to the individual soldier and policeman, across all related functional areas and specialties.
- **Capable** in size and effective enough to accomplish assigned missions, sustainable over time, and resourced within state capabilities.
- **Committed** to the security and survival of the state, the preservation of the liberties and human rights of the citizens, and the peaceful transition of authority.
- **Confident** in the ability to secure the country; earning the confidence of the citizenry, the government, and the international community.

**TRANSITION OF AUTHORITY**

6-42. The transfer of security responsibility from intervening to host-nation forces is conducted according to the tactical, operational, and strategic conditions identified during SSR planning. As forces establish suitable conditions, responsibility for security gradually transitions to local, provincial, and national government institutions. During transition, the presence of advisors is reduced, although some advisors may be retained to ensure the long-term sustainability of the SSR program. Transition planning must begin early and focus on timeline adherence.

6-43. During the transition of authority, a formal network of committees or consulting agencies validates the readiness and accountability of host-nation security forces. Progress toward transition is gauged through a process that confirms the performance and capabilities of host-nation security forces. Typically, forces gauge capabilities through test exercises similar to those used to validate the readiness of forces for contingency operations. These procedures prevent a premature transition of authority, which can lead to a loss of confidence and cause the populace to seek alternative means of security.

6-44. When the host nation emerges from an extended period of violent conflict characterized by widespread human rights violations, a rigorous vetting process must reestablish the legitimacy of reconstituted or rebuilt security forces. Such processes must be demonstrably neutral and free from political manipulation and may require external control or administration. When public records have been destroyed or lost, effective vetting may require detailed background investigations by trained interviewers to identify past human rights violators and to screen out unsuitable recruits from reconstituting security forces.

**COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY SECTOR REFORM**

6-45. Through a campaign of unified action, execution of SSR unites all elements of the security sector. The activities of military forces may be focused on reforming the military components, but those actions are only part of a broader, comprehensive effort to reform the entire security sector. Military forces may directly support related reform efforts or indirectly support the efforts as related, integrated activities.

6-46. Once the security environment is considered stable, the other participating agencies, organizations, and institutions can safely begin operations in the operational area. Military forces gradually transfer appropriate responsibilities to other participants in the stability effort, one military force to another or military group to civilian group. These transitions allow the military force to focus their efforts on other stability tasks, many of which fall within the bounds of the broader effort to reform the security sector of the host nation.
CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT OF THE DEFENSE SECTOR

6-47. Establishing civilian oversight and control of the defense sector is critical to the success of any SSR program. Oversight and control mechanisms and processes ensure civilian control of the military, a fundamental tenet of democratic governance. These processes and mechanisms also ensure that the various components of the defense sector are accountable to elected and politically appointed civilian leadership, both in the executive and legislative branches. That accountability is essential to establishing a sound foundation for defense budget planning and program implementation.

6-48. The primary agent of civilian oversight and control in the defense sector is the ministry of defense. The ministry of defense operates within some form of interagency or cabinet framework that establishes political links and accountability between the ministry and the head of the executive branch. Other agencies involved in the defense sector may share oversight and control responsibilities, such as the cabinet-level leadership of intelligence agencies, executive protection forces, and border forces. In transitioning or post-conflict states, these institutions are frequently weak, dysfunctional, or altogether absent. SSR programs encompass restructuring, rebuilding, and, in some cases, creating entirely new institutions to provide oversight and control mechanisms for the defense sector.

6-49. The legislative branch plays an important role in oversight and control. The legislature typically determines the funding level of defense activities while providing the statutory framework for defense planning and implementation. Constitutional frameworks may vest in the legislature a share in the appointment of senior government officials, or in the structuring, commissioning, and promoting military personnel. In this context, building an effective partnership between the executive and legislative branches becomes an important enabler of effective security sector reform.

6-50. Most transitioning and post-conflict states clearly define and delineate the roles and responsibilities of military forces and law enforcement agencies in providing internal security for the state. As the security apparatus of a state begins to fracture, the necessary distinctions between military and law enforcement roles and missions erode or disappear entirely. This situation frequently leads to inappropriate military involvement in political affairs. As a result, military forces may subsume justice and law enforcement functions although they lack the training or equipment. Restoring the distinction between military and law enforcement functions, as well as providing robust mechanisms to sustain that distinction, is fundamental to SSR.

6-51. The primary agent of civilian oversight and control over law enforcement agencies will likely be a separate ministry, such as the ministry of interior or of justice. As host nation capacity for law enforcement increases, inherent power struggles may develop as police leaders strive for primacy in the management of social order. For this reason, it becomes imperative to facilitate forcing functions and forums that improve communication and coordination between disparate ministries that have responsibility for maintaining civil security. Often, the threshold delineating military and police primacy issues is dependent on the quantifiable level of violent activities in an area that serves as a quantifiable measure of effectiveness for military or civilian security sector efforts.

SECURITY FORCE STRUCTURE

6-52. A comprehensive, whole of government approach is essential to building partner capacity in the security sector. While it is important to develop all essential capabilities, structures must be kept simple. In determining the optimal security force structure, SSR plans account for the following:

- Political oversight and control in the form of capable ministries or departments of defense, justice, and interior. This aspect of SSR links the political direction of the state to the implementation of national interests and policies.
- National force headquarters that provides overall command and translates national interests and policies to the operational level for military, police, and other security forces. For the military component, this may be a joint structure.
- Appropriate legislation defining the role of the different security sector elements and forces, and delineating oversight mechanisms in both the legislative and executive branches.
Operational headquarters for both the military and law enforcement sectors. These may be regionally based, capability based, or a combination of the two.

Staff disciplines at all levels, from strategic to tactical, for both military and law enforcement sectors.

The ethnic and cultural factors that influence the security sector. SSR approaches must be able to accommodate significant cultural differences across societies and states.

6-53. The size, structure, and capabilities of tactical organizations, whether in the law enforcement or the military sector, depend on various considerations. Tactical forces must meet all the operational functions identified when assessing the security sector. This assessment initiates the SSR program. An interagency team conducts the assessment, drawing on all of the functional specialties required for a successful SSR program. The considerations and factors guiding the assessment include the following:

- Required capabilities and roles. This includes consideration of the requirement for different types of forces. These requirements stem from a thorough threat analysis that helps to identify functional capabilities and requirements.
- Historical lineage and traditions (their positive and negative influences) of previous host-nation security forces.
- A realistic consideration of available resources, including near- and long-term manpower.
- Political requirements of peace settlements, mandates, host-nation tools of governance, bi-lateral agreements, and similar political documents, frameworks, or processes that shape the overall stability operation.

6-54. **Equipment and resources.** An integrated and synchronized training plan provides guidelines for identifying and balancing resource requirements; accounts for resource planning and prioritization; and identifies budget, funding control, execution, and reporting requirements. It also addresses the funding, procurement, allocation, and distribution of resources necessary to reform host-nation security forces. This is a broad task with the military advising and assisting the host nation and other actors in the stability operation. Training plans address not only how to use the equipment and resources, but also how to maintain them. Likewise, equipment procurement includes sustainment plans that provide for the life cycle management of materiel systems.

6-55. **Infrastructure and essential services.** The initial SSR assessment identifies requirements to support the entire SSR program, including the reform of host-nation security forces. These requirements are incorporated into the broad plan for SSR, and resources are allocated against them. Typically, these requirements consist of the basic infrastructure and services necessary to support training and operational requirements—While commanders try to make use of existing infrastructure, they may need to acquire resources to improve or expand that infrastructure to support the reform effort.

6-56. **Geographical force dispositions.** Several factors influence the geographical distribution of restructured security forces. These factors include regional requirements, force role and capabilities, geography and climate, and existing infrastructure. Other considerations include differing cultural regions, local and regional associations, and historical lines of authority.

6-57. **Accession and training policies.** SSR planning includes policies for accession and training host-nation security sector personnel. These policies are developed with, and as a complement to, the broad program for DDR. The accession effort includes a thorough, transparent vetting of all prospective recruits by an external agency that has credibility with all participants in the SSR program; vetting is conducted in consultation with civil authorities.

**Requirements for Force Development**

6-58. The initial SSR assessment identifies the nature and type of forces to be developed and their respective capabilities. While these capabilities reflect host-nation aspirations, they also represent a detailed capability requirements analysis. This ensures a qualitative, as well as quantitative, foundation for the development program that accounts for the future contribution of the host nation. All efforts to build capable forces are balanced with support to the institutional systems, processes, and managers that support them. (See FM 3-24 for additional doctrine on developing host-nation security forces.)
6-59. **Military forces**. Military forces are developed primarily to counter external threats. The design of these forces develops from the analysis of those threats and the specific capabilities required to counter them. Other key military missions include disaster relief, providing humanitarian assistance, and in special cases, countering certain types of internal military threats. External organizations executing SSR and the individuals assigned to them are selected for their specific abilities to train and advise the developing force. For example, military police should help develop military police forces. This provides for appropriate development of expertise while facilitating the advising process.

6-60. **Justice and law enforcement**. An effective and accountable justice system and supporting law enforcement (especially police) forces are vital components of a democratic security framework. Although the military may be involved initially in developing the justice and law enforcement forces, this task should be assumed by the law enforcement and justice sectors as soon as possible. Qualified, professional justice sector and police trainers support an improved advising process and ensure sustainable development with an appropriate civilian, democratic framework. Their expertise ensures an appropriate delineation of roles and responsibilities between the military and law enforcement sectors.

6-61. **Other security forces**. Requirements may arise for the development of other forces within the security sector. These requirements may include specialized security forces; presidential guards; a coast guard, border control, and customs services; or intelligence services. The host nation provides the specific requirements on which to develop these forces. Until such forces are developed and trained, other security forces may assume responsibilities outside of their intended domain. In such cases, due caution ensures forces conduct operations in compliance with relevant host-nation constitutional and statutory provisions and consistent with international law and humanitarian guidelines. Such caution extends to how civilians perceive operations and the legitimacy of the forces supporting the operation; continuous assessment ensures that commanders remain aware of how their operations affect the local populace and the broader SSR program.

6-62. In general, the roles of security forces reflect the capabilities for which they are designed and trained. There may be overlap, particularly in times of emergency or until all planned forces are developed and trained. Cooperation between military and police is emphasized from the outset, permitting both components to maintain their appropriate and distinct constitutional roles in the security sector. The SSR program educates host-nation forces, civilian oversight agencies, and political leadership on the appropriate roles for each part of the security forces. Military forces should be restricted to their role as a force of last resort in the face of military threats. Their use may require several approaches within the constitutional rule of law when military support to civil authority is required.

6-63. Ultimately, the force development process clearly defines and institutionalizes the separation of roles and responsibilities between military forces and law enforcement agencies. Usually, this distinction is reflected in their organization, training, and equipment, which are often designed to deliberately limit the amount and degree of force law enforcement agencies can generate. For example, civilian police entities may adopt military-style command structures and systems, but not their mobile organizational structure. Also, police forces generally provide services to a particular local area, neighborhood, or community. They are not generally organized for large-scale maneuver. Therefore, they do not generally form like military organizations.

**INITIAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION**

6-64. In areas of the world torn by conflict, disaster, poverty, or internal strife, host-nation security forces often possess only rudimentary proficiency and development. Initial training for security forces must focus primarily on developing basic skills appropriate to their roles. Generally, host-nation security forces should not train for specialty skills until personnel exhibit sufficient competence and confidence with these basic core skills. Advanced technology or materiel, while representative of increased status among developing forces, is often beyond the comprehension of local forces, creating an unnecessary training burden.

6-65. To foster development and ease transition, training exercise programs are progressive. They test all levels of command, gradually bringing together all the individuals and institutions representing the new security sector, from team-level organizations through senior ministerial personnel. Host-nation security forces also require a complementary education program that supplements training, ensures understanding
of roles and responsibilities, and reinforces relationships across the security sector with the local populace. Education and training must encourage civilian oversight of the security forces and a culture of service to the host nation and its population.

**DEVELOPING ARMED FORCES**

6-66. **Security force assistance** is the unified action of the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational community to generate, employ, sustain, and assist host-nation or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority. It is integral to successful stability operations and extends well beyond traditional “train and equip” missions. Security force assistance includes organizing, training, equipping, rebuilding, and advising of various components of host-nation security forces:

- **Organizing.** Some security force assistance operations require organizing new institutions and units from the ministerial level to the smallest maneuver unit. Building infrastructure-related capability and capacity—such as personnel, logistics, and intelligence—is necessary for sustaining the new host-nation capacity. Developing host-nation tactical capabilities without the sustainment structure is inadequate. Host-nation organizations reflect their own unique requirements, interests, and capabilities; they should not simply mirror existing external institutions.

- **Training.** Training occurs in institutions—such as training centers and academies—and in units. It includes a broad range of subject matter to include those issues that make security forces responsive to a civilian oversight and control.

- **Equipping.** Equipping is accomplished through several mechanisms including traditional security assistance, foreign support, and donations. Equipment must be appropriate for host-nation sustainment—appropriate to the physical environment of the region and within reasonable appropriations for operations and maintenance. When equipping police forces, the distribution of materiel can be a dangerous and complex process, occurring at numerous, geographically disparate locations across an area of operations.

- **Rebuilding.** In many cases, particularly after major combat operations, it may be necessary to rebuild—or build—infrastructure to support security forces. This typically includes facilities and materiel but may also include physical plants, command and control systems, communications systems, transportation, personnel management processes, and other necessary infrastructure. The rebuilding of police facilities is often different from military compounds. Police stations must be approachable and accessible to the community they support to be legitimate and effective.

- **Advising.** Advising host-nation units and institutions is key to the ultimate success of security force assistance. This benefits both the state and the supporting external organizations. To be effective, advising requires specially selected and trained personnel.

6-67. Stability forces conduct security force assistance according to certain imperatives. Like the Principles of War, these imperatives, if followed, give the operation the best chance for success.

- **Understand the operational environment.** An in-depth understanding of the operational environment—including the available friendly host-nation forces, the opposing threats, and especially the human geography aspects—is critical to planning and conducting effective security force assistance operations.

- **Provide effective leadership.** Leadership, a critical aspect of any application of military combat power, is especially important in the inherently dynamic and complex environments associated with security force assistance.

- **Build legitimacy.** Ultimately, security force assistance aims to develop security forces that contribute to the legitimate governance of the local population.

- **Manage information.** Managing information encompasses collecting, analyzing, managing, applying, and preparing information from an operational perspective as well as leveraging that information in ways essential to the security force assistance operation, such as lessons-learned integration.
Ensure unity of effort and unity of purpose. The effort will include security force assistance and host-nation forces and may include large-scale conventional forces, as well. Additionally, other joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational organizations involved in security force assistance need to be integrated into the overall effort.

Sustain the effort. Sustainability consists of two major components: the ability to sustain the security force assistance effort throughout the campaign and the ability of the host-nation security forces to sustain their operations independently.

6-68. As host-nation security forces gradually progress toward the transfer of authority, close relationships forged between host-nation forces and their partners prove essential to sustainable development and successful transition. Genuine relationships engender trust and confidence, enabling increased responsibility and a well-executed transition process. These relationships also foster a clear understanding of command responsibilities and authorities. Such an understanding ensures host-nation forces approach transition prepared to assume the full weight of their future role in the security sector. At the unit level, success in developing host-nation forces often depends more on relationships and personalities than anywhere else in the security sector.

6-69. Trainers and advisors play a significant role in transition. They offer a guiding influence for host-nation security forces before, during, and after the transfer of authority. Practical experience with development activities in SSR indicate that—

- Trainers and advisors provide a crucial link between host-nation forces and the forces, agencies, organizations, and institutions supporting the broader stability effort.
- Trainers and advisors must be capable of dealing with challenges inherent in working with poorly trained and equipped forces. To contend with these challenges, predeployment training focuses on the stresses and ambiguity associated with developing host-nation security forces.
- Continuity of personnel is essential to maintaining relationships on which the success of force development depends. Tour lengths for advisory personnel must be long enough to develop these relationships and staggered to maintain continuity and expertise with the host-nation force under development. Continuity fosters understanding, which is essential to the development process.
- The nuances of language and dialect must be addressed, either through formal training or dedicated interpreters. If using interpreters, they must be capable of performing all of the activities conducted by embedded trainers and advisors.
- The organization, training, and equipping of trainers and advisors should be tailored to support the planned role for the host-nation force under development.
- Trainers and advisors at all levels should be linked through a collaborative network that facilitates information sharing across the security sector. This enables them to monitor the actions, challenges, and decisions among the host-nation forces under development while providing a means to alert one another should issues arise.

**DEVELOPING BORDER CONTROL FORCES**

6-70. To maintain its authority, the state must control access to its territory. Military forces provide the necessary border security and control while trainers and advisors focus on training host-nation border control forces. These border security activities include managing land border areas, airspace, coastal and territorial waters, and exclusive economic zones. The control of border areas and crossings prevents smuggling, movement of irregular forces into host-nation territory, and uncontrolled flow of refugees. In a broad sense, border control also includes managing and regulating the flow of intangible goods through the information environment. This is common in electronic commerce and banking, where the state may levy duties and import and export fees on transactions conducted through the Internet.

6-71. Border guards often are involved in monitoring, detecting, and preventing crime in border areas, including illegal entry and the illicit trafficking of goods, services, and human capital. The activities of border guards correlate to those of customs in facilitating and securing legal trade, migration control, and
antiterrorism efforts. Effective, accountable border guards encourage trade and economic activity, facilitating the ability of the state to generate revenue and investment.

6-72. In fragile states, ineffective border control and management systems can frustrate efforts to detect and prevent organized criminal and irregular activity. Such failures erode confidence, fuel conflict, and threaten security. This often results in increased trafficking in illegal arms, good, and human capital. To avoid these conditions, initial development efforts include—

- Establishing a civil border service under the control of the host-nation government.
- Facilitating the efficient and regulated movement of goods and people. This helps to achieve an appropriate balance among security, commerce, and social normalization.
- Building capacity to detect and prevent illegal trafficking, organized crime, irregular force movements, terrorism, and other activities that threaten the security of border areas.
- Strengthening revenue-generating capacity, promoting integrity, and discouraging corruption.
- Integrating the activities of border control and customs.
- Establishing cross-border protocols with adjoining states to enhance cooperation, trade, and social normalization.

DEVELOPING INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY SERVICES

6-73. Intelligence and security services provide advance warning, analysis, information, and insights concerning emerging and existing threats and trends that affect the security and economic stability of the state. In peacetime, their analysis and intelligence indirectly shape policy through the state’s political leadership. They usually are organized under the central government and report directly to senior political leaders. During SSR, intelligence and security services often resist change and may actively attempt to subvert the reform effort. Participants in the reform program must acknowledge host-nation sensitivities and the potential lack of transparency. During the initial development of intelligence and security services, training and advising activities include—

- Strengthening the legitimacy of intelligence and security services through civilian oversight and control.
- Developing effective systems capable of providing strategic intelligence and measurable contributions to national security planning.
- Enhancing the professionalism and ethics of intelligence and security services personnel. This can include the disestablishment of illicit intelligence groups with specific political agendas of allegiances.
- Rightsizing and rationalizing overlapping intelligence services and agencies.

JUSTICE REFORM

6-74. The host-nation justice system encompasses an array of formal and informal institutions and actors. These include the judiciary, ministry of justice, legislature, prosecutor’s office, public defenders, law enforcement, corrections, ombudsmen, regulatory bodies, law schools and bar associations, legal advocacy organizations, alternative dispute mechanisms, and human rights and public interest groups. The legal framework includes the Constitution, laws, rules, and regulations. Peace agreements may also constitute part of the legal framework in post-conflict countries.

6-75. Justice systems differ significantly across national boundaries; there may also be multiple systems functioning within a country. To enhance host nation legitimacy, justice reform should be built upon the existing legal framework, which may include common law, civil law, criminal codes, and traditional or religious law, as well as international standards. SSR planners do not impose their concepts of law, justice, and security on the host nation. The host nation’s systems and values are central to the development of legal system reform.

6-76. A formal legal system may be complemented by informal customary or traditional justice systems unique to particular areas, cultures, or regions. Sometimes referred to as “nonstate justice systems,” traditional justice systems frequently provide important alternatives to formal, codified systems and
provide greater access to justice to remote or underserved populations. Traditional justice systems may enjoy high levels of legitimacy with host-nation populations and may possess unique advantages as a means of promoting SSR in a broader context. Conversely, nonstate systems may not adhere to international human rights standards. At the very least, SSR planners gain a thorough knowledge of any alternative systems that may be operating within a particular host nation.

6-77. Transitioning and post-conflict states frequently confront significant unresolved justice concerns from past or ongoing conflicts. Where those concerns are especially widespread, involving large numbers of perpetrators and victims, or where the violence accompanying intra-state conflict has been especially horrific, special venues and processes for conflict-related justice and reconciliation may be necessary. Such processes sometimes are incorporated in the comprehensive peace agreements that form the foundation of the conflict transformation process. SSR programs must recognize and account for the requirement for such approaches and ensure the reform process acknowledges, embraces, and facilitates such efforts by—

- Promoting access to justice and legal empowerment as a priority to rebuild legitimacy and generate a culture that supports the rule of law. Increase citizens’ awareness of their rights and their ability to use justice systems to build capacity to advocate for change.
- Rebuilding core functions and reconstructing the disrupted (and possibly dysfunctional) justice system. Redefine the legal framework and institutional roles. Rebuild capacity.
- Developing reconciliation mechanisms to promote public trust and create accountability for past abuses.

DEVELOPING LAW ENFORCEMENT

6-78. The creation of community-based police services, with a clear separation between the roles of the police and military, is essential to successful SSR. However, in many weak or fragile states, the police become an instrument of state security rather than a protective force for the local populace. In the absence of a functioning central government, unaccountable, corrupt, and abusive police may undermine authority and threaten, rather than protect, the population’s safety and security. Instead of helping to establish the conditions for recovery, they further destabilize the environment. SSR efforts include demilitarization and professionalization of the police. Police often resist these efforts, especially when the security environment is unstable. Nevertheless, police services are the cornerstone of any justice system and a necessary component of a functioning society.

6-79. Law enforcement reform is nested within larger justice system reform. The justice system consists of a number of interrelated steps—arrest, detention, corrections, prosecution, adjudication, corrections, and parole or rehabilitation. Functionality requires that all actors work together as a system. Law enforcement reform that outpaces the rest of the justice sector may result in more arrests with inadequate detention facilities and no means of adjudication.

6-80. Establishing police primacy for internal security is difficult when confronting a failed state; that challenge is compounded when no historical precedent for primacy exists. Police may need only selective reform, or they may require extensive reform that encompasses a long-term development effort. Ultimately, a police reform effort aims to build a professional police force that earns the trust and confidence of the local populace while strengthening the legitimacy of the host-nation government.

6-81. Following an intervention in a failed state, an effective police force may not exist. With the local security environment in disarray, international police trainers and advisors often cannot safely deploy into the area. Military forces may be required to take the lead in restoring and maintaining order until enough civilian police partners arrive to initiate that component of SSR. While general-purpose military forces may be capable of providing immediate security from armed threats, they are not effective trainers of policing skills. Nor are they appropriate providers of police services to local communities unless acting as an occupying force under the provisions of the law of land warfare. Formed police units trained in stability policing skills are appropriate to perform these functions. Initial planning for failed state interventions should plan to incorporate such forces at the earliest opportunity. Typically, military police will assist in training and advising local police and establishing police stationing operations for local law enforcement forces; military force may also assist in training and advising corrections officers as part of capacity building activities.
6-82. For effective skill-building efforts with host-nation police services, trainers and advisors—

- Assess police roles, responsibilities, structures, management, and practices.
- Understand the traditional role of police within the host nation’s society. From that starting point, develop a force that conforms to internationally accepted standards. Changing the institutional mentality of the police force to one that secures and protects the population requires extensive effort, time, and resources.
- Support links across the justice system to ensure system-wide functionality.
- Improve police training, including the police education system. In the aftermath of conflict, it is important to focus training on investigative processes, including the gathering, handling, and preserving evidence in support of ongoing prosecutions.
- Enhance the ability of police services to plan and develop criminal intelligence analysis skills.
- Strengthen police accountability.
- Develop an integrated approach that complements the broader SSR program.

CORRECTIONS

6-83. Within fragile states, overcrowded and poorly managed prisons are the norm. Typically, the abuse and torture of inmates characterize prisons. Often prisons present serious health and hygiene issues for the local community. It is not unusual for prisoners to be arrested and detained without charge or trial, often for extended periods. In these circumstances, immediate action is necessary to quickly reform and develop the corrections system. Issues considered during the initial development of the corrections system include—

- Ensuring respect for the human rights and dignity of detainees.
- Reducing pretrial detention to manageable levels.
- Improving health, hygiene, and social services in prison facilities.
- Increasing civilian oversight of the corrections system.
- Promoting rehabilitation and reintegration of detainees.
- Developing an approach integrated with the judicial reform process.

THE ROLE OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

6-84. Since the end of the Cold War, intergovernmental organizations have emerged as prominent actors in SSR efforts worldwide. The most prominently recognized among these is the United Nations whose broad membership, international reach, and inherent legitimacy ensures generally unfettered access to any corner of the world. However, intergovernmental organizations also include other international organizations as well as regional organizations. These organizations can include the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (known as NATO) and the African Union and subregional organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States. Intergovernmental organizations exhibit significant qualitative differences; however, their ability to engage meaningfully in operations must be weighed against their expertise, personnel, and materiel. Intergovernmental organizations take active roles in SSR and represent partners that can provide legitimacy to the SSR effort while helping to marshal support for that effort from key subregional, regional, and international states. Regional and subregional intergovernmental organizations have emerged as important players in SSR efforts in recent years, providing vital support worldwide. Such organizations play a critical role in mobilizing multinational partners to support SSR and may provide an important source of legitimacy for the SSR effort.

6-85. The UN brings high levels of legitimacy, unique capabilities provided by a broad mix of member states, and a capacity for sustaining large missions over long periods. It deploys many agencies capable of supporting SSR efforts across all three elements of the security sector. UN integrated missions, under the direction of a special representative of the Secretary-General, facilitate collaboration of multiple actors across UN agency and functional mission lines in support of SSR activities. The integrated mission may also provide a vehicle for building unity of effort across multiple external and host-nation actors in a complex security environment.
DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION, AND REINTEGRATION

6-86. DDR aims to increase the stability of the security environment by disarming and demobilizing armed forces and by helping return former combatants to civilian life. As a complex process, DDR has cultural, political, security, humanitarian and socio-economic dimensions. DDR can potentially provide incentives for commanders and combatants to enter negotiations, facilitate political reconciliation, dissolve belligerent force structures, and present opportunities for former combatants and other DDR beneficiaries to return to their communities. A successful DDR program helps establish sustainable peace. A failed DDR effort can stall security sector reform, disrupt peace processes, and socially and economically destabilize communities, potentially leading to a renewal of conflict.

6-87. Force disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate to eliminate or reduce the size of belligerent forces. Typically, a DDR program transitions from disarmament and demobilization to reintegration. Disarmament and demobilization refers to the act of releasing or disbanding an armed unit and the collection and control of weapons and weapons systems. Reintegration helps former combatants’ return to civilian life through benefit packages and strategies that help them become socially and economically embedded in their communities.

DISARMAMENT

6-88. Disarmament is the collection, documentation, control, and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives, and light and heavy weapons of former combatants, belligerents, and the local populace. Disarmament also includes the development of responsible arms management programs. Ideally, disarmament is a voluntary process carried out as part of a broader peace process to which all parties accede. Disarmament functions best with high levels of trust between those being disarmed and the forces overseeing the disarmament process. Some groups may hesitate to offer trust and cooperation or even refuse to participate in disarmament efforts. In these circumstances, disarmament may occur in two stages: a voluntary disarmament process followed by more coercive measures. The latter will address individuals or small groups refusing to participate voluntarily. In this second stage, disarmament of combatant factions can become a contentious and potentially very destabilizing step of DDR. Military forces manage DDR carefully to avoid disarmament becoming a catalyst for renewed violence.

DEMOBILIZATION

6-89. Demobilization is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups. The second stage of DDR, demobilization, includes identifying and gathering ex-combatants for processing and predischarge orientation. This extends from the processing of individual combatants in temporary centers to the massing of troops in camps designated for this purpose (cantonment sites, encampments, assembly areas, or barracks). In many societies, women and children are active participants in violent conflict. During demobilization, separate facilities are necessary for adults and children. Additionally, child soldiers require specific services including health, education, food, assistance with livelihood development, and reintegration into communities.

6-90. SSR programs must adequately address demobilization to avoid reemerging violence from combatant groups or organized criminals. Demobilization involves deliberately dismantling combatant chains of command and belligerent group loyalties, replacing those with more appropriate group affiliations and restoring their identity as part of the national population. The demilitarization of combatant groups and individuals enables the eventual development of value systems, attitudes, and social practices that help them reintegrate into civil society. Former combatants and belligerents traumatized by extremely high levels of violence may require extended counseling prior to reintegrating into the local populace. This is especially important when dealing with child soldiers.

REINTEGRATION

6-91. Reintegration is the process through which former combatants and belligerents acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. It encompasses the reinsertion of individual former fighters into host-nation communities, villages, and social groups. Reintegration is a social and
economic recovery process focused on the local community level; it complements other community-based programs that spur economic recovery, training, and employment services. It includes programs to impart marketable skills to demobilized armed forces and groups, relocation assistance to support their resettlement in civilian communities, basic and vocational education, and assistance in finding employment in local economies. It accounts for the specific needs of women and children associated with fighting forces and armed groups. Reintegration also addresses the willingness of civilian communities to accept former fighters into their midst. In this context, reintegration cannot be divorced from justice and reconciliation programs that are part of the broader transition process. Successful reintegration programs tend to be long term and costly, requiring the participation of multiple external and host-nation SSR participants.

6-92. Reintegration is part of the general development of a country and leads to restoration of a national identity and a sense of citizenship and civil responsibility. Programs that achieve genuine reintegration of former combatants and belligerents make significant contributions economically, socially, and politically to the reconstruction of fragile states. Only through successful reintegration can a nation avoid renewed violence and instability. The reintegration process inherently includes reinsertion; the repatriation and resettlement of personnel associated with armed forces and belligerent groups involve broader political and diplomatic issues that extend beyond development but may also be integral to reintegration.

- **Reinsertion** is the assistance offered to former combatants and belligerents prior to the longer-term process of reintegration. Reinsertion is a form of transitional assistance intended to provide for the basic needs of reintegrating individuals and their families; this assistance includes transitional safety allowances, food, clothes, shelter, medical services, short-term education, training, employment, and tools. While reintegration represents enduring social and economic development, reinsertion is short-term material and financial assistance program intended to meet immediate needs.

- **Repatriation** is the return of individuals to their country of citizenship.

- **Resettlement** is the relocation of refugees to a third country, which is neither the country of citizenship nor the country into which the refugee has fled. Resettlement to a third country is granted by accord of the country of resettlement. It is based on a number of criteria, including legal and physical protection needs, lack of local integration opportunities, medical needs, family reunification needs, and threat of violence and torture.

6-93. Military forces may establish and operate theater internment facility reintegration centers to ensure the continuity of detainee programs established in detention centers and reintegration efforts that conclude at the points of release back into society. The local populace must widely recognize and understand these and other programs that facilitate the reintegration process. This is achieved through effective information engagement, utilizing leader and Soldier engagement to leverage the interaction between military forces and the local populace. Former combatants will participate in the reintegration process when assured some level of due process involvement that is linked to corrective behavior modification.

### The Importance of DDR to Stability

6-94. Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration is a critical component of peace and restoration processes and is accounted for in initial planning. Often, the terms of a DDR program are negotiated in ceasefire or peace accords. DDR focuses on the immediate management of people previously associated with armed forces and belligerent groups. DDR sets the foundation for safeguarding and sustaining the communities in which these individuals live as contributing, law-abiding citizens. DDR is a central contributor to long-term peace, security, and development.

6-95. DDR dictates, and is dictated by, a variety of priority areas in planning for full spectrum operations and SSR. The promise of DDR to formerly competing fighting forces often plays a crucial role in achieving a peace agreement. DDR planning directly ties to SSR, determining the potential size and scope of military, police, and other security structures. In addition, reintegration of former combatants back into their communities sets the foundation for—and determines the success of—longer-term peace building and development programs.
The success of DDR depends on integrating strategies and planning across all the sectors. For example, the employment opportunities extended to disarmed and demobilized former combatants result from an effectively governed, viable economy with an active market sector. If the DDR program expires without providing alternative economic opportunities to the former combatants, the likelihood of a return to violence substantially increases. DDR is closely coordinated with reform efforts in all sectors to ensure an integrated approach that synchronizes activities toward a common end state.

**Planning and Executing DDR**

Planning for a successful DDR program requires an understanding of both the situation on the ground and the goals, political will, and resources in which actors and other donor organizations are willing to support. Effective DDR planning relies on analysis of possible DDR beneficiaries, power dynamics, and local society as well as the nature of the conflict and ongoing peace processes. Assessments are conducted in close consultation with the local populace and with personnel in participating agencies with a broad understanding and knowledge of the host nation. Military forces and other actors may enter the DDR process at many different stages; therefore, assessment is a continuous process used to guide decisionmaking throughout the DDR program.

Governmental and nongovernmental organizations from the international community and the host nation cooperate to plan and execute DDR programs. External and host-nation military and police working together in a peace support role may facilitate DDR. Conflict termination, represented by a negotiated or imposed settlement, provides the basis for DDR to proceed. Former combatants must develop confidence in the DDR process and the organizations charged with implementing it. To build this confidence, the DDR program focuses on restoring the society, the government, and the economy at all levels. This leads to the host nation taking responsibility for the DDR processes.

Generally the military does not lead the planning and execution of the DDR program. However, military forces must be integrated in the planning of DDR from its inception and may be involved more directly in the disarmament and demobilization stages. Military forces and police, whether from external sources or the host nation, are fundamental to the broad success of the program, providing security for DDR processes. Successful DDR programs use many approaches designed for specific security environments. Each program reflects the unique aspects of the situation, culture, and character of the state. For more detailed guidelines on implementing DDR, and for a compendium of lessons learned in the DDR process, see Lessons-Learned: Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration in Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations—A Guide for United States Government Planners, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), April 2006.

The best interests of children and their protection from violence and abuse are overarching principles during DDR. In operations involving the welfare of children, the entire process emphasizes integration and inherently is a community process. Juvenile justice considerations, which may involve restorative as well as retributive actions, are central to any DDR program involving child soldiers. DDR approaches must comply with The Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups (also known as The Paris Principles). DDR approaches involving child soldiers recognize that all children in armed groups are entitled to immediate release and reintegration, regardless of the role they served during conflict. Cash payments to demobilized minors are harmful and therefore avoided.
Appendix A

Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Nongovernmental Organizations in Stability Operations

Stability operations include many actors with various experiences, resources, mandates, and capabilities. This requires forging a comprehensive approach with a shared understanding of the intended end state. This approach is both the overall goal and the greatest challenge to mission accomplishment. Many actors cannot be compelled to work within a coalition, nor do they have any incentive to do so. Therefore, military forces must build strong relationships through cooperation and coordination. This appendix provides a limited overview of certain interagency, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that U.S. forces can expect to encounter.

INTERAGENCY ORGANIZATIONS

A-1. U.S. military forces conduct stability operations under the authority of the President of the United States, in accordance with treaties, conventions, and executive and other agreements; statutory law; and federal and agency regulations. These operations are conceived and implemented through an interagency process under the general direction and supervision of the National Security Council and its staff. Normally, specific agencies such as the Department of State (DOS), Department of Defense (DOD), and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) are designated as having the lead in the interagency working groups. These groups do the bulk of the day-to-day work involved in implementing policy.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

A-2. The DOD coordinates with the DOS and other U.S. Government (USG) agencies on many issues including—

- Bilateral and multilateral military relationships.
- Treaties involving DOD interests.
- Technology transfers.
- Armaments cooperation and control.
- Humanitarian assistance.
- Peace operations including those under the auspices of the United Nations (UN).

A-3. Within a theater, the geographic combatant commander plans and implements theater and regional military strategies that require interagency coordination. Coordination between the DOD and other USG agencies may occur with a country team or within a combatant command. In some operations, a special representative of the President or special envoy of the UN Secretary General may be involved. Many USG organizations are regionally focused, such as the DOS in its regional bureaus and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). In individual countries, the ambassador and country team supervise and direct the overall foreign assistance program.

A-4. The joint campaign plan is based on the commander’s concept. This plan presents a broad vision of the required aim or end state and how operations will be sequenced and synchronized to achieve objectives. A campaign plan is essential for laying out a clear, definable path linking the mission to the desired end state. Such a plan enables commanders to help political leaders visualize operational requirements for achieving objectives. Given the systematic military approach to problem solving, often
the combatant commander formally or informally functions as the lead organizer of many operations. JP 3-08 outlines how to develop and execute a campaign plan in the interagency arena.

A-5. A political advisor is an officer from the DOS. Usually combatant commanders are augmented with a political advisor. Army component commanders in multinational operations and other operations may also be augmented with a political advisor. The political advisor provides diplomatic considerations and enables informal links with embassies in the area of responsibility and with the DOS. The foreign policy advisor supplies information regarding DOS policy goals and objectives relevant to the geographic combatant commander’s theater strategy. Other USG agencies also may detail liaison personnel to operational-level staffs when requested to improve interagency coordination.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

A-6. The National Security Council (NSC) advises and assists the President in integrating all aspects of the national security policy—domestic, foreign, military, intelligence, and economic (in conjunction with the National Economic Council). The NSC system is the principal forum for consideration of national security issues requiring presidential decisions. The NSC system provides the foundation for interagency coordination in developing and implementing national security policy. It is the only level of the executive branch in which authoritative direction to the various departments can be given. The functions, membership, and responsibilities of the NSC are set forth in Presidential Decision Directive 2.

A-7. The members of the NSC include the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense. The CIA director regularly attends NSC meetings as a cabinet officer. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff attends NSC meetings and serves as a statutory advisor. Other regular NSC meeting attendees include the Secretary of Treasury, the assistant to the President for national security affairs (referred to as the national security advisor), the assistant to the President for economic policy, and the chief of staff to the President. Heads of executive departments and agencies and other senior officials, such as the U.S. permanent representative to the UN, may be invited to attend meetings of the NSC on an ad hoc basis. The NSC staff tracks and directs the development and implementation of national security policies for the President.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

A-8. The DOS is the USG agency responsible for planning and implementing the foreign policy of the United States. The DOS is headed by the Secretary of State, who is the ranking member of the President’s cabinet and fourth in presidential succession. The Secretary of State is the president’s principal advisor on conducting foreign affairs and formulating foreign policy. In its diplomatic role, the DOS is an important source of foreign affairs data, national security and economic information, and data on the policies and inner workings of the countries. In its consular function, it provides notarial and citizenship services to American citizens abroad and assists in implementing U.S. immigration and naturalization laws.

Country Team

A-9. The country team is the senior, in-country, U.S. coordinating and supervising body, headed by the chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each represented U.S. department or agency, as desired by the chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission (JP 3-07.4). The team composition varies widely depending on specific U.S. national interests, the desires of the ambassador, the situation in the country, and the number and level of presence of U.S. agencies. Table A-1 shows possible members of the country team.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table A-1. Country team members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Ambassador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Deputy chief of mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Chief of political section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Senior defense official or defense attaché</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A-10. The country team facilitates interagency action on recommendations from the field and implements effective execution of U.S. programs and policies. It provides the foundation for rapid interagency consultation and action on recommendations from the field and effective execution of U.S. missions, programs, and policies. A country team is relatively small and may not be adequate for every need. A country team may not exist in every country, or it may be inoperative due to damage or casualties from a natural or manmade disaster. Country teams generally have received some crisis management training, but they usually are not prepared to plan in detail. The relationship with military chains of command is frequently ad hoc.

Senior Defense Official or Defense Attaché

A-11. The senior defense official or defense attaché serves as the defense attaché and chief of security assistance in the embassy. This official also acts as the in-country focal point for planning, coordinating, supporting, and/or executing U.S. defense issues and activities in the host nation. These activities include theater security cooperation programs conducted under the oversight of the combatant commander. In addition, the senior defense official defense attaché —

- Serves as the principal embassy liaison with host-nation defense establishments and actively participates in national security and operational policy development and coordination.
- Represents the Secretary of Defense and the DOD components to host-nation counterparts and foreign diplomats accredited to the host nation; acts as the principal in-country diplomatic representative of the Secretary of Defense and the DOD components.
- Presents coordinated DOD views on all defense matters to the chief of mission and acts as the single DOD point of contact to the chief of mission.
- Represents the Secretary of Defense and the appropriate combatant commanders for coordinating administrative and security matters for all DOD personnel not under the command of a U.S. military commander.

A-12. All military personnel, even those not assigned to the embassy or under direct control of the ambassador, coordinate their activities through the senior defense official.

A-13. The defense attaché office, which consists of one or more defense or service attachés and support personnel, observes and reports on the country’s military and political-military situation. This information can be valuable when planning and executing various missions in the country including noncombatant evacuation operations, support to counterdrug and counterinsurgency, and others. Defense attaché office personnel are active duty military attached to the embassy in a diplomatic status. The Defense Intelligence Agency rates and funds defense attachés. They may add to the daily embassy situation report and provide other written intelligence-related information. All military personnel, even those not assigned to the embassy or under direct control of the ambassador, should coordinate their activities through the senior defense representative (which may be the security assistance organization or the defense attaché, depending on the country.) The defense attaché office’s duties also include liaising with host-nation defense officials on military matters related to threat assessments, intelligence, and in-country capabilities. A smaller embassy may not have a defense attaché present; rather it depends on a regional attaché who is accredited to the host nation but stationed elsewhere.
Security Assistance Organization

A-14. The security assistance organization (SAO) also maintains a liaison with the host-nation military forces. It is the most important military activity related to foreign internal defense under the ambassador’s supervision. The SAO assists host-nation security forces by planning and administering military aspects of the security assistance program. It also helps the U.S. country team communicate host-nation assistance needs to policy and budget officials in the USG. In addition, the SAO oversees training and assistance teams temporarily assigned to the host nation. The law prevents the SAO from giving direct training assistance. Instead, training is provided through special teams and organizations assigned to limited tasks for specific periods, such as mobile training and technical assistance teams.

A-15. The SAO is a joint organization. Through the senior defense official or defense attaché, the chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission directs and supervises the SAO chief to accomplish the SAO’s mission. The geographic combatant commander commands the SAO in matters that are not functions of the chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission. The director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency prescribes policy for managing security assistance programs by the SAO.

A-16. The SAO may be known in country by many names according to the number of persons assigned, the functions performed, or the desires of the host nation. Typical SAO designations include a joint U.S. military assistance group, military liaison office, U.S. military training mission, and office of defense cooperation. In countries where the United States has no SAO, another member of the mission oversees security assistance. In many countries, security assistance functions are performed within the defense attaché office. The defense attaché may also serve as the SAO.

A-17. The United States tailors each SAO to the needs of its host nation; thus, no typical SAO. However, a large SAO normally has Army, Navy, and Air Force components. Each component must accomplish its Service portion of security assistance activities. A small SAO may have divisions by function but no separate Service components.

A-18. The primary functions of security assistance personnel are logistics management, fiscal management, training management, and contract administration of country security assistance programs. Security assistance personnel maintain a liaison with host-nation defense establishments. They operate with the host-nation military—primarily at the national level—to interpret U.S. policies, resolve problems in materiel delivery, and obtain technical assistance for defective materiel. They assess the capabilities of the host-nation military and determine additional materiel requirements.

A-19. The SAO provides host-nation governments with information necessary to make decisions about acquiring and using U.S. defense articles and services. (These services include training under the auspices of U.S. security assistance programs.) The SAO obtains information to evaluate the host-nation military’s capability to employ and maintain the equipment requested. The SAO processes security assistance proposals of foreign governments. It also maintains communications with host-nation defense officials on military matters, such as the threat and host-nation military capabilities.

A-20. Documents describing SAO responsibilities and functions include DODD 5105.65 and DODD 5132.3. The former establishes the responsibilities, functions, authorities, and relationships of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency as an agency of the DOD. The latter establishes DOD policy and assigns responsibilities pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, and related statutory authorities, executive orders, and policies established by the Secretary of State relating to the administration of security assistance.

Embassy Representatives

A-21. The chief of mission (the ambassador) has authority over all elements of the USG in country except forces assigned to a combatant commander. The ambassador represents the President but takes policy guidance from the Secretary of State through regional bureaus. The ambassador integrates the programs and resources of all USG agencies represented on the country team. As the President’s representative in the host nation, the ambassador has extraordinary authority. This individual may tailor the country team as needed for any crisis that arises with few limits from written rules. The ambassador functions at both
operational and tactical levels, where recommendations and considerations for crisis action planning are provided directly to the geographic combatant commander or senior military representative in the area.

A-22. The President gives the chief of mission immediate direction and control over USG personnel in country. This does not include personnel in another mission, assigned to an international organization, or assigned to a combatant command or their subordinate elements. The chief of mission ensures that all USG activities in country serve U.S. interests as well as regional and international objectives. This individual promotes positive program direction by seeing that all activities are necessary, are efficiently and economically run, and are effectively interrelated.

A-23. The deputy chief of mission is the senior diplomatic official in the embassy below the rank of ambassador. This official has the diplomatic title of minister, minister-counselor, or counselor (depending on the mission size) and is usually a career foreign service officer. The deputy chief of mission usually chairs the emergency action committee meetings and coordinates embassy staff. The deputy chief helps ensure that all U.S. in-country activities best serve U.S. interests.

A-24. The U.S. defense representative (USDR) is an additional title assigned to a military officer serving in a specifically designated position. This duty title may be assigned to either the defense attaché or the security assistance officer. The USDR represents the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the geographic combatant commander. This officer coordinates administrative, security, and logistic matters with USG officials for all DOD noncombatant command elements in the foreign country in which the USDR is assigned.

A-25. The chief of station is the senior intelligence advisor to the ambassador. The chief of station is an excellent source of information on the country and the current situation.

A-26. The administration officer oversees various activities at the embassy compound. These activities may include security at small posts; running the commissary, motor pool, and maintenance activities; and handling monetary aspects of embassy business, including foreign service national payroll, cash collection, and the budget. At a small post with no security officer assigned, the administration officer assumes the functions of the post security officer and has operational control of the Marine Security Guard detachment. The general services officer and information management officer work for the administration officer:

- The general services officer is responsible for buildings, grounds, construction, vehicles, and maintenance.
- The information management officer runs the post communications center; processes and tracks all classified pouch material; and oversees the computer system at the embassy. This officer is the point of contact for the post’s communication capabilities.

A-27. The political officer reports on political developments, negotiates with the host-nation government, and represents views and policies of the USG. This officer maintains regular contact with host-nation officials, political and labor leaders, and other influential citizens of the host nation, as well as other countries’ diplomats. The political officer makes major contributions to the overall intelligence picture.

A-28. The refugee coordinator works in a regional position to oversee USG assistance to refugees and other populations of concern. This coordinator works closely with the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration at the DOS, USAID, international and local NGOs, and organizations such as United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

A-29. The commercial officer or economic officer analyzes, reports on, and advises superiors, DOS, and DOD personnel on economic matters in the host nation. This officer also negotiates with the host nation on trade and financial issues.

A-30. Consular officers screen, process, and grant U.S. passports and visas. Other duties mandated by law include attending to the welfare of and maintaining a census of American public in the host nation. During noncombatant evacuation operations, the consular officer provides personnel to screen documents of all potential evacuees and instructs any evacuation control center personnel who staff processing stations.

A-31. The regional medical officer is qualified for general practice and can set up triage, trauma, and mass casualty operations. This officer may also advise the joint task force on indigenous diseases and proper
prophylactic procedures for forces executing a noncombatant evacuation operation. These officers are only found in certain interagency coordination embassies where the support exists for them to carry out their duties.

A-32. The regional security officer (RSO) is a DOS diplomatic security agent responsible for the security functions of all U.S. embassies and consulates in a given country. This officer directs the Marine Security Guard detachment via the detachment commander. Similar to the regional medical officer, the RSO is found in all but the smallest embassies. The RSO oversees the following:

- **Post security officer.** Posts with no RSO have a post security officer. This officer has general security duties at a specific embassy (or consulate) and is usually the administration officer. The post security officer is supported by a designated RSO in a nearby country.

- **Mobile security division.** This division consists of DOS employees of the diplomatic security service who respond to crises in foreign countries. The mobile security division responds to increased threats or critical security needs at an embassy, provides additional security, and provides immediate response to a security-related incident.

- **Local guard force.** Embassies enhance security by hiring civilian security guards to provide perimeter security.

A-33. The public affairs officer (PAO) is the ambassador’s advisor concerning public affairs and overseer of U.S. cultural center operations. If the situation permits during an emergency, the PAO is responsible for all press releases and inquiries for information directed to the embassy. The PAO usually speaks at press conferences that the ambassador cannot attend. See FM 46-1 for details on public affairs.

A-34. A Marine security guard detachment has, on average, six Marines, with the maximum number assigned according to need. The Marine detachment commander is normally a member of the emergency action committee. This officer has responsibility to the RSO or post security officer for U.S. personnel and internal security and protection of classified material. Administrative control of detachment Marines is through their company commander, the regional Marine officer.

**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**

A-35. The CIA coordinates the intelligence activities of other U.S. departments and agencies. It advises and recommends policy to the NSC on matters regarding intelligence activities of all governmental departments and agencies. It correlates and evaluates this intelligence and disseminates it in the government. The CIA also conducts special activities approved by the President. Executive Order 12333 directs that “no agency except the CIA (or the Armed Forces of the United States in time of war declared by Congress or during any period covered by a report from the President to the Congress under the War Powers Resolution [87 Stat. 855] [50 USC 1541 et seq.]) may conduct any special activity unless the President determines that another agency is more likely to achieve a particular objective.”

**U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT**

A-36. USAID manages U.S. developmental, humanitarian, and civic assistance activities. USAID supervises and gives general direction on all nonmilitary assistance programs under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Public Law 480, and related legislation. This agency plans and implements programs to improve economic and social conditions overseas. The agency administers civic assistance programs in conjunction with the Department of Agriculture. Under arrangements made with USAID, U.S. affiliates of international voluntary agencies conduct most food programs under Public Law 480. Although USAID is concerned primarily with developmental assistance and civic assistance, some programs it administers are security related. The agency representative in the host nation fully coordinates these programs with the DOD representative.

A-37. The disaster assistance response team provides various trained specialists to assist U.S. embassies and USAID missions with short-term assistance managing the USG response to foreign disasters. It is a major component of USG capability in foreign humanitarian crisis or complex emergencies. The Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance developed the disaster assistance response team to provide rapid response to foreign disasters. See JP 3-08 for more information.
INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

A-38. International and regional intergovernmental organizations possess area or global influence. International examples include such the UN, its agencies, the International Red Cross, and the World Bank. These organizations have well-defined structures, roles, and responsibilities and are usually equipped with the resources and expertise to participate in complex interagency operations. Regional examples include NATO, the African Union, Organization of American States, the European Union, and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The following describes formal or informal ties between the United States and some of the larger regional and international organizations.

THE UNITED NATIONS

A-39. Coordination with the UN begins at the national level with the DOS, through the U.S. permanent representative to the UN. In some administrations, this individual has cabinet status. The U.S. representative is assisted at the U.S. mission to the UN by a staff of 100 foreign service nationals and military and civilian personnel. This staff includes a military assistant who coordinates appropriate military interests primarily with the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the UN development programme, and the United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO).

A-40. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the UN Participation Act of 1945, and Executive Order 10206 authorize various types of U.S. military support to the UN, either on a reimbursable or nonreimbursable basis. U.S. military operations in support of the UN usually fall within Chapter VI or Chapter VII of the UN Charter. (See JP 3-08 for details regarding the UN Charter and Chapters VI and VII of that charter.)

A-41. The UN Security Council normally authorizes peace operations or conducts humanitarian assistance under the provisions of a resolution or mandate from the UN Security Council or the general assembly. As politicians and diplomats try to reach a compromise, they develop mandates. The compromises often challenge military commanders who translate these mandates into workable mission orders. Additionally, fast-changing events on the ground can quickly render a mandate obsolete. Commanders must quickly inform the chain of command of significant changes in the situation.

A-42. The UN headquarters coordinates peace operations and humanitarian assistance around the world. It maintains a strategic-operational-tactical equivalent to the armed forces for implementing UN Security Council resolutions. The UN organizational structure consists of the headquarters and the operational field elements. Strategic decisionmaking resides with the UN Security Council. The Secretariat provides strategic guidance between resolutions of the UN Security Council as well as exercises a measure of operational command. Within an operational area, the special representative to the UN Secretary General (UNSG) at the integrated mission headquarters—normally based in the host-nation capital—provides operational-level command as well as a link to the tactical level. At the tactical level, the various heads of the sectors into which the host nation has been divided for mission implementation provide tactical counterparts for military commanders operating at that level.

A-43. The OCHA coordinates humanitarian operations. This office makes necessary arrangements for UN relief organizations to deliver assistance quickly and effectively. The UN emergency relief coordinator appoints humanitarian coordinators for natural disasters and complex emergencies. In complex emergencies, the emergency relief coordinator appoints a field-based humanitarian coordinator. This latter coordinator works under the authority of the special representative to the UNSG. Under certain circumstances, the UNSG may appoint a special representative to direct day-to-day operations. This representative reports to the UNSG directly and advises UNDPKO and OCHA at UN headquarters.

A-44. The OCHA is a part of the UN Secretariat. It coordinates UN assistance in humanitarian crises that go beyond the capacity and mandate of any single humanitarian organization. The head of this office, the emergency relief coordinator, chairs the Interagency Standing Committee, thus uniting all major humanitarian actors inside and outside the UN system. This committee works to analyze a given crisis. It also ensures interagency decisionmaking when responding to complex emergencies and developing humanitarian policy. The UN country team led by the humanitarian coordinator coordinates the responses to specific crises at the country level for the UN system.
A-45. The UNDPKO is the operational arm of the UNSG for managing day-to-day peacekeeping operations. In this capacity, the department acts as the main channel of communications between UN headquarters and the field when a peacekeeping force is deployed.

A-46. The UN development programme is a separate agency that is part of the UN system. As indicated by its name, this agency focuses more on long-term development than emergencies. The in-country program representative is often the UN humanitarian coordinator, responsible to mobilize and manage the local UN humanitarian resources and provide direction for the field relief effort. If conflict erupts, a special representative to the UNSG—who has greater expertise in emergencies and negotiations—may replace the UN resident coordinator.

A-47. Normally UN-sponsored operations employ a force under a single commander. The force commander is appointed by the UNSG with the consent of the UN Security Council. This commander reports to the special representative to the UNSG or to the UNSG directly. In any multinational operation, the U.S. commander retains command authority over all assigned U.S. forces. The U.S. chain of command will flow from the President through the combatant commander. With presidential authorization, the multinational force commander may exercise operational control over U.S. units in specific operations authorized by the UN Security Council.

THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

A-48. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a good example of the interagency process on a regional level. NATO has been challenged by the demands for cooperation that characterize every regional effort and has endured for over 50 years. U.S. efforts within NATO are led and coordinated by the permanent representative. This representative is appointed by the President and has the rank and status of ambassador extraordinary and chief of mission (Title 22 U.S. Code, section 3901). Table A-1 lists the 26 members of NATO.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NATO Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A-49. Over the years, the NATO alliance has undergone changes in organization, orientation, and membership. Following the Cold War, the alliance was restructured to enable it to participate in peacekeeping and crisis management tasks. The alliance undertakes the tasks in cooperation with countries that are not members of the alliance and with other international organizations. This is evident in NATO support to UN operations in the former Yugoslavia.

A-50. In Kosovo, Operation Allied Force demonstrated for the first time NATO’s ability to conduct offensive operations to compel a noncompliant to comply with the alliance collective will. The alliance has been actively involved in planning, preparing, and implementing peace operations, such as protection for humanitarian relief and support for UN monitoring of heavy weapons.

A-51. Beyond day-to-day operations, training exercises, and logistics authorized by statute, extraordinary use of U.S. military force with NATO across the spectrum of conflict requires presidential approval. They may also be subject to congressional review, including those employments authorized and limited by the War Powers Act. (See appendix B.)
NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

A-52. Nongovernmental organizations do not operate within the military or governmental hierarchy or the chain of command. Therefore, any relationship between the armed forces and an NGO is best characterized as a professional or circumstantial association. Generally, coordination between military forces and U.S. NGOs is facilitated through USAID, the refugee coordinator, or DOS. The military force ordinarily orchestrates this interaction with other agencies and organizations through the activities of a civil-military operations center (CMOC).

A-53. NGOs are frequently present and actively engaged in development activities when U.S. forces arrive. They often remain long after military forces have departed. Some NGOs are independent, diverse, flexible, grassroots-focused, primary relief providers. Others, however, provide a channel for funds and collaborate with other primary relief NGOs (usually local) to carry out the programs. These organizations often provide support to host-nation populations. NGOs assist over 250 million people annually. Most funds used by most NGOs come from governmental or international organizations; that is, the NGOs act as implementing partners for funding agencies. Because they can respond quickly and effectively to crises, they can lessen the civil-military resources that commanders would otherwise have to devote to an operation. Despite differences that may exist between military forces and civilian agencies, short-term objectives are frequently similar. Discovering common ground is essential to unity of effort. The commander’s assessment of conditions and resources includes the activities and capabilities of NGOs and their integration into the selected course of action.

A-54. NGOs range from internationally-based groups with global reach to local organizations focused on a specific area or state. They include groups with multimillion-dollar budgets and decades of global experience in developmental and humanitarian relief as well as newly created small organizations dedicated to a particular emergency or disaster. Some NGOs are not relief-oriented but carry out long-term development projects. The professionalism, capability, equipment, resources, and expertise vary greatly from one NGO to another. NGOs are involved in such diverse activities as human rights, education, technical projects, relief activities, refugee assistance, public policy, and development programs. The connection between NGOs and the DOD is ad hoc, with no specific statutory link. Generally, military forces work through USAID, the refugee coordinator, or the DOS to establish contacts with NGOs from the United States. While their focus remains grassroots and their connections informal, NGOs are major actors in many areas where military forces conduct stability operations. Such organizations affect many lives and control significant resources, making NGOs powerful in the relief, reconstruction, and development community. UN and USG agencies often use individual organizations to carry out specific relief functions.

A-55. Army forces are likely to encounter many NGOs in an operational area. In Somalia, there were 78 private organizations contributing relief support and, in the Rwanda crisis, over 100 relief organizations assisted the UN relief. Over 350 such agencies are registered with the USAID. The first line of security for most NGOs is their adherence to a strict principle of impartiality. Actions which blur the distinction between relief workers and military forces may be perceived as a threat to this principle, resulting in increased risk to civilian aid workers, both expatriates and nationals.

A-56. Their extensive involvement, local contacts, and experience make NGOs valuable sources of information about local and regional governments and civilian attitudes toward an operation. While some organizations seek the protection of the armed forces or the use of military aircraft to move relief supplies to overseas destinations, others may avoid a close affiliation with military forces, preferring autonomous operations. Their rationale may be fear of compromising their impartiality with the local populace or suspicion that military forces intend to take control of, influence, or even prevent their operations. Staffs should consult these organizations, along with the host-nation government (if applicable), to identify local issues and concerns the proposed public affairs guidance should reflect.

A-57. Public affairs planning includes identifying points of contact in NGOs operating in an affected area. Generally, the PAO refers media queries regarding NGO operations to an authorized NGO spokesperson. Military spokespersons should only comment on NGOs based on specific guidance. The office of the assistant Secretary of Defense (public affairs) or a regional organization (such as NATO) provides guidance in cooperation with the in-country headquarters of the organization.
A-58. The President may determine that it is in the national interest to task U.S. forces with missions that bring them into close contact with (if not support of) NGOs. All participants benefit when they closely coordinate their activities. Military forces seek to establish a climate of cooperation with NGOs. Missions to support NGOs are short term, usually necessitated by extraordinary events. In most situations, the NGOs need logistics, communications, and security capabilities. However, in such missions, the role of the armed forces is to enable—not perform—NGO tasks. Often U.S. military assistance has proven to be the critical difference that enabled success of an operation. Commanders understand that mutually beneficial arrangements between the armed forces and NGOs may determine the success of the military operation. Appendix B of JP 3-08 describes many agencies that commanders may encounter in an operational area.

OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

A-59. Other organizations that assistance people in need include the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, civil-military operations center, and various liaisons.

THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT MOVEMENT

A-60. The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement is a well known international humanitarian organization. It consists of three independent parts: the ICRC, the National Societies, and the Federation. Five citizens of Switzerland founded the ICRC in 1863 as the “International Committee for Relief of Wounded.” Voluntary contributions by governments (the majority of funding), the national Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, and private sources finance it.

A-61. The ICRC mission is, on the basis of the Geneva Conventions and protocols, to protect and assist victims of armed conflict and those affected by internal disturbances or tension. More specifically, this means to—

- Visit, interview, and transmit messages to, without witnesses, prisoners of war, and detained or interned civilians.
- Provide aid to the populations of occupied territories.
- Search for missing persons.
- Offer services for establishing hospital zones, localities, and security.
- Receive requests for aid from protected persons.
- Exercise its right of initiative to pursue the above tasks and to offer its services to the parties of internal disputes.

A-62. In its own country, a national Red Cross (such as the American Red Cross) or Red Crescent Society assists the public authorities in humanitarian matters. It primarily backs up the military medical services during conflict. The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies supports the humanitarian activities carried out by the national societies.

A-63. The ICRC is often described as a nongovernmental organization, but it is not; it is also not an international or intergovernmental organization. The ICRC is an organization with a hybrid nature. As a private association organized under the Swiss Civil Code, its existence is not in itself mandated by governments. Yet its functions and activities—to provide protection and assistance to victims of conflict—are mandated by the international community of states and are founded in international law.

A-64. The terms neutrality and independence acquire a specific meaning when related to the activities of the ICRC. The ICRC applies almost exclusively to armed conflicts, disturbances, and tensions. It strictly avoids any involvement in hostilities or in controversies of a political, racial, religious, or ideological nature as an imperative for humanitarian action. This strict and specific neutrality that fosters and maintains universal trust also requires the ICRC to act openly and in good faith toward the nations and parties to the conflict. To discharge the mandate conferred by the Geneva Conventions and to take the humanitarian initiatives fundamental to its role as neutral intermediary, the ICRC must remain independent. Therefore, the ICRC adopts a special structure that allows it to resist political, economic, and other pressures and to maintain its credibility in the eyes of the governments and the public that support its activities.
A-65. In terms of civil-military relations, ICRC's humanitarian activities aim to protect human dignity and lives. ICRC humanitarian activities cannot be subordinated to political or military objectives. The ICRC must maintain a role independent of such influence or association. While consulting closely with international military missions deployed in the same operational area, it must create and maintain a specific humanitarian space. This space clearly distinguishes humanitarian action and political-military action.

THE ROLE OF THE CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS CENTER

A-66. The civil-military operations center is an ad hoc coordination center established and directed by the commander's civil-military operations officer. The CMOC facilitates the coordination of activities of military forces with USG agencies, NGOs, regional and international organizations, and local authorities. The size, structure, and location of the CMOC are situation dependent. As a coordination center, the CMOC is neither a unit nor an organization. (See JP 3-57.) If there is a host-nation government, it has the presumptive right to establish the mechanisms for civil-military coordination.

A-67. The CMOC may be neither the first coordinating mechanism nor the primary one, depending on the situation. Strong consideration should be given to co-locating CMOC functions with previously existing mechanisms, such as an on-site coordination center, a humanitarian operations center, or a civil-military cooperation center. (See Table A-2.) Protection is always a concern for the commander when considering where to locate the CMOC; while placing the CMOC “inside the wire” increases protection, it can also interfere with its ability to interact with NGOs and other actors. The commander must consider this difficulty when analyzing METT-TC (mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations).

A-68. Coordination centers have various names and functions according to the mission and needs of the establishing commander. The CMOC is the type of coordination center most employed by Army commanders. However, a limited discussion of several others may also be helpful. (See Table A-2.) JP 3-57 discusses these coordination centers in more detail.

Table A-2. Example of coordination centers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coordinating Center</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC)</td>
<td>This center is usually established by a host-nation government or UN. The HOC coordinates the overall relief strategy in large-scale foreign humanitarian assistance operations. It is responsible for policy making and coordinating, but does not exercise command and control. The HOC may submit requests for support to a commander through a CMOC. HOCs were established in the UN operations in Somalia and Rwanda.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On-Site Operations Coordination Center (OSOCC)</td>
<td>The OSOCC is a support organization to a HOC. It assists in gathering, evaluating, collecting, and disseminating HOC information. During Operation SUPPORT HOPE in Rwanda, the UN deployed an OSOCC—with essentially the same functions as a CMOC—and helped transmit CMOC responsibilities to the UN.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil-Military Cooperation Center</td>
<td>Civil-military cooperation is a NATO doctrinal concept that roughly equates to the U.S. term “civil-military operations.” Thus, when the NATO-led implementation force in Bosnia-Herzegovina established a center for coordination with the NGO community, it was known as the civil-military cooperation center rather than a CMOC, but it performed the same functions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A-69. Military or civilian representatives from different agencies and organizations compose the CMOC. Mission requirements, command directives, operations security, workload, and accessibility to nonmilitary agencies impact on its actual organization. Figure A-2 shows a sample CMOC organization.
A-70. The number of CMOCs supporting a given operation may vary based on mission analysis. Commanders at any echelon may establish a CMOC. The decision to establish a CMOC stems from civil-military coordination requirements. The distance from the headquarters serving a particular geographic or tactical area can also influence the decision. A joint task force often establishes a CMOC; however, in operations where the joint force headquarters is located in one locale, and units are spread throughout the joint operations area, subordinate Army commanders may establish sector CMOCs.

A-71. The CMOC usually conducts daily meetings to identify needs and available resources. Validated requests go to the appropriate joint task force, Army, or agency representative for action. CMOC tasks may include—

- Facilitating civil-military coordination between those involved:
  - Host nation.
  - International or regional organizations, such as the UN and NATO.
  - USG agencies—such as USAID and country team—to include the disaster assistance response team deployed to the scene by the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance.
  - U.S. or multinational commands.
  - NGOs.
- Assisting in transferring operational responsibility to nonmilitary agencies.
- Receiving, validating, coordinating, and monitoring requests from NGOs for routine and emergency military support.
- Coordinating requests to NGOs for their support.
- Convening ad hoc mission planning groups to address complex military missions that support NGO requirements (such as convoy escort and management as well as security of refugee camps and feeding centers).
- Convening follow-on assessment groups.
- Providing situation reports regarding force operations, security, and other information for participants in the collective effort.
- Chairing meetings on NGO logistic prioritization issues and liaising with port and airfield control authorities.
- Facilitating the creation and organization of a logistics distribution system for food, water, and medical relief efforts.
- Providing updated strike data to support unexploded explosive ordnance clearance and mine awareness activities.
- Providing daily security update, to include incidents of crime, landmine strikes, militia activity, and general safety.
A-72. The PAO attends daily CMOC meetings. As an active member of the CMOC, the PAO ensures that member agencies agree on message and press releases and develop a group consensus in response to media queries. Although each agency’s message need not be identical, agencies must not contradict each other.

LIAISONS

A-73. Liaison maintains contact and communication between elements of military forces and other agencies to ensure military understanding and unity of purpose and action. Liaison is essential in most stability operations because of the variety of external participants and the coordination challenges present.

A-74. Liaison officers are a focal point for communications in joint, multinational, and interagency operations. Liaison officers centralize direction and facilitate understanding while conducting operations with external agencies or forces. (See also appendix E of FM 6-0.) Supported agencies, departments, and organizations need a much clearer understanding of the military planning process. This is best accomplished by direct liaison. Liaison officers normally work closely with the operations officer to seek and resolve interagency problems. Liaison teams establish authoritative representation of the commander, accurately interpret the commander’s intentions, and explain the capabilities of the force. Conversely, the teams interpret the intentions and capabilities of the nonmilitary organizations. Liaison teams provide input while developing courses of action for future operations. They also work to maximize current operations through proactive interaction with the agencies, departments, and organizations to which they are attached.

A-75. The professional abilities of the liaison officer determine a successful liaison. Additional factors that contribute to successful liaisons are—

- Knowledge of the doctrine, capabilities, procedures, and culture of their organizations.
- Transportation.
- Foreign Language ability.
- Regional orientation.
- Communications.
- Single point of contact in the headquarters.
- In support of humanitarian assistance missions, functional skills and experience aligning with the need for medical and logistics expertise.

A-76. Civil affairs or special forces liaison elements may be available to serve as liaison officers. Using contracted interpreters to augment liaison teams may be another option, although in some cases their loyalties may affect reliability.

A-77. Liaison teams are formed when a 24-hour representational capability is required. Teams are tailored to the specific situation and may require the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff controlled communications assets. Individual liaison officers are assigned when 24-hour representation is not required and adequate communications with the joint task force staff are available.
Appendix B

Interagency Management System

Weak and failed states pose a serious security challenge for the United States and the international community. They can become breeding grounds for terrorism, weapons proliferation, trafficking in humans and narcotics, organized crime, and humanitarian catastrophes. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been involved in or contributed significant resources to more than 17 reconstruction and stabilization operations. And the challenge persists. RAND recently reported that in this same time period, the pace of U.S. military interventions has risen to about one every two years. If the U.S. Government is going to meet these threats, we must adapt our national security architecture.

John E. Herbst
Coordinator for Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization

BACKGROUND

B-1. The Department of State’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) was established in 2004. This office is designed as an interagency office. Its staff consists of resources from other Departments of State, Defense, Treasury, Justice, Homeland Security, and Labor; the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID); the Central Intelligence Agency; and the Defense Intelligence Agency.

B-2. By shifting civilian agencies, the office promotes unity of effort to leverage limited resources and avoids unnecessary duplication. Under improved management, the office has two tasks:

- To ensure that the entire U.S. Government is organized to deal with reconstruction and stabilization crises affecting national interests, to include balancing civilian and military activities.
- To build a staff of trained civilians to deploy in support of these missions when called upon to respond.

RECONSTRUCTION AND STABILIZATION

B-3. The National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44) outlines the management of reconstruction and stabilization operations. The directive states that the Secretary of State leads and coordinates integrated U.S. efforts to prepare, plan for, and conduct reconstruction and stabilization activities. These activities are situation dependent; they may be conducted with or without U.S. military engagement. The directive requires the Secretaries of State and Defense to complement civilian and military efforts to allow integrated civilian agency and military planning. The Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 complements NSPD-44.

B-4. NSPD-44 aims to provide senior policy makers with a complete status of existing capacities, needs, gaps, and priorities. This knowledge enables civilian agencies to respond to conflicts while collaborating with the military effectively. The directive tries to present the vision for how the U.S. Government capacity is built to ensure unity of effort.

INTERAGENCY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM ORGANIZATION

B-5. The U.S. Government has capable agencies responsible for various parts of foreign assistance and engagement. Each agency plays an important role in response to a crisis and must be integrated for maximum effect. The integration of the various agencies resulted in the interagency agreement for how the
Appendix B
(Symposium Draft—NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION)

U.S. Government should organize itself to deal with a stabilization crisis. The improved management approach, the Interagency Management System (IMS) for reconstruction and stabilization, consists of three interlinked elements: country reconstruction and stabilization group, integration planning cell, and advanced civilian team.

B-6. The IMS clarifies roles, responsibilities, and processes for mobilizing and supporting interagency reconstruction and stabilization operations. This system provides the tools to ensure unity of effort, guided by whole-of-government planning. The IMS is flexible; planners may modify it to meet the ground requirements and can integrate personnel from other agencies. This system may be used in engagements with or without military operations.

B-7. The IMS provides coordinated, interagency policy and program management for highly complex crises and operations that—

- Are national or security priorities.
- Involve widespread instability.
- May require military operations.
- Engage multiple U.S. Government agencies in the policy and program response.

B-8. The IMS does not conflict with response measures executed through current organizations and systems or with measures responding to the political and humanitarian crises. As a situation evolves, these groups can be absorbed into more routine embassy structures. With time, the responsibilities for assistance will cycle back into normal planning and budgeting cycles.

COUNTRY RECONSTRUCTION AND STABILIZATION GROUP

B-9. The country reconstruction and stabilization group is an assistant secretary-level group of decisionmaking personnel. The group aims to focus exclusively on a single country or regional crisis. Members of the country reconstruction and stabilization group accompany agencies participating in reconstruction and stabilization missions. A S/CRS secretariat with a full-time staff exists for each group to collect and facilitate interagency interactions. The secretariat provides a single channel for providing information, creating options, and monitoring the implementation of policy decisions. The secretariat oversees the drafting of a unified plan that identifies which U.S. Government capabilities to use in the crisis.

INTEGRATION PLANNING CELL

B-10. The integration planning cell is a civilian planning cell deployed to the relevant geographic combatant command or multinational headquarters. This cell integrates civilian and military planning, processes, and operations. The integration planning cell consists of civilian planners and regional and sector-specific experts from across the U.S. Government.

ADVANCED CIVILIAN TEAM

B-11. The advanced civilian team consists of one or more rapid response teams. These teams deploy to the field to support the chief of mission in implementing the U.S. reconstruction and stabilization strategic plan. The advanced civilian team operates under the direction of the chief of mission in countries with a U.S. embassy. The team integrates with existing embassy and USAID mission structures. In the absence of an existing U.S. diplomatic presence, the advanced civilian team helps to establish a U.S. diplomatic structure. The team deploys field advanced civilian teams as necessary. These teams work to implement U.S. reconstruction and stability programs at a provincial or local level. The field advanced civilian team integrates with U.S. or other military forces to foster U.S. and multinational unity of effort.

CIVILIAN DEPLOYMENT CAPACITY

B-12. Three tiers of rapid responders exist in the U.S. civilian reconstruction and stabilization response capacity. The active response corps is the first tier. The second tier is the standby response corps. The civilian reserve corps represents the third tier.
The active response corps officers are federal employees in the Department of State. They work full time to support reconstruction and stabilization activities. This includes training and preparing to deploy immediately to a crisis location. Seventy-five percent of the active response corps is deployable at any given time for up to six months. The disaster assistance response team exists at USAID. This team is the derivative rapid response team of the active response corps.

USAID and the Department of Treasury have a small, dedicated capacity for deployment. Having on-staff personnel dedicated to this purpose ensures that they can deploy quickly without leaving other critical work unstaffed.

The standby response corps consists of existing U.S. Government employees with a wide range of skill sets and expertise. Standby response corps members have full-time jobs. They are available for training and subsequent deployments of up to six months on 30-45 days notice. This corps increases the number of skilled personnel available to meet the specific mission requirements.

The civilian reserve corps represents the third tier of rapid civilian responders in the U.S. Government. The members of this corps are available without the expense of hiring them as permanent U.S. Government employees. The reserve corps can work reconstruction and stability projects for the Departments of State and Justice, USAID, and other government agencies. When deployed, the reserve corps provides management capacity to the embassy and technical assistance to the host-nation government. Using the reserve corps offers two advantages over relying solely on contractors for additional response:

- Faster response.
- Greater accountability.

The civilian reserve corps provides immediate expertise in the field on a short-term basis. The civilian reserve corps provides a venue for the American public to share skills while serving the U.S. Government. When activated, the civilian reserve corps would consist of Americans from outside federal agencies.

The S/CRS established a training working group to bring together representatives from the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, Commerce, Treasury, Agriculture, Health and Human Services, and Homeland Security; USAID; and the U.S. Institute of Peace. This working group fosters collaboration among agencies. Together these agencies develop training to prepare officers for reconstruction and stabilization operations. The training working group builds upon and leverages existing resources to connect multiple interagency training programs.

The S/CRS coordinates training in reconstruction and stabilization with the Department of State’s Foreign Service Institute. The S/CRS offers courses in conflict transformation for U.S. Government employees from the Department of State and other agencies. S/CRS officers assist in designing courses for personnel deploying to provincial reconstruction teams. (See appendix F.) These officers assist in developing courses for Joint Knowledge Online to promote interagency understanding.

Active response corps members attend S/CRS courses. They attend additional training available through the military, other civilian agencies, international counterparts, and outside organizations.

BUILDING CLOSE WORKING RELATIONSHIPS WITH INTERNATIONAL PARTNER ORGANIZATIONS 

Building close working relationships with international partner organizations enhances the IMS. These organizations range from the United Nations, to the European Union, and partner countries like the United Kingdom and Canada. For example, the multinational experiment series led by U.S. Joint Forces Command is designed to improve civil-military cooperation among international partners in a crisis.

The Department of State performs missions using transformational diplomacy—working with a wide range of partners on a global scale. The objective of transformational diplomacy is to build and sustain democratic states that will respond to the needs of their people and conduct themselves responsibly in the international community. NSPD-44 instructs U.S. agencies to work with international partners on early warning systems, conflict prevention, and conflict response.
SUMMARY

B-23. The IMS aims to integrate civilian agencies and, when necessary, military forces in support of reconstruction and stabilization activities. Ground forces rely on a robust civilian capacity for reconstruction and stability. A civilian reconstruction and stabilization capacity relieves U.S. forces of numerous post-conflict activities and allows greater focus on the primary mission. An increased civilian capacity provides U.S. Government agencies with the ability to partner with the military when necessary or deal with some crises without invoking U.S. military power.
Appendix C

USG Principles for Reconstruction and Stabilization

The development community and the military community will continue to move towards closer and increased collaboration. It is critically important that the military and development communities achieve a better understanding of each other's comparative advantages and collaborate accordingly...while the military is the best instrument to enter a conflict environment and provide an immediate stabilizing force; civilian agencies are better equipped to oversee actual reconstruction and development work.

U.S. Agency for International Development

C-1. The tragic events of 11 September 2001 ushered in a new development and security paradigm; the implications have been far-reaching, extending through all branches of the U.S. Government. This new paradigm means that more complex emergencies and fragile states have increased relevance for U.S. national security interests. The United States must engage failed states with the understanding of the potential correlation between failed states and terrorist-induced instability. The development community aims to unite those organizations with a stake in development. The actors and stakeholders include the beneficiaries, businesses, foundations, governments, and non-governmental organizations. The goal of the development community is to assist failed and failing states with finding the solutions and resources to match its requirements for sustained development and growth.

PRINCIPLES OF RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT

C-2. The development community uses specific principles for reconstruction and development. The principles are tested through years of practical application and understanding of cultural and socioeconomic influences in the host nation. Understanding these generally accepted principles enables development officials to incorporate effectively techniques and procedures to improve economic and social conditions for the populace. The principles of reconstruction and stabilization are ownership, capacity building, sustainability, selectivity, assessment, results, partnership, flexibility and accountability.

C-3. Development officials improve their probability of success by applying the principles of reconstruction and stabilization. Timely and adequate emphasis on the principles increases the opportunity for immediate success or, at a minimum, provides a means to adapt to the changing conditions. Development officials assume risk in their programs when these principles are violated or ignored.

OWNERSHIP

C-4. The principle of ownership creates conditions of success by building on the leadership, participation, and commitment of the host nation and its people. Ownership relies on the country to establish and drive the development priorities within the nation. The host nation leads this unified effort with support from external donor organizations. Ownership begins with and is focused on the people. It is founded on community involvement and participation at the local level. This is fundamental to success, since the host-nation government may not exist, or lacks the legitimacy to assume ownership effectively for any peaceful processes.

C-5. Donor organizations support and assist this process as partners toward a common objective. The populace should view development as belonging to their government and not the donor community. Development projects and initiatives should first address the needs of the country and its populace. It requires agency ground presence to build credibility, trust, and consensus in the local population. Building country ownership initially requires large investments of time and resources.
C-6. When ownership exists and a community invests itself in a project, the citizens will defend, maintain, and expand the project after donor organizations have departed. The citizens will abandon what the donor organizations leaves behind if the perception is that the project does not meet their needs or does not belong to them. The development community achieves positive results when it takes a more patient approach to engaging national and local leaders in the development rather than to impose development quickly and autocratically.

U.S. policy in Afghanistan has emphasized the ownership principle and has focused on encouraging Afghans to take government leadership positions. The selection of Hamid Karzai as President of Afghanistan is a good illustration. In December 2001, the four major Afghan factions met in Bonn, Germany, to select an interim leader. They subsequently chose Karzai to head the Afghan Transitional Authority. The significance of this model is that Karzai and his ministers are all Afghan-born. Karzai has additionally strived for ethnic balance; the interim cabinet comprehensively represented all the various political groups in Afghanistan, from Mujahiddin and Northern Alliance factions to European and American members of the Afghan Diaspora.

C-7. It is important to have a national lead the country and to have nationals head the ministries for several reasons. Such leaders—

- Foster national legitimacy.
- Eliminate language barriers.
- Develop legislative responsibility.
- Promote understanding of the national political climate.
- Maximize national support of government policy.

**CAPACITY BUILDING**

C-8. Capacity building involves the transfer of technical knowledge and skills to individuals and institutions. Capacity building aims to strengthen local institutions, transfer technical skills, and promote effective programs. Once met, these goals enable long-term capacity to establish policies and provide competent sustained public services.

C-9. An important by-product of capacity building is that the country increases its ability to retain, absorb, and facilitate economic investment. The investments can come from donor assistance or from private sources of foreign direct investment. Ultimately, an improved governance and investment environment is a necessary condition for sustained economic growth in any country.

C-10. The development community recognizes that the right government policies underscore all successful development efforts. Simply put, a country with weak governance institutions and misguided policies will have a limited ability to lead its own economic and social development. For example, it is not enough to build universities and educate a country’s population. This effort must be accompanied by direct opportunities that will allow university graduates to become future political and business leaders.
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has built individual teacher capacity through programs such as the radio-based teacher training program. This program targets teachers who reside in remote areas of the country. As of June 2005, some 65,000 teachers have been trained through broadcasts that strengthen their teaching skills and spread civic and educational messages. About 7,500 more teachers have been trained through face-to-face instruction, and 6,800 in an accelerated training program. As more teachers have been trained, more children have returned to school: primary school enrollment increased from a pre-war total of one million (2001) to 4.8 million by December 2004.

SUSTAINABILITY

C-11. The development agencies should design programs with an impact that endures beyond the end of the project. The sustainability principle encompasses the premise that a nation’s resources are finite and development should ensure a balance among economic development, social development, democracy, and governance. The sustainability principle compels aid managers to consider whether the technology, institution, or service they are introducing will have a lasting effect to a society. In some cases, managers may pursue programs without long-term sustainability to establish stability. Nevertheless, program implementation should always focus on attaining long-term sustainability, even when circumstances dictate short-term solutions to immediate conditions.

C-12. Sustainability is applicable in the military context. The military balances the need to execute immediate mission requirements quickly and the subsequent withdrawal of forces with the obligation to develop sustainable military and local police forces. Sustainable forces can protect the country against resurgent and future threats. U.S. military forces cannot equate success with merely training and equipping host-nation soldiers. The best-trained army will languish and deteriorate without ongoing government support and funding. Sustainability demands that the government eventually start replacing external military assistance with domestic tax revenues to fund the national military forces and other public services.

The Kajaki Dam in Afghanistan is a case of enduring sustainability. The dam was originally constructed in 1953 with funding from the U.S. Export-Import Bank; it was upgraded with USAID assistance in 1975. It has supplied continuous electricity to the provinces of Helmand and Kandahar and consistently provided irrigation water to the surrounding valley. After the invasion of the Soviet army in 1979 and the subsequent withdrawal of U.S. assistance to Afghanistan, engineers in charge of its maintenance were able to keep the dam operational and productive. They did this through 23 years of civil war and Taliban oppression without any external assistance, supplies, or funding. The dam’s remarkable sustainability results from a combination of factors: extensive engineer training that emphasized dam maintenance, durable construction design, and adherence to the ownership principle—Afghans took responsibility for maintaining the dam themselves, and they did everything possible to keep it operational.

SELECTIVITY

C-13. The selectivity principle directs U.S. bilateral assistance organizations to invest scarce aid resources based on three criteria: humanitarian need, foreign policy interests of the United States, and the commitment of a country and its leadership to reform. To maximize effectiveness, donor organizations allocate resources where resources make a significant impact and where the recipient community demonstrates commitment to development goals. The underlying idea is that resources are finite and are most effective when concentrated together in select situations. Any allocation of resources, whether in combat operations or infrastructure projects, must consider foreign policy interests, political circumstances, and ground-level needs and requirements. See also paragraph C-31.
Appendix C
(Symposium Draft—NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION)

C-14. The Millennium Challenge Corporation exemplifies the principle of selectivity. This U.S. Government corporation is designed to work with some of the poorest countries. It is not meant to provide a long-term commitment to economic assistance. Instead, it focuses on transformational development, fostering far-reaching, fundamental changes so that countries can further sustain economic and social progress without depending on foreign aid. The Millennium Challenge Corporation applies to a specific country archetype: one that possesses a strong governance framework and requires large-scale capital investment as a final ingredient toward full-scale development and growth. To determine which countries fit this transformational development model, the corporation rates countries on a 16-point scale in the broad categories of ruling justly, investment in people, and economic freedom. It then selects countries eligible for funding based on a country’s rating.

ASSESSMENT

C-15. A development agency must conduct a comprehensive assessment of local conditions before designing and implementing a program. Development agencies have the important task of conducting careful research, adapting best practices, and design for local conditions. A serious concern for foreign aid programs is forcing too much money into local institutions that cannot responsibly spend the increased external funding. As a result development agencies must consider several factors in the assessment process:

- Do reconstruction plans conform to conditions on the ground?
- What are the best practices for each intervention?
- What is the absorptive capacity of a society?

C-16. USAID’s collaboration with the provincial reconstruction teams in Afghanistan—which are joint civil-military organizations consisting of 70-80 personnel—offers another illustration of the assessment principle. Good development demands that an agency conduct ground-level assessments before enacting a project. Sometimes USAID uses provincial reconstruction teams. In select situations, the teams allow civilian personnel to conduct field assessments in areas that are otherwise unstable. The instability may be from the presence of Taliban insurgents, regional warlords, drug-financed criminal organizations, and an atmosphere of general lawlessness. With support from provincial reconstruction teams, USAID has been able to monitor critical reconstruction projects, conduct needs assessments, and mobilize local partners.

C-17. Development agencies must work with peripheral agencies such as provincial reconstruction teams to ensure proposed projects fit into national plans. A primary responsibility of a democratically elected government is to provide essential and needed public services. Providing services builds public support and loyalty to the government. To facilitate this, each ministry within the government must produce a strategy that fits into the overall national development plan to maximize limited resources. Donors ensure potential programs are included in the host-nation’s strategic plan and budgets to fund its support for continuous resourcing and ultimate project effectiveness.

C-18. Without a comprehensive field assessment, it is almost impossible to predict whether a project will have a measurable and definable effect. However, exhaustive assessments are often counter-productive and delay the implementation of aid projects. Therefore, the principle of assessment is linked closely to the principle of developing results.

RESULTS

C-19. The principle of results includes directing resources to achieve clearly defined, measurable, and strategic-focused objectives. The principle of results draws on the assessment principle ensuring that before a donor organization decides to enters a particular country, it first determines its strategic objectives or what impact do the donor organization and the country hope to achieve.

C-20. The donor organization and country must consider how they can best attain the desired impact and what types of programs and resources will lead to the goal. The donor organization and the country must determine specific benchmarks. The benchmarks indicate whether countries are accomplishing their strategic objectives and whether implemented programs are achieving the intended impact.
C-21. USAID incorporates the principle of results in all its programs and operations in over 80 countries. USAID believes that when an agency must consider a program’s impact from the beginning stages, the agency will have more clearly defined and strategically focused objectives. Since 1993, the notion of managing for results has emerged as an explicit core value of the agency. When deciding whether to implement a particular project, the agency applies a “results framework” that visually depicts the objectives to be achieved by USAID and through the contributions of other donor organizations.

C-22. The National Security Strategy emphasizes that the United States must “insist upon measurable results to ensure that development assistance is actually making a difference in the lives of the poor.” The principle of results reinforces this sentiment by requiring development agencies to focus attention on the actual impact of foreign assistance investment.

PARTNERSHIP

C-23. The partnership principle holds that donor organizations should collaborate closely at all levels with partner entities, from local businesses and private voluntary organizations to government ministries. Development agencies implement projects to work with a network of partners including international nongovernmental organizations. These partners can directly oversee an entire program, or a local university can implement a civic education initiatives.

C-24. Agencies such as USAID use a highly decentralized structure where implementation and much program design takes place in host-nation missions. The USAID equivalent of “commanders” is its “mission directors.” These directors have much greater autonomy than their counterparts do in the military and most other international aid agencies. USAID missions work in a linear, horizontal organizational structure. The structure links various voluntary partnerships, many different parts of civil society, and local and national governments, through voluntary agreements and funding mechanisms.

C-25. An important part of the agency’s recent mandate has been to expand its base of partners and use nontraditional groups who have resources to offer to the development community. This includes opening a faith-based office to accommodate these nontraditional groups; extending its partner outreach to the business community; and working through USAID’s Global Development Alliance.

C-26. The agency first seeks for a strong, local partner on the ground when considering a project. This partner must be able to manage the program effectively from design and assessment to implementation. The agency has developed a set of analytical tools to determine which potential partners have the highest likelihood of success.

FLEXIBILITY

C-27. Development assistance is laden with uncertainties and changing circumstances that require an agency to assess current conditions continuously and adjust its response appropriately. The principle of flexibility maintains that agencies must be adaptable to anticipate possible problems and to seize opportunities. Flexibility must be balanced against the premise that good development takes time and reconstruction efforts should be systematized and executed on a large scale.

USAID’s role in the Afghan counternarcotics program illustrates the importance of being responsive and flexible. In 2004, poppy production in Afghanistan expanded to more than 500,000 acres, resulting in the opium economy accounting for 60 percent of Afghanistan’s gross domestic product. In response, USAID created the Alternative Livelihoods Program. This program provides Afghans with short- and long-term sources of income to help farmers move out of the poppy economy and into legitimate agricultural activities. Rural development programs already are an integral part of USAID’s agriculture strategy; consequently, the agency was able to refocus the current agriculture program to assist and tackle the poppy problem. It invested additional resources in existing rural growth programs, focused on both farm and non-farm employment, and built upon its relationships with local governments in
targeted poppy-growing areas. As a result, USAID is leveraging the Afghan government's commitment to fighting the opium problem.

C-28. The fact that stability operations incorporate such an expansive agenda—encompassing everything from antiterrorism exercises to humanitarian assistance—underscores the need for military flexibility. Flexibility is an integral component of stability operations as political considerations guide stabilization efforts. Military forces and development agencies must remain constantly aware of the political environment and be prepared to change tactics accordingly.

ACCOUNTABILITY

C-29. The host nation, donor organizations, and the development community must design accountability and transparency into systems. By doing so, they build effective checks and balances to guard against corruption. Donors should work to fight corruption in the countries where they operate. Donors must also ensure that the actual programs they implement are transparent and accountable. Within the U.S. government, oversight bodies help guard against cost overruns, financial abuse, and contractor mismanagement. These oversight bodies can include the inspector general, independent auditors, the Government Accountability Office, and congressional investigative committees. Externally, development agencies should prevent corrupt local officials from preying on potential projects. These same agencies should ensure that development programs enhance democratic governance structures and local accountability systems. Political institutions—especially in developing countries—are fragile, and if these countries lack a strong rule-of-law foundation, then there is an increased risk of corruption.

C-30. The accountability principle closely relates to stability operations as well. The local population must view the military operation as legitimate while perceiving that their government has real authority. If corruption takes root, either on the side of the U.S. aid program or on the part of the host-nation government, then the entire principle of legitimacy is undermined.

C-31. Agencies such as USAID follow a standard set of accountability guidelines based on institutional experience. Agencies distribute smaller amounts of money to local organizations to avoid overwhelming underdeveloped systems. The agency dispenses funds only after work on a project run by a new local organization is complete or as bills arrive. The agency seldom provides up-front money to untested implementing organizations. The agency provides significant financial system training to local groups to build their capacity to handle larger sums of money.

C-32. The development community compiles a list of corrupt organizations and bars them from receiving future funding. The agency chooses experienced organizations as primary fiduciary agents to facilitate timely and accountable completion of large-scale projects.

SUMMARY

C-33. The principles of reconstruction and development formalize customary practices and operating procedures. The principles reflect key institutional principles that most aid agencies incorporate into the reconstruction framework. The principles are designed to ensure local ownership and sustainability of programs as well as the flexibly to adjust a development programs to stimulate economic growth.
Appendix D

Tactical Conflict Assessment Framework

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) developed the tactical conflict assessment framework. It is a standardized framework used by the interagency to identify causes of instability and conflict in an operational area. This framework measures impact of stability programs and provides program guidance to reduce or eliminate instability and conflict. Interagency organizations use the tactical conflict assessment framework as a basic assessment framework; it is presented in this appendix for information purposes only. Army forces use doctrinal assessment tools to inform understanding, aid in planning, and shape execution. The tactical conflict assessment framework may inform but will not replace those doctrinal tools.

TACTICAL CONFLICT ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK STEPS

D-1. There are nine steps in the tactical conflict assessment framework.

STEP 1: ASSESS

D-2. Normally, a staff planner performs this step as part of the military decisionmaking process. Planners often work with information specific to local and regional areas. Military patrols; local, political, and community leaders; government agencies and nongovernmental organizations; and the local populace provide this information. The assessment aims to understand the operational environment—such as security, politics, economics, and infrastructures—and cultural environment—such as tribe, religion, and language.

D-3. The staff planner develops a tactical conflict assessment framework questionnaire. This standardized questionnaire is designed for use by collectors—such as patrols and checkpoint personnel—at the tactical level. It is intended to facilitate discussions with the local populace in an operational area. Each answer creates a data point the staff uses to measure statistically what the local populace perceive to identify the causes of instability and conflict. The questionnaire also provides a baseline that allows the staff to monitor how stability operations impact the area. The questionnaire consists of only four questions focused on the community:

- Have there been changes in the village population in the last year?
- What are the most important problems facing the village?
- Whom do you believe can solve your problems?
- What should be done first to help the village?

D-4. Collectors follow up each answered question with “why” to determine potential reasons for the response. For example, a change in the village population may be due to an influx of refugees, the harvest of agricultural products, pilgrimages, or drought.

STEP 2: IDENTIFY CAUSES OF INSTABILITY AND CONFLICT

D-5. During Step 2, the staff planner analyzes the respondent’s answers. The planner determines if a causal relationship exists between the identified issue and the causes of instability and conflict. For example, the presence of insurgents in the area may be due to perceived corruption versus the lack of water in a village.
STEP 3: IDENTIFY AND PRIORITIZE OBJECTIVES

D-6. Once the causes of instability and conflict have been established, the staff planner identifies and prioritizes objectives in resolving the issues. Objectives are described in terms that can be measured quantifiably; they target the underlying causes, not symptoms, of instability and conflict. Effective objectives are those designed to reduce the causes of the instability and conflict. These objectives involve the participation of the host-nation government and local populace and are coordinated with as many other related efforts as possible. The planner then prioritizes the objectives by available resources, mission requirements, probability of success, and the impact of lessening the instability and conflict.

STEP 4: DETERMINE IMPACT INDICATORS

D-7. Staff planners identify impact indicators that measure the effectiveness of programs and activities against a predetermined objective. Staff planners track impact indicators as input and output indicators. Input indicators track the resources in an activity. For example, they track funds used to purchase equipment, train police, and purchase medical supplies. Output indicators measure the results of activities and programs against the overall objective, such as the number of projects completed or number of police trained. Output indicators only confirm the implementation of activities. They do not measure the impact of activities in diminishing the causes of instability and conflict.

STEP 5: CHOOSE MONITORING METHODS

D-8. Staff planners determine which monitoring methods work most effectively to measure the impact indicators. Monitoring methods include conducting surveys of citizens’ perceptions, having face-to-face communication, hosting targeted focus groups, and analyzing reports.

STEP 6: IDENTIFY ACTIVITIES AND PROGRAMS

D-9. Staff planners identify only those activities and programs that will diminish the causes of instability and conflict. The activities and programs involve local, regional, and national governments. Such involvement enhances legitimacy and creditability of those agencies. It also reduces dependence on foreign governments and military forces to solve local issues. Every activity will increase support for government and its capability and capacity and decrease support for insurgents. An effective communications effort promoting these activities, along with a realistic assessment of potential impact on and timeline for the future, will reduce the populace’s anxiety and interference with ongoing stability operations.

STEP 7: DETERMINE OUTPUT INDICATORS

D-10. Staff planners identify output indicators. These indicators accurately measure the results of individual activities and programs against the overall objective.

STEP 8: CHOOSE MONITORING METHODS

D-11. Planners select monitoring methods. These methods measure how output indicators help to diminish the causes of instability and conflict.

STEP 9: IMPLEMENT ACTIVITY

D-12. The staff planner implements activities at a time and place that maximizes their impact in reducing the causes of instability and conflict. Planners use various media and communications efforts to amplify success of the activity and its impact on reducing the causes of instability and conflict.

SUMMARY

D-13. Tactical conflict assessment framework is a standard interagency framework for identifying the causes of instability and conflict in an operational area. Tactical conflict assessment framework provides
the commander with the ability to see, understand, act, and measure the instability and conflict within the operational environment through culturally sensitive and consistent data collection.
Appendix E

Humanitarian Response Principles

Even in those situations where military forces are not directly involved, a focused and integrated humanitarian response is essential to reestablishing a stable environment that fosters a lasting peace in support of broader national and international interests. Providing humanitarian aid and assistance is primarily the responsibility of specialized civilian, national, international, government, and nongovernmental organizations and agencies. Nevertheless, military forces are often called upon to support humanitarian response activities, either as part of a broader campaign, such as Operation Iraqi Freedom, or a specific humanitarian assistance or disaster relief operation. These activities consist of stability tasks and generally fall under the primary stability task, Restore Essential Services. This appendix outlines the guiding principles used by the international community to frame humanitarian response activities.

E-1. Generally, the host nation or affected country coordinates humanitarian response. However, if the host nation or affected country is unable to do so, the United Nations often leads the international community response on its behalf. The principles that guide the military contribution to that response are fundamental to success in full spectrum operations. These principles reflect the collective experience of a diverse array of actors in a wide range of interventions conducted over decades across the world. They help to shape the humanitarian component of stability operations.

E-2. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 46/182, *Strengthening of the Coordination of Humanitarian Emergency Assistance of the United Nations*, governs the humanitarian response efforts of the international community. It articulates the principal tenets for the provision of humanitarian assistance—humanity, neutrality, and impartiality—while promulgating the guiding principles that frame all humanitarian response activities. These guiding principles are drawn from four primary, albeit separate, sources:

- The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.
- The United Nations Interagency Standing Committee.
- The Oslo Guidelines.
- United States Institute for Peace and the Department of Defense.

INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT MOVEMENT

E-3. The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement is a term covering 2 institutions and nearly 200 national societies. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies comprise the institutions. The ICRC is an impartial, neutral, and independent organization. Established in 1863, its exclusively humanitarian mission aims to protect the lives and dignity of victims of war and internal violence and to provide them with assistance. It directs and coordinates the international relief activities conducted by the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement in conflict situations. It also endeavors to prevent suffering by promoting and strengthening humanitarian law and universal humanitarian principles.

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE RED CROSS

E-4. The seven fundamental principles bond together the national Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red
Appendix E
(Symposium Draft—NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION)

Crescent Societies. The principles ensure the continuity of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent
Movement and its humanitarian work. These principles are:

- Humanity.
- Impartiality.
- Neutrality.
- Independence.
- Voluntary service.
- Unity.
- Universality.

Humanity

E-5. The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement was developed to bring unbiased assistance to the wounded on the battlefield. It aims to prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it may be found. Its purpose is to protect life and health and to ensure respect for the human being. It promotes mutual understanding, friendship, cooperation, and lasting peace among all people.

Impartiality

E-6. The second principle makes no discrimination as to nationality, race, religious beliefs, class, or political opinions. It tries to relieve the suffering of individuals—guided solely by their needs—and to give priority to the most urgent cases of distress.

Neutrality

E-7. Neutrality is the third fundamental principle of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. To continue to enjoy the confidence of all, the Movement may not take sides in hostilities. It may not engage at any time in controversies of a political, racial, religious, or ideological nature.

Independence

E-8. The fourth fundamental principle is independence. The national societies are auxiliaries in the humanitarian services of their governments and subject to the laws of their respective countries. As such, the societies must always maintain their autonomy. Such independence enables the societies to act in accordance with the principles of the Movement at all times.

Voluntary Service

E-9. Voluntary service is the fifth fundamental principle of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. It is a voluntary relief movement. It is not prompted in any manner by desire for gain.

Unity

E-10. The sixth principle is unity. There can be only one Red Cross or one Red Crescent Society in any one country. It must be open to all. It must carry on its humanitarian work throughout its territory.

Universality

E-11. The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement’s seventh fundamental principle is universality. Universality ensures that all societies have equal status in the Movement. It also ensures that all societies share equal responsibilities and duties in helping each other. The Movement is worldwide.

CODE OF CONDUCT

E-12. In the summer of 1994, the code of conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and nongovernmental organizations in disaster relief was developed. It was agreed upon by
eight of the world's largest disaster response agencies. This code represents the body of international
standards for disaster response. Before then, no accepted body of professional standards existed to guide
their work. Today, the international community uses it to monitor its own standards of relief delivery and
to encourage other agencies to set similar standards.

E-13. Like most professional codes, the code of conduct is a voluntary one. It applies to any
nongovernmental organization, national or international, regardless of size. It provides ten “points of
principle” that all nongovernmental organizations should adhere to in their disaster-response work. The
code of conduct also describes the relationships that these groups should seek with donor organizations,
host-nation governments, and the UN. The code is self-policing; no one nongovernmental organization is
going to force another to act in a certain way. There is, as yet, no international association for disaster-
response nongovernmental organizations that possesses any authority to sanction its members. See
table E-1.

Table E-1. The code of conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent
Movement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Humanitarian imperative comes first.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Aid is given regardless of the race, creed or nationality of the recipients and without adverse
| distinction of any kind. Aid priorities are calculated on the basis of need alone. |
| Aid will not be used to further a particular political or religious standpoint. |
| We shall endeavor not to act as instruments of government foreign policy. |
| We shall respect culture and custom. |
| We shall attempt to build disaster response on local capacities. |
| Ways shall be found to involve program beneficiaries in the management of relief aid. |
| Relief aid must strive to reduce future vulnerabilities to disaster as well as meeting basic needs. |
| We hold ourselves accountable to both those we seek to assist and those from whom we accept |
| resources. |
| In our information, publicity, and advertising activities, we shall recognize disaster victims as |
| dignified human beings, not hopeless objects. |

The Humanitarian Imperative Comes First

E-14. The right to receive humanitarian assistance, and to offer it, is a fundamental humanitarian principle
that all citizens of all countries should have. As part of the international community, the International Red
Cross and Red Crescent Movement recognizes its obligation to provide humanitarian assistance wherever
needed. Hence, to provide humanitarian assistance, organizations need unimpeded access to affected
populations. The prime motivation of the response of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent
Movement to disaster is to alleviate human suffering. It strives to help those least able to withstand the
stress caused by disaster. Giving humanitarian aid is not a partisan or political act and should not be
viewed as such.

Aid Is Given Regardless of Race, Creed, or Nationality

E-15. Aid priorities are calculated on need alone. Wherever possible, the International Red Cross and Red
Crescent Movement provides relief aid after thoroughly assessing the situation. It assesses the needs of the
disaster victims and the local capacities already in place to meet those needs. In all of its programs, the
Movement provides aid in proportion to the need. Human suffering must be alleviated whenever it is
found; life is as precious in one area as another. The Red Cross recognizes the crucial role women play in
disaster-prone communities. The Red Cross tries to support, not diminish, their role with its aid programs.
Implementing such a universal, impartial, and independent policy is effective only when relief
organizations have access to resources and all disaster victims. Only then can they provide equal relief.
Appendix E  
(Symposium Draft—NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION)

Aid Will Not Be Used to Further Certain Standpoints

E-16. Humanitarian aid will be given according to the need of individuals, families, and communities. The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement affirms that assistance will not depend on the recipients to adhere to political or religious opinions. The Movement will not tie the promise, delivery, or distribution of assistance to the embracing or acceptance of a particular political or religious creed.

Agents of Aid Shall Not Act as Instruments of Government Foreign Policy

E-17. Nongovernmental humanitarian assistance organizations are agencies that act independently from governments. They form their own policies and implementation strategies. They do not seek to implement the policy of any government, unless it coincides with their own independent policy. They never knowingly or through negligence allow themselves to be used to gather information. Information could be politically, militarily, or economically sensitive to governments or other bodies that may serve purposes other than those that are strictly humanitarian. Nongovernmental organizations that provide humanitarian assistance will not act as instruments of foreign policy of donor organizations. They will use the assistance received to respond to needs. This assistance is not driven by the need to use surpluses or by the donor’s political interest. Agents of aid value and promote the voluntary giving of labor and finances by individuals to support our work. To protect independence, agents of aid avoid depending on a single funding source.

Agents of Aid Shall Respect Culture and Custom

E-18. The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement tries to respect the culture, structures, and customs of the communities and countries in which the members work.

Agents of Aid Shall Attempt to Build Disaster Response on Local Capacities

E-19. All people and communities—even in disaster—possess capacities as well as vulnerabilities. Where possible, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement will strengthen these capacities by employing local staff, purchasing local materials, and trading with local companies. Where possible, these agents of aid will work through local, nongovernmental organizations providing humanitarian assistance as partners in planning and implementation; they will cooperate with local governments where appropriate. The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement will place a high priority on properly coordinating emergency responses. This is best accomplished within the countries concerned by those most directly involved in the relief operations. Such efforts should include representatives of the relevant UN bodies and of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.

Involve Program Beneficiaries in Managing Relief Aid

E-20. Disaster response assistance should never be forced on those needing assistance. Effective relief and lasting rehabilitation can best be achieved when the intended beneficiaries help to design, manage, and implement the assistance program. The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement strives to achieve full community participation in relief and rehabilitation programs.

Aid Must Strive to Reduce Future Vulnerabilities and Meet Basic Needs

E-21. All relief actions affect the prospects for long-term development, either positively or negatively. Recognizing this, the agents of aid strive to implement relief programs that actively reduce the beneficiaries’ vulnerability to future disasters and help create sustainable lifestyles. These agents pay particular attention to environmental concerns when designing and managing relief programs. The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement tries to minimize the negative impact of humanitarian assistance. The Movement tries to prevent the beneficiary from depending upon external aid for long time.

Agents of Aid Hold Themselves Accountable

E-22. The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement often acts as an institutional link between those who wish to assist and those who need assistance during disasters. The Movement therefore holds
itself accountable to both constituencies. All dealings with donors and beneficiaries are open and transparent. The agents of aid report on activities, both from a financial perspective and the perspective of effectiveness. They recognize they must appropriately monitor aid distributions and regularly assess the impact of disaster assistance. The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement openly reports on the impact of its work and the factors limiting or enhancing that impact. Relief programs are based on high standards of professionalism and expertise to minimize the wasting of valuable resources.

Agents of Aid Recognize Disaster Victims as Dignified Humans

E-23. Respect for the disaster victim as an equal partner in action should never be lost. In public information, the Red Cross portrays an objective image of the disaster situation. This image highlights the capacities and aspirations of disaster victims and not just their vulnerabilities and fears. While working with the media to enhance public response, the Red Cross does not allow external or internal demands for publicity to take precedence over the principle of maximizing overall relief assistance. These agents of aid avoid competing with other disaster response agencies for media coverage. In some situations, coverage may negatively affect the service provided to the beneficiaries or the security. Humanitarian response applies to men and women—both genders are humans to be helped equally. Bringing a gender perspective illuminates how gender inequalities, roles, responsibilities, and identities shape and influence vulnerabilities and capacities in a crisis. Men and women (individually and collectively) experience war, floods, earthquakes, and dislocation differently: they can have different priorities, responsibilities, and protection needs. They also can mobilize or draw on different resources to protect themselves, feed their families, or become leaders. To understand how a crisis affects communities and how communities can best respond, it is important to understand gender inequalities, relations, and identities.

OSLO GUIDELINES

E-24. The Oslo Guidelines were completed in 1994. They were the result of a collaborative effort of over 180 delegates from 45 nations and 25 organizations. These delegates drafted the Oslo Guidelines to establish a framework to formalize and improve the effectiveness and efficiency when using United Nations military and civil defense assets for international disaster relief operations.

HUMANITY

E-25. Human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found. Relief groups pay particular attention to the most vulnerable populations, such as children, women, and the elderly. The dignity and rights of all victims is respected and protected.

NEUTRALITY

E-26. Agents of aid provide humanitarian assistance without engaging in hostilities or taking sides in controversies of a political, religious, or ideological nature.

IMPARTIALITY

E-27. Agents of aid provide humanitarian assistance without discriminating as to ethnic origin, gender, nationality, political opinions, race, or religion. Relief of the suffering is guided solely by needs and priority is given to the most urgent cases of distress.

SOVEREIGNTY

E-28. The United Nations provides humanitarian assistance with full respect for the sovereignty of states. Agents of aid fully respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national unity of states in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. In this context, humanitarian assistance is provided with the consent of the affected country and in principle because of an appeal by the affected country.
MILITARY AND CIVIL DEFENSE ASSETS

E-29. As a matter of principle, the military and civil defense assets of forces will not be used to support United Nations humanitarian activities under certain conditions: the forces are perceived as belligerents or units are actively engaged in combat in the affected country or region. Military and civil defense assets should be seen as a tool complementing existing relief efforts by providing specific support to specific requirements.

THE INTERAGENCY STANDING COMMITTEE

E-30. The Interagency Standing Committee is the primary mechanism for interagency coordination of humanitarian assistance. It is a unique forum involving the key United Nations and non-United Nations humanitarian partners. The Interagency Standing Committee was established in June 1992 in response to United Nations General Assembly Resolution 46/182 on the strengthening of humanitarian assistance. All humanitarian action, including civil-military coordination for humanitarian purposes in complex emergencies, must be conducted in accordance with the overarching principles of humanity, neutrality, and impartiality. This section outlines these principles and concepts to follow when planning or undertaking civil-military coordination.

HUMANITY, NEUTRALITY, AND IMPARTIALITY

E-31. Any civil-military coordination must serve the prime humanitarian principle of humanity; human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found. In determining whether and to what extent humanitarian agencies should coordinate with military forces, one must consider the potential consequences or perceptions of too close an affiliation with the military. These affiliations might jeopardize the humanitarian principles of neutrality and impartiality.

E-32. The concept of nonallegiance is central to the principle of neutrality in humanitarian action; likewise, the idea of nondiscrimination is crucial to the principle of impartiality. However, humanitarian assistance means providing protection and assistance to populations in need. Pragmatically, it might include civil-military coordination. Even so, agents of aid must find the right balance between a pragmatic and a principled response so that coordination with the military would not compromise humanitarian imperatives.

HUMANITARIAN ACCESS TO VULNERABLE POPULATIONS

E-33. Humanitarian agencies must have access to all vulnerable populations in all areas of the complex emergency. They also must be able to negotiate such access with all parties to the conflict. Particular care must also be taken to ensure the sustainability of access. Coordination with the military to facilitate, secure and sustain, not hinder, humanitarian access.

PERCEPTION OF HUMANITARIAN ACTION

E-34. Delivering humanitarian assistance to all populations in need must be neutral and impartial. It must come without political or military conditions. Humanitarian staff avoids take sides in disputes or political positions. Such bias will harm the credibility and independence of humanitarian efforts in general. Any civil-military coordination must avoid jeopardizing the longstanding local network and trust that humanitarian agencies created and maintained.

NEEDS-BASED ASSISTANCE FREE OF DISCRIMINATION

E-35. Humanitarian assistance is provided based on needs of those affected, taking into account the local capacity already in place to meet those needs. The independent assessment and humanitarian assistance are given without adverse discrimination of any kind. Assistance is given regardless of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, social status, nationality, or political affiliation of the recipients. All populations in need receive aid in an equitable manner.
CIVILIAN-MILITARY DISTINCTION IN HUMANITARIAN ACTION

E-36. At all times, agents of aid clearly distinguish between combatants and noncombatants. They identify those actively engaged in hostilities and civilians and others who do not or no longer directly participate in the armed conflict. The latter group may include the sick, wounded, prisoners of war, and ex-combatants who are demobilized. International humanitarian law protects noncombatants by providing immunity from attack. Thus, humanitarian workers must never present themselves or their work as part of a military operation, and military personnel must refrain from presenting themselves as civilian humanitarian workers.

OPERATIONAL INDEPENDENCE OF HUMANITARIAN ACTION

E-37. In any civil-military coordination, humanitarian actors take the lead role in undertaking and directing humanitarian activities. The agents preserve independence of humanitarian action and decisionmaking both at the operational and policy levels. Humanitarian organizations do not implement tasks on behalf of the military nor represent or implement their policies. Basic requisites must not be impeded. These requisites can include freedom of movement for humanitarian staff, freedom to conduct independent assessments, freedom of selection of staff, freedom to identify beneficiaries of assistance based on their needs, or free flow of communications between humanitarian agencies as well as with the media.

SECURITY OF HUMANITARIAN PERSONNEL

E-38. Any perception that humanitarian actors are affiliated with the military could impact negatively on the security of humanitarian staff and their ability to access vulnerable populations. However, relief workers must identify the most expeditious, effective, and secure approach to ensure the delivery of vital assistance to vulnerable target populations. They balance this approach against the primary concern for ensuring staff safety. The decision to seek military-based security for humanitarian workers should be viewed as a last resort option when other staff security mechanisms are unavailable, inadequate, or inappropriate.

DO NO HARM

E-39. Considerations on civil-military coordination must be guided by a commitment to “do no harm.” Humanitarian agencies must ensure at the policy and operational levels that any potential civil-military coordination will not contribute to further the conflict nor harm or endanger the beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance.

RESPECT FOR INTERNATIONAL LEGAL INSTRUMENTS

E-40. Both relief workers and military forces must respect international humanitarian law as well as other international norms and regulations, including human rights instruments.

RESPECT FOR CULTURE AND CUSTOM

E-41. Agents of aid maintain respect and sensitivities for the culture, structures, and customs of the communities and countries. Where possible and to the extent feasible, they shall find ways to involve the intended beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance and local personnel in the design, management, and implementation of assistance, including in civil-military coordination.

CONSENT OF PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT

E-42. The risk of compromising humanitarian operations by cooperating with the military might be reduced if all parties to the conflict recognize, agree, or acknowledge in advance that humanitarian activities might necessitate civil-military coordination in certain exceptional circumstances. Negotiating such acceptance entails contacts with all levels in the chain of command.
OPTION OF LAST RESORT

E-43. Use of military assets, armed escorts, joint humanitarian-military operations and any other actions involving visible interaction with the military must be the option of last resort. Such actions may take place only when no comparable civilian alternative exists and only the use of military support can meet a critical humanitarian need.

AVOID RELIANCE ON THE MILITARY

E-44. Humanitarian agencies must avoid depending on resources or support provided by the military. Any resources or support provided by the military should be, at its onset, clearly limited in time and scale. Such support clearly shows an exit strategy element that defines how the function it undertakes could be undertaken by civilian personnel or means. Often resources provided by the military are only temporarily available. When higher priority military missions emerge, such support may be recalled at short notice and without any substitute support.

INTERACTION AND THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

E-45. InterAction is the largest coalition of U.S.-based international nongovernmental organizations focused on the world’s poor and most vulnerable people. Collectively, its members work in every developing country. Members meet people halfway in expanding opportunities and supporting gender equality in education, health care, agriculture, small business, and other areas.

RECOMMENDED GUIDELINES

E-46. The following guidelines facilitate InterAction between American forces and nongovernmental humanitarian agencies (NGHAs) belonging to InterAction. This latter group is engaged in humanitarian relief efforts in hostile or potentially hostile environments. These guidelines do not intend to show endorsement or approval by either party. Simply these guidelines recognize that military forces and NGHAs have often occupied the same space and will probably do so again. When they share space, both sides strive to follow these guidelines; they recognize that extreme circumstances or operational necessity may require deviation. When breaks from guidelines occur, agents of aid must make every effort to explain why they deviated.

E-47. Military forces use the following guidelines consistent with protection, mission accomplishment, and operational requirements:

- When conducting relief activities, military personnel wear uniforms or other distinctive clothing to avoid being mistaken for NGHA representatives. Military personnel do not display NGHA logos on any clothing, vehicles, or equipment. This does not preclude the appropriate use of symbols recognized under the law of war, such as a red cross. U.S. forces may use such symbols on military clothing, vehicles, and equipment when appropriate.
- Military personnel visits to NGHA sites are by prior arrangement.
- NGHA views on the bearing of arms within NGHA sites are respected.
- NGHAs have the option of meeting with military personnel outside military installations for information exchanges.
- Military forces do not describe NGHAs as “force multipliers” or “partners” of the military, or in any other fashion that could compromise their independence or their goal to be perceived by the population as independent.
- Military personnel and units avoid interfering with NGHA relief efforts directed toward segments of the civilian population that the military may regard as unfriendly.
- Military personnel and units respect the desire of NGHAs not to serve as implementing partners for the military in conducting relief activities. However, individual nongovernmental organizations may seek to cooperate with the military. In this case, such arrangements will be carried out while avoiding compromise of the security, safety, and independence of the NGHA community at large, NGHA representatives, or public perceptions of their independence.
E-48. For NGHAs, the following guidelines should be observed:

- NGHA personnel do not wear military-style clothing. NGHA personnel can wear protective gear, such as helmets and protective vests, provided that such items are distinguishable in color or appearance from military-issue items.
- Only NGHA liaison personnel—and not other NGHA staff—may travel in military vehicles.
- NGHAs do not co-locate facilities with facilities inhabited by military personnel.
- NGHAs use their own logos on clothing, vehicles, and buildings when security conditions permit.
- Except for liaison arrangements detailed in paragraphs E-52 through E-53, NGHAs minimize their activities at military bases and with military personnel in a manner that might compromise their independence.
- NGHAs may, as a last resort, request military protection for convoys delivering humanitarian assistance, take advantage of essential logistics support available only from the military, or accept evacuation assistance for medical treatment or to evacuate from a hostile environment. Providing such military support to NGHAs is not obligatory, but rests solely within the discretion of the military forces. Often it will be provided on a reimbursable basis in accordance with applicable U.S. law.
- NGHA personnel visits to military facilities or sites should be by prior arrangement.

E-49. The third recommended guideline deals with forms of coordination. Military forces and NGHA staff coordinate in a way to minimize the risk of confusion between military and NGHA roles in hostile or potentially hostile environments, subject to force protection, mission accomplishment, and operational security requirements. They follow these recommendations:

- NGHA liaison officers participate in unclassified security briefings conducted by the military forces.
- Military forces share unclassified information with the NGHA liaison officer on security conditions, operational sites, location of mines and unexploded explosive ordnance, humanitarian activities, and population movements.
- NGHA staff arranges liaisons with military commands prior to and during military operations to deconflict military and relief activities. Such liaisons include protecting humanitarian installations and personnel. It also includes informing military personnel of humanitarian relief objectives, modalities of operation, and the extent of prospective or ongoing civilian humanitarian relief efforts.
- Military forces provide assistance to NGHAs for humanitarian relief activities when civilian providers are unavailable or unable to do so. Often, such assistance is provided on a reimbursable basis in accordance with applicable U.S. law.

RECOMMENDED PROCESSES

E-50. The dialogue between NGHAs and military forces during contingency planning follows certain procedures. These procedures apply to Department of Defense relief operations in a hostile or potentially hostile environment:

- NGHAs engaged in humanitarian relief send a small number of liaison officers to the relevant regional command for discussions with the contingency planners responsible for designing relief operations.
- NGHAs engaged in humanitarian relief assign a small number of liaison officers to the relevant regional command. For example, one liaison was stationed at U.S. Central Command for six of the first twelve months of the war in Afghanistan, and one was in Kuwait City before U.S. forces entered Iraq in 2003.
- The relevant military planners, including but not limited to the civil affairs representatives of the relevant commander, meet with humanitarian relief NGHA liaison officers at a mutually agreed location.
E-51. NGHAs and military forces follow certain procedures to access assessments of humanitarian needs. U.S. military and NGHA representatives—

- Access NGHA and military assessments directly from a Department of Defense or other U.S. Government Web site.
- Access NGHA and military assessments through a nongovernmental organization serving in a coordination role and identifying a common Web site.

E-52. Certain procedures exist for NGHA liaison relationships with regional combatant commands engaged in planning for military operations in hostile or potentially hostile environments. The NGHA community provides the following:

- The NGHA liaison officer is physically located outside the military headquarters; if feasible, the officer is in proximity to it to facilitate daily contact.
- The NGHA liaison officer has appropriate access to senior-level officers within the regional combatant commander’s headquarters and meets with them as necessary and feasible.
- There is a two-way information flow. The NGHA liaison officer provides such details as NGHA capabilities, infrastructure, plans, and concerns. Military forces provide such details as minefields, unexploded explosive ordnance, other hazards to NGHAs, access to medical facilities, and evacuation plans.
- The NGHA liaison officer has the opportunity to brief military commanders on NGHA objectives, codes of conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and the nongovernmental organizations, the United Nations Interagency Standing Committee guidelines, and country-specific guidelines based on the IASC Guidelines, and, if desired, Sphere Project Minimum Standards. Military personnel have the opportunity to brief NGHAs, to the extent appropriate, on U.S. Government goals and policies, monitoring principles, and applicable laws and rules of engagement. Conversely, the ICRC will typically brief military commanders on the role and capabilities of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.
- The NGHA liaison officer could continue as a liaison to the combatant command headquarters even after a civil-military operations center or similar mechanism is established in country. Once this occurs, liaison officers of an individual NGHA can begin coordination in country through the civil-military operations center for civil-military liaison.

E-53. Possible organizations can serve as a bridge between NGHAs and military forces in the field. (In situations in which no actor exists to serve as a bridge, a U.S. military civil-military operations center can serve as a temporary liaison between NGHAs and military forces.) These organizations can include the U.S. Agency for International Development’s Office of Military Affairs, Department of State’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, and the United Nation’s humanitarian coordinator. The following are recommended procedures:

- If the U.S. Agency for International Development or the Department of State’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization agree to serve a liaison function, they should be prepared to work with NGHAs in addition to U.S. Government implementing partners.
- The United Nation’s humanitarian coordinators or representatives can act as liaisons because they normally would be responsible for working with all NGHAs and maintaining contact with the host-nation government or a successor regime. An exception to his practice is the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, which provides this function independently.
Appendix F

Provincial Reconstruction Teams

For the post-September 11 period, the chief issue for global politics will not be how to cut back on stateness but how to build it up. For individual societies and for the global community, the withering away of the state is not a prelude to utopia but to disaster. A critical issue facing poor countries is their inadequate level of institutional development. They do not need extensive states, but they do need strong and effective ones within the limited scope of necessary state functions.

Francis Fukuyama
State Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century

F-1. A provincial reconstruction team (PRT) is an interim civil-military organization designed to operate in an unstable or limited security province or area. The PRT is employed to improve stability using diplomatic, informational, military, and economic capabilities. A PRT alone will not stabilize an area. The combined military and civil efforts are designed to reduce conflict while developing the local institutions to take the lead in national governance, the provision of basic services, fostering economic development, and enforcement of rule of law.

PRINCIPLES OF PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS

F-2. The development community uses specific principles for reconstruction and development. The principles are tested through years of practical application and understanding of cultural and socioeconomic elements of the host nation (See appendix C). Understanding these principles enables the development officials to incorporate techniques, projects, and procedures effectively to improve economic and social conditions for the populace.

F-3. The development community improves the probability of success by applying the principles of reconstruction and development. Timely emphasis on the principles of reconstruction and development increases the opportunity for success and provides the flexibility to adapt to the changing conditions. This community assumes risk in projects and programs by failing to adhere to the principles. A PRT does not conduct military operations or directly assist host-nation military forces. The PRT assists the central ministries to distribute funds to respective provincial representatives for project implementation.

F-4. Provincial reconstruction teams aim to develop the infrastructure necessary for the Afghan and Iraqi people to succeed in a post-conflict environment. A PRT is an integral part of the long-term strategy to transition the functions of security, governance, and economics to the host-nation populace. A PRT serves as a combat multiplier for maneuver commanders engaged in governance and economics, as well as other critical lines of effort. The PRT also serves as a force multiplier for U.S. Government (USG) development agencies engaged across the reconstruction and stability sectors. A PRT assists local communities with reconciliation while strengthening the host-nation government and speeding the transition to self-reliance. To accomplish this mission, the PRT concentrates on three essential functions: governance, security, and reconstruction.

GOVERNANCE

F-5. The primary focus of a PRT in any area of operations is to improve the provincial government’s ability to provide democratic governance and essential services. Improving the provincial government is important given the decentralization of authority initiated by the Coalition Provisional Authority. For example, under Saddam Hussein’s regime, provincial officials received detailed directions from Baghdad. Under the current structure, provincial officials take initiatives without direct guidance from Baghdad.
F-6. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) contracts a three-person team of civilian specialists to provide training and technical assistance programs. The program aims to improve the efficiency of provincial governments by providing policy analysis, training, and technical assistance to national ministries, their provincial representatives, provincial governors, and provincial councils. The team of civilian specialists works directly with provincial officials to increase competence and efficiency. For example, they assist provincial council members with the conduct of meetings, budget development, and oversight of provincial government activities. The team also encourages transparency and popular participation by working with citizens’ and community organizations, hosting conferences, and promoting public forums.

F-7. The USAID team contains members with expertise in local government, financial management, and municipal planning. Up to 70 percent of the contracted staff members come from regional countries and include local professionals. Additional contracted experts are on call from regional offices. The USAID requires contract advisors speak the host-nation language and possess extensive professional experience. USAID-trained instructors present training programs based on professionally developed modules in the host-nation language. The training and technical assistance programs emphasize practical application with focus areas in computers, planning, public administration, and provision of public services.

SECURITY

F-8. The absence of security impacts the effectiveness of PRT operations and efforts to develop effective local governments. Provincial governors and other senior officials may be intimidated, threatened, and assassinated in limited or unsecure areas. Provincial councils may potentially reduce or eliminate regular meetings if security deteriorates. Additionally, provincial-level ministry representatives could become reluctant to attend work because of security concerns. PRT personnel and local officials may lose the ability to meet openly or visit provincial government centers and U.S. military installations in limited security environments. During security alerts, PRT civilian personnel may be restricted to base preventing interaction with host-nation counterparts. Unstable security situations limit PRT personnel from promoting economic development by counseling local officials, encouraging local leaders and business owners, and motivating outside investors.

F-9. The movement of PRT personnel with heavily armed military escorts contributes to the overall security presence and reassures citizens in the areas where they operate. However, the PRT does not conduct military operations, nor do they assist host-nation military forces. The only security role assigned to a PRT is force protection by providing armored vehicles and an advisor to escort PRT personnel to meetings with local officials. U.S. military assigned to escort civilian PRT members receive training in providing PRT civilian personnel protection under an agreement with the Department of State. The training is designed to reinforce understanding of escort responsibilities and to prevent endangerment to PRT civilian personnel. U.S. military escorting PRT personnel should not combine this responsibility with other missions. The problem of providing PRT civilian personnel with security is compounded by competing protection priorities preventing dedicated security teams in most situations limiting security teams to available personnel.

RECONSTRUCTION

F-10. The USAID representative of the PRT has the primary responsibility for developing the PRT economic development work plan including its assistance projects. The PRT emphasizes the construction of infrastructure including schools, clinics, community centers, and government buildings. The PRT also focuses on developing human capacity through training and advisory programs.

F-11. A PRT, such as those operating in Afghanistan and Iraq, receives $10 million in U.S. military Commander’s Emergency Response Program funding in addition to project funds from USAID programs. Funds and financing for micro-credit projects from the Commander’s Emergency Response Program are necessary to build host-nation capacity and strengthen the legitimacy of the governance. U.S. funds and other sources of outside funding are vital; however, host-nation governments should budget for the long-term financing of most projects. The PRT exists to encourage central ministries in distributing funds to provincial representatives for project implementation.
F-12. Provincial Reconstruction Development Committees (PRDCs) prioritize provincial development projects and ensure the necessary funding for economic progress. The PRDC was developed before the creation of the current PRT structure. The PRDC contains a USAID representative, civil affairs advisor, one or more PRT members, and host-nation officials. A PRDC develops a list of potential projects after consultation with the national ministries, provincial authorities, and local citizens. It aims to coordinate projects with both national and provincial development plans. The PRDC examines possible funding sources to determine how project funding will be provided.

F-13. The PRT provincial program manager (a Department of State employee) works with the PRDC to review projects and determine compliance with project funding guidelines. The PRT engineer technically reviews construction projects to determine feasibility. The list of projects is presented in a public forum to the provincial council for approval following PRDC deliberations. The list is presented to the host-nation coordination team. This team circulates the project list for final review and funding priority. A PRT has limited involvement in project implementation following project selection. See figure F-1.

Figure F-1. Example of provincial reconstruction team organization

STRUCTURE OF PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS

F-14. A typical PRT contains the following personnel: six Department of State personnel; three senior U.S. military officers and staff; twenty U.S. Army civil affairs advisors; one Department of Agriculture representative; one Department of Justice representative; three international contractors; two USAID representatives; and a military or contract security force (size depends on local conditions). The size and composition of a PRT varies based on operational area maturity, local circumstances, and U.S. agency capacity.

F-15. The PRT structure normally has sixty to ninety personnel. A PRT is intended to have the following complement of personnel:
Appendix F  
(Symposium Draft—NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION)

- PRT team leader.
- Deputy team leader.
- Multinational force liaison officer.
- Rule of law coordinator.
- Provincial action officer.
- Public diplomacy officer.
- Agricultural advisor.
- Engineer.
- Development officer.
- Governance team.
- Civil affairs team.
- Bilingual bicultural advisor.
- Military movement team or protective security detail (U.S. military or contract security force).

F-16. PRT civilian personnel normally serve twelve months, while civil affairs and other advisors may serve from six to nine months. Changes in personnel often result in changes in PRT objectives and programs. Ensuring continuity between redeploying personnel and new arrivals maintains project priorities and prevents unnecessary program termination and restart that expend time and resources and deprive the local populace.

STAFF FUNCTIONS

F-17. PRT operations differ depending on location, personnel, environment, and circumstances. PRT personnel perform specific tasks in support of reconstruction and stabilization.

F-18. The team leader is a senior U.S. foreign service officer. This leader represents the Department of State and chairs the executive steering committee responsible for establishing priorities and coordinating activities. The team leader is a civilian and does not command PRT military personnel who remain subordinate to the commander of multinational forces. The team leader meets with the provincial governor, the provincial council, mayors, tribal elders, and religious figures and is the primary contact with the host-nation coordination team and U.S. embassy officials. The team leader builds relationships with host-nation institutions and monitors logistic and administrative arrangement.

F-19. The deputy team leader is typically an Army lieutenant colonel who serves as the PRT chief of staff and executive officer. This officer manages daily operations, coordinates schedules, and liaises with the forward operating base commander on sustainment, transportation, and security. The deputy team leader is the senior representative of the commander of multinational forces and approves security for PRT convoys and offsite operations.

F-20. The multinational force liaison officer is a senior military officer responsible for coordinating PRT activities with the division and forward operating base commander. These include activities related to intelligence, route security, communication, and emergency response in case of attacks on convoys. The liaison officer tracks PRT movements and coordinates with other U.S. military units in the operational area.

F-21. The rule of law coordinator is a Department of Justice official responsible for monitoring and reporting the local government judicial system activities. The coordinator leads the rule of law team consisting of civil affairs and local government personnel. The rule of law visits judicial, police, and corrections officials and reports local conditions to the U.S. embassy. The rule of law coordinator advises the embassy on response measures to local government problems. This coordinator also provides advice and limited training to local government officials. The program emphasizes improvement of court administration, case management, protection of judicial personnel, training of judges, and promotion of legal education. Rule of law officers meet with corrections officials and monitor and report on prison conditions and the treatment of prisoners. However, in the Iraq the Multi-National Security Transition Command—Iraq case, this officer manages training and assistance for police, courts, and prisons without reference to a PRT.
F-22. The provincial action officer is a Department of State foreign service representative and primary reporting officer. This officer meets with local authorities and reports daily to U.S. embassy officials on PRT activities, weekly summaries, analysis of local political and economic developments, and meetings with local officials and private citizens. The provincial action officer assists others in the PRT with promoting local governance. Political and economic reporting by the PRT Department of State officers provides firsthand information on conditions outside of forward operating base.

F-23. The public diplomacy officer is a Department of State foreign service officer. This officer is responsible for press relations, public affairs programming, and public outreach through meetings between the PRT and local officials. The public diplomacy officer also escorts visitors to the PRT and its operational area.

F-24. The agricultural advisor is a representative of the Department of Agriculture. The agricultural advisor works with provincial authorities to develop agricultural assistance programs and promote agriculture-related industries. The agricultural advisor is a volunteer representative recruited from each agency of the Department of Agriculture to serve one-year tours. The Department of Agriculture tries to match its personnel specialties to the specific needs of each PRT.

F-25. The engineer is a representative of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. The engineer trains and advises host-nation engineers working on provincial development projects. The engineer assists the PRT Provincial Reconstruction Development Committee with project assessments, designing scope-of-work statements for contracts with local companies, site supervision, and project management. The engineer advises the team leader on reconstruction projects and development activities in the province.

F-26. The development officer is a USAID representative. The development officer coordinates USAID assistance and training programs and works with provincial authorities to promote economic and infrastructure development. This officer coordinates development-related activities within the PRT and supervises locally hired USAID staff.

F-27. The governance team is under a USAID contract. Currently, RTI International provides a three-person team that offers training and technical advice to members of provincial councils and provincial administrators. These small teams aim to improve the operation, efficiency, and effectiveness of provincial governments. The team provides hands-on training in the provision of public services, finance, accounting, and personnel management. RTI International personnel take guidance from the USAID representative but function under a national contract administered from the U.S. embassy. RTI International maintains offices (nodes) in major cities that can provide additional specialists on request.

F-28. The civil affairs team represents the largest component of the PRT with Army civil affairs advisor performing tasks across each area of PRT operations. Civil affairs advisors are mostly military reserve personnel on temporary duty and represent a broad range of civilian occupations. The PRT makes special efforts to use these personnel in areas where their civilian specialties apply. For example, a civil affairs reservist who is a police officer in civilian life will be assigned to the PRT rule of law team.

F-29. The bilingual bicultural advisor is typically a host-nation expatriate with U.S. or coalition citizenship under contract to the Department of Defense. The bilingual bicultural advisor serves as a primary contact with provincial government officials and local citizens. The bilingual bicultural advisor advises other PRT members on local culture, politics, and social issues. Advisors must possess a college degree and speak both English and the indigenous language within the respective operational area.

OPERATIONS

F-30. A PRT resides at a forward operating base and operates within a brigade combat team’s operational area. A PRT relies on the maneuver unit capabilities for security, transport, and sustainment. The brigade combat team provides available military assets to the PRT under an agreement between the U.S. embassy and the multination force. The military assets and personnel enable convoy movements for PRT personnel.

F-31. Security operations are not a Department of State capability. Normally military forces take the lead while operating in the current post-conflict environment characterized by continuing violence. For example, in Iraq, the U.S. military is in charge of operations and the PRT is embedded within the brigade.
Appendix F
(Symposium Draft—NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION)

combat team operational area. The PRT maintains its primary functions—governance, security, and reconstruction—as a Department of State competency. In Afghanistan, a PRT is led by U.S. military officers. The Department of State and other civilian agencies have an essential role in the operation of the PRT, but military leadership provides unity of command.

F-32. The PRT should possess a clear concept of operations, objectives, and guidelines following a period of experimentation. This effort must include a delineation of civil-military command authority within a PRT, including the supervision of contractors. These measures should also be coordinated with our coalition partners so they are consistent with the operational concepts that govern the PRT.

F-33. Priority assignments and specialized training should replace volunteering and on-the-job learning. A PRT often operates in stressful, uncertain, and dangerous environments. PRT assignments should contain officers with the proper rank and experience. This applies to USAID and other civilian agencies. Employing retirees, junior officers, or civil affairs advisors as substitutes for civilian experts limits competence and reduces effectiveness. Contractors are not designed to permanently replace federal representative, despite training or level of expertise. A PRT requires federal employees with an understanding of federal agency function and knowledge of requirements necessary to influence and deliver project results. Junior officers bring energy and enthusiasm but may not have the same impact as veteran government employees, especially in the area of language skill, social and cultural expertise.

SUMMARY

F-34. A PRT is an essential part of a long-term strategy to transition the functions of security, governance, and economics to provincial governments. The PRT is a potential combat multiplier for maneuver commanders performing governance and economics functions. The PRT provides expertise to programs designed to strengthen infrastructure and the perception of local governments. The PRT uses the Principles of Reconstruction and Development build host-nation capacity while speeding the transition of security, rule of law, and economic development to the control of the host nation.
Appendix G

Summary of Changes

This appendix is under development.

SUMMARY OF MAJOR CHANGES

G-1. The following paragraphs summarize the major doctrinal changes made by this field manual.

CHAPTER 1 – THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT

G-2. Chapter 1 makes the following changes:
   - Prescribes the term **fragile states** to encompass broad spectrum of recovering, failing, and failed states.
   - Establishes **legitimacy**, **capacity building**, and **conflict transformation** as the guiding principles fundamental to any successful intervention that coordinates and integrates the efforts of a diverse array of actors in a stability operation.
   - Prescribes the term **capacity building** as the overarching term for processes that aim to build host nation capacity in stability operations.
   - Prescribes the term **conflict transformation** as the overarching term for unified action to change the conditions of a fragile state to those of enduring peace and stability.
   - Prescribes the term **governance** to account for the rules, processes, and behavior by which interests are articulated, resources are managed, and power is exercised in a society.

CHAPTER 2 – STABILITY IN FULL SPECTRUM OPERATIONS

G-3. Chapter 2 makes the following changes:
   - Introduces the **failed states spectrum** to define engagement and intervention activities in terms of the progress toward stabilizing the operational environment.
   - Introduces the **stability operations framework** to link Army stability operations with joint and interagency approaches. This framework uses the failed states spectrum to define the operational environment and the conditions within the host nation, the task methodology adopted by the Department of State, and the Department of Defense definition for stability operations, to establish a single, integrated framework for the conduct of stability operations.
   - Uses a **whole of government approach** as a means to describe how military forces, other government agencies, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector collaborate within an environment of unified action to achieve success in stability operations.
   - Describes how full spectrum operations support a whole of government approach in stability operations.

CHAPTER 3 – ESSENTIAL STABILITY TASKS

G-4. Chapter 3 makes the following changes:
   - Addresses **essential stability tasks** in terms of those always performed by military forces, those military forces must be prepared to perform, and those best performed by civilians with the appropriate level of expertise. This discussion further defines these terms according to their
likely execution horizon according to the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization essential stability task matrix.

- Establishes stability-focused core and directed mission-essential task lists for corps-, division-, and brigade-level organizations.

**CHAPTER 4 – PLANNING FOR STABILITY OPERATIONS**

G-5. Chapter 4 makes the following changes:

- Describes how leader and Soldier engagement helps to developing understanding.
- Expands on the discussion of stability mechanisms from capstone doctrine and describes how those mechanisms are combined with defeat mechanisms to produce a decisive effect in the operational environment.
- Describes how lines of effort are used at different echelons to focus the constructive capabilities of the force to achieve the broad objectives and conditions established for a stability operation.
- Introduces a discussion of transitions that is expanded upon to include the opportunity and risk associated with transitions among military forces, civilian agencies and organizations, and the host nation.

**CHAPTER 5 – TRANSITIONAL MILITARY AUTHORITY**

G-6. Chapter 5 makes the following changes:

- Describes how transitional military authority provides the basic civil functions of the host-nation government when the host nation no longer is capable of providing those functions.
- Introduces doctrine for transitional military authority that provides the principles and fundamentals necessary for military commanders to provide government capability in the absence of a host-nation government.
- Provides guidelines for transitional military authority to ensure such authority is provided according to the Hague and Geneva Conventions.

**CHAPTER 6 – SECURITY SECTOR REFORM**

G-7. Chapter 6 makes the following changes:

- Prescribes the term security sector reform as the overarching definition for efforts to establish or reform the individuals and institutions that provide for the safety and security of the host nation and its people.
- Introduces the security sector reform as a fundamental component of stability operations that combines subordinate tasks from the primary stability tasks. It includes guiding principles and foundations for security sector reform that help to coordinate the efforts the wide array of actors involved.
- Prescribes the term security force assistance to encompass efforts to organize, train, equip, rebuild, and advise host-nation security forces.
- Introduces disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration as a necessary precursor to security sector reform.
- Prescribes the terms disarmament for the collection, documentation, control, and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives, and light and heavy weapons of former combatants, belligerents, and the local populace; demobilization as the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups; and reintegration as the process through which former combatants and belligerents acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income.
APPENDIX A – INTERAGENCY, INTERGOVERNMENTAL, AND NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN STABILITY OPERATIONS

G-8. Appendix A describes the roles and responsibilities of the various agencies and organizations involved in most stability operations. It also addresses the critical role of civil affairs forces in providing liaison and coordination among these groups.

APPENDIX B – INTERAGENCY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

G-9. Appendix B provides a brief overview of the Interagency Management System, an interagency initiative that will provide other agencies of the United States government with the expeditionary and campaign capabilities to provide initial response and sustained support to reconstruction and stabilization operations.

APPENDIX C – USG PRINCIPLES FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND STABILIZATION

G-10. Appendix C describes the fundamental principles for reconstruction and stabilization observed by the other agencies of the government.

APPENDIX D – TACTICAL CONFLICT ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK

G-11. Appendix D describes the tactical conflict assessment framework established by the United States Agency for International Development and in wide use by other organizations and agencies.

APPENDIX E – HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE PRINCIPLES

G-12. Appendix E outlines the humanitarian response principles adopted and observed by most nongovernmental organizations. These principles inform military understanding with respect to these organizations and help to establish a cooperative environment when conducting operations in areas where such organizations are already present.

APPENDIX F – PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS

G-13. Appendix F provides an overview of provincial reconstruction teams and describes how their efforts can support and complement the broader efforts of the military force.

TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

G-14. Table G-1 lists changes to terms for which FM 3-07 is the proponent field manual. Army terms that also have a joint definition are followed by (Army). Terms for which the Army and Marine Corps have agreed on a common definition are followed by (Army-Marine Corps).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table G-1. New Army terms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>capacity building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conflict transformation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>demobilization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disarmament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fragile states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>security force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>security sector reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>assistance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Glossary

The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army, multi-Service, or joint definitions, and other selected terms. Where Army and joint definitions are different, (Army) follows the term. Terms for which FM 3-07 is the proponent manual (the authority) are marked with an asterisk (*). The proponent manual for other terms is listed in parentheses after the definition. Terms for which the Army and Marine Corps have agreed on a common definition are followed by (Army-Marine Corps).

SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJCSI</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJCSM</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMOC</td>
<td>civil-military operations center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DODD</td>
<td>Department of Defense directive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM</td>
<td>field manual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HACC</td>
<td>humanitarian assistance coordination center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGO</td>
<td>intergovernmental organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMS</td>
<td>Interagency Management System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JP</td>
<td>joint publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>METL</td>
<td>mission-essential task list</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>METT-TC</td>
<td>mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations (See METT-TC under terms)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGHA</td>
<td>nongovernmental humanitarian agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>nongovernmental organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSPD</td>
<td>national security Presidential directive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAO</td>
<td>public affairs officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRDC</td>
<td>Provincial Reconstruction Development Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRT</td>
<td>provincial reconstruction team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSO</td>
<td>regional security officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAO</td>
<td>security assistance organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/CRS</td>
<td>Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFA</td>
<td>security forces assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>security sector reform</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SWEAT-MSO  sewage, water, electricity, academics, trash, medical, safety, and other considerations

UJTL  Universal Joint Task List

UN  United Nations

UNDPKO  United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations

UNSG  United Nations Secretary General

U.S.  United States

USACE  United States Army Corps of Engineers

USAID  United States Agency for International Development

USDR  United States defense representative

USG  United States Government

**SECTION II – TERMS**

**adversary**

(joint) A party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against which the use of force may be envisaged. (JP 3-0)

**alliance**

(joint) The relationship that results from a formal agreement (for example, a treaty) between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members. (JP 3-0)

**area of operations**

(joint) An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and maritime forces. Areas of operation do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the joint force commander, but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. (JP 3-0)

**assessment**

(Army) The continuous monitoring and evaluation of the current situation and progress of an operation. (FM 3-0)

**branch**

(joint) The contingency options built into the base plan. A branch is used for changing the mission, orientation, or direction of movement of a force to aid success of the operation based on anticipated events, opportunities, or disruptions caused by enemy actions and reactions. (JP 5-0)

**campaign**

(joint) A series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space. (JP 5-0)

**capacity building**

The process of creating an environment, supported by appropriate policy and legal frameworks, that fosters institutional development, community participation, human resources development, and the strengthening of managerial systems.

**civil affairs operations**

Those military operations planned, supported, executed, or transitioned by civil affairs forces through, with, or by the indigenous population and institutions, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, or other government agencies to modify behaviors, to mitigate or defeat threats to civil society, and to assist in establishing the capacity for deterring or defeating future civil threats in support of civil-military operations or other United States objectives. (FM 3-05.40)
coalition
(joint) An ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action. (JP 5-0)

combat power
(Army) The total means of destructive and/or disruptive force which a military unit/formation can apply against the opponent at a given time. Army forces generate combat power by converting fighting potential into effective action. Combat power includes a unit’s constructive and information capabilities as well as its disruptive and destructive force. (FM 3-0)

command
(joint) That authority that a commander in the armed forces lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. It also includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale, and discipline of assigned personnel. (JP 1)

command and control
(Army) The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of a mission. Commanders perform command and control functions through a command and control system. (FM 6-0)

command and control system
(Army) The arrangement of personnel, information management, procedures, and equipment and facilities essential for the commander to conduct operations. (FM 6-0)

commander’s intent
(Army) A clear, concise statement of what the force must do and the conditions the force must establish with respect to the enemy, terrain, and civil considerations that represent the desired end state. (FM 3-0)

commander’s visualization
The mental process of developing situational understanding, determining a desired end state, and envisioning the broad sequence of events by which the force will achieve that end state. (FM 3-0)

compel
To use, or threaten to use, lethal force to establish control and dominance, effect behavioral change, or enforce compliance with mandates, agreements, or civil authority. (FM 3-0)

concept of operations
(Army) A statement that directs the manner in which subordinate units cooperate to accomplish the mission and establishes the sequence of actions the force will use to achieve the end state. It is normally expressed in terms of decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations. (FM 3-0)

conduct
To perform the activities of the operations process: planning, preparing, executing, and continuously assessing. (FM 6-0)

*conflict transformation
The process used to change conflicts fundamentally to achieve peaceful outcomes.

control
(Army) 1. In the context of command and control, the regulation of forces and warfighting functions to accomplish the mission in accordance with the commander’s intent. (FM 3-0) 2. A tactical mission task that requires the commander to maintain physical influence over a specified area to prevent its use by an enemy. (FM 3-90) 3. An action taken to eliminate a hazard or reduce its risk. (FM 5-19) *4. In the context of stability mechanisms, to impose civil order. (FM 3-0)
Glossary
(Symposium Draft—NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION)

country team
The senior, in-country, U.S. coordinating and supervising body, headed by the chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each represented U.S. department or agency, as desired by the chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission. (JP 3-07.4)

*crisis state
A nation in which the central government does not exert effective control over its own territory. It is unable or unwilling to assure the provision of security and essential services to significant portions of the population.

decisive operation
The operation that directly accomplishes the mission. It determines the outcome of a major operation, battle, or engagement. The decisive operation is the focal point around which commanders design the entire operation. (FM 3-0)

decisive point
(joint) A geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contribute materially to achieving success. (JP 3-0) [Note: In this context, adversary also refers to enemies.]

defeat mechanism
The method through which friendly forces accomplish their mission against enemy opposition. (FM 3-0)

defensive operations
Combat operations conducted to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces, and develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability operations. (FM 3-0)

*demobilization
(Army) The formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups.

depth
The extension of operations in time, space, and resources. (FM 3-0)

destroy
1. In the context of defeat mechanisms, to apply lethal combat power on an enemy capability so that it can no longer perform any function and cannot be restored to a usable condition without being entirely rebuilt. (FM 3-0) 2. A tactical mission task that physically renders an enemy force combat-ineffective until it is reconstituted. (FM 3-0)

*disarmament
(Army) The collection, documentation, control, and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives, and light and heavy weapons of former combatants, belligerents, and the local populace.

disintegrate
To disrupt the enemy’s command and control system, degrading the ability to conduct operations while leading to a rapid collapse of enemy capabilities or the will to fight. (FM 3-0)

dislocate
To employ forces to obtain significant positional advantage, rendering the enemy’s dispositions less valuable, perhaps even irrelevant. (FM 3-0)

depend state
(joint) The set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commander’s objectives. (JP 3-0)

enemy
A party identified as hostile against which the use of force is authorized. (FM 3-0)
engagement  
(joint) A tactical conflict, usually between opposing, lower echelon maneuver forces. (JP 1-02)

execution  
Putting a plan into action by applying combat power to accomplish the mission and using situational understanding to assess progress and make execution and adjustment decisions. (FM 3-0)

force protection  
(joint) Preventive measures taken to mitigate hostile actions against Department of Defense personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. Force protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or disease. (JP 3-0)

forward operating base  
(Army) An area used to support tactical operations without establishing full support facilities. (FM 3-0)

*fragile state  
Nation that suffer from institutional weaknesses serious enough to threaten the viability of the central government.

*governance  
The state’s ability to serve the citizens, including to the rules, processes, and behavior by which interests are articulated, resources are managed, and power is exercised in a society, as well as the representative participatory processes typically guaranteed under inclusive, constitutional governance.

influence  
In the context of stability mechanisms, to alter the opinions and attitudes of a civilian population through information engagement, presence, and conduct. (FM 3-0)

information engagement  
The integrated employment of public affairs to inform U.S. and friendly audiences; psychological operations, combat camera, U.S. Government strategic communication and defense support to public diplomacy, and other means necessary to influence foreign audiences; and, leader and Soldier engagements to support both efforts. (FM 3-0)

infrastructure reconnaissance  
A multidiscipline variant of reconnaissance to collect technical information on various categories of the public systems, services, and facilities of a country or region. This task may take the form of either an assessment or a survey and develops the situational understanding of the local capability to support the infrastructure requirements of the local populace and/or military operations within a specific area. (FM 3-34.170)

insurgency  
An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict. (JP 3-05)

intelligence  
(joint) The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas. Intelligence is also the information and knowledge about an adversary obtained through observation, investigation, analysis, or understanding. (JP 2-0)

interagency  
(joint) United States Government agencies and departments, including the Department of Defense. (JP 3-08)
interagency coordination
(joint) Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense and engaged U.S. Government agencies for the purpose of achieving an objective. (JP 3-0)

intergovernmental organization
(joint) An organization created by a formal agreement (e.g., a treaty) between two or more governments. It may be established on a global, regional, or functional basis for wide-ranging or narrowly defined purposes. Formed to protect and promote national interests shared by member states. Examples include the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the African Union. Also called IGO. (JP 3-08)

isolate
In the context of defeat mechanisms, to deny an enemy or adversary access to capabilities that enable the exercise of coercion, influence, potential advantage, and freedom of action. (FM 3-0)

leadership
The process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation, while operating to accomplish the mission and improving the organization. (FM 6-22)

maneuver
(joint) The employment of forces in the operational area through movement in combination with fires to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission. (JP 3-0)

METT-TC
A memory aid used in two contexts: 1. In the context of information management, the major subject categories into which relevant information is grouped for military operations: mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations. (FM 6-0) 2. In the context of tactics, major variables considered during mission analysis (mission variables). (FM 3-90)

mission
(joint) The task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason therefor. (JP 1-02)

multinational operations
(joint) A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance. (JP 3-16)

neutral
(Army) A party identified as neither supporting nor opposing friendly or enemy forces. (FM 3-0)

noncombatant evacuation operations
(joint) Operations directed by the Department of State or other appropriate authority, in conjunction with the Department of Defense, whereby noncombatants are evacuated from foreign countries when their lives are endangered by war, civil unrest, or natural disaster to safe havens or to the United States. (JP 3-0)

nongovernmental organization
(joint) A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. Also called NGO. (JP 3-08)

offensive operations
Combat operations conducted to defeat and destroy enemy forces and seize terrain, resources, and population centers. They impose the commander’s will on the enemy. (FM 3-0)

operational approach
The manner in which a commander contends with a center of gravity. (FM 3-0)
operational area
(joint) An overarching term encompassing more descriptive terms for geographic areas in which military operations are conducted. Operational areas include, but are not limited to, such descriptors as area of responsibility, theater of war, theater of operations, joint operations area, amphibious objective area, joint special operations area, and area of operations. (JP 3-0)

operational environment
(joint) A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. (JP 3-0)

operational theme
The character of the dominant major operation being conducted at any time within a land force commander’s area of operations. (FM 3-0)

operations process
The major command and control activities performed during operations: planning, preparing, executing, and continuously assessing the operation. The commander drives the operations process. (FM 3-0)

peacekeeping
(joint) Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (ceasefire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. (JP 3-07.3)

peace operations
(joint) A broad term that encompasses multiagency and multinational crisis response and limited contingency operations involving all instruments of national power with military missions to contain conflict, redress the peace, and shape the environment to support reconciliation and rebuilding and facilitate the transition to legitimate governance. Peace operations include peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peacemaking, peace building, and conflict prevention efforts. (JP 3-07.3)

peacetime military engagement
All military activities that involve other nations and are intended to shape the security environment in peacetime. It includes programs and exercises that the United States military conducts with other nations to shape the international environment, improve mutual understanding, and improve interoperability with treaty partners or potential coalition partners. Peacetime military engagement activities are designed to support a combatant commander’s objectives within the theater security cooperation plan. (FM 3-0)

phase
(Army) A planning and execution tool used to divide an operation in duration or activity. A change in phase usually involves a change of mission, task organization, or rules of engagement. Phasing helps in planning and controlling and may be indicated by time, distance, terrain, or an event. (FM 3-0)

plan
A design for a future or anticipated operation. (FM 5-0)

planning
The process by which commanders (and the staff, if available) translate the commander’s visualization into a specific course of action for preparation and execution, focusing on the expected results. (FM 3-0)

preparation
Activities performed by units to improve their ability to execute an operation. Preparation includes, but is not limited to, plan refinement; rehearsals; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; coordination; inspections; and movement. (FM 3-0)
protection
(joint) 1. Preservation of the effectiveness and survivability of mission-related military and nonmilitary personnel, equipment, facilities, information, and infrastructure deployed or located within or outside the boundaries of a given operational area. 2. Measures that are taken to keep nuclear, biological, and chemical hazards from having an adverse effect on personnel, equipment, or critical assets and facilities. Protection consists of five groups of activities: hardening of positions; protecting personnel; assuming mission-oriented protective posture; using physical defense measures; and reacting to attack. 3. In space usage, active and passive defensive measures to ensure that United States and friendly space systems perform as designed by seeking to overcome an adversary's attempts to negate them and to minimize damage if negation is attempted. (JP 3-0)

refugee
(joint) A person who, by reason of real or imagined danger, has left their home country or country of their nationality and is unwilling or unable to return. (JP 3-07.6)

*reintegration
The process through which former combatants and belligerents acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income.

*rule of law
The principle under which all persons, institutions, and entities, public and private, including the state itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced, and independently adjudicated, and that are consistent with international human rights principles.

rules of engagement
(joint) Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. (JP 1-02)

*security force assistance
The unified action of the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational community to generate, employ, sustain, and assist host-nation or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority.

*security sector reform
The reestablishment or reform of the institutions and key ministerial positions that maintain and provide oversight for the safety and security of the host nation and its people.

sequel
(joint) In a campaign, a major operation that follows the current major operation. In a single major operation, a sequel is the next phase. Plans for a sequel are based on the possible outcomes (success, stalemate, or defeat) associated with the current operation. (JP 5-0)

stability mechanism
The primary method through which friendly forces affect civilians in order to attain conditions that support establishing a lasting, stable peace. (FM 3-0)

stability operations
(joint) An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (JP 3-0)

support
(joint) The action of a force that aids, protects, complements, or sustains another force in accordance with a directive requiring such action. (JP 1) (Army) In the context of stability mechanisms, to establish, reinforce, or set the conditions necessary for the other instruments of national power to function effectively. (FM 3-0)
synchronization
(joint) The arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time. (JP 2-0)

system
(joint) A functionally, physically, and/or behaviorally related group of regularly interacting or interdependent elements; that group of elements forming a unified whole. (JP 3-0)

unified action
(joint) The synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. (JP 1)

unity of effort
(joint) Coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization—the product of successful unified action. (JP 1)

*vulnerable state
A nation either unable or unwilling to provide adequate security and essential services to significant portions of the population.
References

Field manuals and selected joint publications are listed by new number followed by old number.

REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS
These documents must be available to intended users of this publication.


RELATED PUBLICATIONS
These documents contain relevant supplemental information.

JOINT AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PUBLICATIONS
Most joint publications are available online: <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jpcapstonepubs.htm>.

CJCSI 5120.02A
CJCSM 3500.03A
Department of State publication, Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Task.
DODD 5105.65. DOD Executive Agent for Joint Urban Operations. 31 March 2004.
DODD 5132.3. DOD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Assistance. 10 March 1981 (incorporating Change 1, 16 November 1994).

JP 2-0. Joint Intelligence. 22 June 2007.


National Security Decision Memorandum 3. The Direction, Coordination, and Supervision of Interdepartmental Activities Overseas.
References
(Symposium Draft—NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION)


Title 22 U.S. Code, section 3901.

ARMY PUBLICATIONS

Most Army doctrinal publications are available online: <http://www.army.mil/usapa/doctrine/Active_FM.html>. Army regulations are produced only in electronic media. Most are available online: <http://www.army.mil/usapa/epubs/index.html>.

FM 3-0. Operations. 27 February 2008.


FM 5-0 (101-5). Army Planning and Orders Production. 20 January 2005.

FM 6-0. Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces. 11 August 2003.

FM 7-0 (25-100). Training the Force. 22 October 2002.


FM 46-1. Public Affairs Operations. 30 May 1997. (When revised, FM 46-1 will be republished as FM 3-61.)

OTHER PUBLICATIONS

Allied Joint Publication 3.2, Doctrine for Land Operations.


The Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups


http://www.reliefweb.int/ocha_ol/about/resol/resol_e.html

UN Charter.

WEB SITES

United Nations Department of Public Information Nongovernmental Organization Web site.

REFERENCES

These sources are quoted or paraphrased in this publication.


Hart, Captain Sir basil Liddell. Thoughts on War. 1944.


The Ordinance for the Regulation of Indian Affairs.


Stephenson, James. Losing the Golden Hour.
## Index (Chapter Title)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>F</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>S</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>first, 1-1</td>
<td>main, 1-1</td>
<td>second, 1-1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>